The Ties That Unbind: Japan and U.S. Korea Policy

By K.A. Namkung, Ph.D.
Independent Scholar and Consultant

Draft - Not for Citation

Working Paper prepared for the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy, sponsored by the Center for International Policy and the Center for East Asian Studies of the
University of Chicago, Washington, D.C., January 9, 2003

Overview

The return of a crisis situation to the Korean peninsula has brought into sharp relief the need for unity on the part of the United States and its allies to deal with the deteriorating situation. All three governments - in Washington, D.C., Tokyo, and Seoul - have repeatedly stressed the importance of acting in concert during this crisis. But there are also new elements on the scene. The advent of a considerably harsher U.S. posture towards North Korea has moved both of its allies in the region to find new formulas to avoid war and exposed the existence of major differences between them and Washington. One is the offer on the part of the President-elect of the Republic of Korea to "mediate" the dispute between Washington and Pyongyang, another is Japan's earlier bold attempt to establish a political framework for a comprehensive resolution to its differences with North Korea. North Korea for its part has finally come to regard both Japan and South Korea as sovereign entities in their own right. Of equal interest is the new U.S. interest in working with its "friends" in the region, principally Russia and China, to "peacefully" resolve the North Korean issue and in multilateral approaches in general. Thus, the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue (and to removing other military threats from the North) lies in setting up six-party talks as called for by Japan and Russia within which various two-way (U.S.-DPRK, Japan-DPRK) and three-way (U.S.-ROK-DPRK) talks on specific issues can be negotiated, thereby meeting the concerns of all of the principal parties, including North Korea. Within this framework, China can facilitate the U.S.-DPRK dialogue, Russia the Japan-DPRK one. Japan has a disproportionately important role to play in this scenario.

The Koizumi-Kim Summit

It may be too early to declare Japan's traditional "minimalist" diplomacy to be at an end, but the Japanese prime minister's decision to travel to Pyongyang represents a major step forward towards staking out an independent posture with respect at least to the means for resolving regional conflicts, even if overall ends continue to be firmly shared with the United States. Just a quick glance at the timing of the announcement of the visit (August 30, 2002) and official notification to Washington (August 27, 2002) together with the visit itself (September 17, 2002) should suffice to show the blitzkrieg-like nature of the move.

The differences are deeper than mere tactics. While not publicly saying so, the Tokyo government has long felt that it was unwise to include North Korea in the "axis of evil" and otherwise drive it into a dangerous corner. During President George W. Bush's stopover in Tokyo in February 2002, the Japanese prime minister made clear his government's intent "to work on normalizing our relationship with North Korea." ["Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi in Joint Press Conference," Prime Minister's Residence, Tokyo, Japan, February 18, 2002], thus distancing himself from the "axis" remark made barely three weeks earlier.

Reflecting this difference in approach, the Japanese government has used very different methods to extract concessions and gains from North Korea from those used by U.S. negotiators, specifically the "unofficial official" negotiations they have named "underwater" (suimenka) talks whereby the public is aware of their existence but their contents are kept tightly sealed, even from senior officials in the government. ("Track II" discussions differ from these to the extent that non-governmental persons participate in them and their existence is generally not publicized.) In fact, the Koizumi-Kim summit would not have been possible without several years of such preparations at lower levels of the bureaucracy.

Widely perceived as some kind of gambit on Koizumi's part to revive his political fortunes, the real story behind the summit is that over several years Japanese and North Korean diplomats have come to know and develop an element of trust in each other through numerous "underwater" meetings carried out by officials in their "unofficial" capacity in several third countries. As a key Japanese negotiator has written, "The negotiations were held unofficially in order for there to be a quiet atmosphere in which both sides' real positions (honne) could clash freely. There were many times when we had harsh exchanges and came close to rupture." (Hiramatsu Kenji, "Sori hocho to Nitcho Pyongyang sengen chomei e no michi ["The Road to the Prime Minister's Visit to North Korea and the Signing of the Pyongyang Declaration"], Gaiko Forum, No. 173 [December 2002], p.24) In the course of doing so, both sides succeeded finally in keeping out of the negotiations non-governmental persons who had long obstructed their progress, individual LDP politicians in the Japanese case, Korean Workers Party cadres in the North Korean, agreeing to use a single diplomatic channel.

Thus the Pyongyang Declaration clearly evinces a long and laborious process of closing the gap. Whereas the Agreed Framework of 1994 between the United States and North Korea is essentially a quid pro quo transaction binding the parties to move in lock step, a legal document, the Pyongyang Declaration is replete with calls to be "sincere" and to act in "mutual trust." To be certain, the document also spells out in some detail Japan's contractual obligations to provide financial and humanitarian assistance, but the impression that a good deal of trust at a personal level was built over time remains strong. While U.S. and North Korean negotiators have developed a grudging respect for each other (about which non-governmental persons know very little), the Japanese and their North Korean counterparts appear to have reached a common "cultural" understanding of their differences that constitutes a new plateau of achievement in the attempt to draw North Korea out of its isolation. Another aspect of this phenomenon is a mutual respect for "principles." As Hiramatsu Kenji has stated, Koizumi from the outset of his term insisted upon the following formula without wavering and stated repeatedly: "Japan too is sincerely prepared to normalize relations. At the same time, you must with sincerity seriously tackle the security and abduction issues. We cannot normalize without resolving the abductions." [Ibid., p.24] Hiramatsu notes that "North Koreans tend to be scrupulous about principles." [Ibid.] Any reader of North Korean propaganda is all too aware of Pyongyang's self-righteousness about sticking to "principles."

In Japan, intellectual opinion is divided on the significance of this summit meeting. A recent issue of Japan Echo (Vol. 29, No. 6) shows just how far: Masao Okonogi and Hajime Izumi, perhaps the two leading Korea specialists in Japan, rate the summit very highly, while Terumasa Nakanishi and Hisahiko Okazaki, both well known to the West but not as Korea experts, consider it a huge failure. The "moderates" feel that Kim Jong Il has taken some important steps to accommodate Japanese demands, especially on the question of security, while the "hawks" feel he has come not nearly far enough, citing lack of progress on the highly-charged abduction as well as other issues.

The subtext that has gotten lost in this discussion is the two leaders' agreement to establish a bilateral security dialogue for the first time. For years Japan-DPRK normalization talks had foundered on their inability to get beyond a well-known disagreement: North Korea would insist upon an apology and reparations for Japan's colonization after which other issues could be discussed; Japan would demand a resolution of the abductees issue before agreeing to talk about other matters. It was the agreement reached together in "underwater" talks to initiate a bilateral security dialogue that broke the longstanding impasse. The Japan-DPRK Security Dialogue introduces a brand new element in the Northeast Asian security equation about which very little has been written thus far. Clearly it will have far-reaching repercussions down the road. Nothing in the history of Japan-North Korean relations comes anywhere close to this recognition of their roles in building a new peace and security architecture in the region.

It is significant that the Security Dialogue stands outside the normalization talks, because the issues to be discussed encompass more than bilateral concerns such as missile firings, spy ships, and other threats to Japan. Japan and North Korea have agreed that there is a major role for them to play in establishing a new multilateral peace and security framework in northeast Asia. While abductions, spy ships, and economic aid have dominated the headlines and debates, relatively less attention has been given to the issue of regional cooperation. The two leaders agreed on the following: "Both sides confirmed the importance of establishing co-operative relationships based upon mutual trust among countries in this region, and shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building, as the relationships among these countries are normalized." (Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, September 17, 2000)

Finally, the Pyongyang Declaration devotes considerable space to the question of economic assistance. Just prior to Koizumi's visit, former prime minister Yoshiro Mori revealed that the "underwater" talks during his own tenure had yielded an important concession on the part of the North Koreans on the question of historical redress - an agreement to drop the demand for reparations and to accept economic aid in its stead. ["Mori: North Korea Adopted Pragmatic Policy Stance," Asahi Shimbun, September 13, 2002] This clears the way not just for a financial package that is tied to the formula used in 1965 during normalization talks with the Republic of Korea. It opens the door to a major role for Japan in the overall rehabilitation of the North Korean economy, assuming that its security concerns can be verifiably assuaged. Thus the references in the Pyongyang Declaration to economic assistance "over a period of time" and to a Japan Bank for International Co-operation that would support private economic activity.

North Korea's Strategic Shift

A note on North Korea's move away from an America-first policy is in order. For years Pyongyang had operated on the assumption that if the U.S. security threat could be removed, all others would automatically follow. Once talks with the U.S. began in earnest in the early 1990s, North Korea's relations not only with Japan and South Korea but with China and Russia as well, went into a deep freeze. When it appeared in the late 1990s that the U.S. was moving towards recognition of North Korea, Pyongyang began to revive its contacts with the other nations. The Bush administration's hard-lined stance towards North Korea has pushed it in the direction of a multi-directional diplomacy and a recognition - finally - that Seoul and Tokyo do not automatically hear the falconer's call. Unwittingly, the U.S. has created the circumstances whereby a number of nations in the region are fully involved in settling the future of the Korean issue, opening the way to multilateral approaches to the problem.

Policy Recommendations

1. The United States should encourage Japan to begin to negotiate a normalization agreement with the DPRK ahead of any action it might take with respect to political recognition in the future. Public sentiment in Japan, despite the anger over the abductees, remains strongly in favor of normalization. According to a Cabinet-sponsored poll released on December 21, 2002, 66.1% of the respondents favored normalization while 26% opposed, a three-to-one margin. Of the issues of concern, abductees was highest at 83.4%, followed by spy ships at 59.5%, nuclear development at 49.2%, and missiles at 43.7% [Kyodo News, December 21, 2002] North Korea in the meantime must begin to satisfy the full range of Japan's security concerns through the Japan-DPRK Security Dialogue. Concrete discussions of economic aid packages should begin at the same time.

2. Japan should be requested to raise both the uranium-enrichment and plutonium program issues in the Japan-DPRK Security Dialogue. North Korea must agree to immediately dismantle the HEU program in a verifiable way without any expectation of rewards. The 1994 agreement to freeze the plutonium-based program must be revived in some fashion, even if alternative forms of energy are provided North Korea in exchange for the shutdown.

3. In response to North Korean acceptance of Japanese demands on both nuclear programs, the United States must restate its commitment to the Jo-Albright Joint Communique of October 2000 declaring that no hostile intent towards the DPRK exists on the part of the U.S. and that the three conditions set forth by North Korea during the Kelly visit in October 2002 have been accepted. A U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Security Dialogue should be established. This will defuse the current crisis.

4. Japan and Russia should then take the lead to promote a new version of the six-party talks both parties have proffered for some time. Under the new scheme, the six-way talks would serve initially as a framework for various two-way and three-way exchanges that could be held officially or, at first unofficially, as the parties see it. The principal two-way exchanges would be between the U.S. and DPRK, which China would facilitate, and Japan and DPRK, which Russia would facilitate and out of which would result the full normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S. and Japan. In principle, North-South Korean talks could also take place in this forum, but befitting the special character of inter-Korean relations (they are the same people), such talks are probably better held outside it. The principal three-way exchange would be one involving the U.S., ROK, and DPRK to discuss reducing military tensions and even setting up a military mechanism to replace the armistice. Once the military mechanism, a peace agreement of some kind between North and South Korea, and full normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea and between Japan and North Korea are in place, the six-nation parlay could turn into an organization to ratify the various agreements. Its other primary function would be to reach an agreement regarding the permanent denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

5. As these talks get under way, Japan should take the lead in organizing a consortium of nations to plan the rehabilitation of the North Korean economy in the direction of open markets, help North Korea gain admission to international financial organizations, and actively participate in foreign direct investment and trade.

Conclusion

Japan has made the greatest headway in improving relations with North Korea and in extracting concessions from it. In some respects Japan has more appeal as a partner to Pyongyang than do North Korea's traditional trading partners in Russia and China because it is so much fresher. North-South Korean economic relations will naturally be one major spur to North Korean economic development. But only Japan has the resources and the international clout to lead a dispassionate examination of North Korea's needs and come up with prescriptions for large-scale reform.

The key to the success of the prescriptions outlined here lies in the willingness of the United States to allow Japan to play the leadership role on security issues in the northeast Asian region.