Center for International Policy

Finding Our Way Anew to a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula

By David Albright

November 19, 2002

A Working Paper for the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy

Revelations in October 2002 about North Korea's uranium enrichment program have derailed efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. Any such enrichment program would be expected to produce highly enriched uranium, a nuclear weapons-usable explosive material. As a result, North Korea's effort to build a plant able to make HEU is equivalent to its earlier efforts to place in operation a plutonium separation plant at Yongbyon.

The priority must be finding a way to restore a path to a denuclearized Korean peninsula. As in the earlier crisis over plutonium separation, some advocate isolating North Korea and threatening it militarily to force its compliance with its international commitments not to possess nuclear weapons. However, a military approach is risky and unlikely to succeed in any case without incurring a significant risk of a devastating regional war. However, defining an acceptable diplomatic strategy is difficult.

Part of the problem is determining why North Korea has proceeded with its enrichment program. Did North Korea decide to proceed with constructing an enrichment facility because it has a serious grievance against the United States? Or is North Korea just trying to trick the United States, using the centrifuge program as a hedge or as a way to develop a nuclear arsenal regardless of its international commitments?

The Bush Administration has announced that it would not conduct negotiations with North Korea until it first take steps to dismantle its enrichment program verifiably. Administration officials view such an action by North Korea as essential before the United States can view North Korea as a sincere partner in negotiations.

On the other hand, North Korea says it has been dissatisfied with the pace of implementing the Agreed Framework, and it feels increasingly threatened militarily by the United States. In late October 2002, North Korea stated that it is "entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that."

The current crisis has thrust inspections once again to the forefront. If North Korea is to dismantle its enrichment program, it will have to do so with international inspectors present. Many are now calling for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to be instituted fully in North Korea. However, moving too fast on demands for comprehensive inspections could make it difficult to resolve the current crisis over North Korea's centrifuge program. In addition, North Korea is unlikely to agree to comprehensive inspections without receiving significant rewards or concessions from the United States and its allies.

If the current crisis can be resolved, a whole range of options may develop that could accelerate progress toward a nuclear free Korean peninsula. If not, North Korea may move to become a nuclear power, increasing its isolation and risking regional war or its eventual collapse.

North Korea's Enrichment Program

North Korea's enrichment program is based on gas centrifuge technology. According to a fact sheet distributed by the CIA to Congress on about November 20 or 21, 2002, the United States recently gained "clear evidence indicating the North had begun constructing a centrifuge facility." The location of the centrifuge plant is unknown, according to several knowledgeable U.S. officials.

The CIA assesses that North Korea embarked on an effort to develop a gas centrifuge program about two years ago. This date, if taken at face value, appears to state that North Korea's gas centrifuge program started then. Media reports quote sources dating the start of the development of gas centrifuges to 1997 or 1998, although these dates remain highly uncertain.

The CIA fact sheet says that the centrifuge facility could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. Other capacity estimates reported in the media, quoting knowledgeable officials, have varied between one and six weapons per year.

According to the CIA, the date when the plant could be fully operational is "as soon as mid-decade." Media reports have quoted knowledgeable officials as saying the plant could be finished as soon as a year, in 2-3 years, or significantly later.

Little information exists about the specific type of centrifuge North Korea is building. One early report said that the rotor tube was aluminum, suggesting a relatively old design. Newer reports are less certain about the type of rotor, meaning that North Korea may be using more advanced designs. The design matters because it is directly related to the number of centrifuges needed to make enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. For example, if North Korea is building a subcritical centrifuge using aluminum rotors, it would need to operate about 5,000 centrifuges connected together in cascades to make about 15 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, roughly enough for one crude fission implosion-type nuclear weapon. If the same type of centrifuge was made from maraging steel, a light, strong material able to spin significantly faster than aluminum, North Korea would need to build roughly 1,200 centrifuges.

Such uncertainty in such key estimates is not surprising, given the closed nature of North Korea and the difficulty of assessing covert gas centrifuge programs. The CIA fact sheet says that North Korea's nuclear weapons efforts remain a difficult intelligence collection target.

Many media reports have said that Pakistan supplied gas centrifuge technology to North Korea in exchange for ballistic missile technology and components. Details about the type and scale of the centrifuge assistance are lacking, although such assistance may have occurred at least from 1997 until mid-2001.

Pakistan is widely believed to have mastered the manufacture of centrifuges using rotors made from both aluminum and maraging steel. Thus, Pakistan would have been an invaluable source of technology for North Korea.

In addition, U.S. officials and media reports have established that Pakistan has historically imposed weak controls on the transfer of sensitive or "intangible" technology by its scientists or officials. Thus, North Korea may have also obtained sensitive know-how and other types of assistance from Pakistani nationals operating independently of their government. This kind of assistance can involve classified documents, discussions about sensitive topics, and on-going expert assistance on specific problems.

Because of the complexity of developing and building gas centrifuges, access to centrifuge technology is generally viewed as necessary for a country such as North Korea. Certainly, for North Korea to reach the point of building and operating gas centrifuges within two to four years, foreign technical assistance would likely have been critical and extensive.

Based on how Pakistan and Iraq developed and built gas centrifuges, North Korea may have obtained enough information and assistance from Pakistan to develop a road map for building and testing prototype centrifuges, constructing production-scale manufacturing facilities, building and operating cascades of centrifuges, identifying suppliers, and ordering key items overseas.

U.S. evidence for the construction of the centrifuge plant was reported as based on information about foreign procurement and a large construction project in North Korea. The CIA fact sheet said that North Korea last year started seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities. It also said that North Korea obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems, often a strong indicator that a centrifuge plant is under construction.

Based on information from knowledgeable sources, Barbara Slavin at USA Today said that North Korea was seeking numerous items for centrifuges, including specialty metal tubes, epoxy, resin, valves, and control equipment. These items moreover were being procured in production-scale quantities, she said. One U.S. official stated that North Korea acquired centrifuge-related items in quantities measured in thousands.

Joby Warrick at The Washington Post reported on October 18, 2002 that North Korea tried to acquire large quantities of high-strength aluminum. He also reported that the United States received reports of significant construction activity that appeared related to a gas centrifuge plant.

The sources of the above items have been reported to be Russia, China, and Pakistan. In addition, U.S. officials stated that North Korea has also used "global operatives" that specialize in acquiring items worldwide.

North Korea is viewed as skilled in acquiring items overseas illicitly. Its sophisticated procurement networks could have acquired a wide range of centrifuge-related items from many countries that are unknown to Western intelligence agencies. Intelligence agencies rarely see more than a "tip of the iceberg" of illicit procurement by a country. Nonetheless, questions remain whether North Korea has acquired everything it needs to finish its centrifuge plant.

A Path Forward

Few expected North Korea to move ahead with the construction of a gas centrifuge facility. After discovering the program and confronting North Korea about it, the United States appears to have been caught by surprise by North Korea's admission to having such a program. But the restraint being shown currently by all affected governments implies a desire to prevent the crisis from getting out of control.

With all the uncertainties about North Korean intentions and motives, developing a path forward is highly complex. This problem is worsened by the level of mistrust of many, including several senior Bush Administration officials, who believe that North Korea is intent only on cheating and seeking a nuclear arsenal. If this view is correct, few options exist except isolating North Korea and pressing them militarily. However, there is little reason to proceed with such a strategy at this time. Diplomatic alternatives exist that may solve this crisis and establish a sounder path to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

The United States will have to develop a new policy to shape nuclear-related events on the Korean peninsula. U.S. allies are likely to play a key role in developing such a policy, although they are unlikely to lead any such effort. Based on prior experience, North Korea cannot be expected to do much on its own, except perhaps at some point to move to find a way out of the crisis.

Toward any new policy, the United States must reestablish its priorities. Two central priorities should be thwarting North Korea from becoming a nuclear state and avoiding a military confrontation. This policy must also find a way to offer North Korea something tangible, or other face-saving ways, in exchange for significant concessions.

The most immediate goal is convincing North Korea to dismantle its gas centrifuge program. If North Korea agrees to do so, it must do so verifiably. Otherwise, few would believe the program has actually been dismantled. Although North Korea is likely to want something in return, the United States will have a difficult time providing any incentives before North Korea takes concrete and measurable steps to verifiably dismantle its centrifuge program.

In parallel to settling the centrifuge issue, the United States should accelerate efforts to get North Korea to make a fundamental choice about its entire nuclear program. North Korea needs to decide whether it will maintain an ambiguous nuclear weapon status in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or whether it will become verifiably free of nuclear weapons and eligible for significant economic and energy assistance? A compromise in the Agreed Framework is that it has allowed North Korea to postpone making this decision until the construction of the first LWR reached a well-defined point, which is still several years away.

The United States should explicitly seek to speed up the inspection process in North Korea. Ideally, North Korea would allow the IAEA to implement its full range of inspections in North Korea. However, a more prudent approach may be to implement inspections step-wise, with the dismantlement of the gas centrifuge program verified first. Additional North Korea concessions on the inspection issue could be rewarded more easily, because they would be more clearly recognized as significant concessions not required at this time by the Agreed Framework.

Returning to a focus on inspections in North Korea carries its own risks. North Korea may simply refuse to permit them. However, developing a solution to the current crisis without North Korea taking steps to verifiably dismantle its centrifuge program would be extremely difficult to support politically.

The approach outlined above is difficult to achieve when the United States and North Korea are not engaged in any discussions or negotiations. Absent bilateral discussions of some type, the situation may easily worsen. Any punitive action by one side could generate a negative reaction from the other. Thus, the United States should find a politically acceptable way to resume discussions with North Korea, if for no other reason than avoiding misunderstandings escalating the conflict unintentionally.

If the above recommendations are to be implemented, the United States will also have to focus on several specific areas.

Establishing Verification Arrangements The United States must take the lead in designing an adequate verification process for dismantling a gas centrifuge program. No country has verifiably dismantled a gas centrifuge program under the rules and procedures of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, the steps to do so are known and can be implemented in North Korea. In fact, because suspicions of a secret North Korean uranium enrichment plant have existed for years, the IAEA verification process would need to ensure that North Korea does not have an undeclared gas centrifuge program whenever full-scale inspections resumed.

In any nuclear verification scheme in North Korea, the IAEA would necessarily have to play a critical role. However, the IAEA would benefit greatly from a U.S. verification plan. In addition, the IAEA may need to recruit gas centrifuge experts from member states as the nucleus of an inspection team.

Essential elements of a verification regime include a North Korean declaration of the scope, timing, and history of the centrifuge program; program documents and data, receipt of procurement information from North Korea and supplier states; access to a range of North Korean centrifuge research, development, testing, and production sites; and interviews with centrifuge program scientists and officials.

Such an effort would succeed only if North Korea cooperates and provides a high degree of transparency to the inspectors. During the IAEA inspections in the early 1990s, before the initial crisis developed, North Korea took many steps to be transparent in certain areas. However, it decided not to be sufficiently transparent to avoid a crisis from developing. In the current crisis, lack of adequate transparency or cooperation with inspectors would doom the process once again.

In parallel, the United States needs to take the lead in developing verification arrangements for dismantling any North Korea nuclear weaponization activities, which are aimed at developing and building nuclear weapons themselves. Media reports, quoting intelligence officials, have stated that North Korea has continued its weaponization work. Although the IAEA would be expected to conduct these inspections, it may need assistance and personnel from the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states.

Preserving the Agreed Framework There is no need to terminate the Agreed Framework, regardless of North Korea's statements. Slowdowns or cutoffs in specific projects are already occurring, and they make sense. These actions help show North Korea how serious the United States and its allies view North Korea's gas centrifuge program. They also encourage North Korea to understand that the fate of these projects depends on its actions.

Keeping the Agreed Framework in place is currently in the interest of the United States and its KEDO allies. The "freeze" on plutonium-related activities at Yongbyon that is verified by the IAEA is vital to preventing a significant escalation in tensions. For example, if North Korea restarted its plutonium separation plant and processed the spent fuel at the 5 megawatt-electric reactor, it could obtain enough separated plutonium for about five nuclear weapons.

Construction of the LWRs should be slowed down significantly. However, the project should not be ended by KEDO.

The heavy fuel oil shipments have been terminated. Resuming them under the current situation is unlikely, but, depending on developments, they could be started again as a reward for a North Korean action.

Many other actions could be taken that would send a message to North Korea that its work on gas centrifuges is unacceptable, while demonstrating to North Korea that it has the power to avoid more serious consequences and an escalation of tensions.

Blocking Additional Exports Supplier nations need to focus on blocking any more exports to North Korea's nuclear programs. North Korea's gas centrifuge program has depended heavily on imports of materials, equipment, and know-how. The United States and its allies need to focus on uncovering and stopping North Korean procurement efforts.

In addition, key countries need to thoroughly investigate past North Korean procurements to gain a deeper understanding of the items the centrifuge program has already obtained. Based on other cases, countries have proven they can develop detailed information about a particular country's illicit or questionable exports when they cooperate and commit their resources. This information would be important in understanding the pace and scale of North Korea's centrifuge program. Such information would also play a critical role in verifying the dismantlement of North Korea's centrifuge program.

Creating Incentives for North Korea North Korea would expect to receive something in return for verifiably dismantling its gas centrifuge program and speeding up inspections of the rest of its nuclear activities. Selig Harrison and Don Oberdorfer have reported that North Korea wants security guarantees and a normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States in return for abandoning its centrifuge program.

The United States would have a difficult time providing North Korea with a pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, because it is not a member in good standing of the NPT and it is aligned with China, a nuclear weapon state. However, the United States could find some way to provide something short of a negative security assurance that would satisfy North Korea. Similarly, the United States could offer more formally not to launch a pre-emptive attack on North Korea.

U.S. officials have hinted at providing North Korea with economic assistance after it verifiably dismantles its centrifuge program. With Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and other concerned countries interested in finding a solution to the current crisis, sculpting a meaningful economic and energy assistance program should be achievable.

Longer Term Nuclear Arms Control Objectives

In the end, North Korea will have to dismantle verifiably its gas centrifuge program and start a broader process of demonstrating transparency to show it does not have nuclear weapons. The United States will need to find a way to accomplish these goals, including providing adequate incentives to North Korea for taking such steps.

If North Korea chooses not to give up its gas centrifuge program, it will likely be isolated with all the accompanying risks. Few would tolerate North Korea becoming a nuclear power like Pakistan or India. North Korea could expect economic isolation and international condemnation. Economic isolation could cause North Korea to collapse. Regional war may also result. In this scenario, the United States, South Korea, and Japan would face a range of difficult challenges to contain North Korea and prepare for the possibility of war or North Korea's collapse.

If North Korea dismantles verifiably its gas centrifuge program, many promising options may open up. The Agreed Framework could be amended to make it more acceptable to both parties. In particular, inspections of North Korea's nuclear weaponization and plutonium production programs could be sped up and would likely be far easier to tackle. A discussion could start about providing power alternatives to at least one of the LWRs that could be implemented faster. In addition, discussions could be accelerated aimed at solving the immense problems in North Korea's electrical grids. Such a discussion could include the possibility of building transmission lines from the LWRs to South Korea, an option that would allow North Korea to sell much of the LWRs' electricity.

If IAEA inspection issues were being settled, North and South Korea could resume efforts to establish bilateral nuclear inspections, as required under the 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Bilateral inspections would provide a useful complement to IAEA inspections in both countries. The Joint Declaration has the benefit that it bans all uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities on the Korean peninsula. Bilateral inspections under this declaration may be used to help verify the absence of uranium enrichment activities on the peninsula.

Broader discussions on a regional nuclear weapon free zone could be initiated. Involving more countries directly in ensuring that the Korean peninsula and adjoining non-nuclear weapon states are free of nuclear weapons would increase security in the region.

Final Thoughts

No one can doubt that finding a diplomatic solution to the current crisis is difficult and carries its own risks. Making matters worse, the United States and North Korea are deeply mistrustful of each other. The only consolation is that few yet advocate the imposition of international sanctions and military buildups.

If managed properly, the current situation may provide an opportunity to "clear the air" and recalibrate existing nuclear arms control arrangements such as the Agreed Framework. The verifiable dismantlement of North Korea's gas centrifuge program may usher in an era where significant progress can be made on a range of nuclear issues plaguing the Korean peninsula, reinvigorating efforts to obtain a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons.