Testimony of Michael Shifter, vice president for policy, Inter-American Dialogue, Hearing of the House International Relations Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, November 18, 2004

Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

Michael Shifter
Vice President for Policy, Inter-American Dialogue
November 18, 2004

I very much appreciate your invitation to appear before the Subcommittee today to talk about "Aid to Colombia: The European Role in the Fight Against Narco-terrorism." With President Bush making his first visit to Colombia and meeting with President Uribe on Monday, this strikes me as an excellent opportunity to think seriously about how the US government can join with the international community to most effectively assist the Colombian government's efforts to build an enduring, peaceful, democratic order. The Colombian government has already accomplished a great deal to reverse the country's decline - much of it attributed to violence fueled by the drug trade -- and prepare conditions for an eventual, negotiated settlement with the armed groups. This hearing offers a chance to think ahead and take a longer view about how external assistance can be most helpful.

Europe has a vital role in contributing to Colombia's effort to end its longstanding civil conflict and address the serious drug problem. To be sure, Europe's role has always been, and probably always will be, less central than the role of the United States in supporting Colombia. For reasons of geography, history and culture, the United States is more deeply tied with Colombia. Particularly over the past several years the United States government has wisely shown that it is prepared to devote considerable resources to such a critical policy challenge. The Europeans are unlikely to ever match that scale or commitment.

Although it is unreasonable to expect that US and European approaches to supporting Colombia will be identical to one another, it is essential to strive for as much convergence in objectives and strategies as possible. This is critical if Colombia is going to be able to devise sustainable solutions to its profound problems. Setting out a "division of labor" between the United States and the Europeans - with the United States seen as providing "hard," military and anti-drug aid and the Europeans focusing on "soft" assistance oriented towards social development - is unwise. It risks pulling the Colombians in conflicting directions and creating confusion and incoherence. There should be no "right vs. wrong" logic in thinking about external assistance to Colombia. Instead, it is preferable to aim for a common approach that reflects and responds effectively to the priorities set by Colombia's democratic government. Such a comprehensive, wide-ranging approach was best expressed and spelled out in the "London Declaration" that followed a meeting of key national and multilateral donors to Colombia in July 2003.

It is easy and tempting to point to the shortcomings of the European role in assisting Colombia in its battle against terrorism and drugs. Indeed, the European commitment to the overall Plan Colombia package has been disappointing, and has fallen considerably short of its anticipated contribution of some US $1 billion. European governments have also generally been slow in recognizing two fundamental features of the Colombian situation: first, the barbarity of the country's two insurgent groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and, second, the centrality of the drug question in fueling political, destabilizing violence in Colombia, and the importance of tackling the problem at the supply side as well as the demand side. It is fair to say that European governments, and particularly its non-governmental sector, has tended to overemphasize the inequities of Colombia's social and political order as being "root causes" of the conflict. To be sure, such inequities are real, and need to be addressed. But so are the narcotics and terrorism problems, to which the Europeans have for a long time given relatively short shrift.

Still, since the US contribution of $1.3 billion to Plan Colombia was approved in June 2000, the distance has narrowed between the US and European positions regarding Colombia. Encouragingly, there is a stronger basis for common ground than before. First, European governments now officially regard all of the illegal armed actors as terrorist groups. This marks a positive change, and reflects greater agreement with the US position. There are fewer illusions and less romanticism about the FARC particularly than just a few years ago. In 2002, the Pax Christi group in Holland published an extensive study on the kidnappings industry in Colombia, offering a devastating critique of an abuse most commonly attributed to the FARC. And both Holland and Sweden are now backing President Uribe's demobilization of the paramilitary forces.

Second, more European governments have recognized that for Colombia, and most Colombians, security is an urgent priority. The recognition has led to an understanding that security assistance is vital for the Colombian government to allow for the pursuit of broader social and economic development. They have also come increasingly to hold the view that the drug trade is a major factor in accounting for the country's pervasive lawlessness and insecurity. They increasingly believe that to combat this trade, it is not sufficient to seek to reduce consumption, and promote effective alternative development programs. Law enforcement, and attacking the source of the drugs, also has its place.

Of course, Europe is far from monolithic. There are differences, sometimes rather sharp, among the various countries. The United Kingdom has an approach and priorities that most closely resembles that of the United States. The country has contributed security assistance to Colombia, and has even been involved in sharing of intelligence. Until the new government took over last April, the Spanish position had also been quite close to that of the United States. Prime Minister Zapatero has, however, sought to distance Spain to some extent from the policy pursued by Prime Minister Aznar. A pending sale of Spanish tanks to Colombia was, for example, suspended right after the new government took office. (Moreover, the harder line stance of both these countries can in part be attributed to their own extensive experience dealing with such terrorist groups as the IRA and ETA.)

Some of the other European countries have been more reluctant to fully endorse the priorities accepted by the US and the Colombian government. The Scandinavian governments particularly, but also other European governments, are less willing to provide security assistance to the Colombian government, chiefly on human rights grounds. There is considerable concern about documented links between the country's security forces and some paramilitary groups. Still, even among European countries critical of the position taken by the US and the Colombian government, there has been a discernible shift in recent years, and there is every reason to believe that shift can continue. The United States can and should encourage such a shift by further increasing its pressure to help improve the human rights situation.

Indeed, the evolution of European thinking on the Colombian situation presents a unique opportunity as the United States begins the debate about its future support for Colombia. So far, US support has been mainly concentrated in the security area, with a focus on fighting drugs and, since August 2002, armed groups, whether or not there is any direct narcotics connection. The aid to a determined Colombian government has helped yield important and positive results, as reflected in a decline in coca production, and also in kidnappings, homicides and other key security indicators. Colombia's conflict is far from over, but the conditions are riper for a settlement with illegal, armed groups -- and there is no longer talk of a possible "failing state", as there was four years ago. The Colombians deserve most of the credit for this promising turnaround, but US assistance has also played an important role.

Now, however, it is critical to assist the Colombians to prepare for an eventual peace. Given the size and fragmentation of the armed groups, and the continued, pernicious role of narcotics in the country, it is logical to anticipate a very challenging and difficult post-conflict situation. This phase will require sustained support from the United States; otherwise, there is risk of backsliding. In addition, the nature of the support should shift, with a greater emphasis on Colombia's critically important social reform and institution-building tasks. True, the United States has already contributed a great deal in this regard. But it can do better.

Just as Europe has moved closer in fundamental respects to the position held in the United States regarding Colombia, the reverse should also take place. The United States would do well to focus a greater share of its resources in the next stage of support to Colombia to social reform and development aims. The proposed Social Investment Fund of $2.5 billion over five years, under consideration in the US Congress and now designed to cover the region as a whole, could be a model, particularly for continued aid for Colombia and other countries directly affected by the conflict. Unless resources are redirected in this way, any peace settlement could prove illusory and fleeting. Giving high priority to economic development goals will, over time, also enable Colombians to assume an even larger share of the overall financial contribution.

In addition, more vigorous efforts to strengthen the country's judicial system and rule of law should be undertaken. Despite some noteworthy advances, the human rights situation in Colombia remains critical, and the United States should continue to give this question high priority. Extending the presence of Colombian security forces throughout the country is but a first step in a long-term process. The United States should also encourage the Colombian government to strengthen mechanisms of control and monitoring of the human rights situation, in addition to maintaining pressure to sever links between government forces and paramilitary groups. The demobilization program with the paramilitaries has proceeded by fits and starts. The international community, the United States together with Europe, should assist the Colombian government in pursuit of this formidable challenge, and help make sure that there is a proper balance between justice and peace and violators of the law are held accountable.

It is clear by now that success in Colombia depends not only on external support from the United States and Europe, but most crucially from the other Latin American countries, particularly those in the Andean neighborhood. An effective program, building on but also going beyond Plan Colombia, should be sensitive not only to pursuing greater convergence with Europe, but also in consulting and engaging Colombia's neighbors in a fully regional approach. The Andean Regional Initiative is a good start, but that effort should be expanded. In South America, Brazil should be viewed as a strategic partner of the United States in assisting Colombia regain full governmental authority, attack drugs, and reduce the violence. Brazil, along with other countries in Latin America, has a strong stake in reaching such goals.

The post-election environment in the United States offers a window of opportunity to make progress on an array of key foreign policy challenges. Colombia is one of them. The country has enormous assets and advantages. It is also politically united in wanting to see an end to the conflict. Under strong leadership and a broad consensus, the country seems poised to move towards an enduring, sustainable peace.

For that to happen, however, a longer term and more comprehensive commitment by the United States, in concert with Europe and other Latin American countries, is essential. Though it would be premature to deem Colombia a genuine success story, with the right mix of resources and imagination, from national and international sources, it could well become one. I hope this hearing, and President Bush's visit to Colombia next Monday, will lead the United States to do its part in taking advantage of this opportunity.

Thank you very much for this opportunity. I would be happy to clarify or expand on any of these points, or answer any questions you might have.