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Clinton Administration's Aid Proposal Text of a document circulated by the White House, no letterhead, dated February 3, 2000 PROPOSAL FOR US ASSISTANCE TO PLAN COLOMBIASUMMARYColombia is currently enduring critical societal, national security, and economic problems that stem in large part from the drug trade and the internal conflict that it finances. This situation has limited the Government of Colombia's sovereignty in large parts of the country, which have become the world's major cocaine producing region. These problems directly affect the United States in that Colombia has become by far America's largest supplier of cocaine, contributing to drug abuse that costs the United States over $100 billion per year. The Government of Colombia is now taking the initiative to confront the challenges it faces, and the United States needs to be there to assist in the fight against drug cultivation and trafficking. The Administration's proposal for support for Plan Colombia is balanced and addresses the breadth of Colombia's challenges, and will help Colombia in its efforts to fight the drug trade, foster peace, increase the rule of law, improve human rights, expand economic development, and institute justice reform. The Administration is proposing a $1.6 billion assistance package to Colombia including a $954 million FY 2000 emergency supplemental and $318 million in FY 2001 funding, primarily to reduce the supply of drugs to the United States by assisting the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to limit the production, refinement, and transportation of cocaine. Building on current funding of over $330 million in FY 2000 and FY 2001, the Administration's proposal includes an additional $818 million funded through international affairs programs (function 150) and $137 million through defense programs (function 050) in FY 2000, and $256 million funded through function 150 and $62 million through function 050 in FY 2001. The Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, as well as the Agency for International Development, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy all will play a role in this coordinated interagency effort. This package is intended to advance US national security interests while responding in a balanced manner to Colombia's societal, economic, governmental, and narcotics problems. It provides necessary equipment, training, and technical assistance to the GOC to meet the urgent need to assert sovereignty over Colombia's drug-producing regions. It requires the GOC to ensure that these resources are used only by units that meet stringent human rights criteria. It enhances the ability of the GOC to attack the drug trade while simultaneously improving its ability to administer justice fairly. It provides resources to support economic development initiatives. It bolsters the peace process by depriving illegal armed groups of the drug-related cash flow without which they will be more likely to resolve their issues peacefully at the negotiating table. COLOMBIA'S CRISISColombia and its democratically elected government are facing an urgent crisis that has drug-related, national security, and socio-economic dimensions. The cultivation of coca in Colombia has doubled from 50,900 hectares (about 123,500 acres) in 1995 to 101,800 hectares (about 247,000 acres) in 1999 (see chart 1). New information about the potency of Colombian coca, the time required for crops to reach maturity, and efficiency in the cocaine conversion process has led to a revision of the estimates of Colombia's 1998 potential cocaine production from 165 metric tons to 435 metric tons. The 1999 estimates are expected to be even higher. The cultivation of opium poppies has expanded from almost nothing in 1990 to over 6,000 hectares (nearly 15,000 acres) now, producing enough high purity heroin to meet over half of the U.S. demand. The booming drug trade in Colombia yields billions of dollars in profits each year, part of which goes to illegal armed groups (guerrillas and paramilitaries) that are directly involved in producing and trafficking drugs or make money by protecting those who are. These groups are most active in the undeveloped countryside of Colombia, especially the southern departments of Putumayo, Caqueta, and Guaviare. The lack of roads and infrastructure in these regions makes it extremely difficult for the GOC to establish credible counter-drug programs, curtail the illicit activities of the illegal armed groups, or even maintain presence. As a result, as much as half of Colombia may be under the dominance of groups that operate outside the law and the people in those areas lack access to their own democratic institutions. Aside from their involvement in the drug trade, the guerrillas and paramilitaries are also engaged in a thirty-five year old internal conflict which has left thirty thousand dead and more than a million people displaced. The two largest guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and right-wing paramilitary groups have contributed to the erosion of democratic institutions in Colombia through corruption, kidnapping, murder, and other violence. Due to this violence, there have been over 1.5 million people displaced people in Colombia over the last fifteen years. Meanwhile, the Colombian economy is undergoing its first recession in 25 years, and the deepest recession of the