Statement by Rep. Elton Gallegly (R-California), chairman, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, September 21, 2000

Statement by Rep. Elton Gallegly (R-California), chairman, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, September 21, 2000
Statement by Hon. Elton Gallegly: Implementing Plan Colombia

One month ago, the President signed into law, a $1.3 billion supplemental appropriation to carry out enhanced counter-narcotics activities throughout Latin America. Of that amount, some $1.018 billion was designated as the U.S. contribution to what has become known as Plan Colombia.

Of all the issues we confront in our relations with our southern neighbors, none is more critically important to the stability of the hemisphere than the issue of the illicit drug trade. The illicit drug trade in the Americas is pervasive. Drugs are eating away the very fabric of American society and they pose a significant threat to the political and economic stability of the region. In short, I believe the drug trade can be described as a serious regional security threat.

No one should doubt that there is a strong national resolve to deal with the drug problem here in this country. Budgets for demand reduction, education, treatment and law enforcement are at record levels. And yes, those budgets could be increased. But let there be no doubt - reducing demand and maximizing our efforts in the international war on drugs are both necessary.

As I said during Floor consideration of the Supplemental, the question was not whether the U.S. should be involved in providing assistance to Colombia, but how the U.S. should be involved.

I believe United States policy toward Colombia should help Colombia reduce the presence of illicit drug cultivation, production and transit.

It should help protect Colombia's democracy which is under siege from a large and violent guerrilla gang.

It should ensure the stability of Colombia and the Andean Region as a whole.

Today, we are holding this hearing to find out just how the Administration plans to administer this aid to Colombia. Who is in charge? How are the roles and responsibilities of each Agency involved organized and defined? What kinds of timetables and benchmarks are we looking at and what are our expectations, both short and mid-term?

Colombia has a Plan. We have provided funding. We are now at that point, as the saying goes, "where the rubber meets the road". And if my Colleagues will indulge me, We can only hope that this Plan Colombia is not riding on Firestone tires!
To some of the Plan's critics I say let's take a moment and seriously consider the problems that nation is facing. Let's not get caught up in emotional rhetoric. Let's think about the alternatives.

Do people think assisting in the fight against drugs is the wrong thing to do? Do people care little of the future of Colombia's democracy? Do people believe we should not offer alternative economic assistance to the people of Colombia? Do critics not want us to help support judicial reform, human rights or the peace process?
I believe providing funding for all of these is appropriate.
I also believe providing funding for select, vetted, Colombian military units who will work with the Police in the counter-drug effort is crucial if our efforts to address the drug trade and Colombia's stability are to be successful.

It is true that the Colombian police have a proven record in the drug effort and should continue to be supported. And they are in our aid package. But, the responsibility for protecting Colombia's democracy from the drug supported violence of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries is a legitimate job for the military. As Colombia's national strategy to expand the counter-drug effort is likely to be met by stronger resistence from the guerrillas, the police must have a strong military to back them up. Additionally, if the military is to be a successful backup to the police and a credible threat to the rebels protecting the drug trade, then it needs modern weapons and professional training.

And yes, despite the fact that military aid comprises only 25 percent of the entire Plan Colombia, the U.S. aid package is weighted toward the military. But mobility is necessary and helicopters are expensive. And, unless and until the guerrillas, who do not now appear to be serious about ending the bloodshed, nor apparently care at all for the Colombian people, get serious about a peace agreement, why doesn't the Colombian government have the right to ask for help to prepare their military?

The comprehensive strategy known as Plan Colombia was developed by the government of President Pastrana for the good of Colombia. However, there should be no doubt that providing additional aid to Colombia to counter the drug trade, to help reform the judicial system, to provide economic alternatives and to support the peace process is in our national interest as well. Failing to help Colombia help itself will have long-term adverse effects not only on our own country but on the rest of the region, putting Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama under tremendous pressure and risk.

I know many are worried about past human rights abuses involving Colombia's military. And while these are valid concerns, I believe President Pastrana is working to crack down on human rights abuses in the military as well as trying to sever the connections between some of his military units and the paramilitaries.

I believe this aid package provides us a good starting point. We all support peace. We all wish the guerrillas would get serious in those peace talks. We wish the paramilitaries would stop killing civilians. But until those wishes become reality, the Colombians need help and our assistance to their Plan demonstrates to the Colombian people and all Americans that we are committed to helping solve these enormous and dangerous problems of illicit drugs, violence and human rights abuses in that beleaguered country.

The question today is can such a plan be implemented and implemented correctly, efficiently and effectively? I hope our witnesses can provide some assurances that it can be.

As of September 23, 2000, this document is also available online at http://www.house.gov/international_relations/wh/colombia/gallegly.htm