Center for International Policy

Iraq: the Lessons from Vietnam
December 2, 2003

Parker W. Borg

"Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
- George Santayana, early Twentieth Century American philosopher

Are there lessons from Vietnam which might be applicable to Iraq? Throughout nearly two decades of intense involvement in Vietnam, critics argued that we should never have been there in the first place. Many have made the same argument about Iraq. Whatever the merits of the initial involvement, however, the critical question for American leaders at each juncture is always what should be done now. Looking at Iraq and all that has transpired in the last year, what steps should the United States take now and in the immediate future to secure an honorable outcome, reduce the threat of international terrorism at home and abroad, and restore America's position as a respected international leader?

Despite the obvious differences in time, place, and politics, important similarities give pause for reflection. The United States in both cases unilaterally launched a confrontation against a vastly inferior military foe. In both cases, the introduction of American troops changed the situation on the ground, but did not bring the prompt, clear solution that the advocates of war promised. In both cases once the war seemed to become hopelessly bogged down, the United States concluded a plan to turn more authority over to its local allies. And in both cases the United States invested its global leadership in a conflict which generated widespread international anger at America's arrogance.

Some lessons from Vietnam were absorbed and applied to Iraq, either consciously without any fanfare or unconsciously. Speaking at a colloquium on Vietnam in 1973-74, Robert Komer, who was head of the pacification program in 1966-68, said he had asked himself why such an enormous effort had such a limited impact and concluded that we had tried to cope with an atypical situation in Vietnam with the conventional resources at hand. Some of Komer's main points which seemed to have been absorbed in Iraq included:

There was no unified conflict management during the Vietnam conflict to pull together all of the diverse activities of the Defense Department, State, AID, and other participating agencies. Each US agency did its own thing. In Iraq, the lines of authority all went first to the Secretary of Defense and after the October 5 restructuring to Iraq Stabilization Group at the National Security Council.
There was no unified command over the separate military elements on the ground in Vietnam. Americans, Koreans, and Vietnamese each fought under their own command structures. In Iraq, all responsibility has been vested in the Commander of the Central Command, General Tommy Franks until July and General John Abizaid afterwards.
We treated the Vietnamese Government as a sovereign state because we sought to encourage institution building and democracy. During the war we frequently found ourselves at odds with the Vietnamese authorities. Perhaps this explains why we have strongly resisted so long all efforts to give the Iraqi Governing Council more authority.
And finally, during the Vietnam War each of the separate massive intelligence empires focused on their own classic methods of obtaining and interpreting intelligence. As a result, they knew little about the Vietcong infrastructure and operating style. We have learned in recent months about the inter-agency intelligence disputes regarding the Iraqi threat.

While these lessons offer interesting insights into the organization of the American presence; they tell us little about the broader strategic vision behind the involvement. Reviewing the works of a number of other observers of the Vietnam War , four points emerge as critical in establishing successful military/political presence in another country over an extended period of time: 1) a clear set of objectives, 2) an accurate assessment of the military requirements, 3) a program adapted to the target country, and 4) political acquiescence by the local population. All of these are obvious, no brainers perhaps, but in the "fog of war" they often are overlooked.

Establish a clear set of objectives

Looking broadly, almost every observer of the Vietnam War put the highest priority on clear objectives. What were we trying to accomplish and why? Objectives require a connection to a vital national interest if they are to be sustained over the longer term. Objectives are critical not only for mobilizing long term support at home, but also for establishing a framework of expectations in the target country and marshalling international support. Without a clear set of objectives, it becomes impossible to determine when the effort should come to an end and whether success has been achieved.

At the beginning of the confrontation, American objectives in Iraq were controversial and poorly understood both at home and abroad; as the war entered the occupation phase, the objectives seemed to become a moving target.

Before the invasion, the president stated repeatedly that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat because he possessed weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems to menace the world, and strong ties with the Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks. The publicly-stated objective was the disarmament of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Despite skepticism about the threat evidence, more extensively outside the U.S. than at home, Congress first provided its War Powers support and then the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441 in November 2002.

As the disarmament inspections proceeded, the Bush Administration's objectives seemed to change. American leaders began dismissing the importance of disarmament and calling more frequently for regime change in Baghdad. Some would argue that this had been the objective all along, but it had been subordinated to the disarmament objective to generate international support and permit the massing of troops in the region. After choosing to ignore concerns by other members of the Security Council that an invasion of Iraq was neither necessary nor justified, the United States and the United Kingdom launched their invasion, identifying themselves as the coalition forces.

One by one the original objectives slipped from sight during the early months of the occupation. When occupation troops could not quickly find Iraq's weapons of mass destruction or threatening delivery systems, the Bush administration dispatched with great fanfare and high expectations a special team of some 1200 US weapons inspectors. After three months, the joint CIA-Pentagon task force led by the CIA’s David Kay, provided a preliminary report to the administration and Congress in early October which acknowledged their failure to uncover any of the weapons. Likewise the connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda began to unravel. In mid-September, after Vice President Cheney again made the connection in a speech and polls showed that 70 % of Americans believed the connection, President Bush acknowledged publicly on September 18 that there was no evidence to connect Saddam Hussein with the events of 9/11. In addition, seven months after regime change in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein remained at large in an unknown Iraqi location and able to issue period calls on supporters to oppose the American occupation.

As it became increasingly evident that weapons of mass destruction had not posed an imminent threat, the Bush administration began shifting its focus to other justifications for the invasion: mass graves and past human rights violations (without noting that most of these dated to the early 1990s); a strike in the broader campaign against terrorism, and making Iraq a beacon for democracy in the Middle East. These did not come across as objectives, but as ex-post fact justifications, aimed at convincing Americans that shedding American blood in Iraq had been worth the effort.

In an address to the nation on September 7, President Bush said, "Our strategy in Iraq has three objectives: destroying the terrorists, enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq and helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own defense and their own future." The first of these objectives is vague and open-ended; the second is contradicted by our own confusing policy of holding the reigns of power. Only the third seems pertinent. The President provided a variation on this third objective on October 27, when he said, "It's in the national interest of the U.S. that a peaceful Iraq emerge. And we will stay the course to achieve the objective."

The President shifted the objective a bit further, when he spoke in early November about bringing democracy to the Middle East. He said:

"Securing democracy in Iraq is the work of many hands. . . . This is a massive and difficult undertaking -- it is worth our effort, it is worth our sacrifice, because we know the stakes. The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region. Iraqi democracy will succeed -- and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran -- that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution."

If the Bush objective has been securing democracy, staying the course to build a peaceful Iraq, destroying terrorists or even enlisting the support of others nations, one can only wonder why has the White House been so insistent upon retaining total control over both security and the political process in Iraq without more than a fig leaf of international cover. Why are we so insistent about paying the costs and bearing the burden of casualties almost alone for such idealistic goals?

Skeptics wonder whether oil interests or the protection of Israel might be underlying objectives. Are we trying to ensure that Iraq becomes a reliable source of oil possibly restored by American companies and maybe even outside the OPEC framework? Is our primary interest perhaps the establishment of a political environment in Iraq friendlier to Israel and American global interests?

At the six month mark, Americans by a small margin seemed willing to accept the administration's justification for war. A Washington Post-ABC Poll in late October revealed that 54% of Americans considered the war with Iraq worth fighting after comparing the costs and benefits. On a more troubling note for the administration, the poll reported growing numbers saying that the nation had suffered unacceptable losses (62% vs. 28% in April) and that it was time to withdraw (38% vs. 26%).

While Americans may still support the effort in Iraq, the rest of the world has not yet found the arguments convincing. The Pew Global Attitudes Project compared opinions in 20 countries in March and May 2003 and reported in summary in June:

The speed of the war in Iraq and the prevailing belief that the Iraqi people are better off as a result have modestly improved the image of America. But in most countries, opinions of the U.S are markedly lower than they were a year ago. The war has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support of the post-World War II era: the U.N. and the North Atlantic Alliance.

