Testimony of Kenneth Wollack, President, National Democratic Institute, Hearing of the House International Relations Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, March 9, 2005

“Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean”
Statement by Kenneth Wollack, President
National Democratic Institute
Before the House International Relations
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
March 9, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak about the challenges facing democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. NDI has been working with political and civic leaders for more than two decades to assist their efforts to advance democracy in the region. I appreciate the chance to highlight both achievements and troubling trends in the hemisphere.

In recent decades, Latin America and the Caribbean nations have seen historic democratic progress. A wave of democracy has swept the region. Thirty-two countries in the hemisphere regularly elect leaders and enjoy basic democratic rights – Cuba being the only exception. Latin American countries have also committed themselves to collectively protect democracy through the Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). Public opinion surveys show that a majority of Latin Americans support democracy.

Despite these advances, there is real concern that democracy is in danger of being rolled back as occurred earlier in the 19th and 20th centuries. This reversal could lead to a return to fatally flawed elections, leaders with authoritarian tendencies, increased violations of human rights, and compromised democratic institutions including legislatures and courts. These reversals represent direct challenges to shared U.S. and Latin American values and interests. Because of the unique geographic, social and economic ties between the U.S. and Latin America and Caribbean nations, the erosion of democracy can have a profound impact on drug trafficking, security, human rights, economic growth and immigration. Other issues of mutual concern include the $150 billion in exports that go to the region – some 20 percent of total U.S. exports – as well as one-third of the U.S. foreign oil imports.[1]

The failure of political leadership in certain countries is one of the root causes of the “u-turn” in democracy that is leaving social and economic instability in its wake. In recent years, political parties and leaders that brought about democratic transitions in the region are having difficulty in governing and meeting popular expectations that democracy would improve the standard of living. President Alejandro Toledo is an example – a Peruvian reformer who overcame the fraud and corruption of authoritarian president Alberto Fujimori only to struggle with a public approval rating that has sunk as low as 7 percent despite his leading the country to record economic growth. His sometimes single-digit support reflects in large measure a perceived failure to improve the economic conditions of most Peruvians and address allegations of corruption. Alarmingly, surveys indicate that if Fujimori were able to run again he would likely end up being one of the top two candidates in the 2006 presidential election.

In this respect, one issue that unites Latin Americans is their disenchantment with political parties, which have the lowest levels of public confidence of any institution in the region – about 18 percent – trailing the Church, military, television, police, judiciary, and the Congress.[2] Political parties are viewed as corrupt, out-of-touch with citizens and personalistic. Parties are seen as failing to represent the needs and aspirations of large sectors of society especially youth, women and indigenous communities.

The failure of parties to address popular needs – particularly in closing the divide between the rich and the poor, the greatest gap of any region in the world – has led to a popular backlash that is undermining democracy. Large segments of populations are venting their frustration with parties by removing democratically elected presidents at the expense of democratic institutions. Since 1990, some 11 Latin American heads of state have resigned or been impeached before the conclusion of their term of office.[3]

Just last Sunday, President Carlos Mesa offered his resignation to the Bolivian Congress in response to continued street protests and road blocks threatening to paralyze the country. Mesa came into office some 15 months ago in the wake of the 2003 resignation of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. Mesa’s offer to step aside epitomizes the challenge of managing mounting public frustration with the gap between the rich and poor. Mesa has faced a difficult time advancing policies in light of the efforts of populist leaders to further their own agendas by tapping into popular dissatisfaction with economic conditions.

Despite the importance of parties to democratic development, in recent years it has been civic organizations and state institutions that have received the bulk of democracy assistance from international financial institutions and donor aid agencies. The international development community has buttressed civic groups and assisted their rise. This is a good and necessary endeavor; NDI has participated in many such initiatives and continues to do so.

At the same time, there is a danger in focusing almost exclusively on civil society development and state institutions. Civil society activism without effective political institutions quickly creates a vacuum. It sows opportunities for populists and demagogues who seek to emasculate parties and legislatures, which must serve as the intermediaries between the state and citizens and, therefore, are the cornerstones of representative democracy. This dangerous trend has already been seen in several countries in the Andean region – including Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

The international community should take action in several ways. First, efforts must be made to build, sustain, and renew political parties that match our efforts to support civil society. Over the past several years, there has been some encouraging recognition of the need to support political party development. The OAS Democratic Charter affirms that the "strengthening of political parties is a priority for democracy." Unfortunately, for the most part, organizations and institutions that have the commitment and expertise to underpin and promote these initiatives lack adequate resources. In this regard, USAID and the State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor have long recognized the importance of political party development, being two of the few governmental entities to do so. NDI greatly appreciates their support of programs that seek to strengthen and reform parties in the hemisphere.

Efforts to encourage reform must recognize that the problems facing political parties developed over decades. These challenges will not be resolved overnight. A long-term, multi-year approach will be needed much in the way HIV/AIDs or judicial reform initiatives are undertaken. This approach will be particularly important in countries like Haiti where parties need to develop clear platforms and organizational structures that reach far beyond Port-Au-Prince to better represent all citizens. Efforts to help parties modernize should also focus on the areas of internal democracy, transparency and ethics and outreach to sectors of society that are increasingly on the margins of political life. Parties must be helped to undertake profound reforms in these areas that go beyond campaign rhetoric.

Second, efforts must be made to better understand and address the incentives that affect the interest and ability of party leaders to launch reform efforts – especially the need to develop effective policy platforms that address the issue of poverty – a leading cause of popular frustration with parties. As noted, unless parties have incentives for reform, Latin American societies will be tempted to support populists who appeal to the poor and disenfranchised.

In this respect, NDI recently conducted a study in Bolivia with the support of the British aid agency, DFID, which sheds light on the factors that affect the ability of political parties to reform. The study found that reform efforts can be influenced from many directions ranging from the prescriptions of international financial institutions to the lack of basic civics education. For example, the study found that:
Because much of the country’s economic agenda is financed and negotiated by the international community, many Bolivians perceive programs that address poverty as mandated from abroad. Parties do not believe they have control over real fiscal decisions and as a result do not develop policies to fight poverty. They assume that national poverty strategies will be determined by the international community rather than through a competition of ideas – such as an election campaign.

Parties do not believe that the ability to form sound policies will affect their performance at the ballot box. Investing in policy development does not seem to be a worthwhile expenditure. As one Bolivian who was interviewed said: “People are used to the idea that parties don’t have policy platforms.”

Third, the international community must be increasingly engaged in protecting the integrity of elections. In some nations, the weaknesses of political parties have led to the erosion of the independence of democratic institutions. In some instances, election authorities and courts are being used for partisan ends, threatening the minimum but essential requirement for democracy – fair elections. The independence of authorities administering elections slated for 2005, 2006 and 2007 in such countries as Venezuela and Nicaragua, is already being called into question.

The international community must be engaged early in these countries to help ensure that all aspects of the electoral process including the election law, election authorities, voter registry, media access and campaign spending meet international standards. Political support should also be provided to national election observers so that they can closely monitor the entire election period. In addition, the international community should avoid the perception of taking sides in elections and trying to influence the outcome of the vote. Without these actions, there is a genuine risk that historic advances in free and fair elections may be reversed.

Finally, the Democratic Charter has further consolidated Latin America’s position as a regional leader in efforts to collectively defend democracy by building on the historic 1991 Santiago Declaration (Resolution 1080). NDI was pleased to present the OAS and former Secretary General Gavira with its 2002 W. Averell Harriman Democracy Award in recognition of this progress as well as the organization’s important work in safeguarding human rights in the region.

The Democratic Charter represented a watershed in expanding the response to possible threats to democracy. This agreement allows OAS member states to look beyond coup de etats to respond to insidious, systematic efforts to erode key democratic institutions. Although the existence of the Democratic Charter has likely had a deterrent effect, a series of anti-democratic events have nonetheless occurred in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Haiti where the Charter has not been invoked. These omissions raise the issue of whether the trigger mechanisms of the Democratic Charter need to revisited to ensure that the OAS plays an effective role as a defender of democracy in the region.

In conclusion, international engagement and resources will be critical to support political development and stand in solidarity with those striving to strengthen democratic institutions and practices. Without this support, democratic gains in the hemisphere will be in jeopardy. Experience has taught us that an investment in consolidating democracy is far more cost-effective than responding to crises once they occur.

I would also like to take this opportunity to highlight several countries that are grappling with the issues I have described.
Cuba

After more than 40 years of repression by Fidel Castro’s government, an unprecedented grassroots democracy movement is gaining strength in Cuba. Known as the Varela Project, the initiative calls for a referendum on political, economic and civil liberties by drawing upon a constitutional provision that enables citizens to introduce legislation when accompanied by 10,000 signatures. The Project has planted the seeds of a genuine grassroots democracy movement. For the first time, calls on the island for peaceful political change are not emanating solely from a handful of courageous individuals whose appeals could be dismissed by the Cuban government, but from tens of thousands of ordinary citizens. In seeking to expand freedom through peaceful and legal means, the Varela Project has broken the culture of fear that has permeated Cuban society for decades.

Achieving unprecedented success in political organizing in Cuba, Oswaldo Payá and other Varela Project leaders were able to collect and verify 11,020 signatures, which they submitted to the Cuban National Assembly on May 10, 2002. In January 2003, the Cuban legislature rejected the Varela Project, claiming it “went against the very foundation of the constitution.” To further crush the Project, beginning on March 18, 2003 the Cuban government arrested, summarily tried and jailed 75 civil society leaders in Cuba, including independent journalists, librarians and trade unionists. More than half were Varela Project organizers. Despite the repression, Payá and other project leaders collected and submitted an additional 14,384 signatures to the National Assembly in October, bringing the total number of signatures to 25,404. Even though the National Assembly rejected the Varela Project, Payá and his organizers continue to exercise their constitutional right by collecting signatures in support of a peaceful democratic change in Cuba.

Most recently, Oswaldo Payá invited all Cubans to take part in a National Dialogue on a peaceful democratic transition in Cuba. Payá seeks to develop a plan for a transition designed and directed by all Cubans—from political prisoners to members of the government. As a starting point for discussion, he prepared a 100-page working document covering issues ranging from calls for multiparty democracy, freedom for political prisoners, the return of exiles, privatizing much of the economy and preserving Cuba’s free education and health care system. After incorporating feedback from discussion groups held around the island and in Cuban exile communities abroad, the working document will be submitted to the Cuban National Assembly with calls for a referendum on the plan. Payá anticipates that an inclusive dialogue process will play an important role in helping to educate all Cubans on transition issues and increase pressure for change.

For his efforts at promoting peaceful change in Cuba, Payá received the 2003 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought from the European Parliament and NDI’s 2002 Averell Harriman Democracy Award. He was also nominated in 2003 by former Czech President Vaclav Havel for a Nobel Peace Prize. Payá reiterated that international attention on his efforts has protected him from being jailed, unlike his 50 colleagues who were arrested in March 2003, which he calls “The Cuban Spring.” As Payá said in an NDI documentary on the Varela Project “In Cuba, there is hope for change…democracy is for everyone. It can be born in any environment, in any culture, in any race, out of any ideology—as long as there is respect for human dignity.”

The unparalleled success of the Varela Project in mobilizing a grassroots effort for reform provides an important message – that democratic change is beginning in Cuba and it will come in large measure from the island itself. It is critical that the international community stand with the Varela Project organizers, opposition leaders and thousands of average citizens who are struggling against tremendous odds for their fundamental political and human rights.
Peru

After more than a decade of authoritarian government under Alberto Fujimori, Peru is working to rebuild its democratic institutions and reinstitute the rule of law. The election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001 raised high expectations among Peruvians for political and economic reform. However, a combination of weak institutions, low public confidence in the political class and governability challenges has made it difficult for the Toledo administration to meet these expectations. Shortly after assuming office, the Toledo government fostered the creation of an Acuerdo Nacional (National Agreement), which included many of Peru's key political and civil society leaders. The "road map" that its participants outlined provides an important consensus-based reform agenda. In 2003, the Peruvian congress passed a progressive political party law that seeks to help parties enhance internal transparency and democracy.

Despite these advances, the Toledo administration has had difficulty in governing. These problems are due in part to the weak structures of political parties, which have made implementing policy reforms difficult and popular expectations for his administration. Despite high levels of macroeconomic growth, the standard of living is not commonly perceived to have improved for the average citizen and unemployment continues to be the principle challenge facing the country. Popular dissatisfaction with the economy has also been exacerbated by a series of ethics scandals allegedly linked to the government.

Moreover, the backdrop for the 2006 presidential elections is increasingly worrisome. Political parties are fragmented and in public opinion studies a significant percentage of Peruvians indicate they would sacrifice democracy for a system that would generate work, improve the general economy and reduce crime (the highest percentage of any country in the Andean region.) In addition, surveys indicate that if Fujimori were able to run again, he would likely be one of the top two candidates in a presidential election. Compounding these concerns are small but growing signs of the reemergence of the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso, ominously believed to be funded by drug traffickers. Incidents of social unrest have also occurred in 50 distinct areas of the country – including calls for regional autonomy. President Toledo is now promoting an initiative to provide direct subsidies to the poor, the “ProPeru” plan, to counter the challenge by spreading the benefits of high economic growth.

As these disturbing trends indicate, many Peruvians are concerned that historic democratic advances may be rolled back and that future elections may be plagued by irregularities and bring a return to authoritarian government. In the months to come, it will be critical to continue to help political parties develop the organizational structures and policy platforms that will enable them to reengage voters and better represent their needs – particularly in job creation and poverty alleviation.
Venezuela

Once considered a stable democracy, Venezuelan society is now deeply divided and locked in a volatile political stalemate. The current impasse is rooted in the failures and decline of traditional political parties and the erosion of democratic institutions that has taken place during the presidency of former coup leader Hugo Chavez. Unless the current deadlock between opponents and supporters of President Chavez is resolved, Venezuela could be facing more economic hardship and a downward spiral of political instability.

As noted by such respected organizations as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, fundamental rights and democratic institutions in Venezuela are being undermined. In this respect, efforts to exert government control over key institutions such as the media, military, judiciary, and electoral authorities is deeply troubling. The independence of the judiciary has been called into question by legislation that has successfully allowed the government’s legislative coalition to “pack” the courts by adding 12 new judges and increasing the court’s size by half.[4] In addition, new laws allow the government to levy heavy fines on the media, thereby encouraging self-censorship. Recent legal harassment of opposition leaders is also a cause for concern.

The case of the civic organization Sumate is another example of the erosion of democratic rights. Leaders of the organization face possible charges of treason for receiving funding from an international nongovernmental organization, in this instance the National Endowment for Democracy. The right of democracy activists to receive support from abroad is enshrined in international human rights conventions. Given the repression that activists face in many countries around the globe, democratic reform would be difficult without this assistance. Government prosecution of Sumate’s leaders on these grounds would be a dangerous precedent for democratic activists throughout the region and beyond.

During last year’s referendum process on whether President Chavez should continue in office, the international community was deeply involved in mediation efforts between opposition leaders and the Chavez government through the OAS and the Carter Center. At present, however, direct international engagement has all but disappeared. This lack of international effort to reduce the polarization in the country is particularly troubling given the erosion of democratic institutions. Moreover, a series of upcoming elections will give all political sectors a chance to peacefully and constructively take part in the political process. However, questions about the integrity of the election process make it imperative that the international community – particularly the leading countries of the region – become more active in ensuring that upcoming elections meet international standards.
Haiti

In the wake of the departure of Jean Bertrand Aristide, preparations for the 2005 elections continue with the support of the United Nations and OAS, among others. The election law has been passed and dates set for the voting: October 16 for municipal and November 13 for congressional and presidential races. More than 92 political parties have registered to date. However, many challenges remain that will have a significant impact on the future stability of the country. These challenges include reaching out to all political sectors to ensure effective participation in the political process and upcoming elections. This includes involving leading actors in national political dialogue as well as guaranteeing their safety and ability to campaign. These steps are necessary to ensure the legitimacy of the elections and prevent post-election conflict that could exacerbate current tensions.
Nicaragua

Nicaragua is locked in an impasse between the country’s main political forces, including President Enrique Bolaños, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Leaders of the FSLN and PLC have formed a de facto alliance to block the reform efforts of President Bolaños. Recent constitutional changes driven by the PLC and FSLN, including making a simple majority in the National Assembly sufficient to override a presidential veto, have drawn the condemnation of the Central American Court and the concern of the OAS. President Bolanos labeled these changes a “constitutional coup.” At the same time, democratic change from within the PLC and FSLN appears increasingly unlikely as potential reformers are being shut out from the parties. The ongoing struggle for power has created a dangerous level of instability and led to a National Dialogue, sponsored by the United Nations and the Catholic Church, to help resolve the political crisis.

The recent PLC/FSLN appointments of election commission and comptroller positions without executive consultation are increasingly leading Nicaraguans to express concern about the independence and autonomy of key democratic institutions as the 2006 presidential elections approach. Both political and civic leaders have raised concerns about the quality of the voter registry and potential interference with the adjudication of election irregularities, as is alleged to have occurred in the municipality of Granada during the 2004 municipal elections.

The international community must become more engaged in Nicaragua and show support for efforts to ensure the integrity of the electoral process and help reverse the nondemocratic effects of the PLC/FSLN “pacto” and its negative effect on Nicaraguan democracy. This support should include ensuring that Nicaraguan election monitors have the ability to exercise their important right to observe the campaign period and election day processes to help generate reforms and establish safeguards to increase public confidence and participation.
Bolivia

Once considered one of the most stable democracies in the Andes and a paragon of economic reform, Bolivia is experiencing economic disparity, ethnic and regional conflicts and political turmoil. Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was nearly defeated in the 2002 presidential election by Evo Morales, the leader of the association of coca growers. In 2003, however, Sanchez de Lozada resigned amid violent protests over his administration’s plan to export natural gas through Chile. Sánchez de Lozada was succeeded by Vice President Carlos Mesa, who bowed to popular demands for a 2004 national referendum on the export of gas, and agreed to convene a constituent assembly in 2006. Popular dissatisfaction continues to build among the business, indigenous and civil society sectors, resulting in increasing strikes and violence. The Mesa administration is further undermined by his status as an outsider within the political class.

