Speech by Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota), October 24, 2001

Speech by Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota), October 24, 2001
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I will be relatively brief. I want to respond to my colleague from Florida.

First of all, the Senator from Florida is about as committed to this region of the world, and to the country of Colombia, as anybody in the Senate. I understand that. This is just a respectful difference of opinion we have.

The two members of the Colombian Congress my colleague spoke about were killed by paramilitaries, the AUC, not by the FARC or ELN, the guerrillas. Although I agree that the FARC and ELN are terrorist organizations and should be listed as such, so is the AUC, which is now listed as a terrorist organization. I will go into this in a moment because I think it is an important point.

There are reasons we do not want to put an additional $71 million into this package without much more accountability when it comes to human rights and who is committing the violence.

I also want to point out that of the money we are talking about, the $71 million, a lot of that money in this package goes to disaster relief, goes to refugees, goes to combating HIV/AIDS, goes to public health, goes to education. I think we are probably a lot better off in a foreign operations bill with these priorities than we are putting an additional $71 million into this package.

I also have, which I think is very relevant to this debate, an EFE News, Spain piece, the headline of which is ``Colombian Paramilitaries Kidnap 70 Farmers to Pick Coca Leaves.''

The truth is, the FARC and ELN, these are not Robin Hood organizations; they are into narcotrafficking up to their eyeballs. But so is the AUC and the paramilitary.

The problem is this effort, Plan Colombia, has been all too one-sided. If it was truly counternarcotics, we would see just as much effort by the Government and by the military focused on the AUC and their involvement in drug trafficking as we see vis-a-vis ELN and FARC. But we don't see that.

There are other reasons we can make better use of this $71 million. Since we started funding Plan Colombia, unfortunately we have seen a dramatic increase in paramilitary participation.

By the way, let me also point out that on the whole question of the war against drugs, not only do I think we would be much better off spending money on reducing demand in our own country--there is a reason why Colombia exports 300 metric tons of cocaine to the United States every year or more, and that is because of the demand. We ought to get serious about reducing the demand in our own country. As long as there is demand, somebody is going to grow it and somebody is going to make money and you can fumigate here and fumigate there and it will just move from one place to another.

My colleague from Florida talked about this effective effort, but the United Nations, with a conservative methodology, pointed out that although 123,000 acres of coca plants have been fumigated under Plan Colombia, cultivation increased 11 percent last year. Cultivation increased 11 percent last year.

Senator Feingold and I will have an amendment and we will talk about the fumigation and we will see where the social development money is that was supposed to come with the fumigation. That was supposed to be part of Plan Colombia. We are also going to be saying we ought to involve the local people who live in these communities in decisions that are made about this aerial spraying.

There are health and safety effects. We can raise those questions. But it is a little naive to believe these campesinos are not going to continue to grow coca if they are not given alternatives, and the social development money has just not been there.

What I want to focus on, which is why I am opposed to the Graham amendment, is the human rights issues. The ranks of the AUC and paramilitary groups continue to swell. The prime targets are human rights workers, trade unionists, drug prosecutors, journalists, and unfortunately two prominent legislators, murdered not by FARC or ELN but murdered by AUC, with the military having way too many ties--the military that we support --with the paramilitary at the brigade level.

I objected to such a huge infusion of military assistance to the Colombian security forces when civilian management remained weak, and the ties between the military and paramilitaries were so notorious and strong.

Since Plan Colombia funding began pouring into Colombia, we have seen a massive increase in paramilitary participation and its incumbent violence. The ranks of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and other paramilitary groups continue to swell. Their prime targets: human rights workers, trade unionists, judges, prosecutors, journalists, and myriad other civilians.

The linkages between Colombia's security forces and paramilitary organizations are long and historic. Everybody agrees, including the Colombian Ministry of Defense, that the paramilitaries account for 75 percent of the killings in Colombia.

The media and international human rights groups continue to show evidence of tight links between the military and human rights violators within paramilitary groups.

The U.S. State Department, the U.N. High Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch are among the organizations who have documented that the official Colombian military remains linked closely with paramilitaries and collaborates in the atrocities.

According to the Colombian Committee of Jurists (CCJ), ``[i]n the case of the paramilitaries, one cannot underestimate the collaboration of government forces.''

According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), the offical Colombian military has in some cases created paramilitary units to carry out assassinations.

The State Department's September 2000 report itself mentions ``credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups, including instances of both silent support and direct collaboration by members of the armed forces.''

Likewise, in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, released in February 2001, the State Department reported that ``the number of victims of paramilitary attacks during the year increased.'' It goes on to say: ``members of the security forces sometimes illegally collaborated with paramilitary forces. The armed forces and the police committed serious violations of human rights throughout the year.''

More from State Department Reports:

The Government's human rights record remained poor; there were some improvements in the legal framework and in institutional mechanisms, but implementation lagged, and serious problems remain in many areas. Government security forces continued to commit serious abuses, including extrajudical killings. Despite some prosecutions and convictions, the authorities rarely brought higher-ranking officers of the security forces and the police charged with human rights offenses to justice, and impunity remains a problem. Members of the security forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed abuses, in some instances allowing such groups to pass through roadbacks, sharing information, or providing them with supplies or ammunition. Despite

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increased government efforts to combat and capture members of paramilitary groups, often security forces failed to take action to prevent paramilitary attacks. Paramilitary forces find a ready support base within the military and police, as well as among local civilian elites in many areas.

Two weeks ago, Human Rights Watch released a report titled ``The `Sixth Division': Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia.'' It contains charges that Colombian military and police detachments continue to promote, work with, support, profit from, and tolerate paramilitary groups, treating them as a force allied to and compatible with their own.

The ``Sixth Division'' is a phrase Colombians use to refer to paramilitary groups, seen to act as simply another part of the Colombian military. The Colombian Army has five divisions.

In the report, Human Rights Watch focuses on three Colombian Army brigades: the Twenty-Fourth, Third, and Fifth Brigades.

At their most brazen, the relationships described in this report involve active coordination during military operations between government and paramilitary units; communication via radios, cellular telephones, and beepers; the sharing of intelligence, including the names of suspected guerrilla collaborators; the sharing of fighters, including active-duty soldiers serving in paramilitary units and paramilitary commanders lodging on military bases; the sharing of vehicles, including army trucks used to transport paramilitary fighters; coordination of army roadblocks, which routinely let heavily-armed paramilitary fighters pass; and payments made from paramilitaries to military officers for their support.

President Andrés Pastrana has publicly deplored paramilitary atrocities. But the armed forces have yet to take the critical steps necessary to prevent future killings by suspending high ranking security force members suspected of supporting these abuses.

This failure has serious implications for Colombia's international military donors, especially the United States. So far, however, the United States has failed to fully acknowledge this situation, meaning that military units implicated in abuses continue to receive U.S. aid. Human Rights Watch contends that the United States has violated the spirit of its own laws and in some cases downplayed or ignored evidence of continuing ties between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups in order to fund Colombia's military and lobby for more aid, including to a unit implicated in a serious abuse.

Although some members of the military have been dismissed by President Pastrana, it appears that many military personnel responsible for egregious human rights violations continue to serve and receive promotions in the Colombian military.

For example, according to a Washington Office on Latin America, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch joint report, General Rodrigo Quinones, Commander of the Navy's First Brigade was linked to 57 murders of trade unionists, human rights workers and community leaders in 1991 and 1992. He also played a significant role in a February 2000 massacre. A civilian judge reviewing the case of one of his subordinates stated that Quinones' guilt was ``irrefutable'' and the judge could not understand how Quinones was acquitted in a military court. Nevertheless, he was promoted to General in June 2000.