American objectives in Iraq remain a problem. The president argued at the beginning that Iraq's nuclear capability posed a threat to American national interests. Seven months into the occupation, he talks about democracy and staying the course to ensure a peaceful transition. Obviously, objectives change during different phases of a war. Having failed to discover the threatening weapons or delivery systems to justify the intervention, however, the Bush administration faces an additional credibility problem in setting forth current objectives. Now, when the president talks about his idealistic agenda, skeptics wonder about a hidden agenda. Why are we prepared to pay such a high price in blood and treasure? In addition, establishing democracy or staying the course are vague and open-ended objectives, unlikely to be a convincing for the American public as costs and casualties mount; for the Iraqi people as pressures for greater autonomy grow, and for the rest of the world as they witness the continuing carnage without an end in sight.

Ensure the availability of sufficient military force to accomplish the mission

Neither in Vietnam nor in Iraq did the U.S. put the right mix of forces on the ground when they were needed. In both cases, the U.S. led a unilateral effort, aided by a smaller number of allied troops essentially Koreans and Australians in Vietnam and British in Iraq. In both cases, domestic American political concerns rather than the situation on the ground seemed to determine the allocation of forces. In terms of the approach to the number of troops needed, however, the responses in Vietnam and Iraq were in a sense opposite.

During the early years of the Vietnam War between 1954 and 1968 as each crisis evolved, American military and civilian planners repeatedly concluded that the best solution was to increase in the American troop presence. The political leadership accommodated these recommendations with foresight rarely extending beyond the next election cycle. By the end of 1967 there were some 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam. After the shock of the Tet offensive in January 1968, the solution to each emergency seemed to involve the withdrawal of American troops along with upgrading the capabilities of the Vietnamese units without acknowledging the long term commitment this upgrade entailed.

In Iraq the American troop levels appeared to have been capped for the duration before the military phase began because of a dispute within the Pentagon between senior military and civilian leaders. Speaking before a congressional committee in February 2003, Army chief of staff, General Eric Shinseki, warned that the post-war occupation of Iraq would require "several hundred thousand" U.S. troops. Within a matter of days, both Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz decried Shinseki's estimate as way off the mark. The Pentagon's civilian leaders remained adamant thereafter about a limited American force level in Iraq, belittling all suggestions to the contrary.

American force levels remained more or less constant from the completion of the buildup through November 2003. On the eve of the invasion, about 130,000 U.S. troops were standing by in Kuwait ready for deployment. By April 14, when the Pentagon announced that the main fighting in Iraq had been completed, there were some 120,000 American troops on Iraqi soil. As the invasion force became an occupation force in the following months, the mission changed and units rotated, but the total U.S. troop presence hovered between 130-150,000 troops. In early November, Pentagon planners announced their intention to reduce the American military presence in Iraq from 130,000 to100,000 troops by the summer of 2004 - a drawdown which a Pentagon spokesman said was not related to politics.

This lean American force level proved adequate for the invasion, but was sadly insufficient for the occupation, much as General Shinseki had predicted. Throughout the invasion phase, more than one field commander and more than one former general officer, working as a network analyst, complained about U.S. forces being stretched too thin, but the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard units melted away as the American units reached Baghdad, thereby easing the conquest and validating the decision to restrict the American military ground presence. Neocon leaders like Defense Policy Board member Ken Adelman gloated afterwards that the invasion had been a "cakewalk," just as he predicted. What had worked during the invasion, however, was not to work for the occupation phase. Within a short time after President Bush's May 1st declaration about the end of the combat, it became apparent that the Americans lacked the ground forces for the wide range of new responsibilities. American occupying forces failed miserably in the following weeks to protect Iraq's economic infrastructure from sabotage, its cultural heritage from looting, its weapons storage sites from pillaging, its newly arrived U.N. and humanitarian workers from terrorism, and its general population from post-war chaos.

The Bush administration sought allies throughout the war, but with a few exceptions, found only token military support. Stalwarts from the beginning, the British spearheaded the invasion in the southern Iraq around Basra with about 11,000 troops and the Australians provided some 2,000 Special Forces troops for initial desert operations. Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a 45-member "Coalition of the Willing" just prior to the invasion, but except for the British and the Australians, the others had agreed only to provide over-flight or basing rights, logistical support or future reconstruction assistance. Fifteen of the 45 states declined to be identified. Notably missing from the coalition were Russia, France, Germany, and most of the Arab world. This contrasted with the 430,000 U.S. troops plus 295,000 troops from the 31-member coalition who were assembled for the first Gulf War confrontation with Iraq.

Once it became apparent that the occupation was not going to be a cakewalk, the Bush administration made a vigorous push for foreign peacekeeping units, but found support. The absence of a U.N. mandate, the unpopularity of the war, and the American insistence on commanding all forces in Iraq all contributed to international reluctance to become involved in what the world viewed as America's occupation. The U.S. and the U.K. sought to overcome the legitimacy barrier with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003, which recognized the two nations as the occupying powers and called on "Member States to contribute to the stability and security in Iraq." This resolution permitted the United States to cobble together a multinational force of 9,500 troops led by Poles, which began stabilization operations in early July in a band of territory north of the British zone around Basra and officially assumed responsibility for most of the area in early September.

The multinational force added an international flavor to the occupation, but most nations provided only a token presence. Given the growing number of incidents, the force was insufficient. While this force was still taking shape, the Bush administration began approaching other nations, most notably Turkey, India, Pakistan, and South Korea about each contributing 10-15,000 troops. In addition to improving security and making the occupation more international, the Americans wanted to relieve their troops in Iraq without calling up new units for service. Without a more specific U.N. mandate, however, the Bush Administration found little support. Partially to meet this concern, the U.S. and the U.K. pushed through another Security Council resolution (1511 of October 16, 2003), which authorized "a multinational force under unified command" to help maintain stability and security in Iraq. Although the measure passed unanimously, many members were dissatisfied that the U.S. had not offered more concessions in the leadership of the occupation. When announcing their support for the resolution, the French, Germans, and Russians issued a joint statement, saying they would not be providing military assistance.

Despite the new U.N. mandate, interest in a second multinational force waned because of the growing terrorism in Iraq, the continuing unpopularity of the war, and American insistence on military control. One by one, each of the prospective contributors dropped away. At the six month mark, it appeared that only the Turkish Government had agreed to provide a 10,000-strong peacekeeping unit, but they withdrew the offer in early November because of objections from the Kurds and Iraqi Governing Council. It was a major diplomatic gaffe for the Bush administration not to have obtained Iraqi approval prior to the Turkish commitment. Other nations stalled and reduced their commitments. As of December 1, the South Koreans were considering the dispatch of only 3,000 troops.

By December 1, 2003, seven months after President Bush declared the end of major combat operations, security seemed to be deteriorating at an accelerating rate. By November 1, 2003 the number of American troops killed in Iraq exceeded the 116 who had died during the invasion. November was the bloodiest month for allied soldiers since the fighting began. America lost 81 dead in November as contrasted to 73 combat deaths in April. In addition, Iraqi guerilla attacks in November claimed the lives of 18 Italian troops, seven Spanish intelligence officers, two Japanese diplomats, and two Korean electrical workers. Deteriorating security may have prompted President Bush to say that the U.S. would stay the course, but the effect was the opposite on the international community. On October 30, the United Nations humanitarian support operation, which had been devastated by attacks against its Baghdad headquarters on August 19 and again on September 22 decided to evacuate all but 10 of its almost 900 foreign assistance workers. The Red Cross also announced the withdrawal of a portion of its thirty international staff (already down from 130 earlier in the year), following an attack on October 27 against its Baghdad headquarters. Other relief organizations, like Doctors without Borders also announced they would reduce their presence and move their headquarters.

During early November the focus turned increasingly away from foreign troops to a greater Iraqi role in security. Following the bloodiest day of incidents in seven months (16 U.S. troops killed by a missile attack against a helicopter), Secretary Rumsfeld said additional U.S. troops would not be needed because Iraqi forces would be filling the gap. Rumsfeld claimed that over 100,000 Iraqi troops had been trained, although other sources put the figure closer to 85,000, of which only 1,400 were part of the new Iraqi army. Having dissolved the 500,000 Iraqi army of Saddam Hussein, the American had begun rebuilding a new Iraqi army during the summer. The program called for the training of 30-40,000 army troops for light security work and 65-75,000 police, but at most only one battalion might have completed training by the time Secretary Rumsfeld spoke. Other troops trained with the two billion dollar U.S. funding were not likely to graduate until the middle of 2004. Seeking additional security, the Americans began at the same time to look more favorably on the militias, composed of former security service members and loyal to separate political factions. If approved, such troops might have greater success in preventing terrorist attacks, but they could become opposing factional armies in any future power struggle.

By any standard, the United States failed to ensure sufficient military force in Iraq to accomplish its mission. One reason stands out: obstinacy. The administration's obstinacy kept U.S. troop levels below the Shinseki estimates, kept many potential allied troops from participating in an American-controlled occupation, and kept Iraqi involvement at a minimum after disbanding the Iraqi army. Attacks are growing in number and severity. All units seemed to be stretched thin. While each attack may prompt President Bush to restate his assurance that we will stay the course, each new round of casualties seems to create new questions about the value of the war. On the day Secretary Rumsfeld said there would be no need for more American troops, a Washington Post/ABC poll showed that 51% of Americans disapproved of the president's handling of Iraq.

In Vietnam, one dramatic event made the difference which probably determined the course of the war. In January 1968, some 70,000 Communist troops launched simultaneous attacks throughout the country during the Vietnamese New Year holiday, known as Tet. Although the Communists suffered tremendous losses as they were pushed from every town, the effect in the United States was dramatic. After years of rosy forecasts from the White House, the American people and their representatives in Congress lost the will to continue fighting. In the following months, the United States began to reduce the American presence and upgrade the Vietnamese role in a process known as Vietnamization.

Looking ahead in Iraq, one should not rule out the possibility of a single dramatic event, aimed by desperate forces at undermining American confidence in their mission, troops, and leadership. Given the security shortfalls, the United States has perhaps been lucky to have avoided such an attack until now. The United States has already begun its disengagement and the transition to an Iraqi authority. An Iraqi "Tet" could bring unpredictable consequences, underscoring the importance of ensuring sufficient peacekeeping forces to minimize the possible danger.

Adapt policies to the cultural background of the target country.

The successful long term involvement of one nation in the affairs of another society requires an understanding of the target country's history, culture, and self-image so that actions might be customized and miscalculations avoided, particularly regarding people's willingness to persevere under adversity. The more prolonged the expected involvement, the greater the importance of the cultural sensitivity. An understanding of the fundamental nature of Japanese and German societies was critical to the success of the post World War II occupation. The failure of American policy makers to understand the perseverance of the North Vietnamese people was one of the greatest failings of the Vietnam War.

As a society, Americans have as little familiarity with Iraqi historical and cultural traditions as we had with the Vietnamese. A quick review of key issues shows there was even less effort to understand Iraq than Vietnam.

Senior policy makers looked at both Vietnam and Iraq from a one sided optic. We pursued our priorities with little understanding of local perspectives. In Vietnam we opposed the spread of global communism; in Iraq we personalized the confrontation as a struggle against an evil Saddam Hussein. While regional experts in both cases advocated a greater understanding of the local scene and the implications of our actions, these views were brushed aside as irrelevant to the big picture.

American involvement in Vietnam grew slowly over more than a decade, beginning in 1954. By contrast, within the relatively short period of one year beginning in September 2002, the Bush administration had organized a political confrontation, launched a military invasion and begun its occupation of Iraq. While it is true that some of the die-hard proponents of regime change in Iraq had harbored this desire since the end of the Gulf War, promoted their views unsuccessfully during the Clinton years, and used the 9/11 attacks as a pretext to begin planning, there was no government-wide focus on Iraq until September 2002.

Rather than drawing upon the broadest array of knowledge about Iraq, a small coterie of civilians at the Department of Defense, popularly referred to as the neocons, orchestrated the political confrontation and pushed the nation into war, rejecting intelligence at odds with their private estimates and jettisoning postwar plans formulated outside their direct control. Far from exploiting all resources to maximize the prospects for success, the Pentagon civilians seemed far more concerned about maintaining total control of all aspects of Iraqi policy.

The planners pursued a strategy based on the wishful thinking about an idealized Iraq in an idealized Middle East. They selected intelligence which confirmed their preconceptions about the threat, relied excessively on the views of exiles with a vested interest in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and overlooked Iraq's history of opposition to a foreign military presence. Holding to their radical vision for Iraq, the neoconservatives successfully pitched their war plans to White House leaders traumatized by 9/11 and looking for ways to take forceful action.

Ten weeks of military operations in the conquest of Iraq demonstrated new levels of sophistication in the arts of invasion planning, long distance logistical projections, pinpoint razzle-dazzle attacks, and minimal friendly casualties. By contrast, the first six months of the occupation have been a nightmare. In their preparations, military planners placed their focus on the first three stages of "Operation Iraqi Freedom," leaving vague the specifics of the stage four stability and support operations. Having never been enamored with the concept of "nation building," the Pentagon civilians again focused on control, shutting out completely outside influences, most notably the State Department's planning for the post-Saddam era, known as the "Future of Iraq Project." This project had incorporated the views of large number of American and Iraqi experts in a wide range of critical post-conflict issues.

For evidence of the shortcomings in the occupation planning, one need only to review the first six months of the occupation, marked as it has been by planning shortfalls, sabotage against the electrical and petroleum infrastructure, looting of unprotected government buildings and cultural sites, hostility towards American troops in the Sunni triangle and cleric dominated Shiite areas, and a growing number of guerrilla attacks against military and civilian targets. The overlooked State Department project foresaw many of these problems.

Administration officials and occupation forces have professed surprise at the level and intensity of the Iraqi hostility. After receiving assurances from neocons and the allies of the exiled leader Ahmad Chalabi, many had expected American forces to be greeted as liberators. And in some places they have been, at least in the beginning. American officials have blamed violence variously on Saddam loyalists, former members of the Iraqi military angered by their precipitous demobilization, Islamic radicals from other countries flocking into Iraq to embarrass the Americans, or al Qaeda operatives zoning in on Iraq as a new target of opportunity. While intelligence sources might identify the current threats, a better understanding of Iraqi culture might have diminished the threats from the beginning.

Proponents of war in Washington have shown a dismal understanding of Iraqi realities. Military commanders and members of the Occupation Authority have recently shown greater sensitivity to Iraq's political culture, but they are working in an operational realm, often trying to make the best of a difficult situation prescribed from Washington. Their efforts might ameliorate the situation on the ground in Iraq, but cannot easily overcome policy misconceptions.

Cultivate political support among the local population

Political support for a foreign occupation among a local population may be heartfelt or grudging, but some degree of acquiescence is essential for an intervention to have any longer term impact in a target country.

The U.S. failed to develop a constituency among the Vietnamese in support of our military presence. We went into Vietnam with the objective of halting the spread of global Communism. We supported a string of governments in the South which lacked support among the Vietnamese population, a nation whose loyalties were more local than national. Many southerners opposed the Communists, collaborated with the United States, and died defending their southern way of life, but they showed little support for their government in Saigon, the broader American objectives, or the American soldiers who too often both belittled the Vietnamese effort and randomly terrorized the local population in the chaos of war.

Applied to Iraq, the success of the American presence will depend first, on the development of an Iraqi governing authority which accepts the American occupation and second, on an Iraqi populace which supports that Iraqi authority and by extension acquiesces to the presence of a foreign occupation force. This is obvious in the abstract, but problematic because of the vacuum in political authority following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the disbanding of the ruling Baathist Party.

In July, the Iraqi Governing Council was announced, but as appointees of the American-led Coalition Provisional Authority, its support among the Iraqi people was unknown. While great care appears to have been taken to ensure that its 25 members mirrored Iraq's ethnic mix, the Council excluded stridently anti-American Shiite leaders and Sunni Baathists. By early September, the Council had selected a carefully balanced cabinet, but had done little other work. The Council was scheduled to serve under the American authority and American veto power until the new constitution had been written and elections held, at some unspecified future date, possibly towards the end of 2004. Despite the American selection role, relations were strained from the beginning as Council members pushed for greater authority and earlier autonomy, while the Americans pushed the Council to take more responsibility for security problems.

A first step toward greater Iraqi autonomy came on October 16, 2003, with Security Council Resolution 1511, establishing a deadline of December 15 for the Iraqi Governing Council to produce a timetable for drafting a constitution and holding elections. Little progress occurred, however, during the following weeks. The Americans unsuccessfully pushed the Governing Council to move ahead with their planning, complaining that members spent too much time on private economic and political interests rather than the business of governing. Council members countered by arguing for the creation of a provisional authority, which they said would stimulate greater willingness from their fellow citizens to fight against the anti-occupation guerillas.

A second step occurred toward greater Iraqi autonomy occurred in mid-November, when the Americans agreed to accelerate the transfer of power. The decision was prompted by the worst month of casualties of the occupation phase, a statement by the Iraqi interim foreign minister claiming that the deteriorating security situation would prevent the Council from meeting its U.N. deadlines and a poll showing that the majority of Iraqis now viewed the American troops as occupiers rather than liberators. On November 11, the head of the Coalition Authority, L Paul Bremer III, made an unexpected return to Washington for consultations. Upon returning to Iraq, he reached agreement with the Council to establish a indirect selection process to create a transitional national assembly of some 250 members, which would assume sovereignty in June 2004 and serve as an interim government until a constitution could be written and elections held. The Coalition Provisional Authority would be dissolved at that time and American troops would remain as invited guests. The agreement called for the election of the drafters of the Constitution by March 15, 2005 and for a permanent government by December 31, 2005.

Within days, the plan met challenges. The first challenge came from Iraq's most influential Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Systani, who expressed opposition to the indirect selection process, arguing that the selection of the transitional national assembly needed to be put to the entire Iraqi population. The second challenge came when some members of the Iraqi Governing Council questioned the wisdom of disbanding once the new assembly was chosen as called for in the plan. At a meeting of the Governing Council on November 30, members decided on full national elections, despite the absence of any reliable voter role, and a continued role for the Council, possibly as an Upper House, State Council or Senate. The discussion seems far from over.

The autonomy plan poses two dangers. The first is operational. Can the members of the Council develop an acceptable plan? How quickly can voter roles be prepared? Will the Iraqi people support the plan and participate in an orderly manner in the elections? Will this new autonomy plan cultivate support for the occupation? Will hostile incidents interrupt the elections? Can an election produce the intended result of a transitional government? What will be the role for American advisors, American troops, and other occupation troops after the June transfer of sovereignty?

The second danger is more substantive and long term. What sort of governing structure might emerge which will satisfy the disparate Iraqi political constituencies: the majority Shiite, representing 60% of the population; the Sunni, who see themselves as the traditional ruling class but make up only 20% of the population; and the Kurds, who represent the other 20 % and have enjoyed an autonomous state in northern Iraq protected by the no-flight zone for more than ten years? Will the same sort of secular state be acceptable to both Sunni and Shiite? Within the Shiite community, Islamic radicals have attempted from the beginning to push the political process in the direction of clerical state similar to the Iranian theocracy. Once a transitional government has been established, will the United States have any role in guiding the political process toward the creation of a government which is stable, representative, and friendly to American interests?

Both sides have hailed the moves toward the transitional government as the right step forward, but the recent moves have clearly been a victory for the Iraqi Council members. The United States has agreed to a plan which surrenders sovereignty before there is any assurance about the sort of government which will emerge. Has the U.S. now Iraqi-ized the situation in the same way that we promoted Vietnamization when we realized that we were not going to win the Vietnamese War on our terms? It's important to recall that once we began taunting Vietnamization, the American public increasingly believed that our involvement should end quickly and Congress showed declining willingness to provide funding for Vietnam support programs. Will assistance to Iraq face similar congressional disenchantment after America has reduced its profile? Will the new Iraqi authority be able to avoid the destructive forces of militant Shiites or recalcitrant Baathists?

The agreement permits the Bush administration to surrender official authority over Iraq at a time when the 2004 presidential election in the U.S. will be gaining momentum. The months leading up to the June transfer of authority to the new Iraqi Provisional National Assembly will be difficult for both Iraqis and the occupying forces, but the months following the transfer could be far more complicated, violent and dangerous for the Middle East and possibly the entire world. While the Bush administration might believe it will have washed its hands of Iraq after June, the issues stirred up by the Iraq war will hardly disappear from world concern. American actions during the coming months will be as important as any taken to date.

Applying the lessons from Vietnam

Looking at the four lessons from Vietnam, the United States has not done well during its seven months as an occupying power. Looking ahead, the administration needs to:

1. Clarify U.S. objectives

If the objective is to establish a peaceful Iraq, a democratic Iraq, possibly both, or maybe something else entirely, this needs to be stated clearly. Once identified, the U.S. needs also to stick with its objectives and avoid appearing to move the goalposts.
n Once objectives are stated, all plans and programs should be subordinated to these objectives. Efforts should be made to ensure that objectives and plans are understood by the American people, the Iraqi people, and the rest of the world on board.
If the United States seeks to confer the broadest legitimacy on the new government and maximize the economic assistance for the future, the plan should include the transfer of greater authority to the United Nations.
At the same time efforts should be made to dispel rumors of hidden objectives, such as those regarding Iraqi oil interests. Activities in the Iraq oil sector and general contracting should be made transparent to dispel notions of secret plans to control Iraqi oil output or other facets of the Iraqi economy.

2. Ensure sufficient military force to accomplish the objectives.

Determine the number of troops and mix of specialties to complete the occupation phase. If current troop levels are insufficient, it is important to find additional forces either by increasing the American role, eliciting additional foreign peacekeepers, or accelerating the role for Iraqis. If additional foreign troops are necessary, but unwilling to serve under an American command, it may be desirable to establish a separate command authority under the authority of the United Nations.
Review the training plans for Iraqi forces. Are they being trained in all areas of likely future responsibilities? Which missions will they take on and when? American officials need to present consistent numbers when identifying Iraqi participation in the occupation.
The Occupation Authority should be very wary of plans to mobilize local militias unless they can be controlled centrally and eventually integrated into an Iraqi national force.
Set general targets for the withdrawal of all American and foreign troops. Make clear that any future foreign military presence in Iraq will depend solely on the desires of a future sovereign Iraqi authority.

3. Adapt policies to local sensitivities and cultivate political support.

Filter plans from Washington for Iraq through the Coalition Provisional Authority, where they can be vetted and modified according to local sensitivities.
Avoid issuing statements from Washington about the way we expect the Iraqis to choose their provisional assembly, write their constitution, or hold their elections for as long as the Provisional Authority remains in place.