Transcript, hearing of the House Government Reform Committee: "The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan Colombia Successes and Remaining Challenges," June 17, 2004

THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS AND THUGS: A STATUS REPORT ON PLAN COLOMBIA

SUCCESSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES

=======================================================================

HEARING

before the

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

JUNE 17, 2004

__________

Serial No. 108-214

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 96-408 WASHINGTON : 2004 ____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800 Fax: (202) 512ÿ092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER, CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio ------ KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director

David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

Rob Borden, Parliamentarian

Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk

Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

C O N T E N T S

----------

Page Hearing held on June 17, 2004.................................... 1 Statement of:

Moreno, Luis Alberto, Ambassador to the United States of

America, Republic of Colombia; Roger F. Noriega, Assistant

Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department

of State; Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary,

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.

Department of State; Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant

Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity

Conflict; General James T. Hill, U.S. Army Commander, U.S.

Southern Command; and Karen P. Tandy, Administrator, Drug

Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice..... 46

Plotter, Carlos, former political commander, Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); Marc W. Chernick,

professor, Department of Government and School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University; and Adam Isacson, director

of programs, Center for International Policy............... 176

Walters, John P., Director, U.S. Office of National Drug

Control Policy............................................. 14 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Charles, Robert B., Assistant Secretary, International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of

State, prepared statement of............................... 105

Chernick, Marc W., professor, Department of Government and

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, prepared

statement of............................................... 185

Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Virginia, prepared statement of................... 4

Harris, Hon. Katherine, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 8

Hill, General James T., U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Southern

Command, prepared statement of............................. 137

Isacson, Adam, director of programs, Center for International

Policy, prepared statement of.............................. 192

Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the

State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 204

Moreno, Luis Alberto, Ambassador to the United States of

America, Republic of Colombia, prepared statement of....... 82

Noriega, Roger F., Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of... 95

O'Connell, Thomas W., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, prepared statement

of......................................................... 127

Plotter, Carlos, former political commander, Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), prepared statement of..... 179

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the

State of Indiana, information concerning the Colombian

conflict................................................... 47

Tandy, Karen P., Administrator, Drug Enforcement

Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, prepared

statement of............................................... 158

Walters, John P., Director, U.S. Office of National Drug

Control Policy, prepared statement of...................... 17

THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS AND THUGS: A STATUS REPORT ON PLAN COLOMBIA

SUCCESSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES

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THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2004

House of Representatives,

Committee on Government Reform,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis of Virginia (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tom Davis of Virginia, Souder, Duncan, Harris, Cummings, Kucinich, Tierney, Watson, Van Hollen, Ruppersberger, Norton, and McCollum.

Staff present: David Marin, deputy staff director and communications director; Keith Ausbrook, chief counsel; Robert Borden, counsel and parliamentarian; Rob White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy director of communications; Susie Schulte, professional staff member; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Brien Beattie, deputy clerk; Corinne Zaccagnini, chief information officer; Michael Yeager, minority deputy chief counsel; Anna Laitin, minority communications and policy assistant; Tony Haywood, minority counsel; Richard Butcher, minority professional staff member; Cecelia Morton, minority office manager; and Christopher Davis, minority investigator.

Chairman Tom Davis. Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to today's oversight hearing on Plan Colombia, an important component of U.S. foreign and counternarcotics policy. Today we'll examine the U.S. Government's support and contributions to the progress being made in Colombia in fighting drug trafficking and international crime, and in improving economic and social conditions.

Since its inception in 1999, Plan Colombia has been an integrated strategy to meet the most pressing challenges confronting the country today promoting the peace process, combating narcoterrorism, reviving the economy and strengthening the democratic pillars of society. The combined efforts of several of our Government agencies, who are here testifying today, are providing assistance to meet these challenges and improve the stability and future of Colombia.

Not only is Colombia one of the oldest democracies in our hemisphere, but it is also home to three terrorist groups who fund their guerrilla activities with drugs smuggled into the United States for American consumption. Colombia is a significant source of cocaine and heroin for the U.S. market. As many of us are well aware, the drug trade has a terrible and destructive impact on Americans through addiction, drug related crimes and death. Because drug trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency have become intertwined problems, Congress has granted the United States expanded authority and increased flexibility to fight narcoterrorism and reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.

I led three congressional delegations to Colombia last year and can say first-hand that our significant investment, after years of effort, is beginning to see returns on the time, money and resources spent in Colombia. Together with the strong commitment of President Alvaro Uribe and historic levels of support from the Colombian people, U.S. involvement is beginning to hit narcoterrorists where it hurts.

Some European left wing politicians and human rights groups claim the Uribe administration has failed to honor commitments on human rights. They've also criticized new Colombian anti- terrorism laws passed in December. But I think the view from Bogota looks very different. And I think the European left may be guilty of clinging to an overly romantic, naive opinion of the guerrillas. The mask is off the Lone Ranger. These are not idealistic liberators. They're thugs and terrorists, funded by the illicit drug trade.

The fact is, President Uribe continues to enjoy unprecedented support from the Colombian people because his no- nonsense strategy is producing results. He's popular because Colombians feel safer. Men, women and children once afraid to hit the road to visit family and friends for fear of kidnapping or worse are now doing so. A publicly recognized state presence now extends to towns and villages that for decades had been rebel territory.

We are seeing tremendous results in illegal crop eradication, and Plan Colombia's efforts have produced record reductions in coca production and in the destruction of drug labs. Net coca production in Colombia dropped from 355,347 acres in 2002 to 280,071 acres in 2003, a stunning 33 percent decline from the peak growing year of 2001. Interdiction efforts by the Government of Colombia have increased significantly and each week brings news of seizures of cocaine and heroin, interdictions that are usually the result of U.S. supplied intelligence. Eradication, coupled with increasingly successful interdiction efforts, is a key to our war on narcoterrorism, reducing profitability and slowly but surely leading farmers to abandon coca in favor of other, legitimate crops. Ultimately that in turn will mean less cocaine on American streets.

Criminals who have remained at large for years are being captured and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Colombia extradited 90 suspects to the United States in the first 16 months of the Uribe administration, quite an accomplishment considering that 5 years ago it offered up just one of its citizens to the U.S. justice system. The extraditions illustrate the unprecedented cooperation and partnership between our two nations, and the fact that public opinion on extradition in Colombia has changed, due largely to the political will and persistence of President Uribe.

Last month, Attorney General Ashcroft announced the indictment of nine top leaders of Colombia's largest drug cartel, an organization responsible for as much as half of all the cocaine smuggled in the United States. This cartel has exported more than 1.2 million pounds of cocaine to the United States through Mexico since 1990, a load worth more than $10 billion. To put that number in perspective, it's approximately the combined annual budgets of the FBI, DEA and the Bureau of Prisons.

Our continued support of Colombia's unified campaign against drug trafficking and terrorist activities and their effort to obtain democratic security is a wise investment. Although U.S. assistance to the Colombian Government has led to meaningful sings of success under the strong leadership of President Uribe, challenges remain. Complete realization of U.S. policy goals requires a concerted Colombian strategy and effort sustained by continuous U.S. assistance. Our panels of witnesses today will provide an update on the current status of U.S.-Colombian programs, progress that has been made in recent years and an assessment of remaining challenges in the war against narcoterrorism.

I look forward to our discussion today and I again want to welcome our witnesses and their important testimony.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. I will now yield to any Members wishing to make opening statements. Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this important oversight hearing, and I also want to thank the Chair for the manner in which he conducts the work of this committee. It's much appreciated.

This hearing is important because Plan Colombia is a $3.2 billion failed foreign operation. The war on drugs has not been won, nor is it being won. Drug usage at home has not decreased. Aerial eradication efforts in the targeted southern provinces have not eliminated coca production as intended; rather, crop cultivation has shifted to other regions. In the Department of Putumayo, for example, coca production decreased by 82 percent 1999 and 2002. During that same period, however, coca cultivation rose by 163 percent in the Department of Guaviare.

This is ironic, considering that aerial eradication efforts in the Guaviare region in the mid-to-late 1990's shifted production to the Putumayo region in the first place. Coca is one of the easiest and most profitable crops to grow, and simply put, people are going to continue to grow it if it will bring them money. For the past 15 years, despite several programs aimed at eradicating coca cultivation, crop supply has never ceased to meet demand. And this will not change.

What Plan Colombia has succeeded in, however, is in the funding of rightist paramilitaries, groups that have been named terrorist organizations by our own State Department for their heinous human rights crimes. This has occurred because the Colombian military and paramilitary units have a close working relationship. According to the Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, military units have been found to ``promote, work with, support, profit from and tolerate paramilitary groups.'' The relationship between military and paramilitaries has included active coordination during military operations, the sharing of intelligence, the sharing of fighters and the sharing of resources such as vehicles, bunkers and roadblocks. Active duty soldiers have served in paramilitary units, paramilitary commanders have lodged on Army bases and Army trucks have been used to transport paramilitary fighters. For their cooperation and support, military officers have received payments from paramilitaries.

Most atrocious, however, is that these right wing paramilitaries, such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, that's AUC, have been routinely assassinating labor organizers, making Colombia the most dangerous country in the world for unionists. Since the mid-1980's, over 4,000, over 4,000 trade unionists have been assassinated. According to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in 2002 alone of the 213 trade unionists killed in the world, 184 were killed in Colombia. Of those, 70 percent were public sector workers.

Why are so many trade unionists being killed? There's a disturbing correlation between the assassinations and intimidations of public sector unionists by paramilitary groups associated with right wing business interests and the rampant privatization in Colombia. U.S. multi-national corporations are benefiting from the privatization and de-unionization of Colombia.

What a terrible irony it is that taxes paid in the United States are being spent to defeat the basic human rights to decent wages, job security and the right to organize in Colombia under the guise of a war on drugs. We have a big problem with the Government of Colombia, and it starts with the president. In a speech delivered in September 2003, President Uribe described unions and human rights non-government organizations as working ``in the service of terrorism.''

So I think that it's going to be useful to hear a discussion on how the use of war on drugs funds for the de- unionization of Colombia and the assassination of union supporters serves the cause of the United States of America. It is not authorized by Congress, it is not U.S. policy and it should not be tolerated. Thank you.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Do any other Members wish to make opening statements? The gentlelady from Florida and then Mr. Souder.

Ms. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing today as well as for providing me the opportunity first-hand to view the coca eradication going on in Colombia. I also want to thank the distinguished panel of members that we have today for their testimony. I've had the pleasure of working with several of you on improving U.S.- Colombia relations now for several years. Up to a half million Colombians reside in my State of Florida, where they make a tremendous contribution to our economic and cultural dynamism.

In addition, Colombia consistently ranks as one of Florida's top 10 trading partners. Under the extraordinary and adept leadership of President Uribe, his domestic approval ratings have remained above 70 percent. Since August 2000 and 2002 Colombia has made great strides toward eradicating illicit drug production and trafficking, lowering general crime rates and reviving the domestic economy. Indeed, the GDP growth this year is expected to reach 4 percent, which is the highest in 7 years. Exports have reached record levels and the return of confidence within the private sector ensures that increased investment will continue to spur the economy.

Moreover, the definitive peace agreement with the national liberation army terrorist group, the ELN, appears to be drawing closer. In this vein, it's our sincere hope that Mexico's offer to mediate these talks will expedite the resolution to hostilities. Yet we are reminded of the difficult path ahead. Just yesterday, 34 campesinos were apparently killed by the FARC terrorist organization.

This should only steel our collective resolve to continue to provide Colombia and President Uribe with the support necessary to pacify their nation, bringing opportunity and prosperity to its 45 million citizens. Furthermore, the proposed free trade agreement to be singed among Colombia, the United States, Ecuador and Peru should significantly bolster the process in this region to a much greater level.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Katherine Harris follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. I thank you very much.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for this hearing. I'm on the subcommittee and our chairman has held hearings on Colombia and the Colombian approach. I believe it merits the full attention of the committee that you are giving it today.

Mr. Chairman, particularly those of us who live in big cities often hear the simplistic notion that, you know, go after the supply and maybe we can settle this matter. Well, I think Colombia shows that going after the supply is not an easy matter, it's a very difficult matter, and just how difficult this entire approach is. The approach we're using in Colombia is essentially a bipartisan approach. It was begun in the last administration, I'm not sure there's any other real approach available to us.

I am very concerned that Colombia continues to be the leading supplier of cocaine and heroin to the United States. I do note with some optimism that there have been some recent decreases in those numbers. I also note what our subcommittee has also found, that Afghanistan is quickly becoming a competitor, a real competitor to Colombia in the provision of these drugs in our country, something that is particularly worrisome for other reasons.

The new flexibilities seem to be warranted by conditions on the ground. I have been particularly hopeful, because of some progress in civilian institution building and the attention that the new president had been able to get for that approach, and I continue to be optimistic that he will be able to build the civilian institutions, the justice institutions and other civilian institutions in the country. I am very disturbed, however, at reports of human rights abuses. We would hate to see one kind of abuse, drug abuse, be replaced by human rights abuses in order to pacify the country.

And I am concerned, today's New York Times reports the most serious massacre since President Uribe took office, 34 coca farmers killed by FARC. Apparently, they were all farmers who were employed by the paramilitary commanders. All of this has led to the notion that President Uribe's efforts to in fact negotiate with the paramilitaries could bring FARC, could escalate FARC violence. I cite this because of how difficult it is, not because I have an answer for all of this or because there are a dozen things the administration could be doing.

But I think that the emergence of these human rights violations and the continued leading place of Colombia in supplying cocaine and heroin will be worrisome because of the amount of attention we have placed on this one country and people therefore want to see some progress that the money and the attention and the military focus has brought.

I guess we shouldn't even think that there should be an exit strategy. We can't find an exit strategy out of places that we should find them. I think the way we're going now, we're going to be in Colombia for a very long time, and if we're not there, even given the fact that we don't see huge progress, even the small progress that we are seeing is enough, I think, to keep us there for a time to come and to build relationships with the new administration there, so that we don't go off on some detour, for example, involving bringing pacification to the country by violation of human rights.

Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.

Chairman Tom Davis. I thank you very much.

I would recognize the subcommittee chairman, Mr. Souder.

Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing.

I want to thank Delegate Norton for her comments, as well as the ranking member of our subcommittee, Mr. Cummings, and others, for the bipartisan way we've been approaching the Colombian question. Because it's very difficult, it isn't enough just to lock up kids in Washington, DC. or other places around the country, because of their abuse. We have to get to the bigger traffickers, the people who are behind the growing of this, the distribution of this, coming into our country, not just the users. We also have to be aggressive toward the users in the United States, because it's our problem, that it's caused the problems in Colombia, the market explosion in cocaine and heroin is because of domestic consumption.

But the fact is, the more that comes in, the cheaper the price, and the more the purity is. We have to pursue all strategies simultaneously: eradication, interdiction, border control, the networks to the United States and reducing demand and treating those who are abusing. We have had a tremendous internal battle since I was elected in 1994, over how we should fund the Colombia National Police, then the vetted units in Colombia and how we handle difficult human rights questions when there are major U.S. dollars involved.

I believe the progress in Colombia has been tremendous. It isn't perfect, but it's been tremendous. The pressures of the so-called Leahy Rule have led the military in Colombia to go through major reformation, and we hear repeatedly from their units that often an attorney will be in the field with them. They examine with pictures when there's been a battle to see whether there's been abuse. We have had two different groups from the right and two from the left who are committing these violations. The poor campesinos who are growing it, they get killed by one side and killed by the other side.

The Uribe government has gone in after all of them. It has made tremendous progress. The oldest democracy in South America, Colombia, has something to buildupon. As I pointed out before, and I think it's important for us to understand, we're seeing the tremendous difficulty in Iraq to get their police force to stand up. We're doing most of their fighting for them.

In Afghanistan, we have, in my opinion, a near disaster right now. Our Government is doing the best it can, but we don't control this tremendous explosion of heroin poppy that is occurring in Afghanistan. In Colombia, they're doing the fighting. We're having a debate over whether we should have a few hundred more advisors, not 100,000 people going into their country. So while we're at a critical tipping point, as Director Walters has said, and watching very closely, can we actually get a reduction for all this money and see the price rise and the supply go down and the purity drop in the United States? It is a very critical period.

The fact is, Colombia is a tremendous success story. Policemen and military people are dying on the ground because of our habits. We have a few hundred advisors there, and maybe we need a little bit more, but we are rebuilding their institutions. We're rebuilding their police forces. We're rebuilding their military. We're getting vetted units. They're learning more what human rights is, and this is a success story when compared to the rest of the world.

I want to thank each of our witnesses who are here today for coming up to the Hill on a regular basis, for giving us the Colombia story, and for their work over many years. Each one of you have been involved in different ways. It has been a success story when those success stories are so rare around the world. Not a perfect story, just as Delegate Norton says. Drugs aren't going to go away. This isn't something where it's suddenly going to dry up and disappear, any more than our battles against rape, against spouse abuse, against the other evils of the world.

But we can control it more. We don't always have to stay at this level. If we do our job right and if we're organized, we can reduce the level of problems on the streets, and then start to deal with prevention in the schools and treatment in a more manageable form. Because right now, when it's so prevalent and so cheap and so common, we can't get control and make our prevention and treatment programs work.

So I thank the chairman for convening the hearing and I look forward to the questions and the testimony today.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

Any other Members wish to make opening statements?

Let's move to our panel. We have our first witness, who is the Honorable John Walters, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Thank you very much. Director Walters will provide the committee with a report on how we're achieving the President's counter-drug objectives by reducing the production of cocaine and heroin in Colombia and the Andean region. It's our policy that we swear you in before you testify, so if you would rise with me.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. I think you know the rules, the light will turn orange after 4 minutes. Your entire statement is in the record. When it's red, 5 minutes are up, and then you could move to summary. Questions will be based on your entire statement. We appreciate the job you're doing, and we welcome you here today, and look forward to your testimony. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WALTERS, DIRECTOR, U.S. OFFICE OF NATIONAL

DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Mr. Walters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the many members of this committee. Some of them are not here now, but have worked very hard on this issue, and we appreciate it very much.

I also appreciate the committee's particularly longstanding support for the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative. And I'm pleased to report today that the news is very good. For the first time in 20 years, thanks to the unprecedented efforts of the Uribe administration and support of the U.S. Congress for the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative, we are on a path to realize dramatic reductions in cocaine production in Colombia and a complementary reduction in the world's supply of cocaine.

My written testimony discusses a number of areas which affect the success of our drug control efforts, and I request that the full statement be put into the record.

Chairman Tom Davis. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Walters. My opening remarks today will focus on the progress that's been made in Colombia, most appropriate for this hearing, the good news of our eradication and interdiction efforts against cocaine and heroin. The United States and the Government of Colombia have developed a strategy which focuses on three items: one, eradicating almost the entire illegal drug crop each year, regardless of replacing efforts; two, interdicting and arresting drug shipments and the traffickers involved; three, pressuring trafficking organizations through extradition and other organizational attack initiatives.

Today, the United Nations released its latest numbers for coca cultivation and we have seen more good news, a 15 percent decrease in coca cultivation over the last year in the Andean region, according to the U.N. numbers. For 2 years in a row, we have seen record decreases in coca and poppy cultivation, due in part to the unprecedented commitment to aerial eradications through the spraying campaign. In 2003, Colombia sprayed about 127,000 hectares of coca and manually eradicated another 8,000 hectares.

At our current pace, coca cultivation should drop to as little as 80,000 hectares by the end of this year, compared to 144,000 in 2002. In 2002, Colombia had as much as 4,900 hectares of opium poppy under cultivation. U.S. supported eradication programs sprayed an excess of 3,300 hectares and in 2003, Colombia sprayed nearly 3,000 hectares of opium poppy and about 1,000 more were eradicated voluntarily in connection with alternative development programs.

Our eradication efforts have led to double digit percentage decreases in total cultivation of both coca and poppy. Most importantly, the same good results are holding true throughout the Andean region. Total coca cultivation for Peru and Bolivia declined from an estimated 61,000 hectares in 2002 to 59,600 hectares at the end of 2003, a combined reduction of 1,400 hectares, countering any significant concerning regarding the so-called balloon effect.

Thanks to increased Government of Colombia efforts in 2003, Colombian anti-drug forces destroyed 83 HCL labs, the conversion of coca plant product into what we see as powdered cocaine, captured 48 metric tons of cocaine base, 1,500 metric tons of solid precursors and 75,000 gallons of liquid precursor chemicals. We have seen increased success at sea, where the greatest amount of cocaine was interdicted last year ever. We have taken advantage of improved intelligence and cooperation with the United Kingdom and Colombia to interdict a high portion of the boats carrying illicit drugs as they depart Colombia, the principal means of transit to the United States.

We expect to see a substantially disrupted cocaine production capacity with coca cultivation reduced to about one half its peak level from 2 years ago. In disrupting the market, we need to continue our success in eradication, maintain our interdiction performance and keep up the pressure we have placed on major traffickers. An unprecedented number of extraditions from Colombia has helped fan these efforts referred to by you, Mr. Chairman. In addition, there have been significant reductions in all indicators of human rights abuses in 2003. Homicide is down over 20 percent, massacres down 33 percent, kidnappings down 26 percent, and forced displacement of individuals were cut by 49 percent.

A key indicator of this historic progress is that allegations of human rights violations committed by the military has dropped from an excess of 40 percent of all allegations 7 years ago to less than 2 percent of all allegations in 2003. As a result of these advances, Colombia's citizens are safer and democracy in Colombia is more secure. The good news that we have seen in the Andean region and particularly in Colombia is a product of sustained funding by this Congress for the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative, the strategic use of resources, our commitment and the commitment of the Government of Colombia.

Domestically, we have also seen very good news. We have surpassed the President's 2 year goal of a 10 percent reduction in drug use among our Nation's youth, an 11 percent actual reduction between 2001 and 2003. With the continued support of this committee, we fully expect to meet the President's 5 year goal of a 25 percent reduction in the number of drug users in the United States.

I commend the House for providing full funding for our counter-drug efforts, and not placing burdensome, restrictive conditions on those dollars. However, continued full funding in accord with the President's fiscal year 2002 request of $731 million is necessary now, more than at any time in our history, to advance this historic success. We have the opportunity to make a real change in the world drug market and we need your continued commitment and support as we have had in the past.

I look forward to working together to ensure that our goals are met in Colombia and the Andean region and of course, here at home. Last, I'd like to ask to be able to provide for the record, given the opening statement by Congressman Kucinich, a detailed breakdown of eradication province by province to correct the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walters follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

Let me start the questioning. I heard Representative Kucinich's opening remarks. Is it possible that as we eradicate in Colombia, it's moving to other countries?

Mr. Walters. It is possible, and it is a great concern, and in the past this has happened, that cultivation was once much greater in Peru and Bolivia. It's been reduced dramatically. During that reduction, cultivation moved to Colombia. That's why we've tried to make sure that we continue the pressure working with the Governments of Peru and Bolivia. Fortunately, over the past 2 years, we have been able to sustain that reduction and we have not seen the spread.

And not to belabor the point, but as the New York Times reported on June 9, 2004, ``The overall decline in coke in Colombia and the rest of the Andes is indisputable, and the strategy appears to have controlled the so-called balloon effect, the recurring phenomenon that once saw huge fields of coca pop up in one region after being stamped out in another.'' So we have our own estimates, we have the U.N. estimates, and we have the New York Times. They don't usually line up, all three, on such a point.

Chairman Tom Davis. Could you share with me some of the links we've seen in the evidence that the administration has collected that detail the relationship between drugs and financing for terrorist groups in the Andean region?

Mr. Walters. Yes. Our current estimates, and we're trying to refine some of the dollar amounts, are that substantial operational resources are provided both for the extreme right and extreme left groups, the FARC, the ELN and the so-called AUC. The precise amount that they get from drug trafficking is hard to identify, but they could not operate at current levels without the resources they receive. They also take money, as you know, from kidnapping and from some other criminal activities.

But the bulk of that money, there's no question about it, has come from drug trafficking. We have various estimates of the relative amounts. But both for the violence that they cause in Colombia and the violence that we see through armed groups in Mexico, those organizations that are most dangerous and most violent make their money and remain under arms and remain able to put armed, dangerous people in the field because of what they make from the U.S. drug consumer.

Chairman Tom Davis. Are there any other cartels or cabals or drug lords operating independently of the three groups you've described in Colombia?

Mr. Walters. Yes, there are. We have identified a number of organizational leaders that are facilitators, organizers, sometimes they use the armed groups and pay them for protection. Sometimes the armed groups in different areas provide certain levels of product for final processing and distribution. Basically the large scale distribution and shipment to the United States is not run by the armed groups, although there have been some of them involved in a few cases of distribution. But basically, those are run by trafficking organizations, both in Colombia and Mexico today, and they use both the Central American-Mexican route to move the drugs to the United States and the Caribbean.

Chairman Tom Davis. So let me just understand. What percent of the cocaine, let's talk about cocaine for example, and the coca crop, is controlled by the paramilitary groups and what percent by these other independent operators or cartels? Any idea?

Mr. Walters. I can't give you a precise percentage, because in some cases they're mixed.

Chairman Tom Davis. Sub-contracting and everything else?

Mr. Walters. Yes. They are involved in out stages and later stages, yes. We're trying to get a better handle on that. We also believe frankly that some of what we've seen in the large number of desertions I referred to in my written testimony of the armed group participants are a result in difficulties of financing because of the magnitude of the eradication and the disruption of the market for cocaine.

Chairman Tom Davis. I'm just trying to figure out, OK, we're going, the Colombian Government with help from us is going after some of the paramilitary groups down there now, and we wipe those out, there are still others standing that are going into the trade, is what you're saying?

Mr. Walters. Yes. They are working very closely together, and how it might transform itself in the future. Again, what happened was, the drug cultivation moved to Colombia and these armed groups became involved by controlling countryside, keeping government forces, the rule of law from that area so they could grow and produce cocaine. As the government takes control of the country, and I think that's important, we're not just eradicating, the Government of Colombia is systematically taking back the country, as you know, providing government presence and rule of law in all municipalities of the country for the first time in more than two decades.

Chairman Tom Davis. What do you think is the major obstacle and challenge that we face in Plan Colombia at this time?

Mr. Walters. Follow-through. We can and have and do make this problem smaller by pushing back. What happens is, we frequently don't stay at it. I think that everyone is rightly concerned that what are the limits of commitment. This is a large dollar amount, we know that. But when you look at the investment in terms of the $12.5 billion that we spend on drug control at the Federal level, and many times greater amounts that we spend in trying to pick up the pieces from the consequences of substance abuse, this is a cost-effective investment.

It obviously only is cost-effective if it makes a difference. I think that's what the historic opportunity is that the commitment and leadership of Colombia, where most of the effort is being applied, that the resources that we are supplying to support them there and in the other parts of the Andean region are making a difference and systematically shrinking in historic allotments the amount of cocaine coming into the country.

Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you very much.

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Walters, am I correct in understanding that $93 million in funding has been provided this year to protect the Colombian, to help the Colombian army protect the Cano Limon oil pipeline?

Mr. Walters. Yes.

Mr. Tierney. Can you explain to me how that expenditure is justified as part of a program whose primary priority mission is narcotics control?

Mr. Walters. Yes, we tried to work carefully with Congress in the original request over a year ago for these funds. It's designed to be a component to our effort to prevent terror organizations from destroying the institutions and economic opportunities in Colombia. The oil pipeline was systematically attacked, as you probably know, by the ELN and the FARC and a significant portion of both gross domestic product of the foreign earnings of Colombia, as well as a significant amount of the energy, some of this energy goes to the United States. What this allowed Colombia to do when protecting the pipeline is to maintain those earnings at a time when they are trying to grow the economy and for constructive ways.

Mr. Tierney. Explain for us, if you will, exactly how the protection is being provided. Who is providing it and in what manner?

Mr. Walters. Off the top of my head, I may not know all the details. We're essentially providing airlift and helicopters, and we're providing training to Colombian military personnel to be able to protect the pipeline at this point.

Mr. Tierney. And this is a private company's pipeline, am I correct?

Mr. Walters. Yes, it is.

Mr. Tierney. And what financial commitment are they putting into this?

Mr. Walters. I don't know what the company is putting into the program. In the past, we've worked on the basis of the concerns of the Colombia Government here, obviously.

Mr. Tierney. I'm concerned with that. It seems to me we're moving well beyond our, you know, Plan Colombia is the business of going after drugs and now expanding over to a pipeline, getting more involved, putting more money in there. That bothers me in terms of our exit strategy and our involvement growing on that.

Mr. Walters. If I may, if we didn't consult properly with your office, I apologize. But we were very careful when this proposal was initially made to make clear what it was specifically and to include it in the appropriations process. I want to make clear we did not intend to say we have a whole bunch of money over here and we're going to slide this in on the side. This was up front, because we knew there could be----

Mr. Tierney. I don't mean to imply that you did. I just want to address it as a policy question. I think we should consider whether this is wise policy and whether there is the kind of connection that should exist there, and whether or not we're getting into an expansion here that might not otherwise be somewhere we want to go or should go.

But changing the subject for a second, there was a recent New York Times article, June 9th of this year, last week in fact, and it basically was trying to put the 2003 coca eradication estimates into some sort of historical perspective. What they essentially said in the article was that although there has been a reduction this year, it gets us back to where we really were back in the 1990's, so that we're pretty much back to where we started.

Are you comfortable now or are you confident that this downward trend in cultivation is going to be sustained with the resources that you have?

Mr. Walters. Yes, if we follow through. What's happened is the cultivation grew after a decline, as a result of the decline in cultivation in Peru basically some in Bolivia, and the shift was to Colombia. We did have a balloon problem. What we've done is held the line in those other two countries and it looks like as Colombia eradicates at over 100,000 hectares a year, the ability to replant and reconstitute is broken and we begin to have systematic declines. That's what's happened.

Mr. Tierney. But there was part of that same article that talked about it being a race, it was a quote of one of the individuals, I think somebody from the State Department was saying that it's a race. We eradicate, they build somewhere else, we eradicate, they build somewhere else and we just try to get ahead of them. When it is that you think we'll get ahead of them to the degree that we can start to see some effect on the price and purity? I understand they're now currently as high as they've ever been.

Mr. Walters. We believe, the latest intelligence reports that we have just completed, that project and look at flow, we believe we will see a change in availability into the United States, on the streets of the United States in the next 12 months as a result of what happens here. It takes some time between the planting and the processing and the shipping and the dealing. We believe that will probably first appear in reductions in purity, because most of the market for this product, as you know, is dependent individuals. If you raise the price, they go into crisis.

Mr. Tierney. So a year from now?

Mr. Walters. Some time in the next 12 months. I can't tell you precisely, but I'm not saying it's going to be at the 12th month, I can't tell you it's going to be next month.

Mr. Tierney. Let me sneak in one more question, if I can, and that is on the fragmentation issue. What people are saying is instead of getting the balloon effect now, where we might see the crops moving over to Bolivia or elsewhere that in fact they're moving into some of the national parks and some of the other more difficult spots where you might not think, that the strains have become more resistant, and that's where it's going and it's going to be difficult for us to eradicate there. What do you find with regard to that issue?

Mr. Walters. There has been some increased growth in national park areas, and there's been a debate, as you probably know, about aerial spraying in the parks. We have I believe worked out an agreement with the Congress where the Government of Colombia, and we will certify spraying in these park areas as only a last resort. They are doing some manual eradication in those areas as well.

But obviously, we should not create safe havens. And we should also recognize, as I indicated at some length in my testimony, the environmental damage that is devastating is done by coca growth. It is what has stripped Colombia of an estimated million hectares of rain forest. In addition to the stripping of that rain forest and the delicate soil in the moving of this, the pouring of hundreds of thousands of gallons of toxic chemicals into the delicate ecosystem as a result of processing through petrochemicals, acids and others.

We believe, I know people are concerned about the environment, especially in this area where we're concerned also about biodiversity. But the biggest damage to the environment is to allow the coca business to continue. It has been the destroyer of the land and the polluting of the watersheds here of the Amazon. What's happening is, those can be restored, but we have to again stay at it, we have to not let patches of protection be created as we begin to squeeze this down.

But the fact is, the real issue here is, President Uribe has said he is going to eradicate every hectare of coca and poppy in Colombia, and he has aggressively pursued that course.

Mr. Tierney. So is it your position that there is more environmental damage being done from the cocaine growing itself as opposed to the eradication efforts?

Mr. Walters. I believe if you look at this carefully, there is no comparison. What we're using for eradication is the same chemical that you can buy in a hardware store and many Americans use. It is used more widely in Colombia in agriculture settings. It is used massively in the United States in agricultural settings. It breaks down into harmless components in 3 days after use. The chemicals, the insecticides, the others that are being used, sulfuric acid, gasoline, kerosene and others that are being used by the thousand and thousand gallon lots in processing and in cultivation, there is no question, anybody that looks at this systematically, I know it sounds, because people say, well, isn't spraying always environmentally somehow damaging because you're killing something.

But this is a business that lives by killing triple canopy rain forest and dumping toxic chemicals into the Amazon watershed. When we stop that, when we reduce the cultivation, we save that pollution and give the forest a chance to regrow.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I didn't know you were going to come to me next. I do have a question. I went down to Colombia 4\1/2\ years ago with Chairman Spence on an Armed Service Committee trip. And I hate to be the skunk at the garden party, but we heard almost the exact same report that you've just given. It's nothing against you, but we heard all these wonderful statistics then. I don't remember all the exact statistics.

But it seems to me that the Colombia Government is on a permanent dole here. What I'm wondering about, 4\1/2\ years from now, are we going to have somebody else in your same position come here and give us all these same statistics again, but we're still going to be paying $4 or $5 billion a year and this problem is just going to go on forever? I mean, it's amazing how similar your statements are. I'm not criticizing you, because you're just giving us statistics that I guess you believe are reliable.

But we had the top three people from the Colombian Government that were in charge of the eradication program at that time, plus several of the U.S. military people, and they told us of the great progress they had made, and had percentages just like what you have given us, and that was 4\1/ 2\ years ago.

Mr. Walters. If I may----

Mr. Duncan. And I'm sitting here, and it just makes me have to be skeptical about what you're saying. If you continue to make the progress that you're making, then this problem should be wiped out in 4 or 5 years. But I just have a strong feeling that's not going to happen. So how do you explain that?

Mr. Walters. Congressman, I do believe that cynicism about the drug problem generally, on both supply and demand, is our greatest enemy. That cynicism unfortunately has been earned in some cases. If people told you in Colombia 4 or 5 years ago that there were the kinds of reductions we're seeing today, they lied. It's that simple. We have numbers. The U.N. has numbers. The numbers did not show that 4 years ago or 4\1/2\ years ago.

But can we tell you that we have perfect knowledge here? No. But we can tell you that from multiple sources, we have the same information. There is a significant and measurable and massive reduction, a historic reduction in the production of cocaine in the world generally led by Colombia where over 70 percent of it is today grown.

Can we guarantee you or assure you that we're going to get to where you and I and everybody else wants to be? That is that we systematically reduce the drug problem. And I think the answer to that is, we can't guarantee it, because we've had a history of making progress, real progress. The drug problem today is, the number of users in the United States, I think it's important to point out, is half what they were at the peak in 1979 that we measured.

But it's still too high. It went to a low point in 1992, and teen drug use doubled between 1992 and the mid-1990's. When we forget about it, when we stop acting, when we don't do effective things, we get a bigger problem. But that's true of every problem.

Mr. Duncan. I'll tell you, I think that the Colombian Government is going to do everything they possibly can to make sure that they continue getting these billions and billions of dollars each year. And they're going to tell us that they've eradicated it a lot of places in Colombia, but they'll tell us that they've increased it someplace else or something.

I hope I'm wrong. I hope they get it wiped out in 4 or 5 years. And if these percentages that you're telling us today hold up, then it should be pretty well eliminated in 4 or 5 years.

Mr. Walters. I think it's important for us to be clear so we don't generate cynicism ourselves. Our estimate has been, and it's not precise, that the relative ability to reconstitute and replant following spray, again, it's important to lay some groundwork here. The coca is a bush, as you probably saw when you were down there. It takes an estimate, somewhere from between 6 months and 18 months for it to regrow to full productive capacity. So when you eradicate it, it has to be replanted, it has to be allowed to grow to be productive.

They can, with the magnitude of workers they have in the field now, we estimate reconstituted somewhere around 90,000, 96,000 hectares a year. That's why I think it's very important that we spray at the plus 100,000 hectare level as the Colombians have done the last several years and begin to collapse that. A some of those workers move out of this business, the ability to reconstitute, we anticipate, will go down. But----

Mr. Duncan. What you're saying, though, and I can tell you, I spent 7\1/2\ years as a criminal court judge, trying felony criminal cases before I came here. And I'll tell you, I hate drugs. I'm scared to death of them. I tell all the kids that. I've seen horrible things. Almost every case that we handled was involved with drugs in some way.

But what you just said a few minutes ago, you said Colombia in spite of all the billions and billions and billions that we've poured down there over the last several years, that Colombia is still producing 70 percent of the world's cocaine, is that what you just said?

Mr. Walters. Yes. Seventy percent of a pie that's one-third smaller, and a pie that will be 50 percent smaller, we estimate, at the end of this year. So yes, that's why there isn't a balloon effect. If it was producing a smaller percentage, it would indicate that the movement of growth had gone to other countries.

So we have so far contained and shrunk that pie. We estimate that will produce reduced availability in the United States, as I said, within the next 12 months.

Mr. Duncan. Well, I'll tell you this, I hope in 5 years' time you can come back or somebody can come back and tell us it's all been wiped out, we don't have to keep sending all these billions down there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

The gentlelady from Minnesota, Ms. McCollum.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Sir, if I understand your testimony, and some information that I have, it's correct that the coca farmers are growing in smaller plots in places like State parks, correct?

Mr. Walters. There are some. It's a small portion of the overall growth, but there is some movement to State parks.

Ms. McCollum. Would you agree also with some information that I've read that the plants that the farmers are growing now actually produce more leaves per plant?

Mr. Walters. We have adjusted our estimate, not so much in leaf, but of the so-called alkaloid content of the cocaine substance that's extracted from the leaf. It's not necessarily more leaves, there have been adjustments up and down based on field tests in Colombia, so we get reliable estimates of what is being produced. But there has not been in the last couple of years----

Ms. McCollum. I think you answered my question. So you're saying that some of the plants can actually produce more?

Mr. Walters. Yes, there are different varieties of coca----

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

Mr. Walters [continuing]. But there has not been----

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

Mr. Walters. For the record, please, if I can answer the question----

Ms. McCollum. I only have a few minutes.

Mr. Walters. I'd like to answer the question, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tom Davis. It's her time.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you. So you're saying that the amount-- --

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Mr. Souder. Part of this money we put in, the last time I was down there and talked with Occidental and other companies there, felt that the number of attacks were going down, They have minor protection, but they're like Pinkerton forces against armed forces.

But they can now hopefully start to explore this, because it's right near Venezuela, one of the richest oil basins in the world. If they can make their economy work, they can afford to pay their own military, and they can afford to buy their own Blackhawks. But if their economy doesn't work, their whole country will come crashing down and then, because of our drug problem, we have to go in and do it.

I have two questions. One is, we also, in addition to the coca problem, have a heroin problem, about to be dwarfed by Afghanistan, but nevertheless a heroin problem out of--I couldn't resist that--out of Colombia. It's high in the mountains, it's hard to get to. A recent FARC defector said that molasses is being put on the heroin and it's making it hard to aerially eradicate. This is one of the constant debates we've had, because in Bolivia, hand eradication worked very well.

You mentioned the national parks problem, which by the way is happening. We have the first coca in our parks in California. That is a challenge, even though it's the same thing we spray crops in our farmers' fields and in the farmers' fields elsewhere about aerial spraying. Have you seen that problem of molasses coating the heroin? Does that restrict air spraying, and do you see us moving more to hand eradication in those places if it becomes a problem?

Mr. Walters. I haven't heard about the molasses, but there are periodically accounts of ways of circumventing the spray, putting plastic bags over the plants, both poppy and the coca. The problem with almost all of these is they also inhibit the plant growth over any period of time. They're also labor intensive and they make it more difficult. None of them have been used, to the best of our knowledge, on a significant enough scale to undermine the eradication effort.

It is true, as you heard, we are looking at over 100,000 hectares of coca. We're looking at less than 5,000 hectares of poppy, and that's really a basis of figuring two crops on each plot. So that is less than 2,500 hectares. It's a much smaller problem, much smaller plots, as you know.

What we are doing, what the Colombians are doing, is mixing both spray with manual eradication, but that's not because of measures they're taking to prevent the spray, it's because some of these areas are very difficult to get to by aircraft. They are high in the mountains and sometimes it's hard to get an intelligence overhead read from an aircraft on where they are. Sometimes it's hard to get spray into the side of a mountain where a field may be because of the geography. So in that case, the Colombians are trying to move manual eradicators in.

In addition, we are trying to go after this problem with better intelligence. We're spraying everything we find. We're trying to kill one way or the other every plot of poppy that they can find. We are aware that because it's smaller and more dispersed there is a problem of finding it, and the DEA has put in more people. There is a program now of paying people for information about lots of poppy, as well as organizations that are involved in it. So we've tried to go after the poppy problem, which you know we do take seriously, both in Colombia, in transit and in the movement inside the United States from its arrival in small amounts, frequently by aircraft, passengers on aircraft or in their baggage or on their person.

Mr. Souder. Part of our problem here is that almost all Afghan heroin is going to Europe and Europe hasn't been as great a help as they should be in Afghanistan. In Colombia, a high percentage is going to Europe. Even as we try to control our demand, our Colombia problem stays there because so much is going to Europe. Are you pleased with their help?

Mr. Walters. We have consistently asked the Europeans to do more. The British have been steadfast allies in this for more than a decade. We have had sporadic help from some other nations. But it's been small, especially as you point out, considering what they're suffering at this. When President Uribe went to Europe recently, there was, I believe, completely unjustified criticism of him by people whose nations are dearly suffering and should be thanking him for the progress and the possibilities he's allowed in the future.

I don't know of another nation in the world that has had as much progress as rapidly on human rights and safety of its citizens as Colombia has over the last several years since he's been in office. And instead, there are groups that are living in the past in Europe and some, frankly, I think in other places, that think that's not going on. They have to catch up with modern times. President Uribe's popularity in Colombia is based on the fact he's brought economic growth, safety and security. And that continues to be the case.

The military's popularity in Colombia is based on the fact they've stopped being the thugs that they were a decade ago, and through our help, largely through the leadership of Colombian officials, they've become more professional. They remain, we have to remain vigilant, we have to hold the standards, but they understand and we understand that the progress here requires that not to be a country that's a war zone, and not to be a country that's based on narco-dollars that will make it a war zone. The progress there has been historic.

Mr. Souder. Thank you.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. The gentlelady from California.

Ms. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm listening to the witness talk about the progress that's being made with Colombia, Plan Colombia, and I must commend the work that has been done that has gone into that. But the thought occurs to me when we talk about narcoterrorism, what are we doing on this end? It's the consumption of their product that creates the problems, and we have them listed as addiction, drug related crimes, deaths and a destabilizing of our societal core.

I am told that in countries such as Colombia, Afghanistan that the core of their economy is the growing of these plants. My question is, and you might not be able to answer but you might help us to think about it, what are we doing on this end, so the demand won't be as large as it is where billions of dollars return back to someone's pocket or to the country? Conspicuous consumption, sub rosa consumption or whatever, the consumption is here.

Mr. Walters. Absolutely, and that is, I believe, one of the most important questions we can ask about this. It is why we have tried to emphasize in our national effort, is we have to have balance. The President has said, when he's met with us privately and he has said to foreign leaders, we're not asking other countries to do things that we should do in our own borders. That's why we've asked for a reorienting of the drug budget, as well as a strategy to establish that balance.

The President, as you know, over a year ago in the State of the Union, asked for an additional $600 million over 3 years for treatment through the Access to Recovery program, on top of the $2 billion block grant that we have. He asked us, how do we close the treatment gap. Our national estimate is that roughly 100,000 people a year seek treatment and are not able to get it, based on our national survey. The average cost of treatment figure for the Federal Government is $2,000 per episode. The $200 million he asked for for over 3 years is 100,000 people times $2,000. We offer to be an example of closing that gap at the Federal level.

We got from Congress last year the first $100 million. We just got applications for that money, 44 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and 20 Native American tribes applied. With some members, I'm not saying members at this table, of this body, we had trouble convincing them that we could use that money or be able to make this program work. I think the fact that we've had the applicants we are of the overall estimates of numbers that need treatment aren't sufficient indicates we need the full $200 million we asked for for the next year.

In addition, we have put in a series of programs that are designed to help to move people into treatment that need it. We have released moneys that will tie crucial health systems, I was at Ben Taub Hospital in Houston, in the Chicago area we have funded County Hospital in Chicago, to train all workers, as well as doctors and nurses, to screen those people who come into our emergency rooms, many of whom have accidents or are suffering from substance abuse, to screen them and to give them the training to provide them reliable ability to refer individuals to intervention or treatment for substance abuse.

In Houston, they will do 100,000 people this year. They will spread it to their satellite community clinic center and do a million people a year. We have 7 million people we estimate that need treatment. Many of them are in denial, as we know, every family suffered substance abuse directly or indirectly. The most pernicious part of this disease is denial. We need help to bring people in. We have asked for additional moneys to support drug courts where, when individuals come into the criminal justice system largely because they have an addiction, rather than allowing them to go down a path to jail, we use the supervision of drug treatment courts, as you know, to get them into treatment and to help them stay there, which we know is a key to their success.

We've had trouble getting those funds. Congress funded half our request.

Ms. Watson. Excuse me, I'm going to ask you to yield before the Chair makes his----

Mr. Walters. Sure.

Ms. Watson. This is explosive, but I've got to say it. If we could take the financial benefit out of it, and I'm just going to throw that out, and anyone in the audience, and then our panel can figure out what that means, but some way, No. 1, we've got to treat people who are already addicted.

Mr. Walters. Yes.

Ms. Watson. But we have to take the benefit of people on the streets who sell this stuff. And somebody up on that 40th floor in the financial institution is involved. Too much money in it.

Mr. Walters. Yes.

Ms. Watson. So we have to do several things at the same time. Certainly try to eradicate, and I don't think we ever do it, because I remember opium in the far east going back centuries. I understand that in Afghanistan today, there are farmers now growing the crop to support their families.

So we've got to work on the consumption over on this end and the business that surrounds it. Thank you very much. I appreciate your response.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you, Ms. Watson.

Mr. Walters. If I could just touch on that point, we're focused on the international programs. The international programs of the Federal Government, just to put it in context, because I think it is a point of emphasis, are a little over $1 billion total worldwide, 9.1 percent of the Federal drug control budget. Interdiction is a little over $2.5 billion at our borders, a little over 20 percent of the budget request. Domestic law enforcement is a little over $3 billion, or 25 percent.

Forty-five percent of the overall budget is prevention and treatment, 55 percent is supply control, including all those things. The single largest area of funding, at 29.4 percent, is the $3.7 billion we spend on treatment. We have made progress in prevention in the last 2 years. We want to treat people, because most of this cocaine, as you know, is going to dependent individuals, and we need to reduce that demand, and we need to do it through treatment at multiple points.

But we are not, I didn't mean to suggest forgetting to do law enforcement in the United States, and of the key component that Administrator Tandy, who will be on a subsequent panel has done, is every single case DEA does has a money component. Take the money out, find the money. We do not believe we're doing a good enough job against the money. But we are doing a better job against the organizations and the structures that fund this here and abroad. We've linked in a consolidated way the business of the drug trade and focusing intelligence and enforcement efforts against that business.

So we hope that in the future we will be able to both parallel what we are doing at home in what we're doing with other nations, as well as our partners in other parts of the world.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Mr. Van Hollen, any questions?

Mr. Van Hollen. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tom Davis. All right, I think that's all. Thank you very much.

Mr. Tierney. Mr. Chairman, could I ask just two questions?

Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you for your patience. One is, I talked a little bit at the end of my questioning about reductions and the eradication and whether they affect price and purity. Can you tell me what the most recent price and purity data from your office is, what does it show?

Mr. Walters. We have not seen a change in price and purity in the national average over the last couple of years in any aggregate. What I said was, we anticipate, given what we're seeing with the magnitude of eradication and interdiction, worldwide we seized 400 metric tons of cocaine in source countries and in transit last year. That's a record. And we know that it takes, the estimate is roughly 18 months to 12 months for the floor from the pipeline in the fields to the streets of the United States. We expect to see that now, but we have not seen a change. I can give you the individual reports of price and purity for cocaine and supply those for the record.

Mr. Tierney. Would you do that, please?

Mr. Walters. Sure.

Mr. Tierney. And last, following up on the Ambassador's questions on that, the precursors that you mentioned earlier that go into the production of the drugs and the money, obviously, what are we doing with respect to the manufacturers of those precursors and the distributors and to the banks or other financial interests, what's our effort there?

Mr. Walters. Not to dodge, but some of the subsequent witnesses can give you more detail. Overall, what we have tried to do is identify key controllable precursors. Sometimes it's difficult because they are widely used, things like kerosene or some petrol products. There are some precursors that have been more critical in the refining process, and we've had efforts at various places to control them. In some cases, they have been forced to use less effective chemicals as a response and in some cases they've used new methods, so we tried to stay at it.

I think the most encouraging thing on the money side is the effort that Colombia and Mexico have made with us to go after the black market peso, the exchanges which we believe are a source of funding a great deal of this, where money comes back through a system that's been used in some cases to evade taxes even on a larger scale in Latin America than to launder drug money.

Now, we also know that there are instances where people move bulk cash out of the country, we seize it, we're increasing our efforts to focus on that as well. But what we have tried to do now for the first time, and I believe you will see cases, frankly, in the next 12 months, that begin to go after the larger volumes of money. But we have billions of dollars here. We consider it a weakness that we have not been able to do a better job.

Now, a substantial portion of that money is of course being pulled out at the local level where the money first turns from drugs into dollars. And it's being used to fund criminal activity and other activities in our own cities. There are people, I was just in Chicago, who believe we ought to call our urban drug traffickers urban terrorist instead of drug traffickers, because of the violence, the shooting, the murder and mayhem that they cause.

But we need to do a better job on the money side of it. But it's also, you know, there aren't an enormous number of things we need to do. It's basically common sense. We need to collapse this business. We have to begin with demand, everybody agrees with prevention, we have to do treatment. We have to be able to go to where the source is, so they can't operate with impunity.

But we also have to do a better job at home. My office has begun to work with major metropolitan areas to bring together demand and enforcement. We've begun to work with our Federal partners to create a consolidated priority targeting list of major organizations. We want to go after the business as a trade, and I think your question is right on point, we need to accelerate that. But that is something we've learned I think in regard to terror we have to do. It's a small number of people, but we've got to find them because they do a great deal of damage.

Mr. Tierney. In the GAO report that came out of the Senate testimony back in June of last year, talked about a lack of adequate performance measures with respect to Plan Colombia. If I just turn that over a little bit and say, do you have any performance measures with respect to how we're doing against these manufacturers and distributors of precursors and the financiers?

Mr. Walters. I don't think we have a clear numerical goal on the precursors, simply because some of them are controllable, some of them aren't. We're not quite sure how much is being diverted. We try to put in diversion control programs in a variety of these countries that have had some effect. But because we don't entirely know how much they use, or it's hard to tell sometimes how much is being diverted from year to year. We have seen changes in the past in the aggregate quality of the product.

For example, Bolivian-produced, on average Bolivian- produced cocaine and cocaine base is of very low quality. It's largely, we believe, being sent to Brazil, because it's a fledgling market, where inferior product can be consumed. But it has not been able to maintain that. Some of that is because of chemical controls as well as the ability to control the market. So it does vary. It's hard to give you a precise answer, because we can't rack and stack the exact number of gallons that go in and get diverted in each place.

But let me try to get back to your staff and to the committee with the best information we have, because it is an important sector.

Mr. Tierney. I thank you for that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Mr. Souder, you have some followup.

Mr. Souder. I wanted to make an addition to Mr. Tierney's information request. Accountability is one of the most difficult things we have here. But when you respond with the price and purity figures, if you could also include any evidence on stockpiling, because we simply don't know what happened in some of this period, including how long is the shelf life of this cocaine when it heads out. We certainly have found piles of it different places that may have gone before the implementation of our plan. How long and what potentials are in that messes up our numbers? Because if you have a 5-year shelf life, a 10-year shelf life, a 2-year shelf life, if we have stockpiles in Mexico or in places in the United States, that messes up our measures of effectiveness.

The second thing is on the signature program, because I've been perplexed by this for a long time, that we apparently depend on determining where the stuff's coming from a lot on the production method. And in watching the production method, as others copy Colombian methods, is it possible that some of this has moved to Mexico? Are we confident of the signature program and what are we doing with that?

Mr. Walters. I can answer two of those. On the shelf life, I'll get back to you on, because I want to give you accurate information. I am concerned about stockpiling as well. We have no evidence, concrete evidence of significant stockpiling. There have been theories that one of the reasons we haven't seen more of a reduction is that first of all, the FARC had stockpiles in what was the demilitarized zone, and when the Government of Colombia went in or ended that zone, they may have shipped those out.

There also has been some speculation that the right wing paramilitaries, the AUC, in engaging in these peace talks, may have taken stocks and moved them out of the country. We do not have concrete evidence to confirm that at this point. So we don't know whether there's----

Mr. Souder. What about Mexico?

Mr. Walters. We do not have evidence, to the best of my knowledge, maybe other witnesses will have something else, but we work pretty closely together on this, because we're trying to measure the flow of substantial and large stockpiles that would affect the overall measure in a strategic way.

On the signature program, we do use processing, you're absolutely right, of course. We are trying to develop another method that will allow us to determine where the product comes from based on where the plant is grown. We are funding this and it looks promising. We're trying to accelerate that as rapidly as possible with DEA's laboratory and we'll give you a full brief on that, and your staff, at a time convenient to you.

Chairman Tom Davis. OK, thank you very much. We're going to move to our next panel, we'll take a 2-minute recess. Thank you very much, Director Walters.

[Recess.]

Chairman Tom Davis. Again, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today. Joining us on our second panel will be the Ambassador of Colombia to the United States, the Honorable Luis Alberto Moreno. Ambassador Moreno will provide the committee with an update on his country's ongoing fight against drugs and terror. Several important leaders in the administration who are key figures in the battle against narcoterrorism also join us. We welcome the Honorable Roger Noriega, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs; the Honorable Robert Charles, who will be with us in just a minute, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; the Honorable Thomas O'Connell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict; General James T. Hill, the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command; and finally, last but not the least, the Honorable Karen Tandy, the Administrator of the DEA.

We welcome all the witnesses and their testimony today. It's our policy that we swear you in before you testify. If you'll just rise with me and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. I think you know the rules. Ambassador Moreno, we'll start with you. Thank you for being with us.

STATEMENTS OF LUIS ALBERTO MORENO, AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA; ROGER F. NORIEGA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ROBERT B. CHARLES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; THOMAS W. O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; GENERAL JAMES T. HILL, U.S. ARMY COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND; AND KAREN P. TANDY, ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT

ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Ambassador Moreno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member and distinguished members of the committee. It is my distinct pleasure to appear before you today to discuss developments relating to Plan Colombia and the current situation in my country. I have a written statement that I would like to submit for the record.

Chairman Tom Davis. Without objection. All of your written statements will be in the record, as will, I might add, let me just interrupt you, Mr. Souder has a statement he wants to put in the record.

Mr. Souder. This is an insertion about the Colombian conflict.

Chairman Tom Davis. Without objection, that will be inserted.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Go ahead.

Ambassador Moreno. Thank you.

Let me begin by thanking the U.S. Congress for its support in Colombia's ongoing fight against drugs and terror and express my appreciation to the House Committee on Government Reform for holding this hearing. It pleases me as Colombian ambassador to the United States to pay tribute to the chairman of both the committee and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources Representatives Tom Davis and Mark Souder, for their personal commitment to the fight against the scourge of drug trafficking and their contribution to security and developing it in Colombia.

I am pleased to report today that the U.S.-Colombian partnership under Plan Colombia and its successor programs has proved a sound investment for both our nations. Now in its 4th year of implementation, Plan Colombia has played a significant role in combating terrorism and narcoterrorism, restoring economic growth and strengthening the rule of law, human rights and alternative development opportunities.

The illegal violent actors in Colombia's conflict have close ties with international networks that engage in drugs and arm trafficking, money laundering and other criminal activities. The United States is helping Colombia to cutoff the resources that these terrorist groups use to wage their war against Colombian society. Every day, thousands of Americans and Colombians work side by side, building a more secure and prosperous Colombia, and by extension, help advance U.S. strategic interests in the hemisphere.

In recent years, Colombia has seen dramatic results in the eradication and interdiction of narcotics. I don't want to burden you or the committee with figures, all of which can be found in my written testimony. But I want to stress that there have been advances on every front. As of December 2003, coca crops were reduced by 33 percent, more than 300 tons of cocaine with an estimated street value of $9.5 billion have been seized since Plan Colombia started, and more than 9 metric tons of heroin have been removed from the U.S. market in 2003 alone.

The current government's democratic security and defense policy, with key U.S. cooperation, has significantly enhanced the size, training and capabilities of Colombia's armed forces and police. More than 16,000 police officers have been added since 2000, with the result that today, every municipality has a police presence--a first for Colombia.

As for the military, we have added 52,000 plus combat ready troops since 2000, a 60 percent increase. In addition, our armed forces have greatly improved their ability to move rapidly to conflict areas, thanks to U.S. provided helicopters and other specialty aircraft. These assets have been critical in the success of the aerial spraying program, both for the actual spraying of illegal crops and protecting personnel engaged in this dangerous activity.

Enhanced military and police readiness has shifted the balance in the fight against narcoterrorist groups responsible for much of Colombia's violence and civil rights abuses to the government's advantage. As a result of Plan Colombia, the Colombian armed forces and national police have intensified military operations against these organizations. This is shown by significant increases in captures and casualties of members of all illegal armed groups.

Importantly, with U.S. intelligence and training assistance, the Colombian military is being increasingly successful in going after high value targets in the terrorist leadership. In the last 5 months, two high ranking members of FARC have been captured. U.S. training and equipment have produced a new type of military force in Colombia: more professional, more efficient, more motivated, better equipped and more respectful of their obligation to human rights and international humanitarian law.

The U.S. Government has provided training in areas like anti-terrorism, anti-kidnapping, bomb disposal and protection for senior officials. Notably, in 2003 alone, 73,000 members of the Colombian military received intensive training in human rights and international humanitarian law. There was a significant decline of human rights violations in Colombia during the year 2003, including a 48 percent decrease in extra judicial executions. To cite an example, homicides of trade unionists fell by 57 percent during 2003, and were down a further 25 percent in the first 4 months of this year.

A vast program of judicial reform is underway in order to adopt the accusatorial system used in common law countries, a change that is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the administration of justice. To that end, 39 new oral trial courtrooms have been established with USAID, and training has been provided for 3,400 prosecutors, judges, magistrates and defense attorneys, as well as more than 700 community based conciliators.

Since the beginning of Plan Colombia, nearly 200 persons have been extradited to the United States for criminal prosecution, and in 2003, prosecutions for money laundering rose by 25 percent, while asset forfeiture cases increased by 42 percent. The United States and Colombia have successfully implemented alternative development and other social programs to help coca and poppy farmers' transition to legal activity and provide relief to other citizens affected by terrorism and crime. More than 45,000 hectares of legal crops are now in place, benefiting more than 34,000 families who have committed to give up the cultivation of illegal crops.

Plan Colombia has also successfully completed 835 social and economic infrastructure projects, including roads, schools, health clinics and sewer systems in the southern region of Colombia, where this development leads to reduced dependency on illegal drug cultivation and production. It has also provided assistance to more than 1.6 million internally displaced persons, individuals and families who have been forced to flee their homes and communities because of violence.

Additionally, U.S. support for military and social programs has enabled the Colombian Government to earmark the necessary resources for education and health care. This has translated into a substantial increase in the number of children enrolled in public schools and a significant enlargement in the reach of the public health care system.

A strong, growing Colombian economy is fundamental for stability and defeating drugs and terror. Plan Colombia has contributed significantly to restoring investor and consumer confidence and fueled economic recovery in the country. GDP growth in 2003 was 3.8 percent, the highest rate since 1995, and more than 1.2 new jobs were created. Following the renewal of the Andean Trade Preferences Act in 2003, Colombia-U.S. bilateral trade grew 10 percent in 2003 to $10.1 billion, contributing to the creation of thousands of jobs in both countries. Building on that momentum, Colombia and the United States have just started free trade negotiations. A free trade agreement with the United States will significantly enhance Colombia's long term economic prospects and security, and create a positive and predictable environment for new foreign and domestic investment.

While significant progress has been achieved under Plan Colombia, the battle against narcoterrorism is far from over. Colombia and the U.S. need to consolidate the gains in terms of security, law and order and economic growth and begin to look ahead to ensuring lasting peace, stability and prosperity in the long term.

Some specific challenges ahead are as follows: sustaining the military offensive against narcoterrorist groups. As Colombia continues to take the fight to the terrorists, the country will need sustained U.S. assistance in the medium term. This assistance is vital to consolidate the security gains achieved so far and to ensure the success of ongoing military operations in remote areas of the country. Moreover, continued U.S.-Colombian cooperation on the counter-narcotics and transnational crime fighting fronts will help to starve narcoterrorist groups of the drug proceeds they need to maintain their fighting and logistical apparatus.

Consolidating economic recovery through an FTA with the United States expanding international trade and attracting foreign investment remain critical to promoting economic growth, employment and security in Colombia. An FTA with the United States will not only increase exports and promote job creation, but also help attract foreign direct investment to the country in such crucial sectors as oil and gas, where Colombia has enormous untapped potential.

While Colombia continues to exert military pressure on narcoterrorist organizations, the government has opened the door for talks with groups and individual combatants genuinely interested in giving up their arms. The government is determined to seek a peace agreement with these groups in accordance with our legislation and mindful of international standards. Within this framework, a peace process with the AUC is currently underway with international verification. And there is now a distinct possibility of negotiations with the ELN under the auspices of the Mexican Government.

As part of any agreement, demobilizing illegal combatants must be realized on a scale never before attempted in Colombia. Therefore, these processes will pose enormous challenges and require significant financial resources.

We must continue to provide help to thousands of Colombian families who have been displaced by terrorism and violence. This means returning them to their homes and communities, helping them find productive employment and generally enabling them to restart their lives. It is also imperative that we work to repair the damage done to our valuable rain forest ecosystems by terrorists and drug traffickers, both in terms of forest destruction and the widespread dumping of precursor chemicals into the Amazon River systems.

Colombia looks forward to working on the consolidation of Plan Colombia, in order to build on the progress we have realized to date and to develop new, cooperative efforts to address the changing nature of the conflict. As President Uribe aptly put it during his recent visit to the United States, we are more now than ever determined to stay the course.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Moreno follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much, Ambassador Moreno.

Assistant Secretary Noriega.

Mr. Noriega. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you and members of the committee for your continued leadership on U.S. policy toward Colombia, and in particular, on your willingness to engage with Colombian Government officials and to take congressional delegations to Colombia to see for yourselves the reality there. We believe that the engagement of the U.S. Congress, the leadership of the U.S. Congress on this issue is crucial to developing, implementing and maintaining momentum behind our policy on Colombia, which is, I think you will agree, paying solid dividends for our national interests. It is these common efforts between the Congress and the executive branch, and the bipartisan support that this policy enjoys, that make a big difference to our success and the prospects for meeting our objectives.

You see before you here, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, members of an interagency team here, that work together well in implementing this policy. There are many who you have met also in the field, in Colombia, led by Ambassador Bill Wood, members of the various agencies that are represented here who put their lives at risk, playing an important role in implementing our policy in Colombia. I want to recognize their great contribution.

Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues know this integrated policy very well. We support the Colombian Government's efforts to defend and to strengthen its democratic institutions against the acute threat of narcoterrorism, to promote respect to human rights and the rule of law, to intensify counter-narcotics efforts, to foster social and economic development and investment, and to address immediate humanitarian needs that Colombia is confronting.

As several of you have seen for yourselves, Colombia is a vastly different country today than what it was just 5 years ago. Then, many feared that South America's oldest democracy could unravel to a failed narco-state. Today, Colombia is heading in a very different, very promising direction, consolidating itself as a stable nation that provides security and stability for its citizens. Today, Colombians have greater confidence and optimism for the future. Today it is the narcoterrorists who are on the defensive.

Colombia's economy is growing and investors are again looking to tap the rich entrepreneurial spirit of the Colombian people, the private sector. The Colombian people overwhelmingly support President Uribe's leadership and in establishing democratic security for all of Colombia's people. In addition to providing vision, determination and a sense of urgency, President Uribe has accorded 16 percent of Colombia's national budget now to national defense.

While serious challenges remain, the news from Colombia over the past several years tells a story of steady progress. Since 2002, the Colombian national police supported by the United States, has sprayed close to 760,000 acres of coca and coca cultivation has declined dramatically each year. Opium cultivation declined by 10 percent in 2003, and we are always seeking new ways to find that crop and kill it.

With the expanded authority provided by the U.S. Congress, we've been able to assist Colombia's counter-terrorism efforts against the 30,000 people who make up three guerrilla groups, the FARC, the ELN and the AUC, each of which have been designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Government. The Colombian military, in concert with the national police, is taking the fight to these terrorist groups like never before, significantly stepping up defensive operations and arrests.

At the same time, President Uribe continues to hold out the possibility of a peaceful settlement to these conflicts. Both the AUC and the ELN have demonstrated an interest in such a process in recent weeks. However, President Uribe has insisted, I think wisely, that irregular groups observe an immediate cease-fire and end their illegal activities as preconditions for this process moving forward.

The recent massacre of 34 coca farmers in the northern town of La Gabarra is proof that the FARC guerrillas have yet to forego their use of violence and their involvement in the drug trade. While we support the peace process as part of President Uribe's strategy for defeating terrorist groups and imposing the rule of law, we have made clear that any settlement must hold criminals accountable for their crimes. In particular, we have stressed that we will continue to press for the extradition of Colombians indicted by the United States.

President Uribe's Plan Patriota has put the FARC on the defensive. Last year, the Colombian military effectively cleared the province around Bogota of terrorist fighters. This year, they have expended operations in south central Colombia, deploying troops into the traditional FARC stronghold, reclaiming municipalities that have long been in the hands of that organization, disrupting important lines of communication that are important to the terrorist threat and also to the narcotics trafficking.

These efforts have produced real results, extending a permanent security presence into all of Colombia's municipalities. Internal displacement is down by 50 percent. Fifty key terrorists and their financiers have been killed or captured just since July 2003. Colombian defense spending is up, and the attacks on the vital Cano Limon oil pipeline is down dramatically in the last several years.

Our human rights goals complement our policy. We consider Colombia a committed partner in promoting human rights, but we also leverage the human rights conditionality of our assistance program to push the Colombian Government to sever all paramilitary-military ties, and to bring to justice military officials involved in human rights violations, or involved with paramilitarism. We will continue to treat the protection of human rights as an essential part of our policy. Frankly, the Colombian Government can and must be even more proactive in identifying and remedying weaknesses in its human rights record.

The human rights of our own citizens are at stake, too. We are now at about a 16 month mark for the captivity of three Americans who were part of our programs there, Keith Stencil, Mark Gonsalves and Thomas House. We are doing everything that we possibly can to arrange for their safe return.

Mr. Chairman, our counter-drug efforts in Colombia are complemented by our programs in neighboring states where the illicit drug trade presents a historic problem. Our strategy is not to push coca cultivation from one country to another or from one part of a country to another, but to hammer away at every link in the drug chain in all of the countries concerned. We have made steady progress in reducing illicit crops in both Peru and Bolivia, as well as securing greater cross-border cooperation from Colombia's neighbors. We also recognize that trade and economic interaction must be part of our strategy, so that Colombia and, for that matter, its neighbors have the resources to carry on this fight and defend their sovereignty. That's why the trade talks that we are having with Andean countries is clearly very important.

Mr. Chairman, skipping ahead, President Bush is committed to maintaining a robust partnership with Colombia, and we appreciate greatly Congress's abiding bipartisan leadership on the subject. It is important to note that the Colombian people themselves have shown the political will and have shared the financial burden to win the war and eventually to win the peace. We thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I'm prepared to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

Mr. Charles, I have to swear you in. You were not here for the swearing in.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. The light will go on after 4 minutes, try to sum up after 5. Your entire statement is in the record, and we appreciate the job you did with the Speaker's Drug Task Force before you came here and now with the administration. Thanks for being with us.

