Testimony
of Paul E. Simons, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Hearing of the House Government
Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources,
July 9, 2003
U.S. Department
of State
Disrupting
the Market: Strategy, Implementation, and Results in Narcotics Source
Countries
Paul E.
Simons, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs
Testimony Before the House Committee on Government Reform
Washington, DC
July 9, 2003
Mr. Chairman
and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to meet
with you today to discuss how the Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement (INL) at the Department of State is contributing
to efforts to disrupt the market in key narcotics source countries.
The INL
Bureau directly supports the National Drug Control Strategy and its
orchestration of United States Government (USG) efforts to reduce the
availability of illicit drugs in our country. Specifically, we actively
support supply reduction programs through direct assistance programs,
as well as multilateral and diplomatic efforts conducted in cooperation
with other departments and agencies of our government. Prominent among
our programs are those that support the national strategy of reducing
the production and trafficking of drugs in the principal source countries.
The major
foreign-produced illicit drugs significantly affecting the United States
are cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and synthetics such as methamphetamine
or Ecstasy. The source areas for these threats include the Western Hemisphere
principally the Andean Ridge (cocaine, heroin), Asia (heroin), Europe
(synthetics), and Mexico (heroin, methamphetamine/synthetics and marijuana).
Following is a summary discussion of INL-managed and/or supported programs
around the world in support of the National Drug Control Strategy to
reduce the supply of illicit drugs from key source areas.
Our programs
are comprehensive both in geographic reach and in scope of attack. They
are critical to the success of the U.S. and international effort to
demonstrate that illegal drug production can be controlled and reduced
given sufficient political will and well-designed, fully funded programs.
INL protects Americans by fighting the illegal drug trade through a
variety of means: direct eradication of illicit crops, support for alternative
livelihoods of poor cultivators, training and equipping of anti-drug
police forces in partner countries, counternarcotics intelligence coordination
and interdiction, justice sector reform, support for demand reduction
and education in host countries, and strengthening of international
and multilateral cooperation in law enforcement. These programs are
expensive, but demonstrably effective.
Mr. Chairman
and Members of the Committee, we need your support to ensure full funding
of these essential activities. I look forward to answering your questions.
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
The Administration
has requested $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative for
FY 2004. Full funding of this request is critical to sustaining our
success in Colombia and to protecting Colombia's neighbors from a spillover
effect. Our efforts in Colombia are making a difference, and we should
not let up now.
Colombia
Market
disruption in Colombia involves an aggressive combination of eradication,
interdiction, institution building, and alternative development programs.
Last year (2002) was a banner year for counternarcotics efforts in Colombia,
the source of more than 90 percent of the cocaine and most of the heroin
entering the United States. For the first time since drug cultivation
began increasing in the mid-1990s, overall coca cultivation declined
and by over 15 percent. Opium poppy cultivation also declined by 25
percent from 2001 levels. Cultivation in the key coca growing provinces
of Putumayo and Caqueta declined by more than 50 percent. Consequently,
potential production of Colombian cocaine dropped to 680 metric tons
of cocaine, down from 795 metric tons in 2001, and potential production
of Colombian heroin dropped to 11.3 metric tons, down from 15.1 metric
tons in 2001.
These declines
are the direct result of the robust U.S.-assisted aerial eradication
program, which sprayed over 122,000 hectares of coca in 2002, a 45 percent
increase over 2001, itself a record year. In addition, the spray program
destroyed more than 3,000 hectares of opium poppy, a 67 percent increase
over 2001. With this year's delivery of the final spray airplanes procured
with funds appropriated in support of Plan Colombia, Colombia plans
to accelerate the pace of aerial eradication of both coca and opium
poppy in 2003 and beyond. During the first six months of this year,
we sprayed 73,522 hectares of coca and 1,658 hectares of opium poppy,
compared to the first six months of last year that yielded 53,717 hectares
of coca and 1,837 hectares of opium poppy. We plan to spray all coca
and opium poppy in Colombia by the end of the year.
On the
interdiction side in 2002, Colombian military and police counterdrug
forces destroyed 129 cocaine-processing labs and nearly 1,247 cocaine
base labs while seizing more than 55 metric tons of cocaine and 30 metric
tons of coca base.
However,
Colombia faces several significant challenges to its counternarcotics
efforts. In Colombia, the drug trade has a clear advantage since the
bulk of coca and opium poppy grows in zones that fall beyond the firm
security control of the central government. As eradication squeezes
the industry, ground fire from narco-terrorist groups has increased:
aircraft have taken 225 rounds of ground fire during eradication operations
this year to date. This figure is already more than the total number
of hits in 2001 and 2002. Some Colombian extremist groups have become
increasingly dependent on drug-related revenues. Accordingly, we expect
that these groups will increasingly use their firepower and ingenuity
to protect and expand their drug interests in Colombia. The increased
frequency of damage inflicted on aircraft by ground fire has resulted
in 350 days when it has been necessary to ground the spray aircraft
for repairs during the period January May 2003, as compared to 48 days
for the same period in 2002.
Conducting
spray operations is dangerous work. All of the pilots in the spray program
have extensive flying experience and receive specialized training for
the type of flying and local conditions that they will face. We also
provide advance survival training for our pilots in the case of a forced
landing. Each spray mission is planned for maximum security, using all
available intelligence. If a spray mission should face major risk, it
is cancelled or conducted with pre-positioned counterdrug ground troops.
There are armed security escort helicopters as well as at least one
search and rescue (SAR) helicopter. We are constantly evaluating our
operations to refine our procedures and improve security for our personnel.
Our counternarcotics
program also faces a major challenge as our air assets and the Colombian
counterdrug units we support are increasingly called on to pursue a
more active role to assist the Colombian government in its unified campaign
against narcotics trafficking and activities by organizations designated
as terrorist organizations and to take actions to protect human health
and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue
operations.
President
Uribe's tough stance on drug trafficking and narco-terrorists has ushered
in a new political climate and an increase in counternarcotics and counterterrorism
operations around the country. He has boosted security spending and
fully supports an aggressive eradication effort. We continue to coordinate
with the Colombian government to see how best to use the new authorities
enacted in the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery
from and Response to Terrorist Acts against the United States (P.L.
107-206) and in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2003 (P.L. 108-7) in support of President
Uribe's national security strategy. While U.S. policy now recognizes
the flexibility introduced by the expanded authorities, counternarcotics,
alternative development, and judicial reform, as well as humanitarian
assistance and social and economic development, remain key components
of our support to Colombia's democracy and the Colombian government's
programs to exercise authority throughout its national territory.
Since USAID
(U.S. Agency for International Development) began implementing alternative
development programs in late 2000, its activities have benefited more
than 22,829 families and supported more than 24,549 hectares of licit
crops in both coca and opium poppy-producing areas through March 31,
2003. The U.S.-funded alternative development program has also completed
more than 349 public infrastructure and income-generating projects in
11 municipalities in key coca-producing provinces, including construction
of roads, bridges and sewer systems and rehabilitation of schools. Other
USAID projects have improved local governments.
To date,
USAID has established a total of 33 legal service centers (Casas de
Justicia), which have increased access to justice and promoted peaceful
conflict resolution by handling a cumulative total of roughly 1.6 million
cases. The establishment of these centers helps the Colombian government
expand the presence of state institutions and services to remote and
conflict-ridden areas of Colombia. As a first step in facilitating Colombia's
transition to a modern accusatorial system of justice, USAID has helped
to establish a cumulative total of 19 oral trial courtrooms and trained
roughly 3,400 judges in oral trials, legal evidence, and procedures.
As of May
31, 2003, USAID programs had aided 774,601 internally displaced persons
and 733 former child combatants with health care services, education,
vocational and skill development training, and assistance to those families
that are willing and able to safely return to their original communities.
The Department
of Justice is developing specialized units to combat money laundering
and pursue asset forfeiture initiatives. The International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) is nearing completion
of a virtual forensic laboratory that will link through shared databases
the four Colombian law enforcement agencies that have primary investigative
responsibility for criminal activity, including drug trafficking and
human rights abuses. The program includes installation and sharing of
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), Integrated Ballistic
Identification System (IBIS), Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), and
digital imaging databases. The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development,
Assistance and Training (OPDAT) is also providing assistance in legal
code reform and prosecutor training under an accusatorial system.
Our FY
2004 budget request of $463 million for Colombia includes $313 million
for hard side programs of interdiction and eradication and $150 million
for soft side alternative development and institution building programs.
The interdiction and eradication budget is split up between $158.7 million
in support for the Colombian military and $147.5 million for Colombian
National Police Programs. Support for the Colombian military is divided
into $147.3 million in Army aviation support, $6.4 million to support
the air bridge denial aerial interdiction program, and $5 million to
sustain the Colombian Army's Counterdrug Brigade.
The INL
FY 2004 request increases funding for Colombian Army aviation support
by $19 million. The 71 helicopters supported with this funding provide
air mobility for the counterdrug brigade and other vetted units and,
given the severely limited number of helicopters otherwise available,
will continue to be the only reliable airlift available for military
units engaged in counternarcotics operations. As the counterdrug brigade
has already expanded operations beyond southern Colombia in 2003, these
aircraft will also be used to conduct missions throughout Colombia,
responding to opportunities to interdict high value narco-terrorist
targets.
