Center for International Policy

CIP policy consultation held at Brookings Institution, October 30, 2001
Introduction by Selig Harrison

Since September 11 we've been asking why those nineteen hijackers were ready to go to their deaths—what motivated them and what the United States can and should do to defuse these motivations.

Some observers have attempted to circumscribe this debate, saying that September 11 has nothing to do with the situation in the Middle East. A good example of this was Ronald Steel's thoughtful op-ed in the New York Times on September 14. First he pointed to the deeper motivations of the hijackers. "Trapped between the traditional world in which they were born and the confusing world of modernity in which they inescapably live," he wrote, "they seek a single cause for their confusion, their resentments, their frustrated ambitions and their problems of cultural identity."Few of us would disagree with that. But then he went on to say that "It would be a mistake to assume that the terrorism is a spillover from the continuing troubles in the Middle East. Even if the Palestinian-Israeli quarrel were settled tomorrow, the war of the traditionalists against the modernizers would go on."

That was on September 14. Since then the debate has opened up, partly, of course, because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is increasingly out of control and increasingly compels our attention in its own right. Our speakers today reflect differing perspectives on the conflict and I’m confident that what they say will provoke a stimulating and focused discussion.

Ambassador Philip Wilcox is president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace and a veteran of thirty-one years in the Foreign Service. His last assignment was chief of mission in Jerusalem. He is a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern Affairs and served as ambassador-at-large and coordinator for counter-terrorism.
Mary Anne Stein is past president and current North American chair of the New Israel Fund, which supports civil and human rights in Israel. She recently retired as co-president of Americans for Peace Now, a U.S. NGO that supports the Middle East peace process and the Israeli peace movement. She is president of the Moriah Fund, a private foundation funding international and domestic programs to promote pluralism and democracy.
Landrum Bolling is a former president of Earlham College, former president of the Lilly Endowment and former chairman of the Council on Foundations. Among his many books is Search for Peace in the Middle East. He has served as research professor of diplomacy at Georgetown University and has been a senior fellow of the Center for International Policy since 1991.

I will now turn the floor over to the speakers and at 3:00 we will begin questions and discussion ending at 4:30.

Philip C. Wilcox

Philip C. Wilcox, Jr. was ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism between 1994 and 1997 and consul-general at Jerusalem. In the New York Review of Books on October 18, 2001, he wrote, "The United States should reappraise its policies concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq, which have bred deep anger against America in the Arab and Islamic world, where much terrorism originates and whose cooperation is now more critical than ever. We can do all this without abandoning our basic commitments, including to the security of Israel." Click here to read full article.

(The following is a brief summary of the ambassador's presentation, not verbatim.)

The catastrophe was all the more disheartening in that the United States has expended major efforts on terrorism in the past ten years. They weren't nearly enough. We have learned more from this event. We need to do more of the same but better. Better intelligence, better border control, better civilian-activated security. The anthrax scare shows the need for better public-health efforts.

Yet there are no quick fixes. There is no assurance we can "win" this war. We are an open society. We have an infinite number of targets. There is no technology that can prevent attacks. We will be struck again.

We also need to look at causes. There are those who say that looking for root causes is a form of appeasement. Now we must rethink that. We need to rethink our whole foreign policy in the light of these events.

The rethinking is already evident in the turning away from unilateral to more multilateral policies, in paying attention to the needs of allies. Problems of population, ethnic conflict, and poverty are becoming more prominent. These are problems the United States has dealt with in the past but our efforts have flagged in recent years.

Of course, Osama bin Laden says that Muslims must fight the United States because of its support of Israel. The issue is exploited by many in the Middle East. Bin Laden cares little about Israel. He wants to overthrow the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. He knows most Muslims are not interested in revolution, so he uses this cause.

The Israeli-Palestinian issue remains, however, the single most important issue that has created resentment of the United States in the Arab and Muslim worlds. It is especially a problem now when it is essential to have Arab and Muslim support. They would support us on terrorism but there is a limit as to how far they can go because of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

It is particularly difficult because the issue is influenced by domestic political factors and fundraising. There are signs of change in the presidential statement of a vision of a Palestinian state. The prime minister of Israel said this would appease terrorists. The administration was not affected by this accusation and has rebuked Israel more severely than any president for many years.

Israel is a young, troubled, volatile body politic. It swung from the Barak peace agenda to Sharon. Though it is a minor superpower, Israel still lacks security. Palestinian violence played into the hands of Sharon and the right wing, who always believed that the Oslo process favored Arafat and the terrorists and that Israel was only secure if it used power. This was the traditional Israeli thinking. In the 1990s the belief arose that peace was possible. The new intifada undermined this belief. Israeli public opinion is again paranoid. The right wing is devoted to this version of history and advocates keeping all the land and settling it with Jews. Sharon has devoted his life to the greater-Israel concept, so he is not likely to accept abandonment of the settlements.

He has accepted some of the Mitchell plan but not that pertaining to settlements. The march of settlements has been inexorable over the past thirty years.

Sharon called for an end to Palestinian violence before he will respond. He offered a state in only 42 percent of the West Bank and Gaza. This would be a formula for eternal confrontation. Yet if he says there can be no compromise, he risks losing the Labor Party and Peres in his coalition. His game is to keep the pot boiling by provocative actions that prevent any compromise. He believes he can suppress the Palestinians.

The Israeli public doesn't agree with this vision; it still supports the peace process and ultimately a Palestinian state. But it also supports Sharon. There is nevertheless a latent center that could revive. A majority is against the settlements.

During the Oslo negotiations settlers in Gaza took more land. Barak at Camp David offered not nearly enough in terms of a Palestinian state; its components were barely connected.

The Palestinian Authority for its part has kept arms and has not always cracked down on violence.

Sharon, however, with his visit to the Temple Mount sparked the second intifada.

The intifada is also a rebellion against Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, their inefficiency and corruption. It is a kind of revolution in that sense. Arafat miscalculated when he allowed some to engage in terrorism. Once you allow the genie of armed struggle out of the bottle it is very difficult to contain it.

The Palestinian public mirrors the Israeli in its support of violence and terrorism. Yet the great majority of this population want negotiations.

Some Americans say that Arafat is hopeless and can't make peace. This is not true. It is a blame game. Arafat did make compromises. Nevertheless, he's no Nelson Mandela.

The two sides actually came close at Tabbah, they reached compromise on many issues.

Now in addition to violence, Palestinians are increasingly invoking the right of return. This frightens the Israelis. The Palestinians are foolish to promote it.

Meanwhile Sharon provokes the Palestinians with violence of the Israel Defense Force. With Arafat, he can't decide whether to negotiate with him or destroy him.

In any new policy the administration would have to confront a Congress that is sympathetic to Israel.

A worse alternative than Sharon may lie ahead: Benjamin Netanyahu is waiting.

If the United States doesn't take risks in this dispute and get into the fray, it won't be able to create an international coalition including Arab states. The Israeli-Palestinian dispute deepens. Aggression and the settlements continue. There is the spillover into Jordan, half of whose population is Palestinian. The Palestinians could go back to a binational state where the demographics would favor them.

What should be the ingredients of the U.S. vision?

One is to end the violence and terrorism. To create two states at peace, Israel and Palestine. To get Israel to withdraw from most settlements in the West Bank and Gaza with the exception of some big ones near the Israeli-West Bank border.

These are all concepts that have been out there. The challenge is to change public opinion there and here and sell the agreement.

There would be tremendous pressure from Sharon on the administration as well as from some Palestinian extremists. The administration should nevertheless stick with it over the long term. If the parties are unwilling the United States should use incentives and sticks.

Many Israelis and Americans now believe the situation is so hopeless that only the United States can rescue it. It is indeed very risky, difficult but not impossible. We have to do it.