The United States has built a missile defense system that does not work, to defend against a North Korean missile that does not work, that would carry a nuclear warhead that does not work.

Arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, made this assessment on October 10. Did he rush to judgment prematurely?

Until detailed studies on North Korea’s test are completed, it will remain uncertain whether or not its nuclear warhead "does not work." But so far, it does look like only a portion of the fissile material used in the first test exploded, and it does seem clear that the North Korean nuclear weapons program is still in its very early stages.

That is why it is realistic to pursue a rollback of the program through a revived diplomatic effort after the present spasm of sanctions and condemnation is over. South Korea should press the Bush administration to engage in bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang to find a compromise on the key financial sanctions issue as the prelude to a resumption of the six-party talks.

To be sure, at present, the prospects for reviving negotiations look bleak. But public opinion in the United States could well begin to shift if the Democrats do well in the November 7 Congressional elections. Even if the Republicans retain control of the Congress, their margin of control is likely to be reduced. The administration will face increased pressure to consider diplomatic options once the limited utility of sanctions is recognized.

As an example of the limitations of sanctions, consider Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s proposal for the placement of radiation sensors along China’s 880-mile land border and at airfields and ports known to handle cargo to and from the North. This proposal deserves serious consideration, since the danger of North Korean sales of fissile material to others cannot be dismissed, especially if Pyongyang is driven into a corner.

But would it really be possible to stop North Korea from smuggling a thimbleful of reprocessed plutonium out of the country somewhere along its long border with China if it really wanted to do so?

The only way to make sure that North Korea does not feel driven to such a reckless and desperate measure is to negotiate the step-by-step denuclearization process envisaged in the September 19, 2005 Beijing agreement.

During my discussions in Pyongyang three weeks ago with Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, North Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator, he volunteered several times that the United States "should be concerned about the possible transfer of fissile material to others." North Korea had no intention of making such transfers, he said, and wanted a nuclear deterrent solely for its own defense, but "the United States should be concerned about this issue, and we are prepared to give the necessary reassurances."

"A paper pledge not to make such transfers would have little meaning," I said, "unless it is linked to a full inspection regime and complete denuclearization."

"We are ready for complete denuclearization," he replied. "First, a formal pledge not to transfer, then the necessary verification measures as part of a denuclearization process connected to step-by-step progress toward normalized relations."

Based on my six hours of give-and-take with Kim in his office and in two dinner meetings, here is what a package deal leading to the six-party talks might look like:

§ North Korea would pledge not to conduct further nuclear or missile tests for so long as talks with the U.S. on normalization continue.

§ North Korea would freeze production at the 5-megawatt Yongbyon reactor and stop construction of the much bigger, 50-megawatt Taechon reactor. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors would return to Yongbyon to monitor this commitment.

§ North Korea would make a timebound commitment to return to the six-party talks.

§ The United States would compromise on the financial sanctions issue. At present, in addition to the Banco Delta Asia case in Macao, the Treasury Department has asked banks throughout the world not to handle any accounts or transactions relating to North Korea. This was spelled out in an advisory on its web site on December 13, 2005, and in subsequent statements by Undersecretary Stuart Levey, and has been backed up by direct pressure on banks from U.S. Treasury and CIA agents.

A possible compromise would be for a bilateral working group to deal with the Macao case and any others involving specific evidence of the abuse of U.S. laws. The U.S. would provide evidence to back up its charges by an agreed deadline and would de-freeze accounts in Banco Delta Asia not related to counterfeiting or other violations of U.S. law.

The Treasury Department would issue a new advisory, replacing the one on December 13, that would distinguish between accounts and transactions clearly involving weapons of mass destruction and other cases involving legitimate trade and investment. The United States would ask other countries to apply Section 8-d of the U.N. sanctions resolution with this distinction in mind.

§ The United States would remove North Korea from the State Department List of Terrorist States.

§ The United States would provide stopgap energy aid.

The urgency of negotiations on a rollback is underscored by the recklessness demonstrated in the nuclear test. I am often asked in interviews whether I think Kim Jong Il is crazy. My answer is, "crazy like a fox." But I do have the disturbing impression that he can be impulsive and has a gambler’s streak.

Choe Eun Hee, the South Korean actress he abducted, told me of a blackjack game in which everyone was losing and the dealer "had all the money in the pot. Even Kim Jong Il lost everything. He then suggested that they play a single hand with the dealer and called for more chips. All the other players bailed out. He played one hand, winner-take-all, but he ended up losing his whole stack of chips. ’Put the chips on my account,’ he said. I think I understood something of his personality as I watched from behind."

Of course that was 28 years ago, but the prospect of nuclear weapons in the hands of Kim Jong Il is worrisome, and there are only two ways to make sure he does not have them: another Korean War, or purposeful diplomacy to roll back his nuclear weapons program while it is still in its early stages, linked to the full normalization of U.S. and Japanese relations with Pyongyang.