In cooperation
with the government of Colombia and the United States government, MPRI
provided advice and assistance in developing specific plans and programs
to assist the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces of Colombia in
institution building, long range planning, and interagency cooperation
to enhance their counter drug capabilities. [MPRI
website]
MPRI,
hired by the U.S. Defense Department, has a team of about 10 retired
U.S. military officers in Bogotá to advise the military on strategic
and logistical issues. The company has steadfastly declined to comment
on their exact number or work. [Miami
Herald, Feb. 22, 2001 - link to article text at Yahoo Groups]
The [MPRI]
report blurs the lines between the drug war and the civil war: its operational
guidelines would have all Colombian infantry units switching back and
forth between counter-drug and counter-guerrilla operations. [Associated
Press, May 21, 2001 - link to article text at commondreams.org]
Administration
officials say MPRI personnel are doing precisely what uniformed American
soldiers have traditionally done. They say MPRI was hired not because
it has any special expertise, but because U.S. Southern Command in Miami,
which oversees American military operations in Latin America, cannot
spare 14 men to send to Colombia...Nevertheless, U.S.-Colombia policy
experts say the use of firms like MPRI is intended primarily to limit
the risk of American military casualties there. [St.
Petersburg Times, Dec. 3, 2000]
Among
the most provocative parts of the MPRI mission are plans for MPRI to
recommend legislation, statutes and decrees to Colombia regarding a
military draft, a professional soldier statute, officer entitlements
and health law reforms. "They are using us to carry out American foreign
policy," [Edward] Soyster, the MPRI spokesman, said. "We certainly don't
determine foreign policy, but we can be part of the U.S. government
executing its foreign policy." [St.
Petersburg Times, Dec. 3, 2000]
MPRI walked
away with $4.3-million, paid largely from the $1.3-billion aid package
Congress approved for Colombia last year under Plan Colombia to help
fight the drug war.
The Pentagon
compared Colombia's Ministry of Defense with a broken factory. The job
of MPRI was to fix the factory in order to produce a better soldier
to fight the drug war. Before MPRI won the one-year contract, it was
hired by the Pentagon in fall 1999 to assess the defense ministry. MPRI
charged the Pentagon $850,000 for six weeks of work.
The use
of MPRI marked an unprecedented degree of cooperation between the United
States and Colombia.
After
MPRI arrived in Colombia, problems arose, according to military analysts.
The company chose to staff its Bogota office with people who spoke no
Spanish and had little or no experience in Latin America. Instead, most
had a background in U.S. operations in Europe and in the Pentagon bureaucracy.
Over the
course of the contract, MPRI worked with the armed forces and the National
Police in the areas such as psychological operations, training, logistics,
intelligence and personnel management.
Colombian
officials, however, criticized MPRI's work as largely irrelevant and
not tailored for Colombia's needs. Indeed, they were frustrated with
the very mission itself, which strictly provided advice on how to fight
the drug war, not the guerrilla war. [St.
Petersburg Times, May
13, 2001]
Mpri -una
empresa presidida por Carl Vuono, el jefe del ejército estadounidense
durante la Guerra del Golfo-, y que tiene 850 empleados e ingresos anuales
por 70 millones de dólares-, trajo a Colombia 14 empleados bajo
el mando de un general retirado para hacer la asesoría.
Atendieron
consultas específicas del Ministerio de Defensa acerca, por ejemplo,
de si convenía o no conformar una sola agencia de inteligencia
de las Fuerzas Armadas. Además entregaron al Ministerio un enorme
manual llamado 'La doctrina colombiana contra las drogas'. La primera
parte, por ejemplo, buscaba proveerle un manual a la fuerza pública
acerca de cómo "pensar para alcanzar su misión"
y describe "habilidades de guerra necesarias para ganar esta guerra",
según figura en el primer borrador de julio de 2000.
También
recomiendan conductas tales como"mantenerse enfocado en la imagen
que se quiere proyectar, sea esta humanitaria o la de un firme pero
bien intencionado agente de cambio y asegurarse que las tropas se conduzcan
acorde".
Pero la
asesoría de Mpri no fue tan fructífera. "No hubo
empatía", dijo el ministro Ramírez. Las razones son
varias. El Ministro señala que a veces los generales no tenían
tiempo para recibir a los funcionarios de Mpri. "En un país
en guerra no hay mucho tiempo de ir a comités", dijo Ramírez.
También hubo críticas por la irrelevancia de sus documentos
para Colombia, que más bien eran reportes genéricos de
experiencias en todo el mundo.
Otro observador
sostiene que los de Mpri tuvieron que hacer "maromas para atender
las necesidades de los militares colombianos en su lucha contrainsurgente
sin salirse de su mandato de asesorar sólo para la lucha contra
las drogas".
Aunque
algunas de las recomendaciones de Mpri validaron cambios que ya habían
emprendido los militares, el contrato finalmente no se renovó
por decisión del Ministerio de Defensa y Mpri se fue del país
a principios de marzo pasado. Esta experiencia y el debate en Estados
Unidos dejan lecciones valiosas para el país. [Semana
(Colombia),
May 4, 2001]
