For the past two decades, the Washington Post’s David Ignatius has been the mainstream media’s most active apologist for the transgressions of the Central Intelligence Agency. Ignatius reached a new low last month, when he used two oped columns to trivialize the CIA’s use of torture and abuse against detainees (merely “kicks, threats, and other abuse”) and to dismiss the need for an investigation of the CIA’s illegal assassination program against suspected terrorists (“nobody had been killed”).

In both cases, Ignatius relied on high-level sources from the CIA’s National Clandestine Service to make the best possible case for the Agency. This is neither good reporting nor professional journalism. [See Mr. Goodman's previous columns on David Ignatius' defense of CIA misdeeds here and here.]

Thanks to New York Times reporters, particularly Scott Shane and Mark Mazetti, we are learning more about CIA’s illegal assassination program. Ignatius and the Washington Posteither failed to investigate the issue or simply dismissed it based on assurances provided by those at CIA with the most to lose from public exposure. And on Monday, thanks to the work of Attorney General Eric Holder, we should receive additional details of the CIA’s torture program.

Each revelation exposes more about the illegal, immoral, and counter-productive actions of the Bush administration and the CIA over the past eight years. Each revelation demonstrates that CIA has withheld information and sought to cover-up its actions. And each revelation speaks to the need for an accountability investigation that will restore the credibility of the CIA as well as the integrity of American democracy.

Ignatius’ focus is trivial, misguided, and aligned with the perspective of his CIA sources. His expressed concern is that any congressional inquiry or the appointment of a special prosecutor will lead to what he terms “slow rolling” at the CIA. Slow rolling means that Agency officers will “go through the motions…pass cables back and forth; take other jobs outside the danger zone…cover their backsides.” They will “keep their heads down. Duck the assignments that carry political risk.  Stay away from a counterterrorism program that has become a career hazard.” This is a recurrent theme, advanced by those seeking to prevent oversight. And it is arrant nonsense. CIA is staffed by professionals who want to conduct their activities in a legal and effective manner.

Both Ignatius and CIA director Panetta have fallen into a trap, failing to understand that accountability would actually boost morale at the CIA. The fact is that previous CIA directors (George Tenet, Porter Goss, and Michael Hayden) had to rely on independent contractors to conduct torture and abuse and to build an assassination program, because too many professional Agency officers refused to take part.

The CIA’s Office of Medical Services (OMS) did not believe that torture and abuse were either necessary or moral, so Tenet turned to two military retirees who were looking for a business opportunity to sell torture and abuse. The fact that neither man had ever carried out a real interrogation, had any expertise on al Qaeda, or had any knowledge of terrorism meant nothing to CIA officials.

CIA abandoned the worst of its interrogation techniques in 2004, after CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report concluding that torture and abuse had not thwarted any “specific imminent attacks” and OMS advised that the risk to the health of the prisoners outweighed any potential intelligence benefit. Actually, FBI officials and military analysts previously had concluded that torture was “less reliable” than traditional psychological methods, and had warned that it would lead to an intolerable political and public backlash.

The additional fact that CIA had no way of determining which detainees had useful information and which had none almost certainly led to the abuse of low-level or even innocent people. Some or many of these detainees probably provided false “confessions” in an effort to stop the torment.

There is now ample public evidence about the CIA’s renditions, detentions, and interrogations program, but there remains much that is unknown. The job of a serious journalist is to pursue the unknown and shed light on areas of possible wrongdoing. A serious journalist would be trying to learn what was on the 100 hours of torture tapes that CIA operations officers destroyed.  A serious journalist would not rely on sources whose clear agenda is the cover up of their own, possibly illegal, actions.

We would be better off as a nation if journalists such as David Ignatius and congressional leaders such as Sen. Diane Feinstein (D-CA) stopped aiding and abetting CIA’s efforts to cover up its past actions and began to press for genuine reform of the institution. CIA necessarily operates on the edge of the law and in secrecy; it therefore requires strong, constant, and effective oversight from the congress and the press if it is to remain within legal bounds.

Thus far, the nation has benefited from the lawsuits of the American Civil Liberties Union, which have forced the release of government torture documents and the CIA’s IG report from 2004 detailing techniques that violated the Justice Department’s requirements. It has also benefitted from reporting by the New York Times and Warren Stroebel of the McClatchy Newspapers and from the investigation by the OIG. At the very least, Senator Feinstein should make sure that the White House and the CIA appoint another statutory inspector general at the CIA to replace John Helgerson, who announced his retirement more than six months ago. After all, our only comprehensive study on torture and abuse was produced under Helgerson’s leadership five years ago.

Ignatius warns repeatedly that the “sunlight of exposure” will blind our shadow warriors.” The reverse is true. The “sunlight of exposure” will restore the effectiveness of CIA’s “shadow warriors” by providing them a clear understanding of the parameters within which they can operate legally. CIA’s “shadow warriors” are both professional and patriotic; they seek to serve their country by protecting the principles on which it is founded—not by flouting them.

Investigation, public exposure, and accountability will ensure that the activities that have created more terrorists have ended.  They also will restore the credibility of our intelligence services, permit foreign intelligence agencies to cooperative effectively with the CIA, and reverse the damage that has been done to U.S. foreign and national security policy.

Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, is The Public Record’s National Security and Intelligence columnist. He spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA.