Cubas Mothballed Nuclear Power Plant
negotiable issue threatens to aggravate U.S.-Cuban relations and scuttle
worldwide nuclear cooperation agreements worked out over many years
In the wake of the popes visit to Cuba in January of 1998, President
Clinton took two small steps to ease sanctions against the island, and
there seemed to be some hope he might take othersalthough limited
history of Cuban-American relations over the past thirty years is replete
with examples of openings being ruined by unexpected irritants which
could have been resolved through negotiations had anyone in Washington
wished to try. One such irritant which has been elevated into a capital
case by anti-Castro politicians is Cubas longstanding attempt
to build a nuclear power plant with Russian assistance. Such a project
is scarcely unusual for an energy-poor country at Cubas level
of development, yet these politicians have sensationalized the issue
in hopes of erecting another obstacle to improved relations.
for International Policy has taken two delegations to the construction
site and we now publish this analysis by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado,
a senior research analyst at the University of Georgias Center
for International Trade and Security. It is a specialized issue, but
one that has been monopolized by politicians who have neither the expertise
to understand it nor the political objectivity to deal with it effectively.
mid-1930s, Cuba has attempted to deal with its chronic energy dependence.
Energy development has always been viewed as an integral part of providing
a modern life to the Cuban population. Having little fossil fuel to
power its electrical grid, Cuba has relied almost exclusively on imported
oil. By the late 1940s Cuba had formed a government agency to explore
the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy. In 1958, Cuba contracted
American Foundry Works and Mitchell Engineering of Great Britain to
construct a nuclear reactor in Cuba. Those plans were disrupted by the
the 1960s and 1970s Cuba enjoyed the benefits of a preferential trade
arrangement with the Soviet
It got oil credits at below-world-market prices and in excess of its
actual demand. It sold this excess at world market prices for much-needed
hard currency. Cuba could explore the nuclear option with little risk
because of this oil deal with the Soviets.
in the late 1970s Cuba sought to develop a nuclear energy capability
with Soviet assistance. Named the "Project of the Century"
by Fidel Castro, Cuba envisioned a network of nuclear reactors across
the island. The completion of the project would alleviate Cubas
oil dependence once and for all and would provide a shining example
of the success of the Cuban development model. As a by-product of the
peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy, Cuba would also create a cadre
of well-trained nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians.
reap political benefits as well. It would lessen its energy dependence
on the Soviet Union and develop a technological expertise in an area
of considerable prestige and sophistication. It had the option of a
turnkey project from the Russians. It chose a more costly and time-consuming
technical assistance program that would provide training for nuclear
engineers and where the Soviet Union and Cuba would be equal partners
in the construction. While politically more appealing, this option was
marked by inefficiency, delays and a lack of experience on the part
of the Russians building nuclear reactors in the Western Hemisphere.
But even though the memory of the Chernobyl accident tempered Cubas
decision, it remained determined to complete the Juragua facility.
early 1990s, despite one setback after another, the facility was more
than 50 percent complete. At this time, Cuba worried whether a significantly
weaker Soviet Union could continue financing. It also faced a constant
stream of criticisms of the integrity of the construction at the site.
These claims included allegations of shoddy workmanship, lax record-keeping
and accounting, and questionable inspection regimes.
these allegations painted a picture of an accident waiting to happen
and significantly increased concerns in the region about which direction
the wind currents would take the fallout from a nuclear accident. In
1991, in a round of congressional hearings, witnesses blasted the project
and labeled the reactor a potential "Cuban Chernobyl." The
southeastern United States, some witnesses claimed, would be blanketed
with nuclear fallout as far north as Washington, D.C., and Cuba would
be rendered a wasteland for all eternity. The Cubans responded to these
allegations by stating that technical data would unequivocally prove
the integrity and concern for safety on the part of the Cubans.
nonproliferation community was also expressing concerns about the Cuban
program on the heels of allegations that there was a more nefarious
element to the Cuban program, that of a nuclear-weapons development
program. At that time Cuba was not a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), nor to the regional nuclear-weapon-free zone accord, the
Treaty of Tlatelolco. Cuba maintained its opposition to these agreements
on the basis that they were discriminatory, that not all Latin American
states were signatories, and that it faced continued U.S. hostility.
concerns were further exacerbated by the apparent lack of spent fuel
storage and disposal plans, and the absence of a stand-alone nuclear
regulatory body for inspections, accounting and materials control. Nevertheless,
Cuba held important positions within the U.N.s International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and pointed to these close ties as evidence of
its commitment to upholding international nonproliferation norms and
a suspension of the project in 1992, Castro stated that Russia was now
demanding $200 million for the instrumentation and control systems.1
In fact, Russia itself did not have the hard currency being demanded
by the Siemens company of Germany for the installation of these systems.
Cuba and Russia were seeking to replicate the success of a similar facility
at Loviisa, Finland where Russian design was married to German instrumentation
and control to produce a top-flight reactor. Although Cuba was provided
with $30 million in 1993 for mothballing the Juragua site, the situation
changed little until April, 1998 when Cuba and Russia announced a renewed
effort to build the plant.
interim, Cuba sought in vain to attract potential Western suitors for
a joint venture. A feasibility study contracted by Cuba and Brazil from
Ansaldo SpA of Italy placed the cost to complete construction at around
$800 million. This appears to be a conservative figure. When one considers
that there may have to be back-fitting and replacement of some systems,
the costs could be significantly higher, as much as $1.2 billion. Cubas
poor credit rating probably precludes its ability to borrow the money
for the project.
it is difficult to conceive of an investor willing to spend more than
a billion dollars on a questionable venture with little possibility
of return. Russias reluctance to invest any more money in the
project may be related to its own efforts to commercialize its domestic
energy sector. As of 1997, it was estimated that the Russians have only
been able to collect 1.5 cents on the dollar of energy generated and
sold to domestic customers. At this point it is difficult to conceive
of an investment plan for the project that would not either amount to
charity or transfer ownership to the investor.
interim, Cuba has continued developing its legal and bureaucratic structure
to comply with international standards and has signed but not yet ratified
to Treaty of Tlatelolco. It has established a new regulatory structure
and is presently reconfiguring the legal basis of its nuclear-related
activities to comply with the requirements of the Tlatelolco accord,
especially those related to inventory of nuclear materials, reporting
procedures and inspections by international agencies. This has been
made possible because of the
with international agencies and the commitment of the government to
uphold international standards in this area.
Cuba were conceivably to find a means to advance the project, it will
be required to subject its facility to international full-scope safeguards,
significant operational and safety inspections, and numerous internationally
monitored tests before operation could begin. Added to this is the thirty-six-month
minimum of construction time to complete the reactor. Even if the present
Russian-Cuban negotiations succeed and funds were found for start-up,
the plant could not go on line until at least 2001. Cubas "Project
of the Century" has become a project for the next.
Russian support faltered early in the decade, it revived in 1998 as
the Russian Federations atomicenergy commission, Minatom, laid
plans to export nuclear materials and technologies worth $4 billion
by the year 2000. This includes the export of uranium to the United
States, the financing of construction of the Kundankulam nuclear station
in India, a nuclear deal with Egypt, construction of the nuclear station
at Bushehr, Iran and the possible signing of a contract for the construction
of another 1,000-megawatt unit and two 440megawatt units. Russia sought
both to attract new buyers and renew old acquaintances.
context, Russia also wants to restore its trade with Cuba. After a series
of high-level meetings in 1997, Russia and Cuba negotiated an oil-for-sugar
swap and the expansion of Russian cooperation in nickel mining and nuclear
energy. Furthermore, Evgeny Reshetnikov, deputy minister of the Russian
ministry of atomic energy, described the Cuban nuclear plant project
as mutually advantageous: "On the one hand Cuba is in desperate
need of self-sufficiency in electrical supply, and on the other, operation
of the reactor will be the only way for Russia to get from Cuba the
enormous debts it owes our country."2
by Russia came after the failure, noted above, of Cuban attempts to
attract partners such as Fiat, Ansaldo and Siemens. Their decision not
to go ahead may have been prompted by the lack of hard currency and
both Russia and Cubas poor credit rating in the world financial
markets. Given that situation, the Russians proposed installing Russian-built
instrumentation and control systems in the Juragua units.3
is one of the goals of the negotiations undertaken by the Russians and
Cubans in April, 1998. Rather than an international consortium, the
idea now is to set up a Russian-Cuban joint venture. Funding remains
a real problem, but the successful completion of a reactor in Cuba would
be good advertising for Russias nuclear industry. It would demonstrate
to other potential buyers of Russian nuclear reactors that Moscow can
deliver the goods. But whether Moscow is willing to invest a billion
dollars in such a public-relations gambit remains to be seen.
and monster creation
downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes off the Cuban coast, the
pending Helms-Burton legislation swept through both houses of Congress
and was quickly and triumphantly signed into law by President Clinton.
