Program description | Budget | Other sites

Program description:

The 1999 Congressional Presentation for the State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL) lists three objectives for narcotics control efforts in Colombia:

1. Eliminate the cultivation of opium poppy, coca leaf and marijuana;
2. Strengthen host nation capabilities to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations and prevent their resurgence; and
3. Destroy the cocaine and heroin processing industries and stop the diversion of licit chemicals into illicit channels.¹

Colombia is currently the largest recipient of aid through the INC program. The Colombian government will receive INC assistance valued at more than $80 million in 1998, more than one-third of the program's worldwide budget.

Police and military aid

Most of this assistance will support Colombian National Police (CNP) and military units involved in drug interdiction and eradication. A much smaller amount goes to Colombian government agencies that enforce money-laundering and asset-forfeiture laws and investigate drug-trafficking organizations.

The CNP has primary responsibility for Colombia's interdiction and eradication programs. Its Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DANTI) carries out most anti-narcotics missions. The INC program's "major thrust" is to support the DANTI's aerial drug eradication (fumigation) efforts, disruption of drug-trafficking organizations and interdiction of precursor chemicals and cocaine laboratories.

Colombia's armed forces frequently support the police on counternarcotics missions. However, according to the State Department's March 1998 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), military-police counterdrug cooperation "was, for the most part, dependent on CNP requests for assistance and military ability to meet those requests. In most cases cooperation took the form of multi­day deployments in areas where police felt under a significant guerrilla threat."²

The military, the INCSR points out, carries out some counterdrug operations with no police involvement. The armed forces "undertook independent counternarcotics operations in 1997 in order to deprive their primary target, the guerrilla forces, of a source of financing." Meanwhile Colombia's Air Force "continues to attempt, with limited success, to track and force down trafficker aircraft."³

Much of the INC program's assistance for the DANTI seeks to improve the police unit's air capability. The program paid for the training of 153 police anti-narcotics aviators, mechanics and logisticians in 1997 (81 for ground training, 41 pilots and 31 technicians). INC also provided parts and fuel, as well as instructor pilots and technical advisors, for the 56 helicopters and 17 fixed-wing aircraft of the police force's anti-narcotics air wing. The INC interregional aviation program employed an additional 27 U.S.-owned aircraft (10 T-65 spray planes, 5 OV-10 Bronco spray planes, and 12 helicopters) for narcotics eradication missions in Colombia.⁴

The DANTI will continue to be the principal recipient of INC assistance to Colombia in 1999. The INC project "will provide aviation parts in support of the CNP Air Wing, augmentation of base facilities, training and advisory services, and fund many operational costs."⁵

Assistance to military units," reads the 1999 INC Congressional Presentation,

will be directed to those activities that support the CNP's counternarcotics efforts. The Colombian Air Force will receive maintenance assistance and training for its helicopter fleet and fixed-wing C-130, OV-10, and A-37 units, as warranted, to advance the overall counternarcotics effort. The Colombian Navy and its Marine branch is expected to manage a counternarcotics campaign on the rivers and the coast. Equipment, training, and technical assistance will be provided to Colombian riverine and coast guard harbor patrol programs.⁶

Blackhawks and equipment upgrades

Of the $80 million or more in INC funds destined for Colombia in 1998, at least $50 million was originally intended to buy, repair or upgrade aircraft for the CNP. The committee report which accompanied the 1998 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-118) instructed that $36 million of the 1998 INC account be used to buy three UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters for Colombia's National Police. An additional $14 million will be spent to upgrade ten to twelve UH-1H Huey utility helicopters, and Colombia will share a $4 million region-wide account for repairs to C-26 aircraft. The remaining $30 million will pay for the regular INC program in Colombia, including the police and military aid described in the previous section.

The State Department resisted the $36 million Blackhawk helicopter transfer, arguing that it would displace other activities:

State may not have adequate funding support for all its programs in Colombia in fiscal year 1998 because State will spend about $50 million to help the Colombians purchase three new Blackhawk helicopters and upgrade UH-1H helicopters, in addition to the regular INC Program. State officials told us the fiscal year 1998 INC Program for Colombia is currently under review.⁷

Indeed, R. Rand Beers, the acting secretary of state for INL, warned a congressional committee in March 1998 that "INL would be hamstrung by the $36 million directed in report language ... to be spent on 3 Black Hawk helicopters."⁸ In fact, Beers predicted that the $30 million originally estimated for the regular 1998 INC program in Colombia will be increased significantly. "We estimate these program increases at $21 million," he told the committee, "and that is a conservative estimate."⁹

According to a compromise agreement worked out in June 1998 between Congress and the State Department, Colombia's National Police will not receive Blackhawks through the INC program this year. Instead, INL will deliver six Bell 212 helicopters -- three in 1998 and three in 1999. Of the $36 million that would have gone to the Blackhawks, $13 million will go to the Colombia INC program and $23 million to the Bolivia INC program.¹⁰

It is not clear how much the Bell 212 helicopters will cost or whether the INC program will be used to pay for them. Instead of being drawn from the INC budget, the helicopters may be delivered via an emergency drawdown before the end of the 1998 fiscal year (September 30, 1998).

[On July 22, 1998, Sen. Mike DeWine (R-OH) and Rep. Bill McCollum (R-FL) introduced H.R. 4300, the "Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act of 1998," a bill which -- among other things -- would fund the transfer of six Blackhawks for the Colombian National Police at a cost of $96 million. Click for more information about this legislation.]

The "Huey upgrades" and "C-26 Support" accounts will pay for improvements and repairs to helicopters and planes transferred to Colombia by special presidential drawdown authority in September 1996. This equipment is either out of service or lacking key capabilities.

Interregional Aviation and the cost of eradication

As indicated above, the INC Interregional Aviation program maintains 27 U.S.-owned aircraft (10 T-65 spray planes, 5 OV-10 Bronco spray planes, and 12 helicopters) in Colombia. They are mainly used for narcotics eradication, though "resources are also being used for interdiction missions." Colombia continues to receive "a high level of support" for "flight operations and instruction, maintenance, quality control and spare parts."¹¹

"In October 1996," the GAO reports, "the State Department, through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, decided to significantly increase the level of U.S. support for and participation in Colombia's aerial eradication of coca and opium poppy."¹² Aircraft on drug-crop eradication missions are flown by U.S. contract personnel escorted by police aircraft. This is a risky task, as most of the areas being fumigated are controlled by Colombia's FARC and ELN guerrillas. "Spray operations are increasingly hazardous," notes the March 1998 INCSR, "due to the need to fly at low altitude coupled with the threat of hostile ground fire. A total of 94 aircraft were hit by hostile fire in 1997, 51 of them while involved in or supporting spray operations."¹³

The interregional aviation program grew rapidly during 1997, while becoming increasingly dependent on contract personnel. A February 1998 GAO report documents the increased size and role of private contractors in the drug eradication effort:

During fiscal year 1997, State increased the number of aircraft and U.S. contractor personnel involved in the aerial eradication program. As of July 1997, 112 contractor personnel - 9 management and administrative staff, 56 pilots and operations staff, and 47 maintenance staff - were in Colombia. The contractor personnel's role also changed from being primarily responsible for training Colombian pilots and mechanics to directly maintaining aircraft and actively participating in planning and conducting eradication operations. The State Department estimates that the direct costs of supporting the contractor in Colombia increased from about $6.6 million in fiscal year 1996 to $14 million in fiscal year 1997."¹⁴

Citing poor coordination within the State Department and a failure to account for unforeseen costs, the GAO contends that eradication efforts have gone well over budget and taken resources from other INC assistance to Colombia.

"In July 1997, the Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section informed the State Department that because of the expanded aerial eradication effort, it had to reallocate $11 million from other planned counternarcotics programs. The Section went on to report that it could not fully support programs for Colombian police interdiction units, demand reduction, and efforts to strengthen Colombian law enforcement institutions. The Section also reported its concerns about adequate funding for these activities in fiscal years 1998 and 1999."¹⁵

Meanwhile, critics of the program's reliance on fumigation contend that this practice frequently destroys legal crops, may cause health and environmental problems, causes displacement of local populations, and has little effect on the amount of land under illicit cultivation.

Effect of decertification

Colombia's narcotics decertification in 1996 and 1997 had little effect on INC aid to Colombia, as counternarcotics assistance is usually exempt from the aid cutoff that accompanies a decertification. Decertification did, however, end up delaying or canceling about $35 million in U.S. counternarcotics aid through several programs, including $1.1 million in INC funding that was delayed for eight months in 1996.

After the first decertification in March 1996, the State Department and other executive-branch agencies, citing "interagency legal concerns as well as differences within the State Department," took about eight months to decide what aid could and could not be provided to Colombia. "During this period," the GAO reports, "the United States did not provide Colombia with some aviation spare parts, vehicles, or ammunition and funding to repair a Colombian counternarcotics aircraft."¹⁶

The end result:

• Up to $30 million in counternarcotics Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was delayed until August 1997, when it was released by a special presidential waiver.
• About $1.4 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds were delayed until August 1997, when they were released by the same presidential waiver. This funding was then canceled, because it could not be spent by the end of fiscal year 1997 (the government's fiscal years end on September 30).
• $2.5 million in counternarcotics Foreign Military Sales (FMS) were freed in November 1996 when the State Department determined that the decertification did not stop the sales from going forward.
• $1.1 million in INC funding were freed in November 1996 when the State Department determined that the decertification did not stop the grant from going forward.

Thanks to increased INC funding, however, overall counter-drug aid to Colombia's security forces underwent a substantial net increase during the country's two years of decertification. In its response to a GAO report on the matter, the State Department stated that it sharply increased 1997 INC in part as a response to decertification: "Due recognition should be given to the fact that the primary alternative funding source was the State Department's INC funds. Our funding for Colombia more than doubled in 1997, in part to make up for shortfalls caused by the cutoff of FMF."¹⁷ Indeed, overall counter-drug aid to Colombia underwent a substantial net increase during the country's two years of decertification.

End-use monitoring agreement and status of aid to the Colombian Army

As the human rights crisis in Colombia escalates, assistance to the Colombian Army has become increasingly controversial. A provision in the 1997 and 1998 foreign aid appropriations bills, known popularly as the "Leahy Amendment" after its sponsor, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), prohibited the obligation of INC and other aid to units of a country's security forces when there is credible evidence that a unit is committing gross human rights violations with impunity.

The State Department decided to enforce the law by requiring Colombia to sign an end-use monitoring agreement to ensure that aid does not go to units with questionable human rights records. The Colombian police were cleared to receive aid in February 1997. The Colombian Defense Ministry signed an end-use monitoring agreement in August 1997, and the Colombian Navy and Air Force were certified to receive aid soon afterward. The Colombian Army, however, has not yet complied fully with the terms of the end-use monitoring agreement; as of June 1998 only two army units have been identified as eligible to receive U.S. assistance, and these have not been certified. As it is funded through a different appropriations law, however, the Defense Department has trained Colombian army units through its counternarcotics and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs.

Budget:

(Thousands of U.S. dollars)

Other sites:

• General Accounting Office. Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges. Report GAO/NSIAD-98-60, February 1998.
  • Plain text
  • Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) format
• Statement by R. Rand Beers, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC (3/31/98).
• "U.S. Counternarcotics Policy Toward Colombia." Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Robert S. Gelbard, Washington, DC, February 14, 1997.
• "U.S. Counternarcotics Policy Toward Colombia." Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Robert S. Gelbard, Washington, DC, September 11, 1996.

Sources:

¹ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1998): 29.

² United States, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Washington, March 1998, March 2, 1998 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1997_narc_report/index.html>.

³ Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1998.

⁴ Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1998.

⁵ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 30.

⁶ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 30.

⁷ United States, General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges, document number GAO/NSIAD-98-60 (Washington: GAO, February 1998): 35 <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=waisback.access.gpo.gov&filename=ns98060.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao> Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) format <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=waisback.access.gpo.gov&filename=ns98060.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao>.

⁸ Beers.

⁹ R. Rand Beers, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC. March 31, 1998 <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980331_beers_hirc.html>.

¹⁰ Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, United States Department of State, letter to Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, June 19, 1998.

¹¹ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 95.

¹² General Accounting Office 8-9, 33-4.

¹³ Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1998.

¹⁴ General Accounting Office 8-9, 33-4.

¹⁵ General Accounting Office 8-9, 33-4.

¹⁶ General Accounting Office 4, 7.

¹⁷ General Accounting Office 44.

¹⁸ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1997): 30.

¹⁹ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 32.

²⁰ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1999): 27.

²¹ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 2000): 34