Speech
by Rep. David Obey (D-Wisconsin), March 29, 2000
[Page:
H1504]
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, at the end of
last year, the President had asked for $568 billion in appropriated spending,
and Congress had approved $578 billion. In this supplemental as it now
comes before us, the President has asked for additional funds which would
take his total request for the year to $573 billion. The supplemental
has been added to by the committee so that, if this bill passes as it
is now before us, we will wind up spending $587 billion over this existing
fiscal year, which is $13 billion more than the President asked.
In addition, the amendment
that will be offered today and which will be supported by the Republican
leadership will add yet another $4 billion to this package in the DoD
arena. That will take total spending for this fiscal year to $591 billion,
some $17 billion above the President's request.
That additional $4 billion
which is being asked for by the House leadership is there for a very simple
reason. There is nothing wrong with what that money is actually being
spent for. But the fact is it is being spent on routine items for one
simple purpose, and that is to get around the very budget resolution that
was passed just 5 days ago on this floor. Because by moving that $4 billion
in expenditures into this existing fiscal year, my colleagues make room
in the next fiscal year for $4 billion for Members' projects and Members'
pork. Nice game if they can get away with it.
I suggest Senator McCain get
out his pencil. He better get ready, because a lot of stuff is going to
come over there he is probably not going to like. This is one major reason
to vote against this bill before us today.
But there is another, in my
view, even more serious reason. We are being asked by the President and
the Speaker of the House to support $1.3 billion for Colombia. In my view,
that is the camel's nose under the tent for a massive long-term commitment
to a military operation in Colombia that has as much to do with the domestic
situation in Colombia as it has to do with our drug problems here at home.
General Wilhelm from SouthCom
has indicated that this is the first year of a 5-year commitment, in his
judgment. It seems to me if a can-do Marine like General Wilhelm is predicting
that this is going to be a 5-year operation, that it is likely to last
a lot longer, because things have a way of getting more complicated than
Congress originally expects.
As I said in the Committee
on Rules, I detest Vietnam analyses under most circumstances, but I believe
that, in this case, there is a very real parallel. In fact, there are
two. When the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was debated in 1964, it took 2
days in the Senate. It took 40 minutes on the floor of this House. This
Congress has rued the day ever since that it did not give more time to
consider that proposition.
Today, when my amendment comes
before us to eliminate the most dangerous parts of that Colombian package,
we will have exactly 20 minutes to discuss it, 10 minutes for those of
us who are opposed to undertaking that involvement at this time.
Let me tell my colleagues
what I think the unanswered questions are that we ought to be asking.
In my view, this Congress has no real knowledge of what it is we are about
to embark upon. I do not see any real plan by the administration. I see
a plan to have a plan, but I do not see a real plan. There is no specific
authorization for this proposition. Before we slide into this operation,
I think we ought to ask some questions.
First of all, is this really
an anti-drug campaign, or is it a political campaign, a pacification in
Colombia? Will this really produce a reduction in drug availability in
the United States?
The House, in the rule it
just adopted, has eliminated its ability to vote on the Pelosi amendment.
The Pelosi amendment was an attempt to add additional money to fight drugs
here at home by expanding our drug treatment and prevention program.
I would point out that the
Rand Corporation, in a study financed in part by the U.S. Army, indicated
that a dollar spent to eliminate drug use here at home is 23 times more
effective than a dollar spent to try to interdict or to reduce supply
in some foreign land. Yet we are being prevented from voting on the most
effective way to deal with drugs in this country.
I also think we need to be
aware of the fact that in Colombia itself there is substantial doubt about
whether that society is ready to take this issue on. If they are not,
we cannot do it for them.
I do not know, for instance,
how many Americans understand that if we take a look at the ruling elite
in Colombia, their sons do not serve in combat. Because if one is a high
school graduate, one is exempted from having to serve in combat in the
Colombian armed forces.
[TIME: 1245]
Do my colleagues really think
we are going to be able to sustain a 5- or 10-year military operation
with that kind of divided duty in that society? I doubt it.
What happens if the battalions
that we are now training do not succeed? We are training a few thousand
men so they can try to root out the narcos in 40,000 square miles of jungle.
Let us say we succeed, which I think is highly unlikely. What is to prevent
them from simply moving into the other 150,000 square miles of jungle
in that country? I do not think very much.
I think this is ill conceived
and ill thought out. If this does not work, what is the next step? Will
we then cut and run, or will we then deepen our involvement? I do not
think, given our past experience in Vietnam, that we are likely to just
say, `Oh, well, we gave it the good old college try, so now we are going
to yank the plug.' I do not think whoever is the future president is going
to be able to make that decision. That means a long-haul problem.
What I am going to be asking
this House to do, eventually, is to allow the money for police training
to flow, to allow their helicopters to go down to Colombia, but I am going
to be asking my colleagues to delay until July the vote on the over $500
million in additional funding that is meant to expand our basic military
commitment in Colombia until the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on International Relations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
can hold more hearings on this so that Congress knows what it is doing
before it acts. And my amendment will provide expedited procedures to
assure that we would be able to vote on it in July.
We are being told that lots
of very bright professional people have put this package together so we
need have no fear. Well, I respect Secretary Albright, I respect General
McCaffery, I respect Mr. Pickering in the State Department, I respect
the Speaker of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert). But
with all due respect to them, every individual Member of this House has
a constitutional duty to exercise his or her own judgment on an issue
of this gravity, and I do not think we are able to do that under this
truncated arrangement.
So I would urge, for those
and other reasons, that my colleagues oppose this bill today. I have no
illusions that my amendment will pass. I think it is incredible we could
not even vote on the Pelosi amendment, but I would urge Members not to
make the same mistake that was made on this House floor in the Gulf of
Tonkin. This may not be the same as Vietnam. There are undoubtedly major
differences. But there are some very disturbing similarities, and I would
urge my colleagues to take those similarities into consideration and delay
consideration of this crucial vote until the Congress knows a whole lot
more than it does today about what the proper course of action ought to
be.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the
balance of my time.
As of March 30, 2000, this
document was also available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r106:H29MR0-173: