As
printed in The New York Times
June
7 2003
Finding
a way out with North Korea
Interview with Selig S Harrison, director of the Asia
Program at the Center for International Policy and the author of Korean
Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement
Q: Was
it a good idea for the United States to agree two days ago to pull back
American forces from the demilitarized zone that separates North and
South Korea?
A:
I think they're doing the right thing for the wrong reasons and in the
wrong way.
It's long overdue to do this because the threat of another North Korean
attack on the South, as in 1950, is remote. North Korea is in such bad
shape economically that it could not sustain a protracted war. North
Korean forces are forward-deployed at the DMZ to deter us, to make an
American pre-emptive strike unacceptably costly, not to attack the South
again. Also, it's desirable for the United States to end its role as
a "tripwire," so that we're not automatically involved. But
the reasons they're pulling back are the wrong ones.
The Pentagon wants to get American forces out of harm's way in order
to have greater flexibility when and if they decide on military action
against North Korea. They're doing this in the context of a confrontational
American posture toward North Korea, which is unfortunate.
The right way to pull back American forces would have been as part of
a policy of improving relations with the North. We should have traded
American pullbacks for Korean pullbacks.
Q: How do you think North Korea will react to this?
A: They'll be very suspicious that it is connected to possible future
military action against them. They will read it in the context of the
current talk in Washington about promoting regime change or a collapse
in North Korea and the unwillingness of the United States to negotiate
about their economic and security concerns in return for an end to their
nuclear program.
Q: What about the South Korean reaction?
A: There are mixed feelings in the South. The government is afraid that
any change in the status quo will affect the stock market and the influx
of foreign investment by giving the impression of an unstable security
situation. But the younger generation wants a gradual American disengagement.
They see the present American diplomatic confrontation with the North
and the presence of the American forces as obstacles to improved North-South
relations and eventual reunification. If the impression grows that this
is indeed designed to give the United States greater flexibility, with
an eye to military action, then the reaction will be very negative.
Q: Still, you are optimistic that the North Korean leadership can be
convinced to refrain from building more nuclear weapons?
A: I think they're ready to dismantle their nuclear program under adequate
inspections if we're prepared to pay what they consider an acceptable
price. First, we'd have to join in a bilateral or multilateral agreement
pledging not to use our nuclear weapons against North Korea, an agreement
that would have to be linked to a de-nuclearization process. Second,
we'd have to pledge not to pursue the policy of regime change that President
Bush has made clear is his preferred approach to North Korea. Third,
we'd have to be prepared for large-scale energy and food aid. If we
pursue pressure tactics that they would view as designed to overthrow
the present regime, they are certain to respond either militarily or
through other retaliation such as selling nuclear material to anti-American
third parties.
Q: Do you agree with some analysts who argue that North Korea's recent
behavior and threatening statements have alienated China, which was
previously sympathetic to their cause?
A: I think China is equally disgusted with the United States and North
Korea and will exercise pressure on both countries to change their present
policies. I'm sure they're telling the North Koreans not to threaten
us. But they've made it very clear that they believe the United States
should be willing to trade commitment to North Korea relating to its
military and economic security in exchange for verifiable dismantlement
of its nuclear program.
I think China is insisting that the United States conclude a bilateral
security agreement with North Korea and would be prepared for a multilateral,
six-power agreement involving the United States, China, Russia, Japan,
South Korea and North Korea. The external powers would commit themselves
not to deploy nuclear weapons in Korea. And the two Koreas would pledge
not to make nuclear weapons. This would require inspection machinery
centering on, but not limited to, the International Atomic Energy Agency.
My own view is that such a six-power de-nuclearization is the most promising
way to resolve the current crisis because it would not require the Bush
administration to give a bilateral security guarantee to North Korea.
The administration has refused to do that, but some form of security
assurance to North Korea is required. We cannot expect North Korea to
give up its nuclear options if we continue to maintain our "nuclear
umbrella" and assert our right to pre-emptive military strikes.
Q: What has been the impact of the American victory in Iraq on North
Korea?
A: There is no question that the lesson that the North Koreans have
learned from Iraq is that it needs a nuclear deterrent. The American
unilateralism reflected in Iraq and in many other ways is alienating
the United States from China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. We could
end up with the worst of both worlds - a nuclear North Korea and estranged
relations with countries important to us globally as well as regionally.
Q: Contrary
to the expectations of many policymakers, you argue that North Korea
is not about to collapse. Why?
A: Not only is North Korea more effectively insulated from outside influences
than the countries of Eastern Europe, but it also has a nationalist
mystique and a Confucian historical legacy that makes its totalitarian
system more broadly accepted than was the case in Eastern Europe. The
late Kim Il Sung is revered as the George Washington of his country.
