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Last
Updated:11/5/04
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State
Department Memorandum of Justification on Human Rights Conditions, September
2004
MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO ASSISTANCE FOR COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCESSection 563 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Division D, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199) (“FOAA”) establishes conditions under which assistance using funds appropriated under the FOAA may be made available for the Colombian Armed Forces. In particular, section 563(a)(1) allows that up to 75 percent of funds may be obligated prior to a determination and certification by the Secretary of State pursuant to paragraph (2), which in turn provides that up to 12.5 percent of such funds may be obligated only after the Secretary of State has made a certification and report with respect to certain human rights and paramilitary related conditions. The remaining funds may be obligated after July 31, 2004, if the Secretary of State makes a certification described in section 563(a)(3). This memorandum provides the justification for the Secretary of State’s Determination that the factors in section 563(a)(2) have been met and specifically that the Colombian Government or Armed Forces either are, or have made substantial progress in:
Before addressing each of the conditions required for a determination described in section 563(a)(2), a broader review reveals a complex picture, with significant progress in many areas, but also with more work remaining to be done. During the period January-August 2004, since the Secretary’s previous certification, the Colombian Government has continued to implement its Democratic Security Policy, a broad and integrated strategy to restore security, democracy, and effective state control to all parts of Colombian territory. Progress in this ambitious program includes a number of positive developments:
Since the previous certification in January 2004, relations between the Colombian government and human rights groups went through a period of tension, in part because President Uribe made several public statements critical of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, relations have recently improved after President Uribe met with a number of NGOs and made public statements reaffirming the value of their work. In an address to the senior leadership and members of the Armed Forces on August 6, 2004, President Uribe urged the Colombian military to increase its actions to protect all Colombians, including those who may disagree with policies of his government. This was a clear effort to establish a more positive working atmosphere with NGOs critical of his programs. He also noted the significant improvements in overall national security figures, but recognized that improved statistics are not enough. Uribe said “the soldiers of our country, the commanders, even I as President, we cannot say to a family hit by murder or a kidnapping of a loved one that the statistics have improved. What we need is to effectively protect all the families of the nation so that there are no more murders, there are no more kidnappings.” President Uribe further reaffirmed his commitment to promoting human rights in Colombia in his response to a letter raising human rights concerns from 23 U.S. Senators in August 2004. Uribe stated, “My administration highly values the work of the individuals and organizations that are committed to promoting and upholding human rights in my country. They can count on the State to provide whatever guarantees are necessary to perform their tasks, be they friends or opponents of the current administration. We value and respect their efforts but -- as pertains to any democratic and pluralist government -- we reserve the right to disagree with their reports.” In the same letter, President Uribe also noted that his government is dedicated to eliminating collaboration between members of the Armed Forces and paramilitaries, is concerned about the problem of impunity, and is working on judicial reforms. In July and August, President Uribe met on separate occasions with Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and a group of Colombian human rights organizations to express his respect for their work and his commitment to improving human rights in Colombia. Minister of Defense Jorge Uribe and the military High Command also held productive meetings with human rights organizations and pledged improved communication and cooperation in the future. In a demonstration of the Government of Colombia’s ongoing commitment to improve professionalism, eliminate corruption, and sever military-paramilitary ties, General Carreno, commander of the Colombian Army, used his discretionary authority to remove 500 members of the Army during the first six months of 2004. Some of those dismissed were accused of human rights abuses or ties to illegal armed groups. Those dismissed from service include 67 officers, 131 noncommissioned officers, and 311 soldiers. Use of this discretionary authority for dismissal protects the Ministry of Defense from lawsuits in cases where there may not be enough evidence to allow for full prosecution. The Colombian government has accepted responsibility for violations of human rights by past governments in two high-profile cases. In May 2004, an Administrative Court in Arauca ruled that the Colombian government must pay $725,000 in damages to the survivors of a 1998 bombing in Santo Domingo, Arauca, which resulted in the deaths of 18 people. In July 2004, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that the Colombian government shared responsibility for the murders of 19 merchants by paramilitaries in Puerto Boyaca, Boyaca department, on October 6, 1987. The ruling obliges Colombia to meet 23 conditions, including publicly recognizing its responsibility in the events, paying $6.5 million compensation to the victims' relatives, and reopening the criminal investigation, so as to punish those responsible for the massacre. President Uribe immediately and publicly accepted the verdict, saying that Colombia is “a country of laws that respects court decisions.” Although the Secretary has determined that the efforts of the Government of Colombia and the Colombian Armed Forces justify certification at this time, more needs to be done to protect human rights and to sever military-paramilitary ties. President Alvaro Uribe and his Administration have stated repeatedly, both publicly and in discussions with U.S. government officials, their commitment to further improving the human rights situation in Colombia. The United States takes seriously all reports of human rights abuses, and we are committed to continue working with the Government of Colombia on concrete measures that it should take to make further progress in improving the human rights performance of its Armed Forces and in severing military ties with paramilitary groups. The State Department and Embassy Bogota also consult regularly with nongovernmental organizations and civil society groups regarding Colombia’s human rights performance and consider their input carefully before making a decision on certification. Following
is a more detailed discussion of the Colombian government’s and Armed
Forces’ compliance with each of the conditions for certification contained
in section 563(a)(2).
The civilian Inspector General’s Office (Procuraduria) conducts disciplinary investigations and can impose administrative sanctions, including suspension or dismissal, on military personnel. The Inspector General has the authority to order the provisional suspension of personnel during the investigation of offenses involving gross misconduct. Under Colombia’s Military Criminal Justice Code, the Inspector General’s Office is required to exercise oversight of the military legal system. Colombian military investigators immediately notify the Inspector General’s Office of the opening of any criminal investigation by military legal authorities of military personnel and provide the Inspector General with regular updates throughout the investigation. Between January and August 2004, the Inspector General’s Office ordered suspensions in the following cases:
The Prosecutor General’s Office (Fiscalia) is responsible for the criminal investigation and prosecution of military personnel alleged to have committed violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitaries. Under Article 359 of Colombia’s Code of Criminal Procedure, all government institutions, including the Armed Forces, are required to suspend from duty at the request of the Prosecutor General's Office any public servant against whom the Prosecutor General's Office has issued an order for preventive detention. When the Prosecutor General’s Office orders an individual in the Armed Forces to be “preventively detained,” the Armed Forces either holds that individual in custody at a military facility or turns him over to civilian authorities. As used below, suspension refers to suspension under Colombian law, which means removal from active duty and a fifty percent reduction in pay. The Prosecutor General’s Office issues an order for preventive detention during its investigation of a case, prior to formally charging a suspect with a crime. Under Colombian criminal procedure, credible evidence warranting the issuance of a preventive detention order (medida de aseguramiento) is defined as “at least two reliable pieces of evidence developed in an investigation linking the suspect to a crime.” The Prosecutor General’s Office will make a request for suspension of the suspect once a preventive detention order has been issued. The Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor General's Office reports that between January and August 2004 it issued nine orders for the preventive detention of military personnel credibly alleged to have committed gross human rights violations or to have collaborated with paramilitaries. Of the twelve military personnel identified in the January 2004 report as having been detained and suspended by the Armed Forces between July and December 2003, eight remain in preventive detention and suspended as of August 2004, pending further investigation, and three have had trial proceedings initiated against them. The twelfth soldier, Angel Fernando Peña Avila, was exonerated and freed. According to the Prosecutor General's Office, the Armed Forces complied with the order for the preventive detention of each individual when notified, and suspended the military personnel involved when asked to do so. In addition, between January and August 2004, nine military personnel were indicted and had trial proceedings initiated against them in civilian courts. These cases are listed in section 563(a)(2)(B). The following individuals were in preventive detention and suspended between January and August 2004:
The following individuals remain suspended, as noted in the January 2004 memorandum of justification:
Section 563(a)(2)(B) requires a determination that:
The Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor General’s Office is the lead Colombian Government agency in the investigation and prosecution of military personnel who have committed violations of human rights or have colluded with paramilitaries. Significant reforms have been underway at the Prosecutor General’s Office since February 2004, when Colombian media reports revealed evidence of corruption and paramilitary infiltration in the institution. Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio quickly dismissed several senior officials implicated in the scandal, including the administrative director of the Prosecutor General’s Office, the head of the Witness Protection program, and the director of the Cucuta regional office. At least two other senior officials resigned. Osorio implemented a series of polygraph examinations for more than 150 senior officials and any prosecutors assigned to sensitive units, including employees of the Anti-Narcotics and Maritime Interdiction unit, the Witness Protection Program, and the Financial Analysis unit. He also created an Internal Investigation unit to help investigate and prevent such corruption in the future. President Uribe has acknowledged that judicial reform is needed in Colombia. In his August 2004 letter to 23 U.S. Senators, he said, “impunity and the shortcomings of the judicial system are a major concern of this administration.” He noted that the government of Colombia is working to resolve the problems in the justice system by moving to an accusatory system with oral trials starting in 2005. President Uribe signed into law on August 31, 2004 a new criminal procedure code, which will transform the Colombian criminal justice system into an oral accusatory style system. One of the reasons for the transition is to have more effective criminal investigations and prosecutions as well as quicker disposition of cases. There was one significant verdict during the period since the previous certification. On January 30, 2004 a judge in Antioquia sentenced Army Sergeants Sandro Fernando Barrerro and Humberto Blandon Vargas to 40 years in prison each for the January 2000 kidnapping and murder of two demobilized ex-ELN guerrillas. However, two cases in which the Government has not taken the opportunity to send a clear message regarding impunity for human rights violations and collaboration with the paramilitaries remain troubling. On March 4 the Prosecutor General's Office closed its case against General Rito Alejo Del Rio, reportedly due to lack of evidence. Del Rio had been arrested by the Prosecutor General's Office on July 24, 2001 for allegedly establishing paramilitary groups. The dismissal of charges against him angered many human rights groups and civil society activists. The US State Department confirmed in March 2004 that Del Rio's US visa had been revoked pursuant to sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act related to drug trafficking and terrorist activities. While we are pleased that trial proceedings continue against General Jaime Uscategui on charges of omission of duty causing aggravated homicide and aggravated kidnapping in the 1997 Mapiripan massacre, we are concerned at the amount of time this trial is taking, as well as the indictment of Colonel (retired) Hernan Orozco in the same case. Orozco is widely considered to have been the “whistle-blower” in this incident. We have asked appropriate Colombian authorities to review the case against Orozco, especially in view of the message his prosecution sends regarding military cooperation with civilian judicial authorities. In addition to the military personnel placed under preventive detention as listed in section 564(a)(2)(A), between January and August 2004 nine military personnel were indicted (resoluciones de acusación) and had trial proceedings initiated against them in civilian courts:
Trial proceedings continue against the following individuals whose cases were listed in the memorandum accompanying the January 2004 certification:
Trial proceedings have ended against two military officials mentioned in the January 2004 report. The charges against Army Second Sergeant Waldo Quintero Cuervo were dropped on appeal. Army Soldier Luis Humberto Arteaga Garcia escaped and a warrant has been issued for his arrest. From January to August 2004 the Inspector General’s Office charged nineteen members of the Armed Forces with human rights offenses in six separate cases. Of these individuals, one was a colonel, two were lieutenant colonels, three were majors, and one was a captain. The Inspector General reports that during this period, it had 118 total open investigations against members of the Armed Forces. The Inspector General’s Office finished its investigations and ordered disciplinary suspensions in eight cases (see preceding section.) It ordered other disciplinary sanctions against the following military personnel:
Section 563(a)(2)(C) requires a determination that:
The Minister of Defense has designated the Coordinator of the Armed Forces’ Group of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law as the liaison between civilian authorities and the Armed Forces. Additionally, to ensure cooperation on the regional and local levels, the directors of the Human Rights offices of the Armed Forces liaise with the representatives of the Inspector General’s (Procuraduria) and Prosecutor General’s (Fiscalia) Offices in their respective jurisdictions. Elba Beatriz Silva, director of the Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor General's Office, in a letter dated June 18, 2004, certified that the Armed Forces provided full cooperation in its investigations. The Armed Forces cooperated in apprehending and detaining suspects and aided the investigations by facilitating the gathering of evidence, aiding the investigation, and assisting in judicial procedures. Similarly, Edgardo Jose Maya Villazon, Inspector General of the Republic of Colombia, certified that the Armed Forces fully cooperated with the Procuraduria’s investigations. The Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSJ) resolves jurisdictional disputes between military and civilian prosecutors based on whether the alleged crime involved is related to military service or not. Colombian law defines gross violations of human rights as not being an “act of service” and therefore punishable in the civilian justice system. Military personnel charged with a crime by civilian authorities may also challenge the jurisdiction of the civilian court. The Ministry of Defense and civilian judicial officials agree that military courts respect the decisions of the CSJ as to which has jurisdiction. From January through August 2004, the CSJ ruled on eight jurisdictional disputes related to cases of human rights violations or aiding and abetting paramilitaries. Of these, seven cases were transferred to the civilian judiciary and one was assigned to the military judiciary. In May 2004, an Administrative Court in Arauca ruled that the Colombian government must pay $725,000 in damages to the survivors of a 1998 bombing in Santo Domingo, Arauca that resulted in the deaths of 18 people. A Colombian Air Force helicopter is believed to have mistakenly dropped a cluster bomb on innocent civilians in the midst of an attack on FARC guerillas. A civil case brought by the Inspector General found three Air Force crew members guilty and sentenced them to three-months suspension from duty, the most severe punishment available. The Prosecutor General’s Office continues to pursue a criminal case in the civilian court system against the three Air Force members. In July 2004, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that the Colombian Government shared responsibility for the murders of 19 merchants by paramilitaries in Puerto Boyaca, Boyaca Department, on October 6, 1987. The ruling obliges Colombia to fulfill 23 conditions, including publicly recognizing its responsibility in the massacre, paying compensation to the victims' relatives, and reopening the criminal investigation, so as to punish those responsible. The Court ruled that the GOC shared responsibility for the deaths based on the determination that the paramilitary groups that carried out the murders acted with the collaboration and support of various military authorities in the region. The Court's decision marks the first time an international court has sanctioned the GOC for its involvement in the “creation and strengthening” of paramilitary groups in the 1980s. Paramilitary groups were only ruled illegal by the GOC in 1989. President Uribe immediately and publicly accepted the verdict, saying that Colombia is “a country of laws that respects court decisions.” He also insisted that the actions of the military commanders in charge of the zone at the time be reviewed, since they allegedly facilitated the detention of the victims. Two recent high-profile cases illustrate ongoing cooperation between the Armed Forces and judicial authorities, but also raise some concerns that will require further evaluation as the investigations develop. Members of the Colombian Army’s Sixth Brigade killed five civilians in Cajamarca, Tolima Department on April 10 during an operation against the FARC. Armed Forces Commander General Carlos Alberto Ospina acknowledged on April 11 that the military was responsible for the tragedy, saying that the soldiers had mistaken the civilians for FARC due to information of guerilla activity and poor visibility. The Supreme Council of the Judiciary reviewed the case and referred the matter to the military justice system on June 9. At the same time, preliminary investigations revealed discrepancies between the evidence and the soldier’s version of events. On June 21, the Military Liaison office of the Inspector General opened a case against the nine soldiers involved for committing serious human rights violations and added, “the evidence suggests indefensible acts against people uninvolved in the internal conflict.” Given the contradiction between the military’s account and some of the evidence, the Inspector General has called for an autopsy of the other four victims to uncover further information. Minister of Defense Uribe called for the troops involved in the Cajamarca incident to submit to lie-detector exams, promised that these case would be resolved speedily and stated that any soldiers guilty of wrong-doing would be brought to justice. Another
incident took place in Arauca Department on August 5 when soldiers from
the Army's 18th Brigade shot and killed three trade union members outside
a rural home near Saravena, Arauca department. Military authorities
asserted that the three labor activists were members of the ELN guerrilla
group and opened fire upon the soldiers during a routine operation to
execute arrest warrants. Government officials initially supported the
military version of events. Colombia's three major labor federations
denounced the military's actions, calling the killings “extrajudicial
executions,” and denied that the labor activists had ties to the ELN.
The Prosecutor General’s office issued arrest warrants for the three
soldiers involved in the killings on September 6, 2004 based on evidence
that the three unionists were shot at close range. Vice President Santos,
who originally supported the military’s version of the incident, has
since lauded the Prosecutor General’s order to detain the three soldiers
involved (see also section 563(a)(2)(A)) and urged speedy resolution
of this case. Following the decision to issue arrest warrants for the
three soldiers, Minister of Defense Uribe issued a statement in support
of the investigation and urged transparency and clarity in the judicial
process. All three individuals have been preventatively detained in
a military facility pending resolution of the case. Section 563(a)(2)(D) requires a determination that:
The Colombian Armed Forces are taking effective action to sever links between military personnel and paramilitary units at the command, battalion and brigade levels. In addition, President Alvaro Uribe and Defense Minister Jorge Uribe have stated repeatedly, both publicly and in discussions with U.S. officials, that they will not tolerate collaboration between military personnel and paramilitary groups. In a letter sent to members of the U.S. Senate in August 2004, President Uribe said that collaboration between members of the Armed Forces and paramilitaries is “atypical and at odds with the position of the Colombian Government and the attitude of an overwhelming majority of Armed Forces' members. The government is actively engaged in strengthening preventive and control mechanisms and punishing this behavior, which both the State and society regard as unacceptable.” The Colombian military leadership has issued guidance to the Colombian military to address the problem of former service members who join the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) while maintaining their connections with active duty soldiers. The Colombian military is seeking to identify former career soldiers with ties to illegal armed groups and their active duty contacts, and has expressly restricted the access of such individuals to military facilities. The Armed Forces have increased base security and force protection measures to deter unauthorized contacts between active duty personnel and criminal elements such as paramilitaries. The Armed Forces have provided support to civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities investigating and prosecuting alleged paramilitaries. The Colombian National Police are responsible for executing arrest warrants in urban areas, but the Armed Forces frequently execute arrests in rural areas or areas where there is no police presence. The Colombian Armed Forces helped the Fiscalia to execute 117 arrest warrants against paramilitaries between January and August 2004 According to the Colombian Vice President’s office, in the period of January through July 2004, the Armed Forces captured or detained 2,681 paramilitaries and handed them over to the appropriate authorities, a 64 percent increase over the number of paramilitaries captured during the same period in 2003. They also killed in combat 338 paramilitaries, a 100 percent increase over January through July 2003. During that same period, the Colombian military seized from paramilitary groups over 2000 weapons, over 1100 grenades and other explosives, communications equipment, 584 vehicles, and 13 boats. The AUC, the largest of the paramilitary groups, announced a unilateral cease-fire in December 2002. The Peace Commissioner's Office and nine AUC spokesmen agreed on July 15, 2003 to begin formal peace negotiations. The agreement commits the two sides to the phased concentration and demobilization of AUC fighters; the goal is to complete demobilization before the end of 2005, but the process will be complicated and slow. Two small-scale demobilizations, which involved approximately 1000 paramilitary fighters, took place in November and December 2003. After negotiations with AUC leaders appeared to reach an impasse in March and April 2004, paramilitary leaders suddenly signed an accord on May 13 agreeing to concentrate with over 400 of their troops in a special 13-by-13 mile zone near Santa Fe de Ralito, Córdoba Department. In accordance with the agreement, Colombian government forces will surround the zone to provide security and control all entry and exit. The government will not arrest or attack the paramilitary leaders provided that they remain in the zone, carry out no illegal activities while concentrated, their forces continue to respect the cease-fire, and they continue negotiations to demobilize the balance of their forces. On July 1, paramilitary leaders concentrated in Santa Fe de Ralito, with several hundred paramilitary troops. Since then, the government has met several times with the leaders to negotiate details of the concentration and demobilization. The Colombian government was not able to reach an agreement with all the paramilitary leaders. Some AUC signatories retain strong reservations; others have refused to participate in talks to date. Accordingly, the Colombian Armed Forces continue to take military action against paramilitary units. Not only were the Colombian Armed Forces severing ties to paramilitary organizations, they were actively combating the paramilitaries in the following operations:
The Armed Forces have also provided support to civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities investigating and prosecuting alleged paramilitaries. Examples of this cooperation include:
Section 563(a)(2)(E) requires a determination that:
The government of Colombia is attempting to dismantle fully the illegal self-defense groups through ongoing peace negotiations. On July 1, most of the AUC’s top leaders concentrated in a special zone near Santa Fe de Ralito, Cordoba Department. The Colombian government agreed to lift its arrest warrants on the paramilitary leaders while they remain in the zone and continue negotiating peace. The goal of the peace process is to dismantle the financial and leadership networks of the paramilitary forces once and for all, removing thousands of fighters from the battlefield and helping to bring peace to Colombia. However, the Colombian military continues to fight any paramilitary faction not represented at the peace talks and any group that is actively violating the cease-fire. In February 2004, Commander of the Armed Forces General Carlos Ospina warned the AUC that if they do not respect the demobilization agreements and the cease-fire, they will be fought using all the weapons of the state. He said “All the members of these illegal armed organizations who do not accept the agreements can expect a bullet or a bomb.” President Uribe has also taken a tough line with the paramilitaries. In April 2004 he said, “The peace process with the illegal self-defense groups cannot advance in a climate of cease-fire violations, vendettas, narcotrafficking, and violent confrontations among criminal organizations. If the self-defense forces want to advance in a serious peace process, they must demonstrate their will to peace by accepting a concentration zone, with clear rules and under the verification of the OAS. They must move toward demobilization. If this does not happen, the Government will continue combating them until they are eliminated.” President Uribe backed up his words when the cease-fire was flagrantly violated on June 27, 2004 with the kidnapping by AUC forces of former Colombian Senator Jose Gnecco and his family in La Guajira Department. The government immediately reinstated its arrest warrants against those presumed responsible, Rodrigo Tovar Pupo and Hernan Giraldo Serna, and barred them from rejoining negotiations with other paramilitary leaders in the concentration zone on July 1. Gnecco and his family were released unharmed. Paramilitary groups may receive up to 70 percent of their financing from the illegal drug trade. They are also involved in extortion, gasoline smuggling, and other illegal activities. The Government of Colombia is working hard to eradicate drug cultivation and interdict drug shipments throughout Colombia. From January to June 2004, the government of Colombia conducted aerial eradication against 63,634 hectares of coca and 1,603 hectares of poppy. Government forces destroyed 1064 drug labs, seized 50 tons of cocaine, and 409 kilos of heroin. An end to the drug trade will not only make Colombia safer and more governable, it will also stem the flow of funds to all of Colombia’s illegal armed groups. The government’s interdiction efforts were especially successful during the week of July 16-23. During this period, the Colombian government seized almost 13 tons of cocaine in several raids across the country. Almost seven tons reportedly belonged to the AUC, with a street value estimated at $134 million. The Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Unit of the Prosecutor General's Office has 30 prosecutors dedicated exclusively to pursuing money-laundering mafias. These prosecutors are conducting investigations involving amounts totaling $4.240 billion, the equivalent of four times the annual earnings of all of the nation's banks. 459 drug traffickers, 12 guerrillas, 40 paramilitaries, and three kidnappers are being investigated for money-laundering operations. Some examples of other GOC actions aimed at cutting off financing for the paramilitary forces include:
Examples of paramilitary leaders arrested with the help of the Armed Forces of Colombia and handed over to the appropriate authorities include:
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