International Policy Report: "Plan Colombia": The Debate in Congress, 2000

$1.50                                                                                                                 December 2000

"Plan Colombia":

The Debate in Congress, 2000  
By Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson

U.S. relations with Colombia improved instantly in August of 1998, when Andrés Pastrana became the South American country’s new president. The arrival of Pastrana, a Harvard-educated former journalist, meant a break from Washington’s strained relationship with Colombia under his predecessor, Ernesto Samper, who was accused of receiving campaign funds from drug cartels.

A "Marshall Plan"

In October 1998 the new president traveled to Washington seeking funding and diplomatic support for the peace process he had begun with one of the the country’s guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Pastrana came promoting something he called "Plan Colombia." A sort of "Marshall Plan" of social and economic aid, the "Plan Colombia" sought to alleviate the poverty and inequality, particularly in rural areas, underlying Colombia’s nearly fifty years of continuous conflict.

While U.S. officials praised Pastrana’s economic plan, they were less willing to push a big package of economic assistance through a Republican-dominated Congress known for its hostility to foreign aid. At least initially, however, the Clinton Administration actively supported Pastrana’s efforts to get negotiations underway with the guerrillas. This support even included a secret meeting on December 13-14, 1998, between Philip Chicola, the State Department’s deputy assistant secretary for Andean Affairs, and Comandante Raul Reyes of the FARC Secretariat. The U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Curtis Kamman, attended the talks’ January 7, 1999 launch in a jungle zone temporarily ceded to the FARC.

Growing military aid

Even while U.S. support for the peace process was at its height, assistance and contact between the U.S. and Colombian armed forces were increasing sharply. Until the end of the 1990s, most of Washington’s support for Colombia’s security forces was directed toward the Colombian National Police, particularly its counter-narcotics unit. This began to change in late 1998 when the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, and the Colombian Minister of Defense at the time, Rodrigo Lloreda, signed an agreement to formalize closer military cooperation. The accord created a Bilateral Working Group between both countries’ armed forces. It also inaugurated a new initiative: the creation of a 950-man counter-narcotics battalion in the Colombian Army, which was assembled and trained between April and December 1999.

Indeed, the United States’ unequivocal, high-profile support for Colombia’s peace process was short-lived. On February 25, 1999, the FARC killed three American activists who had been working with the U’wa, an indigenous tribe in northeast Colombia locked in a bitter dispute with U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum. The killings reduced U.S. enthusiasm and support for Colombia’s peace process, already dampened by congressional Republicans’ criticisms of the Costa Rica meeting and a lack of progress in the government-FARC talks. Policy proposals with a greater military component soon began to emerge.

As the FARC launched a nationwide offensive in July 1999, Barry McCaffrey, the Clinton Administration’s "Drug Czar" (and a retired general who had headed the U.S. Southern Command), distributed a document among his administration counterparts outlining a plan for a drastic increase in military aid to Colombia. The document proposed a package of mostly military initiatives that would provide Colombia with more than $1 billion — the first time such a sum had been contemplated. In August 1999, Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering paid a visit to Colombia. According to a Washington Post report of Pickering’s visit, the official told Pastrana that "the U.S. will sharply increase aid if he develops a comprehensive plan to strengthen the military, halt the nation’s economic free fall and fight drug trafficking."

A new "Plan Colombia"

This "comprehensive plan" was developed with heavy U.S. input over the next few months, and by late September Pastrana was touting a new "Plan Colombia," quite different than his earlier rural development plan.

The Colombian government presented the new "Plan" in a somewhat vague 30-page document that was available in English in October 1999 and in Spanish in February 2000. This document called for new investment totaling $7.5 billion to support the peace process, combat drug trafficking, reform government institutions and boost a depressed economy. According to the "Plan," the Colombian government would contribute $4 billion of this total, while other countries and international organizations would supply the remaining $3.5 billion. The United States, of course, would be one of the major contributors.

Many speculated that President Clinton would respond to the reworked "Plan Colombia" by asking Congress for a substantial aid package by the end of 1999. By the fall of 1999, though, Congress was tied up in a heated debate over the national budget, and the Colombian government was left waiting. This delay was perceived in Colombian political circles as a blow to President Pastrana, contributing to a decline in his domestic approval ratings.

The U.S. aid package

Pastrana did not have to wait long. On January 11, 2000, President Clinton proposed a package of about 1.3 billion dollars in aid for Colombia and its neighbors and increases for U.S. government anti-drug agencies. The vast majority of this proposed aid - about $1.03 billion - would have gone to Colombia. Of Colombia’s proposed share, about 80 percent ($800.8 million) was destined for the military and police.

The proposal’s heavy emphasis on Colombia’s security forces surprised many. Before its details were made public, U.S. officials had sold their upcoming contribution to "Plan Colombia" as an integrated, balanced approach to Colombia’s crisis, going beyond counternarcotics to tackle more fundamental issues like the peace process, the economy, judicial reform, human rights protection, and strengthening democracy and civil society.

All signs indicated, though, that the proposed aid would win quick approval. It enjoyed the backing of both the president and the Republican majority in Congress.

The aid package turned out to be a tough sell, however. The proposal spent nearly six months moving through Congress, slowed by delays and a great deal of skepticism in both houses. Congressional skeptics’ concerns went well beyond mere proportions of aid amounts. Much unease surrounded the cornerstone of the aid proposal (60 percent of Colombia’s portion), an operation called the "Push Into Southern Colombia." The "push" is a planned Colombian Army offensive in Putumayo, a New Hampshire-sized province along the Colombia-Ecuador border. The offensive would, in the words of then- Southern Command Chief Gen. Charles Wilhelm, "ensure the necessary security for conducting counter-drug operations" like aerial herbicide fumigation. The FARC guerrillas have dominated Putumayo for decades, and their presence, U.S. officials argue, makes it unsafe to conduct such operations in the area.

"Ensuring the necessary security" through the "Push Into Southern Colombia" meant that for the first time the United States was proposing to help the Colombian Army expel guerrillas from a zone they control. A qualitative change from the past U.S. emphasis on Colombian police anti-drug activities, the proposal signified an important new level of involvement in Colombia’s conflict.

Proposed U.S. support for the "push" included the creation, equipping and training of three new 950-man "Counternarcotics Battalions" in the Colombian Army, to be based in Putumayo and neighboring Caquetá province. In the Clinton Administration’s original proposal, the battalions were to be supplied with thirty sophisticated UH-60 "Black Hawk" helicopters and fifteen refurbished Vietnam-era UH-1N "Huey" helopters at a cost of $452 million.

The proposal’s critics expressed grave concerns about this costly and risky new level of U.S. military involvement. A purely military analysis gave reason to doubt that the battalions - about 2,800 troops with a few months of U.S. training - would be able to clear the FARC from Putumayo, one of the group’s oldest, most fiercely defended strongholds and the site of several key guerrilla battlefield victories in the past few years. The possibility that a failed "push" could trigger a further escalation of U.S. military involvement led many to warn of a potential military "quagmire" in Colombia.

Yet even if the "push" were somehow to succeed in eradicating all coca (the plant used to make cocaine) from Putumayo, the aid proposal did not make clear how the package would affect the net flow of drugs from Colombia. The aid package was not designed to prevent drug cultivators - pushed by economic desperation and pulled by U.S. demand for drugs (demand-reduction was not part of the aid package) - from relocating elsewhere in Colombia’s California-sized Amazon basin savannahs and jungles, or over remote borders into neighboring countries.

Concerns were also raised about the aid’s potential to harm Colombia’s fragile peace process. Progress at the negotiating table may be impossible if another country’s money is escalating the fighting. Increased military aid also risks strengthening anti-peace hard-liners on both sides: guerrilla leaders who suspect government motives, and government and military leaders who see a U.S. "rescue" making further peace concessions unnecessary.

The package also had potentially disturbing human rights implications. Even the proposal’s supporters estimated that the "Push Into Southern Colombia" could forcibly displace 30,000 to 40,000 peasants from Putumayo province, and humanitarian groups estimated a much higher number. Concerns were also raised about the new relationship with Colombia’s military, which has a long and troubling record of protecting officers who abuse human rights and aiding and abetting murderous right-wing paramilitary groups. Indeed, administration officials’ cheerleading for the aid plan turned them into some of the Colombian military’s most ardent defenders against human rights advocates’ claims. Meanwhile, the plans for the "push" failed to contemplate the possibility of unsolicited "help" from the paramilitaries, who operate unhindered in Putumayo’s town centers and have voiced support for the revised "Plan Colombia."

Profoundly questioned by skeptics in the House of Representatives and the Senate Appropriations Committee, the package went though several changes during the first half of 2000. When it reached the Senate floor, however, the outcome was quite different.

The House of Representatives

The Appropriations Committee

The Clinton Administration’s January 11 proposal began its legislative journey on March 9, when the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives debated H.R. 3908, the "Emergency Supplemental Appropriations" bill for 2000. This bill included several mid-year additions to the federal government’s 2000 budget to be paid for with the anticipated surplus, among them flood relief for North Carolina, heating oil relief for New England, additional funding for U.S. troops in Kosovo, and the "Plan Colombia" aid package.

Doubts about the proposal surfaced during the committee’s debate, as some Democratic members introduced amendments to cut or limited the aid package’s military portion. Representative David Obey (D-Wisconsin) proposed to delay all military aid until July 31and make Congress approve it separately. This amendment failed by a vote of 20 to 36, gaining the votes of many Democrats uncomfortable with their president’s plan. Nancy Pelosi (D-California), one of the most vocal congressional opponents of the aid package, offered an amendment that would have appropriated an additional $1.3 billion to fund domestic drug-treatment programs. This amendment failed by a vote of 23 to 31. Sam Farr (D-California) introduced amendments, which passed by a voice vote, calling on the administration to add Colombia’s main paramilitary group to its list of international terrorist organizations, and requiring the Colombian government to return any helicopters used in human rights violations.

Toward the end of the debate Farr proposed three more amendments. The first would have added human rights conditions, prohibiting assistance to Colombia’s military until the U.S. Secretary of State certifies each year that Colombia has taken concrete steps to improve military human rights performance, including punishment of military personnel who aid and abet paramilitary groups. Farr’s second amendment would have added $50 million in aid for internally displaced persons and alternative development programs, $6.5 million channeled through the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP). His third amendment would have re-channeled military aid to military reform and economic aid programs in the event of a peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas.

Farr’s amendments failed in the face of fierce Republican opposition. Representative Sonny Callahan (R-Alabama), chairman of the subcommittee that funds U.S. foreign aid, presented a letter sent to him earlier that day by Gen. McCaffrey. The human rights conditions were unacceptable, the drug czar’s letter argued inaccurately, because they would require Colombia to change its constitution. The letter also opposed any funding for UNDCP because "that organization has under consideration the possibility of funding alternative development projects in the zone temporarily under control of the FARC. We would oppose any mechanism to provide U.S. assistance to support that terrorist organization."

After Farr withdrew his amendments, the committee considered other non-Colombia appropriations and voted on the entire bill, which was approved by a 33 to 13 vote. The bill drawn up by the Appropriations Committee ended up closely resembling the administration’s proposal, appropriating $1.701 billion for anti-narcotics, $1.007 billion of it for Colombia. (Most of the increase would have gone to a domestic Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA] program.)

The Full House of Representatives

H.R. 3908 reached the floor of the full House on March 29 and 30, after three weeks of delay caused by several House Republicans’ opposition to any 2000 spending increases. The night before the debate, the House Rules Committee determined that only amendments to cut funds from the package would be ruled "in order," with the exception of a few select amendments approved by the committee.

Skeptics of the Colombia aid package proposed several amendments, inspiring hours of lively debate on the House floor. Representatives Obey, Pelosi, Gene Taylor (D-Mississippi), Jim Ramstad (R-Minnesota) and Ron Paul (R-Texas) offered amendments that in some way would cut, condition or redirect the military portion of the package. Representatives Farr, William Delahunt (D-Massachusetts), Benjamin Gilman (R-New York), and Porter Goss (R-Florida) – some of them staunch supporters of the aid package – offered an amendment to add human rights conditions.

Rep. Obey reintroduced the amendment he had proposed during the Appropriations Committee meeting three weeks earlier. After a brief debate – the Rules Committee gave Obey only twenty minutes of floor time – the amendment lost by a roll-call vote. Though opposed by both the administration and House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Illinois) – the speaker even gave a rare floor speech opposing it – Obey’s measure lost by a surprisingly close 186 to 239 margin, picking up the votes of 60 percent of Democrats, including the party’s House leadership.

The Rules Committee denied Rep. Pelosi’s request to re-introduce the drug-treatment funding amendment she had submitted in the Appropriations Committee. Instead, she introduced a symbolic "cutting" amendment, proposing to cut the $51 million in defense-budget funds (as opposed to foreign-aid budget funds) designated for the "push into southern Colombia." By meeting the Rules Committee’s narrow definition of the type of amendment that could be considered "in order," Pelosi set the stage for a lengthy debate. Twenty-two representatives came to the House floor to give speeches in support of Pelosi’s amendment, using the opportunity to voice opposition to military aid and to call for greater emphasis on domestic drug treatment. Her parliamentary maneuver allowed Rep. Pelosi to extend debate for about four hours; many observers remarked that the exchange was the first in-depth discussion of drug policy that they could recall taking place on the House floor. The amendment eventually failed by a voice vote.

Representative Ramstad, a longtime supporter of domestic drug treatment, introduced a more drastic cutting amendment than Obey’s or Pelosi’s, proposing to eliminate the bill’s entire $1.7 billion counternarcotics section, including all aid to Colombia and its neighbors. This amendment failed by a 159 to 262 margin. The 186 votes for the Obey amendment and Ramstad’s 159 votes were perhaps the high-water mark of congressional opposition to the "Plan Colombia" aid package. Some 210 House members, just under half of those present for the voting, supported at least one of the two measures.

The "emergency supplemental appropriations" bill – less than 10 percent of it aid to Colombia – passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 263 in favor and 146 against. In the end, the bill changed only slightly from the Appropriations Committee’s version (which in turn resembled the Clinton Administration’s proposal). The Delahunt-Farr-Gilman-Goss human rights conditions were added – though they contained language that allowed the President to waive them if "extraordinary circumstances" exist, essentially making them optional. Rep. Tom Sawyer (D-Ohio) inserted an amendment mandating that at least $50 million of the aid be humanitarian assistance for internally displaced Colombians. Rep. Taylor inserted a "troop cap" prohibiting the use of funds in the package to maintain more than 300 U.S. military personnel in Colombia at any given time.

The Numbers

The House bill allocated $1.007 billion for Colombia. Of this amount 78 percent would have benefited Colombia’s police and military. Adding this to $330 million foreseen in the normal aid budget, Colombia would have received about $1.337 billion during 2000 and 2001.

                

The Senate

The Appropriations Committee

The Senate took more than a month to begin consideration of the House’s bill. Majority leader Sen. Trent Lott (R-Mississippi), who largely controls the Senate’s schedule, viewed the emergency appropriation as an obstacle to speedy approval of the 2001 federal budget (potentially keeping senators from adjourning in time for re-election campaigns, which in fact happened anyway). Lott preferred that the Senate consider the Colombia aid funds as attachments to the regular 2001 budget bills. As a result, a small portion of the aid (less than 10 percent) was transferred to the Military Construction Appropriations bill (S. 2521), while the rest was included in the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (S. 2522).

The Senate Appropriations Committee considered and approved both of these bills on May 9, 2000. However, the version drafted by the committee’s leadership – particularly Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) – differed greatly from the House’s bill and the administration’s proposal. The committee’s draft made significant changes, in both amounts and restrictions, to the package’s military aid and human rights provisions.

The anti-drug package was reduced to $1.14 billion, with Colombia’s share reduced to $714 million – a cut of about $300 million from earlier versions. The Senate committee reduced the military and police aid component to $450 million – about $330 million less than the House version. Much of this cut came from a change in the types of helicopters that would be delivered to the new battalions. The thirty UH-60 "Blackhawk" helicopters that were envisioned in previous versions of the package were entirely replaced by seventy-five UH-1H "Super Hueys," an upgrade of a cheaper, older model. "They promised us a 2000 Mercedes, instead we are receiving a 70’s Ford," complained Colombian Air Force Gen. Hector Fabio Velasco.

The committee’s draft legislation included a greatly increased emphasis on human rights. Its version tripled aid for human rights and the institutions that defend them. At the initiative of Sen. Leahy, the Senate version conditioned aid for Colombia’s security forces on compliance with specific human rights standards. The conditions would have mandated that military and police aid be frozen until the U.S. Secretary of State certifies that (1) Colombia’s president has ordered the military to allow officers credibly accused of committing human rights crimes to be tried in civilian courts; (2) military personnel facing credible accusations of human rights abuse are being suspended while investigations proceed; (3) the Colombian military is cooperating fully with Colombian government investigations and prosecutions of human rights crimes; and (4) the Colombian government is vigorously prosecuting paramilitary leaders, and military personnel who aid and abet them, in civilian courts. In the Senate’s version, these conditions carried no waiver; they were designed as a step that could not be bypassed.

The committee’s hour-long debate and the narrative accompanying its bill evidenced a great deal of skepticism about the "push into southern Colombia" and increased cooperation with Colombia’s military. The report cited a lack of clarity in the administration’s plans, a mismatch between objectives and means, and "grave reservations regarding the Administration’s ability to achieve the expected results of reducing production and supply of cocaine while protecting human rights."

During the debate the committee approved an amendment proposed by its most senior Democrat, Sen. Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia), requiring that any future appropriations for counter-drug activities in Colombia be authorized as well as appropriated. Byrd’s measure also established a "troop cap," limiting the U.S. presence in Colombia to 250 military personnel and 100 contract employees. Sen. Slade Gorton (R-Washington) introduced an amendment that would have reduced the Colombia outlay to $100 million, essentially blocking the administration’s proposal. This amendment failed by a surprisingly narrow 11 to 15 margin, leading many to believe that the Colombia aid package would face rough going in a skeptical Senate.

The Full Senate

This proved not to be the case. The expected bloc of senators opposing or questioning the aid package failed to materialize on June 20-22, when the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill came to the Senate floor.

Sen. Lott’s delay of the bill’s consideration gave its proponents – including lobbyists for such deep-pocketed interests as oil companies, helicopter manufacturers and the Colombian government – plenty of time to mount an offensive in the wake of the aid package’s near-defeat in the Senate Appropriations Committee. With the 2000 election much nearer than it was during the House vote, domestic political concerns (particularly the fear of opponents’ thirty-second ads simplistically painting senators as "soft on drugs") exerted a stronger influence.

As a result, the aid package earned quick approval after a surprisingly superficial debate that left many questions unanswered. Most of the debate surrounded two proposed amendments to cut or limit the aid package. Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota) proposed an amendment that would have eliminated the "push into southern Colombia" section of the aid package and shifted those resources into drug-treatment programs in the United States. After about an hour of debate, the Senate voted 89-11 to "table" (essentially, to kill) Wellstone’s amendment. Except for the measure’s sponsor, the only senator who spoke on the amendment’s behalf was Barbara Boxer (D-California). Boxer also sought to introduce an amendment to limit the involvement of U.S. troops in Colombia, but it was not considered for procedural reasons. Sen. Gorton proposed an amendment, similar to the measure he introduced in committee, to cut the Colombia aid to $200 million. Gorton’s amendment failed by a vote of 19 to 79.

The Colombia aid package had some unlikely backers in the Senate. Chris Dodd (D-Connecticut), usually a leading skeptic of military aid to Latin America, was at the forefront of support for the proposed aid. Like the rest of Connecticut’s normally liberal congressional delegation, Dodd was swayed by a domestic consideration: the Blackhawk helicopter is a product of Sikorsky, a division of the defense contractor United Technologies and a major employer (and source of campaign donations) in Dodd’s home state. Sen. Dodd introduced an amendment to reinstate the Blackhawks that the Appropriations Committee had removed from the Senate’s version of the aid package bill. It failed narrowly, by a vote of 47 to 51.

Some senators who had initially opposed the aid package changed their views. A week before the Senate debate, Sens. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois) and Jack Reed (D- Rhode Island) visited Colombia, where they met President Pastrana and traveled to military installations in Putumayo and Caquetá departments. The trip had such an impact on Senator Durbin, until then a co-sponsor of Wellstone’s amendment, that he took the floor to speak in opposition to the measure. Senators Durbin, Reed and Joseph Biden (D-Delaware), all respected Democratic foreign-policy voices, all voiced their admiration for President Pastrana and his "Plan Colombia."