According to the Colombian Attorney General's office, another general, Carlos Ospina Ovalle, commander of the Fourth Brigade, had extensive ties to military groups. He and his brigade were involved in the October 1997 El Aro massacre, wherein Colombian troops surrounded and maintained a perimeter around the village while residents were rounded up and four were executed. General Ospina Ovalle also was promoted.

In the State Department's January 2001 report Major Jesus Maria Clavijo was touted as an example of a successful detention of a military officer associated with the paramilitaries. Yet, by several NGO accounts he ``remains on active duty and is working in military intelligence, an area that has often been used to maintain links to paramilitary groups.''

Colombian and international human rights defenders are under increased surveillance, intimidation, and threats of attack by paramilitary groups.

According to a recent Amnesty International press release, two men identifying themselves as members of a paramilitary group approached members of Peace Brigades International, threatened them with a gun and declared PBI to be a ``military target.''

Members of Colombian human rights groups such as the Association of Family Members of the Detained and Disappeared and the Regional Corporation for the Defense of Human Rights have been ``disappeared,'' murdered in their homes and harassed with death threats. Despite reports to the military and requests for help, Colombian authorities seemingly have failed to take significant steps on behalf of the human rights groups.

The systematic, mass killing of union leaders and their members by paramilitaries in Colombia can only be described as genocide. There has been a dramatic escalation in violations against them--kidnapping, torture, and murder--and the response by the Colombian authorities in the face of this crisis has been negligible.

These attacks are an affront to the universally recognized right to organize.

One hundred and thirty-five trade unionists, both leaders and members, were assassinated during the year, bringing the total number of trade unionists killed since 1991 to several thousand. At least another 1,600 others have received death threats over the last three years, including 180 in 2000; 37 were unfairly arrested and 155 had to flee their home region. A further 24 were abducted, 17 disappeared and 14 were the victims of physical attacks. (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions--10 October 2001. Colombia: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights--2001).

I would like to share this quote with my colleagues; it will reveal the true nature of the situation in Colombia. The quote is attributed to Carlo Castan 6o, head of the AUC, the largest paramilitary group in Colombia): ``We have reasons for killing all those we do. In the case of trade unionists, we kill them because they prevent others from working.''

Most of the union killings have been carried out by Castano's AUC, because they view union organizers as subversives. One of the most recent killings occurred on June 21, when the leader of Sinaltrainal--the union that represents Colombia Coca-Cola workers--Oscar Dario Soto Polo was gunned down. His murder brings to seven the number of unionists who worked for Coca-Cola and were targeted and killed by paramilitaries.

I recently met with the new leader of Sinaltrainal, Javier Correa. In our meeting, he described the daily threats to his life, and the extremely dangerous conditions he and his family are forced to endure. In his quiet, gentle manner he told me about the kidnaping of his 3-year-old son and his mother, both at the hands of the paramilitaries. Frankly, I fear for his life and that of his family. In the wake of this meeting, I dread news from the Colombian press, mainly out of fear of what I may read.

In response to these threats, the United Steelworkers of America recently sued Coca-Cola in Federal court for its role in such violent attacks on labor, and other large corporations are being investigated.

According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), the vast majority of trade union murders are committed by either the Colombian state itself--e.g. army, police and DAS (security department)--or its indirect agents, the right-wing paramilitaries.

On both of my visits to Colombia, I heard repeated reports of military-paramilitary collusion throughout the country, including in the southern departments of Valle, Cauca, and Putamayo, as well as in the city of Barrancabermeja, which I visited in December and March.

Consistently, the military, in particular the army, was described to me as tolerating, supporting, and actively coordinating paramilitary operations, which often ended in massacres. I was also told that too often detailed information was supplied to the military and other authorities about the whereabouts of armed groups, the location of their bases, and yet authorities were unwilling or unable to take measures to protect the civilian population or to pursue their attackers.

