Comments on the Peace and Justice Law by U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Wood, Cali, June 24, 2005

Comments on the Peace and Justice Law by U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Wood, Cali, June 24, 2005

Ambassador Wood's Comments on the Peace and Justice Law

Before the Cali Colombian American Chamber of Commerce

Peace and Justice

The day before yesterday Congress adopted the Peace and Justice Law.

From its first draft in the autumn of 2003, the Peace and Justice Law went through numerous changes, and incorporated elements from alternative drafts and the views of the international community and civil society, always in search of a solution that would provide the widest possible support for one of the toughest problems I can imagine: how to provide maximum protection and peace to the society while dismantling the terror organizations that have plagued the country for up to 40 years and ensuring punishment and reparation to redress the deep wrongs they have committed.

The law does not achieve any of these goals perfectly. Certainly it does not contain all of our suggestions. It embodies hard trade-offs, which is why the process is almost as important as the result. Secretary of State Rice has said that the process of Colombian reconciliation is up to the Colombians. Certainly the process of open, prolonged, democratic debate here has vindicated that confidence. And legitimized the outcome.

The U.S. has consistently advocated a law that would advance peace, punish the perpetrators of serious crimes and their leaders, dismantle the terror organizations, uncover the crimes and tragedies of the past, and provide at least a measure of reparation to the victims, who can never be made fully whole.

I believe that the law is viable.

As I understand it,

The law provides that there will be no benefits for serious crimes intentionally omitted from the ex-terrorist's free declaration. The beneficiary is free to choose the crimes for which he will receive benefits by confessing them. But the government retains the right to try him under ordinary law for any crime he does not confess. This provides a strong incentive for the ex-terrorist to admit all his crimes.

The law also increases the confinement time to at least six years for any crime omitted from the free declaration, increasing the incentive.

The law provides that no crime committed before membership in a participating organization can be included in the benefits. So no one who associated himself with a terror organization to cover his previous crimes will be protected from punishment for those crimes.

The law through reference to Colombian Law 67 rejects a juridical connection between political crimes and narcotrafficking, so that the constitutional prohibition against extradition for political crimes does not come into play. Others who have committed political crimes, such as Simon Trinidad, have been extradited for their non-political crimes, so the record is clear in cases where there is no juridical connection.

The law also provides that the alternative sentence can be served abroad, so even in cases where an ex-terrorist has benefited under the law, extradition remains a possibility.

The law provides for confinement in places and circumstances under the complete control of the government. The jail terms are close to those advanced in one of the principal alternative draft laws, which enjoyed wide international support.

The law establishes an elaborate structure to identify and distribute the assets of the ex-terrorists to their victims. Taken together with the asset forfeiture law, the government now has two powerful tools to divest ex-terrorists of their wealth, and the influence their wealth can purchase.

The law also establishes a legal framework for demobilization, disarmament, separation of leaders from their followers, identification of ex-terrorists, renunciation by them of terrorism, training and assistance for reinsertion into society, and monitoring of their activities following demobilization.

The law makes clear that a return to terrorism or other serious criminal activity will cost the ex-terrorist the benefits of the law and render him immediately subject to arrest, for crimes he already has admitted, plus the punishment for new ones.

Finally, the law opens the door to new individual and collective demobilizations, to reduce the decades of violence against innocent civilians in Colombia's cities, towns, and countryside. I hope that many thousands of members of illegal groups take advantage of it. The United States will be prepared to offer strong support to the public forces of Colombia against any who do not.

I said that the law establishes a viable framework. But only a framework. In the end, it is the implementation of the law that will determine its success or failure.

The difficult debate of the law has generated deep political disagreements here in Colombia. Now that it has been adopted, I urge all sides to put aside their disagreements and work to make it a success.

I urge the government to take all the administrative steps necessary to fully implement the law: enough personnel and equipment to identify demobilizeds and to check their police records; enough fiscales fully to interview, investigate, and prosecute crimes; enough monitors to keep track of demobilizeds and their fulfillment of the conditions of their benefits, to ensure that the terror groups are truly dismantled; enough social services to help them, many of whom were carried off as child soldiers before they could learn the rules and skills of decent society, return to peaceful, productive, honorable life; enough lawyers, accountants and managers to rapidly seize and distribute assets in reparation to the victims.

The United States is helping. We, along with other foreign governments, already have provided several million dollars in assistance to various aspects of the reinsertion program. We are studying the possibility of providing more.

But the Colombian government, or foreign governments, or multilateral humanitarian organizations, cannot do it alone. Reinsertion into private life must have the support of civil society and the private sector, for assistance, for training, for employment. I urge everyone to do his utmost to help.

There is much to be gained from successful implementation. And much to be lost otherwise. Successful implementation will spur new demobilizations, perhaps even mutinies by combatants who want to change their lives against leaders who care only to preserve their brutal, malign power and wealth. In that way, the law adopted the day before yesterday may be more than a start, it may be a new beginning.

Cali, Valle
June 24, 2005

As of June 27, 2005, this document was also available online at http://bogota.usembassy.gov/wwwsww57.shtml