Transcript
of House Western Hemipshere Subcommittee Hearing, June 28, 2001
A
REVIEW OF THE ANDEAN INITIATIVE AND MARKUP OF H. RES. 181
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee
met, pursuant to call, at 11:08 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office
Building, Hon. Cass Ballenger [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. BALLENGER. The
trafficking of illegal drugs and the other criminal activity that goes
along with it are most serious threats to our national security of the
United States. Unlike other foreign policy challenges, drugs and crime
simultaneously target both our internal and external national interests.
Illegal drugs and drug-related crime subvert U.S. social and economic
structures and we can see it in the eyes of our children who have become
hooked on drugs and in the eyes of the victims of the crime that drug
trafficking leaves in its wake.
Page 8
If drugs have such
a devastating effect on the United States, think what they do to fragile
democracies with struggling economies. I cannot think of one issue that
is more important to the stability of our hemisphere than this. In order
to maintain our own security and economic stability, the United States
must be surrounded by stable democracies with strong economies.
Transnational crime
poses a clear and present threat to our nation. Ideological conflict has
been giving way to the pursuit of illicit profits from criminal activity.
International criminal syndicates are becoming increasingly global. Illegal
drug trafficking generates billions of dollars that finance black market
arms trafficking, fueling violence and socially degrading criminal activity
in Colombia and throughout the hemisphere.
The recent U.S.
seizure of the Belize-flagged fishing vessel Svesda Maru, which was carrying
26,397 pounds of cocaine and a crew of eight Ukrainian and two Russian
nationals believed by Latin American law enforcement authorities to be
linked to the Russian mafia, is a real wake up call.
No nation is immune
from this transnational crime. The United States must be ready and willing
to support those nations who will join us in opposing the drug trafficking
that fuels transnational crime.
The situation in
Colombia is as complex and dire as any I have ever known in all my years
in Congress. I have said before that what happens in Colombia affects
what happens here in our own home towns, not years down the road, but
on a daily basis. Failing to help Colombia and the surrounding nations
will no doubt put our nation and citizens in jeopardy. It may seem as
though the cost is great now, but I can assure you that the cost will
be much higher if we do not act now. Having recently returned from Colombia,
my Committee colleague Mr. Smith and I saw firsthand how important our
assistance for Plan Colombia is to that beleaguered nation. From what
I saw, there can be little doubt that Colombia is committed to Plan Colombia.
Page 9
I am very pleased to learn that the Bush Administration is tackling this
issue head-on by pursuing additional economic and counter-narcotics assistance,
as well as the extension of trade preferences for Colombia and its regional
neighbors.
Today, we welcome
Mr. James Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Mr. Michael
Deal, Acting Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Latin America
and the Caribbean, the United States Agency for International Development,
who will present testimony on the Administration's Andean Regional Initiative.
The Andean Regional
Initiative builds upon the resources already provided in support of Plan
Colombia. As you know, U.S. support for Plan Colombia is a bipartisan
policy developed by the Congress and the Clinton Administration which
enjoys continued support from the Bush Administration.
Although the actual
plan is just beginning to be implemented, we have already had successes
and the policy is working. It has been estimated that since the end of
December, roughly 45,820 hectares of coca have been sprayed. Together
with Colombia we are also, and must continue to, redouble our efforts
to completely eradicate the opium poppy that is entering the U.S. as a
very pure, highly addictive heroin. It is going to take time, dedication
and resolve, but, working together, we can implement a sustained strategy
that will lead to final victory over the drug lords who peddle poison
to our children.
Today, we are holding
this hearing to find out just how the Administration plans to administer
this aid package to the Andean region. What are the primary goals? Who
will be in charge? What will the roles and responsibilities of each agency
be involved? What are the timetables and the benchmarks we can expect
from this initiative? I believe that this initiative will permit the continued
implementation of a comprehensive drug and crime control strategy.
Page 10
We look forward to hearing our distinguished witnesses' thoughts and recommendations
on how to best implement an efficient and effective means to fight this
terrible drug problem.
[The prepared statement
of Mr. Ballenger follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF THE HONORABLE CASS BALLENGER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The trafficking
of illegal drugs and the other criminal activity that goes along with
it are most serious threats to the national security of the United States.
Unlike other foreign policy challenges, drugs and crime simultaneously
target both our internal and external national interests. Illegal drugs
and drug related crime subvert U.S. social and economic structures. We
can see it in the eyes of our children who become hooked on drugs-and
in the eyes of the victims of the crime that drug trafficking leaves in
its wake.
If drugs can have
such a devastating effect on the United States, think what they do to
fragile democracies with struggling economies. I can't think of one issue
that is more important to the stability of our hemisphere than this. In
order to maintain our own security and economic stability, the United
States must be surrounded by stable democracies with strong economies.
Transnational crime
poses a clear and present threat to our nation. Ideological conflict has
been giving way to the pursuit of illicit profits from criminal activity.
International criminal syndicates are becoming increasingly global. Illegal
drug trafficking generates billions of dollars that finance black market
arms trafficking, fueling violence and socially degrading criminal activity
in Colombia and throughout the hemisphere.
Page 11
The recent U.S. seizure of the Belize-flagged fishing vessel Svesda Maru,
which was carrying 26,397 pounds of cocaine and a crew of eight Ukrainian
and two Russian nationals believed by Latin American law enforcement authorities
to be linked to the Russian mafia, is a real wake up call.
No nation is immune
from transnational crime. The United States must be ready and willing
to support those nations who will join us in opposing the drug trafficking
that fuels transnational crime.
The situation in
Colombia is as complex and dire as any I have ever known in all my years
in Congress. I have said before that what happens in Colombia affects
what happens here in our own home towns, not years down the road, but
on a daily basis. Failing to help Colombia and the surrounding nations
will no doubt put our own nation and citizens in jeopardy. It may seem
as though the cost is great now, but I can assure you that the cost will
be much higher if we don't act now. Having recently returned from Colombia,
my Committee colleague, Mr. Smith and I saw firsthand how important our
assistance for Plan Colombia is to that beleaguered nation. From what
I saw, there can be little doubt that Colombia is committed to Plan Colombia.
I am very pleased
to learn that the Bush Administration is tackling this issue head-on by
pursuing additional economic and counter-narcotics assistance, as well
as the extension of trade preferences for Colombia and its regional neighbors.
Renewal of the Andean Trade Preferences Act is critically important to
our counter-narcotics strategy in the Andean region.
Page 12
Our first witness
today will be the Chairman Emeritus of the International Relations Committee,
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman of New York. No Member of Congress has
been more dedicated to the fight against drugs than Ben Gilman. We are
honored to have him testify before this Subcommittee.
Today we also welcome
Mr. James F. Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Mr.
Michael Deal, Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Latin America
and the Caribbean, United States Agency for International Development.
Both gentlemen will present testimony on the administration's ''Andean
Regional Initiative''.
The Andean Regional
Initiative builds upon the resources already provided in support of Plan
Colombia. As you know, U.S. support for Plan Colombia is a bipartisan
policy developed by the Congress and the Clinton administration which
enjoys continued support from the Bush administration. Although the actual
plan is just beginning to be implemented, we have already had successes,
and the policy is working. It has been estimated that since the end of
December, roughly 45,820 hectares of coca have been sprayed. Together
with Colombia we are also-and must continue to-redouble our efforts to
completely eradicate the opium poppy that is entering the U.S. as very
pure, highly addictive heroin.. It is going to take time, dedication and
resolve, but by working together, we can implement a sustained strategy
that will lead to final victory over the drug lords who peddle poison
to our children.
Today we are holding
this hearing to find out just how the Administration plans to administer
this aid package to the Andean region. What are the primary goals? Who
will be in charge? What are the roles and responsibilities of each agency
involved? What are the timetables and benchmarks we can expect from this
initiative? I believe that this initiative will permit the continued implementation
of a comprehensive drug and crime control strategy. We look forward to
hearing our distinguished witnesses' thoughts and recommendations on how
to best implement an efficient and effective means to fight this terrible
problem.
Page 13
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is appropriate
that you call this hearing of this Subcommittee on the Andean Regional
Initiative. We might consider that this hearing is as much as about Plan
Colombia and its implementation of which the Andean Regional Initiative
is but a continuation. This is a vitally important topic regarding the
hemisphere's most troubled region.
What we do here
together with our Andean friends will affect the region for years to come.
With the Plan Colombia,
as it appears with this initiative, the United States continues to try
to try to address two problems of significant magnitude and importance
to U.S. national interests: First, tackling the U.S. domestic problem
of illicit drug consumption and, second, fashioning of an effective U.S.
response to a domestic Colombian problem that affects both the United
States and Colombia's neighbors.
I doubt that there
are many people knowledgeable about the region who would argue that there
is not a crisis in Colombia. If that crisis were to go unchecked, it may
threaten the viability of the Colombian state. And that most definitely
would affect U.S. interests. The question is what Colombia, its neighbors
and the United States have done and are going to do about that crisis.
Some wonder how
it is that this crisis developed so suddenly, practically almost without
notice. That was the sense last year when we debated the supplemental
bill to fund U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia to the tune of $1.3 billion.
There are those who claim that there is no crisis, this was election year
get-tough-on-drugs politicking, but I respectfully disagree.
Page 14
A couple of things happened to bring Colombia to where it is today. First,
a largely rural revolutionary insurgency that is close to 40 years old
and had never really threatened the viability of the full Colombian state
has changed dramatically in character over the last decade due to a single
and very distinctive transformation.
The Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia has essentially become a major, dangerous and
highly profitable drug trafficking operation. Let us have no illusion.
The battles the guerrillas are now waging in southwestern Colombia are
not for winning the heart and soul of Colombia; they are for gaining control
of drug supply routes.
Second, coca cultivation
in Colombia, particularly in southern Colombia, increased dramatically
and thus did its impact on the United States. It seemed that practically
overnight Colombia had moved radically from shipping and refining coca
to growing and refining coca to the point where, to its great detriment
and danger, it supplies 80 percent of the United States market.
Last year, the Clinton
Administration presented to Congress an emergency supplemental bill designed
as a response to what it said was an emergency on the ground in Colombia.
The programs funded in that supplemental were devised to address the crisis
or emergency that was almost entirely narcotics-formulated.
Mr. Chairman, in
policy making, we are confronted with choices and must make decisions.
Last year, the United States had a choice: either do something or do nothing
to help one of our closest and historically best friends at a time of
dire need. The previous Administration decided it was appropriate to do
something. The U.S. contribution in Plan Colombia was the response.
Page 15
Now, the question I would like to pursue today in this hearing is: Has
it worked 6 months into the implementation, not has it worked in its ultimate
conclusion, because obviously that is not enough time, but what is the
progress we have made over this last 6 months, where do we go from here?
That is the crux
of the issues I think we need to discuss and in that regard I certainly
want to look at some of the measurable components of Plan Colombia that
we can take stock of on questions of eradication and questions of alternative
development and counter-drug battalions and the Colombia military's performance
in respect for human rights. Those are clearly some of the issues.
Lastly, as it relates
to this Andean Regional Initiative, in the process of consulting on the
Plan Colombia it became apparent that many of us in Congress and elsewhere
expressed concern that the problem was broader than Colombia and involved
more than a security and law enforcement issue.
Whether or not the
Andean Regional Initiative is in response to these concerns, it expands
Plan Colombia, as it were, to neighboring countries that are affected
by the crisis in Colombia and to other areas such as democratic institution
building, judicial sector reform and social welfare issues that must be
addressed because in a very real sense they are at the heart of the matter.
There is a fundamental interconnectedness among these issues that our
hemispheric friends and we ignore at our own peril. Once again, we are
faced with a policy choice with consequences for years to come.
Page 16
Let me close, Mr.
Chairman, by stating that I am dubious that our efforts on the supply
side of the narcotics trade alone can eliminate the cash incentive from
the drug trade over the long term. And in that regard, I know that many
of my colleagues, myself included, are concerned about our efforts at
working seriously at sustainable development issues within Colombia and
the Andean region and for that matter I would say within the hemisphere.
For 9 years that
I have sat on this Committee, I have been advocating a Latin American
development fund. Fifty percent of the people in this hemisphere live
below the poverty level. If you want to avoid coca growing, if you want
to avoid illegal immigration, if you want to avoid the spread of diseases,
if you want to preserve biodiversity, we must do something more than simply
trade. Trade is certainly important, but trade in many respects often
widens the gulf between those who live in poverty and those who can avail
themselves with the education and backgrounds to achieve the benefits
that trade can provide.
So, yes, trade is
important, but sustainable development is very important, and I hope we
will focus on some of that as we also seek to make sure that interdiction,
eradication and other forms of curtailing the supply side, while I hope
we will intensify here at home the demand side, so that we can ultimately
achieve the successes that we want as a country in our national interests,
in our national security, and also in those of our friends to the south.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I look forward to hearing the testimony.
[The prepared statement
of Mr. Menendez follows:]
Page 17
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT MENENDEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, thank
you. It is appropriate that you call this hearing now on the Andean Regional
Initiative. We might consider that this hearing is as much about Plan
Colombia and its implementation, of which the Andean initiative is but
a continuation. This is a vitally important topic regarding the hemisphere's
most troubled region. What we do here together with our Andean friends
will affect the region for years to come.
PLAN COLOMBIA, THE
ANDEAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE AND US INTERESTS
With the Plan Colombia,
as it appears with this initiative, the United States continues to try
to address two problems of significant magnitude and importance to US
national interests. First, tackling the US domestic problem of illicit
drug consumption; and, second, a fashioning an effective US response to
a domestic Colombian problem that affects both the US and Colombia's neighbors.
I doubt that there
are many people knowledgeable about the region who would argue that there
is not a crisis in Colombia. That crisis, were it to go unchecked, may
threaten the viability of the Colombian State. And that most definitely
would affect US interests. The question is what Colombia, its neighbors
and the United States have done and are going to do about that crisis.
Page 18
Some wonder how
it is that this crisis developed so suddenly, practically without notice.
There was that sense last year when we debated the supplemental bill to
fund US assistance for Plan Colombia to the tune of $1.3 billion. There
are those who claim that there is no crisis-this was election-year get-tough-on-drugs
politicking. I respectfully disagree.
A couple of things
happened to bring Colombia to where it is today.
First, a largely
rural revolutionary insurgency that is close to 40 years old and had never
really threatened the viability of the Colombian State, has changed dramatically
in character over the last decade due to a single and very distinctive
transformation: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has
essentially become a major, dangerous and highly profitable drug trafficking
operation. Let us have no illusion: the battles that the guerillas are
now waging in southwestern Colombia are not for winning the heart and
soul of Colombia. They are for gaining control of drug supply routes.
Second, coca cultivation
in Colombia, particularly in Southern Colombia, increased dramatically,
and thus did its impact on the US. It seemed that practically overnight,
Colombia had moved radically from shipping and refining Coca to growing
and refining Coca to the point where it supplies 80 percent of the US
market-to its great detriment and danger.
Last year, the Clinton
Administration presented to Congress an emergency supplemental bill designed
as a response to what it said was an emergency on the ground in Colombia.
The programs funded in that supplemental were devised to address the crisis
or emergency that was almost entirely narcotics-formulated.
Page 19
Mr. Chairman, in
policymaking we are confronted with choices and must make decisions. Last
year, the United States had a choice: either do something or do nothing
to help one of our closest and historically best friends at a time of
dire need. Last year, the Clinton Administration decided it was appropriate
to do something. The US contribution to Plan Colombia was the US response.
Has it worked six
months into implementation? And where do we go from here? I believe that
is the crux of the issue before us today. There is much history particular
to Colombia that I will not touch upon here that factors into this equation,
such the la violencia period of the 1940s and 50s, which nonetheless is
quite relevant.
So much is said
and written about the Plan Colombia that one can lose focus. So let me
try to frame the discussion a bit if I may, Mr. Chairman. Let me suggest
to my colleagues that there are specific and measurable components of
Plan Colombia that we can take stock of. In general, based on what I have
reviewed, I cannot say that overall things have gone badly. Let me address
some of the key points that I believe we must focus on in terms of oversight
of this the Plan Colombia and in assessing the new Andean Initiative:
ERADICATION
I understand that
Colombia is on track toward meeting its objective of a 30 percent reduction
of drug production in two years and a 50 percent reduction over the five-year
course of Plan Colombia. Over 43,000 hectares have been eradicated by
air in Colombia of a total 136,500 of coca cultivation. Despite these
evident successes, I do have reservations about aerial eradication because
it is only a short-term fix, it is subject to errors, and I worry about
the possibility that this coca can be replanted. Perhaps our witnesses
can address these concerns and discuss whether manual eradication is a
viable alternative. Is it too cumbersome and dangerous given conditions
in southwestern Colombia? Finally, there are those who claim that aerial
eradication should not occur unless and until alternative development
takes greater hold. I'd be interested in our witnesses' views on this
and whether or not they believe eradication provides an incentive for
coca growers to accept alternative development packages.
Page 20
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Alternative Development
takes much longer to get off the ground and is difficult because people
need to be persuaded or compelled by circumstances-such as eradicated
coca crops or interdiction-to cooperate. I understand there has been some
success by Colombia in signing up over 17,000 families to voluntarily
pull up coca plants over a year's time, and in return the government will
give them cash, seeds, small farm animals, and also help build roads,
schools and health clinics. Despite these successes, I remain skeptical
about anyone's ability to essentially substitute the alluring cash incentive
of growing coca with far less lucrative crops and look forward to hearing
testimony on this matter.
COUNTER-DRUG BATTALIONS
The often-debated
US military assistance provided under Plan Colombia was geared to training
and equipping these counterdrug troops. There are now between 2,200 and
2,300 such troops and by all accounts they have performed quite well.
They mainly are involved in ground and airborne operations that take down
cocaine labs, whether in the centros de acopio or collection areas where
finished coca base or the big coca processing labs. The battalions unquestionably
have achieved success, having knocked out 180 counterdrug targets in Putumayo
and Caqueta, including nine big HCl or finished cocaine labs, over 100
of small base labs and numerous transhipment and storage sites. Just as
importantly, there have been no accusations against them of human rights
abuses and I commend the Colombian Government for that.
COLOMBIAN MILITARY
PERFORMANCE AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Page 21
I believe we have to give credit where credit is due. The Colombian military
continues to make progress in improving its respect for human rights.
The number of violations continues to go down. Five to six years ago,
half of all human rights accusations were attributed to members of the
security forces. In the last couple of years, these numbers have shrunk
to just 2 percent. They also have made progress in dismissing poor performers
and paramilitary collaborators. But they still have improvements to make.
Although there is no evidence of which I am aware of institutional collaboration
with the paramilitaries-an important point-tactical collaboration does
exist, and I urge the Colombian Government to address this in the most
forceful terms. I would appreciate the State Department commenting on
this.
ANDEAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE
In the process of
consulting on the Plan Colombia it became apparent that many of us in
Congress and elsewhere expressed concern that the problem was broader
than Colombia and involved more than a security and law enforcement issue.
Whether or not it the Andean Regional Initiative is in response to those
concerns, it expands Plan Colombia, as it were, to neighboring countries
that are affected by crisis in Colombia, and to other areas such as democratic
institution-building, justice-sector reform and social welfare issues
that must be addressed because in a very real sense they are the heart
of the matter. There is a fundamental interconnectedness among these issues
that our hemispheric friends and we ignore at our own peril. Once again
we are faced with a policy choice with consequences for years to come.
Let me close, Mr.
Chairman, by stating that I remain dubious that our efforts on the supply
side alone of the narcotics trade can eliminate the cash incentive from
the drug trade over the long term. It appears that Plan Colombia has gotten
off to a good start. This jury will deliberate for quite some time.
Page 22
Thank you.
Mr. BALLENGER. Our
first witness today will be Chairman Emeritus of the International Relations
Committee, the Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman of New York.
No Member of Congress
has been more dedicated to the fight against drugs than Ben Gilman and
we are honored to have him testify before this Subcommittee.
Congressman Gilman,
it is yours.
STATEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE
OF NEW YORK
Mr. GILMAN. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your kind words, Chairman Ballenger.
And I want to thank the Committee for calling today's hearing on the Andean
Regional Initiative, something that is extremely important to our nation,
and providing us with the opportunity to testify.
I welcomed the Administration's
new Andean regional plan of providing more than $800 million for that
region. When we met with our Andean colleagues, parliamentary colleagues,
not too long ago at the Bolivian conference, they stressed how they are
wanting to be cooperative in the drug fight, but they also need help with
regard to their economy and pleaded with us to give some attention to
the trade barriers that they are confronted with and I think that this
proposal by the Administration will help in that direction. I think it
is a proper progression following our Plan Colombia $1.3 billion dollar
counter-narcotics program.
Page 23
With regard to Peru, we are making considerable progress in our fight
against illicit drugs in the Andean region, especially in Peru and Bolivia,
but we need to stay the course. It is time for us to progress and restore
the shoot down policy over the skies of both Peru and Colombia after building
in proper safeguards that are fully needed to prevent the kind of tragic
unfortunate circumstance surrounding the April 20th missionary aircraft
incident.
But we must not
throw out the baby with the bath water and allow the loss of any more
innocent lives from illicit drugs coming from the Andean region to our
shorelines while we delay over just what to do about the tragic mistake
in Peru, which we all sincerely regret.
With regard to drug
trafficking in Bolivia, we are finding a success story in a sea of unfounded
pessimism. Bolivia's total elimination of coca leaf in the Chapare region
and its efforts to control the small remaining illicit crops in the Yungas
area is a model for the entire world. Bolivia gives us all hope. Our continued
support to sustain this startling Bolivian drug fighting success is essential.
Bolivia has provided
some important lessons for all of its neighbors about how strong political
will has taken one nation out of the illicit drug business and has controlled
the supply of precursor chemicals. We all recall how in years gone by
Bolivia was one of the major producers of illicit drugs. In Bolivia today,
it is a crime equal to drug trafficking, with the same punishment, if
anyone were to engage in illicit precursor chemical trafficking.
Other nations should
follow that Bolivian example. Too many have been reluctant to try to control
the extent of trafficking and precursor chemicals. It has had a major
impact on the purity and availability of Bolivian drugs, for without these
chemicals, of course, there can be no drug production.
Page 24
Now, in Colombia, it is gratifying to learn we have resumed opium eradication,
which had been cut off for a while. According to the anti-drug chief of
the Colombian National Police and our embassy in Bogota, we may be able
to totally eliminate opium in Colombia by the end of this year if we can
use the Black Hawks which our Committee led the way in obtaining and which
have been very slow in delivery. The helicopters that we are providing
will save lives and will help protect our young people here at home from
the deadly scourge of Colombian heroin which has impacted our nation's
East Coast.
We still need to
solve the supply line problems in Colombia and that is the Achilles heel
of Plan Colombia, as we all know and have long recognized. The State Department's
proposal of a costly-to-operate C-27 transport plane with parts that have
to come from Italy, along with more American contract crews in Colombia,
and which cannot land on 80 percent of the airstrips that the CNP drug
police need to bring fuel and herbicide to those areas just will not do.
It is a non-starter. We should get the CNP the kind of buffalo supply
planes the police leadership have been asking for over the past few years
and which have been denied to them by the State Department.
Now, with regard
to the FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, I remain concerned
along with many of my colleagues just about what agreements, if any, the
Colombian government may have with the FARC to limit coca eradication
spraying and the safety and security of Americans in Colombia as we aggressively
go after the drugs there. Our Americans are at risk and targeted in Colombia.
Accordingly, I think it is time to drop the fiction that only anti-narcotics
aid should come from the United States. For example, we should help the
CNP's anti-kidnaping unit with lift capacity. It has reduced kidnaping
in Bogota by 50% and just captured 50 criminals and guerrillas linked
to the kidnaping and killings of American oil workers in Ecuador.
Page 25
Overall, I believe we need to keep going and do more in the region. We
must sustain what we have begun in places like Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.
We must also help Colombia's neighbors like Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil
and Panama that are facing the spill-over affect of our battle against
drugs. Ecuador, for example, which has helped with the new Forward Operating
Location after we left Panama, deserves our strong support, especially
as it faces a new FARC-inspired and trained insurgency.
We must continue
to show we are serious and do even more. I have a great deal of reservation
with regard to President Pastrana's safeguarding and providing a haven
in the FARC area in Colombia. It just has not worked. Today, there are
more kidnapings. They say that 70 percent of the world's kidnapings take
place in that part of the world. They are smuggling. They are involved
in drug trade and there are abundant killings. And I think it is time
that President Pastrana take another look at what he has done in providing
that kind of a safe haven for the FARC.
With regard to the
Andean Trade Preference Act, this year it is important, I believe, for
the Congress to renew the Andean Trade Preference Act, ATPA, a 10-year-old
initiative, that was intended to help the Andean region in our common
fight against illicit drugs. Trade with our Andean friends helps increase
jobs and helps their economy, diminishes the attraction of illicit crop
production and helps support farmers who seldom benefit from many of the
illicit narcotics trade.
Congressional renewal
of the ATPA, I think, is an essential part of the regional package to
help make alternative crops and development viable. I look forward to
working with our colleagues on the Ways and Means Committee to make the
ATPA renewal a reality and I am urging the Administration to effectively
advocate for its renewal and I hope our Committee will do the same in
urging the Administration to get on with the ATPA renewal. It sends an
important message that our nation is serious, that we are good partners
and that we are reliable allies in the region.
Page 26
And with regard to the European Union, I think our State Department, along
with the governments of the Andean region, need to demarche the European
governments and the E.U. to do their share to help stem the flow of drugs
from the Andean region. One-third of the cocaine from this region is now
headed for Europe, and places like Holland, Belgium and others in Europe,
provide large uncontrolled quantities of the precursor chemicals to the
region that help make drugs, which in turn flow back to Europe.
The Europeans should
not be standing idly by on the sidelines in this battle. We need their
cooperation in controlling these precursor chemicals, and for more alternative
development aid, as we and our Andean neighbors do our share and do the
tough work. Since illicit drugs affect all of us, it is not too much to
expect help from our European allies and to help us stem the problems
in America's backyard.
So, Mr. Chairman,
I cannot commend you enough for tackling this problem as we take a good
hard look at what we should be doing to control illicit narcotics that
are affecting so many of our communities here and so many communities
abroad.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement
of Mr. Gilman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Page 27
Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for calling today's hearing on the Andean Initiative and providing
me this opportunity to testify. I welcomed the Administration's new Andean
regional plan of more than $ 800 million. It is a natural progression
after our Plan Colombia $ 1.3 billion dollar counter-narcotics aid program.
PERU
We are making progress
in our fight against illicit drugs in the Andean region, especially in
Peru and Bolivia. We need to stay the course. It's time to get off the
dime and restore the shoot down policy over the skies of both Peru and
Colombia after we build in whatever safe guards are clearly needed to
prevent, the tragic, unfortunate April 20th missionary incident.
We must not throw
out the baby with the bath water and allow the loss of any more innocent
lives from illicit drugs coming from the Andean region to our communities
and towns, while we procrastinate over what to do about this tragic mistake
in Peru, which we all sincerely regret.
BOLIVIA
With regard to drug
trafficking in Bolivia, we find a success story in a sea of unfounded
pessimism. Bolivia's total elimination of coca leaf in the Chapare region,
and its efforts to control the small remaining illicit crops in the Yungas
area, is a model for the world. Bolivia gives us all hope. Our continued
support to sustain this startling Bolivian drug fighting success, is essential.
Page 28
Bolivia has provided some important lessons for its neighbors about how
strong political will has taken one nation out of the illicit drug business,
and has controlled the supply of precursor chemicals. In Bolivia today,
it's a crime equal to drug trafficking, with the same punishment, if you
engage in illicit precursor chemical trafficking. Others should follow
that example. It has had a major impact on the purity and availability
of Bolivian drugs. For without these chemicals, there is no drug production.
COLOMBIA
In Colombia, it
is gratifying to hear we have resumed opium eradication. According to
the anti-drug chief of the Colombian National Police (CNP) and our embassy
in Bogota, we may be able to totally eliminate opium in Colombia by the
end of this year using the Black Hawks which our Committee led the way
in obtaining. They will save lives and help protect our children here
at home from the deadly scourge of Colombia heroin which has impacted
our east coast.
THE SUPPLY LINE
We still need to
solve the supply line problems in Colombia, the ''Achilles heel'' of Plan
Colombia, as we all know, and have long recognized. The State Department's
proposal of a costly-to-operate C-27 transport plane-with parts that have
to come from Italy, along with more American contract crews in Colombia,
and which can't land on 80% of the airstrips the CNP needs to bring fuel
and herbicide to-won't do. It's a non-starter. We should get the CNP the
Buffalo supply planes the police leadership have asked for themselves
to fly these past years.
Page 29
THE FARC(see footnote 1)
I remain concerned
about what deals, if any, the Colombian government may have with the FARC
to limit coca eradication spraying, and the safety and security of Americans
in Colombia as we aggressively go after drugs. Americans are at risk and
targeted in Colombia. Accordingly, it's time to drop the fiction that
only anti-narcotics aid should come from the United States. For example,
we should help the CNP's anti-kidnaping unit with lift capacity. It has
reduced kidnaping in Bogota by 50%, and just captured 50 criminals and
guerillas linked to the kidnaping and killings of American oil workers
in Ecuador.
Overall, we need
to keep going and do more in the region. We must sustain what we have
begun in places like Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, and also help Colombia's
neighbors like Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil and Panama that face the spill
over affect of the fight against drugs there. Ecuador, which has helped
with the new forward operating base after we left Panama, deserves our
strong support, especially as it faces a new FARC inspired and trained
insurgency. We must continue to show we are serious, and do even more.
ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE
This year, Congress
ought to also renew the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), a ten-year
old initiative initially intended to help the region in our common fight
against illicit drugs. Trade with our Andean friends helps increase jobs
and wealth, and diminishes the attraction of illicit crop production for
the poor farmers, who seldom benefit from illicit narcotics. Congressional
renewal of the ATPA is an essential part of the regional package to help
make alternative crops and development viable. I look forward to working
with our colleagues on the Ways and Means Committee to make the ATPA renewal
a reality. I urge the Administration to lobby hard and effectively for
its renewal. It sends an important message that we are serious, good partners,
and reliable allies in the region.
Page 30
E.U. SUPPORT
Finally, I call
upon the State Department, along with governments in the Andean region,
to demarche the European governments and the EU to do their share to help
stem the flow of drugs from the Andean region. One-third of the cocaine
from this region is headed for Europe, and places like Holland, Belgium
and others in Europe, provide large uncontrolled quantities of the precursor
chemicals to the region that help make drugs, which in turn, flow back
to Europe.
The Europeans should
not be standing idly on the sidelines. We need their cooperation in controlling
these precursor chemicals, and for more alternative development aid, as
we and our Andean neighbors do our share and do the tough part. Since
illicit drugs affect all of us, it isn't too much to expect some European
help in America's backyard.
Thank you.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank
you, Congressman Gilman.
If I may explain
to the next panel, before we continue with hearing testimony from today's
witnesses, we want to mark up H. Res. 181, Congratulating President-elect
Alejandro Toledo on his election to the presidency of Peru, congratulating
the people of Peru for the return of democracy in Peru, and expressing
sympathy for the victims of the devastating earthquake that struck Peru
on June 23, 2001.
Page 31
And so pursuant
to notification of the Chair, I call up the resolution H. Res. 181 for
the purpose of mark up and move that it be reported favorably to the Committee.
Without objection, the resolution will be considered as read and open
for amendment at any point.
Today, we have before
the Subcommittee H. Res. 181 congratulating the President, Alejandro Toledo,
and congratulating the people of Peru on their return to democracy.
Yesterday, Chairman
Hyde and our Committee's Ranking Democratic Member, Mr. Lantos, hosted
a meeting with President-elect Toledo and he spoke eloquently of his commitment
to restoring full strength to Peru's fragile democratic institutions.
He also spoke very clearly about his commitment to giving Peruvians fiscally
sound government that can bring Peru out of its current economic recession.
It is fitting that
this resolution enjoys extensive bipartisan support. Reversing the manipulation
of democracy that occurred in Peru was possible because, as President-elect
Toledo pointed out yesterday, key Republicans and Democrats took a principled
stand together. As our friend and colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts
Mr. Delahunt noted yesterday, President-elect Toledo said it best when
he said ''Democracy has no country.''
As Peru prepares
to inaugurate its new President and to rebuild from the recent terrible
earthquake, we should take this opportunity to express our congratulations
for the Peruvian people's accomplishment and also express our sympathy
and support for the victims of the earthquake. Accordingly, I urge my
colleagues in joining me in support of this resolution.
And now I would
like to recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Menendez, for his statement on the resolution.
Page 32
[The resolution, H. Res. 181, follows:]
Page 33
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to join you in introducing this resolution
which we mark up today.
First, I would like
to express my sincere condolences to the people of Peru for the earthquake
and especially to the families of the victims in Arequipa. I hope that
the United States will act in its traditional role, as it has so many
times, in helping our neighbors through the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance, in this regard.
I want to heartily
congratulate the Peruvian people and Peruvians everywhere, including in
my congressional district in New Jersey, for conducting a free and fair
election. It was an exemplary election. It was the election of the people
and, once again, Peru is a democracy of the Peruvian people.
As someone who advocated
quite a bit for change in Peru, who noted what was going on in Peru, who
met now President-elect Toledo when he was struggling to create opportunities
in his country for a real democracy, I certainly am very happy to see
his historic victory. I think his courage in confronting Fujimori when
others would not is admirable.
I have no doubt
that he will apply that same courage in looking out for the interests
and welfare of all Peruvians.
Now, we heard from
the President-elect yesterday and certainly Peru's challenges are many
and formidable. Fortunately for Peru, the President-elect has a very clear
understanding of the needs of the Peruvian people and the challenges that
will face his government.
Page 34
I know that President-elect Toledo is committed to democracy in substance,
not just in form, as was his predecessor. This has implications beyond
Peru in South America and throughout the hemisphere. I am confident that
the people of Peru and the people of South America will not be fooled
by those who go through democratic motions to get elected, but would proceed
to install authoritarian governments.
The President-elect
also has a keen and sophisticated understanding of the social issues that
he must address as leader of his country: poverty that is extreme in many
cases, as he knows because he lived through it; illiteracy; lack of access
to basic health care; clean water; clean air; unemployment and underemployment.
These are just some of the challenges that he faces. As the dinner plates
of many Peruvian families are empty, the President-elect's policy plate
is quite full.
As he carries the
torch of returning truly representative democracy to Peru, of fighting
corruption, of restoring faith in a broken judicial system, I want the
President-elect to know that he has the strongest support of so many of
us here in this Congress. So this is a happy and historic occasion to
note, Mr. Chairman.
Let me take the
opportunity once again to congratulate the Peruvian people. I think that
what happened in Peru reverberates far beyond its borders, sends a very
clear message to the rest of the people of the hemisphere and is one very
worthy of our recognition today.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank
you, Mr. Menendez.
Page 35
Are there others who would like to be recognized?
Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
As Chairman of the
Science Subcommittee on Research that oversees our earthquake efforts
in the United States, I have been particularly impressed with not only
the U.S. cooperation, both government and non-government, but also with
world-wide cooperation to assist and cooperate when other countries have
devastation due to an earthquake. My legislation in the last session put
$172 million into development and construction of a new seismic system
to give us the ability for a little earlier detection.
It is an area that
all the countries of the world need to cooperate in an effort to have
a better understanding, the possibility of increasing our warning efforts
by-some optimists have guessed up to 10 seconds. And that could make worlds
of difference in electronically shutting off the gas lines or the electricity
lines that might devastate areas. But I am encouraged so much by the world
effort in coming to the aid of such countries that have had earthquakes
and hope that we will again renew this country's effort in helping Peru
rebuild and overcome, and add my sympathy for the devastation and the
personal destruction that has happened in Peru.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 36
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank
you.
Are there any others
that care to--
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr.
Chairman, I thank you for recognizing me. I am pleased to join with you
in cosponsoring this resolution and I applaud you for bringing it before
the Subcommittee in such a timely manner.
This is certainly
a new day for Peru and it is clear that it is emerging from years of darkness
to claim its rightful place as a democracy. And credit goes to many for
this victory. The current President, President-elect Toledo, and the Organization
of American States all deserve praise. So also do the losing candidates,
Flores and Garcia, who respected the will of the people and accepted defeat.
And many in the international community, including people in this room,
rose above the interests of party and nation to promote genuine democracy
in Peru.
But as the Ranking
Member said, the real credit goes to the Peruvian people. They suffered
through long years of war, recession, and authoritarian government with
a yearning for democracy intact. Their outrage at corruption drove Fujimori
and Montesinos from power, and their faith in democracy and dedication
to creating rule of law ensured this election happened and that it was
free and that it was fair.
Now comes the tough
part. Too often we herald a country's return to the family of democracies
when it has a free and fair election and then we forget about it. Well,
let us not make this mistake as it relates to Peru. It is so clear, as
the President-elect yesterday spoke with us-Peru's democratic institutions
are fragile. The rule of law has been deeply subverted and the criminal
network that kept the Fujimori-Montesinos regime in power has yet to be
fully dismantled. And, tragically, unfortunately, southeastern Peru has
just suffered a massive earthquake. Any one of these problems could slow
Peru's recovery.
Page 37
While the Peruvian people are ultimately responsible for their future,
we can assist in a variety of ways. Most immediately, we must provide
disaster relief to the earthquake victims and we must encourage other
nations to do the same. We must engage economically with Peru to help
raise its standard of living. Unless its people see a brighter future
for their families, they may sour on democracy, as has happened in other
parts of Latin America.
And, as the President-elect
said yesterday, he is going to attack poverty and mentioned a figure,
I think it was 54 percent of the Peruvian people live below the poverty
line. We must join him in that war on poverty because the benefits will
accrue to the benefit of us all, not just Peruvians. And we must help
Peru restore its democratic institutions. To do so, we must help dismantle
the web of criminality that kept Fujimori and Montesinos in power.
It is interesting
that we now find our alleged allies in the war on drugs were benefitting-were
benefitting-from the trade in illegal narcotics.
And, Mr. Chairman,
I would respectfully request, given the statement by my dear friend and
colleague Mr. Gilman, that this Subcommittee conduct a hearing on the
so-called shoot down policy. I eagerly await to hear the Administration's
position in this matter and also to explore alternatives.
In any event, President-elect
Toledo has asked that the Administration declassify any information that
we may have about the extent of corruption under the Fujimori-Montesinos
regime. I would hope that the Administration would fully cooperate with
President-elect Toledo's request. In particular, the CIA should provide
information regarding Montesinos.
Page 38
It has been reported in the newspapers that there was a relationship between
Montesinos and the CIA. That relationship should be fully revealed to
the American people as well as to the people of Peru.
In addition, our
own Department of Justice should offer its assistance in restoring Peru's
judicial system. An independent judiciary free of interference by the
legislative or executive branches is the bedrock of healthy democracy.
President-elect Toledo himself stressed this yesterday at our luncheon
and has pledged to respect the independence of the judiciary. What a breath
of fresh air.
Well, the Peruvian
people deserve our praise and support and I urge my colleagues to support
this resolution.
I yield back.
Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman
Gilman?
Mr. GILMAN. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
I want to join in
congratulating President-elect Alejandro Toledo who visited with us in
our Committee just yesterday. And I think we were all duly impressed with
his sincerity and his reminding us of the pain that he went through in
his impoverished family background when he first grew up. It reminded
him of what he has to do to be of help to his nation.
Page 39
So we look forward to working with President-elect Toledo. We hope that
we can provide a better quality of life for our Peruvian neighbors and
we want to commend Peru for what it has done in the past in fighting the
drug war. And our sympathy, of course, goes out to the many victims of
the massive earthquake of June 23rd and the need for our nation to assist
technically and monetarily as Peru tries to rebuild from that crisis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Representative
Napolitano.
Ms. NAPOLITANO.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After listening to my colleagues, and I totally
join in their comments and I identify myself with them, I believe that
one of the many interesting things that we do in this Committee is discuss
information that deals with the policies and the politics of the country.
And I am, of course,
very much in favor of both, but I also want to add economic betterment
of the country because as the economy increases, so does the ability for
the people to be more in control of their fate. And I would pledge that
any efforts that can be made should be made, not only by your chambers,
but by our small businesses, our Department of Commerce and other areas
to make sure that we do our utmost to assist the people in maintaining
that democracy, because it is so precious and it can be very fragile.
I believe that all
that is being done is very laudable and I think that we can also continue
to work on other fronts to ensure that democracy maintains.
Page 40
And I certainly add my comments to my colleagues in expressing sympathy
for the earthquake that just recently was felt in that eastern portion
of Peru and wish the government all the good wishes for a continued fight
against the drug trafficking and I am very, very much impressed by what
I am hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank
you.
Are there any amendments
to the resolution?
[No response.]
Mr. BALLENGER. If
there are none, now the question is on the motion to report passage of
the resolution favorably.
All those in favor
say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Mr. BALLENGER. Those
opposed, say no.
[No response.]
Page 41
Mr. BALLENGER. In
the opinion of the Chair, the majority having voted in the affirmative,
the resolution is agreed to.
And before going
to the additional witnesses that we have, we will also take any statements
that would like to be made by any of our Members.
Pardon me, ladies
and gentlemen. We are doing it differently.
Those that would
like to make statements on the hearing itself.
Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you providing me this opportunity to make
a statement. I want to make this statement prior to our witnesses because
they might want to respond to the concerns that I will express.
As you know, Mr.
Chairman, last year, myself and Representative Farr from California, during
the course of the debate on Plan Colombia, along with Chairman Gilman
and Representative Goss of Florida secured an amendment regarding respect
for human rights conditionality based upon the transfer of military assistance.
Well, as you know,
I have been an advocate of enhanced civilian oversight and professionalization
of the Colombian military and, in fact, under the leadership of President
Pastrana and the chief of the armed forces, Fernando Tapias as well as
Attorney General Gomez, it has to be acknowledged, I believe, that Colombia
has made significant advances in this regard.
Page 42
However, I think we have to understand the context. That context has been
that the record of the Colombian military in terms of human rights abuses
was the worst in all of Latin America. So from the beginning, there was
much improvement that, in the opinion of many of us, was necessary. And
improvement, again, I reiterate, has been made.
And it is critical.
Unless the Colombian military is clean, efficient and professional, its
troops will continue to commit human rights abuses and collaborate with
drug dealers, guerrillas and paramilitaries. In short, it will be part
of Colombia's problem, not part of its solution.
I am concerned that
the progress which I alluded to may now be under threat. Last week, the
Colombian Congress passed a so-called national security bill. I have followed
this bill's progress through the course of its consideration before the
Colombian Congress.
In fact, I communicated
with appropriate Members of the Committee of jurisdiction in the House
of Representatives of the Colombian Congress about those concerns. I am
pleased to report that a number of them were deleted, but a number of
them still exist and, in my opinion, may threaten to undo everything that
has been accomplished by the Colombian military in the last few years.
Just to cite one
example, the bill as originally drafted would have exempted from prosecution
acts committed by soldiers while engaged in operations against a criminal
organization. Let me suggest that is nothing more than a blank check for
abuses. Well, I am happy to report that that provision seems to have been
taken out of the final conference report.
Page 43
It has been difficult to get the details of what was in the final version,
but they seem, and I underscore seem, they seem to include the following:
Authority of the military to arrest citizens and hold them for an unspecified
period of time until they can be turned over to judicial authorities;
assumption by the military of certain judicial powers if civilian judicial
authorities cannot be present; restrictions on civilian oversight of infractions
committed by the military, possibly expanding a loophole that has been
used in the past to block investigations of human rights abuses; and reduction
of the amount of time to decide on formal investigations of military personnel
from 1 year to 2 months.
Given the state
of affairs in Colombia, let me respectfully suggest this is not enough
time for a thorough preliminary investigation. Thus, this measure could
very well preclude any charges being brought against soldiers committing
such acts.
The bill is now
awaiting President Pastrana's signature.
Mr. Chairman, until
I have some clarification of the language, the intentions behind it, and
how it will be implemented, I will withhold judgment on the proposal before
us, the Andean Regional Initiative.
If all of the progress
that has been made, much of which the U.S. has insisted on as a condition
for providing aid last year will be reversed by this piece of legislation,
I cannot in good conscience support that aid to Colombia's security forces.
I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses.
Page 44
Mr. BALLENGER. As you folks know, we just got a ring on the bell. We have
two more people that would like-if their statements are short, we could
take their statements, go vote and then come back and listen to you fellows,
if that works.
Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Short and maybe I can even talk fast.
First, I would like
to associate myself with the comments of the Chairman Emeritus, Congressman
Gilman, and certainly with you, Mr. Chairman. Your statements, I agree
with the comments, having traveled with you recently to Colombia, that
we are very concerned that our whole effort has got to be more than just
coca or the poppy crop eradication. It has to encompass an effort to economically
assist the opportunities that some of the farmers have in those areas
if we are going to demand that the crops that are now affording them a
fair amount of income are going to be eliminated. It has to be partially
a social view of not just one country at a time, but the whole area.
I was concerned
that in our meetings in Colombia when asked about statistics, we got different
responses from the Colombians that did not match with some of our responses
from our State Department people and I hope the witnesses will relate
to that.
And with that, certainly
part of the solution for the problem has to fall on Europe and the United
States and the other countries that continue the demand for those illicit
drug products.
Page 45
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. If
you gentlemen would like to relax for about-I do not know-it will probably
take 15 minutes, anyhow, and we will be back. I want to thank you for
your ability to sit there and listen to us. In the meantime, let us go
vote.
[Recess.]
Mr. BALLENGER. The
Subcommittee will come to order and we will now proceed with our official
witnesses.
The Chair will first
recognize Deputy Assistant Secretary William Brownfield for a brief introductory
statement.
Fire away.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM
J. BROWNFIELD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We apologize for
the confusion from our side of this hearing. As you have already correctly
noted, the name Brownfield has suddenly and mysteriously appeared between
the names of Deal and Mack. May I reveal the name of the fourth member
on our panel as well, who is representing the State Department's Bureau
of Economic and Business Affairs, Mr. Ben Fairfax. He specializes in trade
issues, Mr. Chairman, in the unlikely event that this hearing might focus
on some trade-related issues.
Page 46
Our proposal, Mr. Chairman, is that I might speak for just a couple of
moments by way of an overview of the Andean Regional Initiative, how we
got there and where we hope it is taking us, and then allow Mr. Mack and
Mr. Deal to offer a brief statement in each case on the counter-narcotics
side of the initiative and the social and economic development and institutional
reform side.
If you will permit
me, I would like to do about 30 seconds of history as to how we got here.
In the summer of 1999, Colombia faces three crises: a security crisis;
an economic crisis, their then second, now fourth consecutive year of
recession; and a drug crisis. Colombia has faced each of those crises
in the past, sometimes two at the same time, never three simultaneously.
Their response was
Plan Colombia, a Colombian plan that was meant to be integrated and comprehensive
to respond to each of those crises.
The U.S. response
was the congressional passage of the emergency supplemental in July of
last year in support of the Colombian initiative, a $1.3 billion supplemental
which focused on six basic areas: first, the push into southern Colombia,
the heart of drug production in Colombia, at this time; second, support
for interdiction efforts by the Colombian government; third, direct support
for the Colombian National Police; fourth, support for institutional reform
throughout Colombia; fifth, support for alternative development; and,
sixth and finally, some regional support outside of Colombia.
Mr. Chairman, in
the months since last July, we have heard commentary and from time to
time criticism from constituencies, from the press, from other governments
and, even perish the thought, from time to time, from Members of the United
States Congress. Their commentary has focused largely on three areas:
one, how widely and thoroughly had we consulted in advance before launching
this initiative; second, that the initiative was focused too heavily on
security and law enforcement issues, not enough on social and economic
issues; and, third, that the initiative was focused excessively on Colombia
and ignored or underplayed other countries in the region.
Page 47
We would like to think, Mr. Chairman, that we heard those criticisms,
we heard that commentary. At the Quebec Summit of the Americas in April,
followed up in May by his budget presentation to the United States Congress,
the President announced his Andean Regional Initiative. The Andean Regional
Initiative includes a strategy, and being simple people in the Executive
Branch, we call it the strategy of the three Ds.
The first D is democracy,
by which we mean not just support for political institutions, but support
for administration of justice, human rights, municipal governments, anti-corruption
and education.
The second D is
development and in that category we very definitely include trade issues.
The President has made very clear that the Andean Trade Preference Act
extension as well as a free trade agreement for the Americas are integral
parts of the Andean Regional Initiative.
The third D is drugs
and the fact that we recognize that while our policy and our initiative
must be comprehensive, part of it and, in fact, an essential part of it,
must be a vigorous and aggressive counter-narcotics effort.
The President submitted
his budget to the Congress, Mr. Chairman, in May. It included an $882
million request for the Andean Regional Initiative. That was to cover
seven countries, not one. Those seven were the five countries of the Andean
region, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, in addition to
some programs to support spill-over type issues and concerns in Brazil
and Panama.
Page 48
The proposal, Mr. Chairman, is, in our judgment, regional in nature. It
is roughly 45 percent to go to Colombia, roughly 55 percent for the rest
of the region. We believe it is balanced in that, unlike last year, roughly
50 percent of this proposal is to support security and law enforcement
efforts and 50 percent would support social and economic development and
institutional reform.
Mr. Chairman, we
believe that the President's initiative has been well consulted in advance
by other governments and countries. We believe it is widely supported
as a proposal in the region, particularly among the seven governments
involved. We believe that it addresses the core problems that we have
identified over the last 2 years as affecting the Andean region and through
the Andean region the United States of America. We believe that the initiative
and the programs that it would fund are very much in the U.S. interests
and we hope that it will find support in the United States Congress.
That is a brief
overview, Mr. Chairman, and if you will permit us, could I perhaps suggest
Mr. Mack would offer a bit on the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative.
Mr. BALLENGER. If
I may, let me go ahead and do it formally. I have a written introduction
here, this has been such a screwed up operation anyhow, let us do it right
from here on out.
Let me now welcome
the testimony from Mr. James F. Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department
of State, followed by Mr. Michael Deal, Deputy Assistant Administrator
of the Bureau for Latin America and Caribbean, United States Agency for
International Development.
Page 49
And, so, Mr. Mack, if you will, fire away.
STATEMENT OF JAMES
F. MACK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. MACK. Good afternoon,
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee. I would request that my full
statement be included for the record.
Mr. BALLENGER. Without
objection.
Mr. MACK. I am pleased
to be here to discuss with you the status of U.S. Government support for
Plan Colombia and to describe to you the Department's Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs component of the Andean Regional
Initiative.
The Department is
moving very quickly to implement the U.S. Government's support for Plan
Colombia. In less than 1 year, the Department has committed approximately
75 percent of the $1 billion, 2-year Plan Colombia supplemental. And by
committed, we mean that we have contracted for equipment or services,
we have signed reimbursable agreements with our agencies, or with bureaus
within the Department of State or that we have contributed to the United
Nations Drug Control Program. Taken together, these commitments total
approximately $750 million of the supplemental as passed in year 2000.
Page 50
Delivery of helicopters
and aerial spray aircraft is proceeding smoothly and is generally adhering
to anticipated schedules. Some deliveries have even been accelerated from
their original estimated timed deliveries.
We have intensified
our support for the Colombian government's aerial spray operations and
alternative development programs, which my USAID colleague will describe
in detail in a few moments. Both are proceeding well.
Looking toward the
future, INL submitted in our fiscal year 2002 budget request $731 million
for a proposed Andean Counter-Drug Initiative. I wish to talk about that
a little bit. The Andean Counter-Drug Initiative is the largest component
of the Andean Regional Initiative. That is to say it is $731 million of
the $882 million Andean Regional Initiative.
This initiative
addresses holistically through assistance to social and economic development
as well as for counter-narcotics and security efforts, the narcotics scourge
throughout the Andean region, and we are hopeful that this macro approach
will eliminate the balloon effect which we observe when programs are developed
country by country.
The Andean region
does represent a significant challenge but also an opportunity for U.S.
foreign policy for the next few years. Important U.S. national interests
are at stake. Democracy is under pressure in all the countries of the
Andes. Economic development is slow and progress toward liberalization
is inconsistent.
The Andes produce
virtually all the world's cocaine and an increasing amount of heroin used
in the United States, thus representing a direct threat to our public
health and our national security. All of these problems are interrelated
and none of the region's problems can be addressed in isolation.
Page 51
Our goals in the Andes are three: first, to promote and support democracy
and democratic institutions; second, to foster sustainable economic development
and trade liberalization; and, third, to significantly reduce at the source
the supply of illegal drugs that are coming to the United States.
No nation in the
region is free of trafficking or the attendant ills of other crime forms
and corruption. To combat these ills, we propose a regional versus a Colombia-centric
policy and a comprehensive and integrated package that brings together
democracy and development as well as drug initiatives.
For this reason,
we plan to allocate almost one-half of the requested $731 million proposal
for this initiative, the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative, to countries
other than Colombia. In doing so, we intend to build on the successful
efforts and tremendous progress we have made in counter-narcotics in countries
such as Peru and Bolivia, while preventing further expansion of the drug
trafficking problem into other countries of the region such as Brazil,
Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador.
In addition to ensuring
regional balance, the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative, which I said before
is part of the Andean Regional Initiative, also spans all three of our
stated goals: counter-narcotics, economic development and support for
democratic institutions. The full proposed Andean Regional Initiative
budget of $882 million breaks into approximately a 50/50 split between
counter-narcotics on the one hand and alternative development and institution
building programs on the other.
Page 52
Its Andean Counter-Drug
Initiative component, the $731 million I referred to, breaks into 60/40
counter-narcotics versus development/democracy split. The sum of $293
million of the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative will be devoted to programs
focused on alternative development and support for democratic institutions.
All of Colombia's
neighbors, Mr. Chairman, are worried about the possibility of spill over,
specifically that the pressure applied by the government of Colombia in
southern Colombia will result in a number of problems: the flight of refugees,
guerrillas and paramilitaries or narcotics traffickers across porous borders
into other countries.
Since we believe
that Plan Colombia will result in major disruption of the cocaine industry
in Colombia, the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative approach, its regional
approach, becomes even more of an imperative. Traffickers will undoubtedly
attempt to relocate as their operations in southern Colombia are disrupted.
We believe they
will first try to migrate to other areas in Colombia itself and then,
failing that, try to turn to traditional growing areas in Peru and Bolivia,
but if those options are forestalled, they may well seek to move more
cultivation processing or trafficking routes into other countries such
as Ecuador, bordering Brazil and Venezuela.
The nations of the
region are heavily committed in all three of the major areas of concern,
democratization, economic development and counter-narcotics. All those
countries devote significant percentages of their annual budgets to these
areas and are willing to work with us in the design and in the implementation
and integration of successful programs.
Page 53
Programs to provide
humanitarian relief for displaced persons, to help small farmers and low
level coca workers find legitimate alternatives to the drug trade, and
to strengthen governance, the rule of law and human rights will all be
incorporated into the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative.
Finally, I would
like to mention that the renewal, again, of the Andean Trade Preference
Act is perhaps the single largest short-term contribution to economic
growth and prosperity in the Andes. By renewing the act and expanding
its benefits, we can continue to provide economic alternatives to narcotics
trafficking in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.
I appreciate the
opportunity to speak with you today and I look forward to responding to
questions which the Members of the Committee may pose.
[The prepared statement
of Mr. Mack follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF JAMES F. MACK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Good morning, Mr.
Chairman, Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss
with you the status of Plan Colombia and to describe for you the Department
of State's programs envisioned under the Administration's proposed Andean
Regional Initiative, or ARI.
First, I'd like
to provide you background on the origin of the President's Initiative.
In July 2000, Congress approved a $1.3 billion supplemental appropriation
to carry out enhanced counternarcotics activities in the Andean region.
Of that amount, approximately $1 billion in Function 150 funding through
the State Department was the U.S. contribution to what has become known
as Plan Colombia, a comprehensive, integrated, Colombian action plan to
address Colombia's complex and interrelated problems. The initial two-year
phase of Plan Colombia focused on the southern part of the country. It
began with an intensive counternarcotics push into southern Colombia,
along with the expansion of programs aimed at social action and institutional
strengthening, and alternative development. Plan Colombia is now well
underway and showing good results. In addition to stemming the flow of
narcotics entering the U.S., our assistance is intended to support institutional
and judicial reform, as well as economic advancement, in one of this hemisphere's
oldest democracies.
Page 54
Members of Congress, the NGO community, and other interested observers
had previously expressed concerns regarding aspects of U.S. government
support to Plan Colombia. Those concerns focused particularly on three
areas: that we did not consult widely enough in putting together our support
package; that we focused too much on security and law enforcement, and
not enough on development and institutional reform; and that our assistance
was too heavily oriented toward Colombia as compared to the rest of the
region.
The Administration
has taken to heart those concerns in formulating the President's proposed
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). ARI is the product of extensive consultations
with the staffs of committees and Members of Congress, with the governments
of the region, and with other potential donor countries and international
financial institutions. ARI addresses the three issues that lie at the
heart of the challenges facing the region: democracy, development, and
drugs. ARI balances the need to address the continuing challenges in Colombia
with the competing priority of working with the rest of the region to
prevent a further spreading of Colombia's problems or backsliding in areas
where progress already has been made.
The President has
proposed $882 million in Function 150 programs as part for of the the
ARI. $731 million of the $882 million in ARI is for the Department's Bureau
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) funding
of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). The broader ARI also includesincludes
funding for relevant Economic Support Funds (ESF), Developmental Assistance
(DA), and Child Survival and Disease (CSD) programs, plus a small amount
of Foreign Military Financing (FMF). covers programs in Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and those areas and programs in Panama and
Brazil most affected by the region's problems and those where our assistance
can best make a difference The ARI covers programs in Boliv ia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and those areas and programs in Panama and
Brazil most affected by the region's problems and those where our assistance
can best make a difference. In addition to being more balanced geographically,
our budget will likewise be balanced programmatically. About 540 percent
of the ACRI budget will be devoted to programs focused on development
and support for democratic institutions. Integral to ARI as well are the
economic development and job creation afforded by expanded trade opportunities.
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) can help the entire region
through increased investment and job creation. More immediately, renewal
and enhancement of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) can provide
real alternatives to drug production and trafficking for farmers and workers
desperate for the means to support their families.
Page 55
Our support to Plan Colombia was the first step in responding to the crisis
underway in Colombia. The Andean Regional Initiative is the next stage
of a long-term effort to address the threat of narcotics and the underlying
causes of the narcotics industry and violence in Colombia, while assisting
Colombia's neighbors to ward off those same dangers in their own countries.
Their success is vital to our own national interests in promoting the
spread of strong democratic institutions, the enhancement of trade and
investment opportunities for U.S. businesses and workers, and the reduction
of narcotics production and trafficking that threaten our society.
My USAID colleague
will describe in detail the status of our alternative development projects.
However, I want to point out that alternative development is an integral
part of our plan for weeding out illicit coca and poppy cultivation in
the Andes. We have had large alternative development programs in Bolivia
and Peru for many years, and they have been quite successful, combining
with aggressive eradication and interdiction programs to produce significant
declines in the coca crops of those countries. Colombia is trying to replicate
that success in Plan Colombia, combining a substantially expanded alternative
development program with aerial eradication and interdiction activities
in southern Colombia, currently the largest concentration of coca cultivation
in the world.
I am pleased to
report that the Department is moving quickly to implement our support
to Plan Colombia. Below, I will discuss delivery of helicopters, aerial
spray aircraft, and other equipment, which is proceeding smoothly. I will
also describe our support for the Colombian government's aerial spraying
program.
Page 56
I'd then like to
discuss the proposal we have submitted in our FY 2002 budget request for
INL's $731 million Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), as part of the
larger $882 million ARI. This initiative addresses holistically-providing
assistance for social and economic development as well as for counternarcotics
and security efforts-the narcotics scourge throughout the Andean region.
We are hopeful that this macro-approach will eliminate the ''balloon effect''
which we observe when programs are developed country by country.
Finally, I will
note our support for the ATPA.
STATUS OF SPENDING
ON PLAN COLOMBIA
In less than one
year, the Department has ''committed'' approximately 75 percent of the
$1.018 billion two-year Plan Colombia Supplemental. By ''committed,''
we mean that we have contracted for equipment or services, signed reimbursable
agreements with other agencies or bureaus within the Department, and contributed
to the UN. Taken together, these ''commitments'' total more than $760
million of the Supplemental.
The Administration
is finalizing the Congressionally-mandated bi-annual report on the Supplemental.
STATUS OF EQUIPMENT
DELIVERIES
Turning now to our
equipment deliveries, I can say that they have proceeded smoothly, generally
adhering to the anticipated schedules. Some have even been accelerated
from their original estimates. As of June 22, 2001, the status of UH-60,
UH-1N, Huey-II and spray planes is as follows:
Page 57
COLAR and CNP Black Hawks: A contract was signed with Sikorsky on December
15th for fourteen Black Hawks for the Colombian Army (COLAR) and two helicopters
for the Colombian National Police (CNP). Specifications for the aircraft
configuration were based on SOUTHCOM recommendations with input from respective
Colombian organizations. Arrangements are being made for next month's
delivery of the two CNP aircraft and the first COLAR aircraft. Remaining
deliveries will be made in increments through December of this year. The
contract includes one year of contractor logistics support (CLS). We expect
to extend this contract pending availability of FY 2002 funding.
COLAR UH-1Ns: The
UH-1Ns supplied to Colombia earlier continue to provide air mobility support
to the troops of the Counterdrug Brigade.
CNP Huey-IIs: INL
and the CNP agreed to use the $20.6 million CNP Huey-II and $5 million
CNP aircraft upgrade budget lines from the Supplemental to modify nine
additional aircraft to desired specifications and retrofit twenty-two
of the earlier produced Huey-IIs to include additional options, such as
floor armor and passive infrared (IR) countermeasures. A delivery order
has been issued for four modifications to be accomplished by U.S. Helicopter
(completion expected approximately August/September), and the other five
modifications will be done by CNP in-country with kits furnished by INL.
(Note: Twenty-Five Huey-II helicopters have been delivered to the CNP
from previous FY 1998 and FY 1999 funding).
COLAR Huey-IIs:
SOUTHCOM presented their recommendations on the configuration of the COLAR
Huey-IIs on February 22nd. An interagency team then selected a configuration
that includes a passive IR engine exhaust system, floor armor, M60D door
guns, secure radios, and a radar altimeter, along with other standard
equipment. We estimate that twenty-five Huey-IIs modified to this standard,
along with individual crew equipment (NVGs, survival vests, helmets, etc.)
and some spares will be possible within the $60 million line item of the
Supplemental Appropriation. We have established a contract delivery order
for the accomplishment of the initial 20 modifications, with options for
additional aircraft. Work is in progress on these aircraft and we believe
that aircraft deliveries to Colombia can begin by approximately January
2002.
Page 58
Additional OV-10D Spray Planes: Three aircraft are currently undergoing
refurbishment/modification at Patrick Air Force Base and are expected
to be completed in August of this year.
Additional Ayres
Turbo-Thrush Spray Planes: A contract is in place for nine additional
agricultural spray planes. The first aircraft should be delivered in August,
with the balance phased in through February 2002.
