OVERVIEW: KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Resolving the Nuclear Crisis

"…The United States should offer to negotiate directly with North Korea on all issues of concern to both sides, including the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons capabilities, its food and energy needs, and the full normalization of political and economic relations, provided that North Korea pledge not to reprocess the irradiated fuel rods that have been monitored by IAEA inspectors under the 1994 Agreed Framework, and to permit the return of the recently-expelled inspectors to resume their monitoring."

"By prearrangement, Secretary of States Colin Powell and Foreign Minister Paik Nam Soon would then make a joint declaration in Washington or Pyongyang. North Korea would pledge in this declaration to negotiate the verified dismantlement of all aspects of its nuclear capabilities. Both sides would pledge that they would not use force against the other during negotiations on dismantlement, and that, upon the successful conclusion of dismantlement, they would categorically rule out the use of force against each other thereafter. The United States would also pledge to respect North Korean sovereignty and not to hinder its economic development." (pp.19-21)

Renegotiating the Agreed Framework

"The Agreed Framework should be renegotiated to provide for the construction of one light water reactor, not two, and the substitution of conventional energy alternatives for the electricity that would have been supplied by the second reactor. North Korea would have to reaffirm its commitment to other existing provisions of the accord… In addition, North Korea would have to accept new provisions that would end its effort to produce enriched uranium under adequate verification…" (pp. 21-22)

Resuming Missile Negotiations

"The United States should resume negotiations with North Korea to end both the further development of missile capabilities that could threaten the United States and the export of its missiles, missile technology and missile components to other states. Priority should be given to extending the North Korean moratorium on missile testing in effect since September, 1999... In addition to multi-year U.S. food aid, energy aid and other economic incentives for a missile agreement, the United States should support `multilateral financial aid to develop new industries that would provide employment for the workers displaced from existing missile factories..." (pp. 22-23)

Ending the Korean War

"Half a century after the end of the Korean War, it is time for the United States to conclude peace agreements with the other two parties to the 1953 Armistice Agreement, North Korea and China, provided that North Korea agrees to conclude a separate agreement with South Korea, which did not sign the Armistice…" (pp. 23-24)

Replacing the Armistice Machinery
"The Military Armistice Commission set up in 1953 should be replaced with new peacekeeping machinery, together with companion steps to dissolve the United Nations Command. The United States should explore the October 9, 1998, North Korean proposal for the creation of a Mutual Security Assurance Commission in place of the Military Armistice Commission and the U.N. Command, consisting of U.S., South Korean and North Korean generals..." (p. 24)

Lowering the U.S. Military Profile

"Before opposition to the U.S. military presence reaches serious proportions and leads to significant pressures for disengagement, the United States should defuse this opposition by lowering the U.S. military profile in South Korea and offering to make changes in the size, character and location of U.S. deployments." (pp. 24-25)

Supporting North Korean Economic Development

"As progress on resolving security issues moves forward, the United States should support economic regeneration and growth in North Korea and, in conjunction with this support, encourage North Korea to carry forward its recent economic reform initiatives with technical assistance from international financial institutions..." (pp. 25-26)

Reducing Migration to China

"The United States and the international community should take urgent steps to relieve the plight of North Korean migrants into China and reduce the flow of future migration through humanitarian and economic assistance measures in North Korea…" (pp.26-27)

Keeping the Threat in Perspective

" Projections of an imminent North Korean capability… to develop and deploy long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the continental United States … ignore the technical constraints on the North Korean missile program." In the only test of the Taepodong 1 so far conducted, in 1998, the third stage failed. Both the Taepodong 1 and the bigger, more complex Taepodong 2 now in development, which has not been tested, "would have to include a third stage, successfully tested, to achieve the longest ranges usually attributed to them." (pp. 9-10)