The Numbers

The Senate’s version of the aid package allocated $714 million for Colombia, a significant decrease from earlier versions due largely to the substitution of Blackhawk helicopters with cheaper Hueys. Of this amount 73 percent would have benefited Colombia’s police and military. Adding this to $330 million foreseen in the normal aid budget, Colombia would have received about $1.044 billion during 2000 and 2001. The military portion was reduced significantly by the helicopter substitution, and the outlay for human rights was tripled.

Conference Committee

The aid package was added to the Military Construction Appropriations bill, H.R. 4425, for its final step: the House-Senate Conference Committee. At this stage, a powerful group of legislators from both houses reaches consensus between the House and Senate versions of a bill that is to go to the President for signature. The Conference Committee, whose compromise version (or "conference report") normally gains quick approval from both houses, is often regarded as the least transparent step of the process, as it normally meets behind closed doors with limited opportunity to inform or affect the debate.

The committee’s compromise legislation included $1.32 billion in new anti-narcotics funding, of which $860 million was designated for Colombia. The committee split the difference on the distribution of expensive helicopters, an area of significant disagreement between the two versions: the Colombian security forces will receive 18 Blackhawk helicopters and 42 Hueys, with two of the Blackhawks and twelve of the Hueys designated for the Colombian Police. Funding for human rights protections totaled $51.0 million, a sum nearly identical to the Senate version.

The Conference Committee retained the Senate’s human rights conditions, but weakened them severely by giving the President the ability to issue a "waiver." This means that if the Colombian military does not meet the human rights standards outlined in the law, the President, citing "national security interests," may skip this step and allow the aid to go forward anyway. In August 2000, President Clinton chose to waive the "optional" human rights conditions.

The Conference Committee also omitted some sound provisions in the House bill, such as Rep. Sawyer’s amendment to allocate $50 million to the displaced, and a clause addressing the environmental impact of herbicide fumigation.

The committee’s report gained both houses’ approval on June 29 and 30. On July 13, President Clinton signed it into law (Public Law 106-246).

An evolving position: Clinton Administration rhetoric, 1998-2000

Mid 1998 through early 1999: clear support for the peace process "We know peace can come, even in the most difficult circumstances, if the will and the courage for peace is strong. President Pastrana has the will,the courage, and the support of his people to build peace. I welcome his efforts to open talks with insurgent groups. We stand ready to help." –President Clinton, October 28, 1998 "We are also broadening our relationship to include greater U.S. support for Colombia’s delicate peace process, its difficult human rights situation, its great and still incompletely realized trade and investment potential, and its complex humanitarian problems." – Peter Romero, acting assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, February 24, 1999 "The United States has strongly supported peace processes in places like Guatemala and El Salvador. For this reason we want to work with you to promote peace in Colombia." – Harold Koh, assistant secretary of state for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, April 9, 1999 Mid-1999: debate and mixed messages "Unless the Government of Colombia succeeds in establishing a security presence in the coca growing regions, Colombian coca cultivation will continue to expand and the guerrilla movement will continue to strengthen. …The [Colombian] government remains wedded to a faltering peace process. The negotiations scheduled to begin July 7 were postponed by the guerrillas, who then launched a nationwide offensive on July 3, raising anew questions of their commitment to establishing a lasting peace." – Barry McCaffrey, director, White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, July 13, 1999 "To turn the tide, President Pastrana must wage a comprehensive effort. And he needs -- and deserves-- international support that focuses on more than drug interdiction and eradication."-- Madeleine Albright, secretary of state, New York Times, August 10, 1999 "The strategy that President Pastrana will prepare will, I hope, set out a clear way ahead in economics; in drug fighting; in negotiations; in human rights observance in Colombia, that we can support and do these kinds of things. That’s where I believe the situation is, and that’s where the work needs to go ahead." – Thomas Pickering, under-secretary of state for Political Affairs, August 16, 1999

Post-Plan Colombia: consensus on an elevated military emphasis "The United States Government believes in and supports the peace process not just because it is the right thing to do, but because it would be of great benefit to U.S. interests in Colombia. … However, we have made it very clear to the Pastrana government that "peace at any price" is not an acceptable policy. … We have made clear to all parties that the peace process must not interfere with counternarcotics cooperation, and that any agreement must permit continued expansion of all aspects of this cooperation, including aerial eradication." – Rand Beers, assistant secretary of state for International Narcotics Control, September 21, 1999 "We support the peace process in part because we don’t see a military victory being likely to occur anytime in the foreseeable future. But we also see that to get a negotiation that produces a peace agreement, you have to put some pressure on the parties, especially the guerrillas. And therefore, we are working, as we always have, with the Colombian National Police, to strengthen their ability to go after the narcos, thereby denying income to the guerrillas. And we are doing the same thing now with the Armed Forces which we had done on a much more limited scale in the past. Now we see the need to provide enough firepower, enough manpower in the Armed Forces to accompany the police in their efforts to go after the narcotraffickers. – Ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman, November 1, 1999 "While I share the widely held opinion that the ultimate solution to Colombia’s internal problems lies in negotiations, I am convinced that success on the battlefield provides the leverage that is a precondition for meaningful and productive negotiations." – Gen. Charles Wilhelm, commander-in-chief, U.S. Southern Command, February 15, 2000 "We must not stand by and allow a democracy elected by its people, defended with great courage by people who have given their lives, be undermined and overwhelmed by those who literally are willing to tear the country apart for their own agenda. And make no mistake about it; if the oldest democracy in South America can be torn down, so can others. … The Colombians waging this campaign are fighting not just for themselves, they are fighting for all of us — all of us in this room and the hundreds of millions of people we represent — and for our children." President Clinton, May 2, 2000

The numbers

The new law gives Colombia supplemental aid totaling $860.3 million for 2000 and 2001. This is in addition to an estimated $330 million in already planned aid for those two years, nearly all of it for Colombia’s security forces.

The new money includes $519.2 million for Colombia’s armed forces (or 60.4 percent of the total), of which $416.3 million is designated for the "push into southern Colombia" (of that amount, $328 million will pay for helicopters). The remaining $102.3 million will support military aerial, land and water interdiction activities, logistical and intelligence support, and institutional reform (which includes both human rights training and technical assistance to make Colombia’s military a more effective fighting force). Colombia’s police get $123.1 million from the new aid package (14.3 percent of the total).

Smaller amounts will go to alternative development ($68.5 million, or 8 percent); human rights protection ($51 million, or 6 percent); assistance for displaced persons, including those to be displaced by the "push into southern Colombia" ($37.5 million, or 4 percent); law enforcement and rule of law assistance ($45 million, or 5 percent); judicial reform ($13 million, or 2 percent); and support for the peace process ($3 million, or less than 1 percent).

The Interests Involved

Several powerful economic and political interests played important roles in guiding the U.S. contribution to "Plan Colombia" through Congress. The Colombian government, aware of the impact the package’s passage would have on President Pastrana’s approval ratings at home, hired the prestigious lobbying firm Akin, Gump to help it craft its sales pitch.

What Happened in Europe? The Colombian government met with representatives of 27 donor countries and several international organizations on Friday July 5, in Madrid, Spain and again on October 24 in Bogota. The Colombians’ goal: to acquire 1 billion dollars to support "Plan Colombia." These meetings, however, have not brought their desired results. The only non-U.S. country to pledge a contribution to Plan Colombia has been Spain ($100 million). The Inter-American Development Bank and Andean Corporation for Development jointly contributed $300 million worth of loans. The United Nations contributed $131 million for its agencies’ programs in Colombia, an outlay that would have been made even if Plan Colombia had not existed. The lack of commitment owes mainly to European governments’ reservations with regard to "Plan Colombia." To many, the social and development programs for which Colombia seeks European support appear hastily planned and poorly integrated with the primarily military aid plan being backed by the U.S. contribution. At the same time as the July 5th meeting, 150 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from Europe and Colombia met in Madrid. The "Plan Colombia," these groups argued, is primarily militaristic due to Washington’s contribution, and will ultimately worsen conditions in Colombia. The NGOs in Madrid opposed the "Plan" for several reasons: its high military component, the forced displacement that will result from its implementation, the economic reform measures proposed, and the lack of input in its design from the Colombian people, the Congress and the communities which will be most affected.