AERIAL SPRAYING
Plan Colombia-related
aerial spray operations began on December 19, 2000 in the southern department
of Caqueta and moved into neighboring Putumayo on December 22. Operations
later shifted to the northern and eastern parts of the country.
Some allege that
the glyphosate used in the spray program results in health side-effects
to exposed populations. First, let me stress that glyphosate is one of
the least harmful herbicides available on the world market. Glyphosate
has been the subject of an exhaustive body of scientific literature which
has shown that it is not a health risk to humans, and is extremely environment-friendly.
It is used throughout the United States and over 100 other countries and
has been rigorously tested for safety for animals and humans. Nonetheless,
we feel compelled to probe assertions that it is making people sick. At
the request of Congress, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, with assistance from
our regional EPA representative in Embassy Lima, is sponsoring two studies
on the issue. The first dealt with the individuals who reported reactions
to the spraying. The final report is not yet complete but the physicians
who reviewed those cases found them to be inconsistent with glyphosate
exposure. In fact, many of the cases were reported prior to any exposure
from the spray program. The second study is getting underway and will
compare populations before and after their areas are sprayed to see if
any differences could be attributable to spraying. The Center for Disease
Control is assisting in designing an appropriate sampling methodology
for this study.
Page 59
The timing of spray operations in Putumayo was based on a number of factors.
Some were operational concerns, such as seasonal weather conditions. The
timing of operations was also meant to discourage the return of an itinerant
labor pool (coca leaf pickers or ''raspachines'') who generally spend
the December holidays at their homes in other parts of the country. Importantly,
the timing also corresponded with efforts to recruit communities to enroll
in development programs. While the intent of the Colombian government
to conduct eradication in southern Colombia was well publicized, coca
growing communities in the region initially showed little interest in
participating in development programs, preferring instead to continue
their illicit activity. Only after those initial spray efforts in Putumayo,
which demonstrated the government of Colombia's resolve to address the
growing problem of coca cultivation in the region, did these communities
express real interest in abandoning their illegal activities in exchange
for assistance. Funding was already in place for these programs at the
time spray operations began and, as each community signed up for the program,
the process began to tailor community-specific assistance packages.
Many safeguards
are built into the selection of spray targets and further improvements
are constantly bein g made to the system. And while the Department of
State does not select the spray locations, (those decisions are made by
the government of Colombia), the Department, through the Narcotics Affairs
Section (NAS) of U.S. Embassy Bogota, does consult on the selection and
supports the Colombian National Police (CNP) efforts.
According to Colombian
law, an Inter-Institutional Technical Committee (ITC) of Colombian government
officials determines what areas of the country may or may not be sprayed.
The CNP generates quarterly estimates of the illicit coca crop by flying
over coca growing regions on at least a quarterly basis to search for
new growth and to generate an estimate of the illicit coca crop. This
information is reviewed for accuracy by technical/environmental auditors
and is passed on to the ITC. The Directorate of Dangerous Drugs (DNE)
chairs the ITC, which includes representatives from the Anti-Narcotics
Police, Ministry of the Environment, the National Institute of Health,
the National Institute of Agriculture, the National Plan for Alternative
Development (PLANTE), regional environmental agencies, and technical/environmental
auditors. The CNP notifies the NAS Aviation Office of all decisions as
to which areas may not be sprayed. Spray operations are then coordinated
and conducted in approved areas only.
Page 60
Generally, reconnaissance flights are conducted over areas identified
by the CNP in their quarterly coca crop estimates. With the use of SATLOC,
an aircraft-mounted global positioning system, these flights identify
the precise geographical coordinates where coca is being grown. Areas
with large concentrations of coca are then plotted, and a computer program
sets up precise flight lines, calibrated for the width of the spray swath
of the spray plane to be used. Once the government of Colombia has approved
spraying in a given area, spray pilots then fly down those prescribed
flight lines and spray the coca located there.
Also, every effort
is made to protect legitimate farming operations from possible damage
from the aerial spray program. The spray aircraft apply glyphosate at
low altitude against predetermined fields, identified by earlier reconnaissance.
The planes carry computerized GPS monitoring equipment that records their
position and the use of the spray equipment. This system serves to verify
that glyphosate is being accurately applied to intended areas. After spraying,
combined U.S.-Colombian teams also visit randomly chosen fields, security
permitting, to verify that the treated plants were indeed coca. To further
aid in the identification of fields not subject to aerial eradication,
the government of Colombia is currently working to produce a comprehensive
digitized map indicating exempted areas.
Furthermore, the
government of Colombia maintains a system to compensate farmers for damages
caused by the program. Over the past few months, we have encouraged the
Colombian government to streamline the process and efforts have begun
to better educate the public about that option.
Recent field visits
encountered evidence that coca growers in southern Colombia are using
dangerous chemicals, such as paraquat. That is a concern to us as it presents
a very real risk to the people of the region. The traffickers' utter disregard
for human health and environmental security that pervades the illegal
drug industry goes beyond the obvious examples of poisoning millions of
drug consumers with their illegal products. It includes the clear cutting
of rain forest; the contamination of soil and watersheds with acids and
chemical salts; and the exposure of their workers and themselves to potentially
deadly chemicals-all in the name of profit.
Page 61
For example, the expansion of coca cultivation, production, and trafficking
in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia has resulted in the destruction of, at an
absolute minimum, 2.4 million hectares of the fragile tropical forest
in the Andean region over the last 20 years. In addition, the very act
of refining raw coca leaves into finished cocaine creates significant
environmental damage because of the irresponsible disposal of large amounts
of toxic chemicals used in the process. A study conducted by the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1993 of cocaine production in
the Chapare region of Bolivia showed that production of one kilo of cocaine
base required the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric acid, ten
kilos of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of potassium permanganate,
and one liter of concentrated ammonia. Processors discard these poisonous
waste products indiscriminately, often dumping them into the nearest waterway,
where the extent of damage is greatly increased. They also may dump these
chemicals on the ground, where as point sources, they may infiltrate through
the soil to groundwater. A report from the National Agrarian University
in Lima Peru estimated that as much as 600 million liters of so-called
precursor chemicals are used annually in South America for cocaine production.
This translates to more than two metric tons of chemical waste generated
for each hectare of coca processed to produce cocaine.
These environmental
concerns are another reason why we must continue in our efforts to help
the governments of the Andean region in their ongoing struggle against
the narcotics industry.
INL'S PROPOSED ANDEAN
COUNTERDRUG INITIATIVE (ACI)
The Andean region
represents a significant challenge and opportunity for U.S. foreign policy
in the next few years. Important U.S. national interests are at stake.
Democracy is under pressure in all of the countries of the Andes. Economic
development is slow and progress towards liberalization is inconsistent.
The Andes produces virtually all of the world's cocaine, and an increasing
amount of heroin; thus representing a direct threat to our public health
and national security. All of these problems are inter-related. Sluggish
economies produce political unrest that threatens democracy and provides
ready manpower for narcotics traffickers and illegal armed groups. Weak
democratic institutions, corruption and political instability discourage
investment, contribute to slow economic growth and provide fertile ground
for drug traffickers and other outlaw groups to flourish. The drug trade
has a corrupting influence that undermines democratic institutions, fuels
illegal armed groups and distorts the economy, discouraging legitimate
investment. None of the region's problems can be addressed in isolation.
Page 62
Of the $882 million Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) request, $731 million
is for INL's Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). Our goals in the Andes
are to:
Promote and support
democracy and democratic institutions
Foster sustainable
economic development and trade liberalization
Significantly reduce
the supply of illegal drugs to the U.S. at the source
Just as Plan Colombia
represented an improved approach by considering drug trafficking as part
of Colombia's larger crisis, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative benefits
from its appreciation of the illegal drug industry as part of something
bigger. Drug trafficking is a problem that does not respect national borders
and that both feeds and feeds upon the other social and economic difficulties
with which the Andean region is struggling.
No nation in the
region is free of trafficking or the attendant ills of other crime forms
and corruption. To combat these ills, we propose a regional versus Colombia-centric
policy and a comprehensive and integrated package that brings together
democracy and development as well as drug initiatives.
For this reason,
we plan to allocate almost one-half of the requested $731 million for
this initiative to countries other than Colombia. In so doing, we intend
to bolster the successful efforts and tremendous progress we have made
in counternarcotics in countries such as Peru and Bolivia, while preventing
the further expansion of the drug trafficking problem into other countries
of the region, such as Brazil, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador.
Page 63
In addition to ensuring regional balance, the ACI also spans all three
of our stated goals-counternarcotics, economic development, and support
for democratic institutions. The full ARI budget of $882 million breaks
into an approximately 50/50 split between counternarcotics and alternative
development/institution-building programs. Its ACI component ($731 million)
breaks into a 60/40 (counternarcotics vs. development/democracy) split.
$300293 million of the ACI budget will be devoted to programs focused
on alternative development and support for democratic institutions.
All of Colombia's
neighbors are worried about the possibility of ''spillover,'' specifically
that the pressure applied by the government of Colombia (GOC) in southern
Colombia will result in the flight of refugees, guerrillas, paramilitaries
and/or narcotics traffickers across porous borders into other countries.
We will work with the countries of the region to strengthen their capacity
to cope with potential outflows. In Peru and Bolivia, we will work with
those governments to continue their reductions in coca through a combination
of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development. In all countries,
we will work to strengthen democracy and local institutions in order to
attack trafficking networks which move precursors, money, fraudulent documents
and people.
Since we believe
Plan Colombia will result in major disruption of the cocaine industry,
ACI's regional approach becomes even more of an imperative. Traffickers
will undoubtedly try to relocate as their operations in southern Colombia
are disrupted. We believe they will first try to migrate to other areas
inside Colombia, then try to return to traditional growing areas in Peru
and Bolivia. But if those options are forestalled, they may well seek
to move more cultivation, processing and/or trafficking routes into other
countries such as Ecuador, Brazil, or Venezuela.
Page 64
The nations of the region are already heavily committed in all three of
the major areas of concern: democratization, economic development and
counternarcotics. All devote significant percentages of their annual budgets
to these areas, and are willing to work with us in the design and integration
of successful programs. Exact figures are impossible to come by, but the
nations of the region in total are committing billions of dollars to economic
development, democratization and counternarcotics efforts. For example,
Ecuador has established a Northern Border Initiative to promote better
security and development in the region bordering Colombia. Brazil has
launched Operation Cobra, a law enforcement effort concentrated in the
Dog's Head region bordering Colombia. Bolivia has been attacking drug
production through its Dignity Plan and is developing a comprehensive
poverty reduction strategy. Colombia continues to pursue its commitments
under Plan Colombia. Panama has taken concrete steps to improve security
and development in the Darien region. The new Peruvian government has
made reform of democratic institutions a national priority, and continues
to pursue aggressively the counternarcotics missions. In Venezuela, local
authorities have cooperated admirably on drug interdiction, exemplified
by last year's record multi-ton seizure during Operation Orinoco.
Programs to provide
humanitarian relief for displaced persons, to help small farmers and low-level
coca workers find legitimate alternatives to the drug trade, and to strengthen
governance, the rule of law, and human rights will also be incorporated
into the ACI.
ATPA RENEWAL
Renewal of the Andean
Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) is perhaps the single largest short-term
contribution to economic growth and prosperity in the Andes. By renewing
the Act and expanding its benefits, we can continue to provide economic
alternatives to narcotics trafficking in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.
The Act has already succeeded in doing so without adverse economic impact
for the U.S. The original justification for the legislation still stands,
but it expires at the end of the year, and should clearly be renewed at
the earliest possible date. ATPA renewal would serve to strengthen the
credibility of democratically-elected governments in the region and provide
them with a clear demonstration of the benefits of continuing to cooperate
on counternarcotics. It would also halt a potentially crippling exodus
of U.S. industries that relocated to the region when ATPA was established.
Page 65
I appreciate the opportunity you have given me to speak to you today,
and I look forward to responding to questions which Members of the Committee
may have.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr.
Deal, go ahead.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL
DEAL, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN, USAID
Mr. DEAL. Mr. Chairman,
Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to briefly summarize
the U.S. Agency for International Development's role in the Andean Regional
Initiative and progress to date in implementing Plan Colombia. I request
that my prepared statement be included in the hearing record.
Mr. BALLENGER. Without
objection.
Mr. DEAL. USAID's
program directly supports a comprehensive, integrated approach to our
Andean counter-drug strategy by balancing the interdiction and eradication
efforts of other agencies with social and economic development assistance.
Our experience demonstrates that no single facet of our counter-drug program
can be successful without the other two also being effectively applied.
The Andean Regional
Initiative, like our support for Plan Colombia, maintains a belief that
the problems of drugs and violence will not be solved in any sustained
way unless the fundamental causes of these problems are also addressed.
Democratic institutions must become stronger, more responsive, more inclusive
and more transparent. The presence of government in rural areas must increase
and provide better services to the rural poor and give them a stake in
the future and improve the quality of life. The justice system must be
more accessible and efficient, must reduce impunity and the human rights
environment must improve.
Page 66
Unless the problem of widespread corruption is solved and legal employment
opportunities are created to absorb the high number of unemployed, these
fundamental causes and their effects on the region and on America's national
interests will be with us for a long time to come.
But addressing these
tough issues is going to take time. They will require a sustained commitment
and interest on the part of the U.S. Government. The Andean Regional Initiative
proposes that USAID manage $390 million in fiscal year 2002 funds. This
initiative expands many of our existing programs in response to the changing
circumstances in the region.
USAID assistance
will be directed in three main areas: first, strengthening democracy;
second, economic growth through trade enhancement and poverty reduction;
and third, alternative development.
In order to strengthen
democracy in the region, we propose to commit $59 million in fiscal year
2002. USAID will assist in court administration and training of judges,
institutionalizing the public defender system, and working with NGOs and
other interested groups to provide greater oversight and participation
in judicial reform.
We are helping human
rights groups increase their capacity to document abuses and monitor individual
cases. In Colombia, our activities are designed to help prevent killings
with the development of an early warning system. We also have programs
directly aimed at the protection of human rights workers and union leaders.
Page 67
We are and will
continue to strengthen local governments by training mayors and council
members. We are working to strengthen the ability to expose corrupt practices
and investigate and prosecute corrupt officials and, very importantly,
make citizens realize they have the right to demand accountability from
their governments.
The second major
area of emphasis for USAID assistance will be economic growth, trade enhancement
and poverty reduction, for which we propose $123 million. All of the economies
in the region have struggled over the last few years and continue to be
vulnerable to setbacks.
USAID assistance
will directly support the poverty reduction strategies, including macroeconomic
policy and banking reform, employment generation activities, support for
micro enterprise and trade capacity development.
We will also continue
health programs in Peru and Bolivia and we will pay specific attention
to education, including an Andean regional Center for Excellence for teacher
training as announced by the President in Quebec at the Summit of the
Americas.
Protection of their
natural resources and helping rehabilitate environmental damage from coca
cultivation will also receive attention.
Our third and largest
area of attention is expanding our work in alternative development for
which we are proposing $207 million. After a decade of work in Bolivia
and Peru, we know that alternative development works. In Colombia, we
are seeing that the risk of illegal coca production is credible, as evidenced
by the fact that over 24,000 farmers have lined up to sign coca crop eradication
agreements in just the last 3 months.
Page 68
In Peru and Bolivia, we are concentrating on sustaining the dramatic advances
made in these countries in coca eradication. We want to help these governments
and these farmers withstand the temptation to slide back under the shadow
of narcotics production. In Ecuador, USAID will expand two key initiatives
along the northern border with Colombia.
Let me conclude
by saying that the Andean Regional Initiative should be viewed as the
national program in each of the affected countries, responding to their
priorities and problems. They are the ones that are going to have to make
this work. Our role is one of facilitating the process and we will be
working along with them over the next several years in this effort.
Thank you for giving
me this opportunity to outline our programs, and I would be pleased to
respond to any of your questions.
[The prepared statement
of Mr. Deal follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF MICHAEL DEAL, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, USAID
Mr. Chairman, Members
of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to speak about the U.S. Agency
for International Development's (USAID) role in the Administration's proposed
Andean Regional Initiative and progress to date in implementing Plan Colombia.
