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Cuba Staff Articles
Wayne S. Smith
Response to Cohen column
Why the crackdown in Cuba?
Dismal diplomacy
Can new justice tell patriotism
from terror?
Fidel Castro is no Osama Bin
Laden
In reaching out to Cuba, Carter
can bring reform
Who is a
terrorist?
Anya K. Landau
Too much TV/Radio Martí
static in Miami
How engaging Cuba can help us
It's not the president who needs
them
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Wayne S.
Smith and Chloe Schwabe
|
Bush Call for Regime
Change in Cuba Violates OAS Charter
On the
basis of badly flawed intelligence, much of it from Iraqi exiles who wanted
the U.S. to invade, and in defiance of the United Nations, the Bush Administration
invaded Iraq to bring about regime change. There turned out to be no weapons
of mass destruction and no "imminent threat" from the existing
regime. But in the ensuing invasion and occupation, more than 500 American
soldiers have been killed and thousands wounded so far, along with many
thousands of Iraqi civilians - and there is no end in sight.
Now the Bush Administration is planning to bring about regime change just
to our south - though, it insists (so far at least) that it will do so
by peaceful means. It has virtually closed off channels for dialogue with
the Cuban government, even in early January of this year suspending the
twice-yearly migration talks. You don't seek dialogue, you see, with a
government you intend to oust, and regime change is now the avowed objective
of the Bush Administration in Cuba. As Assistant Secretary of State Roger
Noriega put it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 2
of last year, "the president is determined to see the end of the
Castro regime and the dismantling of the apparatus that has kept him in
office for so long."
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
To achieve that goal, the President has now appointed a Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba 1) "to bring about the expeditious end
of the dictatorship" [1] and 2) to develop a plan to provide assistance
to the Cuban people in a post-Castro Cuba. Commission members include
all cabinet level agencies. The core agencies responsible for its day-to-day
operations, however, include the Secretary of State (its chairman); the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; the Secretary of the Treasury;
the Secretary of Commerce; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Assistant
to the President of National Security Affairs; and the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Secretary
of State Powell has appointed Assistant Secretary Roger Noriega to oversee
the day-to-day operations of the Commission.
Questionable Goal:
Regime Change
Now, while it may seem premature to plan for assistance to the Cuban people
in a post-Castro period, no one can object to the concept, assuming that
the Cuban people and authorities, when the times comes, wish to receive
such assistance. Bringing about "the end of the Castro regime"
is something else again. The Bush Administration insists that this will
be brought about by peaceful means, and mentions assistance to the internal
opposition as one of the principal instruments to achieve its goal. But
that is still in blatant violation of the principle of non-intervention
in the internal affairs of another state, embodied, for example, in the
Charter of the OAS [2]. That appears to be a matter of no concern to the
Administration - not surprisingly, since its attitude toward international
law and treaty restrictions can best be described as utterly contemptuous.
There is nothing in international law, in the Charter of the United Nations
or in the Charter of the OAS, that would give the U.S. the right to change
the government in Cuba. Quite the contrary. But the Bush Administration
goes even further; it insists that "neither would it accept a successor
regime."
As Mr. Adolofo Franco,
the USAID official who would be responsible for providing assistance to
Cuba in the supposed post-Castro period, put it at a recent conference
at the University of Iowa: "The President has said that we will not
accept a successor regime. It is the law. It is embodied in the Helms-Burton
Act" [3]
Now, it is true that
the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 lays down a whole series of conditions that
must be met by any Cuban government before we can lift the embargo. Those
include democratic elections, that neither Castro be a part of the new
government, that the new government be moving toward a free market economy,
that it have stopped jamming Radio Marti (!) and a series of other things.
But lifting the embargo is one thing, dealing with, negotiating with,
a future Cuban government is quite another. And there is no provision
in the Helms-Burton Act that would prevent us from dealing with a future
Cuban government in the same way the U.S. government dealt with the present
Cuban government from 1996 until the Bush Administration decided to close
off dialogue. The interests sections, after all, are supposed to be channels
for communication, even with the embargo still in place.
Policy Instruments
And how is the Administration to bring about "the end of the Castro
regime?" According to the State Department's announcement concerning
the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, there are three principal
instruments.
-- Travel
Crackdown. First, it will "deny revenues to the regime."
Clearly, since the U.S. buys nothing from Cuba, this will be principally
a matter of tightening up on travel controls, so that fewer Americans
travel to Cuba and spend money. But the effect of this is likely to be
marginal at best. Of the 1,900,000 foreign visitors who went to Cuba last
year, only some 190,000 were Americans and less than 20% of that number
would likely be affected by the Administration's crackdown on travel,
i.e. by denial of licenses under the new and more stringent guidelines.
The resulting two to three percent reduction ( if that) in Cuban tourist
revenues might be inconvenient, but it certainly would not result in "the
end of the Castro regime."
Treasury Secretary John Snow's speech in Miami on February 9 was symptomatic
of the Administration's effort to use travel reduction as a weapon. He
spoke of "cracking down" and "cutting off American dollars
headed to Castro" by making it illegal for Americans to deal with
a series of Cuban-owned travel agencies without a license. But in fact,
all American travel providers already must have licenses to deal with
those companies, so despite its tough tone, the speech in fact changed
little at all.
And there are definite
limits as to how far the Administration can go in limiting travel. The
great majority of those who travel are Cuban-Americans going back to visit
families. They have made it clear that they want to continue that practice.
Any effort to prevent them from doing so would risk a strong counter reaction
from the Cuban-American community itself - exactly the community President
Bush is supposedly courting with his "get rid of Castro" rhetoric.
Even so, the Administration
has recently hinted at the possibility of reducing remittances to families
in Cuba and cutting back on the number of charter flights to reduce travel.
[4] But the result of that would be that people would simply then travel
through Nassau, Jamaica and Mexico. And if the Administration tried to
cut back on the remittances Cuban-Americans send to their families on
the island, those here would simply revert to sending the money in through
"mules," or couriers, as they did in years past. The amount
of travel or money going in would not be drastically reduced. The Administration
would, in effect, incur the wrath of the great majority in the Cuban-American
community to little avail.
-- International
Support. Second, the State Department announcement suggests that the
end of the Castro regime will be hastened by "encouraging international
solidarity."
The idea, supposedly, is that we get other nations to join with us in
trying to force Castro from power. But this is simply wishful thinking.
Other nations, and especially those belonging to the European Union, do
increasingly criticize the Castro government for its repressive actions
against its own citizens, notably the massive arrest of the dissidents
and the execution of the three would-be hijackers back in March of last
year. But they
have not joined - and will not join -- with us in a trade embargo against
Cuba. On the contrary, at last November's Ibero-American Summit, Latin
American governments, joined by Spain and Portugal, condemned "extraterritorial
laws and measures that are contrary to international law"
and
therefore called on the U.S. to end enforcement of the Helms-Burton law
(the same one to which the Bush Administration says we must adhere in
rejecting "a successor regime.") And, of course, the vote against
the U.S. embargo becomes more and more lopsided every year. This past
year, the vote in the General Assembly was 179 against the embargo, only
three in favor. Only Israel and the Marshall Islands voted with the U.S.
- and Israel is one of the most active states in trading with and investing
in Cuba! In other words, it votes with us, but does not cooperate with
our embargo.
Few if any cooperate
with our embargo. Even fewer will join us in efforts to oust the Castro
government. As indicated above, this violates international norms, represents
blatant intervention in the internal affairs of another state, and is
exactly the kind of extraterritorial measure rejected by the Ibero-American
Summit.
Cuba's relations with
most of the Latin American states, moreover, have actually improved. They
do not wish to emulate its political or economic system, but having suffered
the consequences of the neo-liberal economic theories encouraged by the
United States, and resenting what they see as its high-handed unilateralism,
they feel a certain sympathy for Cuba's defiance of the Colossus of the
North. Thus, U.S. efforts to bring an end to the Castro regime are likely
to excite more support for Cuba than for the U.S., especially as they
directly contradict the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs
- a sacrosanct principle for the Latin Americans.
-- Support for
Dissidents. Third, and finally, the Administration cites "support
for the opposition" as a key means of bringing down the Castro regime.
But this also is wishful thinking. In their efforts to expand the parameters
for freedom of expression and civil rights in Cuba, the dissidents deserve
our moral support and expressions of solidarity. But they do not have
and are not likely to have the strength or following even to think of
bringing down the government. Nor, as most, including the dissidents themselves,
see it, is that their role. Thus, when the Bush Administration says it
will use them to bring down the Cuban government, it places them in a
false position. And it does them a distinct disservice, making them thus
appear, wrongly, as the paid agents of a foreign government working for
the overthrow of their own. This places them not only in a false position,
but in one that is most dangerous. It was precisely this perception that
helped lead, however unfairly and unfortunately, to the massive arrests
of the dissidents last March.
Wayne Smith has discussed this dilemma with Vladimiro Roca, Oswaldo Paya,
Elizardo Sanchez and other dissidents during recent visits to Cuba. He
found that all had deep reservations about the Bush Administration's approach.
All specifically questioned the efficacy of a commission designed to plan
a transition in Cuba. "Such a plan is up to the Cuban people,"
Roca said, "not to the United States."
All said they would accept no assistance whatever from the United States
and, as Paya put it, "most of that money will stay in the pockets
of people in Miami, but the very fact that it is on the books encourages
the Cuban government to accuse us, unfairly, of receiving assistance from
a foreign power. U.S. talk of assistance, in short, doesn't help us; it
harms us."
Obviously. Unfortunately,
that seems not to have dawned on the Bush Administration or its minions
in the State Department.
Unrealistic Expectations?
If none of its policy
instruments is capable of bringing about regime change, on what does the
Administration base its expectation that the Castro regime is coming to
an end? Again, largely, it would appear, on wishful thinking. As Mr. Franco
put it at the Iowa University Conference: "The President is convinced
that given growing economic problems in Cuba and increasing opposition,
the Castro regime is entering its final phase."
Cuba faces serious
economic problems to be sure, resulting largely from the fact that in
response to the Helms-Burton Act and other factors, it put the brakes
to a reform process begun in 1993 and has never reactivated that process.
The reforms had turned the economy around, i.e., stimulated impressive
growth. In not going forward with them, Castro appears to be trying to
maintain a certain ideological purity, or, phrased another way, to give
control priority over economic pragmatism. But rather than allow continued
economic deterioration, one must assume he would at some point turn again
to reforms. As one elderly Cuban put it recently in a conversation with
Wayne Smith: "Things cannot go on the way they are. Either we have
the biological solution [i.e. Castro dies] or things get so bad that he
has no alternative to revived reforms. I expect the latter, a new reform
process."
There is as yet no
indication that Castro is moving in that direction. The point is, however,
that between collapse and reform, Castro is more likely to choose the
latter.
Castro is now 77 and
of course is not immortal. As one reads the papers prepared by the University
of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies on a "democratic
transition" in Cuba, and listens to the statements of Administration
spokesmen such as Otto Reich (special presidential envoy for the Western
Hemisphere), Adolfo Franco and Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega,
it is clear that their expectation is that a regime friendly to the United
States will emerge and invite the U.S. to help rebuild and refashion Cuba
- in its own image, they would probably hope - exactly the kind of golden
vision painted for the Administration by the Iraqi exiles before the U.S.
invasion ran head-on into reality.
What is far more likely
is that Castro would be replaced by a transitional collective leadership
drawn from the present power structure. Raul Castro might well be called
President, but he would likely serve more as a chairman of the board.
And the board would likely include men such as Ricardo Alarcon (now the
President of the National Assembly), Carlos Laje (who now directs the
economy from within the Politburo), and Army General Colome Ibarra. Indeed,
the transitional leadership might include two or three of Cuba's top generals,
for the Army would be the key institution. The crucial thing is that this
transitional leadership, if it wished to retain the support of the Cuban
people, would have to move ahead rapidly with reforms. Castro has the
moral authority to hold out against them, but no one else in the leadership
does. And the Cuban people do want change -- and an economy that works
again.
All things being equal,
this transitional leadership would probably be inclined to have a constructive
relationship with the United States. Unfortunately, the hostile attitude
of the Bush Administration almost precludes that, especially since the
Administration has made it clear that a "successor regime" would
also be unacceptable - and this would be exactly that - a successor regime.
In a Blind Alley?
And so, the Bush Administration's Cuba policy would seem to leave us in
a blind alley. We have virtually abandoned efforts at problem-solving
through dialogue. The Administration's objective, rather, is to get rid
of the Castro regime. But none of its means of doing so is even remotely
capable of achieving that objective. At the same time, the more hostile
and threatening our posture, the greater the tensions between the two
countries and the greater the likelihood of some kind of unfortunate incident.
And if we go by what the Administration says, that hostility - that determination
to bring about regime change - will most likely continue even after Castro
passes from the scene. Thus, it is a policy which leads no where but which
by again ignoring international norms is likely to cause the United States
new problems - especially in Latin America.
Finally, this is a
policy designed by and put forward by a distinct minority. Polls indicate
the majority of American citizens want to reduce or eliminate controls
on travel to Cuba, not increase them. Indeed, clear majorities in the
House and Senate, reflecting the will of the American people, voted to
do exactly that this past fall, only to have the resulting amendments
stripped out in blatant violation of the established procedural rules.
And why does the majority wish to neutralize travel controls? Because
they understand that we are likely to accomplish far more in terms of
encouraging a more open society in Cuba by reducing tensions and increasing
contacts between the two countries. As some in the Congress put it, if
the confrontational tactics of the Bush Administration did not actually
provoke the arrest of the dissidents last March, the crackdown was a vivid
demonstration of the failure of those tactics.
Indeed, this is a
policy not even supported by the majority in the Cuban-American community.
Polls there indicate some 55% believe the embargo is a failed policy and
that we should be looking for a new one. An even larger percentage express
determination to continue to travel to Cuba to see their families.
The Cuba policy now
being put forward by the President, in short, is one without public support.
It is applauded by only a handful of people in Miami and a few of their
representatives in Washington. More than anything else, it represents
a perversion of democracy.
End Notes
[1.] Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba, U.S. Department of State, forwarded on January
22, 2004.
[2] See, for example,
OAS Charter, Chapter II, Article 3 (a) International law is the standard
of conduct of States in their reciprocal relations; (b) International
order consists essentially of respect for the personality, sovereignty
and independence of States, and the faithful fulfillment of obligations
derived from treaties and other sources of international law; (e) Every
state has the right to choose, without external interference, its political,
economic, and social system and to organize itself in the way best suited
to it, and has the duty to abstain from intervening in the affairs of
another state. Subject to the foregoing, the American States shall cooperate
fully among themselves, independently of the nature of their political,
economic and social systems [emphasis added].
As pointed out by lawyers at the OAS, moreover, although Cuban membership
in the OAS was suspended at the Punta del Este Conference in January of
1962, for legal purposes, Cuba remains a member, and is therefore due
the same obligations for non-interference in its internal affairs as other
members.
[3] Mr. Adolfo Franco,
during his luncheon address at the Symposium "Whither Goes Cuba?
Prospects for Economic and Social Development" at the University
of Iowa, February 6, 2004.
[4] See an article
in The Miami Herald on February 16 entitled "Money", by David
Ovale.
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