Peace on the Table: Colombian Government

Peace on the Table: Colombian Government

Peace on the Table
a summary of demands and proposals for peace from the various actors in the Peace Process

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

I. TOTAL PEACE AND USEFUL DIALOGUE

II. CRITERIA AND POSITIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN A PRELIMINARY STAGE OF A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATION WITH THE COORDINADORA GUERRILLERA SIMÓN BOLÍVAR - CGSB (SIMON BOLIVAR GUERRILLA MOVEMENT COORDINATING BODY)
A. Purpose of the Negotiation
B. Agenda for the Negotiation
C. Venue and Time schedule
D. Interlocutors
E. Mechanisms of Participation of the Civilian Society
F. International Participation
G. Legal Guarantees
H. Information Handling
I. Methodology and Mechanisms

III. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PEACE

IV. ACT AIMING AT ATTAINING CO-EXISTENCE AND EFFICACY OF JUSTICE

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

I. TOTAL PEACE AND USEFUL DIALOGUE

Although during more than a decade Colombia has longed for a National reconciliation of all Colombians by a definite settlement of the armed conflict through negotiation, the present Administration began its term in a barely favorable context for peace endeavors. Two years before, the contact between the previous Administration and the guerrilla movements had been broken off and the so-called "total war" against insurgency had started.

In his inauguration speech, President Samper reaffirmed the purpose of seeking a stable, long-lasting reconciliation as a central task of his Administration and he proposed Total Peace and Useful Dialogue as principles of his Government action.

Total Peace is the set of State actions in the mid term and long term aimed at achieving the social, political and cultural transformations required to ensure a process of true reunion of all compatriots.

This broad vision of National reconciliation gathers many of the important elements that were espoused during the Caracas and Tlaxcala negotiation rounds in 1991 and 1992. It constitutes important progress regarding the conceptualizations that limit peace to disarmament and social reentry of insurgent armed groups.

From the present Administration's perspective, peace is not exclusively equivalent to silencing weapons: indeed, it implies, among others, broadening and strengthening participative democracy, attaining social development with equity, recovering the rural economy, respecting Human Rights without restriction, building a new National culture based on tolerance, respect and pride for ethnic and political diversity, strengthening the State's capacity to guarantee security to its citizens using professional Armed Forces, improving the administration of justice and the fight against impunity.

Accordingly, Total Peace is not merely a Government program; it is a commitment of the State as a whole to fulfill the constitutional mandate, establishing peaceful co-existence as one of its essential aims (Article 2).

Within this framework, the policy seeking a negotiated settlement of the armed conflict was proposed and named by President Samper "Useful Dialogue". Its main governing principles are the following:

"A. Acknowledgment of the political character of the armed conflict and of guerrilla organizations.

B. Willingness to negotiate during the conflict, and with no prior conditions set by any of the parties.

C. The decision to guarantee the State the legitimate monopoly of the force through the action of its Armed Forces is just as firm as the State's will to seek peace.

D. The State's unilateral commitment to comply with International Humanitarian Law -IHL- principles and rules during the armed conflict, as well as the National Government's reiterated willingness to reach agreements with the guerrilla groups concerning the effective, verifiable application of IHL as a first step toward peace.

E. Active, permanent and effective participation of the civilian society in the peace-building.

F. Unified, nation-wide negotiation of settlements of regional conflicts.

In other words, peace implies the transformation of the State, the democratization of society, and the consolidation of elements which make the use of weapons and illegal practices unnecessary, as a means to foster the triumph of political ideas. Peace requires a process in which the opposition is truly granted the right to operate as a political entity, regardless of its belligerency, provided that it is unarmed. It also implies the end of the impunity that currently characterizes the justice system.

The National Government is willing to consider and promote the necessary reforms for such purposes in its various institutions.

