Speech by Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts) at CIP-sponsored conference, October 14, 2005

New Ideas for US Policy toward Colombia: Exploring the Alternatives
Center for International Policy
Carnegie Endowment for International peace
1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW
The Root Room - 2nd Floor
Friday, October 14, 2005

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

I want to thank my good friend, Bob White, for that kind introduction. As he noted, we've been together for a lot of trials and tribulations in Central America. And I'm glad that he's still engaged in foreign policy debates - He knows both sides of the coin - He's been on the receiving end of criticism about U.S. foreign policy -- and now he's the one who gets to criticize and make recommendations to government officials.

I also want to acknowledge the outstanding work of CIP staff - Bill Goodfellow, Winifred Tate and Adam Isacson. I don't know anyone who puts out so much high-quality work and analysis on a daily basis as Adam. And for those of us who try and follow events and policy in Colombia, there is no finer scholar or advocate we can turn to than Adam.

I want to thank the Center for International Policy for inviting me to participate in today's conference. It's a little unnerving to stand up in front of an audience of people who are far more expert than I am on the issues confronting Colombia today - so please, no hard questions.

The good news is that I'm one of a handful of Members of Congress who actually tries to be educated on the issues surrounding U.S. policy in Colombia.

The bad news is - I'm one of just a handful of Members who try to be educated on the issues surrounding U.S. policy in Colombia.

Nonetheless, for the past few years I have offered amendments to cut, limit or condition U.S. military aid to Colombia. Nearly 200 members of the House annually join me in support of these efforts - and once, we even got more than 200. And I'd like to take a moment to explain why I do this.

My intent has never been to walk away from Colombia, but to achieve a better balance, a better purpose to a policy and a strategy that I find failing in Colombia.

Colombia is not just the source of 90 percent of the cocaine on U.S. streets. Its people - almost two-thirds of them living on less than three dollars per day - suffer from an intractable forty-year war with three groups the State Department considers terrorists. Vast stretches of the national territory are totally ungoverned, left to the whim of cruel, drug money-fueled guerrillas and paramilitaries.

Yet Colombia was facing exactly the same set of challenges five years ago, when President Clinton signed "Plan Colombia" into law. Now Bill Clinton is a good friend of mine - and certainly a good friend and leader of my party. But he was wrong with his particular Plan Colombia. And after five years and $4 billion - making Colombia the largest aid recipient outside of the Middle East - little has changed.

I'm frustrated by the lack of results in reducing coca production - however many ways you try to cut and spin the numbers, there's barely been a dent in coca production in Colombia - and no dent at all in coca production region-wide.

I'm frustrated by the lack of results in addressing the urgent economic and social conditions faced by the majority of Colombians.

I am very frustrated by the lack of results in human rights. I know there are members of the State Department here - and let me first applaud you for briefly holding up the release of military aid this year because you just couldn't certify that everything was going okay on the human rights front. That was a courageous decision on your part, and I know it was not an easy action to take. But shame on you for going ahead and certifying that improvement had actually been made - when indeed nothing had changed on the several key cases cited by the State Department itself when suspending aid - including the San Jose de Apartadó murders - and the aid was released just in time for President Uribe's visit to Crawford, Texas.

If President Uribe is truly committed to human rights and justice - our withholding military aid can only strengthen his hand. As it now stands - the U.S. is a cheap date. We say these are conditions to our aid - but when push comes to shove - we waive these conditions.

And while we're talking about human rights - let me add one other frustration that I have - and that is the inability of Colombian government and military officials to distinguish between people who dissent and those who are armed actors. Human rights lawyers, trade unionists, academics, community leaders, religious leaders and others who disagree publicly with the Colombian government are not terrorists or guerrillas - they are exercising the rights that any person should have in a democracy - the right to speak their opinions. It's been discouraging to hear President Uribe himself - on more than one occasion - lash out against his critics as terrorists. It puts these individuals' lives - and sometimes whole communities - in danger.

And that's why I say the United States, putting it simply, is not pursuing a balanced strategy in Colombia.

80 percent of our money has gone to Colombia's military and police. For every four dollars spent on helicopters, guns and military trainers, only one has gone to feed millions of displaced families, or make a broken judicial system function, or help people in neglected rural areas make a decent, legal living.

The results of our policy have not only been depressing, they were predictable. Cocaine is just as cheap and plentiful here as it was in 2000. Last year saw no drop in the amount of coca being grown in Colombia. And while President Uribe deserves our congratulations on reducing several measures of violence, especially in the area of kidnappings, the guerrilla groups remain far from the negotiating table, genuine territorial gains have been few, forced displacement (or its shadowy partner - "forced confinement") is increasing, and recent months have seen a spike in guerrilla attacks.

More troubling, for the past two years, the United Nations has documented an increase in the number of abuses and human rights violations by military personnel. Just this week alone, I received notices in my office about the following events:

" Colombian police fire upon peaceful marchers and kill an indigenous leader, wounding several others;
" Campesino labor leaders arrested and held without access to counsel;
" The Colombian police and the DAS detain the former mayor of Caldono; and
" Even more threats by Colombian police and the army against members of San Jose de Apartadó.

I make no assumptions regarding the circumstances of these events, but the pattern, nonetheless, is very disturbing.

The main step towards peace is President Uribe's deal with pro-government paramilitary groups - groups that really functioned as military allies in the field and were rarely fought by the Colombian army. Now, there has been a great deal of debate about the demobilization law that barely passed the Colombian Congress in June - the so-called Justice and Peace Law. And only time will tell whether the concerns raised by human rights groups - and Members of Congress like myself - will turn out to be justified or not. I still see no guarantees that these groups and their structures will truly be dismantled - especially if what is happening in Medellín serves as any kind of model, where we are seeing paramilitaries and their leaders transforming into Mafia-style criminal networks.

And we won't have to wait long to find out whether high and mid-level paramilitary leaders who have committed human rights crimes or who are deeply embroiled in drug trafficking - and many of them face U.S. indictments for sending tons of drugs to our shores - will get off scott free or serve only short sentences under "house arrest" or in comfortable jail cells. President Uribe himself has announced that most of the U.S. extradition warrants for these criminals will be suspended or ignored.

I know that this morning you have already discussed several of the grassroots and regional initiatives aimed at achieving peace, increasing security, and lessening the violence that too often affects daily civilian life. And this afternoon, you will be discussing alternative forms of development and economic investment. I have had the privilege of meeting with many of the groups and leaders represented on the panels, and seeing first hand what they are accomplishing in Colombia.

Let me assure you, I would be the first in line to support a large increase in non-military aid to address Colombia's striking economic and social inequities.

I also believe that our drug policy could do a great deal more if we would invest more to reduce demand here at home by providing treatment on demand and strengthening local law enforcement. It is our insatiable demand for drugs that fuels this crisis. But we must also do more to alleviate the economic desperation that pushes poor farmers in Colombia into the coca trade.

I have visited some of the most troubled corners of Colombia. Unlike some of my congressional colleagues, I'm not satisfied with a brief visit to the capital, a military fly-over of an area that has just been fumigated, dinner and a show. I've been privileged to travel to Putumayo and meet with several hundred people who actually try to live and work there; I've gone to San Jose de Apartadó, Barrancabermeja and Sincelejo; to Popayan and Arauca. And when I'm in Bogotá, I visit communities like Barrio Kennedy, and Soacha, and Ciudad Bolívar. And bit by bit, I'm learning how large, diverse and complex Colombia and its problems are.

I've been asked by mothers, fathers, grandmothers, teachers, priests, mayors, governors, and community leaders - please help us with projects that will generate income, get our children into school, put food on the table - otherwise, our children will have no choice but to join the guerrillas or the paramilitaries just to get a meal and shoes on their feet.

I've been shocked by the poverty and isolation in which people live, but I have also been so very much inspired by the many brave people - some of whom are here at this conference - who are trying to forge peace and create opportunity in their communities, often with little or no support from their own government. This is why I have sought to cut aid to Mr. Uribe's military and to bring a better balance to our strategy. This is why I keep forcing a debate in the U.S. Congress on this policy. And I keep regretting that we seem to miss opportunity after opportunity to change its course.

Now, for those of you who are sitting here and disagree with every word I say - take heart. At this point in time, the majority in Congress is on your side - but barely. And you should take note that Congress keeps adding more and more conditions onto the aid we do send to Colombia. While that's a far cry from an outline for a better, more balanced strategy for U.S. policy, it is a clear signal that questions about the policy are increasing. Do not be complacent or think that Congress blindly supports you.

And to those of you who say I don't understand what's going on in Colombia - and that we should just give President Uribe the benefit of the doubt because he is very popular and the polls show he has the support of 70 percent of the Colombian people - I have to ask you, just what does that mean when trying to evaluate whether U.S. policy in Colombia is effective or not? Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has the support of 70 percent of his people, according to the polls, and the United States certainly doesn't seem to be supporting his policies! President George Bush, in 2003, had the support of 80 percent of the American people, but today he's at 39 percent. And who knows where the polls may put him tomorrow?

Polls are polls; they aren't policy. And in Colombia, like in most developing countries, polling reflects only the opinion of those Colombians who have telephones and who live in the seven largest cities. We know little to nothing about the views or concerns of the people who live in the rural countryside -

" Where the war is fought,
" Where communities are caught in the crossfire or live under the thumb of the guerrillas, the paramilitaries and the Colombian Army;
" Where the violence is greatest and takes place on a daily basis;
" Where poverty is endemic;
" Where the crops are fumigated; and
" Where investment in development is scarce.

And for those of you who agree with much that I've said, take heed and take heart: Times change. And time affects not just the strengthening or weakening of any given political party in Congress - time contributes to the gradual erosion of support for spending billions and billions of dollars, with few results - or at least highly-contested results. The U.S. budget is in a mess - and aid to Colombia, just like funding for other programs, many of them very worthy programs, will face greater scrutiny over the next couple of years.

Let me just say, it's hard being a Democrat right now in the U.S. House of Representatives.

But it's much harder being a campesino farmer in rural Colombia, far from markets or any basic social services.

It's much harder to be an indigenous community, caught in the cross-fire between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, and the army.

It's much harder being a religious or community leader, trying to encourage local development, while at the same time having to personally broker agreements with the paramilitary or guerrilla groups that have effective control over who lives and who dies in the area.

And I do understand how much harder it is for any local, regional or national government or elected official to genuinely represent the Colombian people and their best interests - and still come out of office alive.

I also know that there are no easy answers for Colombian leaders. Drug trafficking is a way of life for many on the right and the left. For there to be a lasting peace, many people will have to take a pay cut. But I do believe - at the end - Colombia's troubles will not be solved on the battlefield - but through a policy that truly recognizes the importance of strengthening civilian institutions, combating head-on the scourge of poverty and displacement, protecting human rights. And finally - and I say this to all actors in Colombia - to talk and negotiate in good faith. The challenge for the U.S. - I believe - is to help create the incentives and climate for this to happen.

And so, from the safety of my office here in Washington, D.C., once or twice a year, I try to bring the voices and concerns of these forgotten Colombians to the attention of my colleagues in the House of Representatives. That's why I offer amendments that demand Congress debate what the United States should be doing in Colombia. And that's why I'll keep doing it.

Once again, I thank CIP for inviting me here this afternoon. And I wish you all the very best exchange of ideas in your discussions about possible alternatives for U.S. policy in Colombia.