Even if previous Cuban-American missions had violated Cuban air space,
the Cuban choice of a military response was inappropriate and ultimately
regrettable for a number of reasons. The Clinton administration had
been opposed to the Helms-Burton legislation. But with the shoot-down,
it felt compelled to sign.
violates international law, is extraterritorial and has caused problems
with our closest friends and trading partners. It also reflects a growing
trend in American foreign policythe demonization of foreign-policy
German peace researcher Kinka Gerke has put it:
. . . serves to simplify complex foreign-policy situations . . . it
helps in formulating clear foreign policy lines, in providing moral
justification for U.S. foreign policy, and in mobilizing public support
. . . As a result, interest groups that revive old enemy images either
by creating new monsters or restoring old ones that were gathering dust
off-stage are getting a disproportionate hearing.4
the essence of what has happened to Cuba with the February 1996 downing
serving as the catalyst.
in the Helms-Burton legislation are provisions to limit Cubas
ability to complete construction of the nuclear reactors at Juragua.
Specifically, these provisions aim at deterring Cubas would-be
nuclear partners, most notably the Russian Federation, from helping
the Cubans in any meaningful way. Helms-Burton calls for the "withholding
from assistance allocated for any country an amount equal to the sum
of assistance or credits . . . in support of the completion of the Cuban
nuclear facility at Juragua"5
argue that the mostly symbolic nature of Cuban-Russian nuclear cooperation
in the postCold War period is indicative of the success of this
approach. A much more reasonable appraisal would point to the chronic
shortages of hard currency for both partners that have brought this
project to a standstill. Yet, these provisions aim to limit the possibilities
of this cooperation with the threat of a reduction in foreign aid to
under the 1993 Comprehensive Threat Reduction Act or "Nunn-Lugar
Act" (Public Law 103-160), Russias nuclear infrastructure
was earmarked to receive assistance to stabilize its nuclear assets.
Moreover, assistance to Russia and other states of the former Soviet
Union was exempted from these sanctions in the areas of political, economic
and humanitarian aid. This would have given Russias Minatom a
free hand to continue cooperating with Cuba and pursue reactor sales
in the international nuclear markets. Furthermore, under the provisions
of international nuclear accords and as a member of the IAEA, Cuba is
entitled to pursue a nuclear energy capability so long as it adheres
to provisions of full safeguards and nuclear safety protocols. Helms-Burton
simply ignores all that.
1980s, Cuba has been a very active member of the IAEA. During the 1980s
Cuba held a seat on the agencys board of governors and Cubans
have served as international safeguards inspectors. The IAEA has provided
a number of Cubans with advanced training in the areas of safety assessments,
designing and implementing training programs for personnel involved
in the operational safety and maintenance of nuclear installations,
and projects to assist in licensing the reactor and providing quality
assurance for them. It has also sponsored regional informational seminars
in Cuba for the exchange of information on applications of nuclear energy.
Cuba hosted an IAEA co-sponsored International Symposium on Nuclear
Related Technologies in Agriculture, the Environment, and Radiochemistry
in Havana in late October 1997. Over 31 nations were represented with
450 scientists, technicians and nuclear engineers participating. This
can be viewed as a complimentary function to the wider international
norms and standards related to the peaceful exploitation of nuclear
energy. Additionally, there is a strong linkage between Cuban and Soviet/Russian
nuclear scientists and engineers. This consists of a sort of "nuclear
brotherhood" of a cadre of specialists who were educated and trained
under the old Soviet system. Few can argue with the quality of this
process and it substantiates Cuban claims of technical competence.
1997, NBC Nightly News reported that funds contributed by the United
States to the IAEA were being used to fund training programs in Cuba.
A subsequent GAO study of the issue indicated that indeed a portion
of the voluntary contribution by the United States was earmarked for
technical assistance programs for the Cubans.6
But a closer
inspection of the figures behind this news story indicates that there
was more smoke than substance. In 1996, the United States contributed
$16 million (about 30 percent) to the IAEAs technical cooperation
fund. Cuba for its part contributed $45,150 (or 0.7 percent) to the
same fund. The IAEA has approved $1.7 million in technical assistance
for projects for Cuba for 1997 through 1999. By extrapolation, the United
States contribution to the fund over this same period of time would
be around $48 million of the $159 million total. The amount of technical
assistance for Cuba, $1.7 million, is 3.5 percent of the total US contribution.
That assistance from the IAEA coffers to Cuba represents 1.06 percent
of the total contributions of the fund for 1997 through 1999. The reduction
of the 3.5 percent that goes to Cuba from the US contribution to the
fund would only amount to a paltry $59,500. This would hardly disable
Cuban cooperation with the IAEA, nor could it be conceived as an impediment
to the provision of assistance to Cuba from the agency. Symbolically,
opponents of the Cuban program could point to the non-involvement of
the US for assistance programs from the IAEA. Whether it is $59,500
or $1.7 million matters little. The IAEA will most likely push forward
with the assistance and training programs that ultimately benefit the
United States as well as Cuba.
July 1997 a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman
Robert Menendez to withhold U.S. assistance for programs and projects
of the IAEA in Cuba. H.R. 2092, known as the IAEA Accountability and
Safety Act of 1997, is clearly designed to wash American hands clean
of any involvement in Cubas nuclear program. A similarly worded
amendment was included in the 1997 Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for 1998 and 1999. These bills are essentially toothless and violate
the spirit of international nonproliferation cooperation. Like the Helms-Burton
law, these proposed pieces of legislation render themselves moot by
the nature of the exceptions to their provisions. Sec. 2 (2)(b)(i) states
that the law would not apply to IAEA programs for "safety
of nuclear facilities or related materials, or for inspections and similar
activities designed to prevent the development of nuclear weapons"
by Cuba. This sounds very much like the mission of the international
organization under which all these activities would take place.
perplexing is the inclusion of a provision in the 1997 defense-appropriations
bill to construct a network of early-warning radiation detectors along
the gulf coast of south Florida at a cost of $3.2 million. The detection
system would purportedly provide warning of radioactive fallout emanating
from a nuclear reactor accident at Juragua. Yet this is a power plant
that cannot possibly go into operation for at least another three years
and that may never go into operation.
specific to the Juragua facility and the nuclear research center at
Pedro Pi would be lifted by the United States if Cuba: ratifies the
Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; negotiates
full-scope safeguards with the IAEA not later than two years after ratification
of the accord; and incorporates internationally accepted nuclear safety
standard into practice. Interestingly enough this has been the focus
of Cubas nuclear activities for some time. In 1996, the Cubans
embarked on a new nuclear law project to complement the passage of Decreto-Ley
No. 208Regarding the National System of Accounting and Control
of Nuclear Materials. Cuban nuclear officials have indicated that the
reason for delay in the ratification stems from the need to alter the
existing legal basis of nuclear law so that it will more easily comply
with the provisions of agreements with which they fully intend to comply
with. Decreto-Ley No. 208 represents part of that effort.
officials are clearly cognizant of the shortcomings of the Soviet-based
systems of accounting, control and materials handling. They have sought
to design legislation that conforms to internationally recognized standards
and norms of nuclear materials handling and storage. They have modeled
the system in spirit to the scope and objectives contained in U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission standards. Reaching that standard is another question
altogether. But they have sought to make this system amenable to the
requirements of the full-scope safeguards agreements that Cuba intends
to sign when the treaty comes into force.
On a larger
scale the new nuclear law project, under the direction of the Agencia
de Energia Nuclear and the Centro Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear, seeks
to place all of Cubas nuclear activities under a system of laws
and practices that correspond to existing and future international nuclear
standards.6 Should this come to pass, and by all indications, it appears
that it will, there will be very little that the United States can do
to impede the progress of the Cuban nuclear project.
progress in meeting international nuclear standards and its eventual
ability to construct the plant, what is to be gained from unreasoning
U.S. opposition? As previously detailed, the demonization of Fidel makes
it easy domestically. But what does the United States stand to gain
by alienating our allies and trading partners over issues of little
or no importance? Where does it end?
present environment of U.S.-Cuban relations, Cuban ratification of the
Tlatelolco accord would soften the U.S. position not at all. Were Cuba
to resume construction of Juragua, the call for action in Congress would
be almost immediate. One can easily imagine the introduction of legislation
that would call for the removal of the United States from certain international
or regional organizations because those organizations treated Cuba as
a sovereign and independent nation. Moreover, the imposition of unilateral
sanctions against any state cooperating with Cubas nuclear program
would be almost certain. We have seen elements of the more radicalized
opposition to the Castro regime call for "surgical strikes"
against Cuban nuclear installations, and in a major U.S. newspaper no
be no argument that the Cuban nuclear program does raise concerns regarding
the safety and integrity of a Cuban- and Russian-built installation.