Mr. Charles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really sincerely want to thank you for holding this hearing and for frankly becoming so engaged in Plan Colombia and the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative. I think it's saving lives by the thousands and I think leadership by the U.S. Congress makes a huge difference. So I wanted to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman Souder and frankly, the Republican and Democratic leaders in the House of Representatives and Senate.

Oddly enough, I think we are also at a unique, almost unprecedented moment. I think we are aligned. That leadership, your leadership in this chamber and in the Senate is aligned with a remarkable administration team that sees eye to eye with mutual respect, including Secretary Noriega, Secretary O'Connell, General Hill, Administrator Tandy. If you had us off microphone, we would be agreeing as fully as we will agree with you probably on the things we have to say today.

I also think that is aligned with a third star element which is the U.S. ally, Colombia, and the extraordinary leadership of President Uribe and Ambassador Moreno. This is a unique time, and it is in that spirit that I want to offer you my thoughts, which will be abbreviated. Again, I want to thank you for inviting us.

Plan Colombia, complemented by our regional efforts in the Andes, represents a significant investment by the American people and the Congress to fight the flow of drugs responsible for ending thousands of young lives each year in America, to fight powerful and entrenched terrorists in this hemisphere and to protect democratic rule across the Andean region. The success in Colombia over the past few years would not have been possible without strong leadership from President Uribe, who took office in 2002. His administration has taken an aggressive position against narcoterrorism, which enables our Colombia programs to work. It is again my pleasure to testify with my colleagues today, all of whom are leaders in their own right.

In a sound bite, you have given us the power to make a difference, and in fact the investment in our national security is paying off. Generally, Congress has a right to look not only for sound policy and well managed implementation but also for a measurable return on the American people's investment. While measuring the shift of tectonic plates can be difficult, I believe we are seeing real and one may hope lasting change.

In short, your investment is paying off in numerous ways, and you've heard the statistics, so I'm not going to go through them again. What I will say in real broad brush strokes is you have drug cultivation in Colombia down for a second straight year. By the way, the only time that has happened in the last 14 years, and a double digit reduction at that, as Mr. Walters indicated.

Second, you have, despite recent killings by the FARC, you have violent crime and terrorist attacks down and falling. Third, you have a respect for rule of law expanding in palpable, measurable ways and putting tap roots down in places we never had the rule of law. And finally, we're providing meaningful, often innovative alternatives to poverty level farmers, titling land, giving them opportunities they never had before by the thousands. The Andean Counter-Drug Initiative, as you know better than I, is a multi-front effort that does not begin and end with counter-narcotics. It is a robust effort, yours as much as ours, at creating a sustainable, regional, deep-seated and democratically faithful alternative to the destruction in terror on personal, national and hemispheric levels that comes from drug trafficking and drug funded terror.

In short, what we do in places like Colombia has a direct effect on us here in the United States, whether it's Fairfax County or Fort Wayne, IN, or any of the other locations represented, it is directly affecting the security and the safety of hometown America. Our policy and our commitment, our aim is to wipe out narcoterrorists. We will never fully eliminate drugs from this hemisphere, but we can get them down to a level where they are de minimis and where those organizations are completely taken off the face of what we worry about day to day. Also to help Colombia seize their assets, strengthen Colombia's institutions and increase legitimate economic opportunities for those who wish to live free from drugs and terror.

Central to the larger Andean Counter-Drug Initiative is restoring, preserving and sustaining the rule of law in cities, towns and the countryside in Colombia. Strong congressional support will be critical to reaching the end game, to consolidating the gains that you have heard already talked about and no doubt will elicit from us.

So what is the end game? It's a hemisphere in which drug funded terrorism and corruption of struggling democracies by drug traffickers, by drug violence and by drug abuse on the streets of Bogota, but also back here at home in Mr. Cummings' district in Baltimore and all over this region, are simply reduced to a point where if they're not de minimis, they're dramatically down. And they are manageable at that lower level.

As Assistant Secretary at INL, I have put a premium on management of these programs. INL is working with Congress, OMB, GAO, the State Department, IG's office and others in the executive branch to ensure the accountability that you require of us and that we should require of ourselves, that it is front and center and that every American taxpayer dollar that you give us to spend is actually achieving the purpose that you intend. For example, INL is working closely with the State Department's Bureau of Resource Management and with OMB to develop outcome measures much talked about earlier today that have in fact been front and center during the OMB-led program assessment rating tool process. We aim to make our programs models for performance based management.

Since time is short, I'm going to jump right to my conclusion. That is that you will get from us the full promise to work together as a team, and you will get from me the dedication that INL will be trying to lead its programs toward the kind of conclusions you put in legislation and expected of us. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Charles follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

Mr. O'Connell, thank you for being with us as well.

Mr. O'Connell. Chairman Davis, distinguished members of the committee, it's my honor to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense programs and policy that support that National Drug Control Strategy, and provide a current assessment of this strategy's effectiveness in Colombia.

The Department appreciates the support Congress provides, and it's critical to our efforts in fighting narcoterrorism in Colombia. In fact, last week, sir, I had the honor of spending a solid afternoon with Representative Souder's staff over here, in a very instructive exchange on a wide range of issues. We do, sir, appreciate the congressional interest and support that we get.

Over 75 percent of the world's coca is grown in Colombia, and nearly all the cocaine consumed in the United States is produced and shipped from Colombia. This coca is primarily grown in remote areas of Colombia where there is little government control. Colombian narcoterrorists receive large majorities of their funds from protecting, taxing and engaging in this illegal drug trade. These narcoterrorists seek to overthrow the freely elected Colombian Government, the oldest democracy in Latin America.

The Secretary of Defense has promised Colombian President Uribe increased support for the Colombian counter- narcoterrorist effort. Under President Uribe's leadership, Colombia is regaining control of areas long held by the narcoterrorists. It has made exceptional progress in fighting drug trafficking and terrorism, while improving respect for human rights. Colombian security policies have diminished, the ELN put the FARC on the defensive and pushed the AUC to come to the negotiating table. The Colombian Government and its people are committed now more than ever to save their country.

With only a few years left in office, the continued leadership of President Uribe offers Colombia a unique window of opportunity to preserve democracy. This administration supports President Uribe against FARC and other narcoterrorists by providing resources in support of Colombia's Plan Patriota. In order to maintain the momentum achieved thus far by the Colombians, Congress provided expanded authority in fiscal year 2004 to support Colombia's counter-narcoterrorist efforts. In the same year, expanded authority has been crucial to leverage our resources both against narcotics and terrorism. We thank Congress for supporting our request to extend that expanded authority to fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and in the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization bill.

The Department asked Congress for reprogramming authority of $50 million during this current fiscal year and I'm pleased to report that the Department will be able to increase our efforts in Colombia in fiscal year 2005 by some $43 million.

In the coming year, as the Colombian military will be conducting full scale operations across the country, the personnel cap will begin to have a deleterious effect on Colombia's counter-narcoterrorism mission. The current troop cap limits the U.S. presence in Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 contractors under most conditions. SOUTHCOM manages this on a daily basis, often canceling or postponing personnel travel to Colombia. While U.S personnel will not be directly on the front lines, more training and planning assistance will be required for the Colombian military, who will be directly engaged on a broader front to defeat the narcoterrorists.

We should support this effort with manning that bolsters increasing Colombian military needs. Consequently, the administration requested an increase of the personnel cap to 800 military and 600 contractor personnel. The administration's request of 800 military personnel and 600 civilian contractors is part of a well-defined, well-phased plan. The administration's plan was developed with the government of Colombia to maximize the impact of its Plan Patriota. The Department urges that the administration's request be supported.

As an aside, sir, I'd like to pay tribute to my administration colleagues here at the table. This is a tough and hard working administration team that works well together and realizes the challenges we're up against.

As a last thought, sir, I've had the opportunity to be both on the ground 20 years ago as a U.S. officer, fighting terrorism in Colombia, and I've had the opportunity to stand with Secretary Rumsfeld and President Uribe. Those 25 years have seen a remarkable change and I look forward to being able to answer your questions later today.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

General Hill, welcome.

General Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Souder. I'm honored for this opportunity to appear before you today to provide my assessment of Plan Colombia.

I greatly appreciate the support of the committee for the U.S. Southern Command and to soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Coast Guardsmen and the civilian personnel I am so privileged to command.

As I mentioned in my written statement, Colombia is at a decisive point. Although there is much work to be done, our country's significant investments in Plan Colombia and the Andean Ridge Initiative are beginning to show substantial results. The trends are generally positive. The Colombian economy is growing, major categories of criminal activity are down, narcotics production is down, terrorist attacks have been cut almost in half. Desertions and demobilizations by the narcoterrorist organizations are increasing.

The military has grown into a professional, competent force that respect human rights and the rule of law and has gained the strategic initiative. I am therefore guardedly optimistic that President Uribe and his government can bring security and stability to Colombia. Over the past 22 months, I have traveled to Colombia 26 times, and will go again next week. I have worked closely with President Uribe, Minister of Defense Uribe and his predecessor, Minister Ramirez, along with General Ospina, the Chief of the Armed Forces, and his predecessor, General Mora.

I have seen these strong and determined leaders in action. I have visited all corners of Colombia and witnessed the tremendous cooperation between our armed forces. I have seem the professionalism and increased capabilities of the Colombian military. I have also been inspired by the dedication of the Colombian soldiers in their daily fight to defend Colombian democracy against vicious narcoterrorists.

I have observed Colombia's leaders inculcate the government and armed forces with an aggressive spirit. The Colombian people believe they can win the war against the narcoterrroists and end the violence. They are operating in an established governmental presence in areas of the country they have not been in in decades. They have built and are executing an extensive and aggressive campaign plan to systematically break Colombia's narcoterrorists' will to fight.

Fully understanding that the problems of Colombia do not have a simple military solution, President Uribe and his administration are building the political, social and economic systems that will eventually return Colombia to the ranks of peaceful and prosperous nations. However, as it currently stands, President Uribe has only two more years in office, which coincidentally will mark the end of Plan Colombia.

Consequently, it is important that we sustain the progress that has been made under Plan Colombia, and that he gets our steady support to set all of his long term initiatives firmly into place. As one of the oldest democracies in this hemisphere, a key trading partner and supplier of oil, a staunch ally and only 3 hours from Miami, a stable Colombia is important to our national security interests.

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Hill follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

Ms. Tandy, thank you for being with us, last but not the least. We appreciate the job you're doing.

Ms. Tandy. Thank you, Chairman Davis. It's a privilege to be last before you today and also Chairman Souder. And certainly an honor to discuss with you today the Drug Enforcement Administration's counter-narcotics role in Plan Colombia.

I want to thank you first for your strong leadership and support of DEA's work worldwide, and certainly specifically in Colombia. Few tasks are more critical to the security, peace and prosperity of the western hemisphere than dismantling and disarming Colombian drug cartels and their terrorist associates. Both the FARC and the AUC depend on drug trafficking as the primary means to support their terrorist activities. Plan Colombia's integrated strategy to combat the narcotics industry is working, and it is crucial to sustaining the progress that we have achieved to date. Plan Colombia and the courageous leadership of President Uribe have provided critical support to a number of coordinated and hugely successfully Colombian national police and DEA investigations.

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, 6 weeks ago, we announced the indictments of nine leaders of the Norte Valle cartel. As you noted in your opening statements, this cartel is responsible for exporting more than $1.2 million pounds of cocaine to the United States since 1990, that value in excess of $10 billion. The cartel has been estimated to be responsible for a third to a half of the cocaine brought into this country, and it paid the AUC to protect its operations and its members. The indictments against the Norte Valle cartel are made possible through Plan Colombia.

While the plan provides limited direct support to DEA, its impact in bolstering Colombian institutions and the rule of law has created a climate favorable to law enforcement. The justice sector reform program in particular has strengthened law enforcement institutions and infrastructure and directly supports two DEA programs in Colombia. First among these is the Bilateral Case Initiative. That initiative undertakes investigations of drug trafficking and money laundering organizations outside the United States for prosecution inside the United States. Under this program, we have built prosecutable cases in the United States that have led to more than 50 convictions.

The second Plan Colombia supported program that DEA is involved in is a communications interception program that's funded by almost $5 million from Plan Colombia as part of the justice sector reform money. This wire intercept program enables the Colombian national police to gather intelligence through judicially authorized communications interceptions. Effectively carrying out these kinds of enforcement actions requires strong coordination with U.S. law enforcement and diplomatic communities and with our Colombian counterparts. And within Colombia, DEA consults on most U.S. counter-drug programs and coordinates with the Department of State and with other Federal agencies. And I am especially proud of the effective working relationship that DEA has cultivated with the Colombian national police, Colombian prosecutors and other Colombian law enforcement counterparts of ours.

Within this cooperative framework, DEA continues a number of our own initiatives that are critical to our success in Colombia. Our Sensitive Investigation Unit, which we refer to as SIUs, take the lead in operations against the consolidated priority target organizations and other related targets. The specialized financial investigation groups that we have set up have focused on divesting traffickers of the proceeds of their crimes, and we're working to interdict the flow of drugs to the United States by targeting go-fast boats leaving Colombia, and in the last year, we have almost doubled cocaine seizures through Operational Firewall.

We are also working in Colombia's airports to stop heroin and cocaine couriers. Our strong partnership with Colombia and the programs that I've just described have led to major enforcement successes. For example, Operation White Dollar dismantled a massive international money laundering ring responsible for laundering millions of drug dollars through the black market peso exchange. It resulted recently in 34 indictments and the forfeiture of $20 million in the United States.

These are victories, these are successes for Colombia, but these are victories for America. When we dismantle drug cartels, we eliminate criminals responsible for bringing in massive quantities of poison into our own neighborhoods and reciprocally, we know that violence, instability and terrorism in Colombia are fueled by American drug consumption. Our successes strengthen Colombia and ultimately protect Americans from the misery of drug abuse.

I thank you again for your continued support of DEA's work, and I'm sure I can speak for all of my colleagues and good friends on this panel that we are all very pleased now to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tandy follows:]

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Mr. Souder [assuming Chair]. I thank you all, and I'm going to start the questioning, then Chairman Davis will be back to do some additional questions.

First let me thank each of you and through you, all the people who work for you for their valiant efforts. With all the news focused on Iraq and secondarily Afghanistan, it's often forgotten by many American people that far more people are dying per month because of drug abuse than we're actually losing over the whole period of the Iraq war, and that Colombia is one of our, certainly even if you take Iraq and Afghanistan, the Indian expression would be, you can count them on one hand and have enough fingers left to bowl.

In other words, there are very few countries that get as much money in foreign aid and in direct assistance as Colombia. As Congress, we have to have a lot of oversight on that and a lot of focus, and we can't lose track either of the deaths in the United States, the battles going on in Colombia, or the hot war in what's happening financially as we go through our budget.

I also want to, even though we've had some very interesting conversations and I can't say how glad I am to see that Mr. O'Connell is in your position at the Defense Department. You're in a very critical position not only to back up SOUTHCOM but help CENTCOM, as well as Mr. Charles, having both Iraq and Afghanistan in his portfolio.

It's important that people in your position understand that there is an interrelationship which you can really see in Colombia between the terrorists and the drug money. We're seeing that around the world and having people who are working all those simultaneously, even if the general public doesn't understand we've actually learned a lot in Colombia that now is applying in other areas.

And how we stand up and how we work with that information, is very important because you're in positions with which to transfer that. And now with DEA on the ground and Afghanistan as well, we can kind of take those worldwide experiences, and secondarily, that you haven't forgotten about Colombia. Because while we're working on those highly visible things on television, the key thing is that it's still the primary supplier of cocaine in the world, and our major supplier of heroin and other things along with Mexico.

With that, I have a couple of particular questions. I wanted to make sure I asked General Hill a question, Mr. O'Connell made some statements about the 800 military advisors that are proposed in the President's budget. I wonder if you could elaborate on that a little bit, why you think that's necessary.

General Hill. Succinctly put, I need a lot more flexibility to support the Colombian Plan Patriota. About a year ago, they briefed me on this well thought out, conceived campaign plan, not a one-time military operation, but a campaign plan to retake the country. Specifically in the old Despye area, where they have not operated in 20 years.

Today, they have the better part of two divisions and nine brigades, along with the joint task force out there conducting that fight daily. And they're having some wonderful success. What I need to be able to do is put enough planning assistance teams in there, logistical planners, operational planners, to assist them in carrying out this very valuable fight. I think all of us across the table have mentioned to you that we are at an increasingly closing window given President Uribe's time in office and for the end of the existent Plan Colombia. They will coincide together in 2 years.

We need to take every opportunity to ensure that our already significant U.S. investment pays off. I believe that we can offer militarily a great deal of planning support to the Colombian military effort that I'm not able to do right now underneath the cap.

Mr. Souder. I may do a followup to this, but I wanted to directly ask you this question. A number of years ago, General Wilhelm, when he was head of SOUTHCOM, said he was even micromanaging how planning and control, command and control systems were working on the ground, because the Colombian military was so in effect disorganized. It seemed as we first visited in the 1996, 1997 period, Ambassador Moreno would know, because he's kind of been the continuity of the Colombian Government and the voice and the picture of Colombia here in the U.S. Congress, and we really appreciate his continuity.

But somewhere in there, when we started to go down, it seemed like the Colombian military never won a battle. In fact, we'd visit a place and then the next year we'd go down and we couldn't go there because it had been overrun. There are areas of combat, but what progress have you seen to respond to Mr. Duncan's concerns earlier? Have you seen changes in the Colombian military? Are the military advisors having that impact on the military?

They certainly seem to be taking casualties. They seem to be taking some victories. Could you talk about that from a commander's sense? Because General McCaffrey, when he was there, was saying, look, this is going to be a long effort to rebuild this, to get vetted units, to do the human rights. Then General Wilhelm, General Clark and others.

General Hill. Well, I think the work of my predecessors and the work of the Colombian military is in fact, it has made them a substantially better unit. They are a substantially more competent, capable force than when I assumed command 2 years ago. I have watched them. I took over command about the time that President Uribe came into office, within days of each other. He has inculcated in them a spirit of aggressiveness and they have responded. He's provided them the political support along with the Colombian people, and they have responded. They have moved out of the barracks. They are out in the field in the fight.

Yours and the American people, through the Congress, substantial investment in Plan Colombia, the ability with the helicopter support that allows them to move rapidly around the battlefield, around the country in effect, take on the battle. So in just pure operational sense, they've improved significantly.

I don't believe 2 years ago when I took command that you would have said to me, they're going to develop this Plan Colombia, Plan Patriota, excuse me, and then they're going to go out into the old Despye area and they're going to stay out there, not for 18 days, but for 18 months and conduct a campaign. I would have said there's no way they can do that. They're out there doing it today. And we are out there with them, helping them in a very meaningful way with advice, logistics and operational sustainment. This is not an easy military problem, and we're out there doing it.

Mr. Souder. Mr. O'Connell.

General Hill. Could I have one point, Mr. Souder?

Mr. Souder. Yes.

General Hill. The other thing that they're doing I think that's very important, and it should not go unnoticed, they have established a center for coordinated and integrated action. What is that? That is when an office that says, when we retake an area militarily, we will flow in directly behind it in a coordinated, integrated manner in order for those other elements of governance to ensure that we can stay the course in that village, and they've done a wonderful job of it.

Mr. Souder. Mr. O'Connell, in your written testimony you had, I believe, stated that you were going to work for additional forward operating locations. Because one of the problems was when the FARC particularly moved over to the eastern side of Colombia and where we suspect they may have our kidnapped Americans, it's very difficult to move, because it's Amazon basin, it's parks, it's jungle. How are we going to deal with that, and do you have particular plans in the budget?

Mr. O'Connell. Sir, on that, on the tactical operational side, if you don't mind, I'll defer to General Hill.

General Hill. What the Colombian military has been able to do is very early on in the fight, under Plan Patriota, they reclaimed several major airfields in that area. Then they had flown in logistics behind them and it allowed them to both sustain the fight and to take their own aircraft, either helicopter, rotary wing or fixed wing and conduct operations out of there.

Mr. O'Connell. Sir, when you referenced forward operating locations, with respect to those FOLs that we're concerned with outside of Colombia, as you know, the closure of Roosevelt Roads has posed some financial difficulties that we had not anticipated. And you and I have discussed those before and what demands on other accounts that we just----

Mr. Souder. So you were talking about the in between, on the way in and out of Colombia?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Souder. As opposed to inside Colombia, where we also have a given problem?

Ambassador Moreno, my impression is, and I know this was in the written testimony, but if you could expand on it now. You certainly alluded to it and had some detail on a number of towns where they actually have mayors now and have city councils up and running. There was not an understanding that until you get order and security, who wants to be a mayor? Could you talk a little bit about that, and then how you see that progressing into some of the zones where we still don't quite have functional control?

Ambassador Moreno. These are very important questions, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by saying that about 5 years ago, about 30 percent of the municipalities in Colombia did not have the kind of military or police presence that we have today. Today all the municipalities have, the municipalities in Colombia have them. So inasmuch as this has been a policy of gaining the upper hand from the law enforcement side, from the eradication of coca, from the alternative development and the institutional strengthening, it has also been a battle for control of the territory in Colombia. Because without that, or absent that, it's impossible to really do the success that we require in terms of drug eradication.

Certainly, for instance, when President Uribe came into office there were a number of mayors who had basically given up and resigned because there was either no security or simply because they didn't feel they were capable of doing their jobs under those circumstances. Today, increasingly with the help of General Hill, we're doing a lot in the way of planning, and integrated planning between both the military operation as well as the civilian side. Because I think we need the hearts and minds of the people in many of these municipalities. You require not only to have the security, but also to have the government be able to deliver services.

Some of the things we have found, many of these municipalities that basically, the only thing that happened was the production of coca, or perhaps not viable the way they used to be. So it would require much more good work on the side of the government. But this is precisely the phase in which we're in right now.

Mr. Souder. I thank you, and I want to mention two other things before I yield the Chair back to Mr. Davis. We really appreciate the efforts, Director Tandy, on-going after the financial and the money situation and what you've done to break up some of these big networks and follow through. And that I never really fully understood, until we got into the Afghanistan question, that even for DEA to be able to work on the ground, you must have some semblance of order. Because the DEA agents aren't the military. It is important to be able to infiltrate the different networks and to be able to move out farther, as the military establishes those zones, and then the DEA can move in, as we're attempting to do in Afghanistan, and start to break up the financial network.

It's fine to talk about how we have to break up the financial networks, but if you can't get to the sources, because you're afraid of being blown up, it is a very difficult job. I appreciate the recent efforts. Do you have any specific requests of where you think Congress should focus more on DEA related to Colombia?

Ms. Tandy. We have a number of issues with technology in terms of keeping pace with the changes in technology to support our ability to continue our partnership with the Colombian national police and the Intercept program. And it is the interception of communications that is key to our collection of intelligence to determine who is moving the billions of dollars derived from the American drug consumer. That is at a rate of about $65 billion a year, and to date, in the past, we have only successfully seized, and I say we, that's all Federal, State and local law enforcement, less than $1 billion.

We have a long way to go. We have restored that priority within DEA, it was lost over the last number of years. And it is the No. 1 priority in DEA, because we will never effectively dismantle these cartels if we have left their money in place. To that end, as part of our right-sizing proposal, which has cleared the House and is in the Senate, we will be, once that is approved, if it is approved, we will add a money laundering task force to Bogota to complement our SIU that we have with DOS in Colombia that is currently focused on the money.

We have challenges in that regard of simply having the necessary funds and boots on the ground to go after the money.

Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. I will yield back to Chairman Davis. I know there are other questions I have. I want to thank you for that.

I also want to make sure we have adequate radar coverage in all parts of the country, and we'll continue to talk about parts of Colombia where I have concerns, and also the ability to track. There is a sophistication where communications networks get better. And also, I'm pleased that we're able to work together with some of the private sector people who weren't particularly helpful for a while.

Chairman Tom Davis [resuming Chair]. Let me just say thanks again to all of you. It really has been a team effort, as I think several of you have said in your testimony. Mr. Ambassador Moreno, let me ask you a question. The hero of today, which is the Colombian army, which is I think taking unprecedented steps to go into FARC controlled areas and other areas, do you think they have the staying power to defeat the FARC and the ELN? Do you think they're helping to bring the ELN to the conference table? Talks are going on, they're starting to sustain some heavy casualties. This is really a new test. Can you give us your appraisal of that? And then I'd like to hear from General Hill on the same thing.

Ambassador Moreno. Yes, Mr. Chairman, clearly there's an opportunity with the ELN, the Mexican Government has been very cooperative. In fact, recently they named their Ambassador to Israel to begin the initial contacts with the ELN leadership to see if we can get to a situation where a negotiation can proceed. President Uribe from the beginning has always stated that our big condition for any pace process is that of a cease- fire and ceasing of hostilities that would permit any process to go forward. I think it's too early to tell.

My sense is from what I hear, and I would like to hear, of course, from General Hill, who is closer to the military on these issues, that the relative of the ELN progressively has been losing some of their strength as a result of clearly the better campaign that the military is doing with success, especially on territory controlled throughout the country. As that campaign under their control is successful, any group, any terrorist in Colombia will have a harder time going about its business.

Chairman Tom Davis. What's the, in terms of the casualties and everything else that the army is taking on, any kind of ratios? What's happening with the FARC and the ELN as we go into some of these areas? What kind of resistance? Are we hitting them and they're running? Try to give me a feel for what's happening.

Ambassador Moreno. I will try to give you some. Again, I would like to be complemented by General Hill.

In terms of the number of both casualties and deserters, the numbers are very impressive. I mean, the last numbers that I've seen are around 7,000 in the last year between FARC, AUC and ELN, between people who have lost their lives on the field and those who have deserted. Clearly, the push on desertion has been working very well. This we have done again with some U.S. funding, especially for child soldiers. The number of combats, which I think is a very important denominator, has increased significantly, meaning that the army more and more is doing combats on the field. This is a very deep change from what it was as recently as 2 years ago.

Chairman Tom Davis. General Hill, what's your appraisal?

General Hill. Let me take that from a couple of different angles, Chairman Davis. One is in military parlance, which is the close fight, and the other is the long fight, or the deep fight. On the close fight, not only what they're doing with Plan Patriota, but they're standing up a special operations command, they're improving their ability to operate jointly, they're doing a lot better in terms of intelligence sharing. And that has allowed them to conduct tactical military operations that they were simply incapable of doing 2 years ago, both in terms of major combat operations and in terms of specialized operations, going after the heads of the organizations.

Ambassador Moreno mentioned combat actions. In 2003, they were involved in 2,312 distinct combat actions. That's a 73 percent increase from 2002.

Chairman Tom Davis. And that's it. The government's initiative, not a reaction, for the most part?

General Hill. Yes, absolutely. Because if you would look at the results of Plan Patriota in the early stages, the first 2 or 3 or 4 months of it, what we're seeing is a delaying action by the FARC in the sense that they are putting out a lot more anti-personnel mines, they are trying to fight in smaller organizations and they are trying to avoid major combat. That was to be expected.

The problem for them, however, is they will not be able to avoid that forever. Because the military is not going to go away. They are going to continue to push the fight. That's near term.

Let me talk about one thing just in terms of long term. The one thing that separates the U.S. military from most militaries in the world, and if you brought in anybody in uniform and said, what's the one thing that makes you different or better than anybody else, and the answer is, non-commissioned officers. Non-commissioned officers and the responsibility that we give to non-commissioned officers.

I had a long discussion about a year and a half ago with General Mora, who was then the chairman of their Joint Chiefs, and General Ospina, the head of the army. And along this pro- fessionalization, they wanted to professionalize the Colombian NCO corps. So my Command Sergeant Major and several senior NCOs from SOUTHCOM went down, began working with the Colombian Army, and they have built a non-commissioned officers sergeant major academy, started the first class with us teaching it, only Army. Second class, mutual teaching, included some Marines. Third class includes all services. They did a scrub of their senior sergeants major and opted about 30 percent of them to retire, and have changed the role of the sergeant major from an admin role to a combat role. This will put them, long term, in a much better stand.

Chairman Tom Davis. When they go out on these missions, are they accompanied by American advisors?

General Hill. No, sir. We are prohibited from being any, in a direct combat role. We stay on secure bases only in a planning assistance role. And in my request for the CAP increase to 800, those rules of engagement do not change.

Chairman Tom Davis. Do you have any idea how many Americans are currently held captive by the different groups, contractors or----

General Hill. Sir, there's three.

Chairman Tom Davis. Just the three?

General Hill. Yes, sir.

Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Let me ask Secretary Charles, is it still your position that the Colombian air wing program is best left where it is? There's a lot of debate about moving the program to a law enforcement agency. Have you been able to identify and assess any existing problem areas with air wing at this point?

Mr. Charles. I think it belongs where it is. But the second part of the question is a very important one. And the answer to it is that since the 9 months I've been there, one of the focal points has been evaluating the air wing.

In a nutshell, that air wing has run on a shoestring for a long time. And God bless them every one for having been able to achieve what they have to date. But the air assets need support. And one of my missions, in addition to putting performance measures on the contracts and penalties in place for contractors and contractor oversight is also to look at the capital account of that air wing.

You're talking about an air wing around which the environment has changed, and which is responding very well to the changed environment. But nevertheless, in 2002, you had about 194 hits on that air wing. The next year, 2003, you had about 383 hits on it. Even this year, while there's been a reduction in hits, the risk environment is very high. It complements exactly what General Hill has been talking about, and Ambassador Moreno. As you get closer and closer to the burning ember of the FARC, the heat is felt by everybody. And it's being felt here.

That's good, in the sense that we're having an impact. And it will be good as we capitalize that account and make sure they know how to do their job there and frankly elsewhere in the world. That air wing also operates in Pakistan and other locations for other purposes. But the short answer is, I'm very confident that it belongs there, that it is functionally and operationally where it belongs. But it is also true that proper management of the air wing is an imperative, and I'm working on it.

Chairman Tom Davis. Do you know how the Colombian Government will use the recently acquired DC-3 airplanes for opium poppy eradication efforts? These planes, will they make it easier to find and eliminate the hard to reach or concealed fields of opium poppy?

Mr. Charles. As you may or may not know, I am a strong advocate of that particular decision.

Chairman Tom Davis. That's why I asked you.

Mr. Charles. I appreciate it. I know you are, too. I think this is again an example of the U.S. Congress working closely with the administration. And I think we all know that the heroin that shows up on the eastern seaboard, whether it's Congressman Cummings' district in Baltimore or whether it's the 352 deaths outside of Chicago, Speaker Hastert's, or whether it's anywhere is chiefly coming on this side of the continent from Colombia. That means we have to be very aggressive about addressing it.

What those DC-3s do is they give us the opportunity now to get the altitude with manual eradicators and to complement other programs. Let me just tell you how important we think, I think and I think this entire table thinks heroin is. Frankly, the leadership for this also comes as much from the Colombian Government as it does from the American government, from the U.S. Congress; 1,200 kilograms of heroin seized last year, DEA has an entire operation that is affecting it, Operation Firewall, significant maritime interdiction, together with other efforts. DEA runs the Heroin Task Force in Bogota, 50 DEA and CMP members, very aggressive on it. We're targeting heroin organizations, which never occurred before.

In the last 2 years on eradication, in 2002, we talk a lot about coca. But let's not forget the significant impact of heroin. In 2002, there was a 25 percent reduction, in 2003, there was a 10 percent reduction. What do we mean by these reductions? Why do they count? Why do they matter? They matter because they are deterrents.

Just like in the cold war, aggressive, continuous, consistent, sustained effort ended in victory in every reasonable sense of the word. The same thing is what we're shooting for here. We're looking for an end game that puts deterrents in place, so that if you destroy those crops again and again and again, people say, the heck with it, the risks are too high, the prosecution too high, police are now in every district.

The short version of this is we're doing good things. We've also got a rewards program. Heroin will not go away soon, but we are aggressively tackling it, and the DC-3s are a big part of it.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Mr. Cummings.

Mr. Cummings. Just picking up where you left off, we've spent 4 years there. It seems like we're not--well, what's your vision?

Mr. Charles. My vision for Colombia, my vision is really the President's vision and this table's vision. I think it's shared, if you ask that question of all of us, more or less in the same way. I think we are blessed by extraordinary leadership right now in Colombia. I don't think that will last forever. It never does anywhere in the world. But I think we have a moment, a window of opportunity.

I also think objectively we're at a tipping point. You've heard me use that phrase before, but I believe it with all my heart. We are at a point where if we do right at each of the missions that we have here, if we stay in our lanes and get it done right, what we will end up with is a dramatic reduction in both heroin and cocaine production. We cannot give up on prevention and treatment. They are central to what we're doing. But we will make those, as I think Director Walters said, manageable.

As I think Chairman Souder also said and as you've said before, you can't do those things unless you get the supply down. Because supply of addictive drugs not only destabilizes the country, not Colombia in this case and its region, not only feeds terrorism, but it creates its own market. Addictive substances create their own markets. So if you bring supply down, you make manageable the rest of the demand reduction side. The vision is that we will never get rid of drugs completely in this hemisphere or in the world. Human beings are weak and they have faults and they become addicted.

However, what we can do, we never got rid of crime in Los Angeles, never got rid of crime anywhere in the world. What we will do is reduce it to a manageable level, where people can breathe better and safer and feel both in this country and across the hemisphere that they are not being constantly victimized by major narcotrafficking, and frankly, also narcoterrorism organizations.

Mr. Cummings. So how you measure your progress?

Mr. Charles. You always have three or four measures that you work with. You've got your inputs, and we're putting them in there and you're putting them in there. That matters. You've got outputs. We're getting direct outputs. We're seeing that hectarage is coming down. We're seeing that prosecutions, interdictions, extraditions, all the key things that you're looking for that way are going up.

And then you have outcomes. That's how many kids do we see not being victimized ultimately by these drugs. How many families are not destroyed in this country by this menace. And I think we will see, as Director Walters said, in the next year to 2 years, next 12 to 24 months, you should see some impact, probably first on purity, because that's where it will typically show up first, and then ultimately on price. And you'll have to see it metropolitan area by metropolitan area. The DEA collects a lot of this data. You've got the Stride data and other data is collected metropolitan, you should see Dawn data eventually change.

We have one real, really unusual advantage when we talk about the drug war. We have done this before successfully. Some things, when SARS came up and other things, these are brand new. How to tackle them is not clear. We try against a new event.

But in this case, between 1985 and 1992, cocaine use in this country dropped by 78 percent. The number of marijuana users, regular 30 day marijuana users, dropped from 21 million to 8 million. Heroin purity was back at about 7 to 10 percent. It can be done. With this kind of team and your support, it will be done.

Mr. Cummings. I want to just zero in on Colombia. As you've heard me say many times, people in my district, deal with terrorism on our streets every day. The neighborhood I live in, we have terrorists on the corners. And 300 people dying a year, and probably about 500 or 600 being saved from death because we have one of the best shock trauma units in the world, and a lot of that having to do with drugs.

I guess what I'm trying to figure out is, the people in my neighborhood say, we don't have any planes. We don't have any boats. And when they see money going into interdiction, the question is, well, how does it even get into our neighborhoods. And I try to explain it to them. It's hard, though. It's hard. And there are a lot of people that almost believe that, not almost believe, believe that we are not putting forth our best efforts, and that's putting it lightly, in this war on drugs.

I don't feel that way, because I get a chance to hear all this. But I can tell you that this 4 years we've spent--about how much money have we spent in Colombia? Do you know?

Mr. Charles. Well, Plan Colombia is a 5-year plan at about $3 billion, give or take.

Mr. Cummings. $3 billion. And it just seems to me, the reason why I asked you about the vision, and the reason why I asked you about how do you measure success, is that I think that all of us want to make sure that our tax dollars are being spent effectively and efficiently. No matter which side of the aisle you're on, that's what you want.

And I guess, I just want to make sure that as we go about the business of spending money in Colombia, and I understand how, you know, it moved from Colombia, and I'm saying everything you just said about eventually it showing up in weaker forms on the street and all that, that's very significant. But I just want to make sure we're doing something that's effective and efficient. That's why I asked you about the vision. There are a lot of people who basically wonder, in my district, whether we are truly being effective.

Mr. Charles. I never forget, Mr. Congressman, that you live on a block that you've lived on for many, many years.

Mr. Cummings. Twenty-three years.

Mr. Charles. Twenty-three years, goes up by 1 year every year. And on that same block is a crack house, or was a crack house. That story has never left me. I know that we will only truly be showing success downstream when we have done all of the pieces of the drug war right, and when it shows up your street corner.

That's the end game. I come from a small town, but the principle is the same. In order to get there, we have to get this stuff out of the system. It takes time. People ask, what about price and purity. The answer is, we don't know how much excess capacity there is in the system right now. I think Director Walters said it well, we are tackling this, we are shrinking the overall production environment. That has to go hand in glove, I know you were just in that shock trauma unit. And we have to go hand in glove to make sure that the treatment is effective and real and captures the people that need it.

The same thing is true with the kids. We've got to reduce demand by preventing them from making the worst decision of their life. We've got to educate the parents, so that they not only know that piece of it's happening, but that the rest of this expenditure is very real. It's a weapon of mass destruction in its own way. And we've got to keep it out of this country. And it will simultaneously stabilize the rest of the hemisphere, which allows people to have incomes elsewhere outside of drugs.

But I am very sensitive to the point you make which is that it's got to show up here in America in a meaningful way on your street corner. And we are all, I think, at this table committed, every one of us, to that mission.

Mr. Cummings. Administrator Tandy, how are we doing with regard to justice in Colombia? You and I have had this discussion before with regard to, I guess it was Afghanistan, about making sure that we don't have, you know, corruption is reduced and all that. How are we looking over there in Colombia? Because we've had our corruption problems.

Ms. Tandy. Corruption goes with drug trafficking like disease with rats. It doesn't limit itself to Colombia. It is, as you know, an issue everywhere there is drug trafficking. Obviously there are corruption issues in Colombia which President Uribe, and under his leadership has been very aggressive in tackling the justice sector reform. Part of Plan Colombia also has focused on corruption as part of its training of now over 10,000 police, prosecutors and judges and technical assistance in that justice sector piece of Colombia.

The rooting out of corruption is one of the key elements to our success. It is something that we are constantly focused on. It is a constant issue, and it will remain one for all of us. But I am confident that it is a shared concern of the Colombian Government and leadership with the United States.

Mr. Cummings. As far as the money that we spent over there, how is that money used to minimize corruption? In what ways? Are you following what I'm saying? In other words, I assume that you've got to have, you've just got to have good people, right? I'm talking about over there, the people that live there, and the people that are in the armed services and whatever. A lot of people say you've got to pay folks more money. I don't know whether that's a part of the formula or not. How do you make sure, how do you maximize the probability that you're going to have minimal corruption? How do we do that as a country, us?

Ms. Tandy. Within the United States, part of that clearly is the selection process of our members in law enforcement and all of the other associated members of law enforcement, such as the analysts and those people with access to information, limiting access.

Mr. Cummings. I think you may misunderstand my question. I'm sorry----

Ms. Tandy. In Colombia?

Mr. Cummings. Yes, in Colombia. In other words, how do we-- --

Ms. Tandy. I understand.

Mr. Cummings. Yes, here we are, we're spending $3 billion, corruption is a major, can be a major problem. You can fight all you want, but if you've got people being paid off, you're going backward really. And corruption can lead to so much damage, it can lead to loss of life, if the wrong information gets into the wrong hands.

So I was just wondering, I just want to make sure that we're doing what we can with some of our dollars to make sure that we minimize the corruption. I know it's going to be there. I'm just wondering what are we doing, if anything.

Ms. Tandy. I can tell you what we are doing. I would defer to Ambassador Moreno for what the country of Colombia is doing on a more broad basis. But within our relationship in Colombia, Representative, we start with the sensitive investigative units where we carefully select the members of those units, we vett them, we conduct urinalysis, we do background investigations on those people to ensure that we are working shoulder to shoulder with people who share our same goals and are not corrupt.

The payment, the salaries and benefits for those people I will leave to Ambassador Moreno to discuss. We have had issues and continue to have issues with corruption despite that. Part of rooting that kind of corruption out is dependent on the collection of intelligence and knowing where our potential leaks are. We have had those situations and we have shared those issues and that intelligence with select members of the Colombian Government. And the Colombian Government has acted swiftly to eliminate those individuals who were at issue.

That is in a nutshell, in a very small sum way how we try to prevent it and then how we address it once it surfaces.

General Hill. Could I add to that, Mr. Cummings?

Mr. Cummings. Yes.

General Hill. On the military side, we assisted the Colombian military in developing a JAG school, a Judge Advocate General, JAG school and the standup of a JAG corps. That helps them in terms of operationalizing investigations of possible abuse or human rights violations, and also gets at the idea of having an operational lawyer on scene with their units. The other piece of it is that we only train and work with units which we have vetted, both in terms of corruption and in terms of human rights allegations, through the U.S. embassy and the State Department.

Mr. Cummings. Thank you.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

Mr. Noriega. Mr. Chairman, if I could add one last point.

Chairman Tom Davis. We have to move to our next panel, but that's fine.

Mr. Noriega. The democracy and human rights and rule of law programs amount to about $200 million of that $3.3 billion, including at training of prosecutors, support for the Colombian judicial system, and teaching a culture of lawfulness, starting from the municipal local level all the way up to training of prosecutors at the highest level. Especially developing security for prosecutors so that they're not afraid of enforcing and imposing the rule of law against corruption when it's detected.

Mr. Charles. Could I add one refinement to that, Mr. Chairman? Very short.

Chairman Tom Davis. Yes, you may.

Mr. Charles. Exactly what Secretary Noriega described in many ways is a microcosm, this is a robust program, anti- corruption is a very big part of it. The numbers of lawyers, 10,000 lawyers, judges and public defenders have been trained collectively between, with us in support of the Colombian Government. Training isn't perfect, people get disbarred every day.

But the reality is, it's significant if it has the right components. It complements the military, the human rights component, the police have vetted units. There is an intense effort not only in the near term to look at anti-corruption, but the culture of lawfulness is a program that goes into all the public schools and talks about the ethics of what a civil government is all about. Frankly, we need more of it here, too.

But the reality is, that is a long term strategy and it's complemented by vetted units, and that's all.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Ambassador Moreno.

Ambassador Moreno. Very quickly, for Congressman Cummings, basically, aside from all the vetting, both in human rights and for purposes of law enforcement and specialized units in the attorney general's office in Colombia. The whole issue of corruption the President of Colombia takes very seriously. There is a task force that is directed by the vice president of Colombia which basically goes to look at all levels of government, at the local level, the state level and the national level with 800 numbers, with ways for people to make demands as to very specific things in terms of contracting, having things electronic government, e-government, so that people can talk about bids, if there's a problem with a bid they can immediately address this issue.

So there's a whole host of things that are built around a program of anti-corruption at the level of the vice president of Colombia. Is there corruption? Unfortunately, yes. Director Tandy said clearly there is, when it's associated with drug trafficking and drugs. And that's why for Colombia, it is not a choice if we destroy enough drugs, for us it's an obligation to rid our society, to rid a generation that has been full of these problems for years, to have our children live in a country that will be much better as a result.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to ask you if I could answer to both what Congressman Duncan and Congressman Kucinich, who I thought was going to be here, but I see that he didn't come back to answer some of the questions and to put in written testimony if you don't mind.

Chairman Tom Davis. That would be fine, without objection.

Thank you all very much. It's been very, very helpful to us. We're going to take a brief recess before the start of our third panel. We're going to be setting up a screen so that one of our witnesses is shielded from the cameras. As the media knows, this gentleman can't be filmed or photographed. We're in recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman Tom Davis. We want to welcome our third panel, Mr. Carlos Plotter, and for him, translating we have Ms. Patricia Cepeda. I'm going to have to swear you both in. Mr. Plotter is a former member of the FARC. He'll discuss the time he spent with the FARC, why he chose to voluntarily turn himself in to the Colombian national police after serving 10 years as a guerrilla. His testimony will provide a valuable inside guerrilla perspective on the peace process between the Colombian Government and the guerrilla groups in an effort to restore authority and control of the Colombian Government in areas of the country where the government control was lacking.

We are just very appreciative of your taking the time to be here today and sorry we've delayed you. You can stay seated, would you raise your right hand?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman Tom Davis. Let the record show he said I do. Muchas gracias. You may begin, thank you.

We'll allow Mr. Plotter to speak and then you can translate for him. Thank you very much.

STATEMENTS OF CARLOS PLOTTER, FORMER POLITICAL COMMANDER,

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC); MARC W. CHERNICK, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY; AND ADAM ISACSON,

DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY

Mr. Plotter. [All remarks of Mr. Plotter are given in native tongue through an interpreter.]

Ms. Cepeda. First of all, I want to express my thanks to you for your invitation and for hosting me in this honorable room.

As you mentioned before, I spent 10 long years with the FARC.

My process of re-entering civil society was part of a very important stage, both in my country, in Latin America and internationally.

I am a man from the provinces, and I was raised with very strong Catholic convictions.

In that same capacity for analysis, in that same feeling that I was raised with in the Catholic church, led to a deepening of my social responsibility feelings.

At age 16, I entered the National University of Colombia to study engineering. And then I entered a period of exposure, not just to the academic world of the exact sciences, but also to a deepening of my feelings of social responsibility by doing community service in the popular neighborhoods of Bogota.

That interaction I had with people from needy communities deepened in me the feeling that I had to put into practice what I believed and thought in feeling.

This was the period when the Berlin wall was falling and when there was the crisis of socialism, and this combined with the reading of the theories of Francis Fukuyama, the End of History, led in me a desire to be more conscious of putting into practice what I thought and felt.

So I joined the Communist Youth in Colombia.

In that international context, there were also some very local political contexts in Colombia which had to do with the ideological crisis of the left.

What was happening in Colombia was that there was starting to be process of demobilization of armed groups, such as the M- 19, parts of the ELN and the EPL. But what was becoming obvious was that there was lots of aggression against parties like the UP and the Communist party that were trying to participate in the political processes.

Among, in the middle of all that context, I became aware that I sort of needed to put into practice what I believed, the love of the people around me and the care for those that needed it the most. So I put into practice things I had grown up with in Catholicism.

I was looking for an organization that wanted to build a new society toward socialism, and I wanted also an organization that would protect the work with the gun, so I joined the FARC.

In 1993, I started looking for a way. And this way was unfortunately the one that was most painful for my country. I participated in guerrilla activities in various spaces of our national geography.

In those 10 years that I spent with them, I saw how the FARC went from being a political-military organization with a clear ideological north to--it became an armed, just an armed group isolated from a political aim or context, purely militaristic and with a commercial component.

The lure of easy money, which came by the cultivation, the processing and the sale of narcotics, made the organization lose its political route, and went from being an organization that we thought was a mass organization, a revolutionary people's organization.

Colombia lacked at that moment the guarantees for development of social and economic conditions that we all wished for.

But the fact is that we have a new reality in Colombia. There are conditions now that allow for those of us who might think differently to set out our ideas in a democratic framework.

There's now an opportunity for the word to win the war over the gun.

I think democratic spaces are now open for us to oppose a guerrilla force that is fueled by drug money and will not be able to conquer the hearts and minds of the people.

We Colombians are now trying to have an opportunity to resolve our differences through discussion.

It is a democratic moment where even though some people say that the Uribe government is a government of the right, but this is when the opposing forces of the left have achieved a democratic security to participate in society.

I left the FARC because, simply, theory did not meet up with practice.

The moral imperative of a revolutionary fighter was simply substituted for the economic imperative.

There was a qualitative sea change. There was no work done that would add anything to the local populations. The actions that we were taking simply lessened the local populations.

We are living a historical moment now where we have an opportunity to lay aside the guns and have an opportunity for discussion and negotiation in a democratic framework for us to enter civil society.

I believe that we now have a possibility to win the war of ideas with political and social investment and not try to win the war in the military terrain.

In this last phase of the struggle, I believe it's now time to turn to see how Plan Colombia has affected this last phase.

I repeat, I do not believe in an armed resolution to the conflict. But I do believe that the military help that has come through through Plan Colombia has given the army new initiative, and it has also given it increased operational capacity in the terrains that are dominated militarily by the guerrillas.

The military component, especially in the area of aerial interdiction, has helped in both stopping the influx of dollars, the outflows of drugs and components and armaments for the guerrillas.

The guerrilla needs the commerce of narcotrafficking. And narcotrafficking is now the fuel that motors the barbarism that is taking place in our country.

But I do believe a social component is important for Plan Colombia, one that has the guarantees that crop substitution, that there will be a market for the crops that are substituted, so there is a guarantee of livelihood for our peasants.

The war in our country is essentially a war between two factions of poor people. Because there are a lack of guarantees for the crops that our agricultural workers raise, they are forced in fact to raise coca. If there was solid investment, planning and some guarantee that the products they raise have equal access and participation in markets, this will go a long way toward closing the spaces for coca growing.

What we are looking for is some justice and equity in the negotiations for market processes. But in our economic relations, there's some kind of interest in restricting the protectionism in North America for our products and some kind of equity of access to their markets that are demanding of us that we open our borders.

In a world that's every day more interdependent, we now believe that the democratic processes are the guarantees that we will be part of some important decisionmaking that takes place internationally, and that there will be equality, fraternity and solidarity for us also.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Plotter follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much as well. We also have Dr. Mark Chernick and Mr. Adam Isacson, well credentialed in this area. Will you raise your right hand with me?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.

Let me note for the record your entire testimony is in the record. We're expecting votes in about 10 minutes, so if you can get through, we'll try to get to some questions. Once the bells go off, we'll have a couple of minutes, but I want to get you each going. I'll start with you, Dr. Chernick and then to Mr. Isacson.

Mr. Chernick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this important meeting.

I just wanted to briefly begin by discussing how we got here, because there's not a lot of clarity about the origins of Plan Colombia. Because Plan Colombia in its initial formulation was a $7.5 billion Colombian strategy developed by President Andres Pastrana 5 years ago, with the assistance and the urging of the Clinton administration to address Colombia's multiple crises. It was to be funded by the United States, the European Union, multi-lateral development banks, and the Colombian Government.

President Pastrana, when he took office in 1998, originally spoke of a Marshall Plan for coca-growing regions. He thought that a negotiated peace with the FARC would enable the state to cerate a legitimate presence in areas largely abandoned by the state, and would allow the state to promote alternative development away from dependence on drug related crops. For Pastrana, the peace process was viewed as an effective anti- narcotics strategy. To this end, he hoped to enlist the support of the United States.

This original formulation of Plan Colombia was received with great skepticism in Washington. By the time Congress approved the $1.3 billion supplemental appropriation in June 2000, the formula had basically been turned on its head. For the United States, peacemaking and state building was not seen as viable anti-narcotic strategy. Rather, anti-narcotics was viewed as the basis for pacification and peace.

As such, the approval of the original assistance strategy to Plan Colombia needs to be viewed from two perspectives: the anti-narcotics strategy, and second, its impact on peace. And I want to discuss both of these.

From the anti-narcotics perspective, Plan Colombia represents the continuation of a succession of strategies dating back to the mid-1980's of attacking production at its source. This can be seen in the initial operations in the Bolivian coca fields under Operation Blast Furnace in 1986, in the efforts to destroy the Colombian cartels, what was known as the kingpin strategy in the late 1980's and early 1990's, and the airbridge strategy that effectively cutoff the Peruvian and Bolivian coca fields from the producers in Colombia.

In each of these cases, the immediate objectives were achieved. The kingpin strategy effectively dismantled the Medillin and Cali cartels. The airbridge strategy led to declines of up to 85 percent in coca production in Peru and Bolivia. However, in every case, new patterns of trafficking emerged. Instead of large cartels, small cartels appeared in Colombia, as well as new large scale drug syndicates in Mexico. And the great reduction in coca production in Bolivia and Peru led to massive increase in coca cultivation in Colombia.

What has happened with Plan Colombia? Massive aerial fumigation by the United States and Colombian Governments finally has led to a modest decrease in overall production. But as would be expected, the available evidence is that the market has adjusted. New producers have entered the market and new techniques have been forged, including agrinomical advances that allow coca production at lower elevations, effectively opening up the entire Amazon Basin and not just the foothills of the Andes. The available evidence is that production is moving into micro-plots scattered throughout Colombia and into newer areas that do not have a historical relationship with coca production.

But the impact of Plan Colombia was perhaps even more devastating for the peace process. The FARC viewed the development of Plan Colombia as an effort by the Colombian and U.S. Governments to undermine the peace process and to promote a military solution. One can be skeptical about the sincerity of the FARC in engaging in talks. There were clearly divisions among their senior leadership, and they too increased their military actions during the period of negotiations.

However, the United States basically sent a signal that it was not interested in the peace strategy. In so doing, it also alienated other members of the international community, particularly the EU, which refused to endorse or support Plan Colombia.

After September 11th and beginning in mid-2002, Congress lifted the previous restrictions that required all military aid and assistance to be dedicated to anti-narcotics. The action has brought the United States more directly into Colombia's internal armed conflict, something that it had previously attempted to avoid. The new posture of the United States converges well with the policies of the Uribe administration, elected in 2002 on a hard line platform following the breakdown of the peace talks. Current policy is to confront militarily the FARC and to increase the military and police presence throughout the national territory.

The Uribe government has also initiated negotiations with the right wing paramilitaries, the AUC. This is a new strategy. It is one I support. The AUC has been the largest violator of human rights in the country and the most destabilizing element in the conflict. However, negotiations will be difficult. The AUC is extensively involved in drug trafficking, it is fragmented, it is undergoing a leadership change following the disappearance of its nominal leader, Carlos Castano.

Successful negotiations with the AUC will not lead to peace. The conflict with the FARC will continue. However, a durable accord that removed the AUC from the conflict would clarify the nature of the war between the state and the FARC. Eventually, removing the AUC from the conflict might clear the way for a negotiated settlement with the FARC. However, this will not happen in the short term.

To conclude, the war in Colombia has endured in one form or another for 58 years. The war antedates the drug boom. It is deeply rooted. For 20 years, the situation can be characterized as an escalating military stalemate. Both sides, government and guerrillas, have escalated their capacities and neither side is likely to defeat the other.

Under these conditions, I am convinced that there is no military solution to the conflict. This dose not mean that the Colombian Government does not have the legitimate right to defend itself. Yet peace will take more than battling the FARC or pushing coca cultivation into different corners of the country. The United States can potentially play a major role in ending this conflict. A stable Colombia is in the interest of the United States. But it will require a rethinking and reprioritizing of the component parts of the U.S. assistance program to Plan Colombia, balancing needs of development assistance, human rights, humanitarian assistance, judicial reform and peace promotion with the more visible policies of counter-terrorism and anti-narcotics.

For starters, one might want to look at the original $7.5 billion Plan Colombia, the original Plan Colombia, developed by the Colombian Government in 1999. It presents a more balanced approach.

Again, let me thank the committee for its time, and I'll be happy to answer any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chernick follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.

Mr. Isacson.

Mr. Isacson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate the committee for holding a hearing on Plan Colombia, it is absolutely crucial that Congress closely oversee the U.S. strategy in Colombia. And I thank you for staying this late to hear my testimony.

We've heard a lot of glowing statements today about Plan Colombia, including Colombian Government statistics showing less violence and less coca. I don't have alternative statistics, how can I cover the whole country? But in the last year, I have interviewed dozens of local officials, religious and community leaders in Colombia, and I've heard a lot of skepticism. People on the ground have seen little change in violence or drug crop cultivation.

A prime example is Putumayo. Putumayo is a province in southern Colombia about the size of Maryland. Putumayo was the main focus of Plan Colombia when it began in 2000. I visited there in March 2001 and I was there again 8 weeks ago, in April. In the 3 years in between, the United States has paid for the fumigation of at least 100,000 hectares of Putumayo, and we funded a dramatic expansion in Colombian military and police capabilities there. Conservatively estimating, we spent $1 billion in and around Putumayo in 4 years.

I did see less coca in Putumayo than there was 3 years ago. But even after wave upon wave of fumigation, it's still very easy to find coca there. I took this picture within a quarter mile of Putumayo's only paved road. It shows a pretty commonsite, a small plot of new coca bushes, about knee high, growing in a field that had been fumigated some months before. Replanting in Putumayo is common, and several people I interviewed said that seeds and nurseries are very booming industries right now.

Three years ago, Putumayo was full of large plots of coca. They would go all the way to the horizon, it seemed. Nobody does that any more, because it's too much of a target for the spray planes. But there's still a lot of coca, and today the plots are different. They're smaller, they're more widely scattered.

But even more disturbingly, everybody I asked there, and I asked several times, said that the price of coca leaves and coca paste has not changed since before Plan Colombia began. A kilo of coca paste still sells for about $800 in Putumayo, the same as it did before the year 2000. This would seem to violate the law of supply and demand. If fumigation were actually making coca scarcer, the price should rise. But that has not happened. There is no tipping point yet.

A gram of cocaine sold on our streets goes for about $25 to $150, depending on the city. That was as of January of this year. That's the same as the studies ONDCP was carrying out in 1995, and they say there's been no change in purity. Supply is meeting demand as well as it ever has. This means that the traffickers are adapting yet again to increased fumigation.

To counter this, we can't respond just by fumigating even more. If you want to reduce drug supplies, we have to start thinking about real governance. There's no substitute. Eventually, Colombian Government civilians are going to have to be able to look growers in the eye in places like Putumayo and tell them, what you're doing is illegal, but we're committed to providing you the basic conditions you need to make a legal living.

So far we're nowhere near there. The United States has given Colombia $3.2 billion since 2000, but of that, only 2 percent has gone to civilian governance or economic aid, even though 8 out of 10 rural Colombians live below the poverty line, creating a very strong incentive to grow coca. The rest of our aid is going to guns, helicopters and spray planes. Even with all this military aid, including the creation of all these new vetted units, Putumayo is still a very dangerous place.

In April, I had to take a canoe across the Guamues River where the main road had a bridge going across it, but there was no bridge. Late last year, the FARC was perfectly able, at complete liberty to bomb out this and several other bridges along the main road. This was part of a larger wave of violence in Putumayo at the end of last year. The guerrillas also launched dozens of attacks on Putumayo's oil infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the paramilitaries are heavily present still in the towns of Putumayo. Bodies show up on the streets and roadsides nearly every day. There's no peace talk, cease-fire in Putumayo. The paramilitary attacks on civilians haven't let up at all. The paramilitaries are also very easy to find. I came across a dozen of them in full uniform on the outskirts of one of the main towns.

Meanwhile, everyone there takes for granted that the military and the paramilitaries help each other and don't fight each other. When I asked local officials, religious leaders whether military-paramilitary collaboration is still a problem, they looked at me like I was an idiot. They said, of course it is.

Violence and coca persist in Putumayo, despite all of our investment there. We have to learn from this as we hear about ambitious new plans to aid military offensives like the Plan Patriota that was discussed in the last panel. The last several years in Colombia are full of examples of massive military offensives, there have been many, with no long term results.

This is a familiar pattern. Here's what happens. Thousands of troops rush into a guerrilla stronghold, and as we heard in the last panel, the guerrillas don't fight back much, they melt away into the jungle. Maybe there's an occasional encounter or ambush, but nothing much more. The soldiers then stay in the zone for a few weeks, even a few months, but they can't stay forever. When they eventually have to go back to their bases, we find that nobody made any effort while they were there to bring the rest of the government into the zone. There are still no judges, cops, teachers, doctors, road builders or any of the other civilian government services that every society and economy needs in order to function.

When the soldiers leave, armed groups simply come back and fill the vacuum. The former FARC demilitarized zone, much of it, I'm afraid, is still an example of this. There was a huge military offensive there in 2002, but today the rural part of the demilitarized zone is again dominated by the FARC. Whether you call it Plan Patriota or Plan Colombia II, if we're going to help Colombia govern its territory, we have to remember that military power is only a small part of doing that. A government gains authority by providing its citizens the basic conditions they need to make a living in peace. Both of our governments are going to have to spend much more than to insert civilian government institutions, not just the military, but the rest into Colombia's owned governed areas. We can pay of a lot of this by diverting money away from our fumigation program and our huge military aid program.

In conclusion, this sort of non-military aid doesn't just neglect security needs. In fact, development aid is security aid, because Colombia won't have security without it. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Isacson follows:]

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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you all very much. I've been to Putumayo. What alternative crop would you suggest for these farmers? That's the difficulty.

Mr. Isacson. Well, there are crops and there are products that will make money. Juice concentrates are showing some promise.

Chairman Tom Davis. They'll make money, but it's nothing near what they're getting.

Mr. Isacson. Actually, it wouldn't be that far off. A coca grower who has three hectares, after they make their payment to the paramilitaries and to the guerrillas in the area, after they pay for all their inputs, two hectares will probably give you a net of about $300 or $400 a month, which, Colombia's minimum wage is only $110. But you could probably make that with hearts of palm or something like that.

Chairman Tom Davis. They could use some of our ag programs where they pay you not to grow, you'd probably do better down there.

Mr. Plotter, let me ask a couple of questions. What was it like on a day to day basis being a guerrilla? What was the quality of life like? Did you have running water? Were you living out there in the jungle in tents? What kind of food did you get? What was the quality of life compared to going into the city and living a normal civilian life?

Mr. Plotter. [All remarks of Mr. Plotter are given in native tongue through an interpreter.]

Ms. Cepeda. It was a drastic and a radical change. I grew up in the provinces, but I always, up to the moment I went into the guerrillas, lived in urban centers.

In my 10 years as a guerrilla, I was always in the geographical regions of either the big mountain range or the jungle.

The conditions maybe satisfied the military struggle, but they didn't satisfy human needs.

We never get used to war. We just become resigned to living in those conditions.

Our basic sanitary services, for example, are what nature provides.

When the FARC started getting money and when they started getting more comfortable in the demilitarized zone, those of us who were outside the zone wanted to copy those bourgeois kinds of accommodations.

What happened was the sacrifice and the personal giving oneself up to the revolutionary or guerrilla----

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[Note.--A copy of the transcript held during the power outage follows:]

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Ms. Watson. I mean, do you lose sight of what your original goal was?

Mr. Plotter. [All remarks of Mr. Plotter are given in native tongue through an interpreter.]

Ms. Cepeda. There needs to be a distinction between what was the central objective, which was the taking of power and the methods and scenarios where these objectives are trying to be developed and reached.

The taking, a Colombian expression famously said, do you want to take power, for what. And my question is, do they want to take power and have power over the ruins of a country?

But we now have the chance to nullify the power of the gun, because we have democratic mechanisms and democratic scenarios where there can be divergence of opinion, divergence of ideas and there can also be dissent. So we do not have to take recourse in a fratricidal war.

And this war among brothers has its fuel in drugs and the drug business.

Ms. Watson. Just let me say this, and then we'll all have to go. Was it the narcotics that fueled the revolution in terms of financially, or could there be another kind of way of keeping a stable democratic government other than the proceeds from narcotics? And then that goes over to this group, however, we're not going to have time.

Mr. Plotter. [All remarks of Mr. Plotter are given in native tongue through an interpreter.]

Ms. Cepeda. No, it was not always like this. Before drugs fueled the armed struggle, there was from the part of the guerrilla a really partisan, committed ideology based on the population and based on looking, and the search for a better society.

The qualitative jump in the characteristics of the FARC is that now they have a much better, much improved arsenal as a product of drug profits.

Ms. Watson. Muchas gracias.

Mr. Cummings. Dr. Chernick and Mr. Isacson, how could we better use our money? You heard what I said a little earlier. We spend a lot of money, and everybody here, all of us, we want to be effective and efficient. How do you see, what do you see as a better way of using our money, assuming we want to use it to reduce drug production in Colombia? How would you approach it? Apparently you don't feel too good about the way we're doing it right now.

Mr. Chernick. My feeling, and I think most people who have looked at the drug war, as they call it, over the last 15 to 20 years, is that the current strategy is not successful. We continue to move it around and we show no results, zero results. Something else should be done.

You can change the circumstances in a particular country. We've done that in Bolivia and Peru, and we are changing things in Colombia, change, not lowering, changing politically, changing the war, changing the political actors, changing the social movements. But what we're not doing is stopping the flow of drugs. So I think something else needs to be thought on the drug side, and it probably means placing a lot more baskets on the demand side.

Even then, you must remember, the United States is not the only country fueling the demand for drugs. Brazil is now the second largest consumer of cocaine, and Europe is close behind. So that there is a growing global demand. And that's going to be met. That's simply economics. That's supply and demand.

And the drug war shows, you can send all the planes and helicopters you want, and you will simply push it around, you will not alter the laws of economics, of supply and demand. If you understand that, you need to think of a new way to approach the drug problem.

Second, a separate problem is the issue of the war in Colombia, and what is the impact of a war on drugs and the war in Colombia. My contention is that the U.S. drug war now collapsed into a war on terror is simply fueling the war. The United States should be on the side of the democratic side of democratic security, of promoting development, of dealing with humanitarian crises and dealing with human rights. And it should be putting its money and its diplomatic and its political weight on that side. It could go a long way.

But one should not collapse the drug war and Colombia's internal war. One should deal with Colombia's problems and one should try to address the issues of Colombia's armed conflict through some sort of negotiated settlement.

Mr. Isacson. Very quickly, right now the United States gives Colombia about $750 million a year. I don't think any of us dispute that amount. I think we all endorse that. That is a good investment if it's done right. Our problem is that is 80 percent going to the security forces. And it's not looking at the reasons why people grow drugs, why people have no choice but to join the guerrillas and paramilitaries if they happen to live in the rural part of Colombia, which is a vast area.

It's hard to even imagine from here, but these are zones where most people have come within the last 30 years, cut down some jungle and tried to make a living and their government never followed them there. If somebody tries to take your land, you can't go to a judge and get it adjudicated. You can't get a land title, which means you can't get credit. There's no road for you to take your legal crops to market. And there's no cops to settle any dispute. Your kids can't go to school so they end up unemployed and probably joining one of the armed groups.

There's a whole lot of other needs that our aid really isn't meeting. But we certainly have no problem with the amount or the level of commitment.

Mr. Cummings. So in other words, if the economic and social problems aren't addressed, you're going to continue to have these problems and we're going to continue to pour money into Colombia, and it's just going to be a bottomless pit.

Mr. Chernick. Mr. Plotter mentioned that the FARC are able to, are very freely able to recruit like crazy in the areas under their control. Why? Because there's a lot of people there with nothing to do. And as long as those social conditions are there, you've got this reserve army of drug growers and future guerrillas and para-militaries. That's absolutely true.

Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.

Chairman Tom Davis. Let me just ask, the Homestead Act, President Lincoln did so much to develop the west here and the gold rush and everything like that. Would something like that be conceivable for Colombia?

Mr. Chernick. I think so. Actually, a lot of the places we're talking about, like Putumayo, some of the people that came in the 1960's and 1970's came at the behest of the Colombian Government as what they called colonization plans. But the Colombian Government didn't followup.

Chairman Tom Davis. They didn't have Wyatt Earp following it up.

Mr. Chernick. That's exactly right.

Chairman Tom Davis. No cavalry and everything else.

Mr. Chernick. No Pony Express, either. Nothing.

Mr. Isacson. Could I just add something? There is a problem here. It is true that Colombia has this really hundreds of years process of colonization of what they call the agricultural frontier. It's like the Homesteading Act. The problem is with most of the areas of homesteading, it's not only that they don't have title to the land and therefore the state doesn't have infrastructure, no roads to market and all that, but most of this area is not suitable for agricultural production. Most of this is very fragile rain forest that does not lend itself to agricultural production.

You asked, what else can you grow? In most places, nothing. And that is, one really needs to think about it. I in fact worked with the World Bank on a project of creating alternative poles to development. Because it's not only alternatives crops, it's in fact alternative poles of development that would draw populations out of the forest. Because one can't think of simply continuing the colonization zones. They've thought about that in the past. Half the country is basically unpopulated.

But it's not suitable for habitation. And one needs to think of a different relationship of the population in that lands. The alternative development question hasn't even begun to address that issue.

Mr. Chernick. That's true.

Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Well, our votes are on, and I don't want to hold you while we go over and do them, but it's been very helpful. We appreciate all of your perspectives, as we put this in the record and as we move forward.

So, Mr. Isacson and Dr. Chernick and Mr. Plotter, and also for you, Ms. Cepeda, thank you very much for being with us today. This has been very, very helpful to us. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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