Statement of Brian Sheridan, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, October 12, 2000

Statement of Brian Sheridan, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, October 12, 2000
BRIAN E. SHERIDAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,
AND HUMAN RESOURCES

October 12, 2000

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this Committee to discuss the implementation of the Department of Defense's portion of the Fiscal Year 2000 supplemental appropriation that supports the Government of Colombia's execution of Plan Colombia.

Drug abuse is an undeniable threat to our national security; one that is measured by the thousands of lives lost in our country every year and that costs our country billions of dollars annually. Reducing the supply of drugs on our streets is an integral component of our National Drug Control Strategy and the Department of Defense (DoD) plays a key supporting role in creating the opportunity for law enforcement agencies, both our own and those of foreign nations, to interdict the flow of drugs into our country. DoD is committed to this counterdrug mission.

The demand for illegal drugs in the United States, specifically for cocaine and heroin, is met primarily from the growing fields and production laboratories in Colombia. The vast sums of money that this illegal activity provides have served to exacerbate current domestic issues facing the people of Colombia. The U.S. and Colombian Government, and our citizens, share a common objective to reach our specific national goals -- to reduce drug abuse in our own country and to bring peace and stability to Colombia. A significant reduction in the flow of illegal drugs to the U.S., with the corresponding reduction in the supply of "easy money" which supports both guerillas and illegal self-defense forces operating in Colombia, serves the national interests of both our countries. For these reasons, it is absolutely necessary that the U.S. continue to support Colombia in its effort to reduce the production and transport of cocaine and heroin that is destined for the U.S.

Over the past two years Colombia, specifically the area east of the Andes, has become the center of the cocaine trade, largely as a result of successful interdiction and eradication efforts in Peru and Bolivia. The remoteness of southern Colombia and the lack of government control in large areas of this region has precluded Colombian interdiction operations to the point that the expansion of coca growing areas, especially in the Putumayo Department, has progressed virtually unchecked. Most of the world's coca is now grown in Colombia and over ninety percent of the cocaine consumed in the U.S. is manufactured in or passes through Colombia. The United States, the nation with the greatest cocaine demand, currently consumes over 200 metric tons annually from the Andean region.

DoD has been supporting Colombian counterdrug efforts for over ten years. The additional funding provided by the FY00 Emergency Supplemental will allow the Department to build on past programs, in short, to accelerate the implementation of the efforts in Colombia that ultimately proved to be successful in Peru and Bolivia. The plan funded with the emergency supplemental is a balanced and executable plan that will not require an appreciable increase in the number of U.S. military personnel present in Colombia. This effort is responsive to Plan Colombia and consistent with current U.S. policy. Furthermore, these programs, in coordination with other interagency efforts, form the core of a sound, responsive, and timely assistance package that will significantly enhance Colombia's ability to conduct effective counterdrug operations.

While I have confidence in this plan, I would like to reiterate what I have stated in previous testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in February and April of this year, the House Armed Services Committee in March and, most recently, before the House International Relations Committee last month. Program execution will be a challenge and results will not be evident for some time. I also highlighted this point during numerous Hill briefings over the last several months. The vastness of southern Colombia and the lack of significant infrastructure pose major challenges. The sheer number of supporting contracts required to be implemented to ensure the long-term viability of this effort will necessitate careful management and mandate frequent review. Some of these concerns are also reflected in the draft GAO report, to which the Department is in the process of formally responding. There will be setbacks and emerging challenges. Perseverance will be required. But the plan is sound and the mission worthwhile.

The President signed the Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction Appropriations Act, which contained the Fiscal Year 2000 Emergency Supplemental that provided the additional funding support for Plan Colombia, on July 13, 2000. I signed the DoD Colombia Supplemental Execution Plan on July 24, 2000 and the U.S. Army's 7th Special Forces Group commenced training the second Colombian counternarcotics battalion on July 27th. As you can see, the Department has, where possible, moved out quickly in support of Colombian counterdrug efforts.

Let me briefly outline the Department's programs. Of note, while funding was appropriated in July of this year, several congressional reporting requirements had to be met first which precluded immediately obligating funding for some of the Department's programs. As a result, most of the supporting contracts are just now being submitted for review by the Department and many of the dates reflect our best estimate of the expected delivery date. As I have already stated, execution remains a challenge before us.

SUPPORT FOR THE PUSH INTO SOUTHERN COLOMBIA
Counternarcotics Battalion Support

The Department has commenced training the second Colombian counternarcotics battalion using members of the U.S. Army's 7th Special Forces Group. This training is scheduled to be completed in the December 2000 time frame. The third battalion is currently scheduled to begin training in early 2001. These battalions will give the Colombian Army a complete counterdrug brigade in the Putumayo/Caqueta region to engage what is the world's largest coca cultivation center. Plans include positioning counternarcotics battalions at Tres Esquinas and Larandia.

Counternarcotics Brigade Headquarters

The establishment of a counterdrug brigade headquarters is sequenced to support the strategic and tactical operation of the counterdrug Brigade located in southern Colombia. Department support for this program is scheduled to begin in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001. Allocated funding will provide for training, communications equipment, computer needs, facility modification, and similar requirements. The counternarcotics brigade headquarters is scheduled to be operational in February 2001.

Army Aviation Infrastructure Support

The Colombian Army does not have the infrastructure necessary to support the number and mix of helicopters that will be provided by the Department of State using emergency supplemental funding. DoD will fund a variety of critical aviation infrastructure needs to support the UH-1N, UH-1H Huey II and UH-60 helicopters that are required to provide mobility for the counternarcotics battalions. This program will include funding for electrical utilities and road infrastructure, aviation fuel storage and fueling systems, security improvements, parking aprons and helicopter pads, a maintenance hanger, an operations facility, and a taxiway. DoD has conducted several site surveys and hosted conferences to facilitate planning for this challenging requirement. Support contracts are expected to be awarded in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001 and continue through 2002.

Military Reform

For some time the Department has been managing a contractor-led endeavor to provide the necessary assistance to Colombia to support the government's effort to restructure its military establishment so it can successfully engage the drug threat throughout the country. The focus of this effort is not tactical but organizational in nature, centered at the Minister of Defense level and the uniformed services of Colombia. The contractor's efforts have focused on restructuring and improving military planning, logistics support for ground and air operational assets, development of counternarcotics military doctrine, development of counternarcotics military strategy, new concepts on recruitment and conscription, development of an integrated intelligence capability, improved computerization and command and control, and similar initiatives. The program will also support efforts to promote human rights and effect judicial reforms. This is an on-going effort and is subject to periodic review. Supplemental funding will be utilized to extend this program should it prove to be necessary.

Organic Intelligence Capability

The intelligence collection capability in the region will be enhanced to support operations by the counternarcotics battalions. This program will provide the counternarcotics battalions with a combination of airborne and ground tactical intelligence capabilities to directly assist in the planning and execution of counterdrug operations. It is scheduled to begin in the third quarter of fiscal year 2001 and be sustained for an extended period of time.

SUPPORT FOR INTERDICTION EFFORTS

Tracker Aircraft Modification

In the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, DoD will provide for the modification of two Colombia Air Force C-26 Merlin aircraft by installing APG-66 air-to-air radars, Forward Looking Infrared Radars (FLIRs), and communications equipment. The completed aircraft will give Colombia an organic capability to terminally track and intercept illegal smuggling aircraft that move the cocaine from the HCl labs in southeastern Colombia to the Colombian coasts for transshipment to the United States. These modified aircraft will replicate the terminal radar interceptor that supported the Peruvians in their successful air denial operation against the Peru-to-Colombia air bridge. The aircraft modifications should be completed in the summer of 2001.

AC-47 Aircraft Modifications

Commencing in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, the Department will support the installation of a FLIR in one of the three operational Colombian AC-47 aircraft. The FLIR will greatly enhance the aircraft's ability to support night operations against drug smuggling activities.

Funding will also support modification of an additional Colombian DC-3, converting it into an AC-47 aircraft with FLIR, night vision cockpit, and fire control systems. This will be the fourth operational AC-47 in the Colombian inventory. These planes have been used repeatedly by the Colombian military to strafe drug trafficking aircraft. The aircraft upgrades are scheduled to be completed in the third quarter of fiscal year 2001.

Ground Based Radar

The contract for the installation of a ground-based radar at Tres Equinas, Colombia that will provide positive air control for the counternarcotics brigade helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that operate in the region is scheduled to be awarded in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001. The Tres Equinas radar will provide improved detection and monitoring of smuggling air activity in the Putumayo region of Colombia, where over 70% of Colombia's coca cultivation occurs. The program includes the upgrade of an existing TPS-70 owned by DoD, and the installation costs for installing the radar at Tres Esquinas. The radar site is scheduled to be operational in October of 2001.

Radar Command and Control

The DoD supported radar command and control program will provide Colombia a modern and operationally effective system, located in Bogota, which will be capable of monitoring multiple radar sites throughout Colombia. It will support positive control of Colombian Air Force air interdiction operations throughout Colombia. The current system is outmoded and needs to be replaced. The contract will be awarded in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001 with completion expected in the first quarter of fiscal year 2002.

Andean Ridge Intelligence Collection

This ongoing program supports Colombia with critical intelligence against drug smuggling activities. It provides for collection sites located in critical areas throughout the drug cultivation and trafficking regions.

Colombian Ground Interdiction

The Colombian ground interdiction program is still in the initial planning stages. Supplemental funding will be used to initiate a Colombian program to control drug smuggling on the major roads across the Andes and those roads feeding the northern coast and western coast cocaine transshipment regions. This funding will start the process of Colombia regaining control of its major roads, which currently are routinely utilized by the drug trafficking forces. Road control is important since it can help control cocaine and precursor chemical smuggling across the Andes and to/from major ports. As reference, there are 4 or 5 major roads across the Andes and these highways feed the road network located west of the Andes. Vehicle traffic on the highways west of the Andes serves as the principal mode of moving chemicals and cocaine to/from the northern coast and western coast cocaine ports and transshipment regions.

All these programs that I just outlined build on our current strategy -- no change in DoD policy is required to execute the programs funded by this supplemental. There is nothing new here for DoD. However, there will be challenges to confront in the course of our efforts to attack the center of the cocaine industry in southern Colombia. It will not be easy, but it is worth the effort. Let me share with you my concerns.

DoD Concerns

Colombian Military Organization

The Colombian military has limitations based on resources, training practices, lack of joint planning and operations. They need to better coordinate operations between the services and with the Colombian National Police (CNP). The restructuring of the military is essential if Colombia is to have continuing operational success against the drug threat. President Pastrana recently announced the issuance of several decrees that will serve to make the Colombian military a more modern, professional and effective force. Among them is a provision giving the armed forces leadership authority to suspend or dismiss military personnel, regardless of rank or length of service, for poor performance or unsatisfactory behavior, as Congress urged in the supplemental. This is potentially an important tool for ensuring respect for human rights -- if used appropriately. The reforms also include a provision which, in effect, establishes a JAG corps, another of the measures Congress sought in the supplemental. The Colombian military needs help and, as was previously outlined, we plan to use a small portion of supplemental funding towards this end.

Human Rights

I am also concerned, as are Members of Congress and representatives throughout the interagency, about human rights. The human rights practices and procedures that the U.S. government has put in place, in response to legislative enactments, and the example set by the small number of our troops training Colombian forces has had an impact, as have President Pastrana's reforms. Armed forces cooperation with the civilian court system in prosecuting human rights violations committed by military personnel is improving. Some military officers accused of collaboration with or tolerance of illegal self defense force activities have been dismissed, while others face prosecution. The armed forces have demonstrated greater aggressiveness recently in seeking out and attacking illegal self-defense forces. Clearly, the Colombian Armed Forces have come a long way, yet no one would dispute that more must be done. I am also alarmed by the reported dramatic increase in human rights violations attributed to both the illegal self-defense forces and insurgents -- this is symptomatic of Colombia's crisis in general and, as I see it, a call to action. We continue to press the Government of Colombia for sustained progress and concrete results in its efforts to improve the human rights climate, and our assistance package contains a variety of human rights elements in support of this goal.

Counterdrug vs. Counter Insurgency

Lastly, let me address the "targets" of this supplemental package, and our source zone strategy as a whole. The targets are the narco-traffickers, those individuals and organizations that are involved in the cultivation of coca or opium poppy and the subsequent production and transportation of cocaine and heroin to the U.S. Only those armed elements that forcibly inhibit or confront counterdrug operations will be engaged, be they narco-traffickers, insurgent organizations, or illegal self-defense forces.

I know that some are concerned that we are being drawn into a quagmire. Let me assure you, we are not. There are numerous restrictions, constraints, and reviews that are involved in the approval of the deployment of U.S. military personnel on counterdrug missions in Colombia. It suffices to say, the process is comprehensive, involving reviews by the Embassy in Bogota and U.S. Southern Command in Miami as well as the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I personally look not only at who is deploying and what they are doing, but at the specific locations to which they are going. Furthermore, each and every deployment order states, in no uncertain terms, that DoD personnel are not to accompany host nation personnel on operational missions. This will not change. As I have said, the execution of this increased support does not require a change in U.S. policy. Is there risk to U.S. personnel providing counterdrug support? Yes, there is. However, we are aggressively working to minimize that risk.

In summary, the Department of Defense supports this additional assistance for Colombia. U.S. Southern Command and my office participated extensively in its formulation. It integrates fully our source zone strategy, affording the opportunity to enhance those counterdrug programs that have proven successful in Peru and Bolivia. Execution will be a challenge and it will take some time before measurable results are achieved. There will be setbacks and perseverance will be required. However, President Pastrana has asked for international support to address an internal problem that has international dimensions -- fueled in part by our country's demand for illegal drugs. We can, and should, provide this assistance. It is time to move forward.

As of October 13, 2000, this document was also available online at http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/011/lef401.htm