U.S. operational presence in Colombia Aerial eradication Assistance to the Colombian National Police Assistance to the Colombian Armed Forces A new aid package Counternarcotics battalion Riverine program Air force assistance Intelligence-sharing Military reform

Other assistance Training and exercises Arms transfers The Leahy Law and the vetting process Counternarcotics and counterinsurgency

Colombia today receives more U.S. police and military assistance than the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean combined. With nearly $300 million in new weapons, equipment, training and services, Colombia was the world’s third-largest recipient of grant U.S. security assistance in 1999.¹

The main source of cocaine and an important source of heroin entering the United States, Colombia also faces growing internal political violence. The worsening crisis, along with the 1998 exit of drug money-tainted President Ernesto Samper, has led the U.S. government to increase both its military operating presence and its assistance to Colombia’s security forces.

U.S. operational presence in Colombia

Roughly 250 to 300 U.S. military personnel -- largely Special Operations Forces -- are present in Colombia on a typical day. The Defense Department maintains that they do not participate or accompany Colombian forces in military operations against armed groups or drug traffickers.² Instead, they carry out training  or fulfill counter-drug detection, monitoring, and intelligence-gathering missions, most of them secret.

The Defense Department maintains five radar facilities on Colombian soil to detect drug-smuggling activity. Three ground-based radars (GBRs) are located in the southern Amazon basin area at Leticia, Amazonas department; Marandúa, Vichada department; and San José del Guaviare, Guaviare department. Two other radar sites, part of the U.S. Air Force’s Caribbean Basin Radar Network, are located at Ríohacha in the northern department of La Guajira, and on the island of San Andrés in the Caribbean near Nicaragua.³ In report language accompanying its version of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the House Armed Services Committee recommended the establishment of a fourth GBR at Tres Esquinas, Putumayo. The final version of the bill, however, did not include this recommendation.

Though the sites are located on Colombian military installations, they are manned by U.S. personnel who are responsible for guaranteeing their own security. “A typical detachment,” according to a 1997 U.S. Southern Command (Southcom) publication, “consists of 36 to 45 personnel. Perhaps 30 to 40 percent are radar technicians. Since GBRs are essentially self-contained units, everyone from cooks to security guards are among those based at the sites.... Duty at these remote posts varies from two weeks to six months, depending on service status, rank and specialty.”⁴

The non-military U.S. counter-drug presence is also significant. It incorporates, among others, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents assisting Colombian police investigations, and contractor pilots spraying herbicides on coca and opium poppy fields in southern Colombia.

Since the mid-1990s, fighting has intensified between the Colombian government, right-wing paramilitary groups, and three leftist guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the much smaller People’s Liberation Army (EPL). Many policymakers are concerned about the growing presence of U.S. military personnel in the midst of this violent internal conflict. Reflecting this concern, in the 2000 NDAA Congress requires the Secretary of Defense to submit, on January 1 of each year, a report detailing the number of members of the U.S. armed forces deployed or assigned to duty in Colombia at any time during the preceding year, the length and purpose of their deployments or assignments, and the associated costs and force-protection risks.

Map image copyright © 1999, Microsoft Corp.

Aerial eradication

The International Narcotics Control (INC) program, which is managed by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), supports a large aerial eradication program. The program sprays glyphosate, a water-soluble herbicide, on coca fields in the southern departments of Guaviare and Caquetá. A smaller program to fumigate opium poppy elsewhere in Colombia began in November 1998.⁵ Additional coca fumigation is planned for the department of Putumayo, further south along the border with Ecuador, but has been delayed, according to the State Department’s February 1999 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), “by the threat of guerrilla activity.”⁶

U.S. contractor pilots flying State Department-owned T-65 and OV-10 “Bronco” spray planes fumigated over 65,000 hectares (160,618 acres) of coca in 1998.⁷ The spray-plane pilots, as well as several trainers and maintenance workers, are employed by Dyncorp, a Virginia-based private defense contractor. Between eighty and ninety contract personnel are stationed in Colombia either temporarily or permanently.⁸ The State Department estimates that the aerial eradication program in Colombia may cost as much as $68 million in 1999, an increase of about 350 percent over the $19.6 million spent in 1996.⁹

A-10 "Warthog" attack aircraft may be enlisted in the aerial spray operation in the year 2000. The A-10, according to a U.S. Air Force fact sheet, is "specially designed for close air support of ground forces."¹⁰ According to the conference committee report accompanying the 2000 Defense Department Appropriations bill, the chief counternarcotics officials at the Departments of State and Defense are to submit a report to Congress on the cost-effectiveness of transferring refurbished A-10s "for the Department of State's coca eradication mission in Colombia."

The spray program involves some risk, as Colombian guerrilla groups are present in most of the areas being fumigated. Aircraft on spray operations were hit by hostile fire, most of it small-arms fire, fifty-one times in 1997 and forty-eight times in 1998.¹¹ For their protection, U.S.-funded Colombian police planes and helicopters escort the contract pilots on their spray sorties.

Critics of the program contend that glyphosate fumigation frequently destroys legal crops, may cause health and environmental problems, causes displacement of local populations, and has little effect on the amount of land under illicit cultivation. Many propose a greater emphasis on crop substitution programs, which have been employed far more widely in Bolivia and Peru, but the U.S. government refuses to initiate these programs in areas that are not fully under Colombian government control.¹²

Assistance to the Colombian National Police

The Colombian National Police (CNP), particularly its Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DANTI), has been the United States’ chief partner on eradication and other anti-narcotics missions. Support for the DANTI is “the primary focus” of the INC program, according to its 2000 Congressional Presentation. Additional beneficiaries of INC assistance, the document states, include “other CNP elements, the National Narcotics Directorate (DNE), the National Plan for Alternative Development (PLANTE), elements of the military involved in counternarcotics, and other Colombian government entities, such as the Civil Aviation Administration.”¹³

The INC program is the largest single source of U.S. assistance to Colombia, with a budget of about $203 million for its 1999 Colombia activities. Of this amount, about $195 million benefits Colombia’s security forces, with the vast majority going to the police. INC funds support the police’s role in the aerial eradication program, interdiction of drug and precursor-chemical shipments, and investigations of trafficker organizations.¹⁴

In October 1998, Congress augmented the original $30 million budget for the INC program’s 1999 Colombia activities with a $173.16 million appropriation of funds authorized by the “Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act.”

The original $30 million paid chiefly for training, spare parts, aviation fuel and equipment upgrades, much of it for the Colombian police anti-narcotics air wing, which in 1998 maintained fifty-eight helicopters and seventeen planes. It also paid the salaries of 100 civilian pilots, maintenance and logistics personnel supporting the police air wing.¹⁵ The INC program trained 125 police in 1998 and 153 police in 1997.¹⁶

The House-Senate Conference Committee that drew up the additional $173.16 million appropriation gave specific instructions for how the INC program should spend it:

• $96 million for six UH-60 "Blackhawk" helicopters for Colombia’s National Police.
• $40 million for thirty-four used twin-engine UH-1N helicopters, and fifteen upgrades of UH-1H "Huey" helicopters to the “Super Huey” configuration, all for Colombia’s National Police. “When this program is complete,” Assistant Secretary of State for INL Rand Beers told a House subcommittee, “virtually every helicopter in CNP service will be capable of operating at high altitude, meeting a key requirement for operations against opium poppy, which is customarily grown at altitudes between 5,000 and 9,000 feet.”¹⁷
• $6 million for operations and support of the Colombian National Police air wing.
• $6 million for twenty-five minigun systems for the Colombian National Police air wing. Six will be installed on the new Blackhawk helicopters listed above, and the rest will be mounted on CNP Super Huey, Bell 212, and UH-1N helicopters. Any remaining funding will pay for ammunition for the guns.¹⁸
• $6 million for security measures for Colombian National Police counter-drug bases.
• $2 million for a DC-3 transport aircraft for the Colombian National Police air wing.
• $2 million for reconstruction of the Colombian police-military counternarcotics base at Miraflores, destroyed by FARC guerrillas in an August 1998 attack.
• $1.2 million for enhancements to Colombian National Police prison security systems.
• $14 million to implement an "extended life program" for the Colombian Air Force’s A-37 "Dragonfly" attack aircraft. This item, discussed further below, is the only significant INC assistance for a branch of Colombia’s military in 1999.

“When this supplemental funding runs out,” notes the INC Congressional Presentation, “an increase in the regular INC budget will be required for the continuing operational costs of the aircraft and other equipment provided to Colombia.”¹⁹

Though the INC program largely assists Colombia’s police, it plans to devote $4 million in 2000 to re-start an Armed Forces Counternarcotics Support Project in Colombia.²⁰ According to the INC Congressional Presentation, this project, which has not been funded since 1997, will assist military activities “that support the CNP’s counternarcotics efforts or conduct independent counternarcotics operations.” Assistance will include spare parts, supplies, equipment and training for the use and upkeep of previously donated Air Force C-130 and C-26 aircraft and Navy riverine and coastal patrol craft.

Assistance to the Colombian Armed Forces

As recently as early 1999, Colombia’s police received the vast majority of U.S. assistance, roughly 90 percent of the total. This is changing rapidly, as U.S. policymakers are directing an increasing amount of counter-drug aid toward the military. “Now, for the first time, the CNP's commitment to counternarcotics has been adopted by the Colombian armed forces,” noted Brian Sheridan, the Defense Department’s drug enforcement policy director, in September 1999.²¹

Gen. Charles Wilhelm, the head of the U.S. Southern Command and a vocal proponent of increased military aid to Colombia, argued before a Senate caucus that police assistance alone is insufficient, given the likelihood of confrontation with guerrillas during counter-narcotics efforts.

We must now increase the capabilities of the armed forces without degrading the capabilities of the CNP. Though professional and well led, the CNP are precisely what their name implies -- they are a police force. They lack the strength in numbers and combined arms capabilities that are required to engage FARC fronts and mobile columns that possess army-like capabilities. This is a mission that the armed forces and only the armed forces can and should undertake. By bringing the capabilities of its armed forces into balance with those of the national police, Colombia can achieve a "one-two punch" with the armed forces preceding the police into narcotics cultivation and production areas and setting the security conditions that are mandatory for safe and productive execution of eradication and other counter-drug operations by the CNP.²²

A new aid package

On January 11, 2000, the Clinton Administration unveiled a large package of anti-drug assistance to Colombia for 2000 and 2001, with an unprecedented emphasis on the military.²³ The administration’s aid package follows along the lines of at least the military and police aspects of the “Plan Colombia,” a September 1999 Colombian government document outlining Bogotá’s economic and military needs over the next few years. During 2000 and 2001, the proposed package would add about $1.005 billion in new military and police assistance; the vast majority is destined for Colombia, though an undetermined amount would go to Colombia's Andean neighbors. The package is to be submitted for Congressional approval in two segments: as a supplemental appropriation for 2000, and as part of the regular 2001 budget request.

The aid proposal falls into five categories:

1. Push into southern Colombia growing areas. $600 million over two years, for the following efforts:
   • Training and equipping two additional counternarcotics battalions within the Colombian Army.
   • 30 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and 33 UH-1H Huey helicopters for the counternarcotics battalions.
   • Intelligence for the counternarcotics battalions.
   • USAID assistance that will, according to a White House document, "provide shelter and employment to the Colombian people who will be displaced during this push into southern Colombia."²⁴
2. More aggressive Andean region interdiction. $341 million over two years, for the following efforts:
   • Radar upgrades.
   • Airplane and airfield upgrades.
   • Provision of intelligence.
   • Support for the U.S. Forward Operating Location (FOL) at Manta, Ecuador ($38.6 million).
   • Assistance for interdiction efforts in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
3. Colombian National Police support. $96 million over two years, for the following efforts:
   • Upgrades to existing aircraft.
   • Purchases of additional spray aircraft.
   • Secure bases for increased operations in coca-growing areas.
   • Provision of intelligence.
4. Alternative economic development. $145 million over two years, for the following efforts:
   • USAID assistance to provide economic alternatives for former coca-growers.
   • USAID assistance to increase local governments' ability to provide for citizens' basic needs.
5. Boosting governing capacity. $93 million over two years, for the following efforts:
   • USAID and Justice Department assistance to increase protection of human rights, reform the judicial system, increase the rule of law, and crack down on money laundering and other high-tech crimes.
   • Training of Colombian government representatives to prepare them for peace negotiations.

For current information about the aid package's progress through Congress, and for links to relevant government documents, consult the Center for International Policy's U.S. Aid to Colombia web site.

Most of the military and police assistance in the package will be managed by the State Department's International Narcotics Control (INC) program. A sizable portion of the first two categories (the push into southern Colombia and Andean interdiction), $144 million, will be funded through the Defense Department's "Section 1004" counternarcotics budget authorization. The defense budget portion will fund equipment and training for the counternarcotics battalions, a headquarters for a three-battalion counternarcotics brigade, helicopter maintenance, military reform assistance, intelligence, aircraft upgrades, a new ground-based radar facility, support for the Manta FOL, and a road-based drug interdiction program.

On October 20, 1999 Sen. Paul Coverdell (R-GA) introduced a separate proposal, the “Alliance with Colombia and the Andean Region (Alianza) Act” (S. 1758). If approved, this legislation would authorize -- but not appropriate -- $945 million in new assistance for Colombia's security forces during 2000, 2001 and 2002. This would include support for the creation of at least three counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army. Additional Army support would include fifteen UH-60 "Blackhawk" helicopters, intelligence, surveillance and refueling aircraft, airfield construction, and other equipment and training. Colombia's navy would receive patrol aircraft, helicopters, patrol boats and forward-looking infrared radar systems. The country's National Police would get additional spare parts, upgrades, transport aircraft, base construction assistance, and training.

The legislation also includes some human rights provisions. Among them, the bill would require the Secretary of State to notify Congress about, and to cut off funding for, Colombian military units that provide material support to paramilitary or narcotrafficking groups, even if gross human rights violations are not a direct result. The bill would also authorize $100 million to assist Colombia's judicial system, government human rights institutions, non-governmental human rights organizations, and internally displaced populations, and $50 million for alternative-development programs in drug cultivation areas. 

While any new aid package for 2001 is likely to multiply U.S. assistance for Colombia’s armed forces, several other military cooperation initiatives -- many begun in 1998 and 1999 -- are already underway.

Counternarcotics battalion

U.S. funding, particularly emergency drawdowns of equipment and the Defense Department’s “Section 1004” anti-drug authority, helped the Colombian Army to create, equip and train a 950-man mobile counternarcotics battalion in 1999.

Gen. Wilhelm of the U.S. Southern Command described the Colombian Army’s First Counternarcotics Battalion at a June 1999 Senate committee hearing:

This battalion is a highly mobile unit, designed from the ground up to work with the Colombian National Police, other Colombian Army units, or independently, taking the fight to traffickers in the safe havens of southeastern Colombia where the majority of cocaine production takes place. Southcom is working closely with the Colombian Armed Forces providing them guidance, advice, and training, as they develop these new, important and very relevant capabilities.²⁵

The unit’s members were vetted for past corruption or human rights abuse, and the United States began training and equipping its members in April 1999. The battalion, which will complete training in December 1999, is to be headquartered at Tres Esquinas, in the southern department of Putumayo.²⁶

According to a June 1999 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) of the U.S. Congress, "Southcom estimates that the battalion would require in excess of $70 million worth of equipment and training to become fully operational. Of this amount, approximately $60 million would be to provide helicopters." Through a “no-cost lease,” in 2000 the battalion will receive eighteen UH-1N utility helicopters which the United States recently re-purchased from Canada.²⁷ A September 1999 drawdown is providing spare parts and equipment for the battalion.

The unit’s training, much of it carried out by the U.S. Army’s Seventh Special Forces Group at the Tolemaida garrison in Tolima department, was estimated to cost about 3 to 4 million dollars in 1999.²⁸ Training topics include intelligence, reconnaissance, indirect fire, light infantry tactics, medical skills, and human rights.²⁹

Much counternarcotics training for the battalion and other Colombian military units is paid for with funds authorized by Section 1004 of the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, a provision that allows the Pentagon to use its own budget to offer some forms of counternarcotics assistance. Over thirty military teams, most made up of Special Forces, deployed to Colombia in 1999 to train more than 1,500 members of Colombia’s security forces.³⁰ This training, according to Gen. Wilhelm of Southcom, included “such diverse subjects as light infantry training for CD [counter-drug] field operations, helicopter familiarization, and riverine craft handling and safety.”³¹

U.S. funding is likely to pay for additional counternarcotics battalions over the next few years, with at least two more scheduled to begin training in 2000. The administration's aid proposal includes funding for two more battalions, while the Coverdell legislation calls for the creation of three more. Gen. Wilhelm of Southcom said in September 1999 that he will “encourage Colombia's military leaders to expand the concept and create a CD [counter-drug] Brigade.”³² The average Colombian Army brigade has eight battalions.

Riverine program

A "riverine" counter-drug program, using defense budget funds authorized by Section 1033 of the 1998 National Defense Authorization Act, seeks to improve the Colombian Navy's ability to control traffic on rivers. The program, authorized to operate between 1998 and 2002, works mainly in the Amazon basin area of southern Colombia, a region where rivers abound, coca is grown and guerrillas are numerous.

The program pays for spare parts, infrastructure improvements, and training for Riverine Combat Elements (RCEs), small units with four boats each, within the Colombian Navy. Eighteen RCEs currently exist, seven of which were formed with the riverine program's assistance as of June 1999. The eventual goal is to deploy 45 RCEs.³³

The program has also helped the navy create a new Riverine Brigade. "A major milestone" was achieved in August 1999, according to Southcom’s Gen. Wilhelm, "when President [Andrés] Pastrana personally activated the new Riverine Brigade and its five battalions. Earlier, the Colombian Navy launched its first indigenous support or 'mothership.'"³⁴

In 1998, Section 1033 funds for Colombia totaled either $1.82 million or $2.172 million, depending on the Defense Department source consulted. These funds mostly paid for spare parts and equipment.³⁵ In 1999, the riverine program expects to spend between $9.3 million and $12.623 million in Section 1033-authorized funds.³⁶

Air force assistance

The United States is encouraging Colombia’s Air Force to adopt a policy, modeled on that of Peru, of forcing or shooting down suspected drug-smuggling aircraft. “The Colombian Air Force is willing,” State Department INL Director Rand Beers said in September 1999, “but requires considerable assistance to carry out the mission.”³⁷

A key element of U.S. support for Colombia’s Air Force is a program to upgrade its fleet of A-37 “Dragonfly” intercept aircraft. The Dragonfly, a U.S. Air Force web site states, is “intended for use in counterinsurgency operations.”³⁸ The State Department INC program contributed $14 million in “Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act” funds to the A-37 upgrade effort in 1999. The Defense Department, according to Pentagon drug policy director Brian Sheridan, spent an additional $7 million in 1999 -- about $5 million for upgrades and $2 million on A-37 training for Colombian pilots.³⁹

The State Department's INC program is also funding improvements, such as a runway extension, to the Colombian air base at Tres Esquinas, Putumayo, the headquarters of the Colombian Army’s First Counternarcotics Battalion.⁴⁰

Intelligence-sharing

The United States is providing the Colombian military with some intelligence about drug and guerrilla activity, while improving the armed forces’ own intelligence-gathering and analysis abilities. According to INL Director Beers, U.S. personnel are “working to improve the Colombian security forces' ability to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence on counternarcotics activity and on insurgent activity which could threaten counternarcotics forces.”⁴¹

An inter-agency U.S. effort intends to improve information-sharing between Colombian police and military units. Toward this end, in 1999 the United States supported the establishment of a Colombian Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), which will be based at Tres Esquinas alongside the Army counternarcotics battalion. “By reprioritizing tasks,” Southcom’s Gen. Wilhelm said in September, enough Defense Department funds were committed in 1999 to train, equip and provide facilities for the JIC. The center’s personnel underwent training in the latter half of 1999, and the facility is expected to be initially operational by December 15, 1999.⁴²

Under certain circumstances, U.S. personnel share intelligence with the Colombian military and police. Until recently, U.S. officials avoided transferring intelligence about guerrilla activity if unrelated to counter-drug operations. This decision owed to discomfort with such direct involvement in Colombia’s conflict, and concern about recipients’ use of the information (it could, for instance, be passed on to paramilitary groups or military human rights abusers). A June 1998 guidance allowed U.S. personnel to share intelligence about guerrilla capabilities and activities only if directly related to approved counternarcotics operations. 

Citing guerrilla involvement in the drug trade, U.S. officials have loosened restrictions on intelligence-sharing. According to a June 1999 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, “within the area where most drug-trafficking activities occur, U.S. embassy officials stated that the drug traffickers and the insurgents have become virtually indistinguishable.”⁴³ The U.S. government response in March 1999 was to issue new guidelines that allow U.S. personnel to provide intelligence about guerrilla activity to military and police units in Colombia’s southern drug-producing region, even if the information is not directly related to counternarcotics operations.⁴⁴

Military reform

The U.S. Southern Command seeks to help restructure Colombia’s army, an institution plagued by human rights abuse charges, corruption scandals, and serious battlefield losses. These reforms, according to Southcom’s Gen. Wilhelm, involve helping to “transition the Colombian Army from its defensive mindset, forge a better union with the National Police, and improve its overall CD [counter-drug] capabilities.”⁴⁵ In addition to informal advice and consultation with Southcom and the country team at the U.S. embassy in Bogotá, the U.S. military sends deployments -- Military Information Support Teams (MISTs), Joint Planning Assistance Teams (JPATs), Operational Planning Missions (OPMs), and others -- which offer management advice and other planning and intelligence assistance designed to make the army more effective.⁴⁶ A high-level Bilateral Working Group, created in December 1998, now meets twice a year to coordinate U.S.-Colombian military cooperation and assistance.

The U.S.-assisted restructuring program includes an effort to improve the Colombian Army’s human rights practices. U.S. personnel are offering human rights training and suggesting improvements to the military’s justice system and human rights training curriculum.⁴⁷

Other assistance

Training and exercises

Several other programs, such as IMET, ICITAP, and Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), offer small amounts of funding (less than $1 million each) for Colombian military and police students taking non-counternarcotics courses. Special Forces training visits to Colombia rarely fit within the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) category; the vast majority instead have a counternarcotics mission. (As discussed above, over thirty such visits trained over 1,500 Colombian personnel in 1999.)

Colombian forces took part in several Southcom-sponsored training exercises and seminars in 1998 and 1999, including Fuerzas Aliadas Chile, Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarian, UNITAS and United Counterdrug. A Medical Readiness Training Team (MEDRETE) paid a rare visit in September 1999, offering health services in the town of Honda in Tolima department.

Arms transfers

In addition to the sources discussed above, Colombia’s security forces also receive grants of weapons and equipment through emergency counternarcotics drawdowns. The latest drawdown, announced on September 15, 1999, included $58 million of spare parts, equipment, fuel, weapons and ammunition for the Colombian military and police.⁴⁸ Colombia has not received grants of weapons through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program in recent years.

Colombia is consistently among the hemisphere’s top three customers for U.S. weapons through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, and the top five customers for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) purchases. Recent Colombian acquisitions include eleven UH-60 “Blackhawk” and twelve TH-13 “Sioux” training helicopters, small arms, spare parts, vehicles and ammunition.⁴⁹ In November 1999, the administration notified Congress of an especially large potential FMS sale to Colombia: $221 million for fourteen Blackhawk helicopters and several different kinds of weapons and spare parts. In an unusual move, the Export-Import Bank of the United States may finance at least $20 million of this sale.⁵⁰

The Leahy Law and the vetting process

The “Leahy Amendments” to the foreign operations and defense-budget appropriations bills prohibit units of a country's security forces from receiving assistance if their members face credible evidence of gross human rights violations. The laws allow accused units to receive aid through Foreign Operations-funded programs if “effective measures” are taken to bring the accused unit members to justice, and to receive aid through defense budget-funded programs if unspecified “corrective steps” are taken.

Though its overall record is improving, the Colombian Army today is the hemisphere’s worst abuser of human rights and international humanitarian law. Its abuses take place both through direct action and through middle and lower-ranking officers’ collaboration with, or acquiescence to, paramilitary groups’ atrocities. 

The Clinton Administration and the human rights community view Colombia as a chief test case for the Leahy Law’s implementation. A vetting procedure, within the framework of an August 1997 End-Use Monitoring agreement between the U.S. Embassy and Colombia’s Defense Ministry, screens unit members for past corruption or human rights abuse. The agreement also requires Colombia’s Defense Ministry to submit every six months a certification listing ongoing formal investigations or prosecutions of unit members for gross human rights violations.

All counternarcotics units within Colombia’s National Police, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have passed the vetting process and are cleared to receive material assistance. Five of the Colombian Army’s twenty-four brigades have cleared the process. Four brigades, a command, a Special Forces school and the new counternarcotics battalion, whose members were individually vetted upon the unit’s creation, are the only Army units allowed to receive weapons, equipment, or other assistance that benefits the entire unit. 

Under the administration's current interpretation of the Leahy Law, however, “the ‘unit’ to be trained is the unit that is vetted.” In other words, U.S. programs offer training to individuals with clean records even if they belong to units that are prohibited from receiving assistance.

The Army units cleared to receive U.S. assistance are the Eastern Specified Command, based in Puerto Carreño, Vichada department; the Twenty-Fourth Brigade, based in Mocoa, Putumayo department; the Twelfth Brigade, based in Florencia, Caquetá department; and two mobile brigades: the Rural Special Forces Brigade and the Army Aviation Brigade. The Army's Rural Special Forces School, on the island of Barrancón in the Guaviare River near San José del Guaviare, has also been approved.⁵¹

A November 1998 U.S. Embassy response to a congressional inquiry notes that three other brigades for which the Colombian government has sought assistance -- the Third Brigade in Cali, Valle del Cauca department; the Seventh Brigade in Villavicencio, Meta Department, and the Second Mobile Brigade -- were denied their request “on the basis of their human rights record and the absence of ‘effective measures’ to bring those responsible to justice for their actions.”⁵²

Counternarcotics and counterinsurgency

Analysts and the media often speculate that military assistance and other counternarcotics programs may lead the United States into a counterinsurgency mission that it has not decided to pursue. At issue is how to keep U.S. military personnel, and the counter-drug forces they train and equip, from getting too deeply involved in Colombia's bloody civil conflict. 

"While the committee supports more direct involvement by the Colombian government in the war on drugs," the House Armed Service Committee stated in its May 1999 report on the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, "the committee is concerned with the expanding role of the U.S. military in domestic Colombian affairs."

The committee notes that Colombia has become a major recipient of military hardware assistance and training ostensibly for counter-drug purposes at the same time the government of Colombia is engaged in a protracted war against a wide-scale guerrilla insurgency. The committee is concerned that counter-drug training and assistance provided by the Department of Defense to Colombian forces may be redirected or used for non-counter-drug activities. The committee supports continued U.S. cooperation with the government of Colombia to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States but remains concerned over the prospect of U.S. military personnel being drawn into Colombia's civil war.⁵³

Concerns about the U.S. operational presence and intelligence-sharing activities were heightened by the July 1999 crash of an El Paso, Texas-based U.S. intelligence-gathering plane. The accident, in a guerrilla-controlled area of southern Colombia, took the lives of five U.S. soldiers and two Colombian airmen.

Sources:

¹ United States, Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2000, (Washington: Department of State: March 1999): 1317-28.

² Brian E. Sheridan, Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, U.S. Department of Defense, Statement for the Record Before the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Washington, September 21, 1999 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/sheridan.htm>.

³ Walter B. Slocombe, undersecretary of defense for policy, United States Department of Defense, letter in response to congressional inquiry, April 1, 1999.

⁴ Richard K. Kolb, "Tracking the Traffic. U.S. Southcom Counters Cocaine at the Source," Dialogo: The military forum of the Americas. (U.S. Southern Command: July-September 1997) <http://www.allenwayne.com/dialogo/julsep97/frames/article.htm>.

⁵ United States, General Accounting Office, “Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow,”  Report to Congressional Requesters no. GAO/NSIAD-99-136, Washington, June 1999 <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=ns99136.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao> Adobe Acrobat (pdf) version <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=ns99136.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao>.

⁶ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998, (Washington: Department of State: February 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/major/Colombia.html>.

⁷ Statement of Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Washington, September 21, 1999 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/beers.htm>.

⁸ General Accounting Office.

⁹ General Accounting Office.

¹⁰ United States Air Force, "A-10/OA-10 Thunderbolt II - Fact Sheet" <http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/A_10_OA_10_Thunderbolt_II.html>.

¹¹ United States, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997, Washington, March 1998, March 2, 1998 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1997_narc_report/index.html>.

“The Evolving Drug Threat in Colombia And Other South American Source Zone Nations,” Statement by General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, October 6, 1999 <http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/colombia/mcaf06.htm>.

¹² General Accounting Office.

¹³ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1999): 23 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/fy2000_budget/latin_america.html>.

¹⁴ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 24.

¹⁵ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 24-5.

¹⁶ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997.

¹⁷ Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Testimony before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 3, 1999 <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990303_beers_hirc.html>.

¹⁸ Beers, March 3, 1999.

¹⁹ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 24.

²⁰ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 25.   

²¹ Sheridan.

²² Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps, Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, Before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, September 21, 1999 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/wilhelm.htm>.

²³ United States, The White House, "Proposal for U.S. Assistance for Plan Colombia," memorandum, Washington, DC, January 11, 2000. <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidprop2.htm>. 

²⁴ The White House, "Proposal for U.S. Assistance for Plan Colombia." 

²⁵ Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, United States Department of Defense, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism, June 22, 1999  <http://www.usia.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/geog/ar&f=99062203.lar&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml >.

²⁶ Slocombe, April 1, 1999.

²⁷ Sheridan.

Wilhelm, September 21, 1999.

General Accounting Office.

²⁸ Slocombe, April 1, 1999.

²⁹  Slocombe, April 1, 1999.

³⁰ Wilhelm, September 21, 1999.

³¹ Wilhelm, September 21, 1999.

³² Wilhelm, September 21, 1999.

³³ Wilhelm, June 22, 1999.

³⁴  Wilhelm, September 21, 1999.

³⁵ Slocombe, April 1, 1999.

Wilhelm, September 21, 1999.

Ana Maria Salazar, deputy assistant secretary of defense for drug enforcement policy and support, United States Department of Defense, letter in response to congressional inquiry, Mar. 19, 1999.

³⁶  Slocombe, April 1, 1999.

Wilhelm, September 21, 1999.

Salazar.

³⁷ Beers, September 21, 1999.

³⁸ United States Air Force, “T-37 Tweet/A-37B Dragonfly - Fact Sheet” <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/almanac/spanish/colombia/col-a37b.htm>.

³⁹ Sheridan.

⁴⁰ Beers, September 21, 1999.

⁴¹ Beers, September 21, 1999.

⁴² Wilhelm, September 21, 1999.

⁴³ General Accounting Office.

⁴⁴ General Accounting Office.

⁴⁵ Wilhelm, June 22, 1999.

⁴⁶ United States, Department of Defense, News Briefing, presenter: Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, en route to Brazil, May 26, 1998 <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May1998/t05281998_t526enrt.html>.

⁴⁷ United States, U.S. Southern Command, “Posture Statement Of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps Commander In Chief, United States Southern Command Before The Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 4, 1999.  

⁴⁸ United States, White House, "Draft Working Document: FY99 506(a)(2) Drawdown List -- Requested Items," Memorandum, September 30, 1999.

⁴⁹ United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, Foreign Military Assistance Act Report To Congress, Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington: September 1997).

United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: August 1998).

United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of The Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: July 1999).

United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, Foreign Military Assistance Act Report To Congress, Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington: September 1997).

United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Arms Exports: Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations for Fiscal Year 97 (Washington: August 1998): 1.

United States, Department of State, U.S. Arms Exports: Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations for Fiscal Year 98 (Washington: July 1999): 20-2.   

⁵⁰ United States, Department of Defense, "Memorandum for Correspondents," Memorandum no. 176-M, Washington, November 10, 1999 <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1999/m11101999_m176-99.html>.

United States, Export-Import Bank, "Summary of Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors, November 22, 1999," Washington, November 22, 1999 <http://www.exim.gov/summary/nov99wk4.html>.

⁵¹ Conversation with congressional staff, November 1999.

⁵² U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman, letter in response to congressional inquiry, Bogota, November 17, 1998. .  

⁵³ United States, House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee Report 106-162 on National Defense Authorization Act, 2000 (Washington: May 24, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/z?cp106:hr162:> Plain text <ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/cp106/hr162.txt> Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas2gpo_script/|log_filename=/prd/compr/log/cp106.log||sid=QA4g601pc_tentnirpslaid242phsawcd100-ra-nd||report=|http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_reports&docid=f:hr162.106.pdf>.