The FY
2004 INL request for support to the Colombian National Police (CNP)
includes $60.3 million in aviation support, $44.2 million to continue
successes in aerial eradication, and $41 million for interdiction programs,
and $2 million in administrative support for the CNP. This request reflects
a $19 million increase to boost CNP interdiction operations and other
counternarcotics programs under CNP command by improving forward counternarcotics
operating base capabilities, enhancing road interdiction operations,
assisting the auxiliary police, and helping the CNP/DEA Heroin Strategy
Program.
INL's FY
2004 soft side request for Colombia will sustain at FY 2003 levels the
USAID-administered programs to support democracy ($24 million), to encourage
alternative development ($60.2 million), and to assist vulnerable groups
($38 million). This request also increases by $1.5 million support for
PRM-administered programs to provide protection, food, potable water,
basic health services and sanitation, education, and other humanitarian
assistance to Colombia's internally displaced people.
The INL
request also will provide $7.5 million for selected Department of Justice
programs to support training and protection of the Fiscalia's human
rights units, continue reform of Colombia's legal code, train human
rights prosecutors, set up an asset forfeiture and money laundering
database, and improve prison security and drug rehabilitation programs.
Also included under rule of law programs is $13.8 million (a $3 million
increase) for the CNP reinsertion program to increase government presence
and law and order to areas of conflict. This program -- largely funded
by the Government of Colombia -- has placed well-trained and equipped
police units into 77 municipalities that lacked security presence thus
far this year.
Bolivia
and Peru
To prevent
traffickers from further developing alternative drug production sources
elsewhere, we are actively reinforcing our counternarcotics programs
in the countries surrounding Colombia. In Bolivia and Peru, our efforts
to support stronger government counternarcotics actions have been slowed
by radical cocalero movements that have seized upon the historical tradition
of coca cultivation as a rallying cry for indigenous rights against
the dominant urban political culture. Economic difficulties in both
countries have also weakened government resources to enhance counternarcotics
efforts.
As a result,
despite eradicating 12,000 hectares in 2002, Bolivia had a 23 percent
(4,500 hectares) net increase in coca cultivation due to massive replanting
in the Chapare and the government's reluctance to conduct forced eradication
in the coca-rich Yungas province in the face of violent cocalero opposition.
In response, we have supported Bolivian government efforts to strengthen
its eradication and interdiction efforts by expanding the Special Drug
Police (FELCN) by 15 percent, constructing 14 new bases, establishing
a national communications grid, and creating several data banks and
information-sharing systems to enhance law enforcement intelligence.
FY 2004
funding will strengthen these programs, which are focused on developing
the Government of Bolivia's capacity to enforce all drug laws, maintain
the rule of law in outlying areas and continue national and regional
interdiction activities. In addition to supporting these law enforcement
programs, our funds support Bolivian efforts to consolidate and sustain
regional alternative development programs (bringing direct improvement
to farmers and communities), with special emphases on developing viable
and sustainable domestic and international markets for crops other than
coca.
USAID has
assisted over 21,500 families. The annual value per family of licit
agricultural products for assisted families now averages $2,055, up
from $1,706 in 2000. For comparison, the average annual per capita income
for Bolivia in 2000 was $994. Over 51,000 farming jobs and 600 non-farming
jobs have been created through USAID's alternative development program.
Some 8,500 families have received electricity in their homes. Over 3,000
kilometers of road and 110 bridges have been paved or improved.
In the
socially volatile Yungas, following careful preparation and work with
the local populace, U.S.-funded alternative development programs are
being implemented among cocalero communities that are willing to decrease
coca (legal and illegal) cultivation. USAID's Yungas Development Initiative
is focused on improving the quality of life of the people of the Yungas
by promoting health, developing the licit economy, improving basic infrastructure
and strengthening local government. Seventeen sanitation services have
been completed benefiting over 8,000 people and 10 projects providing
access to potable water will benefit over 3,000 people. In addition,
municipalities are receiving assistance in budgeting, responding to
citizen needs, and regional economic planning.
Also, our
judicial support programs continue to help Bolivia's transition to an
oral accusatory system while increasing the capabilities and capacities
of those offices that deal with drug-related investigations and prosecutions.
The FY
2004 Bolivia funding request for $91 million is broken down into three
major efforts: $33.7 million is focused on supporting USG efforts to
develop the Government of Bolivia's long term ability to sustain law
enforcement and judicial institutions capable of enforcing all drug
laws, increasing interdiction of essential chemicals and cocaine products,
and increasing successful prosecutions of major narcotics traffickers
at a time of significant political and economic weakness in the Bolivian
state. Integral to this effort is our support for substantial air, river
and ground forces in major coca cultivation areas that provide for rule
of law, security for alternative development and support for eradication
efforts. An additional $10 million is focused on coca eradication and
its supporting security and logistical infrastructure.
In addition
to these law enforcement programs, $38.5 million will support Bolivian
efforts to consolidate and sustain regional alternative development
programs (bringing direct improvement to farmers and communities), with
special emphases on developing viable and sustainable domestic and international
markets for crops other than coca. In the socially volatile Yungas,
following careful preparation and work with the local populace, U.S.-funded
alternative development programs will decrease legal and illegal coca
cultivation among cocalero communities. The balance of the funding request
is for smaller supporting programs such as demand reduction, policy
planning, administration of justice projects and administrative support.
In Peru,
labor unrest on a national scale slowed the Peruvian government's efforts
to expand coca crop eradication, leading to increased resistance and
violence against government development projects by organized cocaleros
in the first six months of 2003. In response, the Peruvian government
has reorganized its approach to provide stronger alternative development
incentives for voluntary eradication by coca growing communities, while
simultaneously reinforcing national law enforcement interdiction efforts.
The participatory eradication model was conceived as a means to establish
a commitment on the part of an entire community to eliminate illegal
coca plots. Communities that do not participate face forced eradication.
Participants receive daily wages for work eradicating coca, as well
as food rations. Communities that remain coca free for two to three
years will receive infrastructure improvements. Over 200 communities
have asked to participate in the eradication program with more asking
to join every day. The pilot phase of the program was very successful.
More than 1,000 hectares of coca were eradicated, helping Peru to achieve
its 2002 goal of 7,000 hectares eradicated for the year.
Seizures
of drugs and chemicals by Peruvian law enforcement units have increased,
but coca eradication currently remains below the 7,000 hectares eradicated
in 2002. We believe that eradication rates will improve in the second
half of the year.
U.S. Government
efforts to support an enhanced Peruvian law enforcement interdiction
and security presence in coca-growing areas will require substantial
FY 2004 funding to establish and sustain forward operating locations,
as well as additional operating funds for the necessary fixed wing and
helicopter airlift assets that provide regional mobility to Peruvian
interdiction forces directed at trafficker production sites and other
units charged with maintaining the rule of law in alternative development
areas.
Despite
these increases, cultivation in both Bolivia and Peru remain significantly
below the peak years of the mid-1990s and far below the levels in Colombia.
Even with these increases, the total Andean coca crop declined by about
8 percent in 2002.
The FY
2004 Peru funding request for $116 million has an intense focus on reducing
coca by at least 8,000 hectares through an integrated voluntary/ involuntary
eradication and development assistance program with specific coca communities.
Supporting this goal in FY-04 requires $35 million in additional helicopter
and fixed wing aerial support for Peruvian counternarcotics police units
that provide security for eradication, interdiction and alternative
development projects in outlying areas. The Administration has requested
$13 million to support the Peruvian police in sustaining a counternarcotics
presence on outlying coca-growing areas, as well as monitoring roads
and rivers used by trafficking interests.
The Administration
has requested $11.3 million to support programs aimed at involuntary
eradication and licit/illicit crop monitoring, as well as seeking out
opium poppy for immediate manual forced eradication. Approximately $8
million will be required to construct a safe and effective Airbridge
Denial Program, although this remains subject to negotiation with the
Peruvian Government. The critical alternative development program, $50
million in FY 2004, will increase the number of communities committed
to coca reduction, currently 200 communities, and provide near-term
alternative development emergency assistance to help meet nutritional
and health needs, generate family income lost to eradication of coca
fields, and long-term alternative development to sustain rural licit
economies.
Airbridge
Denial Program
On April
28 of this year, we signed a bilateral agreement with the Government
of Colombia for an Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program. The agreement creates
a legal framework that would help ensure that all USG legal and procedural
safety requirements are fully satisfied (to preclude situations like
the tragic shootdown of missionaries in Peru in 2001), and to protect
USG employees and contractors involved in ABD from undue legal liability.
Preparations for final Presidential approval for a re-initiation of
the Colombian ABD program are nearly complete, after which the Colombian
government will be able to take important steps to retake control of
its airspace from aerial trafficking. It is important to note that an
effective Colombian ABD program will require a substantial Colombian
and U.S. commitment of funding and resources to secure suspected aerial
trafficking routes. The Colombian government has already committed substantial
resources to ABD and we plan to support Colombian efforts with FY 2004
funds to establish forward operating locations for tracker and intercept
aircraft involved in the effort.
Plans to
provide some form of airspace control against trafficking aircraft are
currently under discussion with the Government of Peru. It is our expectation
that implementation of a viable airspace control program in Peru would
require greater USG funding than in Colombia, due to a lack of necessary
Peruvian government resources and a shortfall in national communications
and radar system architecture both prerequisites for a Colombia-style
program.
Mexico
Mexico
is the principal transit zone for most illicit drugs from South America
destined for the U.S. as well as a source country for heroin, methamphetamine,
and marijuana. Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations operate an
extensive distribution network across the U.S., posing a significant
domestic criminal threat. Under the Fox administration, cooperation
between the United States and Mexico in fighting drug trafficking and
other transnational crime has significantly improved.
During
2002, the Government of Mexico extradited 25 fugitives to the United
States, up from 17 in 2001, but the extradition relationship remains
a difficult one due to Mexico's inability to extradite fugitives who
face life imprisonment in the requesting country. Mexican law enforcement
agencies and military personnel continued their successful targeting
of major drug trafficking organizations and their leaders, including
the arrest of 36 major fugitives wanted on drug charges in the United
States. Opium poppy cultivation, which is widely dispersed in small
plots in isolated areas, dropped in 2002. At the same time, Mexico conducted
an intensive, primarily manual, eradication program. Potential heroin
production was reduced from 8.4 metric tons in 2001 to 5.6 metric tons
in 2002.
To raise
the profile and urgency of counternarcotics, the Fox administration
unveiled an ambitious six-year National Drug Control Plan in 2002 that
called on Mexican society and institutions to wage a frontal assault
against all aspects of the drug problem, including production, trafficking,
and consumption. Following September 11, the United States and Mexico
significantly stepped up cooperation on border security to ensure tighter
screening of both people and goods.
The Fox
administration has taken steps to curb corruption in Mexico's institutions.
The arrests of two Mexican generals in 2002 and the disbanding of a
Mexican Army battalion in Sinaloa due to corruption reflect the willingness
of the Fox government to attack corruption. In order to prevent corruption,
the Mexican anti-drug police force (FEADS) has been disbanded and the
new federal investigation agency (AFI), a more modern police force,
has been structured with anti-corruption and the protection of information
as chief priorities.
In 2002,
Presidents Bush and Fox signed the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership to
improve controls along our shared border. The 22 action items focus
on developing infrastructure, the movement of people, and the movement
of goods. Using $25 million in emergency supplemental funding appropriated
by Congress, INL has been working with U.S. partner agencies to provide
Mexican customs and immigration agencies with inspection equipment,
safety training, computers and software for port of entry management
and advanced passenger information exchange, and other enhancements.
The goal is to expedite the movement of legitimate flows of goods and
people while increasing the ability of law enforcement to detect criminal
activity.
In FY 2004,
INL proposes to merge the counternarcotics and border programs through
a combined request for $37 million. Of this, approximately $17.5 million
would be used to build on the foundation supported by Emergency Supplemental
funding; $2.5 million would complement that effort through assistance
to enhance maritime port security. In addition, $10.9 million would
be used to support counterdrug and countercrime operations and $3.4
million would be used to expand our important work with Mexico in criminal
justice sector reform, training and professionalization. We also plan
to continue modest ongoing programs relating to drug abuse prevention,
crime prevention, and alternative development.
ASIA
Afghanistan
Poppy cultivation
in Afghanistan, which had been banned in 2000 under the draconian rule
of the Taliban, resumed following September 11 in an environment that
saw a devastated economy and an absence of law and security throughout
the country. Afghanistan resumed its position as the world's largest
producer of heroin in 2002 and preliminary results for 2003, despite
our own efforts and the significant contributions of the UK as the lead
country on Afghan counternarcotics, show only modest gains thus far.
Without an organized security force or rule of law, the drug trade and
the revenues and criminal groups generated by it will undermine the
stability of both Afghanistan and the region.
Following
the fall of the Taliban, the U.S. and other members of the international
community laid the groundwork for rebuilding Afghanistan's almost completely
destroyed security and criminal justice systems. Under pressure from
the U.S. and others, the new Afghan government announced a ban on the
cultivation of opium poppy; set up a Counternarcotics Directorate (CND)
under the National Security Council (where it will have the necessary
authority, visibility, and access); supported UK eradication programs
(which reduced the spring 2002 crop by an estimated 30 percent) and
U.S. alternative development programs; and began directly to press provincial
governors to support eradication.
Given the
absence of central governmental authority in the provinces, and a general
breakdown of rule of law, opium brokers have been free to provide poppy
seed, fertilizer, credit, and cash bonuses to encourage farmers to cultivate
opium. Expanded agricultural support services for legitimate crops will
be necessary, and we are pleased that USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture)
and USAID have plans to work to provide those services. Credit at reasonable
cost will also be required. The critical requirement, however, is the
restoration of security and the rule of law. Without an organized security
force or the rule of law, the drug trade and crime will undermine efforts
to create stable recovery in Afghanistan.
INL is
working closely with other countries leading the reestablishment of
Afghan public security capabilities, including the UK, which has the
lead on counternarcotics issues; Germany, which is providing training
and equipment to the national police; and Italy, which is developing
and modernizing the judicial system. President Karzai ratified a National
Drug Control Strategy in May, and we, the UK, and the UN Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) are leading the effort to support that strategy in
a way that it can be implemented efficiently and effectively.
Our FY
2004 budget request of $40 million for Afghanistan would be divided
in three areas: counternarcotics, police training, and justice sector
reform. The bulk of the 2004 budget ($26.5 million) focuses on building
law enforcement and rule of law programs that are essential components
for carrying out successful counternarcotics programs and building counternarcotics
law enforcement capacity. We will contribute smaller portions ($12.8
million) to alternative development, demand reduction, and drug awareness
programs.
It should
also be added that apart from our work within Afghanistan, and our large
programs in Pakistan, which I will discuss next, INL is also working
in the five countries of Central Asia, in close cooperation with the
United Nations, to upgrade their capacities for intelligence, investigation,
interdiction, and prosecution of drug-related illicit activities. These
countries themselves cultivate poppy only on a minor scale, but they
lie between Afghanistan and the major markets of Western Europe and
the sizeable and still-growing markets of Russia and other intermediate
transit countries. The Central Asian countries are susceptible to drug
trafficking as a result of their porous borders and weak counternarcotics
programs.
Pakistan
September
11 shifted the focus of INL assistance to Pakistan from drug control
and related programs to law enforcement, including security of the critical
border with Afghanistan. The border security program being implemented
by the Department of Justice is designed to build on and expand initiatives
undertaken with funding provided under the 2001 and 2002 supplemental
appropriations acts to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement agencies
in Pakistan to secure the western border against criminal elements (including
terrorists) and narcotics traffickers. As President Musharraf noted
at Camp David last month, the Pakistani Government has been able to
enter its western border areas for the first time in a century. INL's
effort to help Pakistan strengthen the security of its borders is paying
off.
On the
narcotics side, Pakistan, which was once the world's third largest producer
of opium poppy, reached record low production levels in 2000-2001. While
cultivation levels increased somewhat during the 2002-2003 growing season
due to a number of factors including very high prices and a spillover
effect from Afghanistan, the Government of Pakistan continues to make
a determined effort to reduce cultivation. The U.S. Government is aiding
these efforts through a number of programs, including crop control/alternative
development support and a road-building initiative in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which will allow the Government of
Pakistan to bring an active law enforcement presence to these isolated
areas.
INL's FY
2004 request of 38 million for Pakistan includes two major components
that build upon efforts undertaken in previous years, particularly since
September 11. The Administration has requested $10.8 million for assistance
to Pakistan's civilian law enforcement agencies. The proposed assistance
will address two primary objectives: providing operational assistance
to support immediate term needs and supporting Government of Pakistan-led
reform of law enforcement institutions. This assistance, spearheaded
by the Department of Justice, while perhaps not producing immediate
results, will provide for a higher quality and consistency in law enforcement
and sustainable respect for human rights. The Administration has requested
$26 million for border security, which will build upon the successful
implementation of commodity support, training, and technical assistance
that was begun with FY 2002 Emergency Relief Funds (ERF) supplemental
funds.
Funds will
be used to provide ongoing maintenance, support, and operating expenses
of the Ministry of Interior Air Wing, which includes three fixed-wing
surveillance aircraft and five helicopters based at Quetta in Balochistan
province. Our assistance will also extend air mobility for rapid response
and law enforcement presence into the North West Frontier Province through
the establishment of a new forward operating location in Peshawar with
five helicopters. These ambitious projects will require full funding
in order to ensure that they have the maximum possible positive effect.
Burma
Burma remains
the world's second largest producer of illicit opium and among the world's
leading producers and traffickers of methamphetamine, which constitute
a major threat to the security and social fabric of Thailand and other
countries in the region. Drug trafficking groups operate within Burma
along its borders with China and Thailand, and the Government of Burma
has yet to curb involvement in illicit narcotics by the largest, most
powerful and most important trafficking organization within its borders,
the United Wa State Army. Over the past several years, the Government
of Burma has significantly reduced opium production within its borders.
The Burmese government entered into a non-aggression pact with the United
Wa State Army, which controls a large territory within Burma, and under
the terms of the pact, the Wa agreed to end opium production after the
2005 growing season. Burma has also cooperated with regional and international
counternarcotics agencies, resulting in several cases against traffickers
and their organizations and several agreements on controlling precursor
chemicals. But more much remains to be done to address major gaps in
Burma's counternarcotics efforts.
While legislation
currently prohibits direct counternarcotics (or other) assistance to
the Burmese regime, we support a UN alternative development program
in the major opium-producing region in Burma, and we support broader
regional efforts through the UN and others to coordinate counternarcotics
efforts. We have been one of the major donors to the UNODC's Wa Alternative
Development Project, and have successfully encouraged other donors to
support this effort as well. We will continue to support worthy UNODC
alternative development projects that do not directly benefit the Government
of Burma, and will continue to urge the Government of Burma to take
serious, verifiable action on counternarcotics issues.
North Korea
We are
increasingly convinced that state agents and enterprises in the DPRK
(Democratic People's Republic of Korea) are involved in narcotics trafficking.
At the same time, information remains somewhat fragmentary. While we
strongly suspect that opium poppy is cultivated in North Korea, we lack
exact information regarding the extent of production. Press reports
and other sources suggests that North Korea cultivates between 7,000
and 8,000 hectares of opium poppy and produces 40-to-50 tons of opium
annually, enough to produce about three to five tons of heroin, but
those figures can not be verified.
Although
there have been a number of cases of heroin with a reported DPRK origin
being seized in recent years, including on Taiwan and in Japan and the
Russian Far East, and in a number of cases North Koreans (including
diplomats) have been apprehended, we lack direct evidence indicating
that the seized drugs were actually produced in the DPRK. Similarly,
the source of approximately 125 kilograms of heroin smuggled to Australia
aboard the North Korean-owned vessel Pong Su and seized by Australian
authorities in April 2003 is unclear its packaging suggests, but does
not prove, a Southeast Asian origin.
There have
been very clear indications, especially from a series of seizures in
Japan, that North Koreans traffic in, and probably manufacture, methamphetamine.
At least since 1995, North Korea has been importing significant quantities
of ephedrine, the main ingredient for methamphetamine production, some
of which could be diverted to manufacture illicit drugs. Japan is the
largest single market for methamphetamine in Asia, with more than 2.2
million abusers and an estimated consumption of 20 MT of methamphetamine
per year. During the past several years, Japanese authorities have seized
numerous illicit shipments of methamphetamine that they believe originated
in North Korea. In most of these seizures, traffickers and North Korean
ships rendezvoused at sea in North Korean territorial waters for transfer
of the narcotics to the Japanese traffickers vessels. Authorities on
Taiwan also have seized several shipments of methamphetamine and heroin
that had been transferred to the traffickers ships from North Korean
vessels.
The sharp
increase in large methamphetamine seizures in Japan after earlier indications
of North Korean efforts to import ephedrine strongly suggests a state-directed
effort to manufacture and traffic this narcotic to the largest single
market for it in Asia. Thirty-five percent of methamphetamine seizures
in Japan from 1998 to 2002 originated in North Korea, and Japanese police
believe that a high percentage of the methamphetamine on Japanese streets
originate in North Korea.
Likewise,
seizures of drugs trafficked to Taiwan in similar fashion, (i.e., with
traffickers vessels picking up the drugs from North Korean vessels),
suggest centralized direction. In both cases, large quantities of drugs,
expensive even at wholesale prices, have been transferred from North
Korean state-owned ships, on occasion by men in uniform, to ships provided
by Japanese or ethnic Chinese traffickers to be brought surreptitiously
to Japan or Taiwan.
The U.S.
Government has decided recently to step up legal and law enforcement
efforts against DPRK illicit activity, including narcotics trafficking,
both domestically and internationally. We are in the process of discussing
a range of diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence-sharing initiatives
with key governments in Asia and look forward to strengthening broader
international efforts to stem the flow of illicit narcotics and other
illegal products from North Korea.
SYNTHETIC
DRUGS
Synthetic
drugs, while currently a serious concern, potentially present an even
greater future threat to the United States and many other nations. These
drugs offer significantly higher profit margins for criminal groups,
are relatively easy to produce, and do not encounter the same social
stigma among user populations, e.g., youth, as do cocaine and heroin.
While there are a number of synthetically produced drugs of abuse, the
two principal threats to the United States are methamphetamine, an amphetamine-type
stimulant (ATS) of growing global concern, and Ecstasy (MDMA/XTC), a
club scene drug. Following is a summary of INL efforts against these
principal synthetic drug threats to the United States.
Methamphetamine
This is
currently the principal synthetic drug of concern in the United States.
Abuse is most problematic in our western and central states but is increasing
in the eastern half of the U.S. While much of the methamphetamine is
produced domestically predominantly in the western states the major
foreign source is Mexico. Mexican-based criminal groups are also active
in methamphetamine production in the United States.
INL-directed
or supported programs that engage this threat in Mexico include the
following: (1) we support the attack against major drug trafficking
organizations by providing technical assistance and training to Mexican
law enforcement directly involved in enforcement actions against the
principal criminal groups; (2) we fund both bilaterally and through
the Organization of American States drug secretariat CICAD chemical
control enhancements designed to reduce the availability of essential
chemicals used in methamphetamine production; (3) we actively manage
a post-9/11 program to enhance substantially the physical security along
our southwest border across which most of the foreign produced methamphetamine
is smuggled; and (4) we are emphasizing a number of programs designed
to modernize and professionalize key Mexican justice sector institutions
and thereby have a positive impact on their counternarcotics capabilities
and performance.
While Mexico
appears to be the largest foreign source of processed methamphetamine,
the U.S. Government is concerned that Canada has become a significant
source of the precursor chemical pseudoephedrine. Canada is also a source
of high-potency marijuana. Over the past few years, there has been an
alarming increase in the amount of pseudoephedrine diverted from Canadian
sources to clandestine methamphetamine laboratories in the United States.
The Government of Canada implemented regulations on the sale and distribution
of precursor chemicals this year. We welcome these new regulations,
but remain concerned that the resulting control regime may not be strong
enough, particularly on the investigative/enforcement front.
INL has
worked closely with the interagency community to establish an active
dialogue with Canada about these issues, beginning with formal correspondence
last year of the USG's assessment of the proposed regulations. We used
the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report to highlight the
problem and to call on Canada to respond forcefully. Canadian authorities
have assured us of their commitment to ensure that their new control
regime effectively addresses the threat.
Methamphetamine
production and trafficking is also a serious problem in Southeast Asia,
causing governments from Thailand to the Philippines to identify it
as a major national security concern. Although a regional problem, much
of the focus centers on Burma, where it is estimated that hundreds of
millions of pills are produced and trafficked to and through neighboring
countries. Thailand has been particularly hard hit; Thai authorities
seized over 70 million pills in 2002, prompting the Royal Thai Government
to embark on a war on drugs in 2003. A long-time U.S. ally in the fight
against drugs and a regional leader in combating illegal drugs, Thailand
is a key partner in counternarcotics activities. A one-time source country
for heroin, Thailand's aggressive counternarcotics strategy kept opium
poppy cultivation below 1,000 hectares in 2002 for the fourth year in
a row, and at the lowest level since the mid-1980s. Even so, Thailand
serves as a transit zone for heroin and the sharply increasing volume
of methamphetamine coming out of Burma and other states in the region.
Our FY
2004 request for $2 million will sustain at reduced levels programs
initiated previously to support institution building to improve capabilities
to arrest, prosecute and convict significant traffickers, and dismantle
their organizations. At U.S. urging and with our assistance, Thailand
is in the process of amending virtually all of its basic narcotics laws
and all substantive and procedural criminal laws, including those that
pertain to money laundering and financial crime.
We are
also helping Thailand modernize its criminal justice system and improve
its ability to investigate and prosecute all types of crime. The recent
spate of extrajudicial killings associated with Thailand's war on drugs
underscores the need for such assistance. We have repeatedly expressed
our concerns on this issue at the highest levels of the Royal Thai Government,
stressing the need to respect the rule of law and seek accountability
and justice in cases of extrajudicial killings. Our efforts continue
to be critical for Thailand's ability to deter or effectively prosecute
traffickers in drugs, people, and weapons, and dismantle criminal organizations
whose activities adversely affect regional security and other U.S. interests.
Ecstasy
The increase
in the quantity of illegal synthetic drugs entering the United States,
especially Ecstasy from Europe, is of particular concern. A significant
amount of the Ecstasy consumed in the United States is manufactured
clandestinely in the Netherlands (in 2001, a total of 9.5 million ecstasy
tablets were seized in the United States, and the DEA believes that
the majority of tablets originated in the Netherlands).
We are
working closely with Dutch authorities to stop the production and export
of Ecstasy, which we both regard as a serious threat to our citizens.
In March, we co-chaired with the Department of Justice a high-level
meeting with Dutch counterparts that resulted in a concrete plan of
action to enhance Dutch efforts against Ecstasy production and trafficking
and U.S.-Dutch cooperation on the same. Both sides are increasing their
staffing levels, sharing information (including threat assessments)
and cooperating closely to identify and disrupt criminal organizations.
At the end of June, the Dutch seized more than 12 million Ecstasy pills
in Rotterdam, demonstrating both the scope of the problem and the progress
being made.
Mr. Chairman,
the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs very much appreciates the opportunity to discuss this important
issue and these key counterdrug programs with the Committee. Further,
we appreciate the Committee's continuing interest and your many personal
efforts in supporting our programs. We look forward to increasingly
close cooperation with the Committee and the success of our combined
efforts to reduce the availability of illicit drugs produced and trafficked
from the principal drug source countries.
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