USAID's program
directly supports a comprehensive, integrated approach to our Andean counter
drug strategy by balancing the interdiction and eradication efforts of
other agencies with social and economic development assistance. Our experience
demonstrates that no single facet of our counter drug program can be successful
without the other two also being effectively applied.
Page 69
The Andean Region faces a wide range of challenges. There are growing
doubts among significant numbers of the region's populations whether democratic
government can deliver essential services and a better life. Sluggish
economies produce political unrest that threatens democracy and, in turn,
weak democratic institutions; corruption and political instability discourages
investment, and contributes to slow economic growth. This vicious cycle
provides fertile ground for drug traffickers and other illegal groups
to flourish, and forces large segments of the population to rely on crime,
insurgency and the drug economy to survive.
The Andean Regional
Initiative, like our support for Plan Colombia, maintains a belief that
the problems of drugs and violence in the Andean region will not be solved
in any sustained way unless the fundamental causes of these problems are
also addressed. Democratic institutions in the region must become stronger,
more responsive, more inclusive and more transparent. The presence of
governments (both national and local) in rural areas must increase and
provide better services to the rural poor, and give them a stake in the
future, and improve the quality of life. The justice system must be more
accessible and efficient, must reduce impunity, and the human rights environment
must improve. Unless the problem of widespread corruption is solved, and
legal employment opportunities are created to absorb the high number of
unemployed, these fundamental causes and their effects on the region and
on America's national interests will be with us for a long time to come.
Helping address
these tough social and economic issues is going to take time. They will
require a sustained commitment and interest on the part of the U.S. Government.
The Andean Regional Initiative, which builds upon the FY 2000 supplemental
funding for Plan Colombia, proposes that USAID manage $390 million in
FY 2002 funds. This initiative expands many of our existing programs in
response to the changing circumstances in the region. USAID assistance
will be directed in three main areas: first, strengthening democracy;
second, economic growth through trade enhancement and poverty reduction;
and third, alternative development.
Page 70
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY
In order to strengthen
democracy in the region, we propose to commit $59.3 million in FY 2002.
This assistance will help address the problems of fledgling institutions,
political instability and corruption which lessen popular support for
democracy at a time when most economies are under-performing.
USAID will assist
in improving the administration of justice by helping to make justice
systems work, make them more modern and efficient, more transparent, and
more accessible. An independent and vigorous judicial system is vital
to the observance of human rights, the defeat of narcotics trafficking,
and the decrease of white collar and street crime. Working with the U.S.
Department of Justice in Colombia, for example, we are helping move from
an inquisitorial to a more open, accusatorial judicial process. We are
strengthening court administration and training of judges, institutionalizing
the public defender system, and working with NGOs and other interested
groups to provide greater oversight and participation in judicial reform.
Part of that program provides access to justice for the poor through one
stop legal offices called ''Casas de Justicia'' (Houses of Justice), in
the poorer neighborhoods of major cities. We are doing this now in Colombia
and Peru with very good results. In Colombia, 18 ''Casas de Justicia''
have been established thus far, each hearing 150 cases per day and using
alternative dispute resolution techniques to resolve problems.
We also have a program
that is designed to help improve the observance of human rights which
will continue. We are strengthening human rights institutions and groups,
increasing their capacity to document human rights abuses and monitor
individual cases. In Colombia, our activities are designed to help prevent
killings with the development of an early warning system that works with
the human rights ombudsman and channels information up the line to law
enforcement and the military. We also have programs directly aimed at
the protection of human rights workers and union leaders. In Peru, we
will continue to promote increased observance of human rights through
informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, with support to legal
clinics and conciliation centers, which provided assistance for 145,000
cases in 2000.
Page 71
We are and will continue to strengthen local governments in rural areas
of Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Panama where the lack of basic
institutional and social services has marginalized rural populations.
Where the state is present, it is in the form of an overly centralized,
unresponsive bureaucracy that does not necessarily work or understand
the local interests of a community. Thus, we are training mayors and council
members in identifying and monitoring projects, setting priorities, and
handling financial resources in a more accountable, transparent way. It
is a very important part of bringing democracy to rural areas. And it
is an indispensable part of any program where local empowerment and ownership
of national goals-such as the war against drug cultivation-will be required
to assure the continued enforcement of agreed upon eradication agreements.
With USAID assistance
and through policy dialogue, the decentralization process in Bolivia helps
targeted municipal governments to develop and carry out action plans in
a participatory fashion, engaging civil society at the local and regional
level in the process. As a result, citizen participation in government
has increased, and municipalities have organized themselves into a nationwide
Federation, with departmental associations and an association of women
council members.
Corruption is another
very serious problem. The ongoing corruption scandal from the Fujimori
era in Peru has shaken public confidence in the government institutions
of the country. We will work closely with the incoming administration
to strengthen democratic institutions and promote good government. Similar
problems are being encountered throughout the region, where we are working
to strengthen the ability to expose corrupt practices and investigate
and prosecute corrupt officials and very importantly, make citizens realize
they have the right to demand accountability from their governments.
Page 72
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The second major
area of emphasis for USAID assistance will be economic growth, trade enhancement
and poverty reduction, for which we propose $123 million in FY 2002 funding.
All of the economies in the region have struggled over the last few years,
and continue to be vulnerable to setbacks. Each of the Andean countries
has a large divide between a small wealthy elite and a large impoverished
class, frequently indigenous in origin. Some lack the mix of policies
necessary to promote growth. Others have constructive policies, but lack
the popular support necessary to sustain them over the long run.
USAID assistance
will directly support the poverty reduction strategies of Ecuador and
Bolivia, and will also address macroeconomic policy and banking reform
in Ecuador. After an intense economic crisis in 1999, recent increases
in oil prices have helped Ecuador's economy and contributed to a successful
dollarization that has restored confidence in the economy. However, important
and necessary structural reforms are still pending, particularly in the
banking sector, for a sustainable recovery. In both countries, our assistance
will promote employment generation and access to private lending capital
through support to microenterprise.
Support for trade
capacity development will be strengthened to help these countries develop
WTO consistent trade regimes. The Administration has endorsed an extension
of the Andean Trade Preference Act and a desire to move aggressively toward
creation of a Free Trade Area for the Americas by January 2005. USAID
Administrator Natsios has consulted with Trade Representative Zoellick
as to how we can advance these trade liberalization measures. Early in
June, my staff presented a range of options for promoting free trade to
our Andean country Mission Directors. We look forward to helping our cooperating
governments analyze their existing trade regimes and prepare themselves
for discussion of competition policy and other issues. We will also assist
cooperating governments in bringing civil society into the process to
ensure, not only that there are economic and social development benefits
from globalization, but that there is also a broader understanding of
those benefits.
Page 73
We will also continue health programs in Peru and Bolivia, and we will
pay specific attention to education, including an Andean regional Center
for Excellence for teacher training as announced by the President in Quebec
at the Summit of the Americas.
Protection of their
natural resources, preserving their unique ecological diversity, and helping
rehabilitate environmental damage from the use of harsh and persistent
chemicals for producing illicit drugs will also receive attention. Cultivation
of illicit crops has a devastating effect on the environment, both in
the high mountains where poppy is grown and in the lower altitudes where
coca is produced. In both cases, delicate forests are cleared and their
fragile soils degraded by the illegal crop. Even after the coca or poppy
is eliminated, the land remains exposed and environmentally sound production
systems must be adopted for sustainable conversion to pasture or agriculture.
As part of our commitment to the Amazon, we have encouraged the Government
of Colombia's decision to support sound livestock production systems within
alternative development areas. Our Parks in Peril program extends from
Mexico through Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, providing practical
assistance in protected area management. Also, we continue to manage local
funds created under the America's Fund and the Tropical Forestry Conservation
Act that underwrite the programs of local environmental NGOs.
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Our third and largest
area of attention is expanding our work in alternative development for
which we are proposing $207.5 million for FY 2002. We know that alternative
development works. After a decade of work in Bolivia and in Peru, we have
seen conclusively that a three-pronged strategy of eradication, interdiction,
and alternative development has dramatically reduced coca cultivation
in both of those countries. There is nothing as economically profitable
as coca. The incentive to get out of coca on a voluntary basis is not
economic. Rather, it is the threat of involuntary eradication or interdiction
because drug production is illegal. There has to be a credible threat
and a risk of continuing to stay in coca in order for our alternative
development approach to work.
Page 74
In Colombia, we are seeing that the risk of illegal coca production is
credible, as evidenced by the fact that over 24,000 farmers have lined
up to sign coca crop eradication agreements in just the last two months.
But this is not the only ingredient. Once eradicated, production has to
cease. It cannot be allowed to grow back and farmers cannot move down
the road to replant the same crop. To make elimination sustainable, farmers
have to have credible alternatives and local governments and organizations
have to apply pressure and provide incentives for the entire community
to stay out of illicit production.
Our alternative
development approach is basically the same in all of the Andean countries.
Groups of small farmers, communities, or farmer associations sign agreements
with the government, agreeing to voluntarily reduce their coca crop in
exchange for a package of benefits both at the farmer level and at the
community level. At the farmer level, the benefits help get them involved
in legal income-producing alternatives, and at the community level, the
Government agrees to provide basic infrastructure such as schools, health
clinics, public water systems, and rural roads.
Last year USAID
set a target in Colombia for voluntary eradication of 30,000 hectares
of coca and 3,000 hectares of opium poppy within five years. We have started
in the Department of Putumayo, which presents a particularly challenging
situation. Compared to the coca areas in Peru and Bolivia, the climate
is harsher, the soils are poorer, the access to markets is more difficult,
the infrastructure is not as good, and of course the security situation
presents an additional complication for legitimate agricultural activity.
Despite these challenges, the turnout of farmers who are voluntarily agreeing
to sign these pacts and eradicate coca has been quite promising. Our pre-Plan
Colombia heroin poppy eradication program has already eliminated 675 hectares
of poppy and produced 600 hectares of productive, licit crops benefiting
770 families in the highlands of Tolima, Huila and Cauca.
Page 75
In Peru, where coca production has dropped from a high of 129,000 hectares
to just over 38,000, we will concentrate our efforts in the Huallaga valley.
Here we intend to put into practice our beliefs that local ownership of
the coca eradication goals and local empowerment to make decisions regarding
the economic and social life of the region will create the environment
to deter a minority from going into, or back into, coca production. In
coca producing valleys, more than 27,000 hectares of crops such as coffee,
cacao, palm heart and pineapple have generated around 10,000 full time
jobs. Niche industries and global link-ups with international groups have
been promoted in the chocolate and specialty coffee areas.
In Bolivia, coca
cultivation in the once notorious region of the Chapare has all but been
eliminated. Where once over 44,000 hectares of coca grew, there are now
over 114,000 hectares of licit crops and pastureland. Last year alone
the value of licit crops in this region exceeded $49 million. Our agricultural
programs have enabled Bolivian products such as bananas, canned palm hearts
and dried fruit to enter the highest quality markets, such as Germany,
Switzerland and Chile. Last year, Chapare exports represented $5.7 million,
an increase of 68 percent over the previous year. We intend to consolidate
these successes by providing agricultural services used for coca growers
to other farmers who have not yet benefited from the program but who are
susceptible to offers from drug networks.
In Ecuador, USAID
will continue two key border initiatives begun with Plan Colombia supplemental
funding and expand the northern initiative along the Colombian border.
Support will be provided to community organizations working on land-titling,
social and infrastructure services, income earning activities, integrated
farming activities for indigenous populations, irrigation, potable water
and sanitation projects. Recognizing that support for local initiatives
and institutions can help extend the presence of the state and its accountability
to citizens, we will introduce activities to strengthen the capacity of
local governments both on the southern border, as well as throughout the
country.
Page 76
Since beginning work in January, Plan Colombia has already began implementation
of 23 projects valued at $5.0 million and benefiting 117,000 people. They
include potable water systems, sewers, bridges, roads, land titling, income
generation, and human rights. We have special programs with indigenous
communities in Carchi province and an innovative approach to assisting
the 24,000 Afro-Ecuadorans who live in northwestern Esmereldas province.
STATUS OF PLAN COLOMBIA
IMPLEMENTATION
Mr. Chairman and
Members of the Subcommittee: I would also like to take a moment to review,
specifically, some of our progress in Colombia. While the task is complex,
and even dangerous, and requires extraordinary coordination among many
actors, we are pleased with our start-up activities and the progress we
have made to date.
Because of our close
collaboration with international organizations and NGOs prior to receiving
Plan Colombia funds, we were able to sign over $22 million of our displaced
person monies almost immediately upon receiving the funds. By renegotiating
certain contracts funded prior to Plan Colombia, we were able to ''jump
start'' the important southern Colombia elements of the program. Because
of the size of other aspects of the program and the interest of the U.S.
private sector, it took several months to compete and sign our initial
contracts. However, all of our funds were obligated with the government
by September of 2000, all commitments to contractors and subcontractors
for reintegrating and resettling internally displaced persons have been
made, and to date, all contractors have mobilized in the field. These
efforts have resulted in tangible successes on the ground
Page 77
I have already mentioned
our successes in heroin poppy eradication. In the Plan Colombia phase
of our program, I can report that, as of June 11th of this year, 26 of
the 31 coca elimination pacts have been signed. Those pacts are pledges
to the Colombian Government by small farm families to eradicate coca in
exchange for short and long term assistance in substitute production,
and these 26 pacts represent promises to eradicate over 29,000 hectares
of illicit coca crops by the end of next year.
Supporting the program
has been our local governance strengthening effort in southern Colombia.
Memos of Understanding have been signed between USAID and the 13 municipal
mayors of Putamayo. These memoranda outline the specific activities that
USAID will undertake in each municipality over the next year. To date,
social infrastructure fund activities have engaged scores of small farmers
in their villages in Southern Colombia, providing many of them with the
first tangible evidence of government concern regarding their economic
and social development.
In democracy strengthening,
6 of 12 planned pilot courtrooms have been established to demonstrate
the efficiency and fairness of oral trials in helping to move Colombia
from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial judicial system. USAID has supported
institutional development of the national Judicial School, which has trained
3,400 judges in oral advocacy, legal evidence gathering, and courtroom
management procedures. USAID has also worked with NGOs and other civil
society actors to analyze remaining needed reforms, increase coalition
building and support full implementation of the modernization process
in the justice sector.
In our highly successful
effort to promote justice through alternative dispute resolution, 18 of
a targeted 40 casas de justicia or houses of justice have been established.
These ''casas'' are neighborhood judicial centers in underserved communities
which bring together a variety of services in one location, giving residents
''one stop'' access to legal services.
Page 78
Protection of human rights workers remains a major concern. In addition
to having selected a long term local contractor to help design and implement
a management information system for the Ministry of the Interior to monitor
abuses and progress, to date 197 individuals have received some sort of
protection from the program. We are pleased to say that 38 individuals
received needed relocation assistance within Colombia and two were relocated
internationally under the program.
We have also made
grants to seven human rights NGOs in Colombia totaling over $575,000 to
help improve delivery of human rights services.
Concerning our efforts
to respond to the needs of displaced persons, we can report that over
176,000 individuals have received or are receiving direct USAID assistance
in the areas of housing, employment generation, health-care or education.
This figure exceeds by about 70 percent our target of 100,000 individual
recipients by this time-which was considered to be very optimistic during
our planning of this vitally important activity.
USAID also supports
a $2.5 million program for Ex-Combatant Children which strengthens Colombian
initiatives in clarifying the legal status of these children, extend them
appropriate treatment and provides concrete and durable reintegration
solutions. In preparation for a large-scale release of child soldiers
by an illegal armed group, USAID is preparing a network of decentralized
organizations to respond to such a release, as well as to assist individual
cases where children must be rehabilitated after exposure to combat conditions.
The Program aims to benefit directly 800 ex-combatant children through
January 2003.
Page 79
It is important
to underscore the enormous commitment that the Colombians have shown in
the various efforts we are supporting. Our efforts are complemented by
$62 million that the Colombian Government has contributed this year through
the sale of government ''peace bonds'' and an additional ''peace tax''.
Major roads within Putamayo and connecting southern Colombia to national
and international markets are already underway, as are smaller social
and infrastructure projects, such as the Casas de Justicia, health clinics
and schools. There have been problems at times given the need for coordination
with the large number of agencies involved, and the Government of Colombia's
complex procurement procedures, but these were not unexpected and have
not been serious obstacles. When issues have surfaced, we have worked
with the Colombians to improve the process.
I should note the
special dedication of the people such as the Ombudsman's office representatives
in the field, who face serious risks to their own personal safety as well.
Their efforts are also supported by other members of the international
community. International donors other than the United States have already
pledged over $300 million to assist Colombia's effort, and the Colombians
with our support have been working hard to press other donors to turn
these pledges into real commitments and projects in the field.
Let me conclude
by saying that just as in Colombia, the Andean Regional Initiative should
be viewed as the national program in each of the affected countries, responding
to their priorities and problems. They are the ones that are going to
have to make this work. Our role is one of facilitating the process, and
we will be working along with them over the next several years in this
effort.
Thank you for giving
me this opportunity to outline our programs, and I would be pleased to
respond to any of your questions.
Page 80
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you.
Mr. Mack, I just
got back from Colombia a little while ago and it seems that General Gallego
has done an exceptionally good job as far as kidnaping is concerned and,
since I think somebody has already made the statement in our hearing that
the home of kidnaping in the world today is in Colombia, we at the time
were trying to see what we could do to assist him and there was a request
by him, is there any chance of getting me one or two helicopters, he says,
we have to walk into every one of these mountain hideouts where they have
people locked up and there is nothing like walking up a mountain with
people at the top who have guns shooting down at you.
Is there any likelihood
of the possibility of one or two helicopters for General Gallego?
Mr. MACK. Mr. Chairman,
we, too, think very highly of General Gallego and we would like to help.
The appropriation for the helicopters that went to the national police
were for counter-narcotics purposes. We are looking at his request. We
would want to get back to the relevant Committees of Congress to see whether
some adjustment might be made and some sort of sharing program, although
we would not be very anxious to actually transfer helicopters to his unit,
but with the concurrence of the Congress we might be able to provide some
sharing of helicopter time so he could move his people where he had to.
Mr. BALLENGER. And
a question I would like to throw in, you know, when we first decided to
do Plan Colombia and we did not have any equipment, we took all the helicopters
out of Guatemala and sent them down, what they had. Is there any likelihood
we can give back to our DEA agents in Guatemala some helicopter possibilities?
Page 81
Mr. MACK. Mr. Chairman, I have had this question a number of times in
the he past. We might be able to deploy them on temporary deployments.
Right now, our priority, as you know, is the Andes, particularly Colombia.
So if we were to deploy them to Guatemala at the current time, it would
be for a temporary period, it would not be a long period. But I understand
your concern and we are looking at it.
Mr. BALLENGER. Well,
I greatly appreciate it.
Let me ask you,
if you could, everybody and his uncle keeps talking about the spray and
what dangerous stuff it is and please, please, please do not destroy the
ecology of the world by doing this. Unless I am mistaken, it is Round
Up, which I use in my yard and so forth.
Could you give us
a little background on that?
Mr. MACK. Well,
actually, the active ingredient is called glyphosate and it is sold under
many, many brand names in about 160 countries in the world. It is EPA
approved and has been for about 30 years, recently recertified. It is
in fact probably one of the two or three most benign herbicides that exist
and, as you said, Mr. Chairman, many Americans use it every weekend in
their yards.
We do not believe
it is environmentally dangerous. We believe it is benign. We have, by
the way, launched a health study in the Putumayo area to look at claims
that glyphosate was causing skin problems down there. Preliminary returns
in one particular village where we have looked at the records show quite
conclusively that it does not, that the maladies that people suffered
there were caused by other factors. They were not consistent with glyphosate.
In fact, many of the cases had come to light well before spraying took
place and well after.
Page 82
One of the major problems, of course, in the narcotics business is that
the coca farmers themselves use all sorts of highly toxic materials to
kill the wee beasties that bother the coca. They apply this material indiscriminately,
some of the names you will recall from our dark past like paraquat, which
is illegal in the United States and in many countries, and it must be
applied under very, very restricted use.
In addition, the
narco traffickers use tons and tons, thousands of tons of solvents, very
toxic solvents like sulfuric acid, potassium permanganate, acetone in
the process of removing the alkaloid which produces cocaine from the leaf.
And that is simply dumped right back in the rivers and streams.
In addition, the
whole coca business has probably claimed about-translating into square
miles, about 10,000 square miles of Amazonian rain forest has been reduced
to land that is no longer under tree cultivation during the last 20 years.
So there is no question that the narcotics industry itself is the major
damager of the environment and the use of glyphosate is not-repeat, not-endangering
the environment.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank
you.
Mr. Deal, knowing
that the Europeans do not think a great deal of the army or the arms part
of the Plan Colombia, and I know Plan Colombia had a great deal of requests
for-what do you call it-alternative development funds coming out Europe,
have they come through? Have they stepped up to the plate? Have they ever
produced?
Page 83
They have not been
very forward looking, since they are using at least a third of the drugs
going out. I was just wondering if you have anything to say about that.
Mr. DEAL. Well,
we have had two consultative group meetings with the Europeans to discuss
their cooperation in the Andes and to date their commitments total approximately
$300 million. While substantial, we are disappointed that they have not
come to the plate in a more forceful way. We think that they could do
a lot more.
In just one area,
the internally displaced persons program that we have, we were programming
a much stronger contribution from the Europeans and that is an area where
we have far exceeded our assistance in order to meet the demand, but the
assistance is suffering because they have not come in a stronger way.
I do not know if
Mr. Brownfield would like to add to that.
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
Mr. Chairman, I went to the last of these consultative meetings with Under
Secretary Grossman, this was in Brussels on April 30th. At that time,
the numbers after we totaled them up between the Europeans, the Japanese,
the Canadians as well as the international organizations, came up to roughly
$500 million. This was not as much as we had hoped for when we started
down this road in 1999. Obviously, it is more than nothing.
Our hope is, and
we have gotten reasonably good signals in this regard with our pre-consultations,
that is, the President has widened the scope of his approach, from a heavy
Colombia focus to a more regional focus, from a heavily law enforcement
and security focus to a more balanced focus, that we will find more willingness
on their part to work with us in supporting and funding these programs.
But I do not wish to understate the case, we had hoped for more. We are
disappointed so far.
Page 84
Mr. BALLENGER Yesterday we met with President-elect Toledo of Peru, and
he spoke to us about poverty and the need for assistance in Peru.
I was wondering,
could you discuss AID's plans for Peru as an individual country?
Mr. DEAL. Yes. In
our discussions with President-elect Toledo, he emphasized his desire
to strengthen democratic institutions and to address poverty as the two
principal emphases of his government.
Our program, I think,
is very well situated to support him on both scores. With respect to democratic
strengthening, we anticipate strengthening our activities in the administration
of justice and support for decentralization. This was another area that
he specifically mentioned in our meeting yesterday with Administrator
Natsios. They are anticipating a number of tax measures which would provide
more resources for the municipal governments. So our support for municipalities
in the decentralization process will certainly receive emphasis.
We have several
new activities that we would like to explore. Support for the Truth Commission
has been promised. Approximately $1 million has been set aside for that
activity. We also want to work with the Congress to strengthen its independence.
We will also be offering assistance to strengthen civil-military relations
and we anticipate continuing our assistance for the human rights ombudsman's
office for human rights activities, working with civil societies and NGOs.
Page 85
We provided approximately
$7 million for support to elections, both directly to the election tribunal,
as well as to Transparencia, a local NGO, and for international observers.
In the area of poverty
reduction, most of our assistance will be provided in alternative development
in support of social infrastructure at the municipal level, the local
community level, and also in terms of economic growth, finding new opportunities
for licit employment and working also in micro enterprise activities.
I believe our program,
along with INL resources, under the Andean Regional Initiative total approximately
$80 million, up from $25 million this past year.
And with respect
to the earthquake, to date, our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
has provided $600,000 in immediate emergency relief. We are positioning
approximately 500,000 metric tons of food from our Food for Peace stocks
in Lima to transport to the southern region, based on what exactly is
needed there. But we anticipate that we will be responsive with additional
resources as the OFDA assessment is completed and we have a better idea
of the needs.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr.
Menendez?
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen,
for your testimony.
Page 86
Mr. Mack, in your
statement at the bottom of the first page you say that the ARI is the
product of extensive consultation with staffs of Committees and Members
of Congress. Could you tell me what Members of Congress you have spoken
to?
Mr. MACK. I personally
have not spoken to Members of Congress. My supervisor, Assistant Secretary
Beers has spoken to many Members of Congress. In addition, we have briefed
a very large number of staffs from various Committees, Committees of jurisdiction.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Well,
just so you know, I did a little poll of some of my colleagues here who
sit on this Committee which clearly has great concern over this issue
as well as some of the jurisdiction and starting from the Ranking Member
on down, none of us have been consulted, so I hope if you want to achieve
support for some of your initiatives that you tell your colleagues that
I think it would be important to consult with all of us. To get to 218
in the House is sometimes not the easiest proposition.
Let me ask you with
reference to the 75 percent you said has been committed in Plan Colombia.
How much of that is sustainable development commitments?
Mr. MACK. I could
get you that figure, Mr. Menendez. I do not have it handy, but I could
certainly get that figure.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Could
you venture-I would appreciate the exact figure, but could you venture
a sense of the 75 percent? Any percentage of it?
Mr. MACK. For development
side?
Page 87
Mr. MENENDEZ. Sustainable development.
Mr. MACK. I would
imagine a substantial amount because we have-some of that figure has been
obligated and contracts have been signed with various NGOs to implement
some of those programs. I think Mr. Deal could probably give you some
better information on that.
Mr. DEAL. I am sorry,
Congressman. I do not have a precise figure, but essentially all of the
resources were obligated in September when they became available. And
essentially all of the contracts have been committed. Within the first
several days of the resources becoming available, we signed up five grants
to NGOs for the internally displaced persons program. Most recently, in
March, we signed a $75 million contract for the alternative development
component. We also have signed a major contract for strengthening the
justice system. So essentially all of the resources have been committed,
either through grants to NGOs or through major contracts.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Now,
looking specifically at sustainable development, I know that some Members
of the Appropriations Committee have raised questions and considered offering
amendments because their sense is that on the sustainable development
side we are moving slow while we are moving rapidly on all of the other
interdiction and enforcement type provisions.
You talk about issuing
contracts. Is anything underway in terms of work? There is a difference
between issuing a contract and getting something done.
Page 88
Mr. DEAL. Yes, Congressman. We feel that we are pretty much on the time
table that we had set out for ourselves. The government of Colombia has
signed competitive grants with five NGOs. The initial grant has begun
operations within the last 30 to 40 days in the Putumayo region. NGOs
are giving short-term production assistance to approximately 1,800 families.
Our contract that I mentioned has a 12-person team on the ground. They
began their operations within just the last 30 to 40 days.
Over this last several-month
period, 26 of the anticipated 31 coca elimination pacts have been signed,
promising to eradicate over 29,000 hectares by the end of the year. I
mentioned in my opening statement that over 24,000 farmers have signed
these pacts in just the last 3 months.
We have signed memorandums
of understanding with 13 mayors in the Putumayo area agreeing to the variety
of infrastructure, social infrastructure programs that will be implemented
in those municipalities over the next year.
The government of
Colombia's commitment to this program, I should mention, has also been
substantial, some $62 million has been set aside thus far, $11 million
last year and a little over $50 million programmed this year from government
peace bonds and the peace tax. Major roads connecting southern Colombia
to the national and international markets are underway.
A variety of smaller
social and infrastructure projects including health clinics and schools
as well as the Casas de Justicia, or Justice Centers, that we have a total
of 18 casas out of the planned 40 that have already been established employing
alternative dispute resolutions to deal with local problems.
Page 89
In the human rights area, we have a contractor selected.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Okay.
I do not want to cut you short and I would be happy to read all of your
information. I am trying to focus on sustainable development. Those are
other issues that certainly are of merit, but I am trying to focus on
sustainable development, so I appreciate your laundry list, but I am trying
to focus on sustainable development.
Let me go to the
ARI initiative, which I understand is seven countries. Is that correct?
Now, in each of
them, there is a breakdown of how much money goes to each country and
in each country I have a breakdown here of what goes to what is broadly
defined as the socio-economic aid packages, which includes in most of
them alternative development, judicial reform, human rights, anti-corruption
measures and support for the peace process.
Do you have either
in dollar terms or in percentage terms how much of that rubric goes specifically
for sustainable development?
For example, Colombia
is getting $399 million under the proposed initiative, $146.5 is in socio-economic
aid programs. How much of that is alternative development?
Mr. DEAL. For Colombia,
under the Andean Regional Initiative, we have budgeted approximately $95
million that AID would be managing, of which $60 million would be for
alternative development activities.
Page 90
Mr. MENENDEZ. So $60 million out of $146 million goes toward alternative
development.
Mr. DEAL. That is
correct.
Mr. MENENDEZ. How
about in Peru?
Mr. DEAL. In Peru,
we are budgeting $79 million for alternative development, out of a total
package of approximately $128 million.
Mr. MENENDEZ. In
Bolivia?
Mr. DEAL. In Bolivia,
we have $40 million budgeted out of a total in the initiative of $88 million.
Mr. MENENDEZ. In
Ecuador?
Mr. DEAL. That total
for alternative development is $28 million, out of approximately half
of the $57.5 million budgeted.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Brazil
does not have an economy that-Why are we giving money to Brazil?
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
I can jump in on that, Mr. Menendez. Brazil, as you see, the number is
not that large and they are focused strictly on those parts of the Brazilian-largely
law enforcement community that work Andean regional issues.
Page 91
And the focus, while I will not tell you that it is all up on the border,
the programs that are to be supported will be supporting their efforts
to manage, avoid, control narcotics flow along the Andean region.
Mr. MENENDEZ. So
we are not looking at economic capacity of countries when we are making
this determination?
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
We are to the extent, Congressman, that we are putting much smaller-we
are proposing to put much smaller amounts of money in countries that have
a larger economic capacity, particularly on a per capita basis, such as
Venezuela, such as Brazil. And there we are trying to target them solely
on those areas where they are working closely with us, with our law enforcement
community on counter-drug, counter-narcotics issues.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Let
me ask you two over arching questions and then I will yield so that my
colleague can have a chance here.
Some critics point
out that the 50/50 distinction that you all speak of in terms of the state
budget in the Andean initiative is misleading because it excludes Pentagon
funding. Can you describe for me how you respond to that?
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
I will take that on, Congressman, and I will say partly guilty as charged.
I will also say to a certain--
Mr. MENENDEZ. Well,
you get credit for honesty, as far as I am concerned.
Page 92
Mr. BROWNFIELD. To a certain extent, we are trying to make a silk purse
out of a sow's ear. We, like I presume you, are waiting to determine what
the final budget proposal from the Department of Defense will be. When
we see that, it will undoubtedly have some impact on the total split or
spread between the social and economic side and the law enforcement and
security side.
Having said that,
in an attempt to be as honest and transparent with you as possible, we
have in our defense tried to say this is a function 150 presentation that
we are making.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I
am fully aware of that and I would understand that technicality. Having
said that, will you consider once you know the Pentagon's budget in this
regard of readjusting your numbers or are your numbers going to forward
regardless of the Pentagon's numbers?
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
We believe, Congressman--
Mr. MENENDEZ. Excuse
me. Let me just clarify my question. Not your total numbers, but how you
are using your dollars.
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
Understood. Let me give you a two-part answer. First, regardless of how
the Pentagon numbers come in, we are quite confident that the split, which
to put it in some context for you, last year the split was 79/21, 79 percent
security and law enforcement, 21 percent social and economic development.
Page 93
While we may not come out at 50/50 when the entire budgetary process and
appropriations process is completed, we are confident and I hereby state
on the record that we are extremely confident that the balance will be
far closer this year than it was last year.
Second, we have
operated on the assumption that the final Department of Defense budget
proposal will be consistent with and not significantly different from
where they came out last year. We made our budget proposals based upon
that assumption. Therefore, my answer to your question is while we may
propose some fine tuning, we do not expect to have to do any major surgery
to the budget that the President submitted.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Well,
let me do a little saber rattling for you. Seventy-nine/twenty-one gives
a lot of room for a closer adjustment, so if it is not much closer, much
closer, you will see many of us, many of us, engaged in making sure that
sustainable development and the related items that can truly get to the
core of this-I am not even speaking about demand reduction in this country
which is really, to quote the President back in May, and Secretary Rumsfeld,
the single most important way in which we ultimately reduce the supply
side. I have tremendous support here from my colleague from Massachusetts.
My final question
is an over arching policy question and maybe, Mr. Secretary, you might
be the best person to answer it.
What is the Administration's
policy toward the counter-insurgency in Colombia? Does the Administration
see a distinction as a matter of Administration policy between supporting
the counter-insurgency in Colombia and the counter-narcotics effort?
Page 94
Mr. BROWNFIELD. Let me give you two parts to my response, Congressman.
First, the insurgency and how President Pastrana is addressing the insurgency
is partly his peace process. The Administration's position on his peace
process has been consistent and that is that we support President Pastrana's
peace process, we encourage other governments and other institutions to
support it as well.
We ourselves, the
U.S. Government, do not engage directly with the parties, the FARC, the
ELN, the AUC, because of some strongly held views on their human rights
record and the fact that several of these organizations either have definitely
or in all likelihood have targeted American citizens for kidnaping or
for murder and have not accounted for them.
Secondly, you have
asked a broader question about drawing the line, if you will, between
counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics. As Mr. Mack said earlier in
a response to one of the Chairman's questions or comments, virtually all
of the funds that have been appropriated for use in Colombia up until
this point in time have been appropriated for counter-narcotics purposes.
We take that not only as a matter of guidance, but as a matter of law
in terms of what they can be used for.
We believe, therefore,
that what we are engaged in today in Colombia for the most part is support
for counter-narcotics efforts, operations and activities by the government
of Colombia.
Are there areas
where there is overlap? Yes, of course there are. And that is where we
have to make careful case-by-case calculations as to how much is this
a counter-narcotics effort, how much is this a humanitarian or counter-insurgency
effort and when those cases get tight enough, presumably they would be
sent back to Washington for decision.
Page 95
To give you some sense as to how often that has happened, I have been
in my current job for 2 years and not once has one of these cases arisen
where the Ambassador has felt that he or she needed to come back to Washington
to make the decision.
There has been a
substantial amount of commentary in the last month or so, Congressman,
about counter-insurgency, the argument to a certain extent is we cannot
accomplish our objectives in Colombia without engaging in counter-insurgency.
That is not our position. We do not agree with that. That is not what
we are proposing in the Andean Regional Initiative. We are proposing a
three-part strategy: democracy, development and counter-drug.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr.
Secretary, as an attorney, I admire greatly your ability not to answer
my question and I appreciate your career service to our country and I
am sure the State Department is extremely proud. And since I want to be
courteous to my colleagues here, I will refrain from going any further.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr.
Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Menendez has
taken most of my questions.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Which
you fed me.
Page 96
Mr. DELAHUNT. No, I did not feed them. I am sure with the Chair's indulgence,
we have as much time as the Chair feels appropriate.
I would echo the
observations by Mr. Menendez as to the talents of Mr. Brownfield.
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
And the passion. The passion.
Mr. DELAHUNT. The
passion is there. The passion is noticeable.
I would make one
observation, however. You referred to the peace process as involving the
AUC and I think it is important to indicate for the record that clearly
the AUC is not in any way, shape or form implicated in the peace process
that I am aware of.
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
I stand corrected. You are correct, Congressman.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I
also find it interesting that it is the position of the United States
Administration that we refuse to engage directly, I think that was your
word, directly, as opposed to indirectly, whatever that may mean, in the
peace process because of concern about the FARC, the ELN and you referenced
the AUC's record on human rights. Am I quoting or paraphrasing you?
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
So far, so good. Yes, Congressman.
Page 97
Mr. DELAHUNT. I find it fascinating that the Administration, however,
while expressing reluctance to engage in this particular peace process
has recently resumed negotiations with North Korea regarding the negotiations
and discussions that had been previously undertaken by the Clinton Administration.
I guess that does not elicit any response from a career professional diplomat,
but--
Mr. BALLENGER. Could
I just ask a question?
Mr. DELAHUNT. I
will yield to the Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. I
am the only one that is not a lawyer in here and you all keep talking
in circles. How about--
Mr. DELAHUNT. Well
stated.
I just see a disconnect
there, Mr. Brownfield. I really do. And it was my understanding-you know,
if we can engage in negotiations with the regime in North Korea whose
record is, I would suggest, as bad as the guerrilla groups in Colombia,
that there is an inconsistency there. And that we have profound national
security interest in what occurs in Colombia because that in turn implicates
the entire Andean region.
I would hope-and
it is my memory that the specific rationale or premise for refusal to
engage in the peace process with the FARC was the murder of the three
American missionaries. Is that correct?
Page 98
Mr. BROWNFIELD. It is correct, Congressman, that less than 6 weeks after
the one time that the U.S. Government did engage directly in discussions
with representatives of the FARC whose only precondition, the only precondition
that the U.S. Government had imposed upon the FARC, was that they would
agree to cease targeting U.S. citizens for kidnaping and murder, and less
than 6 weeks later all evidence suggests and I believe in fact they have
admitted it, they targeted and murdered three American citizens. So, yes,
that is correct. For that specific event.
Mr. DELAHUNT. But
that would not-I mean, I am unaware, and maybe I am ignorant, where there
has been intelligence or information relative to the ELN in terms of targeting
American citizens or American commercial interests.
Are you aware of
any information involving the ELN? Because, as we know, there is a-there
have been a series of negotiations and discussions going on between the
Colombia government and the ELN.
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
Congressman, I will not-because it would be no more helpful for you than
for me-go into detail in terms of what the ELN has threatened or targeted.
Obviously, they have targeted some things in a commercial sense that have
a U.S. connection to them, such as the oil pipeline and so forth.
Having said that-and
I do understand clearly what you are doing, which is differentiating between
the FARC and the ELN, which I think is perfectly legitimate. I do not
mean to suggest that the U.S. position or that the entire peace process
is a static process, a rigid process, and that nothing is ever going to
change. I did want to flag for you, and so unsuccessfully in my attempt
to respond to Congressman Menendez-non-respond to Congressman Menendez's
question, what our posture is as of this moment on the peace process.
Page 99
Mr. DELAHUNT. And I welcome the inference that there is flexibility and
I interpret that by your comment regarding the fact that it is a dynamic
as opposed to a static process, if you will.
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
And if I could add to your inference, that there are many ways to engage
or to be involved in the peace process. It does not have to be direct.
There are many players involved in this process. Some are with the United
Nations. Some are with other international organizations. Some are additional
governments. And all of these, I think, we are confident that we know
what they are doing and are communicating with them on a regular basis.
Mr. DELAHUNT. We
are in consultation with them.
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
Yes.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Let
me articulate, I think, a concern that was expressed by Mr. Menendez.
I am pleased to hear that contracts are being signed and executed, but
I have been particularly concerned and even disturbed by some reports
about the tardiness, if you will, of the delivery of the so-called soft
aid.
It would appear
that what has transpired according to reports is that there for months
now has been aerial eradication of crops without the simultaneous delivery
of the soft aid to the affected farmers, campesinos, and that we now find
ourselves with a population where in the past distrust has been the status
quo, if you will, between the population and the government.
Page 100
Some have suggested that has been exacerbated by the failure to deliver
in a simultaneous fashion the aid itself that would provide an opportunity
for these farmers who are growing coca and poppy to survive while alternate
crops are planted.
I really think it
is important that we align our efforts so that there is a contemporaneous
delivery of services along with the eradication. Clearly, there has been
much controversy surrounding aerial eradication. You referenced Round
Up and you seem to suggest that there is no ecological impact and yet
am I correct when I say there is a study now that we are paying for being
conducted by the Colombia government to determine if there is any adverse
environmental impact?
Mr. MACK. Sir, the
study is-first of all, they are going to examine the people who claim
that they were harmed in some way by the herbicide that was sprayed. That
is ongoing. In addition, they are going to do an epidemiological study
in which they are going to take blood and urine samples from a random
sample of people in the area who have not been sprayed, before any spraying
has taken place, to get a baseline. And then they will get another representative
sample of people after spraying takes place.
There has been virtually
no spraying in Putumayo, in the southern part of Colombia for quite a
few months now. But when it does resume, when the weather breaks up and
they can spray, they will go back and take another random sample and then
they will see what the exposure rate is.
The exposure rate--
Page 101
Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, Mr. Mack, that really kind of concerns me, to
be honest with you, because it is almost like these tests are going on
and yet there are people out there. So making a control group of people
who have not been sprayed on and people who are going to be sprayed on
really makes me very, very uneasy, to be very candid with you.
I would hope-and,
again, I think maybe these questions should have been answered previously
before we embarked on a spraying program or at least we should have had
people on the ground or the Colombia government with our assistance should
have been prepared to deal with those issues.
Whatever the answer
may be, clearly a population of people who are not reassured, who have
concerns about the public health consequences of what is occurring-I am
sure that is not a population that is going to be particularly amenable
to engage in a positive way with the government of Colombia.
Mr. MACK. Sir, if
I may, I would like to make two points.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure.
Mr. MACK. First,
there are two or three decades of scientific studies into the impact of
glyphosate on humans, on animals, on fish, on birds, and the aquatic environment.
The overwhelming result of all these studies is that it is not damaging.
However, the study-we
have undertaken the study to re-prove what we already are quite confident
are the facts, but your point is well taken, there are many people down
there, there is a lot of misinformation of the impact of spraying. You
can make an argument that more preparation should have been made in advance.
Page 102
Mr. DELAHUNT. A community outreach program.
Mr. MACK. I accept
all that. I also would like to note one further point and that is at the
time that the overtime of Colombia announced its alternative development
program for Putumayo and southern Colombia, there were very few takers.
Very few communities were interested. It was only after the spraying campaign
began that the large numbers of communities all of a sudden realized the
government was serious and then came forward and offered themselves to
the program.
I would also like
to point out that those communities that were initially singled out for
participation in the program were all exempted from spraying. They have
not been sprayed. There are now some communities coming in that were sprayed
in the January, February timeframe, but the majority of those communities
were not sprayed in advance. And what happened was there was an overwhelming
response when the government showed it was serious in developing a coca-free
Putumayo and they realized the government is serious and now want to participate
in the program.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I
thank you for the answer, but I want to pick up on something that Mr.
Menendez made in terms of the alternate crop substitution.
It would appear
that none of-first of all, there were promises. It is my understanding
that promises were made in terms of a direct cash grant or subsidy in
amount ranging from 2000 to 1000 and that was restructured so that it
was not a cash grant but then became, you know, a food substitution. Can
you respond to that?
Page 103
Mr. MACK. I think Mr. Deal can respond to how that is working.
Mr. DEAL. Yes. I
would like to reinforce the last point that Ambassador Mack made which
is that of the pacts that I mentioned, the 26 pacts that have been signed,
they are for voluntary eradication and they are dealing with communities
that had not been affected by the spraying. And the promises that were
made in those pacts, the timetable for voluntary eradication only begins
once the delivery of services begins. There is not a fixed set of benefits
established for the communities. The assistance is really based on discussions
that the NGOs and the government of Colombia entity undertake with the
communities. It could range from farm animals to seeds and farming supplies.
So there are a range of things and it really is based on the discussions
and the negotiations that they have with each individual community.
Mr. DELAHUNT. If
I can have one final question?
You heard my opening
comments regarding legislation that has actually passed the Colombian
Congress and is now awaiting action by President Pastrana and I asked
that a letter be distributed to the panel and I wonder if anyone on the
panel might have information as to what is the current status of the legislation
in terms of its provisions and what is anticipated in terms of action
by the Pastrana Administration because, as I indicated, it causes me grave
concerns.
We advocated vigorously
for human rights conditionality as it related to military security assistance
and that was sufficient for many of us to reluctantly-and I underscore
reluctantly-support Plan Colombia. As soon as that assistance is delivered,
then somehow this legislation is filed in the Colombian Congress and,
as I mentioned earlier, in its initial stages was totally unacceptable.
Page 104
And let me conclude there and see if any one of you can respond.
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
Why don't I take a crack at that Congressman, if I can, please.
When Bill 81 was
first introduced in the Colombian Congress, we were concerned, as were
you, in terms of what it appeared to say and what its impact would be.
A bill has passed, your understanding is correct or at least it is the
same understanding as ours.
It is our understanding
that it has passed both houses, that the bill in the Colombian Congress
as it would in the U.S. Congress, you had a bill that required reconciliation,
it went to conference, a conference bill came out and was then passed
by both houses.
The President of
Colombia has 20 days from the date of the passage of the conference bill
to either sign the bill or under Colombian constitutional law the bill
will be enacted by virtue of his non-signature. We calculate that that
means he signs or he vetoes by the 10th of July.
Finally, we would
be surprised if someone did not file a challenge against the law as being
a violation of the Colombian constitution and if that happens past history
indicates that the Colombian constitutional court process would take about
a year to work its way through the entire process.
Page 105
Now, the bill that
has come out of the Colombian Congress so far is, we think, substantially
different and substantially better than the bill that was first introduced.
For example, it no longer gives the military authority to detain suspects
for up to 7 days without review or challenge; it no longer explicitly
allows the military to interrogate prisoners; it no longer exempts members
of the military from prosecution for specifically designated issues. It
is an improvement in that sense.
It still has some
areas in it that could, if interpreted or used the wrong way, cause some,
if you will, legal and human rights concerns, such as the breadth of the
authority of the so-called Supreme Council for Defense and Security, how
much power do they have, how much control are they under from the President,
or the possibility of one of the articles giving local military commanders
authority to usurp civilian control in the region.
We are working the
issue with President Pastrana. I am not yet in a position to tell you
what we understand his intentions are. I can tell you he is very much
aware of our concern with the text of this legislation, but even more
important with how it might be implemented and executed.
Mr. BALLENGER. Let
me just say, if I may, gentlemen, we have some more votes coming up.
I want to thank
you all for coming and giving us a clear picture, I think, a clearer picture
of what is going on down there. I recognize that we have been there and
we will all keep going back, but keep us posted.
Page 106
Mr. Brownfield,
one of these days I would like to sit down and talk to you without legalese
just to figure out what in the world you just did say. I am not sure.
Mr. BROWNFIELD.
I am ready, Mr. Chairman, but I am sure Mr. Menendez knows and can give
it to you in perfect detail.
Mr. BALLENGER. Okay.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr.
Chairman I would be happy to tell you what he said.
Mr. BALLENGER. Okay.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr.
Chairman, I really want to commend you--
Mr. MENENDEZ. It
will not take very long, by the way.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I
really want to commend you for this hearing and for your profound interest
in Latin America and Central America. It is really very refreshing.
And I also-you know,
it was interesting listening to Mr. Menendez list the countries that are
impacted by this particular proposal and I would respectfully suggest
that if possible hearings regarding the individual countries, because
there are so many questions that I think need to be answered and addressed,
ought to be considered, ranging from Colombia, obviously, to all of the
countries that would be implicated in this initiative.
Page 107
Mr. BALLENGER. We will look forward to thinking about that. Right now,
we have to go vote.
Gentleman, we thank
you again.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:46
p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Material Submitted
for the Hearing Record
73454g.eps
(Footnote 1 return)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
As of November 8,
2001, this document is also available online at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/
intlrel/hfa73454.000/hfa73454_0f.htm