While in Colombia, I discussed with General Carreno the status and location of the San Rafael--de Lebrija--paramilitary base. The base is operating openly in an area under his command, and its activities have directly

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caused much of the bloodshed in the region. Almost 7 months after our meeting, however, no effective action has been taken to curtail the operations of the San Rafael paramilitary base, and that it remains open for business.
The Colombian military knows where the base is, and who operates it. The Colombian government knows. I know, for heaven's sake. But, just in case they don't know, I will tell them here. The base is on the Magdalena River about 130 kilometers north of Barrancabermeja on the same side of the River as Barranca, northwest of the Municipio of Rio Negro, in the Department of Santander.

It is from San Rafael de Lebrija that the paramilitaries launch their operations to dominate the local governments and the local community organizations in the area around and including Barrancabermeja. It is there that they organize their paramilitary operations of intimidations of the citizens of the area including the attacks on Barrancabermeja.

It is from there that they stage the murder of innocent civilians like Alma Rosa Jaramillo and Eduardo Estrada. These brave volunteers were brutally assassinated in July, simply because they stand for democracy, civil rights, and human rights. They are against the war, and have no enemies in the conflict. They were both leaders in the Program of Development and Peace of the Magdalena Medio, located in Barranca, lead by my friend Father ``Pacho'' Francisco De Roux.

I call on the Colombian government and military to show the U.S. Senate that they are serious about cracking down on paramilitaries.

Close San Rafael. Close Mirafores and Simón Bolívar, also located in Barranca, in the northeast quadrant of the city. Close San Blas, south of the Municipio of Simiti near San Pablo in the South of the Department of Bolivar. Close Hacienda Villa Sandra, a base about one mile north of Puerto Asís, the largest town in Putumayo. Is this too much to ask?

From the annual report on Colombia, by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Organization of American States--year 2000) (The OAS on paramilitary bases):

..... observations ..... confirm that the free operation of patrol checks, paramilitary bases and acts perpetrated by the AUC in the areas of Putumayo (La Hormiga, La Dorada, San Miguel, Puerto Asís, Santa Ana), Antioquia (El Jordën, San Carlos), y Valle (La Iberia, Tuluë) are being investigated mainly in the disciplinary jurisdiction.

It further says:

The Commission is particularly troubled by the situation in Barrancabermeja, Department of Santander. Complaints are periodically received concerning paramilitary incursions and the establishment of new paramilitary camps in the urban districts. The complaints report that even though civilian and military authorities have been alerted, paramilitary groups belonging to the AUC have settled in the Mirafores and Simón Bolívar districts in the northeast quadrant of the city, and have spread to another 32 districts in the southern, southeastern, northern and northeastern sectors.

Arrest the notorious paramilitary leaders who open and sustain these bases. Nearly everyone knows who they are, where they operate. I know, and I've only been to Colombia twice.

They are operated by the AUC, led by the likes of Carlos Castano, Julian Duque, Alexander ``El Zarco'' Londono, Gabriel Salvatore ``El Mono'' Mancuso Gomez, and Ramon Isaza Arango.

The men on this short list--a mere five paramilitaries--account for over 40 arrest warrants over several years. They are responsible for untold cases of kidnaping, torture, and murder. Go get them.

In its annual report on Columbia, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Organization of American States--year 2000) addressed the problem of paramilitary groups and their bases of operations. Here is what they said:

The Commission must point out ..... that although the human rights violations committed by paramilitary are frequently investigated by the regular courts, in many cases, the arrest warrants the courts issue are not executed, especially when they involve the upper echelons of the AUC and the intellectual authors. This creates a climate of impunity and fear. A case in point is the fact that in 2000, the highest ranking chief of the AUC, Carlos Castan 6o, has had access to the national and international media and contacts at the ministerial level, yet the numerous arrest warrants against him for serious human rights violations, have never been executed.

The Colombian government seems to have accepted paramilitary take overs, in places like Barranca. The Colombian government and military must find a way to respond to the paramilitary threat. It is a threat to the rights of free speech, free assembly, and moreover, the rule of law in Colombia.

