Memorandum
To: Interested
Colleagues
From: Ingrid Vaicius
Date: December 18, 2003
Re: Paramilitary
peace process
On November 25, in a highly publicized ceremony in Medellins
convention center, 850 members of the Bloque Cacique de Nutibara paramilitary
unit handed over their weapons to Colombian government officials.
Broadcast throughout Colombia on live television, the surrender was
portrayed as a major step forward in a process that could lead to
the full demobilization, by the end of 2005, of the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC), a 13,000-member umbrella organization of
rightist death squads currently on the U.S. governments list
of foreign terrorist organizations. During the ceremony Colombias
peace commissioner, Luis Carlos Restrepo, exclaimed, "this is
a huge advance and a demonstration of peace. It will help rebuild
hope."[1] In the end, however, the 850 demobilizing
low-ranking fighters turned in fewer than 200 weapons nearly
all pistols.[2]
Not physically
present at the ceremony were key AUC leaders like the blocs
commander, Diego Murillo Bejarano, known as "Don Berna"
or "Adolfo Paz," as well as notorious chieftains Carlos
Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso. These figures are still officially
fugitives: they are still trying to negotiate the terms of their surrender
with the Colombian government, seeking not only immunity for past
crimes against humanity but also a guarantee that they will not be
extradited to the United States for drug trafficking charges. They
did, however, address the surrender ceremony in a prerecorded video
shown during the live television broadcast; igniting the anger of
Colombias human rights community.
All three
of these leaders face very serious accusations. Castaño, the
AUCs political leader, has admitted to playing a role in the
1990 assassination of presidential candidate Carlos Pizarro, leader
of the M-19, a guerrilla group that negotiated peace with the Colombian
government. A Colombian judge also sentenced Castaño in absentia
to 22 years in prison for the assassination of presidential candidate
Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa. More recently, Castaño was sentenced
to 40 years in prison for his role in the 1997 Mapiripán massacre,
in which more than 200 paramilitaries killed and tortured more than
30 people over a five-day period.[3] Don Berna
carved out a fearsome reputation organizing gangs of hit men for cocaine
king Pablo Escobar's brutal Medellín cartel.[4]
Sources from the US Drug Enforcement Administration and Colombia prosecutors
say that today Don Berna is regarded as one of Colombia's biggest
cocaine barons.[5] Mancuso has eight arrest
warrants issued under his name for a number of massacresincluding
the 1997 El Aro massacre and numerous selective killings.
Critics
contend that the current peace strategy is largely an
improvised process. Allowing low-level paramilitaries to demobilize
while its leaders remain free, able to recruit and continue to commit
crimes will not weaken the overall paramilitary structure. In fact,
some believe that [Colombian President Alvaro] Uribe's decision
allows hundreds of killers and drug traffickers to go free under a
process that lacks international supervision.[6]
After
the initial disarmament, how is the government going to guarantee
and verify their reinsertion to civilian life, who is going to pay
for the costs of job training, psychological assistance and other
related social work, and who is going to verify that ex-fighters do
not go back to illegal activities? One member of the Nutibara bloc
told El Tiempo that once demobilized he will not stop selling marihuana
and he will not give in all his weapons. How am I going to walk
around without a weapon? Do you think the men in Blanquizala
neighborhood that had a large guerrilla presence until last yearare
going to give up all their weapons knowing that the guerrillas may
come back? You hand over some weapons but not all.[7]
Additionally,
Mr. Uribes proposal of an amnesty law that would allow human
rights abusers to pay reparations rather than serve jail time is extremely
controversial. Such a law would allow many who have committed crimes
against humanity to get away with no punishment not even accountability
for their crimes. In a recent interview, for Colombias main
newspaper El Tiempo, Don Berna was asked about the processes pending
against him for atrocious crimes. His response was emphatic Adolfo
Paz is not willing to pay a day in jail.[8]
Immunity cannot come without a cost, and the paramilitaries owe much
more than a symbolic gesture to their many victims. An official, credible
mechanism a truth commission, individual trials, or something
else must be in place to bring to justice those who have killed,
massacred and disappeared so many people in Colombia.
Furthermore,
the Uribe government will have to address the drug trafficking charges
and extradition requests pending for some of the AUCs most notorious
leaders. Castaño and Mancuso are charged with smuggling 17
tons of cocaine to the United States. The U.S. Justice Department
has made clear that it will seek the extradition of paramilitary leaders
charged with drug trafficking, without regard to any peace accord.[9]
Critics have also noted that handing out pardons before negotiations
begin can lead common criminals and drug traffickers many of
whom have lately bribed their way into the AUC to benefit from
the proposed amnesty. This peace process should not be a vehicle by
which drug traffickers can legitimize their wealth and escape punishment.
Finally,
one of the biggest challenges the Uribe administration will face is
filling a security vacuum that may be left as the paramilitaries demobilize.
The government must be able to establish the presence necessary to
prevent guerrillas, or paramilitary splinter bands, from taking over
those territories. As stated by military analyst, Alfredo Rangel if
the armed forces cant contain the guerrillas, then they (the
rebels) will be strengthened and recover strategic positions.
[10] While the Uribe government has set forth some
measures to increase security forces capacities, it is not clear
how his government plans to pay the high cost of holding onto new
territories.
Past
administrations, in their rush to reach a negotiated settlement with
armed actors, have been criticized for improvising and ultimately
have seen the failure of their peace efforts. The Uribe administration
should learn from its predecessors mistakes: instead of entering
this negotiation process with no clear strategy, it must carve out
a plan that leads to truth and reconciliation without impunity.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1]
Penhaul, Karl. The Boston Globe Colombian fighters aim at peace,
November 26, 2003.http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/2003/11/26/colombian_fighters_aim_at_peace/)
[2]
Forero Juan, The New York Times 800 in Colombia Lay Down Arms,
Kindling Peace Hopes, November 26, 2003 http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/26/international/americas/26COLO.html
[3]
Human Rights Watch. Paramilitary Television Broadcast a Travesty,
November 26, 2003. http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/11/colombia112503.htm
[4]
Penhaul, Karl. The Boston Globe Colombian fighters aim at peace,November
26, 2003.http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/2003/11/26/colombian_fighters_aim_at_peace/)
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Editorial. In Colombia, a move in the right direction,
The Miami Herald, December 3, 2003 http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/opinion/7401006.htm
[7]
Joven paramilitary que se desmovilizara reconoce que seguira
armado y en el narcotrafico, El Teimpo, November 17, 2003. http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-_NOTA_INTERIOR-1324050.html
[8]
No pagare un solo dia de carcel, afirma Don Berna,
El Tiempo, November 29, 2003.
[9]
Van Dongen, Rachel. 800 Fighters Surrender in Colombia,
The Los Angeles Times, November 26, 2003. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg
colombia26nov26,1,687878.story?coll=la-headlines-world
[10]
Acosta, Luis Jaime. Paramilitary peace plan makes Colombians
nervous, MSNBC, November 27, 2003.