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| Letter
from Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Missouri), March 28, 2000 March 28, 2000 The Honorable Rand Beers The Honorable Brian Sheridan
Dear Secretaries Beers and Sheridan: I write to follow up on the Armed Services Committee's hearing of last Thursday and to share with you some concerns that I have on the direction of U.S. policy in Colombia. As I said in my opening remarks at the hearing, I am second to no one in my commitment to end the scourge of drug abuse in this country, and I am sure that both of you agree. However, I am concerned that the Colombia aid package contained in the emergency supplemental appropriations bill - both in the request and in the bill as passed by the House Appropriations Committee - puts too much emphasis on supporting the high-risk military "Push into Southern Colombia" aimed at the guerrillas and not enough priority on other strategies which, in my opinion, hold much more promise of success. For example, the aid package appears to be focused on guerrilla-controlled coca-growing areas to the exclusion of areas controlled by paramilitaries or other narcotraffickers. Under the six-year plan Gen. Wilhelm discussed, paramilitary groups linked to the drug trade will continue to operate with impunity until the last two-year phase of the plan, when the department of Norte de Santander is to receive more attention. Other paramilitary-dominated areas where drugs are produced, such as Urabá and the Magdalena Medio regions, will remain untouched. In addition, the focus on the departments of Putumayo and Caquetá, both longtime FARC strongholds, raises concerns about the risk of getting drawn into Colombia's larger conflict. Guerrilla units in these zones undoubtedly know the terrain and inhabitants better than the newly created battalions being set up at Larandia and Tres Esquinas. I am worried that there is a real possibility that the new counter-narcotics battalions might sustain heavy losses at the guerrillas' hands, and I am uncertain how the U.S. strategy would change if that were to happen. Taken together, Putumayo and Caquetá are about the size of Pennsylvania. However, Colombia's Amazon-basin plain, similar geographically to these two departments, is the size of California. Even if coca eradication is successful in Putumayo and Caquetá, what will keep the crop from being grown elsewhere in this zone, or even across the border in Ecuador, Peru, Brazil or Venezuela? Finally, in testimony before the Committee, we were told that, even though over $1 billion is being requested for Colombia, a long-term reduction in coca production is the only measure for the project's success that has so far been contemplated. We were also told that "secondary and tertiary goals" would not be determined until June, well after the supplemental appropriations bill should be signed into law. I am uneasy that we seem to be embarking on this strategy before our specific objectives are even made clear. I think there are alternatives to the "Push into Southern Colombia" strategy that should be considered. I believe we should build on the success we experienced in reducing coca cultivation in Peru. By most accounts, that success was based on (a) aggressive air interdiction of drug traffickers; (b) a comprehensive A.I.D. alternative crop development program; and, some believe, (c) crop eradication. The Washington Post recently reported that other defense priorities have chronically kept U.S. Southern Command from providing the air coverage it requires. The Peruvian government is complaining about the resulting lack of solid intelligence. Greater funding could easily go to meet this urgent priority. The Colombian government has not yet matched the Peruvian government's demonstrated willingness to interdict the drug traffickers' aircraft. The Colombian government should be encouraged to match that commitment. Such an interdiction strategy could be accomplished even more effectively now that the new Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) is presently coming on line in Puerto Rico. The ROTHR will significantly increase the detection and monitoring capabilities in the source zone, particularly in Colombia. When combined with a successful effort to interdict the air bridge, a strong ground interdiction strategy at the three main points that drugs must have to cross the Andes - the road to Pasto, the road through Florencia and the road through Villavicencio - should largely have the effect of stopping the flow of drugs to the ports. This combined air and ground interdiction focus would most keep the drugs from the ports north and west of the Andes and would stanch the flow to the United States, without the risk of getting involved in the counterinsurgency war. As in Peru, there should be an aggressive alternative development program, using crops that agronomists determine are best suited for particular zones. These programs must reach into some areas where government control is not complete, as these are generally areas of greatest economic desperation. Aid should also be directed toward providing basic services and building rural infrastructure. This aid should help provide clean water, electricity, schools, credit, farm-to-market roads, and other services that the state has never provided but are essential for the economic viability of rural drug-producing zones. Moreover, while the supplemental has small amounts of funding dedicated to judicial reform, more emphasis should be placed on programs to improve the rule of law, making the judicial system fairer, faster, and applicable even to the most powerful. Colombia should be assisted in a way that encourages the government to put in place more and better protections for human rights defenders and that ends impunity for human rights violators. I think ensuring the safety of those who seek reform without violence is an excellent strategy for undermining Colombia's guerrillas. The drug trade is one of several important U.S. interests in the Andean region. If Colombia's guerrillas pose a threat to these interests, the American public may support the counterinsurgency strategy that the "Push into Southern Colombia" so closely resembles. I do not believe such a threat currently exists, however, and I doubt that the American people would support a counterinsurgency campaign. The administration's continued insistence that the package is entirely counter-narcotic, however, has made impossible any debate on the merits of counterinsurgency. Having said all of the above, I concur with the sentiment expressed last Thursday by my colleagues on both sides of the aisle when they said that the only true answer to the drug problem in the United States will be based on demand reduction through prevention and treatment programs. This is ultimately where the problem is, and it is ultimately where the answers will be found. I appreciate your taking the time to consider these thoughts. I will be pleased to learn the extent to which you propose to modify the existing strategy for Colombia to take my ideas and concerns into account. I know we all seek the policy that will most effectively contribute to the end of drug abuse in our country. Sincerely,
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