Statement
of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
October 15, 2001
Statement
of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor
Coordinator for Counterterrorism
U.S. Department of State
Before the Inter-American
Counterterrorism Committee
Of the Organization of American States (OAS)
October 15, 2001
(As Prepared for
Delivery)
Mr. Secretary-General,
Members of the OAS:
Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today on the subject of terrorism, and
what we in the Americas and the Caribbean can do about it. I would also
like to take a moment to thank Secretary General Gaviria and the OAS member
states for their strong support and expressions of solidarity with the
United States over the last 34 days.
The horrific attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, just one month
ago, were a reminder that our hemisphere is no longer safe from international
terrorism. In this global era, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans can no
longer protect our land and our people from violence, as they have done
in previous international conflicts.
As you know, the
United States has presented to our coalition partners around the world
clear and compelling evidence that the September 11 attacks originated
in Afghanistan, with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida organization.
We must recognize
that al-Qaida could not have carried out such attacks -- planned over
a period of years -- without relying on an extensive support network around
the world. That network may include cells in some or many OAS member states,
including the U.S.
Moreover, al-Qaida
is but one of many terrorist organizations with extensive international
networks. International organizations operating in this hemisphere include
Islamic extremist organizations such as Hizballah, al Gamaat (IG), HAMAS,
and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ); the Basque separatist group ETA and
even the Irish Republican Army also have a presence in this hemisphere.
These groups -- when
combined with terrorist groups based in the Americas such as the FARC,
Shining Path, and others -- provide more proof that terrorism is a threat
to all of us.
In fact, one can
argue that modern terrorism originated in our hemisphere. We date the
advent of modern terrorism from 1968, four years before Munich, when revolutionary
movements began forming throughout the Americas. The following year, in
1969, the first terrorist kidnapping of an American ambassador took place
when Ambassador Burke Elbrick was taken hostage in Brazil by members of
two revolutionary groups. In those early years of the still-new phenomenon,
Latin America saw more international terrorist attacks than any other
region.
Our goal, therefore,
must be to eliminate international terrorist threats to citizens, installations,
and other interests.
Our strategy to do
this has three main facets:
-- Disrupt terrorist
activities to prevent attacks
-- Deny sanctuary
to terrorist groups
-- Bolster our capabilities
for combating terrorism
There is growing
recognition within the international community as to what terrorism is
-- and is not. This recognition is reflected in U.N. international conventions
as well as in an OAS convention from 1973.
Kidnapping, hijacking
and other terrorist actions that had been justified or excused as "political"
are now labeled for what they really are -- criminal actions. Terrorism,
we hope, is becoming de-politicized and recognized for what it truly is
-- criminal behavior.
Leaving the policy
of terrorism for a moment, let me speak for a moment about terrorism strategy.
The fight against
international terrorism is more than 30 years old, and in that 30 years
we have learned the hard way what works to combat terrorism effectively.
Our strategy has
two clear-cut goals:
-- The first is to
reduce the international terrorist threat by:
1. Disrupting terrorist
activities and preventing attacks
2. Denying sanctuary
to terrorist groups
3. Improving capabilities
for combating terrorism
-- The second goal
-- the goal I view as crucial to this body -- is to get OAS member states
to leverage their capabilities in the fight against terrorism via cooperation
with other member states. By sharing tools and capabilities, we gain the
strength of our neighbors.
Moving from the larger
goals, I'd like to speak for a moment about specific steps. Again calling
on 30 years of fighting terrorism, we have a good idea now of what works
and what does not.
The first order of
business is to separate light from darkness, the good guys from bad guys.
One thing that sets the two sides apart is the "rule of law."
Criminals operate outside the law, and it is at times tempting to fight
them with the same tools that they use, but in the end this brings us
down to their level. The rule of law is not always the fastest approach,
but it is the best.
The second key to
is to build and sustain international cooperation. We simply cannot fight
international terrorism alone.
Next, on the domestic
side of things, reducing the friction between agencies is key. For example,
it is crucial to build an information-sharing link between the police
and military units that fight terrorists. This coordination must be undertaken
by senior officials who can provide firm direction to the effort, and
settle conflicts when they arise.
Moving from what
works, generally speaking, I would like to tell you about a set of counterterrorism
measures -- or "tools," as I like to call them -- that you can
call upon.
The specific tools
we call upon can include:
-- Diplomacy
-- Intelligence cooperation
-- Law enforcement
cooperation
-- Legislative and
judicial measures
-- Border controls
-- Financial controls
-- Training programs
-- U.N. conventions
-- Best practices
-- Terrorism workshop
DIPLOMACY
The diplomatic tools
at your service may be your most effective ones. Bilateral diplomacy with
your key neighbors is of utmost importance. We in the U.S. have a long-term
CT {counterterrorism) relationship with Canada, and we wish to explore
a similar partnership with Mexico. I urge all of you to ask yourselves
how you could improve or broaden the level of cooperation with your neighbors.
Public diplomacy
is a vital tool. A free press such as that enjoyed in Colombia -- at the
cost of far too many journalists' lives -- is the best way to expose terrorists
to the light of public scrutiny. My office publishes a document entitled
"Patterns of Global Terrorism" each year in the hopes of doing
the same thing.
The multilateral
fora provide an excellent way to promote mechanisms to punish terror groups
and the nations that harbor them. The U.N., OAS and CICTE, the OAU and
others come to mind. For the effectiveness of these fora, look no further
than U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1333 targeting [the] Taliban regime
and Resolution 1373 providing broad license to fight al-Qaida.
INTELLIGENCE
Your next tool is
intelligence. Intelligence is nothing more than refined information. Without
the right information, the fight against terrorists is impossible. Calling
again upon your relations with your neighbors and allies, I point at that
cooperation [which] builds capabilities. Bilateral service-to-service
information sharing can have a direct security payoff. We in the U.S.
saw this when cooperation with Jordan led directly to prevention of a
massive terror plot last year -- the Millennium plot.
I also urge that
you explore sub-regional intelligence cooperation -- for example, among
Andean region countries or the Mercosur bloc.
LAW ENFORCEMENT
As important as intelligence
cooperation is law enforcement cooperation. The investigation of [the]
August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa is an example of
significant recent cooperation. Kenya and Tanzania both worked with us,
providing joint access to crime scene and evidence. This early cooperation
eliminated legal complications and sped up prosecution, successfully concluded
earlier this year. Such cooperation has side benefits as well: investigators
share techniques and approaches.
Bad laws or lack
of enforcement can be exploited by terrorists.
Good laws are a deterrent
to terrorism and the lesser crimes committed by terrorist groups.
Laws must be consistently
implemented by judicial systems. Terrorists, like narco-traffickers, often
use money to weaken judicial systems. Eliminating corruption in the judiciary
makes all criminals less like to reside where they know they will be effectively
prosecuted.
Your goal is not
to make it impossible for terrorists to do their business, but to make
it as difficult as possible.
BORDER CONTROL
I understand that
the OAS and CICTE may also create a subcommittee on border control issues.
I want to encourage that effort. Speaking from experience, the world's
longest non-militarized border is that shared by the U.S. and Canada,
and the second longest is that shared by the U.S. and Mexico. Since the
inception of NAFTA, these borders that were already the world's busiest,
in terms of commerce, have become even busier.
An international
cooperative effort to reduce the ability of terrorists to move across
key borders is crucial. We know that we will never have perfect knowledge
of every person and every vehicle that crosses these borders.
Therefore, we in
the U.S. know that we must work hand-in-hand with intelligence, law enforcement,
customs, and immigration officials in Mexico, Canada, as well as the Central
American and Caribbean states -- the U.S. "third border."
Some of the tools
your work group may discuss include:
-- Identification
programs
-- Training for customs
and immigration officials
-- INTERPOL communications
system upgrade
FINANCIAL CONTROLS
Your agenda also
tells me you intend to discuss financial controls and create a subcommittee
on financial flows. Cutting off terrorists' access to funds is a sure
way to limit their success. I support your efforts. An international effort
to reduce the ability of terrorists to move money can concentrate on:
banking programs, asset tracking, etc.
TRAINING
When it comes to
increasing the capabilities the forces that fight terrorism, there is
no faster path to success than via training. I hope that a key objective
of CICTE will be to facilitate the sharing of training expertise and resources
among member states.
This is a matter
of doing what we do best. For example, my office relies upon "Antiterrorism
Assistance" (ATA) -- by which we provide assistance in areas where
we believe we have expertise.
BEST PRACTICES
I hope that CICTE
will also be a clearinghouse for what experts refer to as "best practices."
We learn from experience in responding to terrorist bombings, shootings,
hijackings, etc. For example, the G-8 guidelines on hostage-taking are
based on the experience of G8 member states. These shared guidelines include
key principles: save lives of hostages; oppose concessions; uphold rule
of law. These principles also cover policy coordination, operational cooperation,
information sharing, media relations, and family welfare. My hope is that
CICTE will be able to do something similar for OAS countries.
TERRORISM WORKSHOPS
Still on the topic
of training, I want to take a moment now to offer a service to CICTE.
My office would like to provide, over the months and years ahead, a series
of terrorism workshops.
The goal of these
one-day sessions is to improve crisis response and consequence management
capabilities of key government officials and diplomats. We have already
conducted workshops conducted in 10 countries, but none yet in this hemisphere.
Therefore, on behalf
of my government, I wish to propose a series of U.S.-funded workshops
to take place in conjunction with CICTE Regular and Special Sessions,
beginning with the next regularly scheduled CICTE session.
CLOSING REMARKS
In closing, I remind
you that effective counterterrorism requires:
-- political will
-- a policy framework
-- trained forces
-- and reliance upon
the rule of law
I wish you the best
of luck on your special session today. I thank the member states of the
OAS for their solidarity, and I welcome the opportunity to work with you
in the months ahead.
As of October 17, 2001,
this document was also available online at http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/011/lef214.htm