Speech
in Colombia by Barry McCaffrey, director, White House Office of National
Drug Control policy, November 20, 2000
Remarks
of Barry R. McCaffrey
Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy
to the Academia Diplomática de Colombia
November 20, 2000
Regional Implications
of Plan Colombia
Good morning, ladies
and gentlemen. It is a pleasure for me to be here with you. Thank you
for the opportunity to share the views of the United States regarding
Plan Colombia and our support for Colombia's democracy and counterdrug
efforts. We continue to believe strongly that drug production, trafficking
and abuse are problems that affect every nation in the hemisphere, and
indeed, nearly every country in the world. For that reason, we must all
work together to make our societies safe and our nations strong.
In the last two decades,
the countries of Latin America have successfully surmounted a wide range
of difficult challenges, from political turmoil and economic recessions
to population shifts and natural disasters. During that time period, longstanding
internal conflicts and border disputes were resolved, economic transformations
were initiated, and democracy spread to encompass 34 of the region's 35
countries. While these accomplishments have created a framework for continued
advances in upcoming years, several potential obstacles remain active
within Latin America. Severe income distribution inequalities persist,
and poverty remains a way of life for roughly one-third of the region's
populace. Corruption blocks socio-economic progress and undermines public
faith in government institutions and authorities. Violence and crime exact
staggering tolls upon society, in terms of both human costs and government
resource allocation requirements. These tenacious problems critically
challenge the institutional capabilities of Latin America's many democracies,
both nascent and long-standing.
While there may be
several conditions that have conspired to perpetuate these difficulties,
perhaps none has been more detrimental than the unique threat of the growing
illicit drug trade. The easing of political and trade barriers and the
globalization of international commerce, finance, and information technologies
have made every country in the region vulnerable to becoming a transit
or market country for illicit drugs. This increased vulnerability to the
illicit drug trade also heightens the risk of corruptive influences, amplified
criminality, and extended health and social problems that can pressure
and potentially undermine democratic foundations. As the Government of
Colombia endeavors to resolve the threat to its national security and
well-being, it has assistance from the U.S., many European nations, and
Japan, as well as the stated support of its regional neighbors. At the
same time, Colombia's neighbors are concerned about the possibility of
increased violence, refugee flows, and drug production as a result of
Colombian action against drug traffickers and the illegal armed groups
associated with drug trafficking. President Clinton has said that the
U.S. is prepared to assist Colombia's neighbors as they confront the regional
threat posed by drug trafficking and illegal armed groups.
The National Security
Strategy of the United States recognizes transnational threats, such as
those posed by drug trafficking and international crime, as serious threats
to the security of the United States. It also identifies the threat of
failed states and environmental destruction as growing challenges to U.S.
interests. Drug trafficking increases a state's risk of entering into
failed state status and the ruin of its environment. Drug trafficking
undermines the democratic institutions of a country, distorts its economy,
increases corruption and fosters a complete disregard for human rights.
It is in the U.S. interest to ensure that these dire effects do not emerge
within Colombia's neighbors as Plan Colombia takes effect. A long-term
commitment is required to support efforts in countries throughout the
region to strengthen democratic institutions, stimulate economic development,
promote the rule of law and eliminate illicit drug production and trafficking.
U.S. Assistance for
Colombia and the Region
The U.S. role in
Colombia is limited but important. In February, 2000, President Clinton
presented an urgently-needed, two-year funding package to Congress to
assist Colombia in vital counter-drug efforts aimed at keeping illegal
drugs off U.S. streets and to help Colombia promote peace, prosperity,
and the continued growth of democracy. President Clinton signed the supplemental
package on July 13, 2000. It stands as one of the largest and most comprehensive
efforts ever by the United States to assist an ally in Latin America with
a national emergency. And make no mistake -- this was a grave national
emergency for Colombia, as evidenced by the drug-fueled deaths of 22,957
Colombian citizens in 1999.
Colombia's drug elimination
plan has a high potential for success in the first phase because drug
production is concentrated in the south and vulnerable to eradication.
In the long term, Plan Colombia will succeed because it works at the village
and farm cooperative level to introduce programs to support the evolution
away from a drug economy. These programs include infrastructure development
for marketing legitimate crops and technical assistance for the grass-roots
organizations that contract for a program of verified voluntary coca reduction.
This approach was successful in Peru and Bolivia once those countries
could provide basic security for the civilian programs and there was a
reasonable threat of eradication without compensation for organizations
that fail to keep their promises to eliminate drug crops.
Security is one of
Colombia's greatest challenges, especially considering the profits to
be made by the illegal armed groups that control the drug producing areas.
It is the main reason why U.S. assistance has a strong military component.
The current fighting between guerrillas and AUC in the south has brought
a halt to counterdrug operations in the region, including the vital alternative
economic development programs. Assisting the Colombian government with
training and equipment to regain lawful control of the drug producing
regions will enable it to protect and serve its citizens as well as reduce
illegal drug production.
A viable peace process
will ultimately be Colombia's best hope to achieve peace and stop the
bloodshed that has marked the country for forty years. We firmly believe
that our assistance package supports such a process and makes it possible
to achieve a just peace in Colombia. An end to the instability in Colombia
would, in and of itself, be a great boon to the neighboring countries,
which all suffer to one degree or another, from the instability and violence
on their borders.
Regional Implications
The effects of a
de facto unification of drug traffickers and illegal armed groups that
control vast territory for drug cultivation and production reach far beyond
the boundaries of Colombia. The drug money that fuels Colombia's internal
conflict is also causing instability throughout the Andean Region. For
example, the violence associated with this ongoing conflict has contributed
to Colombian nationals crossing temporarily into neighboring countries
such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. In the United States, illegal
drugs cost the U.S. 52,000 lives and $110 billion in accidents, lost productivity,
and property damage each year. Approximately 90 percent of the cocaine
coming into the United States originates in or passes through Colombia,
and two-thirds of the heroin seized in the United States comes from Colombia
as well. By assisting Colombia with its response to its emergency situation,
the United States aids its own domestic circumstance; by extending support
throughout the affected region, we seek to bolster our own opportunities
for continued success and security.
The primary focus
of this supplemental effort is to provide support for Colombia's intensifying
counterdrug effort. As a matter of Administration policy, the United States
will not support Colombian counterinsurgency efforts. The United States
will, however, provide support to the Government of Colombia for force
protection and for security directly related to counterdrug efforts, regardless
of the source of the threat. Overall, U.S. support to Plan Colombia reflects
both Colombian and regional concerns, and is based on linked initiatives
to: (1) provide counterdrug assistance to help the Colombian police and
military combat drug production and trafficking in the extensive coca
growing regions in southern Colombia; (2) supplement major increases in
Colombian alternative economic development programs; (3) strengthen governing
capacity and develop better programs to enhance the rule of law and to
support respect for human rights; (4) support Colombia's economic recovery;
(5) promote progress in Colombia's peace process; (6) enhance regional
capacity for the interdiction of illicit drugs and related precursor chemicals;
and (7) support alternative development programs that build on successful
efforts in Peru and Bolivia while initiating programs in Ecuador."
Complementary Regional
Support
The United States
recognizes that the massive effort to restore the rule of law in Colombia
will have implications throughout the region. In fact, the language of
the act of law containing the assistance package highlights this need
by noting that "this effort requires a greater regional emphasis
so that the problems associated with the cultivation, processing and trafficking
of illegal narcotics are not simply relocated elsewhere in the region."
The assistance package, though focused on Colombia, contains $180 million
to support counterdrug efforts in other countries in the region and to
counter any attempts by the traffickers to relocate their illicit enterprises.
The United States
and its allies in the region have a unique opportunity to make a long-term
impact on drug cultivation and trafficking in Latin America now that the
majority of coca cultivation and cocaine production is centralized in
one country. To accomplish this goal, however, our collective planning
must reflect the surest lesson of the many years of counterdrug efforts
-- the illicit drug traffickers will try to adapt to changes in their
environment, such as those projected in Plan Colombia. If the price of
coca continues to climb, Peru and Bolivia could backslide into increased
coca growth in recently eradicated regions; as the processing infrastructure
in Colombia is disassembled, similar capabilities could emerge in Brazil,
Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. It is therefore imperative that the United
States and its allies prepare policies and programs to address the related
threats that may emerge or expand throughout the region.
The illegal drug
producers already appear to be shifting their operations within Colombia.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC) are fighting each other over the existing coca
plantations in the Putumayo department. This interaction is displacing
individuals from that region to other parts of Colombia and causing refugees
to seek temporary safety in Ecuador. Illicit drug producers are also moving
both north and further east within Colombia and may be planning for possible
relocations to Venezuela and Brazil, although the easiest moves would
be to go elsewhere in Colombia.
In Peru, traffickers
have adjusted routes and methods to reduce the effectiveness of law enforcement
and interdiction operations. Peruvian coca prices have been rising since
March 1998, making alternative development and eradication more difficult.
Farmers are returning to abandoned fields and the central growing areas
are being rejuvenated. Clearly, rebounding cultivation in Peru would be
a setback to regional counterdrug efforts. Moreover, the current political
instability may hinder continued eradication in the Upper Huallaga Valley
and expanded alternative crop development.
In Bolivia, the Banzer
administration continues to achieve dramatic reductions in illicit coca
cultivation, but there is cause for long-term concern. The infrastructure
of the cocaine industry is largely still intact and prices are climbing.
Tragically, desperate coca farmers have instigated many acts of violence
(as recently as last month) resulting in the deaths of several Bolivian
citizens. In addition, the demand for alternative development assistance
in Bolivia now substantially outstrips supply. Progress continues to depend
upon the will of the Banzer Administration to incur considerable political
risk as it attempts to reduce coca cultivation while increasing licit
income alternatives. Increased support to address the alternative development
issue and to facilitate justice sector and institutional reform will be
necessary to ensure that the gains are not reversed.
In addition to its
increasing significance as a transshipment site for the cocaine industry,
Ecuador's proximity and terrain could make it an ideal relocation option
for narcotraffickers in southern Colombia. In the past, Ecuador has been
able to deter coca cultivators from establishing a foothold there by maintaining
a credible government presence in the region. Ecuador's will to continue
that strong deterrence is unquestionable. Nonetheless the challenge is
made more difficult because it comes at a time when Ecuador is being stressed
by a variety of factors. The U.S. and its allies need to seek the means
to increase support to create a significant positive impact in the areas
of justice sector and institutional reform, interdiction capabilities,
alternative development, and environmental programs in Ecuador.
Panama is already
being tested by violent incursions into the Darien and San Blas regions
by Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries, where Panama's inadequately
trained and equipped police forces are no match for the insurgents. The
country's overall counterdrug effort is further complicated by expansive
money laundering in its off-shore banking system and the inability of
their law enforcement institutions to properly detect and prosecute these
violations. As the Government of Colombia increases the pressure on the
guerrillas and paramilitaries, these groups can be expected to increase
the frequency of their incursions into Panama.
Venezuela is a significant
transit route for illegal drugs destined for the U.S. and Europe, with
over 100 metric tons of cocaine transiting Venezuela annually by some
estimates. Air and maritime smuggling are both conducted through Venezuela,
due to a transit volume that greatly surpasses the capabilities of their
interdiction forces. Furthermore, some processing operations have recently
relocated from Colombia, making Venezuela a secondary source country,
with the potential for additional growth as Colombian traffickers seek
to shift their production base. Recent counter-drug successes in Venezuela,
such as the 8.8 metric tons of cocaine seized in August 2000 by the international
law enforcement operation "Orinoco," indicate that at the operational
level there are opportunities to make an impact through cooperative efforts.
Due to its proximity
to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela, Brazil is becoming a major transit
country for illegal drugs destined for Europe. Until now, Brazil's remote
and sparsely populated border has experienced limited spillover from the
Colombia conflict. Due to concerns over recent confrontations between
Colombian security forces and the FARC in the border region, Brazil has
taken additional steps to defend its sovereignty. Brazil will soon install
a nation-wide air traffic surveillance network that could help in the
struggle against narco-traffickers, but most illegal drugs transiting
Brazil today are believed to be travelling via land or river systems.
The Amazon Basin is another logical area for the illicit drug traffickers
to target for infrastructure development as they search for additional
territories that pose difficulties for effective law enforcement.
Regionally, the United
States is also committed to initiatives that increase cooperation between
countries and supplement our ability to provide direct support to the
counterdrug efforts of our partner nations. We will continue the development
of the U.S. Forward Operating Location (FOL) infrastructure, enabling
more effective regional counterdrug operations in both source and transit
countries. We will also expand our programs for regional justice sector
training, demand reduction, alternative development, and humanitarian
assistance for refugees. Non-programmatic efforts to support the Colombian
peace process, to share information regarding the intent and impact of
Plan Colombia (particularly with non-governmental organizations), and
to encourage greater cooperation on regional border security and law enforcement
issues will also be important factors in the overall success of our regional
programs.
The crisis in the
Andean Region has precipitated a need for a major U.S. effort to protect
its national interests in stemming the flow of illegal drugs, supporting
democracy and human rights, and encouraging free economic development
by supporting the counterdrug efforts of our regional allies. There is
strong political will in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to attack the drug
trade, root out corruption, end violence, and establish peace and security
within the framework of democracy and respect for human rights. There
is also strong will in the governments of Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela,
and Brazil to counter the negative impact of the illicit drug trade in
their own territories. While there will undoubtedly be some impact to
neighboring countries as the Government of Colombia moves in to restore
the rule of law in its drug producing regions, the impact of increased
criminal activity, internal conflict, and instability would have far greater
consequences for all of us. We will continue to work with all the nations
in the region to ameliorate any negative consequences that may occur as
a result of increased counterdrug efforts in Colombia.
President Pastrana
is on the right track. With international solidarity and support for Colombia's
broad-based long-term strategy, drug traffickers and terrorist groups
can be deprived of their income, drug production will be crippled, and
Colombia's long-suffering people might secure their basic right to earn
a legitimate income without fearing for their lives. Plan Colombia will
work. It will not be a quick or easy process, but it is a process that
will lead to economic recovery, internal security and respect for human
rights, a stronger commitment to democracy and the rule of law, and increased
stability in the region. We will all be benefit from Plan Colombia's success.
As of November 21,
2000, this document was also available online at http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/011/lef102.htm