Home
About Us
Publications
Press Room
Support our work with a tax-deductible donation.
Home
|
Analyses
|
Aid
|
U.S. Govt
|
Peace
|
News
|
Events
|
Links
|
Español
|
Staff
Last Updated:7/7/04
Speech by Sen. Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia), June 23, 2004

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, it is no secret that America's military forces are stretched thin across the globe. The relentless fighting in Iraq has exacted a heavy toll on the U.S. military, forcing thousands of American troops to face extended tours in a dangerous war zone. Stop-loss orders have prevented thousands more from leaving the military when their obligations have been fulfilled. America's men and women in uniform have gone far beyond the call of duty to meet the increasing demands that have been placed on them, and we owe them a great debt of gratitude.

In the face of such hardship facing America's military personnel, this is hardly a propitious time to arbitrarily expand U.S. military obligations overseas, and yet that is exactly what the bill in front of us does. In an effort to help the Government of Colombia launch a new offensive in its civil war against guerrilla insurgents and the drug trafficking that funds them, the Defense authorization bill substantially increases the number of U.S. military and civilian personnel authorized to support the operations of Plan Colombia in Colombia.

Plan Colombia is a 6-year antinarcotics initiative authorized by Congress in fiscal year 2000 to combat cocaine production and trafficking in Colombia. From the outset, many Members of Congress worry that United States intervention in Colombia's drug wars--even noncombat intervention--could serve to draw the United States into the thick of Colombia's longrunning civil war. In an effort to preserve congressional oversight and prevent mission creep in Colombia, Congress placed a cap on the number of U.S. personnel who could participate in Plan Colombia. Current law limits the number of U.S. personnel in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military troops and 400 civilian contractors, for a total of 800.

This is a part of my statement. I believe it was in the year 2000 that we placed a limitation. Originally, the 800 was divided into 500 military and 300 contractors, making a total of 800. That limitation on the number is current. This bill, however, would double the number of military personnel authorized to participate in Plan Colombia, raising the troop cap from 400 to 800.

That troop cap is being doubled. The cap on civilian contractors would be increased by 50 percent, climbing from 400 to 600. This bill says let us put in a little more. Let us lift the number.

The increases reflect the number of military and civilian personnel requested by the administration to carry out a 2-year training and support operation in relation to an aggressive new counterinsurgency offensive being undertaken by the Government of Colombia called Plan Patriota. With the stroke of a pen, just like that--just a stroke of the pen--this bill would increase the number of U.S. civilian and military personnel authorized to be in Colombia to support Plan Colombia from 800 to 1400.

So we are just inching along, just inching along. That may seem like an insignificant increase to some, but I

expect it looms large in the minds of U.S. forces who have seen their tours in Iraq extended or who have been prevented from leaving the military when their obligations have been fulfilled. The 800 military personnel who could be sent to Colombia under the proposal are 800 military personnel who would not be eligible to relieve American troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere. Before signing off on such a measure, the Senate should consider very carefully the ultimate goals of Plan Colombia and the amount of oversight Congress should maintain on the program.

I am offering an amendment. The amendment I am offering is an effort to address these considerations. My amendment provides a reasonable and sustainable level of support to continue Plan Colombia and to support Plan Patriota, but it limits the support to immediate needs, not presumed needs a year or two from now. Under my amendment, the cap on both U.S. military and civilian personnel would increase from 400 to 500 each, for a total limit of 1,000.

My amendment conforms with the House-passed version of the Defense authorization bill. The House bill caps the number of military personnel in Colombia at 500. The House bill does not address the civilian caps, but the State Department has determined it needs fewer than 100 additional contractors next year to support Plan Patriota.

Plan Colombia remains a volatile and dangerous mission. Three American civilian contractors operating in support of Plan Colombia have been held captive in the jungle by Colombian insurgents for more than a year. Five other U.S. civilians were killed as a result of aircraft crashes. Additional cocaine fumigation flights have been fired on, and since August 2003, two planes have been downed by hostile fire.

This is not the time, colleagues, and Colombia is not the place for the United States to ramp up its military commitment so sharply. Although the numbers may be relatively small, the mission in Colombia has been constantly increasing.

That is the problem. The mission in Colombia has been constantly increasing, evolving from a strictly antinarcotics campaign into an operation encompassing antiterrorism, pipeline protection, and an air-bridge denial program to intercept drug trafficking flights in Colombia.

A major infusion of additional U.S. personnel into Colombia will place more American personnel at risk and will increase the prospects of the United States being drawn ever deeper into Colombia's civil war.

The State Department has confirmed that it needs fewer than 100 additional personnel next year to accomplish its goals. The Defense Department has estimated that it needs no more than 158 additional personnel to support the second phase of Plan Patriota next year. Defense Department officials have also said they do not need a total of 800 personnel and do not anticipate a time when 800 military personnel would be in Colombia in support of the initiative. The Department is asking Congress to provide broad flexibility through an unnecessarily large troop commitment at a time when both human and financial military resources are severely limited.

I think Congress should take a more conservative approach to Plan Colombia and particularly to the involvement of U.S. forces in Plan Patriota. I am willing to authorize a modest increase in the number of military and civilian personnel for next year, but I believe Congress should review the progress that has been made a year from now before determining what the final number should be.

If the Pentagon cannot tell Congress how many troops it will need in Iraq a year from now, how can it say with such certainty how many forces it will need in Colombia 2 years from now?

The United States has spent the past 4 years training and equipping Colombian troops and flying cocaine crop eradication missions for the Government of Colombia. According to the Congressional Research Service, U.S. funding for Plan Colombia, since fiscal year 2000, totals approximately 3.7 billion bucks.

The administration has characterized the next 2 years as a ``window of opportunity'' to assist Colombia with its war against the insurgents. Now, that may or it may not prove to be true, but the burden of securing that window has fallen on--guess who?--Uncle Sam. That is where it lies, in the lap of Uncle Sam.

If the Government of Colombia is as committed to eradicating the drug crops and defeating the guerillas as the administration contends, then the Government of Colombia should take the lead in seizing this opportunity. Four years and $3.7 billion into Plan Colombia, the United States should be on the verge of tapering down its commitment to Colombia, not sharply increasing it. Where are we going here? When is this going to come to an end?

Plan Colombia has ample flexibility built into it to allow the military to surge, if needed, to respond to emergencies such as search and rescue or evacuation of operation.


In addition, at the request of the administration, Congress has agreed to broaden routine exemptions to personnel-counting procedures, giving the Defense and State Department even greater flexibility in managing the number of personnel in Colombia.

Routine exceptions now include such activities as port calls, DOD civilian visits, certain military exercises, aircrew overnights as needed for weather, maintenance, or crew rest overlapped during deployment location, headquarter staff visits, and traditional commander's activities, just to name a few.

Instead of the United States committing more troops and more civilian contractors to Colombia than are actually needed, the Government of Colombia should increase the resources it is committing to Plan Patriota to mitigate the

burden on the United States.

My amendment increases U.S. support for Plan Colombia, but it does so at a prudent level that allows the Defense and State Departments to commit the minimum number of additional U.S. personnel needed to assist the Government of Colombia in prosecuting Plan Patriota while maintaining necessary congressional oversight on Plan Colombia.

In recognition of the current sacrifices this Nation is demanding of its men and women in uniform, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and to resist unwarranted and excessive increases in a level of military and civilian personnel that may be deployed in Colombia.

I yield the floor.

As of July 7, 2004 this page was also available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/B?r108:@FIELD(FLD003+s)+@FIELD(DDATE+20040623)

Google
Search WWW Search ciponline.org

Asia
|
Colombia
|
Cuba
|
Financial Flows
|
National Security
|
Joint Projects

Center for International Policy
1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Suite 801
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 232-3317 / fax (202) 232-3440
cip@ciponline.org