Lobbying by corporations, those with investments in Colombia and those who stood to gain financially from the aid package, played a big role as well. Oil companies, stung by years of guerrilla attacks on their infrastructure in Colombia, aggressively supported the legislation; a vice president of Occidental Petroleum even testified in a hearing before the House Drug Policy Subcommittee. Meanwhile the lobbying efforts of helicopter manufacturers – Blackhawk vendor United Technologies and Huey upgrade kit maker Bell Textron – included free helicopter rides over Washington for congressional staffers.

A key factor driving the Clinton Administration’s aid push was a September 1999 Democratic poll revealing a Republican edge on the drug-policy issue for the 2000 campaign. The poll, Newsweek’s Michael Isikoff and Gregory Vistica reported in April, was commissioned by defense contractor Lockheed Martin, which will gain $68 million from the aid package’s inclusion of P-3 aircraft upgrades for the U.S. Customs Service.

Domestic political concerns also determined many legislators’ votes. Election-year fears of being misleadingly portrayed as "soft on drugs" certainly swayed many. A large number of those who voted for the package lacked in-depth knowledge of the issue, but saw no reason to take a stand against a measure that the President and the Republican congressional leadership both supported.

The Next Steps

With the aid package now law and the human rights conditions waived, implementation of the military strategy is now in full swing. Since late July, a contingent of U.S. Special Forces has been training the second Colombian Army counternarcotics battalion (as it was funded through the Pentagon outlay, this training could proceed without regard to the human rights conditions, which only applied to funds in the foreign aid budget). The battalion will complete its training in December. The third battalion should be ready by April 2001.

December is when the "push into southern Colombia" is scheduled to begin in earnest. With the onset of the dry season, aerial herbicide fumigation is to begin on large-scale cultivations (defined as greater than three hectares, or 7.5 acres) in Putumayo province. The two available counternarcotics battalions, armed with an initial shipment of "interim" Huey helicopters, are to ensure the safety of these operations by guaranteeing that guerrillas are not present to retaliate against fumigation aircraft.

Growers of less than three hectares of coca will be given twelve months to enter into "community pacts," in which the Colombian government will provide them aid and technical assistance in exchange for immediate voluntary eradication of their coca plants. The U.S. aid package provides enough assistance to help 2,650 families, or 13,250 people, though most of Putumayo’s population of 300,000 depends directly or indirectly on the coca trade. Those who do not enter into "community pacts" will face aerial fumigation after twelve months.

Helicopter deliveries will proceed throughout 2001. More "interim" Hueys will arrive in the first quarter of 2001. Blackhawks are to begin arriving in the second quarter of 2001 and will complete delivery by the end of the year. (Until October 12, 2000, the State Department had been predicting the Blackhawks’ delivery between November 2002 and May 2003. The actual delivery schedule is probably somewhere in between the original and revised estimates.) The refurbished "Huey IIs" are to begin delivery in mid-2001, and the last is to arrive in mid-2003.

Military aid funds for 2001 may not be disbursed until the State Department issues another human rights certification, or until the President waives this requirement. This certification (or waiver) is expected in late December 2000 or early January 2001.

The recently approved aid package only covers U.S. assistance to Colombia in 2000 and 2001. The debate over 2002 aid will begin next spring, when the Bush or Gore administration submits a new aid proposal to Congress. As the United States deepens its involvement in Colombia’s conflict, we will soon be doing this all over again.

Putumayo: The epicenter of the "Push into Southern Colombia"

The map illustrates Colombia’s Department of Putumayo, highlighting areas where U.S. aid is focused, combat sites, and oil and coca production zones.

Much more information about U.S. aid to Colombia is available at CIP’s website: www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/

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Ingrid Vaicius is an associate in the Center for International Policy’s Latin America Demilitarization Program. Adam Isacson, a Senior Associate at the same program contributed in the editing and design of this report. This work was made possible by contributions from the Compton Foundation, the CarEth Foundation, the General Service Foundation, the Academy for Educational Development, and several individual supporters.

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