Center for International Policy

As printed in
The South Florida Sun-Sentinel
January 12, 2005

Our Own Devil's Island

By Wayne S. Smith

Reports coming out of Guantanamo continue to horrify. The International Red Cross speaks of the systematic abuse of prisoners "tantamount to torture." FBI agents describe detainees chained hand and foot in a fetal position and left for up to 24 hours without food or water, often having urinated or defecated on themselves. And agents also confirm stories from the prisoners themselves of beatings and other abuses often leading to serious injury or even death.

A nightmare. Can we really be talking about the treatment of prisoners on an American military base? A base that some are now calling "America's Devil's Island."

And a Devil's Island that, if the Bush Administration has its way, will become a permanent symbol of our descent into inhumanity. The decision has been made, you see, to construct a special facility at Guantanamo - one where some 200 so-called "illegal enemy combatants" are to be held indefinitely. The government has no evidence of illegal conduct on their part, but judges them, on the basis of evidence it never intends to present, to be a danger and so will continue to hold them - without any form of due process whatever. Indeed, the U.S. government argues that the Geneva Conventions do not even apply to these prisoners. Held forever for reasons never explained! It is a scenario right out of Franz Kafka.

I read all this with a profound sense of loss and sadness. The sadness of an old man with memories of more hopeful days - days when one could foresee sensible, humane solutions. Days when one could assume our country would do the right thing. No more.

As we first re-engaged with Cuba back in 1977, we began to discuss a whole series of problems that stood between us. One of these of course was the status of the Guantanamo Naval Base. As the American side made clear, so long as Cuba was the ally of our principal global rival, the Soviet Union, the U.S. would be most reluctant to negotiate the base's return to Cuba - lest that give the Soviets some advantage. At the same time, in various conversations with Ramon Sanchez Parodi, the first Chief of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, we acknowledged that at some point in the future - albeit probably a distant one -Guantanamo, rightfully, would be returned to Cuba. During one of these conversations, a golden vision emerged as to how that might happen. I don't remember who came up with it first, but we all thought it a grand idea and vowed to keep it in mind for the future. It was that at an appropriate moment, Guantanamo would be returned to Cuba, which would then turn it into a major international research and medical center, perhaps specializing in the treatment of diseases prevalent in the Caribbean. There'd be doctors and patients from the other Caribbean countries and from the United States as well as from Cuba. The animosities of the past would be replaced by a cooperative effort to serve humankind.

Unfortunately, re-engagement did not result in any greater harmony and new problems arose between us. Neither side was without blame, but blame aside, the result was that even with the end of the Cold War, the golden vision remained as distant as ever.

But for a brief moment after 9/11, it seemed the two sides might be brought together in a common cause. Cuba, after all, was part of the almost universal surge of sympathy and support for the U.S. following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington that day. Ironically, it seemed that tragedy might result in a world in which the vast majority of nations, including Cuba, would work together, in harmony with the U.S., against the terrorist threat.

Immediately after 9/11, Cuba condemned the attacks and expressed its solidarity with the American people. In his speech on September 22, 2001, moreover, Castro pledged that Cuban territory would never be used for terrorist actions against the people of the United States. He also reiterated Cuba's "willingness to cooperate with all countries in the total eradication of terrorism."

Cuba signed all 12 U.N. anti-terrorist resolutions and offered to sign agreements with the United States looking to cooperation against terrorists.

But the Bush administration had come to office committed to regime change in Cuba. Rather than exploring Cuban overtures offering cooperation, it hardened its position, reiterating that its objective was to bring down the Castro regime. Forget about cooperation against the terrorists!

And by invading Iraq in virtual defiance of the U.N., with a sneer for "old Europe," it squandered the opportunity to lead a world united against terrorism. For Iraq had nothing to do with terrorism. Saddam Hussein was a thug and a tyrant, yes, but he was not an ally of Osama bin Laden. On the contrary, the two were rivals. Iraq had no part whatever in the 9/11 attacks or in any other terrorist efforts against the United States. We went to war against a country that had not attacked us and in the process lost the support of much of the world. Support was further undercut by the images of abused prisoners coming out of Abu Ghraib, and other military prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan, and out of Guantanamo.

Is there any hope that the abuses will not continue? One cannot be reassured by the elusive testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 6 of Alberto Gonzalez, the man whose memos opened the way to the worst of abuses. The Geneva Conventions, he said, would be honored, but then added, "whenever they apply."

And you can imagine who will decide that. "Torture and abuse," he went on to say, " will not be tolerated by this administration."

Ah, but you see, it's all a matter of definitions! And Mr. Gonzalez apparently doesn't define being shackled hand and foot in a fetal position as torture or abuse!

What has happened to us as a country? That this man could be confirmed as our Attorney General!

Now a Senior Fellow with the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C., Wayne Smith is a Marine veteran of the Korean War. He was Director of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State, 1977-79, and Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana from 1979 until 1982.