This is especially so when we consider the significant resource constraints
that the project has faced over the past six years. As a close neighbor,
we, as well as the Cubans, have a responsibility to be sure that the
nuclear facility at Juragua would pose no threat to the environment.
The United States has and continues to coordinate and consult with the
other national civilian nuclear agencies in the region.
consistently threatening would-be participants in the Cuban program,
we already are treading on thin international legal ice. The United
States has over the past two decades expended vast amounts of diplomatic
capital in garnering support for international agreements on all aspects
of the exploitation of nuclear energy. Many of these agreements were
the result of measured confidence-building initiatives and based on
the promise of reciprocity. We are now fairly confident that these agreements
provide a stable base for peaceful nuclear commerce and a reduced threat
of weapons of mass destruction.
these agreements and their resulting norms over our domestic imperatives
regarding Cuba would be appallingly counterpreductive. These international
and regional nuclear cooperation agreements were worked out over many
years and have served us well. Under them, Cuba like any other state
in the international system is entitled to develop a peaceful nuclear
energy capability, whether we like it or not. By enacting domestic legislation
that ostensibly diminishes that ability we violate the very international
accords we worked so hard to obtain.
mean that we must idly stand by and let Cuba move forward on this project
with nary a word? Not in the least. There are already well-established
international protocols for review and oversight of civilian nuclear
installations and programs. What this project in particular is in need
of is direct U.S. cooperation in all areas of the program. What would
be required is the insertion or reinsertion of the American scientific
and technical community in this discussion. Given that Cuba is a member
in good standing of the international nonproliferation community by
virtue of its de facto participation and progress in the activities
of that community, there should be direct contact between American and
Cuba officials at this level.
It is noteworthy
that Cuba, unlike its other regional partners, will not receive any
of the rewards commonly associated with the accession to regional and
international nonproliferation accords. Argentina and Brazil, for instance,
got nuclear cooperation agreements and commercial contracts as a result
of their accession to the Tlatelolco accord. Cuba is already a member
of the IAEA, the American Nuclear Society, the World Association of
Nuclear Operators and numerous other international nuclear organizations.
Moreover, it continues making progress toward ratification and compliance
with the Treaty of Tlatelolco as evidenced by the passage of Decreto-Ley
No. 208 of 1996, and the new nuclear law project.
nuclear cooperation with post-revolutionary Cuba would not be new. During
the 1980s Cuban and American officials conducted informational and technical
exchanges on the nuclear program. Duke Power of North Carolina, under
the leadership of William Lee, hosted a delegation of Cuban nuclear
officials at McGuire Nuclear Power Station outside of Charlotte, North
Carolina. Both sides viewed these visits and exchanges as essential
components for assuring that Cuba could successfully and safely exploit
nuclear energy. Moreover, the 1997 GAO study affirmed that safety and
technical cooperation with Cuban nuclear officials should continue for
the time being.
it is puzzling why in the face of progress in these areas, and with
the legitimate concerns regarding the development of nuclear energy
in Cuba, that U.S. legislators would be seeking to limit Cuban access
to advancement in these areas. Those officials now seated in positions
of importance within Cubas energy bureaucracies, and who will
likely remain after a transition in leadership, need to know that the
concerns raised by the United States are legitimate and that we are
prepared to discuss these matters in a sober and objective manner.
It is precisely
this type of cooperation that could enlarge one other neglected avenue
for resolving the nuclear- power-plant issue: development of alternative
energy sources. In January, 1997 Castro announced that Cuba would be
seeking other energy alternatives, displacing the nuclear project as
the energy-policy priority. This marked a significant shift in policy.
The past year has witnessed a sea change in Cubas energy priorities
as it is de-emphasizing the nuclear option to explore modernization
of the existing energy generating capability and new means of energy
generation such as wind and solar power.
As a future
political, commercial and environmental consideration, it is in the
interest of the United States to establish scientific and technical
ties within Cubas nuclear and energy community to encourage such
alternatives. Casting aspersions and the threat of impending nuclear
disaster across the Straits of Florida provides no real means of prudently
addressing those concerns.
the domestication and politicization of international scientific and
technical matters only serve to cloud the reality of what is occurring
in Cuba in this area. This has forced individuals within this country
to rely on secondary interpretations of the facts.
way one can know what is really going on in Cuba is to directly engage
Cuban officials. In place of that we have vengeful politicians tampering
with elements of our national security policy about which they are mostly
uninformed and less than qualified to understand. As a result, we rely
on mostly symbolic measures to address what are legitimate, but ultimately
exaggerated concerns. U.S. threats are not likely to succeed. One or
more partners might be frightened off, but it is an educated guess that
the majority, as in the case of Helms-Burton, would resist any attempts
to have the United States dictate their trade with Cuba.
the prospect of a democratic Cuba is one that would be welcomed by most
everyone. Our actions today affect how smoothly the transition might
be. Cuba is attempting to deal with its future by putting in place a
reliable source of energy and electricity to fuel its continuing development.
Nuclear energy, for all of its inherent failings, is a legitimate option
for the Cubans. Cuba also needs to explore viable alternatives that
correspond to its economic reality. The future Cuba, the Castro-less
Cuba, the Cuba of the twenty-first century, will desperately need energy.
States can play a part in ensuring that Cuba can and will develop its
energy sector for the future. The notion of a democratic life would
ring hollow without any light by which to read or any power to turn
the wheels of commerce and industry. Promoting the "economic asphyxiation"
of Cubathe declared goal of U.S. legislationis both immoral
and in conflict with U.S. interests.
bells being rung in Congress are decidedly premature. The plant is mothballed
and may never go on line. Russian-Cuban negotiations on the possibility
of resuming construction which began in April, 1998 remain in doubt.
But even if they succeed and construction should resume, the plant could
not possibly go into operation until the year 2001, and probably several
years after that.
the best way for the United States to assure itself of the plants
safety is to work through the IAEA to make sure all the international
safety conventions are fully observed. The absolutely worst way is the
approach now being pushed by some in Congress, i.e., to work against
the IAEA and in violation of various conventions on nuclear safety.
To threaten to cut funds to the IAEAthe very agency we should
be relying on to supervise Juraguas construction and operation
if it should ever reach that pointis simply illogical and counterproductive.
but perhaps most importantly, the United States cannot deny Cuba the
right to build a nuclear power plant. To do so would violate a whole
series of international conventions on the subject to which the United
States and Cuba are signatories. All nations which have signed the conventions
and committed themselves to safe construction and operation have a right
to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. What the United States
can doindeed, would be expected to dois to make certain
those conventions are upheld.
has never been a consensus of the figures that are often quoted in relation
to the Cuban nuclear program. Additionally, until such time as there
is a "verifiable" accounting of aspects of the nuclear program
by independent analysts all figures should be treated with doubt.
Rybak, "Russians To Resume Juragua Construction Alone, Minatom
Says." Nucleonics Week, Vol. 38, No. 7, Pg. 2.
Minatom is in direct competition with U.S. and other Western nuclear
firms, especially now since the signing of the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation
accords for a market estimated to be worth $60 to $70 billion in potential
Kinka Gerke, "Unilateral Strains On Trans-Atlantic Relations: U.S.
Sanctions Against Those Who Trade with Cuba, Iran, and Libya and Their
Effects on World Trade Regime." PRIF Reports No. 47 (Frankfurt:
Peace Research Institute, April 1997), pp. 67. See also Gebhard
Schweigler, "Elemente der Irrationalität: Historiche Traditionen
und innenpolitische Faktoren," in Zur weltpolitischen Rolle der
USA (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: Ebenhausen, 1994), pp. 21-31.
International Atomic Energy Agencys Nuclear Technical Assistance
for Cuba (GAO/RCED-97-72) March 1997.
Benjamin-Alvarado, "The Cuban New Nuclear Law Project" The
Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control. Vol. 3,
No. 3 (Summer 1997), p. 41.