These factors culminated on Sunday, March 6, when President Mesa offered his resignation to congress. In an address to the nation, Mesa stated he could no longer “continue to govern with the threats that strangle the country,” referring to a possible nationwide blockage of roads called for by Evo Morales and protests over the operations of a foreign-run water company and taxes on oil companies.[5]

Mesa’s actions are a clear example of the challenges facing Latin American political leaders and the need to promote political party reform. Indigenous sectors have long felt excluded from social and economic life in the country and are using demonstrations and road blockages as a powerful political tool to have their demands heard. Until the economic disparities in the country are better addressed and political parties become more representative and responsive, Bolivia will continue to be primed for populism and continued social unrest.
Colombia

President Alvaro Uribe has enjoyed the strong support of the Colombian people for his success in implementing his “Democratic Security” plan to aggressively fight guerrilla groups and drug traffickers who have fueled decades of violence. The president is attempting to negotiate the disarmament and demobilization of paramilitary forces, many of which are accused of human rights violations. Some Colombian analysts are concerned that demobilized paramilitary groups could try to use their financial resources to influence the outcome of upcoming elections – causing their role to become an issue in the campaign.

In response to dissatisfaction with political parties, President Uribe successfully advocated a package of reforms that will have a dramatic impact on the political system including establishing a minimum vote threshold of 2 percent for parties to be officially recognized and receive public financing. This provision is expected to reduce parties from 61 to approximately 10. Another significant reform advocated by the president is immediate reelection of incumbents, including him. The Congress approved the re-election measure and it is now under review by the Constitutional Court. As these events unfold, Colombia will provide an important case study in party reform as the impact of the changes advocated by President Uribe take effect.
Ecuador

In recent years, Ecuador's political system has been one of the most unstable in South America, with an average survival rate for both elected governments and military regimes of less than two years. As successive governments failed to resolve the country's economic and political crises, Ecuadorians are increasingly losing faith in the democratic system and rejecting political participation. The geographic divide between the coast and the highlands also contributes to a lack of national unity, dialogue and consensus on issues of national concern.

In 2002, Ecuadorians elected the populist and former coup-leader Lucio Gutierrez to office. He came to the presidency with the support of political groups representing the country’s indigenous community and promises of reform. Gutierrez’s governing coalition broke apart over policy disagreements and his administration has been dogged by charges of corruption. A recent incident demonstrating the weakness of Ecuador democratic institutions occurred when the president summarily dismissed 27 of 31 members of the Supreme Court with the assistance of a make-shift majority in Congress. The effort was seen as a means of blocking impeachment efforts that Gutierrez argued were being advanced by judges biased in favor of the opposition Social Christian Party.

Ecuadorian analysts suspect the president’s coalition was based on promises to the Roldos Ecuadorian Party, which seeks to clear charges of misappropriation of public funds pending against former President Abdala Bucaram, (popularly known as “El Loco.”) The party seeks to enable Bucaram to return to Ecuador from Panama where he has resided since being impeached. Gutierrez is now advocating a referendum to “depoliticize” the judiciary and increase the president’s ability to fast track legislation and has warned that he will “resort to ‘other powers’” under the constitution if Congress does not act on his plan.[6] The events in Ecuador are a clear demonstration of the rise of populist leaders who are further dismantling democratic institutions after gaining power through democratic elections. NDI is also concerned about the rise of political violence in Ecuador and intimidation against civil society leaders.

[1] Agenda for the Americas. Inter American Dialogue, March 2005, p. 3.

[2] Latinbarometro

[3] Washington Post, “Tunnel Vision on Corruption,” editorial by Moises Naim, February 20, 2005.

[4] “Venezuela: Chavez Allies Pack Supreme Court,” Human Rights Watch, December 14, 2004.

[5] “Bolivian President Submits Resignation,” The Miami Herald, March 7, 2005.

[6] Latin American Weekly Report, “Minister Storms Out, Court Antagonizes Public.” March 1, 2005, p. 8.

As of March 10, 2005, this document was also available online at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/wol030905.htm