A possible negotiation with the insurgency must be designed and applied as a joint work project, with clear, precise goals; this project shall be jointly drafted by the National Government, the guerrilla groups and the civilian society. The idea is, thus, to speed up and deepen the multiple processes of change that the country is now undergoing, which are aimed at re-defining a cultural, ethical, political and educational project to recover the Colombians' morale, in order to strengthen both the political, economic democracy and National unity for the purpose of achieving the higher objective of reuniting opposing compatriots.

Negotiating the end of armed conflict must set the stage for rethinking, in a concerted fashion, the project for the Colombian Nation's unity and cultural identity, the construction of a constitution-abiding social State as well as for designing solutions to the serious problems it faces. The efforts made to combat problems such as drug trafficking and illicit crops, destruction of the environment, violations of Human Rights, relations with our neighbors and the rest of the international community, payment of the social debt, recovery of agrarian economy, to name a few, shall be incomplete as long as the internal war continues.

The end of the war implies sacrifices for all, deep structural changes and a management for peace that assumes the task of promoting and coordinating programs of individual adaptation and a collective transition to peaceful co-existence for ex-combatants from all sides, victims of the confrontations, displaced persons and all of those exiled due to violence. It also implies the reconstruction of the regions most affected by the conflict, through the use of a highly "productive" ingredient that stresses the long-term economic viability of all projects and combines the efforts made by the State, the private sector, the affected sectors and international cooperation.

The socioeconomic benefits of this reconciliation process shall be primarily offered to the communities, regions and sectors affected by the armed conflict. These benefits must be collective and not only granted to ex-combatants on a personal basis.

Pursuant to its strong democratic ideals and its conviction that Colombia's capacity to reform can still be deployed, the National Government considers that there are no vetoed topics nor aspects of the National reality that should be excluded from an agenda for a possible negotiation with the guerrilla movement. Moreover, it is important to remember that, within the framework of its total peace conception, the present Administration has made its positions, policies and actions on all aspects of a possible agenda publicly known."

II. CRITERIA AND POSITIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN A PRELIMINARY STAGE OF A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATION WITH THE COORDINADORA GUERRILLERA SIMÓN BOLÍVAR -CGSM- (SIMON BOLIVAR Guerrilla Movement Coordinating Body)

The National Government considers that the specific strategy to be adopted in order to enable a Useful Dialogue with the guerrilla movement depends on the process and the conclusions resulting from a preliminary phase and the hypothetical negotiation that can be reached at that stage.

The negotiation initiation shall depend on the outcome of the preliminary phase. The goal of this phase is to build the foundation for a negotiation, with the necessary guarantees, jointly with the insurgency and in a direct, reserved fashion. This foundation includes the definition of the agenda, the venue, the interlocutors, the guidelines for information handling, mechanisms of participation of the civilian society, methodology and mechanics of the negotiation, international participation, negotiation time schedule and term, legal safeguards, and all other aspects needed to be agreed upon.

The National Government proposes the following considerations regarding the above-mentioned matters to be taken into account:

A. Purpose of the Negotiation

As was stated in the second part of this document -Total Peace and Useful Dialogue-, the Government led by Ernesto Samper understands peace not only as the mere demobilization of the insurgency and its re-entry into society, but also as the elimination of the causes that have created the conflict.

In other words, peace cannot only be the demobilization or the disarmament of the insurgency. It implies the transformation of the State, the democratization of society, and the consolidation of elements which make the use of weapons and illegal practices unnecessary, as a means to foster the triumph of political ideas. Peace requires a process in which the opposition is truly granted the right to operate as a political entity, regardless of its belligerency, provided that it is unarmed. It also implies the end of the impunity that currently characterizes the justice system.

The National Government is willing to consider and promote the necessary reforms for such purposes in its various institutions.

Negotiating the end of armed conflict must set the stage for rethinking, in a concerted fashion, the project for the Colombian Nation's unity and cultural identity, the construction of a constitution-abiding social State, as well as for designing solutions to the serious problems it faces. The efforts made to combat problems such as drug trafficking and illicit crops, destruction of the environment, violations of Human Rights, relations with our neighbors and the rest of the international community, payment of the social debt, recovery of agrarian economy, to name a few, shall be incomplete as long as the internal war continues.

The socioeconomic benefits of this reconciliation process shall be primarily offered to communities, regions and sectors affected by the armed conflict. These benefits must be collective and not only granted to ex-combatants on a personal basis.

Consequently, in principle, the National Government considers the text agreed upon in Caracas in 1991, regarding this issue, a natural point of departure for the discussion on the purpose of the negotiation. It reads as follows:

"The Government and the Coordinating Body ratify that the objectives of the peace process shall refer both to the definitive settlement of the political armed conflict and materialization of polices aimed at definitively eradicating the causes which have given rise to such conflict, for the benefit of all Colombians, in a manner ensuring the democratic co-existence of all nationals and the search for a society based on social justice".

B. Agenda for the Negotiation

Pursuant to its strong democratic ideals, its conviction that Colombia's capacity to reform can still be deployed, and its firm commitment to peace-seeking, the National Government considers that there are no vetoed topics nor aspects of the National reality that should be excluded from an agenda for a possible negotiation with the guerrilla movement. Moreover, it is important to remember that, within the framework of its total peace conception, the present Administration has made its positions, policies and actions on all aspects of a possible agenda publicly known.

Nevertheless, various topics, susceptible of being structured into general topics, can be the object of analysis at a negotiation table. These topics can be extracted from the 1991 Constitution and the National Government policies; further elements can also be taken from the present National problems, from the agendas agreed upon in Caracas and Tlaxcala, and from the statements of the various guerrilla movements made after 1991. These topics are, among others, the following:

- Effective and verifiable application of International Humanitarian Law as a first element of the settlement of the armed conflict.

- Democratization of the economy and of economic and social policy; regional and social development.

- Agrarian reform, strengthening of the peasant economy; promotion of alternative rural development, eradication of illicit crops.

- Energy policy.

- Management of natural resources, environment preservation and protection.

- Enlargement of political democracy, spatial planning, local power, guarantees for the practice of political opposition.

- Human Rights, systems of justice, control systems, combat against impunity and corruption at public and private levels.

- National defense policy, and citizen security for the post-war period.

- Mechanisms for distention and the outright termination of the armed political conflict.

C. Venue and Time Schedule

The National Government prefers the process to be completely developed abroad, in one country or in several countries. There are many reasons for this. It would be easier to guarantee the security of the attendants. It would allow for the continuity of the process and the integration of the various members of the commissions. There can be elements facilitating information handling. The fact of being distant from the armed confrontation in Colombia allows for an atmosphere of understanding and search for agile solutions to the conflict. The withdrawal of troops in certain zones of the country would no longer be needed. The level of the negotiation can be enhanced. And finally, there can be a greater influence of external factors favorable to the negotiation.

Another foreseeable option is, that certain stages of the process can take place in the National territory in order to facilitate the utmost representation of the Parties.

It is not realistic nor pertinent to establish rigid time schedules that oblige the parties to reach agreements at predetermined dates. But conversely, a chronogram for future sessions and agile, reliable communication mechanisms must be clearly agreed upon during the first meeting.

D. Interlocutors

The National Government maintains the principle of bilateral nature of the negotiation: the central, main interlocutors in the negotiation process are the National Government, on the one hand, and the guerrilla movement, on the other. This does not imply, however, that complementary instances of participation, consultation and follow-up cannot be created within the other branches of the Public Power, the State agencies, the political parties, and the civilian society.

The National Government maintains the thesis of a unified negotiation in which the whole insurgency would be sitting at the same table. If this should not be possible, the negotiation would then go on with those organizations willing to participate.

E. Mechanisms of Participation of the Civilian Society

From the very day of his taking office, President Samper called on the civilian society to take part in the National objective of peace-seeking. The National Government is thus committed in articulating, in an effective, permanent fashion, its participation in the construction of a peaceful co-existence culture following its conception of Total Peace.

It estimates that this shall result from the rich, autonomous process of participation and active expression taking place in various sectors of the civilian society. Likewise, it has the conviction that the existing institutional mechanisms of participation of the citizen must be favored, developed and strengthened, without prejudice to the eventual creation of a special instance of negotiation.

The peace process must be carried out within the general framework of a previously defined policy, calling for the participation of the actors directly concerned, such as entrepreneurs, political parties, sectors of the community, trade unions, outstanding representatives of the forces of production, ethnic minorities, and the Church, to name a few. The construction of loyalties, civic spirit and trust in the State's authority can only be achieved through the constant participation of the civilian society as builders of their own living conditions.

The participation of the civilian society in the peace process is fundamental to generate an ample political agreement and concrete commitments allowing to conceive said process as something more than a negotiation aiming at ending the armed conflict. In fact, this process shall also strengthen the institutions that will provide the framework for democratic co-existence. If this is understood, the need to create spaces of participation to attain said objective becomes self-evident.

The creation of commissions of support, accompaniment and facilitation during the stage prior to negotiation or during the negotiation itself may play an important role in helping to create and maintain a political and social atmosphere allowing for the development of the process of talks between Government and the guerrilla groups. Accordingly, said commissions shall act as assistants of the process, contributing to relieve the tension of the parties at difficult moments during the negotiation. Additionally, they can develop programs of harmony among citizens and peace pedagogy, and coordinate the various mechanisms of participation of the civilian society in the process.

F. International Participation

As an initial consideration, a difference between internationalization of the armed conflict and internationalization of the peace process must be established. While the former depends on the conditions and context proper to the conflict -generally beyond the control of the opposing actors-, the latter is the result of a decision of the Parties to the conflict, allowing for the participation of external actors as instruments for the negotiated settlement of their differences.

It is reasonable to argue that a conflict with a high degree of internationalization requires a negotiated settlement with a high degree of internationalization (as in El Salvador); however, it is not possible to argue that a conflict with a very low degree of internationalization as the Colombian conflict, become "internationalized" through the international participation in the negotiations.

Another conceptual error is believing that international participation in a possible negotiation process is tantamount to handing over the solution of our conflicts and the destiny of our country into foreign hands. Regardless of the degree of an eventual international participation in the negotiation, the decision on accepting or not the terms therein presented or concerning an eventual agreement falls exclusively into the parties' hands.

Possible international participation shall be defined according to criteria of flexibility and complementarity so that the multiple roles eventually played by the actors or group of actors of the international community are maximized. To that effect, it is fundamental to differentiate the various possible forms of international participation:

- Good offices/facilitation: A variety of discrete tasks aimed at facilitating the process of understanding. They may include helping to create a favorable climate among the parties, co-operating with each of them in performing tasks proper to a negotiation, providing them with the technical and political elements that enable them to narrow the gap between them, and offering means of reserved, fluent communication at a given moment during the process.

- Host: It provides all the necessary elements of logistic support and security and permanency guarantees for the partial or total carrying-out of the negotiation.

- Accompaniment: External guarantee to the negotiation process involving a broad range of action. The support is not given within a mandate and the scope of accompaniment depends on the parties' request. An example is the group of "friendly countries" that act as consulting entities facilitating the process and as communication channels between the parties.

- Witness: Passive role limited to recording the development of the discussions during the negotiation, providing evidence of and a point of reference for what occurs during the process. Such was the case in the Caracas and Tlaxcala experiences where the delegates of the respective host countries played that role.

- Observer: Similar to the previous form, but implying a larger possibility of intervening in the process if the Parties so request and of calling for external support.

- Moderation / intermediation / mediation: Active participation in the negotiation so as to guarantee constant, timely communication and interlocution within a mandate of autonomy and neutrality defined by the Parties and with an intensity that depends on the needs of the process.

If this is fluid and constructive, the role of the intermediator is null; conversely, if difficulties in the handling of specific topics arise at the negotiation table, the intermediation may offer alternatives that may break the stalemate of the discussions.

- Monitoring: It implies an external agent that supervises and surveys accords agreed upon by the Parties, but without any "coercive" power that would allow it to make a judgment on the degree of compliance of said accords. This kind of instance was agreed upon in Caracas on July 25, 1991 by the National Government and the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Movement Coordinating Body. Nonetheless, the instance never came into existence because the agreements that the Government considered as indispensable for its implementation were not reached.

- Verification: It implies supervision and surveillance of the accords agreed upon by the Parties. President Samper has made a commitment to form an international body to verify compliance to International Humanitarian Law.

- Co-operation and Technical Advisory: There are several world-wide centers specialized in studying and dealing with topics involved in a negotiation process. The existence of these centers may be useful for our process as long as the Parties are willing to seek their assistance and undertake a "constructive approach" with the various NGOs dedicated to these matters.

- Credit and Financing: Aid to avoid the expenditure of National resources and to broaden the scope of the reconciliation programs. This has been essential in the reconstruction programs of various countries that have suffered the scourge of prolonged internal armed conflicts.

G. Legal Guarantees

1995 Act 241 which extends the time limit of, modifies and complements 1993 Act 104, authorizes the National Government, in the undertaking of a peace process with the guerrilla movements, to:

- suspend the execution of arrest warrants against members or representatives of guerrilla movements. This suspension, valid during a limited time, aims at facilitating these persons' traveling throughout National territory;

- determine zones of the National territory -geographically limited- where members or representatives of the guerrilla movements can be located; this implies, on the one hand, relocating the Public Force and giving it specific instructions for action and, on the other hand, suspending the execution of arrest warrants against members/representatives of the guerrilla movements in the area;

- determine zones of the National territory where all members of the guerrilla movements can be located so as to carry out the withdrawal of official troops and the compliance of the accords agreed upon;

- create temporary access corridors, so as to facilitate the entry or exit of members / representatives of guerrilla movements to and from defined areas and to guarantee the security and life of those taking part in the talks.

H. Information Handling

The National Government's central criterion is that information handling must be agreed upon between the Parties in terms of the proper development of the negotiation rather than for the benefit of said Parties.

To that effect, the creation of an effective communication mechanism and a direct, permanent dialogue between the National Government and the guerrilla movement must be agreed upon. On the one hand, this shall ensure a space of reserve and discretion between the Parties, needed to explore options, build trust, settle differences and reach basic harmony. On the other hand, it shall offer the channels for public, balanced, true, timely information that a political negotiation requires.

To reach those goals, a Negotiation Table Press Bureau can be created; it shall be composed of representatives of the National Government, the guerrilla movements and an external, independent body, or, it can have a single spokesperson to communicate the advances and drawbacks in the negotiation to the public opinion.

A difference must be made between, on the one hand, the wise recommendation not to heat the spirits of the population with a direct, sensationalist transmission of facts of violence or by making an apology of the violence through the information conveyed and, on the other hand, the undue censorship preventing the guerrilla spokespersons to contact the media.

In fact, overcoming the armed confrontation implies the creation of alternative spaces of communication and contact with the public opinion whose existence shall make it no longer necessary for the insurgency to use weapons in their political activity.

If such spaces are created, the public opinion can become acquainted with the guerrilla movement's proposals and realize that the Government negotiates with groups whose nature is political. The insurgency is thus granted the opportunity to debate their thesis with the public opinion who, in turn, in the last few years has become less passive and has increased its power of critical analysis.

Finally, a true pedagogical offensive must be fostered by disseminating the values of reconciliation and peaceful co-existence. A dissemination campaign on the negotiation process including the use of multiple institutional spaces in the existing mass media must be launched.

I. Methodology and Mechanisms

In accordance with what has been said, the National Government considers it appropriate to propose a methodology for the negotiation through three closely interrelated instances:

- The National Negotiation Board: It is the highest instance for the discussion and decision-making processes. It shall consist of the negotiating commissions of the National Government and of the guerrilla movement. Its responsibility is to supervise and implement the process agreed upon in the preliminary stage and to see to the success and efficient progress of the negotiation as a mechanism for the settlement of the political armed conflict.

