The
Conventional Arms Control Agenda
By: Selig S. Harrison
When First
Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju told visiting U.S. officials on
October 4, 2002, that North Korea was attempting to produce weapons-grade
enriched uranium, he also expressed North Korean readiness to negotiate
an agreement with the United States that would end the North Korean
nuclear and missile programs under an inspection regime acceptable to
Washington. Such an agreement, he said, would require that the United
States take these steps:
Ø
pledge not to stage a preemptive military attack against North Korea
Ø demonstrate a willingness to coexist and to accept North Korean
sovereignty by normalizing economic and political relations
Ø sign a peace agreement formally ending the Korean War and replace
the 1953 Armistice machinery with new machinery to keep the peace and
reduce military tensions through confidence-building and arms control
measures
Subsequent
North Korean statements have modified the third requirement, referring
only to a "non-aggression agreement" as a first step toward
a peace agreement.
For members of the Task Force and other close students of Korean affairs,
the first two of these North Korean preconditions involve issues that
require little elaboration. But the third has received surprisingly
little study: The issue of how to end the Korean War and what should
replace the Armistice machinery. Its legal and historical complexities
make eyes glaze over and obscure its central importance. Yet enduring
progress toward ending the military confrontation in Korea and resolving
the nuclear and missile issues is not likely in the absence of a formal
end to the war.
This paper will first set the historical record straight as a prelude
to a discussion of how to end the state of war and replace the Armistice
machinery. Next, it will discuss guidelines for the conventional arms
control discussions that would become possible if a peace agreement
is concluded and the U.N. Command and Military Armistice Commission
are replaced, reviewing little-known North Korean proposals. Finally,
it will suggest specific policy recommendations suggested by the paper
for consideration by the Task Force.
Who Signed
the Armistice?
The United
States has properly resisted North Korean demands for a bilateral peace
treaty excluding South Korea as the only legal instrument needed to
end the Korean War. But the U.S. counterproposal for a North-South treaty
excluding the United States is equally unrealistic. So long as the United
States retains wartime operational control over South Korean forces,
North Korea can logically insist on some form of U.S. participation
in the agreements that replace the armistice accord. By the same token,
a stable peace in Korea must necessarily include some form of separate
North-South peace agreement.
Washington and Seoul argue that the South was, in fact, a party to the
armistice because it fought under the U.N. Command. In this argument,
the United States was not a party to the truce because Gen. Mark W.
Clark, although a U.S. general, signed the agreement on behalf of the
U.N. Command, not the United States. Above all, it is said, although
Rhee did not sign, his eleventh-hour commitment to honor its provisions
amounted to the same thing as signing.
These arguments contain substantial elements of historical revisionism.
From the very outset of negotiations on a cease-fire in June 1951, the
Rhee government insisted that it would fight on alone rather than accept
a truce that did not provide for the reunification of Korea under the
South. On April 21, 1953, the South Korean National Assembly formally
opposed the impending armistice, and Rhee ordered the South Korean representative
in the negotiations to withdraw.
On May 12, as a precondition for not obstructing the armistice, Rhee
demanded a bilateral mutual security agreement that would commit the
United States indefinitely to the defense of the South in the event
of a new attack. President Eisenhower resisted, offering instead to
seek a pledge by the sixteen U.N. member states represented in the U.N.
Command to renew their intervention if necessary. As tensions between
Seoul and Washington mounted, General Clark prepared a series of contingency
plans known as "Operation Everready" to deal with the possible
obstruction of the impending armistice by South Korean forces. These
included disarming "disloyal" South Korean units, restricting
both civilian and military movements in the South, and if necessary,
sponsoring a military coup by cooperative South Korean generals, accompanied
by the arrest of Rhee and a proclamation of martial law.
When agreement was reached on a final demarcation line on June 17 and
the prospect of a truce seemed imminent, Rhee made a determined effort
to wreck the armistice. On the night of June 18, South Korean Army units
organized a mass breakout of more than 27,000 North Korean prisoners
of war, imprisoning and intimidating U.S. guards. This was just four
days before a scheduled visit by Walter S. Robertson, the U.S. assistant
secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs. Robertson's mission was
to get a firm South Korean commitment not to interfere with the operation
of the armistice. On July 12, after two weeks of intense discussions,
Rhee gave Robertson a letter for President Eisenhower saying that he
had "decided not to obstruct, in any manner," the implementation
of the armistice.
Robertson thought he had an agreement and left. The United States had
agreed to conclude a mutual security treaty and to provide both massive
economic assistance and enough military aid to build a twenty division
South Korean Army. On July 24, however, Rhee upped the ante, demanding
a U.S. commitment to join in a new military offensive against the North
if the projected post-armistice political conference failed to agree
on plans for reunification within ninety days. At this point, the White
House decided to go ahead with the armistice regardless of what Rhee
did and, if unavoidable, to invoke a toughened version of "Operation
Everready" to deal with him. In addition to its original provisions,
the new version envisaged withdrawing recognition of the Rhee government,
blocking South Korean dollar and sterling accounts, and, as a last resort,
a naval blockade.
On July 27, 1953, when the armistice agreement was finally concluded,
the South Korean Army refused to join in the honor guard at the signing
ceremonies along with troops from the fifteen other countries that had
fought in the war. On August 27, the United States signed the mutual
security agreement with Seoul that remains in force today.
With tensions between Seoul and Washington continuing to simmer a year
after the armistice, President Eisenhower invited Rhee to Washington
in July 1954. But their encounter only made matters worse. Rhee insisted
on language in the minutes of the White House talks that pledged U.S.
support for unification "by all means." A U.S. draft of the
minutes specified "peaceful means." For six months Rhee refused
to sign the minutes, which led to a virtual paralysis in Seoul-Washington
relations and a U.S. cutoff of civilian oil supplies. He finally agreed
to abandon his language on unification only under pressure from South
Korean military leaders eager to complete a major arms agreement.
Replacing
The Armistice
Against this background, South Korea clearly has no legal status as
a signatory to the armistice agreement. Rhee's undertaking not to disrupt
the truce was made in a letter to President Eisenhower, not to North
Korea. Thus, it does not amount to the same thing as having signed the
agreement, as some argue. The contention that General Clark signed on
behalf of all of the forces under his command is irrelevant in the context
of Seoul's opposition to the agreement itself. In any case, the South
was only one of sixteen countries that fought under the U.N. banner,
and all of them cannot be treated as signatories in replacing the armistice
agreement. But to say that the South was not a signatory does not alter
the fact that it must be a central part of a peace settlement. A distinction
should be made between the replacement of the armistice accord per se
and the broader challenge of establishing a stable peace structure.
The 1953 agreement should be replaced by one or more legal instrumentalities
involving the three states that did, in fact, sign the agreement---
the United States, China, and North Korea. At the same time, North and
South Korea, as in the principal antagonists in the war, would either
have to conclude a separate, new peace agreement of their own or take
the steps needed to upgrade their 1991 "Basic Agreement" into
a credible peace accord that explicitly writes finis to the war.
In technical legal terms, the United States is on solid ground in stating
that General Clark signed the armistice in his capacity as commander
of the U.N. Command. However, he was also commander of the U.S. Fifth
Army and of all U.S. forces that fought the North. Moreover, as a practical
matter, however, the command has been multilateral in name only since
its inception. This has been conclusively demonstrated by John Barry
Kotch in his definitive study of its origins. In giving the United States
the right to act on behalf of the United Nations, the Security Council
merely authorized it to enlist the help of other U.N. members. It did
nothing to establish multilateral control over the U.N Command. The
United States rejected as "impractical" a proposal by U.N.
Secretary General Trygvie Lie to create U.N machinery that would "coordinate
offers of military assistance and take other action in implementing
the Council's decision." In his memoirs, Lie bitterly recalled
that his plan was stillborn because the United States was "unwilling,
in those early days when the pattern of the police action was being
set, to accord the U.N. a larger measure of direction and thereby participation."
During the war, successive American commanders of the U.N. Command insisted
on unfettered U. S. control over military operations, and in subsequent
years even the cosmetic trappings of multilateral control have been
progressively reduced.
Moreover, for more than two decades, the U.N. Command has had no military
functions. In 1978, when the United States and South Korea created their
Combined Forces Command, the U.N. Command formally transferred its authority
to the new command. The same U.S. general who headed the new command
continued to retain the title of commander in chief, United Nations
Command, but he has worn his U.N. hat only when participating in meetings
of the Military Armistice Commission. Although its military functions
have ceased, the U.N. Command provides useful diplomatic cover for the
United States within the armistice commission. Wearing his U.N. hat,
the U.S. representative can deal with North Korea without giving it
implicit diplomatic recognition.
The insistence of the United States that it was not a party to the armistice
is governed by political, not legal considerations. At bottom, it reflects
a fear that normalization of relations with North Korea and the replacement
of the armistice could threaten the future of the U.S. military presence
in Korea. When and if the United States decides to normalize relations
with Pyongyang, the fact that General Clark signed as U.N. commander
need not be an insuperable legal obstacle to replacing the armistice.
The need for U.S. participation in a settlement replacing the Armistice
is underlined by the fact that a four-star U.S. general not only presides
over the U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command but would also exercise
operational control over South Korean forces in wartime. The United
States acquired operational control in July 1950 during the dark early
days of the Korean War. After the fighting ended, American generals
continued to exercise this authority until 1994, when South Korean nationalist
pressures forced Washington to relinquish peacetime operational control
to Seoul. In the event of war, however, the United States would automatically
regain it. This is the key reason why North Korea regards the United
States as its main adversary and why some form of direct peace agreement
between Washington and Pyongyang is likely to be unavoidable when and
if the armistice is replaced.
The Legal Issues
In a detailed analysis of the many legal scenarios that have been proposed
for ending the Korean War, Patrick M. Norton, former legal counsel to
the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has
suggested a flexible approach that could include direct U.S. participation.
"Legally," he argues, "a direct U.S. role would clearly
be appropriate in light of Security Council Resolution 84V," which
refers to the role of the United States as the "unified command"
in Korea in light of its "direct" command role in the fighting
itself, and in light of its intimate political and military involvement
in the maintenance of the Armistice over more than four decades."
Although it is often assumed that the armistice must be replaced by
a single "peace treaty," Norton says, "form should not
dictate policy, and there is no compelling reason why the Korean Armistice
could not be superseded by an agreement, or agreements, not expressly
entitled 'treaty.' The legal tail should not wag the policy dog."
Such an agreement, or agreements, could be submitted to the U.N. Security
Council, which would pass a resolution confirming that they bring the
Korean War to an end.
Norton envisages a North-South agreement as an integral part of such
a package of agreements. In my own view, since South Korea cannot be
considered a signatory to the armistice and Pyongyang is likely to be
unshakable on this point, the agreements explicitly designated as replacing
the armistice could be between the United States and North Korea and
the United States and China. As suggested earlier, South Korea and North
Korea could conclude a separate companion agreement not linked to the
armistice.
The key element in this formula is that the United States would sign
a direct bilateral agreement with North Korea. Until now, Pyongyang
has rejected a direct North-South agreement, but its position would
become flexible if Washington agreed to sign a bilateral accord with
the North. When I emphasized the need for South Korean participation
in a peace agreement, or agreements, during my June 8, 1994, meeting
with Kim Il Sung, he smiled and said, "Don't worry, the diplomats
have ways of dealing with these things."
The U.N.
Fig Leaf
On May 28, 1994, North Korea formally asked U.N. Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali to initiate steps that would lead to the replacement of
the armistice agreement and the termination of the U.N. Command. Boutros-Ghali
replied categorically on June 24 that the United States alone has the
authority to "decide on the continued existence or the dissolution
of the United Nations Command." He recalled that Security Council
Resolution 84 of July 7, 1950, "limited itself to recommending
that all Members providing military forces and other assistance to the
Republic of Korea 'make such forces and other assistance available to
a unified command under the United States of America.' It follows, accordingly,
that the Security Council did not establish the unified command as a
subsidiary organ under its control, but merely recommended the creation
of such a command, specifying that it be under the authority of the
United States. Therefore, the dissolution of the unified command does
not fall within the responsibility of any United Nations organ but is
a matter within the competence of the Government of the United States."
Apart from the utility of the U.N. Command as diplomatic cover for U.S.
representatives to the Military Armistice Commission, the United States
has three other reasons for wanting to retain the U.N. Command indefinitely.
One is a desire to avoid the need for renewed U.N. Security Council
approval of U.S. intervention in the event of a new war. American and
South Korean forces could once again fight in the name of the U.N. Command
without seeking U.N. approval as the United States did in the case of
Desert Storm. A more substantial reason relates to the U.S. use of bases
in Japan in connection with military operations in Korea. An agreement
with Japan during the Korean War gave seven U.S. bases in Japan dual
legal status as U.N. Command bases. The U.N. Command has explicit authority
to use these bases to refuel and service U.S. aircraft en route to Korea
in the event of hostilities.
The United States also fears that the termination of the U.N. Command
would intensify what is already a growing debate in South Korea over
the return of operational control to Seoul. Even a U.S. general, the
late Richard G. Stilwell, once commented that the degree of operational
control enjoyed by the United States in Korea is "the most remarkable
concession of sovereignty in the entire world."
For Lim Dong Won, like many other leading South Koreans, the continuance
of U.S. operational control so many years after the Korean War is not
only an affront to sovereignty but also an impediment to meaningful
dialogue with the North. "South Korea must recover its independent
identity as the main player in negotiations with North Korea,"
Lim declared in 1996. "This issue is intrinsically related to the
question of recovering the operational control of its military forces
from the Commanding General of the U.N. Command. Only with the reversion
of operational control will North Korea respect South Korea's authority
and capability." Urging on another occasion that wartime operational
control "must be returned as soon as possible," Lim said that
this would necessarily entail the restructuring of the existing U.S.-South
Korean Combined Forces Command along the lines of the U.S.-Japan military
arrangements, "linking two separate operational structures on a
cooperative basis." A continued U.S. force presence in Korea is
desirably, he added, emphasizing that the U.S. presence is "primarily
based on the R.O.K.-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty of 1953 and is totally
unrelated to the existence or dissolution of the U.N. Command."
The South Korean government position is that operational control can
be safely returned only "as the North Korean threat declines."
So long as the United States retains operational control, officials
say, the United States will be automatically involved in the event of
hostilities, and "we will have a guarantee of U.S. commitment and
reinforcement on the basis of which we can make operational plans."
Conversely, it is argued, the United States would be free to delay and
limit its involvement if South Korea has operational control.
From the perspective of most U.S. officials and military officers, it
would be dangerous and unworkable for the United States to keep forces
in Korea without retaining operational control- dangerous because South
Korea might overreact to North Korean provocations and drag the United
States into a needless conflict, and unworkable because it would be
difficult to coordinate U.S. and South Korean forces without a single
unified chain of command. Logically, U.S. officials say, a South Korean
general could head the existing Combined Forces Command, but Congress
would balk at the idea of American troops fighting under a foreign command,
anywhere, and might not be willing to keep any U.S. forces in Korea
at all without U.S. operational control.
Those in the South who call for the return of operational control believe
that a coordinated command structure patterned after the U.S.-Japan
model would work effectively. Asked about this concept, Lt. Gen. John
H. Cushman, who commanded the U.S.-South Korean First Corps Group from
1976 to 1978, expressed concern that such an arrangement "would
fall apart under pressure." It would be especially difficult under
such circumstances, he said, for U.S. forces to provide the efficient
intelligence, command and control, and targeting on which the South
now depends.
Objections such as these to coordinated command arrangements in Korea
similar to or stronger than those in Japan rest on the assumption that
the two Koreas will remain poised on the brink of war indefinitely.
But some version of the Japan model would be appropriate for Korea during
a transitional peace process when tensions are gradually subsiding and
arms-control efforts are proceeding under the aegis of a new post-armistice
peace structure.
North Korea's Peace Proposal
The conclusion of the Agreed Framework in 1994 led to a series of North
Korean proposals during the next four years to replace the Military
Armistice Commission and the U.N. Command. Since they were conveyed
to the U.S. government through me and other visitors rather than through
official channels, the Clinton Administration made no effort to explore
these proposals, which I have outlined in detail elsewhere. Finally,
on October 9, 1998, General Ri Chan Bok, the North Korean Representative
at Panmunjom, did formally propose to U.S., South Korean and U.N. Command
representatives at Panmunjom that, to replace the Armistice, "both
sides should establish a Military Security Assurance Commission as a
joint military mechanism to be composed of the Korean People's Army,
the U.S. military and South Korean officers."
Instead of participating in the new commission wearing his U.N. hat,
the U.S. representative would represent the United States. This would
signify U.S. recognition of North Korea. The participation of South
Korea as an equal would signal a departure from past North Korean efforts
to treat the South as an appendage of the United States on security
issues. The purpose of the new commission, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Kang Sok Ju told me, would not only be to prevent incidents in the DMZ
that would threaten the peace, but also to develop arms control and
confidence-building arrangements reflecting a new and more symmetrical
U.S. posture toward the two Koreas. "The Armistice was concluded
between two hostile parties," Kang said, "but the purpose
of the new peace arrangements will be to end adversarial relations and
prevent any threat to the peace, whether from the South against the
North or the North against the South."
When I asked General Ri whether the U.S.-South Korean Security Treaty
could remain in force under the proposed "new peace arrangements,"
he replied, "Definitely yes." I observed that "this is
possible because you don't want the issue of your mutual security treaty
with China to be raised, isn't that right?" He smiled, commenting
that "these are longer-range issues that can be considered in time
at the political level."
I asked Ri whether establishment of a "new peace mechanism"
would make it unnecessary to conclude a peace treaty formally ending
the war. His answer was that a treaty would still be necessary. However,
a Foreign Ministry statement soon afterward on June 16 offered to discuss
"the discontinuation of our missile development after a peace agreement
with the United States is signed and the U.S. military threat completely
removed."
North Korean diplomats have subsequently made clear that the use of
the phrase "peace agreement" rather than "peace treaty"
was calculated. In a conversation on May 16, 2001, Li Hyong Chol, North
Korea's U.N. representative, said that "our concern is to end hostilities
and formalize relations between us in a mutually agreeable way. But
the United States must deal with us directly. A peace agreement would
end the Korean War and a treaty might not be necessary, certainly not
any time soon. After all, Japan and Russia have diplomatic relations
without a formal peace treaty."
Kim Jong Il made clear during his June 2000 summit meeting with Kim
Dae Jung that he does not want the issue of U.S. forces to get in the
way of obtaining a peace agreement and normalized relations. But precisely
what he said concerning U.S. forces is a subject of some confusion.
Kim Dae Jung raised the issue, saying that "U.S. forces will be
needed in Korea even after unification to preserve a regional balance
of power." On one occasion, Kim Dae Jung said that Kim Jong Il
replied, "I totally agree with you." On another occasion,
Kim Dae Jung said that the North Korean leader "showed substantial
understanding of my position on the need for U.S. troops." An adviser
to Kim Dae Jung who briefed Secretary of State Madeline Albright has
a different version: Kim Jong Il had responded that he was "not
totally opposed" to what Kim Dae Jung had said. Another South Korean
official who participated in the summit said that North Korea "wants
to retain some strategic ambiguity on this matter." China's official
Beijing Review offered its own clarification of North Korean policy.
One option acceptable to Pyongyang, the Review said, would be for the
United States to "return operational control over South Korean
forces to the South, change the adversarial role of U.S. forces into
a peacekeeping role and transform the Demilitarized Zone into a zone
of peace."
In his address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on September
27, 1999, Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun declared that the United States
need only announce a "political decision" accepting the principle
of an eventual withdrawal as part of a negotiated tension-reduction
process that could extend over an indefinite period.
The Conventional
Arms Control Agenda
The debate in the United States on conventional arms control is constricted
by the prevailing assumption that the American military presence in
Korea in its present form is immutable. Thus, the Bush Administration
demands that North Korea unilaterally pull back its forward-deployed
forces, with no reciprocal U.S. concessions. A recent study by a Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Working Group argued
that "in the unlikely event that North Korean leaders would be
prepared to put their forward-deployed forces on the negotiating table
at all,
they would
surely insist that the allies make concessions of comparable magnitude
in return, including, for example, the reduction or withdrawal of U.S.
forces, particularly air assets. The allies would most likely calculate
that the price they would have to pay, in terms of reducing their own
deterrent capabilities, would simply be too high.
Implicitly,
the CSIS study envisages the indefinite continuance of the status quo
at the thirty-eighth parallel, downgrading both the military danger
posed by forward-deployed North Korean forces in the event of hostilities
and the destabilizing political impact of their continued presence on
North-South relations.
This paper proceeds from the premise that the most compelling conventional
arms control priority in Korea is to relieve South Korean fears of a
surprise attack on Seoul by getting North Korea to pull back its forward-deployed
forces from the DMZ permanently. North Korean pullbacks from the DMZ
would have an immediate and profound payoff, greatly reducing North-South
tensions. The operative questions for Washington and Seoul, therefore,
are what concessions would be required to get different degrees of redeployment
on the part of Pyongyang, and what changes in the U.S. and South Korean
force posture would be acceptable in order to get differing degrees
of North Korean redeployment. Since the U.S. military presence in Korea
was established to deter North Korean aggression, it should be reduced
in return for negotiated reductions in the North Korean threat. As I
show in Korean Endgame, the Pentagon goal of keeping U.S. forces in
Korea for larger regional reasons, even if North-South tensions subside,
would place South Korea or a reunified Korea on a collision course with
China and is unrealistic.
The Task Force should give special attention to the proposal made by
Lim Dong Won in 1989, long before Lim became Kim Dae Jung's National
Security Adviser, for a 62-mile mile "Offensive Weapon-Free Zone"
or "Limited Deployment Zone." Tanks, mechanized infantry,
armored troop carriers, and self-propelled artillery would be barred
completely from this zone, and the number of infantry divisions would
be subject to agreed limits. Lim emphasized that equipment is easier
to quantify--- and verify--- than personnel. Elaborating on this proposal
in 1994, he stated that "in light of Seoul's relative proximity
to the DMZ, the Limited Deployment Zone should be asymmetrically placed
with respect to the Military Demarcation Line. That is, since Pyongyang
is much further away from the Demarcation Line than is Seoul, the Zone
should be framed in terms of promoting equal security rather than geometric
symmetry." Contending that there were imbalances favorable to the
North in both the number of troops and major categories of equipment,
he emphasized that "in the first phase of reductions, the South
and North should eliminate imbalances and asymmetries as regards both
main armament and troop numbers. Given the difficulty of verifying troop
numbers, it seems important that cuts in major items of equipment proceed
in parallel with less verifiable troop reductions."
In a more modest variant of Lim's proposal for a Limited Deployment
Zone, Yong Sup Han has proposed an asymmetrical widening of the DMZ
in which the North pulls its forces back twenty-six miles to the north
and Seoul pulls back thirteen miles. Under this plan, he argued, it
would take a day for North Korean infantry units to reach the military
demarcation line, "and they will not have the advantage of surprise."
The major bone of contention in any discussion with the North on mutual
force pullbacks is likely to be the principle of asymmetry emphasized
in these South Korean proposals. Since Seoul is so close to the DMZ,
symmetrical pullbacks equal in distance could place South Korean and
U.S. forces at a disadvantage. For example, suppose that both sides
pull back twenty-five miles. South Korean and U.S. forces would then
be on the northern outskirts of Seoul. In a surprise attack, North Korean
forces could be well on their way to the DMZ before South Korean and
U.S. forces could get their counteroffensive started. More important,
North Korean artillery fire would impede their advance. South Korean
and U.S. generals argue that they would have more warning time if the
opposing forces remain in their existing forward positions than if both
sides pull back an equal distance. In short, the location of Seoul would
make pullbacks unacceptable to Seoul and Washington unless North Korea
pulls back further than the South. How much further would be the pivotal
issue.
Significally, Kim Il Sung, in his June 17, 1994, meeting with Jimmy
Carter, acknowledged that pullbacks would have to be asymmetrical. Recalling
his meeting with Kim, Carter told me that he had emphasized the South's
fears of a surprise attack, whereupon Kim had said: "I am ready
to discuss a withdrawal of both sides back from the DMZ, and I recognize
that we would have to withdraw a further distance than the South, given
the realities of geography and the location of Seoul."
In 1990, Gen. Robert Riscassi, then commander of U.S. forces, proposed
a joint pullback of U.S. and South Korean forces to the Han River, where
they would be less vulnerable to North Korean artillery fire. South
Korean generals were amenable, but their civilian superiors balked.
Their stated reason was that the South Korean people, especially residents
of Seoul, would be demoralized by the prospect of an unimpeded North
Korean advance to the outskirts of the capital, even if this made military
sense. But another, decisive consideration is South Korean resistance
to any change in the present forward strategy is the belief that a U.S.
"tripwire" is essential to assure U.S. intervention and that
even a limited pullback could lead to more pullbacks as part of a negotiated
tension-reduction scenario culminating in complete U.S. disengagement.
The United States backed off in 1990, and 15,000 American soldiers in
forward positions are still cannon fodder, not for overriding military
reasons but in deference to Seoul. Such deference to an ally was understandable
when the argument was over a unilateral pullback. But if North Korea
should agree to mutual asymmetrical pullbacks and the South should say
no, the United States should be prepared for a showdown with Seoul no
less fateful than its 1953 confrontation with Rhee over the armistice.
This time, instead of buying Seoul off once again with open-ended military
aid commitments, Washington should bar all U.S. sales of military hardware
and technology until Seoul cooperates.
Throwing cold water on the idea of mutual pullbacks, Brig. Gen. Young
Koo Cha, director of policy planning in the Defense Ministry, said that
"it would simply be too expensive. Relocating forces would be a
very expensive business for all concerned." But if the United States
is willing to spend so much on maintaining its forces in Korea, it should
be willing to help pay for arms-control arrangements that reduce tensions
and make its force presence in Korea progressively less necessary. The
possibility of such an American role was suggested obliquely in the
1991 report of a South Korean-U.S. conference in which I participated
together with General Cha, then director of a South Korean military
think tank. The conference report observed that "in early negotiations
with North Korea, the South might wish to avoid requesting reciprocal
measures from Pyongyang that are very expensive and time-consuming.
Major redeployment of troops, for example, can take some time and require
the construction of new bases and housing." Referring specifically
to Lim Dong Won's proposal, the report added that "such a move
would be expensive--- unless an outside sponsor offered to make up the
costs." A 1998 working group on Korea sponsored by the U.S. Institute
of Peace concluded more categorically that "international financial
support will be necessary to cover certain costs associated with a Korean
arms reduction process, including mutual troop and equipment reductions
and repositioning." Such support, the report said, would have a
precedent in the U.S. support provided for strategic arms reductions
with Russia under the program initiated by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard
Lugar.
What concessions would North Korea seek as the price for asymmetrical
pullbacks? A categorical answer to this question quickly emerged when
a Carnegie Endowment delegation met with a leading North Korean military
spokesman in May 1992. One of our members was Gen. Edward C. Meyer,
former U.S. Army chief of staff. General Meyer's presence led to an
hour-long meeting on May 2 with Lt. Gen. Kwon Jung Yong, then deputy
army chief of staff for strategy, disarmament, and foreign affairs.
When we raised the issue of mutual pullbacks, General Kwon smiled indulgently.
Pointing to a map showing U.S air bases in South Korea and Japan, he
spoke slowly, as if explaining something to children. "Look where
you are," he said. "You can leapfrog over us, deep into our
territory. That is why we must keep our forces far forward, to deter
you, to make it too costly for you to do that. You talk of equitable
redeployments but they wouldn't be equitable unless we are no longer
threatened by your air forces as well as your ground forces." Much
the same argument has been repeated in my 1994, 1995, and 1998 meetings
with General Kwon, Gen. Ri Chan Bok, North Korean delegate at Panmunjom,
First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, and other officials in Pyongyang.
When I emphasized the importance of pullbacks from the DMZ several times
in a one-on-one dinner with Kang on September 29, 1995, he held up a
knife, drew it across his throat, and said that "my military friends
will do this to me if I ever mention such a thing. Unless, of course,
you are prepared to withdraw your forces, especially your air forces."
Brig. Gen. James Grant, the former assistant director of intelligence
of U.S. forces in Korea, expressed doubt that North Korea would ever
negotiate pullbacks. Pyongyang wants to keep its own forces forward,
he said, because it knows that the forward-deployed U.S. forces are
in a vulnerable position. "They don't want us to pull back,"
he said. "They're not really afraid of an American attack, and
they're happy to have us right where we are if there ever is a war."
As in other U.S. military analyses, Grant pointed out that North Korean
forward deployments are not, strictly speaking, defensive, since key
logistics dumps and artillery are deployed in front of their major infantry
forces. "They're too exposed," he explained. "It wouldn't
make sense to do that if they expect the United States to attack first."
The answer to this argument is that North Korean fears of a surprise
attack appear to be focused not on U.S. ground forces but on U.S. air
capabilities. The reason for deploying its forces so far forward and
for seeking to develop nuclear, missile, and chemical warfare capabilities
is to make sure that North Korea never again suffers an air onslaught
like the one during the Korean War. Thus, to get Pyongyang to negotiate
the pullback zone proposed by Lim Dong Won, the United States would
have to make concessions relating to its air forces as well as its ground
forces. The trump card in the U.S. hand would be a readiness to transfer
the U.S. combat aircraft now based in Korea to bases in Japan or Hawaii.
Most experts agree that the South Korean Air Force could prevail in
a war with the North, even after a withdrawal of U.S. combat aircraft,
if the United States continued to provide command and control, targeting,
and intelligence support.
Until the United States, South Korea, and North Korea begin a security
dialogue, North Korean intentions concerning the pace and extent of
U.S. ground force withdrawals will remain unclear. In my meetings with
General Kwon, Gen. Ri Chan Bok, and Foreign Ministry arms control officials,
they have consistently reaffirmed the linkage between U.S. withdrawals
and North-South force reductions that was central in past North Korean
arms control proposals. At the same time, they have indicated a new
flexibility concerning how fast the disengagement of U.S. forces would
have to be. As I have argued earlier, the North Korean attitude toward
arms control and the future of the U.S. presence will be decisively
shaped by whether Washington is ready to bring a formal end to the Korean
War and end the adversarial relationship symbolized by the Military
Armistice Commission and the United Nations Command.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Ending the Korean War
Half a
century after the end of the Korean War, it is time for the United States
to conclude peace agreements with the other two parties to the 1953
Armistice Agreement, North Korea and China, provided that North Korea
agrees to conclude a separate agreement with South Korea, which did
not sign the Armistice. A formal end to the state of war now existing
is a necessary precondition for the reduction of tensions through conventional
arms control negotiations. The United States should reconsider its position
that it was not a signatory to the Armistice, and South Korea should
reconsider its position that it does have legal status as a signatory.
Rationale
The U.S. position that it was not a signatory is untenable. Although
General Clark did identify himself in the Armistice agreement as Commander-in-Chief
of the U.N. Command, the Command was from its inception multilateral
in name only. As Trygvie Lie, U.N. Secretary General during the Korean
War, spelled out in his memoirs, successive U.S. commanders of the U.N.
Command insisted on unfettered control over military operations, and
in subsequent years even the cosmetic trappings of multilateral control
have been progressively reduced.
The South Korean position is based on two fallacious arguments.
The first is that even though Syngman Rhee attempted to subvert the
Armistice and the South refused to sign it, Rhee later agreed to abide
by its provisions. This is fallacious because Rhee's commitment to honor
the agreement was made only to the United States, not to North Korea.
The second argument is that since General Mark W. Clark, in signing
the Armistice, identified himself as Commander-in-Chief of the United
Nations Command, and that South Korea, as one of the countries fighting
under him, should thus be treated as a signatory. But 15 other countries
also fought under the U.N. command. In any case, General Clark's role
as head of the U.N. Command was a mere extension of his position as
the ranking commander of all U.S. forces in Korea and of the U.S.-South
Korean Combined Forces Command.
Operational control by the United States over South Korean forces in
time of war understandably leads North Korea to regard the United States
as its main enemy, necessitating a bilateral peace agreement with the
United States in order to bring the war to an end.
Replacing the Armistice Machinery
The Military
Armistice Commission set up in 1953 should be replaced with new peacekeeping
machinery, together with companion steps to dissolve the United Nations
Command.
The United States should explore the October 9, 1998, North Korean proposal
for the creation of a Mutual Security Assurance Commission in place
of the Military Armistice Commission, and the U.N. Command, consisting
of U.S., South Korean and North Korean generals. The United States should
condition its participation in such a trilateral commission on North
Korean agreement to activate the bilateral North-South Joint Military
Commission envisaged in the 1992 North-South "Basic Agreement."
Rationale
Both the Military Armistice Commission and the U.N. Command are obsolete
vestiges of an adversarial cold war relationship between the United
States and North Korea. Their continuance would be incompatible with
a peace agreement and with the normalization of relations between the
two countries that the Task Force supports.
A trilateral commission would be appropriate because a U.S. general
presides over the U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command and would
have operational control over South Korean forces in wartime. At the
same time, the United States cannot speak for South Korea. Thus, issues
relating only to South Korean and North Korean forces would be addressed
in the Joint North-South Military Commission. The new Mutual Security
Commission would deal with all issues involving U.S. forces in Korea,
Combined Forces Command, and would oversee arms control and tension
reduction proposals involving both the United States and South Korea.
The dissolution of the U.N. Command would have no military impact, since
it has had no military functions for more than two decades. In 1978,
when the United States and South Korea created the Combined Forces Command,
the U.N. Command formally transferred its authority to the new command.
The same U.S. general commands both the Combined Forces Command and
the U.N. Command, but he wears his U.N. hat only when participating
in meetings of the Military Armistice Commission. The U.S.-South Korea
Mutual Security Treaty would continue to provide an umbrella for the
U.S. military presence when the U.N. Command is dismantled.
President Kim Dae Jung's Adviser, Lim Dong Won, has proposed a North-South
"Offensive Weapon-Free Zone" in which tanks, mechanized infantry,
armored troop carriers and self-propelled artillery would be barred,
including artillery using chemical or biological warfare agents. Given
the fact that Seoul is closer to the DMZ than Pyongyang, North Korea
would have to pull back further than Seoul.
Critics of this proposal have argued that both sides, in such an agreement,
should be required to deploy all of their artillery in the open, everywhere
in their respective territory, to facilitate inspection and to maximize
the warning time that the South would have in event of an attack in
violation of the agreement.
For North and South alike, it would be costly to relocate their forces
in order to create a mutual pullback zone. As a U.S. Institute of Peace
Working Group has observed, "international financial support will
be, necessary to cover certain costs associated with a Korean arms reduction
process, including mutual troop and equipment reductions and repositioning."
Such support, the report said, would have a precedent in the support
provided for U.S. strategic arms reductions with Russia under the program
initiated by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.
Lowering the U.S. Military Profile
Before
opposition to the U.S. military presence reaches serious proportions
and leads to significant pressures for disengagement, the United States
should defuse this opposition by lowering the U.S. military profile
in Korea and offering to make changes in the size, character and location
of U.S. deployments, including pullbacks of some or all of its forces
from their forward "tripwire'role" at the DMZ. Such changes
could be made either through unilateral U.S. action or in return for
the pullback of forward-deployed North Korean forces.
The Task Force urges consideration of a structural change in the U.S.-South
Korean military relationship designed to show greater sensitivity to
South Korean sovereignty. In place of the tightly-integrated US-South
Korean Combined Forces Command, the United States and South Korea should
consider emulating the US-Japan model in which two separate operational
structures are linked on a cooperative basis and the United States surrenders
its wartime operational control.
Rationale
In place of its present "tripwire" role, in which U.S. forces
are automatically drawn into any new Korean conflict, the United States,
in such a new and looser structure, would have more flexibility than
at present in deciding whether to participate in any given conflict
situation. South Korea would have the principal responsibility for defending
itself and this, in turn, would give it a new incentive for finding
a modus vivendi with the North.
