Diplomatic scenarios for negotiating the release of two captured U.S. journalists now held in North Korea focus on proposed visits by Richardson, the governor of New Mexico, and former Vice President Gore, who founded Current TV, which the journalists represent.

Richardson, now facing indictment on corruption charges, would like to use a Pyongyang mission to divert attention from his legal troubles. He has handled past troubleshooting missions to Pyongyang skillfully and the North Koreans might prefer him to Gore. However, Gore’s status as a former Vice President under a Democratic President might enable him to use a visit more effectively in opening up larger possibilities for a resumption of U.S. dialogue with North Korea. This, in turn, could set the stage for an eventual resumption of the six-party process at a much later stage.

Conversely, with the trial of the two journalists now scheduled for June 4, there is a growing danger that a harsh sentence would heighten tensions.

I have talked with the families of the detained journalists, who say that the two women have not been mistreated and are living in comfortable quarters while awaiting their trial. This information, which comes from the Swedish Ambassador to Pyongyang, Mats Foyer, who has had access to them, flatly contradicts the incorrect, propagandistic assertion in the Washington Post by Georgetown University Professor and former Director of Asian Affairs in the Bush White House Victor Cha that the women have been “forced into a world of barren prison cells.”

Gore has told U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that he is ready to go to Pyongyang, and she is reportedly “considering” the idea in the hope that the release of the two women would provide the political cover necessary for a resumption of bilateral talks with Pyongyang. However, I see no indications so far that the Obama Administration is ready for the concessions that might make such a dialogue possible or productive, and it is uncertain whether North Korea is ready to invite either Gore or Richardson.

Korea policymaking in the Obama Administration has been in disarray since the start and continues to be. The most striking symbol of this is the fact that Clinton’s choice for assistant secretary of state for East Asia, Kurt Campbell, is not likely to be confirmed by the Senate until late June or early July.

Since Campbell served as a deputy assistant secretary in the Pentagon under Bill Clinton, the Defense Department had to submit detailed files on him to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and these were just provided last week. Moreover, since Campbell had foreign government business dealings after leaving the Pentagon, especially in Taiwan, investigations of these ties must also be completed before confirmation hearings can be scheduled. In any case, the committee’s schedule for hearings is fully booked until late June.

Campbell is a hardliner and his relations with Stephen Bosworth, the U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, could prove to be difficult. Bosworth, who headed the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and visited North Korea several times, has had little impact so far. North Korea policy is being decided by Denis McDonough, the deputy national security adviser in the White House, and Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (UN), who were responsible for the counterproductive decision to seek UN Security Council sanctions against Pyongyang for its missile launch.

Apart from Bosworth, there are only two officials in high places who have worked on North Korea issues in the past, Daniel Russell, deputy to McDonough, and Gary Samore, who handles U.S. National Security Council (NSC) non-proliferation policy. Jeffrey Bader, the Senior Advisor for East Asia in the NSC, is a China hand.

What would the agenda include if bilateral U.S.-North Korea talks are held?

North Korea’s priority would be getting the 200,000 tons of energy aid not yet delivered under the terms of the defunct six-party talks. Japan was supposed to provide this portion of the multilateral aid pledged in return for the disabling of the Yongbyon reactor. This was one-fifth of the energy aid North Korea was supposed to receive in return for disabling Yongbyon, and I was told on my January visit that the disabling process would not be completed unless President Obama found a way to provide the promised aid. So it was no surprise that the disabling process did, in fact, end and Pyongyang is now rebuilding the reactor.

If Obama could get Japan to provide the 200,000 tons, or could find another way to provide it, North Korea might agree to suspend the process of rebuilding the reactor now underway. To be sure, Pyongyang says that it is no longer interested in negotiations and that the six-party process is dead. This position, however, should be tested with an offer to provide the 200,000 tons of energy aid previously promised.

If Pyongyang agrees to a Gore or Richardson mission, they could suggest this trade-off. More significantly, they could test North Korean interest in U.S. steps toward normalized relations, such as replacement of the [add?(Military)] Armistice Commission with a“Mutual Security Commission” proposed repeatedly by Pyongyang in the past.

North Korea has long recognized that waiting for a de jure peace treaty might delay the achievement of a de facto peace at the DMZ. In a meeting with me on September 28, 1995, General Ri Chan Bok first proposed the concept of a North Korea-US “mutual security assurance commission” as a way of replacing the Military Armistice Commission without waiting for a peace treaty.

The mutual security commission would be limited to U.S. and North Korean military officers, General Ri said, but as soon as it began operating, the North-South Joint Military Commission negotiated in 1992 but never activated would begin to operate in parallel with the North Korea-US commission. The functional role of both commissions, he said, would be to prevent incidents in the DMZ that could threaten the peace and to develop arms control and confidence-building measures.

In later meetings with General Ri, he agreed that South Korean representatives should have equal status with U.S. and North Korean officers on the commission. General Ri said explicitly that North Korea would not object to U.S. forces staying in Korea if the Military Armistice Commission and the UN Command were replaced.

Would the hard-liners in North Korea's National Defense Commission endorse this proposal today? The only way that the U.S. can find out is to resume a bilateral dialogue as a prelude to restoring the six-party process.

Selig S. Harrison is director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy