Top Ten Myths about the U.S. Supported Aerial Coca Eradication Program in Colombia, Latin America Working Group, July 22, 2003

Top Ten Myths about the U.S. Supported Aerial Coca Eradication Program in Colombia, Latin America Working Group, July 22, 2003

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Top Ten Myths about the U.S. Supported Aerial Coca Eradication Program in Colombia

1. Myth: The U.S. supported aerial eradication program in Colombia will reduce cocaine and heroin availability and use in the United States.

Reality: Despite the 15% decline in Colombian coca cultivation in 2002, coca production in the Andes actually increased since Plan Colombia began, rising from 184,900 hectares in 2000 to 205,400 hectares in 2002 [1] . Coca yield per hectare in Colombia also increased by 33% from 2000 to 2002, suggesting the use of higher-yield coca varieties [2] . Aerial eradication has shifted coca production back to Bolivia and Peru where cultivation jumped by 23% and by 8% respectively [3] . In 2002, major coca production in Colombia also shifted from Putumayo to the neighboring regions of Narino (~8000 ha. increase) and Guaviare (~2000 ha. increase). [4] Potential small coca fields have also been detected in remote forested areas outside traditional agricultural zones [5] .

Aerial eradication efforts have had no apparent impact on availability or use of cocaine in the U.S. The National Drug Intelligence Center of the Department of Justice reported in 2003 that powder cocaine’s “availability appears to be steady overall. [6] ” The prevalence of cocaine use among young people in the U.S. remained steady between 2000 and 2001 and increased slightly in 2002. [7]

2. Myth: The Colombian government will soon be able to sustain the aerial eradication program without substantial U.S. aid.

Reality: “According to the General Accounting Office, “Neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing support counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future. According to the U.S. embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up to $230 million per year, and future costs for some other programs have not yet been determined…As GAO noted in 2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to achieve it. [8] ”

3. Myth: Cutting the supply of coca in Colombia is the most cost-effective way to reduce cocaine consumption in the U.S.

Reality: A 1994 RAND study concluded that source-country drug control efforts, including aerial eradication, are the least cost-effective means to control U.S. cocaine consumption. In terms of what the U.S. government would need to spend to reduce cocaine consumption by just one percent, researchers found source country control efforts to be 23 times more expensive than drug treatment programs [9] .

4. Myth: Aerial spraying is tightly controlled, not indiscriminate. Pilots do not spray people’s homes, water bodies, pastures, forests, or licit crops (that are not interspersed with coca).

Reality: Substantial evidence suggests that the spraying program is not nearly as accurate as claimed. EPA modeling shows that drift may affect areas up to 600 feet from the targeted crops. [10] In 2002, the Colombian Ombudsman received more than 6,000 complaints of damage to socio-economic and development projects and areas under eradication pacts, included among those the much-heralded palmito project. [11] In 2001, a field investigation by a Colombian Inter-Governmental Commission confirmed damage to 11 alternative development projects receiving local, national and international funding. [12]

U.S. NGOs Witness for Peace and the Institute for Policy Studies have amassed a large number of photographs that show extensive damage to food crops in areas where coca was non-existent. The photos also document where homes and water sources, used for drinking, bathing, and washing, were sprayed with herbicide. [13]

5. Myth: Food aid and assistance are available for families that are forced to move as a result of the coca eradication program.

Reality: Thousands of Colombians fled their homes in 2002 due to aerial spraying programs; estimates range from 9000 leaving Putumayo between January and November [14] , to 39,000 displaced by fumigation nationwide [15] . The majority of families displaced by aerial spraying are not considered to be legitimately displaced and thus they are not eligible for food aid or assistance. [16] Local governments are often not given advance warning of fumigation and so cannot prepare to provide food aid, even if funding is available. [17] Food scarcity from fumigation places additional stress on rural residents who live in poverty and suffer from poor nutrition and health conditions.

6. Myth: Farmers receive compensation if aerial spraying damages their licit crops (not interspersed with coca), livestock, or health.

Reality: As of May 21, 2003, the Colombian anti-narcotics police (DNE) had recognized only two cases of fumigation damages in the entire country among the multitude of complaints registered, neither of which was in Putumayo, the department most heavily sprayed. [18] In August 2002, the State Department reported that of 1000 claims, 800 were dismissed on technical grounds, 220 were deemed to require verification, 14 had been verified, and in only one case had the DNE agreed to pay damages [19] .

While a large number of claims may be false, the outstanding number of claims rejected and the miniscule number verified suggests that the assessment and verification process is seriously flawed and ineffective. According to the Colombian Ombudsman, the DNE rejects claims if the complainant cannot specify the exact location of his farm according to terms accepted by the DNE, and yet the officials who register claims do not have the necessary maps, forms or training to file proper claims. A conflict of interest also pervades the compensation program since the agency charged with investigating complaints, the DNE, is the same agency charged with implementing the aerial spraying program. The universe of claims reported by DNE is also highly questionable, as the Ombudsman’s office alone has received 6,553 claims [20] .

According to the State Department, no process for filing health complaints exists. Citizens’ only recourse is to file a legal complaint or lawsuit [21] . According to the Colombian Comptroller General’s office, of 800 fumigation complaints presented to the municipal representatives in La Hormiga, Putumayo, 73% included claims of health harms. [22]

7. Myth: U.S. aid for alternative development programs is sufficient and providing viable sources of income for small farmers affected by coca eradication.

Reality: U.S. supported alternative development programs covers only a fraction of the small farmers targeted by eradication efforts. U.S. provided aid to small farmers for only 11,800 hectares of licit crops in 2002, or one-tenth of the 122,965 hectares sprayed with U.S. funds in 2002. [23] Small farmers grow an estimated one-third to one half of the 144,400 hectares of coca in Colombia. [24]

8. Myth: Glyphosate, the active ingredient in the herbicide sprayed in Colombia, has been extensively tested and is widely used around the world, therefore it is safe for use in the aerial spraying program.

Reality: The safety of using glyphosate in the aerial spraying program in Colombia cannot be assumed simply because the chemical is widely used or “well-tested.” The safety of using glyphosate in Colombia depends on 1) the effects of all chemicals in the herbicide mixture, 2) the way in which the herbicide is applied and consideration of exposure pathways in rural Colombia, and 3) the herbicide mixture’s effects in Colombian ecosystems. On all three counts, considerable uncertainty still exists.

On the first count regarding chemicals in the mixture, the State Department asserts it is using a less toxic herbicide formulation than the one used last year, but the official records in Colombia do not support this claim. To the contrary, Colombian government documents suggest that the previous more toxic herbicide formulation is still in use. [25] Also, we have not yet seen the results of toxicity evaluations of the new herbicide formulation plus additives, nor do we know whether a thorough risk assessment or toxicological evaluation has been conducted for the inert ingredients in this product. [26] Finally, accurate knowledge about chemicals in the mixture requires a system of controls over manufacturing, transport, mixing and loading, among others. The State Department did not provide the EPA with this information in last year’s analysis, [27] and it remains to be seen what quality control data DOS will provide as a basis for 2003 certification to Congress.

On the second count regarding herbicide application, uncertainty exists about the level of herbicide drift because no quantitative spray drift data was provided, and as the EPA noted, application to forestry sites by fixed wing aircraft (as in Colombia) is extremely rare and “is likely conducted at a higher speed and from a greater altitude than would be typical in the U.S.” Regarding exposure pathways, the State Department has not provided concrete evidence that safeguards are in place to minimize human exposure to the spray mixture. [28] In addition, the EPA has not yet conducted an assessment of herbicide exposure that considers all likely pathways of exposure. [29] Based on reports received by the Colombian Ombudsman, NGO investigations, spray parameters, and conditions in rural areas, it is likely that people are directly sprayed, consume contaminated water and food products, and experience significant exposure while working in fields immediately following application. These and other exposure pathways have not yet been duly examined.

On the third count, substantial uncertainty exists regarding the effects of the herbicide mixture in Colombian ecosystems. The State Department’s 2002 report to Congress did not include “one single study that examines the potential impacts on fragile tropical ecosystems such as those in Colombia or other nations with similar environmental and climatic conditions. The DoS provide[d] no information regarding the fate of the pesticide in this environment. The DoS provide[d] no information regarding plant re-growth rates or impacts on ecosystem composition in this environment. The DoS provide[d] no information regarding impacts on endangered or endemic species in Colombia. Clearly, in the absence of such site-specific information, it is impossible for the DoS or EPA to draw firm conclusions regarding potential environmental impacts in Colombia. [30] ”

9. Myth: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency determined that the aerial eradication program in Colombia will not harm human health or the environment.

Reality: The EPA did not conclude that the spraying program poses no unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment. On the contrary, with regards to the environment, the EPA indicated a substantial risk of spray drift affecting non-target vegetation, and that there may be adverse secondary effects to terrestrial and aquatic species from the temporary loss of habitat in the spray area. The EPA also expressed uncertainty about assessing environmental risks of the spray program because the Agency’s studies are based on North American species and ecosystems, it did not have the relevant toxicity data for the Colombian formulation and the spray additive, and it did not review ecological effects studies for the specific formulation used in Colombia.

With regards to health, the EPA indicated that the pesticide formulation used in Colombia could cause acute eye toxicity and recommended the use of a less toxic product (which the State Department says is now in use). The EPA did not draw conclusions about health effects from the aerial spraying program due to the lack of relevant and valid data.

In addition, it should be noted that the EPA did not conduct a comprehensive environmental assessment, as this was not required by the 2002 foreign appropriations act. To date, neither the EPA or any other entity has assessed the full range of environmental impacts from the aerial eradication program, such as deforestation in remote areas due to the relocation of coca fields, and cumulative impacts to threatened species and critical habitat. [31]

10. Myth: An effective health monitoring program is in place to ensure that the aerial eradication program does not cause adverse health impacts to people in sprayed areas.

Reality: No epidemiological monitoring program exists to measure health impacts from the aerial eradication program. The State Department only conducts investigations of health complaints brought to their attention and occasionally holds medical health programs in sprayed communities. The Colombian authorities, despite requirements by Colombian law and orders by three Colombian Ministers of Health, have failed to implement their own Plan of Epidemiological Monitoring [32] . Rural medical facilities in Colombia lack the necessary equipment [33] , training and resources to adequately diagnose, monitor and treat potential herbicide poisoning.

Dr. Camilo Uribe, Science Director of the clinic which conducted the State Department’s 2002 health study in Putumayo, testified recently in court that based on their studies in Narino and Putumayo, it is necessary to establish an epidemiological monitoring system to evaluate the effects of pesticide use and aerial spraying. He emphasized that their studies also recommended that future research involve pre and post evaluations of resident’s health in order to effectively determine health impacts in sprayed areas. [34] Without this monitoring program, the Ombudsman maintains that it is impossible to affirm or deny the harmlessness of the substances applied in the fumigation in a technical and scientific manner. [35]

[1] International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports for 2000 and 2002, U.S. Department of State.

[2] “Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003,” Chapter 1, United Nations Office on Drug Control and Crime Prevention, June 2003, p. 23.

[3] “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report –2002,” U.S. Department of State, March 2003.

[4] “Colombia Coca Survey for 2002 -Preliminary report,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, March 2003, p. 3.

[5] “Colombia Coca Survey for 2002-Preliminary Report,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, March 2003, p. 10.

[6] “National Drug Intelligence Center Assessment Cites New York City as Major Drug Transshipment Area,” U.S. Department of Justice, January 23, 2003.

[7] “Trends in 30-day prevalence of selected drugs among 12^th graders,” National Drug Control Strategy Update 2003, Office of National Drug Control Policy, February 2003.

[8] Executive Summary, “Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia,” United States General Accounting Office, June 3, 2003.

[9] "Coca Eradication," Coffin, Phillip, et al, Foreign Policy In Focus, October 1998; 3(29): p. 1-4.

[10] Memorandum to Honorable Members of Congress from Anna Cederstav, Staff Scientist, Earthjustice and AIDA, September 23, 2002, p. 10. Available at www.amazonalliance.org.

[11] Colombian Government Ombudsman’s Office, Resolution No. 026, “Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Framework of the Armed Conflict and Fumigations of Coca Crops in Putumayo Province,” October 9, 2002, p.31-32.

[12] Colombian Government Ombudsman’s Office, Resolution No. 1, “Fumigation and Alternative Development Projects in Putumayo,” February 9, 2001.

[13] Some photos can be viewed at http://www.usfumigation.org/stree/index.htm. For more information contact Witness for Peace at http://www.witnessforpeace.org/contact/.

[14] Scott Wilson, “Colombia’s Air Assault on Coca Leaves Crop, Farmers in the Dust,” Washington Post, November 13, 2002.

[15] “Destierro y Repoblamiento,” Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento CODHES, April 28, 2003.

[16] Colombian Government Ombudsman’s Office, Resolution No. 028, “La Crisis Cafetera y Las Fumigaciones en el Departamento de Caldas,” Manizales, Caldas, May 21, 2003, p. 18.

[17] Interviews with regional and local officials in Tolima, Nariño and Cauca by the Latin America Working Group, RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights, and the Center for International Policy, February 2002.

[18] Colombian Government Ombudsman’s Office, Resolution No. 028, “La Crisis Cafetera y Las Fumigaciones en el Departamento de Caldas,” Manizales, Caldas, May 21, 2003, p. 18.

[19] “Report on Issues Related to the Aerial Eradication of Illicit Coca in Colombia,” U.S. Department of State, August 2002.

[20] Colombian Government Ombudsman’s Office, Resolution No. 026, “Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Framework of the Armed Conflict and Fumigations of Coca Crops in Putumayo Province,” October 9, 2002, p.24.

[21] “Report on Issues Related to the Aerial Eradication of Illicit Coca in Colombia,” U.S. Department of State, August 2002.

[22] Comptroller General of Colombia, Evaluation of Plan Colombia, Third Report, July 2002, p. 62.

[23] “International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY 2004 Budget Justification,” U.S. Department of State, June 2003.

[24] USAID reported that an estimated one-third of coca in Colombia is grown by farmers who own three hectares or less. “U.S. Assistance to Colombia,” Remarks at Special Briefing, Washington, DC, March 12, 2001. The United Nations reports that over 50% of coca in Colombia is grown by small farmers. UNDCP 2001 report

[25] Letter to EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman from Marcello Mollo, Associate Attorney of Earthjustice. June 13, 2003.

[26] Memorandum to Honorable Members of Congress from Anna Cederstav, Staff Scientist, Earthjustice and AIDA, September 23, 2002. Available at www.amazonalliance.org. p. 7-8.

[27] Based on information provided by EPA officials to Betsy Marsh, Amazon Alliance. October 2002.

[28] Memorandum to Honorable Members of Congress from Anna Cederstav, Staff Scientist, Earthjustice and AIDA, September 23, 2002. Available at www.amazonalliance.org.

[29] “Findings from Independent Reviews of the State Department Report on Aerial Spraying in Colombia Regarding Compliance with Requirements in the FY2002 Foreign Appropriations Act,” Amazon Alliance, October 10, 2002. Available at http://www.amazonalliance.org.

[30] Memorandum to Honorable Members of Congress from Anna Cederstav, Staff Scientist, Earthjustice and AIDA, September 23, 2002. Available at www.amazonalliance.org. p. 12.

[31] “Findings from Independent Reviews of the State Department Report on Aerial Spraying in Colombia Regarding Compliance with Requirements in the FY2002 Foreign Appropriations Act,” Amazon Alliance, October 10, 2002. Available at http://www.amazonalliance.org.

[32] Ruling by Administrative Tribunal of Cundinamarca, Bogota, June 13, 2003, p. 43.

[33] Colombian Government Ombudsman’s Office, Resolution No. 028, “La Crisis Cafetera y Las Fumigaciones en el Departamento de Caldas,” Manizales, Caldas, May 21, 2003, p. 19.

[34] Statement by Doctor Camilo Uribe Granja, Science Director of the Uribe Cualla Toxicology Clinic, Ruling by Administrative Tribunal of Cundinamarca, Bogota, June 13, 2003, p. 82.

[35] Colombian Government Ombudsman’s Office, Resolution No. 028, “La Crisis Cafetera y Las Fumigaciones en el Departamento de Caldas,” Manizales, Caldas, May 21, 2003, p. 18.

Written by Betsy Marsh, Consultant, Latin America Working Group