- The Technical Advisory Team: It shall be made up of the advisory teams of the National Government and of the guerrilla movement. Its function is to evaluate and establish coincidences and discrepancies of views as well as margins of action regarding the measures, actions and future implementation of the various topics dealt with in the National Negotiation Board. It shall also technically examine and evaluate the topics submitted to it by the National Negotiation Board and then present its conclusive remarks and alternative solutions.

- The National Joint Action Forum: By mutual agreement, it shall be made up of independent persons or entities. Its task is to gather proposals and ideas from social, political and regional sectors on the subject matters on the agenda to be discussed by the National Negotiation Board. Additionally, with the support of the Technical Advisory Team, it must look for consensus on proposals from the society and evaluate their technical, notional, administrative, legal and financial feasibility.

Finally, as a means to settle disagreements persisting among the members of the National Negotiation Board, after a reasonable time limit previously agreed upon, or, as a means to reaffirm the accords that might be reached, the National Government deems convenient to resort to one of the various mechanisms of citizen participation provided for in Chapter I of Title IV and in Title XIII of the Constitution.

In the first case, the purpose is to ensure that, once the decision to initiate a negotiation is taken, a viable tool be available and that the odds of this leading to the final termination of the armed confrontation be high.

In the second case, the aim is to commit the whole country to what is eventually agreed upon. That was the case in 1957 when a referendum ratified the historical National Front pacts.

III. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PEACE

On April 10, 1997, when the Minister of the Defense, Mr. Gilberto Echeverri Mejía, took office before President Ernesto Samper Pizano, he proposed the establishment of the National Council for Peace. On April 2, 1998, after the issue of the relevant Act of Congress, this Council was installed by the President of the Republic.

Article I of this Act defines the peace policy in the following terms:

"The Peace policy is a permanent, participative State policy. Every State organ as well as every instance of organization, action and expression of the civilian society shall cooperate in structuring it in a coordinated, harmonious manner transcending various Government Administrations and in a fashion that expresses the National complexity".

"Each Government shall endeavor to respect the State's aims, principles and responsibilities in peace matters".

The civilian society shall assist the National Council for Peace by acting as an advisory, consulting organ of the National Government. The mission of the National Council for Peace shall be "to endeavor for the achievement and keeping of peace and the harmonious collaboration among entities and organs of the State, giving priority to political alternatives of negotiation for the settlement of the internal armed conflicts and aiming at attaining social relations that ensure permanent integral peace." (Art. 3).

The participation of irregular armed actors is welcomed, provided that, according to the Council's judgment, they have expressed their explicit willingness to take part in a peace process. (Paragraph in Art. 3).

The Council shall be chaired by the President of the Republic. It shall be integrated by representatives of the executive branch of the Public Power, representatives of the legislative branch of the Public Power, representatives of the Control bodies of the State and representatives of the civilian society; Members of the Public Force may be invited to discuss military and police matters. (Art. 4).

The Council shall fulfill several functions as advisor and consultant to the National Government and as facilitator of the harmonious collaboration of State entities and organs. (Art. 6).

The National Council for Peace shall appoint, among its own members, a National Peace Committee, a State agency, as a body carrying out the functions delegated to it by the President of the Republic as well as those assigned or delegated to it by the National Council for Peace, pursuant to its regulations. At least three of the seven members of the Committee shall be representatives of the organisms of the civilian society". (Art. 7).

The functions of the Technical Secretariat of the National Council for Peace shall be performed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace of the Presidency of the Republic. (Art. 10).

The National Council for Peace shall have the faculty to form a consultative body composed of representatives from universities and research centers from around the country as well as of individuals and legal entities recognized in academic circles, which shall carry out advisory tasks on specific issues. (Art. 11).

The departmental and municipal councils shall be authorized to create, at the initiative of the respective Governor or Mayor, the departmental or municipal Councils for Peace. (Art. 13).

On February 3, 1998, President Samper sanctioned the Act creating the National Council for Peace. In his speech he talked about his peace proposal and singled out the points of a peace agenda.

"There are no vetoed issues on the agenda.

Besides the constitutional and legal reforms, which are indeed very important, the real question we have regarding Colombia's future is the development model that we need.

As in other countries Colombia experiments a confrontation between social and neoliberal models that divides the country. We should rather focus on designing a National development plan defining issues such as market limits, social role of a constitution-abiding State, social investment share in the National budget, democratization of property and income, and defense of our autonomy in the context of the cataclysmic globalization process we are undergoing. In this context it is worth discussing the role of the armed forces in a fair, more democratic society living in peace".

On April 2, 1998, when President Samper installed the National Council for Peace, he spoke again about this issue:

"In the talks held in Caracas and Tlaxcala with the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Movement Coordinating Body as well as in other more recent approach talks with the ELN, certain topics and issues have been broached which deserve to be discussed in a negotiation process.

I know by heart the FARC's ten fundamental points and the ELN's five fundamental points, concerning agrarian changes, oil policy, social investment, privatization, respect for Human Rights, role of the Armed Forces in a violence-free society, and environment. If to those proposals we add our own ones, they could constitute a reconciliation agenda that should approach the two sides up to a meeting point.

When we accepted the ELN's proposal for a National convention gathering spokespersons from the civilian society, as those present here today, we were certain that that was the right direction to take.

Once we have clarity on the model that shall unite us all, we will be able to resort to various legitimization procedures such as a referendum, irregular sessions of the Congress or the very same National Constitution Drafting Assembly proposed by the FARC.

What is really important is understanding that any of the scenarios for the legitimization of the agreements must be a point of arrival not of departure. Any different standing would be tantamount to taking a shot in the dark that could lead to frustrated efforts and to gaps, as did happen, as far as peace is concerned, in the 1991 Constitution Drafting Assembly.

In this sense, the function of the National Council for Peace members would be that of pre-drafters of a larger peace agreement, examining the reform drafts which would be later taken, in the legitimization phase, to the proper settings for their approval.

The first step is thus the disarmament of the spirits, the establishment of a basis for trust among the opposing parties, as we have already done in cases such as the FARC's returning the soldiers in Caguán, and the ELN's releasing the OAS observers in Santana.

In these two cases we reached an agreement on specific points and respected what had been agreed upon to the letter.

The second step is to solve the crucial problems that have caused our confrontation, by creating the conditions by which our country shall become a country where all of us can live despite our differences.

Later on we could duly execute the agreements made, and then, we could expect the attainment of a definite reunion, in conditions of tolerance and respect, without the hindrance of weapons.

In the meantime, we must make a commitment to respect the ethical limits imposed by international rules on Human Rights during wartime.

When innocent people are being killed in the conflict at a rate of four persons per hour, we have no right whatsoever to defer an agreement on the humanization of the confrontation we face today."

IV. ACT AIMING AT ATTAINING CO-EXISTENCE AND EFFICACY OF JUSTICE

Act 418, dated December 26, 1997

"Which enshrines certain instruments aiming at attaining co-existence and efficacy of justice and sets forth other provisions".

This Act is known by the public opinion as the 'Public Order Act'".

Title I of this Act, concerning the instruments for seeking this coexistence is divided into two chapters.

Chapter 1:

Provisions for facilitating talks and signing agreements with armed organizations on the fringe of the law to which the National Government has acknowledged political character in order to allow their demobilization. Provisions for reconciliation and the peaceful co-existence of Colombians.

Chapter 2:

Provisions for the protection of minors against the effects of the armed conflict.

Title II rules on matters concerning the "Attention to Victims of Violent Actions Occurred in the Context of Internal Armed Conflict".

Title III refers to "Causes for the Abatement of Action and Sentence in Cases of Political Offenses".

Titles I to VI of the Act "Second Part" relate to mechanisms for the efficacy of justice.