last 70 years. Real gross domestic product is estimated to have fallen by 3.5 percent last year, the result of external shocks, fiscal imbalances, and a further weakening of confidence related to stepped up activity by insurgent groups. Unemployment has rocketed from under 9 percent in 1995 to about 20 percent in 1999, adding to the pool of unemployed workers who can be drawn into the narcotics trade or into insurgent or paramilitary groups (see charts 2 and 3). The deep recession has also sapped the Colombian government of resources to address societal and political pressures, fight the narcotics trade, or respond to its thirty-five year internal conflict. HOW THE US IS AFFECTEDDespite the efforts of President Pastrana's administration, the vast majority of Andean coca is cultivated and produced in Colombia, which is now the source country or transit zone for about 80 percent of the cocaine used in the United States. Colombia is also a growing source for heroin coming into the United States. Colombia's capacity for drug production is on the rise. Drug cultivation is moving rapidly into southern Colombia. Farmers are planting opium poppy and ever more potent coca plants that yield increasing amounts of cocaine per hectare of coca under cultivation. Left unchecked, the continued expansion of Colombia's drug crops will lead to an increase in the cocaine and heroin supply to the United States, potentially reversing recent years' gains in the fight against drug trafficking and abuse. The drug production problem in the Andean Region has changed dramatically over the last decade, in large part due to successful cooperation with Peru and Bolivia in counter-drug programs. Until 1997, most coca was grown in those two countries, and coca base was shipped to Colombia for processing and distribution. Aggressive drug crop eradication and interdiction operations in combination with alternative economic development programs in Peru and Bolivia have reduced coca cultivation in those countries 66% and 53%, respectively, since 1995. Unfortunately, the traffickers found favorable conditions to move cultivation into Colombia, converting it into the world's largest producer of coca. Dominance of Colombia's vast coca growing regions by guerrilla or paramilitary groups, another relatively recent phenomenon, has greatly handicapped Colombian President Pastrana's ability to reduce drug production or enforce Colombian national law. These new circumstances require a change in strategy, policy, and resources if we intend to protect our nation from becoming the target of dramatically increased amounts of cocaine and heroin and avert possible increases in drug addiction, violence and crime. It is in the interest of both the United States and Colombia to curb the Colombian drug trade and bring increased peace and stability to Colombia and the Andean region as a whole. COLOMBIA'S RESPONSE - PLAN COLOMBIAColombian President Andres Pastrana, who took office in August 1998, is doing what he currently can to deal with these interlocking problems. He launched peace negotiations with the FARC. He has arrested scores of drug kingpins and courageously resumed the sanction of extraditing Colombian narco-traffickers to the US for trial. In recent months, for the first time in ten years, one Colombian and one Venezuelan have been extradited, and over forty more Colombians are in various stages of the process that may lead them to extradition to the United States. President Pastrana has also placed his personal prestige behind the decision made by Colombia's military leadership to improve the military's human rights performance, end collusion with right-wing violence; and punish those who violate these new policies. Under current leadership, the Colombian military is also undergoing a cultural transformation which, if sustained, bodes well for Colombia. Defense Minister Ramirez and Armed Forces Commander Tapias have taken dramatic steps to deal with the legacy of human rights abuses and impunity that have clouded our bilateral relations in the past. The forced retirements of Generals Millan and del Rio because of ties to illegal paramilitary organizations and the arrests of General Uscategui and Lt. Col. Sanchez Oviedo for alleged involvement in the 1997 Mapiripan massacre conducted by paramilitaries are particularly significant. The USG's annual human rights report has also documented a steadily declining number of reported human rights violations by the Colombian military. Clearly, these are only steps toward a solution. Still, these good faith efforts demonstrate the will to do the work that remains in addressing human rights problems in the Colombian military and to resolving the difficult challenges facing Colombia. Most important, this past summer President Pastrana unveiled Plan Colombia, a comprehensive, integrated response to Colombia's economic and societal problems, the internal conflict, and the narcotics business that fuels it. This program will cost $7.5 billion to implement. Colombia will pay most of the cost itself, and President Pastrana is seeking $3.5 billion dollars in foreign assistance from the US and other international donors. President Pastrana's plan focuses on five strategic issues:
These five planks respond to Colombia's most severe problems comprehensively. The key to all of them is strengthening the democratic institutions and its ability to rule. Repairing the economy will make it easier for the Colombian people to provide for themselves and will decrease the lure of the drug trade and other illicit activity. Combating the drug trade will reduce corruption, allow for legitimate economic development, remove the principal source of economic support from the illegal armed groups who create havoc within Colombian society, and make the negotiating table a more attractive setting than the battlefield for solving their problems. Decreasing the scale of the internal conflict will facilitate the reform of human rights and the justice system. illegal armed groups will no longer be in a position to control and abuse the Colombian people, and the GOC will be able to focus on reforms within the government more than combating insurgents. True democratization and social development will bring better governance to the Colombian people. Plan Colombia provides carefully balanced and integrated programs that respond to Colombia's wide-ranging problems. To promote any plank over another would be to leave weak links in place in Colombian society, which would in turn decrease the efficacy of the overall program. HOW PLAN COLOMBIA BENEFITS THE UNITED STATESOne of the costliest social issues facing the United States is the use and abuse of illegal drugs. illegal drugs cost our society nearly $110 billion dollars each year due to health costs, accidents, and lost productivity (see chart 4). The US has been successful in reducing the number of cocaine users by over seventy percent since its peak in 1985. With coca growth and cocaine production concentrated in southern Colombia, President Pastrana's administration and Plan Colombia, in combination with continued successful counter-drug efforts in Peru and Bolivia, present the United States with its greatest opportunity for supply reduction in the fight against drug trafficking and abuse. The program will also bolster the economy of one of America's largest Latin American trading partners and will increase stability in the Andean region. Just as the United States and Colombia share the threat to our respective national security and society posed by the drug trade, we share the responsibility to act against it. The United States and other nations must join together to help President Pastrana implement Plan Colombia. To that end, President Pastrana has asked the United States for assistance to support Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia and US support for it are designed as a comprehensive, integrated response to Colombia's challenges. Thus, this proposal includes support for counter-drug interdiction operations and for the creation and support of Colombian Army Counter-narcotics Battalions to support Colombian National Police (CNP) law enforcement efforts. US support to Plan Colombia also provides measures to strengthen the justice system, including the handling of human rights violations. It also provides help for economic and social development to address Colombia's socioeconomic challenges and to give Colombians engaged in the drug trade genuine legal alternatives to their current illicit activities. In formulating this package, the Administration has assessed Colombia's capacity for equipment, training, and development programs in order to robustly support all in a balanced package that Colombia can absorb constructively. Accordingly, the Administration is proposing a comprehensive, multi-year program totaling more than $1.6 billion over the next two years. The bulk of this package is being proposed as an emergency FY 2000 supplemental of $954 million. The remainder is included in current programs or proposed in the Administration's FY 2001 Budget. The current conditions were not foreseen when the FY 2000 Budget was developed. In line with the counter-drug assistance supplemental for FY 1999 championed by the House leadership, and because of the urgent and extraordinary nature of Colombia's problems and their effect on the United State, the Administration is requesting the FY 2000 supplemental as an emergency. Considering the explosion of coca cultivation and cocaine production in southern Colombia, the recession s negative impact on the GOC's ability to respond to social and economic needs, and the continuing violence and human rights abuses associated with the civil conflict and financed by the drug trade, it is in the US interest to respond quickly and firmly to President Pastrana's timely request for US assistance. Support to Plan Colombia in FY 2001 is fully paid for within the Budget. The United States has sought to ensure that others also assist Colombia in addressing its problems. With our strong support, the International Monetary Fund has approved a $2.7 billion dollar program for Colombia. In addition, we are supporting the GOC's request for more than $3 billion in loans from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. These funds will be used for financial and public sector restructuring, social safety net, and infrastructure investment. We have also initiated efforts to build support among potential bilateral donors in Europe and Asia. UNITED STATES SUPPORT TO PLAN COLOMBIAThe proposed United States' contribution to support Plan Colombia has five components centered around reducing the supply of drugs to the United States. It includes a counter-narcotics push into the drug producing regions in southern Colombia, increased drug interdiction, greater support of Colombian National Police eradication efforts, alternative economic development, and assistance to boost Colombia's local and national governing capacity, including enhanced justice and human rights protection (see chart 5). The push into drug producing southern Colombia will give greater sovereignty over that region to the GOC, allowing the CNP to eradicate drug cultivation and destroy cocaine laboratories. Increased interdiction will make the entire drug business more dangerous for traffickers and less profitable. Meanwhile, funding for Plan Colombia will support internally displaced people with emergency relief in the short term and will fund alternative economic development to provide licit sources of income in the long term. USAID and DOJ will fund programs to improve human rights conditions and justice institutions giving the Colombian people greater access to the benefits of democratic institutions. Regional parts of the program will prevent the resurgence of the illegal drug industry in neighboring countries like Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, where the United States has had success in stemming drug cultivation and production through cooperative efforts with those nations' governments. Table 1. Support to Plan Colombia Budgetary Request
Push into Southern Colombia Coca Growing Areas:Summary: The world's greatest expansion in drug cultivation is occurring in insurgent- dominated southern Colombia (see map on chart 1). With this package, the Administration proposes to fund $600 million over the next two years to help train and equip two special counter-narcotics battalions (CNBN) which, in addition to the CNBN that the US just trained, will round out a counter-narcotics brigade. illegal armed groups such as FARC and the paramilitaries earn hundreds of millions of dollars per year participating in and protecting the narcotics trade in Colombia. The Colombian National Police (CNP) lack the capability to carry out counter-narcotics missions in the southern departments of Caqueta and Putumayo, which have become the center of coca cultivation, due to the good growing conditions and heavy concentration of well-armed guerrillas and paramilitary groups operating there. The Colombian Army CNBNs will be dedicated to supporting CNP counter-narcotics operations and providing protection to the CNP to enable them to eradicate illicit crops, destroy drug labs, and arrest those involved in drug trafficking. CNBN mobility is paramount to the success of this effort. Without airlift, the CNBNs will not be able to operate in the most active coca growing areas in preparation for CNP eradication and lab interdiction operations. The package will provide 30 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and 15 UH-1N Huey helicopters, as well as funding to sustain 18 UH-1N Hueys now in Colombia. This will give the CNBNs the air-mobility they need to access remote and undeveloped regions of southern Colombia. The proposed assistance package will also provide resources to increase intelligence for the Colombian Joint Task Force - South, based at Tres Esquinas, which includes fully-vetted participants from all the military services and the Colombian National Police. This package will also provide funds for shelter and assistance to the Colombian people who will be displaced due to the counter-drug effects of this push into the southern coca-growing regions of Colombia. Counter-Narcotics Battalions: The cornerstone of the push into southern Colombia will be the newly developed air-mobile counter-narcotics battalions (CNBNs). Plan Colombia provides funding for two such battalions, which, along with the 900-man battalion that already exists, will provide sufficient force to make this effort viable. These two battalions will be trained by U.S. troops on temporary duty in Colombia. This training is scheduled to begin in the March/April 2000 time frame. The training of the two battalions will go on nearly simultaneously and should be completed about seven months after it begins. Thus, by late in CY 2000 the three-battalion force should be ready to conduct operations. In accordance with US law and policy, the personnel for these CNBNs will be vetted for any signs of past involvement in human rights violations. It will cost about $9 million to train and equip each battalion, with roughly half covering training costs and half providing non-lethal equipment (radios, uniforms, etc.). These costs will be borne by DOD. Another $2 million per battalion for lethal equipment (weapons, ammunition) will be funded by the State Department. The CNBNs will have substantial logistics capability along with combat capability that will enable them to be reasonably self-sustaining. They will also have a self-contained capacity to train replacement personnel to fill slots as soldiers leave. $3 million is provided in FY 2001 to sustain training for the CNBNs and provide counter- drug training to other vetted Colombian forces involved in counter-drug missions. These troops will also be thoroughly vetted for compliance with human rights standards. $36 million over the two years is also included to cover sustainment costs for the CNBNs (food, ammunition, fuel, etc.), force protection (construction of bunkers, perimeter lighting, etc. at existing Colombian Army facilities), and logistical support improvements for these units (training and equipping logistics personnel, including computers). Initial operations by the CNP and CNBNs will focus on the fringe of the coca growing areas of Putumayo and Caqueta and in the areas closest to existing operational bases. This will allow the counter-narcotics forces to gain operational experience in the field before they become fully air-mobile. It will also allow time for improvements to forward operating sites, and will ease the integration of the helicopters into their operations. Helicopters: The supplemental appropriations request includes funding to provide 30 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and 15 UH-1N Huey helicopters to the Colombian army, as well as funds to operate and maintain them. These helicopters will augment 18 UH-1Ns already in Colombia for the CNBNs and will provide the CNBNs the mobility and rapid access to undeveloped areas that they will need to support and protect the Colombian National Police in the remote southern coca-growing regions. The quantity and type of helicopters chosen is intended to optimize the operations of the CNBNs by providing the Colombian army the maximum capability at a reasonable cost. Giving the soon-to-be-trained CNBNs dedicated aviation support will allow them to maintain a high operations tempo in support of the CNP's drug eradication effort. While the UH- 1N helicopters are less capable than the Blackhawks, they are also less expensive, easier to maintain, and faster to assimilate into operations because they only require modifications to existing airframes while the Blackhawks are new production airframes. The Blackhawks, while more expensive and more complex to maintain, can fly farther and faster than the UH-1Ns, can carry more soldiers, and are better suited to operate in the high elevations and hot conditions of Colombia. The GOC currently has 28 Blackhawks among its security forces. Table 2. Blackhawk and Huey Comparison Specifications
* depending upon configuration Assuming funding is provided this summer, anticipated delivery of the final 15 Huey helicopters will be complete in late CY 2000. We anticipate that Blackhawks will begin to come on-line in late 2001. Pilots for the Hueys will largely be a combination of Colombian contractors and service members with some on contract from other Latin American countries. Blackhawk pilots will then come from the Colombian Army and Air Force's existing pool of trained helicopter pilots. To support ground-based tactical surveillance and intelligence collections requirements, the request includes funds for procurement as well as operations and maintenance costs of low- altitude, long-duration reconnaissance aircraft with Forward-Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) and signal intelligence collection, such as a Schweitzer, RG-8A. Humanitarian Assistance: Plan Colombia also addresses the societal impact of the push into southern Colombia through meeting the needs of displaced persons, supporting human rights delegates to the region, strengthening local governments, and providing alternative economic development. The eradication of coca crops will hurt the illicit economy, and will force some people to move to find employment. The proposed assistance package supports the positioning of international organizations such as the Red Cross and the International Organization for Migration, as well as Colombian NGOs to deal with the estimated 10,000 plantation workers that will be displaced by the eradication campaign. Displaced persons will receive a 90-day emergency benefits package, followed by a "Contingency Plan" sponsored by PLANTE (Colombia's alternative development agency) covering the time of return until the onset of a viable alternative development program. To address the expected increase in violence arising from the eradication effort, USAID will provide support to the human rights delegates of Colombia's National Ombudsman's office to circulate where possible in Putumayo and Caqueta. In order to foster the recovery of municipalities once illicit production has been destroyed, USAID will provide simple grants for public infrastructure. To obtain a grant, the municipal government must meet criteria for transparency in financial management and active participation in alternative development. USAID will also establish Casas de Justicia in conflictive areas of Putumayo and Caqueta as security permits. Finally, for those small farmers who do not leave the region (estimated 4,000), USAID will assist the GOC to implement an alternative development program of licit crop substitution, improved local governance, and environmental management similar to the program initiated in the rest of Colombia. More Aggressive Andean Region Interdiction:Coca and cocaine are produced in a relatively small area of Colombia, while the Central American/Caribbean/Eastern Pacific transit zone is approximately the size of the United States. Enhancing Colombian interdiction capabilities will allow them to attack the narrow end of this funnel, which is essential to decreasing the northward flow of drugs. Denying cocaine shipments out of southeast Colombia will also decrease the price paid to farmers for coca leaf. This effect on coca leaf prices may initially seem counter-intuitive, but experience in Peru provides a striking success story. Through skillful use of intelligence and coordination between US detection and monitoring assets and Peruvian Air Force interceptors, the Peruvians were able to force down enough trafficker aircraft to seriously diminish coca leaf trafficking from Peru to Colombia. This in turn deprived coca farmers of a market for their product, leading to a drop in coca leaf prices. Coca cultivation then fell from over 115 thousand hectares in 1995 to some 51 thousand hectares in 1998. Interdiction will have a depressing effect on prices because as interdiction is stepped up, there are fewer planes to transport the same amount of coca leaf production. The result is an effective glut of coca leaf that allows the traffickers to shop around for the cheapest purchase price from farmers who wish to sell their product. The lower price paid to farmers will decrease their incentive to grow illicit crops and makes it easier to move into legal economic activity. To beef up interdiction capabilities, the program includes funding over the next two years to improve radar systems to track suspect targets, to upgrade airfields and AC-37 and OV-l0 aircraft to give Colombia a greater ability to intercept traffickers and to provide better intelligence to allow the CNP and military to respond quickly to narcotics activity. The proposal would also fund the construction of a US Forward Operating Location in Manta, Ecuador and fund assistance to enhance interdiction efforts in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador to prevent narco- traffickers and growers from moving into neighboring countries. In addition to air interdiction, Plan Colombia will expand riverine, maritime, and over- land interdiction capacity. The Colombian Navy will also receive support to upgrade and increase their operations to intercept the precursor chemicals that are used to make cocaine from coca leaves as they are ferried up-river to laboratory sites. Additional funding will improve CNP bases and aircraft to provide easier access to laboratories and greater mobility in putting CNP forces on the ground to destroy those labs and make arrests. In Peru and Bolivia, the Administration proposal will fund upgrades to helicopters and airplanes to further enhance existing interdiction programs to help ensure that pressure in Colombia does not push the drug trade back into neighboring countries. As a consequence of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, U.S. Forces were required to withdraw from the Republic of Panama by December 31, 1999. In order to continue regional drug interdiction, replacement operating locations were identified in Ecuador and Aruba/Curacao, with one more location to be chosen in Central America. The proposal for Plan Colombia provides $38.6 million in the supplemental for initial construction of a US Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Manta, Ecuador where the U.S. has already negotiated a long-term presence. This FOL will provide the USG with the capability to enter the source zone rapidly and remain on station longer without need for aerial refueling. The FY 2000 supplemental request would also fund $68 million for US Customs to replace APS 138 radar systems in four P-3 AEW (Airborne Early Warning) narcotics interdiction aircraft with the new APS 145 system. The Customs P-3 aircraft is used for narcotics interdiction and will emphasize detection and monitoring of suspect targets in the cocaine source zones, primarily Colombia. The Customs radar systems are purchased from and maintained by the Department of the Navy. The Navy will soon stop purchasing and providing regular support for the APS 138 when they complete the conversion of their active aircraft to the new APS 145 radar system. The $68 million would fund the one-time cost of upgrading the four radar systems to the new system. The request includes funds to further enhance Colombia Air Force airborne reconnaissance capability and CNBN protection. For tracking airborne aircraft, the request includes installation of two nose-mounted F-16 radars for installation on C-26 aircraft giving Colombia an air-to-air tracking capability. Additionally, the Plan calls for outfitting two AC-47 aircraft bringing the Colombian inventory up to six such aircraft. The AC-47 provides close air support protection to the CNBNs. One aircraft would be outfitted with a Forward-Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) and a second aircraft would be outfitted with both a FLIR, night vision cockpit, and fire control system. Colombian National Police (CNP):The CNP has been at the forefront of Colombian counter-drug efforts, and the Administration proposes additional funding of $96 million over the next two years to enhance the CNP's ability to eradicate coca and poppy fields. This will upgrade existing CNP Huey UH-1Hs to Super Hueys (greater speed, lift, range), purchase additional spray aircraft, provide secure bases for increased operations in the coca-growing center, and provide more intelligence on the narcotics traffickers. Eradication is an essential component effecting the economics of the drug trade. The CNP's ability to eradicate cultivation deep in FARC territory and at high altitudes has been hindered by weak security and inadequate equipment. This funding, in conjunction with the establishment of the CNBNs, will enable the CNP to conduct operations in narcotics-growing areas previously beyond their reach. Alternative Economic Development:The Administration includes new funding of $145 million over the next two years, more than a ten-fold increase to provide economic alternatives for Colombian farmers who now grow coca and opium poppy, and to increase local governments' ability to respond to the needs of their people. Through PLANTE, Colombia's Alternative Development agency, US funds will provide basic social infrastructure to communities committing to voluntary eradication. Assistance will increase communities' productivity through credit and technical assistance for planting and marketing replacement crops. As interdiction and eradication make drug farming less profitable and appealing, these programs will assist communities in the transition to licit economic activity. $30 million of this amount will fund alternative development in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. $25 million of the total will assist internally displaced persons (IDPs). USAID will provide basic social services for up to 300,000 individuals displaced by violence and conflict. Boosting Governing Capacity:Importantly, the Administration budget also contains approximately $93 million over two years (with $45 million targeted for FY '00 and $48 million for FY '01) for boosting the government capacity of the COG - the majority of this is dedicated to justice-related projects to be undertaken by DOJ and USAID. The significant funding for justice-related programs illustrates that the USG is committed to a comprehensive solution to the problems in Colombia and to protecting human rights and the rule of law. Colombia faces dramatic and inter-related challenges to the rule of law. Many of these basic challenges stem from the culture of violence bred by a long-standing insurgency and weak governing institutions in the interior of Colombia. The growing narcotics trade has spawned additional violence and corruption. US assistance to the program includes increased training for the police, prosecutors and judges in areas of human rights, narcotics, maritime and border security, corruption, kidnapping, and money laundering/asset forfeiture cases. Funds will also be used for security protections for witnesses, judges, and prosecutors in the criminal justice system, as well as assistance in prison design and administration. Additionally, US support for Plan Colombia will provide for procedural and legislative reforms to ensure that the system functions fairly and effectively, with particular emphasis on the transition to an accusatory system, including oral trials. There must also be close coordination between civilian and military justice systems to ensure that any member of the armed forces implicated in human rights abuses is properly investigated and held accountable for crimes. Projects to strengthen governance capacity, particularly in the area of human rights and the rule of law, by project category, include: Human Rights Strengthening - Funds training and support for human rights non-governmental organizations as well as government investigators and prosecutors, including a specialized human right task force (approximately $15 million over two years). Judicial Reform - Funds efforts to move to a modern accusatory system, as well as the expansion of USAID's Casas de Justicia program (approximately $11 million over two years). Training to Support the Administration of Justice - Funds training for all actors involved with the Administration of Justice, including judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and police (approximately $14 million over two years). Security for Witnesses and Justice Officials - Training and support to develop effective security program for witnesses and justice officials (approximately $5 million over two years). Anti-Corruption Campaign - Funds anti-corruption prevention programs and funding for an anti- corruption task force (approximately $6 million over two years). Counter-Narcotics Law Enforcement - Funds support for counter-narcotics task force and bilateral and multilateral case initiatives, illustrated by the recent Operation Millennium and the arrest of, among others, Fabio Ochoa of Medellin Cartel fame (approximately $8.5 million over two years). Financial Crimes Enforcement and Asset Management Assistance - Funds support for task forces to fight money laundering (in particular the Black Market Peso Exchange) and seek asset forfeiture of ill-gotten gains as well as support for newly created Financial Intelligence Unit (approximately $8 million over two years). Prison Security Upgrades - Funds improved procedures and training for a corrections force, little in the way of physical construction until necessary reforms are put in place (approximately $8 million over two years). Maritime and Port Security - Funds support for maritime enforcement task forces and port security (approximately $4 million over two years). Customs Police - Funds training and support for the Colombian Customs Police affiliated with the Colombian Customs Service (DIAN) (approximately $6 million over two years). The Administration looks forward to working closely with Congress to develop a package that will stem the tide of drugs flowing into the United States while providing the necessary funding to help Colombia confront its current problems. The attached charts describe the plan in summary. US SUPPORT FOR PLAN COLOMBIAFY 2000 - FY 2001 (dollars in millions) / last updated 02/03/00
Counter-Narcotics Battalion (CNBN) Support
Interdiction
Colombian Nat'l Police (CNP) Support
Development
Boost Gov. Capacity
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