Mr. President, as I have said all along, if we are really serious about counter-narcotics we should strongly encourage the Colombian government to act boldly and officiously in response to the increasing strength of the paramilitaries, who are actively engaged in narco-trafficking.

Carlos Castan 6o has admitted that about 70 percent of his organization's revenues come from taxing drug traffickers. He is listed as a major Colombian drug trafficker in recent documents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.

Drug trafficking is a lucrative business for all parties involved in the Colombian conflict. The fact is, many military personnel are finding that paramilitary work is simply more lucrative than military pay. In addition, they are not forced to comply with even the minimum in standards for conduct. Yet, this begets another crucial question: where do all these vetted officers and soldiers end up? I fear the answer again lies in the paramilitaries. After all, their ranks have swelled dramatically in recent years.

To date, the debate surrounding Plan Colombia has been disingenuous. Why has there been little effort to combat paramilitary drug lords? I'm afraid we may be exposing this plan for what it really is; counterinsurgency against the leftist guerrillas, rather than a sincere effort to stop the flow of drugs. A recent Rand report suggested that the U.S. government should abandon this charade, in favor of an all-out military offensive on guerrilla forces.

Lamentably, I do not see any improvement on the rule of law front. Since Plan Colombia started, and the requisite oversight, we have witnessed an unprecedented increase in the power and authority of a Colombian military with a long history of corruption and abuse.

Last summer, President Pastrana signed a new national security law that gives the Colombian military sweeping new powers. Among other things, the law allows military commanders to declare martial law in combat zones, suspending powers of civilian authorities and some constitutional protections afforded civilians. The law also shortens the period for carrying out human rights investigations of police and army troops, allowing soldiers to assume some of the tasks that had been assigned to civilian investigators.

Other controversial aspects of the law are provisions that allow the military to hold suspects for longer periods before turning them over to civilian judges. Under the old law, government troops had to free suspected drug traffickers and guerrillas if they were unable to turn them over to civilian authorities within 36 hours. I am very concerned about the implications of these provisions. Like many, I fear that torture or other human rights violations may increase as a result.

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia believes, as I do, that some of the provisions of the law are either unconstitutional or violate international human rights treaties. I have conveyed my objections about this law to the Colombian government. By pouring another $135 million into the coffers of the Colombian military, we will be increasing their power further without adequately strengthening checks on military abuses. Frankly, I feel this is the wrong direction.

I am pleased that my colleagues, especially Senator LEAHY, have fought to attach safeguards to U.S. military aid to ensure that the Colombian armed forces are: First, cooperating fully with civilian authorities, in prosecuting and punishing in civilian courts those members credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or aided or abetted paramilitary groups; second, severing links, including intelligence sharing, at the command, battalion, and brigade levels, with paramilitary groups, and executing outstanding arrest warrants for members of such groups; and third, investigating attacks against human

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rights defenders, trade unionists, and government prosecutors, investigators and civilian judicial officials, and bringing the alleged perpetrators to justice.
Moreover, the paramilitaries undermine the peace process. How can guerrillas--be they ELN or FARC--agree with the government about future political inclusion in the context of a cease fire without first defining the problem of paramilitary groups?

In early 2001, President Pastrana agreed to create a DMZ for the ELN in the northern state of Bolivar. This backfired badly when ELN rebels were chased out by members of the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC. The ELN subsequently pulled out of the peace process.

Frustration with the peace process on the part of the military and the country's elites has helped transform the paramilitary AUC into a major

player in the conflict. Some estimates of the strength and size of the AUC are as high as 9,500 fighters. In my view, this resurgence can be directly linked to the flawed peace process.

The AUC poses a real threat to the FARC and the ELN, who may now be forced to co-operate with each other more closely. That is bad news for the security situation, particularly given the boost it could provide to the weaker ELN.

What's even more telling is the trend of FARC guerrillas joining the ranks of the paramilitaries. Their motives are based on greed. Paramilitaries, financed by narcotraffickers, are now using ex-gerrillas as scouts and officers, to combat the FARC and ELN more forcefully. This amounts to a deadly coalition. The narcotrafficers have money without limits, the paramilitaries use violence without scruples, and the military supplies inside information and protection.

Press reports detailing U.S. reluctance to paticipate, even as an observer, in peace talks between President Pastrana and FARC leaders only serve to increase my concerns. All sides need to encourage a continued dialogue among all sectors of civil society, but the escalating violence makes that increasingly impossible.

Some of my colleagues have argued that the present campaign against terrorism merits our continued military involvement in Colombia. These funds, it is said, are going toward counternarcotics operations, targeting the FARC and ELN, both of which are on the State Department's terrorist list.

I am well aware that paramilitary groups are not the only armed actors committing human rights violations in Colombia, and I am no friend of these guerrilla movements. In fact, I have consistently decried their repressive tactics and blatant disregard for international human rights standards.

I was deeply saddened by recent reports from Colombia which suggest that the FARCC kidnapped and murdered Consuelo Aruajo, the nation's former culture minister. She was a beloved figure across Colombia, known for her promotion of local culture and music. So, I would like to take this opportunity to again call upon the FARC to suspend kidnappings, killings and extortion of the civilian population and the indigenous communities.

That said, I further believe that we should be more forceful in going after paramilitary death squads, with longstanding ties to some in the Colombian military and government.

Several weeks ago, Representative Luis Alfredo Colmenares, a member of the opposition Liberal Party was assassinated in Bogota. We do not yet know who perpetrated this despicable act, but most signs point to paramilitary death squads, AUC. These same paramilitaries are believed to be responsible for the October 2 murder of representative Octavio Sarmiento, also a member of the Liberal Party. Both men represented the province of Arauca, Northeast of the capital, on the Venezuelan frontier--a region that has become increasingly ravaged by the ever-widening war.

I was pleased that Secretary Powell made the decision to add the AUC to the State Department's terrorist list. It was a sign that the United States oppposes threats--from both the left and right--in the hemisphere, and I am encouraged by this development. Yet, I do not believe it goes far enough. As Senators, we should embrace the challenge of making a bold effort to quell paramilitary violence. Wwe must not shirk from that responsibility.

The way out of this mess is nothing particularly new or innnovative. What has been lacking in Bogota and Washington is the political will to take the risks to make the old proposals work.

The Congress and the Bush administration must insist on credible and far-reaching efforts to stop the paramilitaries.

Further, we must provide serious and sustained support for the peace process, and work to deliver economic assistance programs that work instead of dramatic military offensives.

Finally, we need to embrace demand reduction as the most effective mechanism for success in the campaign against drugs.

General Tapias, the highest ranking military person in Colombia was coming to meet with me. It was the day the Hart Building was evacuated. We talked on the phone. I know the Presiding Officer spent some time in Colombia. I said to him on the basis of the good advice from a wonderful human rights priest, Francisco De Roux, General: (A) thank you for trying to do a better job of breaking the connection between the military and the paramilitary. Thank you for trying to do that. We know you have made that effort. (B) I said thank you for going after the FARC and the ELN.

The third question I asked him was when it comes to the murder of civil society people such as the people I met on two trips to Barrancabermeja--some of whom I met, some of whom are no longer alive--people who work with Francisco De Roux, probably the best economic development organization in Colombia--they are murdered with impunity. I said to the general: Where are you? Where is the military? And where are the police in defending the civil society?

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will yield for just one moment.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, military-paramilitary linkages are long and historic. Everybody agrees. I told you that FARC and the ELN are not Robin Hood organizations. But the paramilitaries, now listed as a terrorist organization by our State Department, account for 75 percent of the killings in Colombia by the AUC.

The U.S. State Department, the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty international, and Human Rights Watch are among the organizations who have documented that the official Colombian military has remained linked closely with the paramilitaries and all too often collaborates in these atrocities.

We don't need to be giving out any more money.

The State Department's September 2000 report mentions ``credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups, including instances of both silent support and direct collaboration by members of the armed forces.''

Two weeks ago, Human Rights Watch released a report titled, ``Sixth Division: Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia.'' It is troubling.

The ``Sixth Division'' is a phrase Colombians use to refer to paramilitary groups seen to act as simply another part of the Colombian military. The Colombian military has five divisions.

In this report, Human Rights Watch focuses on three Colombian Army brigades: The Twenty-Fourth, Third, and Fifth Brigades.

I asked the general about direct ties to the paramilitary. They are documented. The paramilitaries are brazen. President Pastrana operates in good faith, and I know he has publicly deplored the paramilitary atrocities. But the armed forces have yet to take the critical steps necessary to prevent future killings by suspending these high-ranking security force members suspected of supporting these abuses.

I am telling you that it is documented. We know. But these military folks aren't removed. They are not suspended. Nothing or very little is done. I don't think we need to spend more money on this.

Human rights abusers are rewarded with promotion. The joint report of the

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Washington Office on Latin America, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch talks about the fact that a number of different high-ranking military people involved in atrocities are directly involved with the paramilitary, and are promoted.
Human rights workers are under attack. There are systematic mass killings of union leaders and their members by the paramilitary in Colombia.

I describe that as genocide. That is what it is. As a matter of fact, the AUC has actually bragged about this. Their leader bragged about this.

And we need to give them more money? I don't think so.

I wish I could mention some of the courageous people who have been murdered.

I have gone to Colombia twice. I have gone to Barrancabermeja. I have gone there because it is sort of a safe haven in Colombia. It is one of the most violent cities in a very violent country.

I have had the opportunity to meet with a man that I consider to be really one of the greatest individuals I have ever met--Francisco De Roux, referred to as Father ``Pacho.'' Why is he so respected and beloved? He has an organization called the Program of Development and Peace of the Magdalena Medio located in Barranca. They do wonderful social justice and economic development work.

In the last several months, a number of innocent civilians, such as Alma Rosa Jaramillo and Eduardo Estrada, brave volunteers, were brutally assassinated--one, I think, in front of his family members. It was awful. They were murdered by the AUC. They were murdered by the paramilitary, and the civil society people who work for their organization still wait for the prosecution.

I said to General Carreno, the military man in the region: Here is AUC's leader, the bad guys. Go get them.

It hasn't happened.

I thank my colleague, Senator Leahy, because I think there are some important human rights safeguards and Leahy safeguards in this legislation that go absolutely in the right direction.

I will zero in on this for the Feingold amendment on fumigating and spraying. I am in profound opposition with the amendment of my colleague from Florida, who is one of my

favorite Senators. I am not just saying that; he is. I have great respect for him. I oppose the additional ways in which money is being spent.

Funding for disaster relief--you name it--and health care makes a whole lot more sense. I don't think we need to be putting any more money into this plan. Believe me. There are important human rights questions to be raised. I don't think the Colombian Government has been nearly as accountable as they should.

Frankly, even with the war on the counternarcotics effort, there are very real questions as to how effective this is.

At the very minimum, let's not spend even more money without making sure first we have the accountability, especially on the human rights issues.

My colleague from Florida said: What is the message going to be? I will say this: What is the message going to be if the United States of America, over and over, all of a sudden says when it comes to democracy and when it comes to the human rights question that we are going to put all of that in parenthesis, and we are going to turn our gaze away from it, that it makes no difference to us, and it is not a priority for our government?

If we do that, we will no longer be lighting the candle for the world. It would be a profound mistake.

I hope colleagues will vote against this amendment.

As of October 25, 2001, this document was also available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/B?r107:@FIELD(FLD003+s)+@FIELD(DDATE+20011024)