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Last
Updated:
1/15/09
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US Needs to Rein in Pakistan INDIAN PRIME MINISTER ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE DESERVES STRONG AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR HIS BOLD PEACE OVERTURE TO PAKISTAN. BUT THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO CODDLE PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, AVOIDING A SHOWDOWN OVER THE KEY ISSUE OF PAKISTANI-SPONSORED INFILTRATION BY ISLAMIC MILITANTS INTO INDIAN-HELD AREAS OF KASHMIR. The administration has signaled its readiness for a five-year economic and military aid commitment to Musharraf when he visits Washington June 24. Unless it is conditioned on the complete termination of Pakistani support for Islamic militant insurgent operations in Kashmir, such a commitment would not only undermine Vajpayee's peace initiative but would also poison US relations with India. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, on his recent South Asia mission, did not challenge Musharraf's "absolute assurance" to him that Pakistan has shut down base camps for Islamic militants in Pakistani-held Azad Kashmir. Armitage also made no effort to rebut Musharraf's denial that militants are infiltrating Kashmir, despite clear evidence to the contrary, and told India that the United States had done all it could to pressure Pakistan for an end to infiltration. Islamabad has responded to Vajpayee's initiative with a modest reduction of infiltration that has temporarily eased tensions. But meaningful Indian concessions in any future negotiations are not likely unless Pakistan shuts down its extensive infrastructure of base camps in Azad Kashmir and stops supporting infiltration for good. India has recently provided the United States with detailed maps showing 174 locations where Pakistani base camps of varying sizes are now operating. State Department and Defense Intelligence Agency sources say that US reconnaissance satellite findings broadly corroborate the Indian maps. How hard to push Musharraf has become a bitterly divisive issue within the administration, with Musharraf's partisans arguing successfully that his cooperation against Al Qaeda would be jeopardized if the US applies too much pressure. Retiring Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill openly criticized the pro-Pakistan tilt when he announced his resignation on April 21. Bipartisan congressional sentiment for full disclosure of US intelligence information on Pakistan's activities in Kashmir was reflected in a unanimous amendment attached to aid legislation on May 7 by the House International Relations Committee, requiring the president to certify "the extent to which Pakistan has (1) closed all known terrorist training camps operating in Pakistan and Pakistani-held Kashmir, and (2) has established serious and identifiable measures to prohibit the infiltration of Islamic extremists across the Line of Control into India." Although the House amendment would give the president a year to submit his certification, the White House should issue an interim report immediately based on intelligence now in its possession. In the absence of pressure on Pakistan, Vajpayee's peace initiative is likely to be still-born because he faces Hindu opposition to going ahead with negotiations while cross-border infiltration continues. The United States need not make an either-or choice between keeping Pakistan as an ally against Al Qaeda and applying effective pressure to stop sending Islamic militants into Kashmir. Both critical objectives can be achieved with a determined carrot-and-stick diplomacy. Musharraf and his fellow generals are dependent on US economic life support for the survival of their regime. Washington should use its powerful bargaining leverage in Islamabad to insist on a timetable for dismantlement of the base camps in Azad Kashmir. In return, the United States should offer Islamabad compelling new economic incentives, including access to the US textile market, which Islamabad has been seeking in vain since it signed on as a US ally after Sept. 11. If Musharraf balks, the administration should make clear that it is prepared to reimpose sanctions and, if necessary, suspend all US economic aid. India, for its part, should be prepared to negotiate on Kashmir with Pakistan, which it has refused to do, if Islamabad does agree to discuss a timetable for dismantling the base camps. The Bush administration has wisely ruled out US mediation to help find a long-term solution to the dispute unless both sides invite such a role. But US action is essential to set the stage for a meaningful dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad on the terms for a cease-fire and the mutual pullback of forward-deployed forces in Kashmir, pending a final settlement, as part of a broader dialogue embracing trade and other issues. In addition to getting Pakistan to dismantle base camps, the administration should state the obvious during Musharraf's visit - that any Kashmir solution must rest on recognition of the existing cease-fire line as the permanent international boundary. Such a declaration is the only way to get Pakistani leaders to stop stoking insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistani policy rests on the hope that the major powers can be induced to internationalize the dispute, and ultimately to support accession of the Indian-controlled Kashmir Valley to Pakistan. An American posture that destroys this hope would make it easier for Musharraf to face down Islamic militant sympathizers and move toward a solution. At the same time, it would strengthen Vajpayee in his confrontation with hard-line Hindu groups who want India to bomb the training camps and recapture Azad Kashmir, even if it risks a new war in which one side or the other might resort to nuclear weapons.
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