2006
VENEZUELA: TERRORISM HUB OF SOUTH AMERICA?
HEARING
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND NONPROLIFERATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JULY 13, 2006
Serial
No. 109–189
Page 2 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Printed for the use of the Committee on International
Relations
Available
via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE
ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY
J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES
A. LEACH, Iowa
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
DARRELL ISSA, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
Page 3 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
JERRY
WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
CONNIE MACK, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
TOM
LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
Page 4 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
EARL
BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
THOMAS
E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee
on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
PETER
T. KING, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
DARRELL ISSA, California, Vice Chairman
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
Page 5 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
BRAD
SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
TOM
SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director
DON MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member
EDWARD A. BURRIER, Professional Staff Member
GENELL BROWN, Staff Associate
C
O N T E N T S
WITNESS
Mr. Frank C. Urbancic, Jr., Principal Deputy Coordinator,
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S.
Department of State
LETTERS,
STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Frank C. Urbancic, Jr.: Prepared statement
APPENDIX
Page 6 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri: Prepared statement
VENEZUELA:
TERRORISM HUB OF SOUTH AMERICA?
THURSDAY,
JULY 13, 2006
House
of Representatives,
Subcommittee on International Terrorism
and Nonproliferation,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05
p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building,
Hon. Edward R. Royce (Chairman of the Subcommittee)
presiding.
Mr. ROYCE. This hearing will come to order.
In May, the State Department designated Venezuela
as ''not cooperating fully'' with United States antiterrorism
efforts. This designation is different than the more
serious and commonly referred to state sponsor of
terrorism designation. This designation precludes
the sale of, licensing of defense material and services
to Venezuela. Venezuela is now the only country on
the ''not cooperating fully'' list that is not also
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Page 7 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Back in 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism—the
''Bremer Commission''—urged greater use of this
term, of the ''not cooperating fully'' designation.
The Commission recommended that this category be used
as a kind of ''halfway house,'' in their words, for
reforming state sponsors or as a warning to countries
that may be moving toward a designation as a state
sponsor of terrorism. It is time to revisit this recommendation.
For in our struggle against terrorism, we will need
flexible alternatives for both engaging and stigmatizing
states that are involved in terrorism.
Venezuela, under President Hugo Chavez, has tolerated
terrorists on its soil and has forged close relationships
with officially designated state sponsors of terrorism:
Cuba, Iran and North Korea. Colombian terrorist groups
use Venezuelan territory for safe haven. The armed
Colombian terrorist groups, though they have waged
no attack on United States soil, are among the most
active terrorist gangs in the world. Several of their
leaders have been indicted in the United States for
killings and kidnappings of Americans and of course
for drug trafficking. The State Department will testify
today that, ''While it remains unclear to what extent
the Government of Venezuela provides material support
to Colombian terrorists, it is difficult to believe
that the Chavez Government is unaware of or helpless
to prevent such activity.'' In my view, Venezuela
is walking a thin line between ''not cooperating fully''
against terrorism and ''state sponsorship'' of terrorism.
Earlier this year, the State Department's annual terrorism
report noted that, ''Weapons and ammunition—some
from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities—regularly
turned up in the hands of Colombian terrorist organizations.''
Compounding this situation is the recent arrival of
the first installment of 100,000 Kalishnikovs from
Russia. Furthermore, the Russian agreement allows
for Venezuela to enter into licensed production of
Kalishnikov rifles on its soil. It is the fear of
many that these new machine guns, these new weapons,
or the weapons they replace, will end up arming left-wing
terrorist groups throughout the continent.
Page 8 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
As Members are aware, this Subcommittee has focused
on terrorist travel and our border vulnerabilities.
It is therefore disconcerting to hear from the State
Department today that Venezuelan passports can be
forged with ''child-like ease'' and that the United
States is detaining at our borders an increasing number
of third-country aliens carrying false Venezuelan
documents. According to a 2003 U.S. News report, ''Thousands
of Venezuelan identity documents are being distributed
to foreigners from Middle Eastern nations, including
Syria, Pakistan, Egypt and Lebanon.''
There are other worrisome reports of radical Islamist
activity in Venezuela. State Department officials
have expressed concerns about ''groups and individuals''
in Venezuela with ''links to terrorist organizations
in the Middle East.'' The al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah
cells in South and Central America are tied to fundraising
and to so-called charity and transnational criminal
networks that are key to terrorist mobility. Three
years ago, an intelligence official was quoted as
saying, with respect to terrorism in Latin America,
''We don't even know what we don't know.'' I can't
be sure that this has changed.
I will now turn to the Ranking Member, Mr. Brad Sherman
of California, for any opening remarks he may have.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This issue, like almost everything concerning Venezuela
these days, is potentially inflammatory or taken out
of context. We need to be careful to ensure that what
we say here today provides no ammunition for those
who want to paint America and our Congress as a caricature
somehow of ugly Yankees who are opposed to the legitimate
aims of the Venezuelan people for a prosperous democratic
and fully independent country at peace with its neighbors
and the world at large.
Page 9 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
This Committee is not the 700 Club. Pat Robertson
is not here, and his remarks do not reflect the views
of this Subcommittee, Congress, or the United States
Government.
This Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation
is not concerned with Chavez's social policy or socialist
ideology. The fact that, unfortunately, Mr. Chavez
seems to look more to Marx than to Milton Friedman
should concern the people of Venezuela but is not
the concern of this Subcommittee.
The people of Venezuela now are enjoying the fruits
of $75-a-barrel oil. They should hold their government
to a higher standard now that things are better than
they were several years ago. You could have incredibly
bad government in Venezuela; at $75 a barrel, you
can still provide the people with some social services.
I would hope that the Venezuelan people would hold
their government to account for the huge revenues
that some 3.1 million barrels of oil being exported,
which is the official Venezuelan output, the revenue
that that should produce, and ask, is this government
a good steward of that incredible amount of revenue?
But our concerns here are with terrorism and the United
States' foreign policy, and we are concerned with
the foreign policy of the Venezuelan Government, whether
or not it is able to meet the needs of the Venezuelan
people and well utilize this oil revenue. Our immediate
concern today is the designation of Venezuela as a
country that is not cooperating fully with our antiterrorism
efforts. This results from a State Department review
mandated by law. We should point out that this is,
as the Chairman already pointed out, not the same
as a designation of being a state sponsor of terrorism.
Page 10 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The designation given the state of Venezuela-United
States relations has really only one practical effect,
and that is, we will not sell weapons to Venezuela.
Frankly, I would be surprised if the Chavez Government
viewed the United States as a likely supplier of military
armaments.
The fact that we have not designated Venezuela as
a state sponsor of terrorism indicates that we continue
to have no sanctions with regard to Venezuela concerning
anything other than military weapons.
There are a number of concerns that I have with Venezuela.
Some echo those of our Chairman. The first is the
Islamist presence in part of Venezuela. Venezuela
is not a full-blown safe haven for al-Qaeda or any
other Islamist group. Quite frankly, looking through
the Western Hemisphere, I am still more concerned
about the triborder region involving the intersection
of the border of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, and
I should point out that all three of those countries
are good friends of the United States. That still
does not mean that we would not have concerns if there
was some particular area in which Hezbollah is able
to raise money and otherwise conduct operations.
Turning back to Venezuela, Hezbollah has run a number
of criminal and semi-legal enterprises to raise money
for its organization, particularly in Margarita Island
in northern Venezuela, and I would hope that the Chavez
Government would address that issue.
The second concern is Venezuela's support for certain
terrorist organizations based in Colombia, the FARC
and the ELN. The border between Colombia and Venezuela
is dense jungle; it is not demarcated, not controlled
effectively by either country. The left-wing terrorist
organizations of Colombia, FARC and ELN, know these
facts and use the situation to their advantage. The
Venezuelan Government willfully ignores the Colombian
terrorist presence on its soil. It is almost certain
that there are elements of the Venezuela Government
which have provided assistance to FARC and ELN.
Page 11 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Let me say that if we were to find clear evidence
the Venezuelan Government, as a matter of state policy,
provided material support to Colombian terrorist organizations,
I think there would be serious ramifications in the
State Department and here in Congress.
The Chairman has already described the easy forge-ability
of Venezuelan travel documents, and I would call upon
Venezuela for the advantage of its own citizens to
create forgery-proof passports and to have the source
documents that would cause the Venezuelan foreign
ministry to issue a passport to also be secure. Failing
to do so could interrupt the travel of honest Venezuelan
citizens here to visit Disneyland—very close
to the Chairman's district—Universal Studios—close
to my district—or the other places in the United
States that ordinary Venezuelans, some a little wealthier
now with oil revenues, would want to visit here in
the United States.
I am concerned that Venezuela has provided little
or no assistance regarding various terrorist actions
involving al-Qaeda, little or no assistance regarding
our interest in the Venezuelan who attended the same
flight school in New Jersey attended by some of the
9/11 hijackers. That individual was deported in March
2002. Our request to the Venezuelan Government for
information on him upon our subsequent discovery of
his affiliations or his place of school attendance
have gone unanswered.
Likewise, the United Kingdom arrested a suspected
Venezuelan operative with a grenade in his bag aboard
a Caracas-London flight, and Venezuela provided little
or no assistance. While he was arrested in London
upon arrival and subsequently convicted, unfortunately
the Venezuelan Government of Mr. Chavez refused to
cooperate. This kind of action is hard to understand
in light of the terrible tragedy not only of 9/11
but of 7/7 in London.
Page 12 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
There are other issues that we have with the Venezuelan
Government involving terrorism, including the Venezuelan
Government's current harmful foreign policy in various
international fora. Chavez's close relationship with
Iran, which of course is the number one state sponsor
of terrorism, is reason enough for Congress to be
concerned. There is no issue more important than Iran's
nuclear program, and Venezuela's vote at the IAEA,
voting against sending the Iran case to the Security
Council, would be enough in and of itself to hurt
relationships between the United States and Venezuela.
Venezuela has had a relatively stable democracy since
1959 with a strong free press and respect for important
freedoms. While the U.S. must take action to address
the foreign policy of any government that is counter
to our interests and the interests of international
peace and stability, the United States must have patience
in dealing with the Chavez Government.
Those who talk of ''taking Chavez down,'' should recognize
that it is up to the Venezuelan people to decide who
will be their leader. I am confident that if the Venezuela
people realize that this great gush of oil revenue
is a windfall that a government should use intelligently,
not a sign that somehow this government has accomplished
something in and of itself, the Venezuelan people
will make their own decisions as to what kind of government
meets their domestic and international needs.
I would hope that we would see democracy and human
rights flourish in Venezuela. I am disturbed by Venezuelan
interference with non-governmental organizations seeking
to build a civil society, and I would hope that the
Venezuelan people would not be blinded by today's
oil revenue and instead would demand that democracy
flourish, that human rights flourish, and that the
government be held accountable. I yield back.
Page 13 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. We will go to Mr. Weller of
Illinois.
Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend you for calling this important hearing
which looks into the question of whether or not Venezuela
is a terrorism hub in South America. I also want to
commend you for your leadership on this issue in this
hemisphere in which we live.
This question of Venezuela as a terrorist hub is critically
important to examine at a time when the Chavez Government
of Venezuela is in a very public way attempting to
interfere and intervene in democratic elections across
this hemisphere, whether in Mexico or Peru.
We see the public actions and statements attempting
to corrupt democracy, but equally troubling is that
Venezuela may be in fact supplying weapons and ammunition
to terrorist organizations. The State Department's
Country Reports on Terrorism for 2005 noted that weapons
and ammunition, some from official Venezuelan stocks
and facilities, has regularly turned up in the hands
of Colombian terrorist organizations.
While it is unclear to what extent the Government
of Venezuela directly backs terrorist organizations,
we do know that Colombian terrorist groups use Venezuela
as a safe haven, and it is especially troubling that
senior officials of groups such as the FARC—in
fact, the so-called foreign minister of the FARC was
apprehended in Caracas with no assistance, by the
way, from the Chavez Government. And when the foreign
minister of the FARC was found to be residing in Caracas,
he was carrying official Venezuelan identification,
documents identifying him as a citizen of Venezuela.
Page 14 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I would also note that terrorist groups like the FARC,
which have for the last 5 years held a woman, who
was a Presidential candidate in the previous election
in Colombia, for almost 5 years since her kidnapping,
a group which assassinates elected officials and judges,
intimidates regular folks as well; and I think it
is important to note for the record that the FARC
in Colombia today has openly targeted American citizens
as part of their agenda and currently holds three
United States citizens who have been held for the
last several years. Again, the so-called foreign minister
of the FARC was in Venezuela, living in Caracas with
Venezuelan identification documents.
We also have substantiated reports of training in
guerilla tactics and explosives from Venezuelan soldiers.
In October 2005, the Miami Herald reported on an Ecuadorian
military intelligence report alleging that leftists
from Ecuador and seven other nations had received
guerilla training that strengthened incipient subversive
movements across the continent.
Venezuela sought and fostered closer relationships
with Cuba and Iran, and reportedly there are groups
and individuals in Venezuela with links to terrorist
organizations in the Middle East. Venezuela has also
threatened to sell its F–16 fighter jets to
Iran, the world's leading sponsor of state-backed
terrorism.
Venezuela's lack of cooperation has earned itself
a position on the not-cooperating-fully list when
it comes to United States antiterrorism efforts involving
such countries as Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria.
Page 15 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I am also particularly concerned with reports that
Venezuelan citizenship, identity and travel documents
have continued to be relatively easy to obtain. Venezuelan
identity documents have been distributed to foreigners
from Middle Eastern nations including Syria, Pakistan,
Egypt and Lebanon, making passports easy to obtain.
The question is, why would any government today in
this 21st century not go out of its way to eliminate
these kinds of issues and these kinds of questions
as legitimate citizens not only of our hemisphere
but of our world?
Today, I hope our witnesses will give us a deeper
insight into these serious issues, provide us recommendations
for future policy to deal with these concerns.
Again, Mr. Chairman, this is an extremely important
hearing. Thank you for holding it today.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Weller.
I will now go to Mr. Poe of Texas.
Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The world faces real threats from terrorist groups
like al-Qaeda, Hezbollah. And clear boundaries between
nations that seek to fight terror and those that don't
fight terror must be drawn. Over the last 5 years,
many nations have proven to be great world allies
in the global war on terror, but Venezuela is not
one of them.
Page 16 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
As long as Hugo Chavez remains in power, the United
States must cast a watchful eye toward the nation
of Venezuela and his regime. He has taken every opportunity
to align his regime to opposition of the United States,
Western, and democratic ideals. Through words as well
as actions, Chavez has made it abundantly clear that
he supports the oppressive regimes in Iran and in
Cuba, both designated by the State Department as sponsors
of terrorism.
Chavez has shown no willingness to assist in the global
war on terrorism as evidenced by sympathy for narcoterrorists,
violent insurgents, gangs and general low-level thugs.
The United States has a long road ahead in securing
our borders and fighting the war on terror and faithfully
spreading the concept of freedom throughout this globe.
However, to combat the immediate threats facing us,
we must not be impeded by the saber rattling of Chavez,
who may harbor South American terrorists as well as
other terrorists.
It is my hope the people of Venezuela realize they
have more to gain by aligning themselves not only
with the United States but with just basic freedom
ideas and choosing not to align their rogue regime
with other rogue regimes like Iran, Cuba and North
Korea.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the remainder
of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Poe.
We will go now to our panel. We will turn to the testimony
from Mr. Frank Urbancic. Mr. Urbancic is Principal
Deputy Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism. He is responsible for managing and
overseeing all aspects of counterterrorism activities
at that office, and he has dealt with terrorism and
its causes throughout his career. As Chargé
d'Affaires, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S.
Embassy in Kuwait, Mr. Urbancic coordinated United
States priorities with the host government and managed
the bilateral relationship to ensure access for United
States and coalition forces into Iraq back in 2003.
Page 17 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. Urbancic is joined at the witness table by Ambassador
Charles Shapiro, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
in the Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.
Mr. Shapiro was the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela from
February 2002 until August 2004. Ambassador Shapiro
is available to answer any Member's questions.
Before turning it over to Mr. Urbancic, I would like
to again commend the Coordinator's office for providing
the Subcommittee with the testimony that we have here
well in advance. Your office has set a high standard
for the rest of the Department.
With that in mind, I will remind you to summarize
your remarks. Your full statement is going to go into
the record. You may proceed at this point.
STATEMENT
OF MR. FRANK C. URBANCIC, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY COORDINATOR,
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. URBANCIC. Yes, sir, thank you very much. I will
have just some summary comments to make and then I
would be happy to take your questions. I think the
dialog is probably the most beneficial part of this
discussion anyway.
Chairman Royce, Congressman Sherman, distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you very much for
the opportunity to allow us to talk to you today.
U.S. law prohibits the sale or license for export
of certain defense articles or defense services to
any country determined not to be cooperating fully
with the United States antiterrorism efforts. Earlier
this year, the Secretary of State determined that
Venezuela demonstrated a near complete lack of cooperation
with the United States Government and with our efforts
to fight terrorism. This determination reflected a
view of Venezuela's overall actions against terrorism,
the Venezuelan Government's public statements in international
fora addressing terrorism, Venezuela's conduct toward
terrorist organizations, and the Venezuelan Government's
relations with state sponsors of terror, many of these
subjects you have mentioned in your own statements
this afternoon.
Page 18 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
On all fronts the Venezuelan Government's behavior
is wanting, and Ambassador Shapiro has some statistics
on the lack of cooperation that we have gotten from
the Government of Venezuela.
The Government of Venezuela has refused to condemn
narcoterrorist organizations based in Colombia, and
it has publicly championed the cause of terrorists
in Iraq. It has reputed UN Security Council resolutions
calling for cooperation against terrorism, and it
has ostentatiously cultivated its ties with Iran,
Cuba and other like-minded countries.
The Venezuelan Government has done little to improve
the security of its travel and its identity documents,
as you well noted. The systems and processes for issuing
these documents are corrupted at various levels: Alien
smuggling rings, freelancing bureaucrats, and forgers
who obtain, issue and alter passports with ease.
Most worrisome, Venezuelan Government officials direct
the issuance of documents to ineligible individuals
to advance political and foreign policy agendas. As
a result, we are detaining at our borders increasing
numbers of third-country aliens carrying falsified
documents or fraudulently issued Venezuelan documents.
Venezuela has also been unhelpful in the diplomatic
arena. At the Organization of American States' Committee
Against Terrorism's sixth regular meeting in Bogota
last March, for example, the Venezuelan delegation
disputed the validity of the UN Security Council's
Resolutions 1373 and 1540, which are two pillars of
the legal foundation for international counterterrorism
efforts. Venezuela went so far as to put in writing
its rejection of these principles and to dispute the
assertion that the prospect of terrorists obtaining
WMD is a threat to the Western Hemisphere, and that
transnational crime could be used by terrorist groups
to finance their activities.
Page 19 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The negative impact of Venezuela's behavior could
be amplified if it were to win a nonpermanent seat
on the UN Security Council, where it would have a
voice in various subcommittees on terrorism.
Venezuela has fomented close relations, including
intelligence cooperation, we believe, with state sponsors
of terrorism, Iran and Cuba. It has concluded a number
of agreements with Iran, ranging from investment pacts
to cultural exchanges to pledges of support against
military aggression.
Earlier this year, Venezuela joined Cuba and Syria
as the only countries in the IAEA to vote against
referring Iran to the UN Security Council to account
for its own efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Just
last week, the Venezuelan Government said it supports
North Korea's development of its missile program.
Hugo Chavez recently announced he will soon visit
Iran, Syria, North Korea and, as he put it, ''North
Vietnam'' to cement ''strategic alliances'' with those
countries. He will also continue his close relationship
with Cuba's dictator, Fidel Castro, who we know has
a long history of fomenting subversion in Latin America
and elsewhere.
Hezbollah has been implicated in the bombings of the
Israeli Embassy and the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association
in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, in which over 100
people died. We must be concerned therefore by the
decision of a virulently anti-American Venezuelan
regime assiduously courting Hezbollah's chief sponsor,
while cutting off counterterrorism cooperation with
the United States.
Page 20 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Closer to home, narcoterrorists of the Colombian terrorist
organizations, FARC and ELN, continue to use Venezuelan
territory for safe haven and transit of drugs, people
and arms. Although it is still unclear exactly how
they were obtained, some weapons seized from Colombian
narcoterrorists have come from official Venezuelan
stocks and facilities. The Venezuela Government's
efforts to pursue and deny safe haven to these terrorists
are, at best, anemic.
While it remains unclear to what extent the Government
of Venezuela provides material support to Colombian
terrorists, it is difficult to believe that the government
is unaware of, or helpless to prevent, such activity.
Over the past year, we have seen press reports of
official Venezuelan support for Colombian terrorists
and Ecuadorian subversives in the form of safe haven
for the former, and training in small arms, intelligence,
urban operations and explosives of the latter.
In conclusion, today in Venezuela, we see a regime
that is increasingly out of step with the rest of
the world. Its irresponsible rhetoric and behavior
have drawn rebukes from several neighbors resentful
of Chavez's meddling in their internal political affairs.
We have tried to engage the Venezuelan Government
in constructive discussions for addressing security
problems, including narcotrafficking and terrorism.
Instead of engaging, however, the Venezuelan Government
has taken steps to limit dialogue and cooperation.
In keeping with our responsibilities under United
States law, we conducted the review I mentioned at
the beginning of my statement. And as a result of
our ''not cooperating fully'' finding, as of October
1, we will cut off military equipment sales to Venezuela.
Page 21 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We are also increasing efforts to expose Venezuela's
out-of-step rhetoric and actions, and we are reviewing
the integrity of Venezuelan travel documents for purposes
of admission to the United States.
Since Venezuela has given no indications that it will
change its behavior in the near future, it is all
the more vital we continue to work bilaterally and
multilaterally with our partners in the region. The
United States cannot fight terrorism alone. Together
we will win this fight, for the benefit of all the
citizens of this hemisphere and the world.
This completes the formal part of my statement, sir.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Urbancic follows:]
PREPARED
STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK C. URBANCIC, JR., PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Chairman Royce, Congressman Sherman, distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today on Venezuela's behavior with regard
to international terrorism today.
VENEZUELA:
''NOT COOPERATING FULLY''
Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended,
prohibits the sale or license for export of certain
defense articles or defense services to any country
determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism
efforts. The authority to make such determination
has been delegated to the Secretary of State. This
year the Secretary of State determined that the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela demonstrated a near complete
lack of cooperation with U.S. Government efforts to
fight terrorism. This determination reflected a review
of Venezuela's overall actions against terrorism,
the Venezuelan Government's public statements in international
fora addressing terrorism, Venezuela's conduct toward
terrorist organizations, and the Venezuelan Government's
relations with state sponsors of terror. On all fronts,
the behavior of the Venezuelan Government is wanting.
Page 22 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The Government of Venezuela has stated that it regards
the U.S.-led war on terrorism as a ruse for U.S. imperial
ambitions. It has refused to condemn narco-terrorist
organizations based in Colombia, and has publicly
championed the cause of terrorists in Iraq. Although
it is unclear how they were obtained, some weapons
seized from Colombian narco-terrorists have come from
official Venezuelan stocks and facilities. And the
Venezuelan Government has done little to improve the
security of travel and identity documents it issues.
In the diplomatic arena, Venezuela has also been unhelpful.
At the Organization of American States' Committee
Against Terrorism (CICTE) 6th Regular Meeting in Bogotá
last March, the Venezuelan delegation disputed the
validity of UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and
1540, two pillars of the legal foundation for international
counterterrorism efforts. Venezuela went so far as
to insist on the inclusion of footnotes that opposed
portions of the meeting's declaration reaffirming
the counterterrorism and counter-proliferation obligations
imposed on all States by the UN Security Council.
Another Venezuelan footnote disputed the assertion
that the prospect of terrorists obtaining WMD is a
threat to the Western Hemisphere. The Venezuelan delegation
at CICTE, asserted that the United States is the biggest
security threat to the region. Venezuela, alone, even
objected to language stating that transnational crime
could be used by terrorist groups to finance their
activities.
Venezuela has fomented close relations—including
intelligence cooperation—with state sponsors
of terrorism Iran and Cuba. Consistent with such behavior,
earlier this year Venezuela, Cuba and Syria were the
only countries in the International Atomic Energy
Agency to vote against referring Iran to the UN Security
Council to account for its efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons. And just last week, the Venezuelan Government
said it supports North Korea's development of its
missile program.
Page 23 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Closer to home, narco-terrorists of the Colombian
terrorist organization Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejercito de Liberacion
Nacional (ELN) continue to use Venezuelan territory
for safe haven and transit of drugs, people and arms.
The Venezuelan Government's efforts to pursue and
deny safe haven to these terrorists are, at best,
anemic. While it remains unclear to what extent the
Government of Venezuela provides material support
to Colombian terrorists, it is difficult to believe
that the Chavez government is unaware of, or helpless
to prevent such activity. Over the past year we have
seen published reports of official Venezuelan support
for terrorists and subversives. In February 2005,
an ex-ELN guerrilla told the press that a non-aggression
pact existed between the ELN and Venezuelan authorities;
he alleged that the Venezuelan National Guard allowed
the terrorist group to kidnap ranchers. Separately,
the Ecuadorian press, citing Ecuadorian intelligence,
has reported that Venezuela has provided training
in small arms, intelligence, urban operations, and
explosives to radical leftists from Ecuador.
With the Committee's permission, I will elaborate
on some of these issues.
VENEZUELAN
TRAVEL AND ID DOCUMENTS
Venezuelan travel and identification documents are
extremely easy to obtain by persons not entitled to
them, including non-Venezuelans. Passports and national
ID cards are available for sale in the requester's
identity, or another, if so desired. The systems and
processes for issuing these documents are corrupted
on various levels: alien smuggling rings use confederates
in the issuing entities to make documents available
in large numbers to their clients; freelancers in
those entities capitalize on lax or non-existent controls
to sell documents for personal gain; forgers alter
passports with child-like ease; and most worrisome,
Venezuelan Government officials direct the issuance
of documents to ineligible individuals to advance
political and foreign policy agendas.
Page 24 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We are detaining at our borders increasing numbers
of third-country aliens carrying falsified or fraudulently
issued Venezuelan documents. The so-called Foreign
Minister of the FARC, Rodrigo Granda, was living openly
in Caracas and possessed Venezuelan identity and travel
documents when he was arrested in 2004.
In light of these developments, the Administration
is evaluating steps to ensure that persons seeking
entry into the United States bearing Venezuelan documents
are in fact who they say they are, and seek entry
to the U.S. for legitimate purposes.
RELATIONS
WITH STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM
The Chavez government has sought, over the last two
or three years, ties with unusual allies. A glance
at the State Sponsors of Terrorism listed in the State
Department's Country Reports on Terrorism for 2005
provides a good idea of Chavez' new friends.
At the top of his list is Iran. The Chavez government
has concluded a number of agreements with Iran, ranging
from investment pacts, to cultural exchanges, to pledges
of support against military aggression—ostensibly
by the United States. In March, Chavez defended Iran's
quest to develop nuclear energy without any oversight
by the UN or the International Atomic Energy Agency,
dismissing the concerns of the international community.
Chavez' courting of radical, rogue regimes is not
new. He fawned over Saddam Hussein during a visit
in 2000, even as that brutal dictator tortured his
own citizens, stole Oil-For-Food funds, and sent terror
teams abroad to murder Iraqis who opposed him. Today,
Chavez roots for the terrorists who weekly bomb innocent
Iraqis in a perverse bid to frustrate the will of
the Iraqi people to live in peace and freedom.
Page 25 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chavez recently announced he will soon visit Iran,
Syria, North Korea and, interestingly, ''North Vietnam''
to cement ''strategic alliances'' with those countries.
On his return, he will continue his close relationship
with Cuba's dictator Fidel Castro. Castro has a long
history of fomenting subversion in Latin America and
elsewhere. Under Castro, Cuba—also a state sponsor
of terrorism—has hosted and provided sanctuary
to members of the FARC and the ELN, as well as to
militants of the Basque terrorist group ETA. Castro
and Chavez are using a variety of means to try to
help individuals who share their worldview come to
power via the electoral route.
It is clear that in the case of Chavez' Venezuela,
the old adage ''Tell me who your friends are, and
I will tell you who you are'' is one we would be wise
to heed.
RELATIONS
WITH TERRORISTS, ISLAMIC RADICALS AND INSURGENTS
Hizballah has been implicated in the bombing of the
Israeli Embassy and the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association
in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, respectively. Over
100 people died in the attacks apparently launched
in retaliation for Israel's killing of high-ranking
Hizballah members. Without question, U.S. interests
are put at risk by the decision of a virulently anti-American
Venezuelan regime assiduously courting a nation—Iran—that
so prominently sponsors a surrogate terror group implicated
in a murderous attack in this hemisphere against our
friends and allies.
As regards Chavez' relations with Colombian-based
narco-terrorist organizations, I have noted already
the ease with which narco-terrorists move into and
through Venezuelan territory. Increasingly, the FARC
and ELN use routes through Venezuela to import weapons,
cash, and war material, and to export drugs. It is
difficult to believe that the Chavez Administration
is oblivious to this ongoing encroachment on its national
territory by Colombian narco-terrorists.
Page 26 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The Committee requested information on Venezuelan
Government links to Hakim Mamad al Diab Fatah and
to Rahaman Alan Hazil Mohammad, who was arrested in
February 2003 in the U.K. for smuggling an explosive
device aboard an airliner. Regrettably, there is little
I can offer in an unclassified hearing.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, today in Venezuela we see a regime
that is increasingly out of step with the world. Its
irresponsible rhetoric and behavior have drawn rebukes
from several neighbors resentful of Chavez' meddling
in their internal political affairs. The negative
impact of Venezuela's behavior would be amplified
if it wins a non-permanent seat on the UN Security
Council, where it would have voice in various sub-committees
on terrorism. In sum, in the international community's
fight against terrorism, Venezuela is a liability.
We have tried to engage the Venezuelan Government
in constructive discussions for addressing serious
security problems that should concern us both, including
narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Unfortunately
the Venezuelan Government has taken steps to limit
dialogue and cooperation on these important issues.
In keeping with our responsibilities under U.S. law,
we therefore conducted the review I mentioned at the
beginning of my statement. As a result of our finding
of ''not cooperating fully,'' as of October 1 we will
cut off military equipment sales to Venezuela. We
are also increasing efforts to expose Venezuela's
out-of-step rhetoric and actions, and are reviewing
the integrity of Venezuelan travel documents for purposes
of admission to the United States.
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Since Venezuela has given no indications that it will
change its behavior in the near future, it is all
the more vital that we continue to work with our other
partners in the Western Hemisphere, on a bilateral
and multilateral basis. The United States cannot fight
terrorism alone. We must use all tools of statecraft,
in cooperation with our growing network of partners,
to construct enduring solutions that transcend violence.
In doing so, we must focus our efforts on replacing
an ideology of hatred with one of hope. Over the long
term, our most important task in the War on Terror
may not prove to be that of eradicating enemy networks,
but the constructive task of building legitimacy,
good governance, trust, prosperity, tolerance, and
the rule of law in our respective societies. Social
and governmental systems that are characterized by
choices, transparent governance, economic opportunities
and personal freedoms are keys to victory. These are
enduring solutions, which we know will achieve positive
results.
In the coming decades, the War on Terror, waged in
a rapidly evolving global society, will defy our best
predictions despite our best intelligence and law
enforcement efforts. We must mitigate this uncertainty
by building bonds of understanding and trust through
a variety of partnerships. Together we will win this
fight, for the benefit of all the citizens of this
Hemisphere and the world.
This completes the formal part of my remarks and I
welcome your questions and comments.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Urbancic.
Page 28 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Before we begin questions by the Members, without
objection, I will enter into the record a letter that
was received by the Subcommittee from Venezuela's
Ambassador to the United States as a diplomatic courtesy.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Note:
Image(s) not available in this format. See PDF version
of this file.]
Mr. ROYCE. If I could start with a question about
your testimony. You say that we are detaining at our
border an increasing number of third-country aliens
carrying falsified Venezuelan documents. I would ask
you, how many cases are we talking about here? And
what are the countries or the regions of origin of
those coming here illegally who we are detaining?
Mr. URBANCIC. On specifics, I don't have those exactly
with me, but I will take the question and get you
an answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
WRITTEN
RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. FRANK C. URBANCIC, JR.
TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE
EDWARD R. ROYCE
Mr. Chairman, we are seeing an increasing number of
third-country national using fraudulent Venezuelan
travel documents to attempts to cross our borders.
Last year about fifty individuals, mostly Cubans and
some Chinese, were detained at our airports and other
points of entry with fraudulent Venezuelan documents.
This number does not include the third-country nationals
carrying falsified or fraudulently obtained passports
who were refused visas by our consulates.
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The reason that this number is not higher is that
many third-country nationals destroy their travel
documents before they attempt to enter the United
States. This is particularly the case for Cubans seeking
to enter the United States on flights into Miami.
Other third-country nationals may use Venezuelan travel
documents to travel around Latin America and approach
our borders, but will destroy the documents before
attempting to enter the United States to avoid being
sent back to Venezuela.
The fact that so many third-country aliens are able
to obtain Venezuelan travel documents is of great
concern to the Administration and something we are
working to counter.
Mr. ROYCE. Maybe I could ask the Ambassador. Mr. Shapiro,
could you give us some edification on this?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. Mr. Chairman, I don't have specific
data. We will get that information from the Department
of Homeland Security and share that with you. What
I would like to emphasize is what each of the Members
has emphasized and Mr. Urbancic in his statement,
and that is the great concern we have over the ease
with which people can obtain legitimate Venezuelan
travel documents.
Mr. ROYCE. One of the questions I am asking is, we
hear reports at the border that these documents have
been distributed to people from Egypt, from Iran,
from Pakistan, from Syria, from Lebanon. I am trying
to figure out how. If they are in possession of these
documents and they are not from Venezuela but instead
from the Middle East, what is the modus operandi for
delivering these documents to individuals coming from
countries of concern?
Page 30 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
How much intelligence do we have on Venezuela? Let
me just ask that. Do we have any intelligence that
you can share with us on the methodology by which
these documents come into the hands of people from
the Middle East that transit through Venezuela or
somehow obtain these documents?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. Mr. Chairman, I would be willing
to bet that just about anybody in this room except
for me could probably obtain a Venezuelan passport,
a legitimate Venezuelan passport, within a short period
of time in Venezuela. Part of it is due to corrupt
officials; part of it, one doesn't know the degree
to which that is directed by Government of Venezuela
officials. I will note with some concern that the
Government of Venezuela has signed a contract with
the Cuban Ministry of Interior for the Cubans to run
the Venezuelan office that issues documents, keeps
records, issues identity cards.
Mr. ROYCE. So they have contracted that out?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROYCE. That would lead to the question, what will
the United States do in terms of increased scrutiny
of those documents? Frankly, if people are traveling
to the United States on documents that are being detained
at the border, which allegedly are forgeries or allegedly
are handed out to anyone that requests such a document,
what type of scrutiny is under consideration in terms
of trying to tighten up admissions?
Mr. URBANCIC. Mr. Chairman, we are working closely
with DHS on this side of the border. Unfortunately,
this is a phenomenon which means that all Venezuelan
travel documents are compromised or have to be considered
compromised, and all legitimate Venezuelans are going
to have to undergo additional scrutiny at our borders
because we can't trust the documents issued by that
government.
Page 31 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So we are working with DHS very much to tighten up
scrutiny when people try to cross into our borders,
and I believe the same thing is true at the Embassy.
Mr. ROYCE. Go ahead, Ambassador.
Ambassador SHAPIRO. At our Embassy in Caracas, in
our Consular Section, people are giving great scrutiny
to Venezuelan travel documents, particularly passports,
to ensure that those passports are valid, and they
are issued to the person who's photo is inside that
passport. One of the repercussions of that is that
many ordinary law-abiding Venezuelan citizens are
sent to get new passports because we won't accept
those they come in with. We can't tell whether or
not they are fraudulent, and Venezuelan citizens entering
the United States, again, coming for all sorts of
law-abiding purposes are subjected to greater scrutiny.
If I may add, not just United States, but also France
and the Netherlands, have issued alerts on Venezuelan
travel documents.
Mr. ROYCE. One of the difficulties here is that Margarita
Island, off the coast of Venezuela, is the home of
many Iranian and Lebanese merchants who operate in
the capacity of export-import on that island. There
have been reports of terrorist finance activities
on that island for groups in the Middle East. This
is one of the concerns that our Treasury Department
has.
These individuals also obtain these documents—it
is a transit point for people from Lebanon, Iran and
other countries in the Middle East. It is a Lebanese
transit point through Venezuela, basically, and so
you do have some difficulty since those individuals
arguably are Venezuelan that live on that island and
do business there. I would ask, could you provide
us with an estimate to the amount of money being sent
from Venezuela to Middle Eastern groups involved in
terrorism? The reports we hear suggest that it is
sent off of Margarita Island.
Page 32 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Ambassador SHAPIRO. We will endeavor to get that information
for you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
WRITTEN
RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. FRANK C. URBANCIC, JR.
TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE
EDWARD R. ROYCE
Margarita Island is a free trade zone that is and
has been used by legitimate businesses, including
some in the U.S. Unfortunately, illegitimate businesses
of every persuasion, including South American drug
traffickers, abuse the zone by laundering their funds
through trade. As a free trade zone, Margarita Island
is susceptible to abuse, but it also facilitates legitimate
trade. Unconfirmed press accounts continue to allege
the presence of radical Islamic operatives in Venezuela—especially
on Margarita Island.
The Government of Venezuela has taken some steps to
expand its anti-money laundering regime with the passage
of the Organic Law Against Organized Crime in 2005.
However Venezuela can and should do more. Venezuela
should create and enact legislation to criminalize
the financing of terrorism, as well as institute measures
to expedite the freezing of terrorist assets.
The Department of State actively works with the USG
interagency to monitor and combat money laundering
and the financing of terrorism.
Mr. ROYCE. Can you answer whether state banks are
involved at all in transmitting the money that allegedly
goes to terrorist organizations? And whether this
is a significant fundraising base for those organizations?
Page 33 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. URBANCIC. In this forum, I think the main thing
we would say is that the relationship between the
Venezuelan Government and the Government of Iran,
which is a state supporter of terrorism, and one particular
terrorist group that we all know very well, operating
in south Lebanon, is very well known, and there is
simply no doubt about that, and we are very, very
worried about it and watching it.
Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you one last question. Last
year, an Ecuadorian military intelligence report was
noted in the press alleging that leftists from Ecuador
and seven other Latin American nations received guerilla
training inside Venezuela. Can you comment on the
allegations of that report, that Venezuela has become
a hub for guerilla training for gangs that operate
in seven different Latin America countries?
Mr. URBANCIC. I think what I would say about that
in this forum, again, is that there is no doubt that
the Government of Venezuela is a kindred spirit to
groups that do these types of things and that it is
very clear that the government is headed down a road
which is very unhelpful in this area.
Mr. ROYCE. Are Ecuador's intelligence agencies considered
reliable? They made the report.
Mr. URBANCIC. Sir, we could have another conversation.
Mr. ROYCE. All right. I will turn to Mr. Sherman for
his questions.
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I would like to pick up on
the travel document situation. As you have pointed
out, the victims, initially, of the Venezuelan Government's
decision to have a lot of phony travel documents are
the Venezuelan people who might want to visit the
United States or Europe, or any other country in the
world that is worried about terrorism, and find themselves
subjected to additional scrutiny.
Now there are two ways that a Venezuelan passport
could gain entry into the United States. One is with
a visa. And as you have pointed out, our visa issuance
process has been tightened, and hopefully, we are
not issuing a visa on a Venezuelan passport to someone
that we haven't verified is at least Venezuelan and
hopefully is the individual who is named in the passport.
But the other way a Venezuelan passport could be valuable
is something that we saw at our field hearings in
San Diego, and that is, this Congress has not provided
the Border Patrol with a sufficient number of detention
beds, so that if someone is other than Mexican and
comes across the border, then we can't bus the people
back to Mexico because Mexico won't accept anybody
but its own citizens, and we need to detain people
until they can be processed and sent home.
Now with the scarce number of detention beds, the
Border Patrol is allocating those detention beds first
to people with countries of concern. So if you are
caught at the border, the United States-Mexican border,
for example, or I would assume the United States-Canadian
border, although that is a whole other story, and
you are holding an Iranian passport, we can't send
you back to Mexico but the catch-and-release program
hopefully does not apply. That is to say, if you are
not from Mexico but you are from a country of concern,
one of those scarce and inadequate and inadequately-funded
detention beds is made available to you.
Page 35 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. Urbancic, maybe you can't tell us for the record,
but most of those countries of concern are the countries
from which terrorists have come, like Iran, the number
one state sponsor of terrorists. Let's say someone
is caught with a Venezuelan passport. Would that make
them eligible for one of those scarce detention beds
because they are from a country of concern, or would
that make them eligible for the catch-and-release
program where we say, ''We can't send you to Mexico,
we don't have a bed for you, so please come back for
your immigration hearing at such and such a time''?
And as I am sure it doesn't surprise you, most people
who are caught and released never do come back for
those.
How do we treat a Venezuelan passport, like an Iranian
passport or like a passport from one of the countries
in Latin America that has a good program of controlling
its documents and a good cooperation with us on terrorist
issues?
Mr. URBANCIC. Congressman, as a former employee of
the former Immigration and Naturalization Service,
I take your question very seriously, and I understand
exactly what your concerns are. I am not absolutely
positive of the answer to that, what the DHS procedures
are, but we will find out.
[The information referred to follows:]
WRITTEN
RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. FRANK C. URBANCIC, JR.
TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE
BRAD SHERMAN
Over the past several years, State, DHS and other
agencies have identified areas of concern and documentation
and/or document standards that warrant further scrutiny.
Through this process we have developed procedures
for handling individuals traveling with travel documents
from nations of concern. We continually work with
our interagency colleagues, including DHS, to keep
them informed about problems surrounding the misuse
of Venezuelan travel documents and to collectively
look for ways to tackle this problem.
Page 36 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
For example, the State Department is looking at ways
to apply extra scrutiny, where warranted, to Venezuelan
travel documents and applicants.
The question of what specific actions Border Patrol
officers might take when they apprehend an individual
with fraudulent Venezuelan documents attempting to
enter the U.S is a question that is best answered
by DHS.
Mr. SHERMAN. Can I ask you to go to DHS in your role
and help craft the list of countries of concern to
reflect which countries terrorists are likely to come
from and/or which travel documents terrorists are
likely to be able to obtain so that DHS reflects the
knowledge of your office in deciding how to allocate
those scarce detention beds, knowing that Congress
should have provided a detention bed for all those
who are apprehended at our borders?
Mr. URBANCIC. We work very closely with DHS, and I
will raise this.
[The information referred to follows:]
WRITTEN
RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. FRANK C. URBANCIC, JR.
TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE
BRAD SHERMAN
We regularly discuss and share with DHS information
on particular regions terrorists are likely to come
from and/or which country's travel documents terrorists
try to, or are likely to, obtain. The specific regions
and countries at any given moment may vary depending
on a multitude of circumstances which can include:
threat reporting, criminal facilitation by alien smuggling
organizations and document vendors, the integrity
of travel documents, extent of official corruption,
border security resources, and other factors. We work
closely with DHS and other agencies to assess the
risks, update assessments, and identify and close
any vulnerabilities. DHS is in the best position to
address how this information would affect actions
taken by the Border Patrol. In the past several years,
State, DHS and other agencies have identified areas
of concern and documentation and/or document standards
that warrant further scrutiny. We continue to work
with our foreign partners to improve document security,
and reduce document fraud and alien smuggling that
can facilitate terrorist travel.
Page 37 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. SHERMAN. I would like to shift to Ambassador Shapiro.
Venezuela says it is producing 3.1 million barrels
of oil a day. OPEC's rules allow it to produce 3.1
million, and the government tells the people they
are producing 3.1 million barrels a day. At today's
prices, that is $85 billion of revenue every year.
Now you look at the Venezuelan budget and you see
that Venezuela is able to do far more for its people
now than they were when oil was selling for $20.00
a barrel. But you don't see $85 billion of revenue
being accounted for. Is this because the Venezuelan
Government is lying to its people when it says it
is able to produce 3.1 million barrels of oil, and,
in fact, they fired a lot of qualified oil producers
so they can't really produce all they say they are
producing? Or is this because they are getting the
revenue, and it is slipping through the cracks and
not entering into the official governmental budget,
or both?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. First of all, Mr. Sherman, the
Venezuelan oil sells at somewhat less than that price
that you see on the evening news.
Mr. SHERMAN. I realize this. The $75-a-barrel oil
may be a little harder to refine. If I said $85 billion
a year, but for those factors, it was only $75 billion—which
I might add would be an incredible discount for 3.1
billion barrels of oil a day—that would still
be true, the Venezuelan budget numbers do not show
$75 billion being spent for the benefit of the Venezuelan
people.
Ambassador SHAPIRO. A couple of things. The General
Accounting Office in June prepared a study on the
Venezuelan oil industry at the request of the Congress.
Their conclusions are that Venezuelan oil production
is probably, varies, probably around 2.6 million barrels
a day.
Page 38 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. SHERMAN. Let me pause for a second. The President
of Venezuela for political reasons fired the qualified
oil workers, and so the Venezuelan people are deprived
of roughly a quarter of the oil revenue that they
would be getting otherwise if Venezuela was producing
the 3.1 billion.
Ambassador SHAPIRO. The oil production has declined
in Venezuela since 2003.
Mr. SHERMAN. As an American, that affects me a little
bit; if I was a Venezuelan, I would be a little upset.
Go on.
Ambassador SHAPIRO. Secondly is that the budget passed
by the Venezuelan Congress is not a document that
in fact reflects expenditures by the Government of
Venezuela, and large portions of that money is not
reflected in the government's budget. In other words,
it is available for the Executive to spend without
the oversight of the Congress.
Mr. SHERMAN. Which means that as a Venezuelan—if
a Venezuelan believed in democracy, they would believe
that, through a transparent process, governmental
revenues are spent as directed by a democratically-elected
Parliament and, in fact, what is happening is the
revenue is being diverted, it is not being spent in
a way in which the Venezuelan people know how it is
being spent, and it is not being spent according to
the dictates of Venezuelan law and Venezuelan democracy.
Ambassador SHAPIRO. It certainly is not a transparent
process, sir.
Page 39 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. SHERMAN. With the Chairman's permission, I am
going to ask one or two more questions.
We know that Chavez, for his own personal reasons,
has decided to have an alliance of sorts with Hezbollah
and Iran. I can think of lots of ways that that hurts
the Venezuelan people because the United States is
kind of important, especially if your country is located
in this hemisphere. Can you think of any way in which
the Venezuelan people are helped by Chavez having
a close relationship with Iran or Hezbollah?
Mr. URBANCIC. Congressman, no.
Mr. SHERMAN. So it is kind of an expensive indulgence
to meet the psychological needs of the President.
Mr. URBANCIC. I can't talk to his motives, but I can't
see any benefit to anybody.
Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Finally, your testimony is virtually
silent on what influence the extremist Islamist operatives
have in Venezuela. Of course, the focus is on Margarita
Island. Can you tell us about the presence of extreme
Islamic forces there? And has the United States Government
confronted the Government of Venezuela over alleged
Hezbollah fundraising and other criminal activity
on that island? This is for both of you, really.
Mr. URBANCIC. There is no doubt that Chavez is friendly
toward these types of activities, and we have made
him fully aware of our concerns, and we are fully
watching and working to make sure that we are aware
of what he is doing. So far, it is an ambiguous situation,
but it is going in the wrong direction.
Page 40 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Shapiro, have we confronted the Venezuelan
Government with our concerns?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. Over the past 2 years, our Embassy
in Caracas has sought on 20 different occasions to
have meetings with Government of Venezuela officials
who have responsibility for counterterrorism. We have
not had a single meeting with the government on these
issues over the past 2 years.
Let me go a little bit further than that, sir. The
bread-and-butter work of counterterrorism cooperation
is the exchange of information regarding bank accounts,
people coming in and out of countries, phone numbers,
e-mail accounts. Over the past 3 years, the Embassy
in Caracas has submitted roughly 130 written requests
for different types of biographical or immigration-related
information on potential terrorist suspects and, to
date, has not received one single substantive response.
These include requests for entry and exit information
from the Venezuelan immigration authorities.
Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador, if I can interrupt, because
the Chairman has been very generous with the time,
I want to kind of crystalize this for the Venezuelan
press that is in the audience. What this means is
Hezbollah is proud that they have killed Americans.
Chavez is proud to help fund Hezbollah. On September
11th, we lost nearly 3,000 people. There is a Venezuelan
citizen, Mr. Hakim Mamad al Diab Fatah, who attended
school with the hijackers and we have asked for cooperation
and, in every respect, the response is that the Venezuelan
Government won't even meet with our people. I would
hope that the Venezuelan people would want a fraternal
relationship with their friends here in the same hemisphere
in the United States, and I would think that if the
Venezuelan people think of how they would feel under
those circumstances, that they might think that it
would be in Venezuela's interest to be more cooperative
and more consistent with the Venezuelan history of
friendship with the United States. We are in the same
neighborhood. We have lived together for a long time,
and we will for the next several centuries and beyond.
It might be in Venezuela's interest to not be among
the countries obstructing our investigation of September
11th or funding an organization that is proud of the
Americans it has killed. And I yield back.
Page 41 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. ROYCE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. On
the question of catch and release, one of the difficulties
we have had with OTMs is that there are few limits
on the appeals of those who are stopped and who are
here illegally. So immigration lawyers can log appeal
after appeal after appeal. Thus it is that we reach
a 90-day average for those who are detained in these
facilities.
We have a provision in the House-passed immigration
bill that would have the first decision by an immigration
judge basically adjudicate the case and would be final.
If that becomes law, then your work in terms of catch
and release becomes a lot easier because the backlog
is then solved.
With that said, let me just go to Mr. Weller from
the State of Illinois. Thank you.
Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Urbancic, Ambassador Shapiro, good to have you
with.
Ambassador Shapiro, whenever I see you, it triggers
memories of the time I spent with you on an election
day on a Chavez referendum almost 2 years ago in Caracas
and witnessing firsthand, as we traveled around to
the polling places, and witnessed firsthand the passion,
the polarization that was going on in Venezuela at
the time. When Chavistas were banging on the vehicle
we were in with their fists, it certainly was an eye-opening
experience for myself and others in our congressional
delegation.
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Let me ask a quick question. What is the size of the
Venezuelan military today? How many men and women
in their armed forces at this time?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. Including all branches of the
service, it is approximately 90,000.
Mr. WELLER. So about 90,000. Now this past year, the
Chavez Government entered into an agreement with Russia
to purchase 100,000 Kalishnikov AK–103 assault
rifles, an advanced version of the old AK–47.
So if their entire military people, including people
who sit at the desk, is 90,000, the question would
be, what do they need 100,000 of them for? And then
my understanding is that agreement also allows the
Chavez Government to have the franchise to manufacture
these weapons on Venezuelan soil and initially produce
up to 300,000 of these weapons in addition to the
100,000 they have already purchased. So, a total of
400,000 Kalishnikov assault rifles for a military
totaling about 90,000 people.
The Chavez Government has talked about organizing
kind of a citizens militia which would report directly
to President Chavez separate from the professional
military. My understanding is that effort is underway
at this time. Have we seen any of these Kalishnikov
weapons in the hands of the citizens' militia?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. Mr. Weller, not yet. The first
installment, the first portion of those have just
been delivered, I think, last month, either May or
June, if I am not mistaken, the first 30,000 of them.
As you stated, the deal includes license to produce
both ammunition and additional rifles in Venezuela.
I don't know exactly what the total number allowed
under that licensing agreement would be.
Page 43 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We have concerns. The government official a few weeks
ago, President Chavez, if I am not mistaken, said
that they want to arm—after the military had
received the weapons—that they wanted to provide
weapons to young people in the Francisco Mirando brigade
that they are calling it. Obviously, this is a matter
of great concern.
In addition, we are concerned about the 60,000 rifles
that these new rifles are replacing, and where they
would end up, whether it is crime, whether it is across
borders, the guerilla organizations, terrorist organizations
in Colombia or in the Caribbean or for criminal purposes,
as people have those weapons and sell them on the
black market.
Mr. WELLER. It is my understanding that when you refer
to the Colombian terrorist groups, that there have
been Venezuelan weapons that have been found with
sequential serial numbers, suggesting they were part
of a large shipment, just not arriving piecemeal.
It is my understanding the citizens' militia that
President Chavez wants organized, his ultimate goal
is about a million men and women organized in the
citizen militia.
Ambassador SHAPIRO. They have got various names for
various slices of it, but yes, that is the figure
that people are using in public.
Mr. WELLER. This is in a country of 25,730,000. So
essentially, that is a big chunk of the population
trained in military tactics.
Page 44 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Now also the Chavez Government does something which
by outward appearances seems like a noble thing. They
have set up a special university for young people
out of the Chavista neighborhoods to give a special
opportunity for education. It sounds very noble. I
am wondering, are these students, are they a recruiting
ground for this citizens' militia? Are they receiving
military training as part of their education?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. I don't know the answer to that,
Mr. Weller. I know that they are recruiting people
for these various militias and reserve forces in the
neighborhoods, of course the neighborhoods that are
those of greatest support for the Government of Venezuela.
Mr. WELLER. I read recently the Government of Eva
Morales, the former coca grower who is now the President
of Bolivia, there were 5,000 students from Bolivia
being sent to Venezuela for an education. Are they
receiving military training?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. I do not know the answer to that
question.
Mr. WELLER. That is an interesting question we should
look into, and I would like to know the answer to
that.
[The information referred to follows:]
WRITTEN
RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE CHARLES SHAPIRO,
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO
QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE
JERRY WELLER
Page 45 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Venezuela has pledged increased economic support for
Bolivia, including the provision of 5,000 scholarships
for Bolivian students to study at Venezuelan universities.
While there is no doubt about increased ties between
the two nations under the Morales government, we have
no specific information regarding military training
for these 5,000 students.
Mr. WELLER. You know, often, as the Chairman has mentioned,
when we think of terrorism, we think—around
the world, people always focus on the Middle East.
We always focus on other parts of the world other
than our own hemisphere; and we have seen throughout
the world, including our own hemisphere, that narcotrafficking
is the primary source of funding for terrorist organizations.
My colleagues talked about Hezbollah and Hamas and
other Middle Eastern-based terrorist organizations;
and, of course, we are well aware there are groups
like the FARC, the ELN, the AUC—three terrorist
groups that are based in Colombia, two on the left
and one on the right—that use narcotrafficking
to finance their terrorist activities.
But what troubles me is what I see as one of the clearest
links between the Venezuelan Government of Hugo Chavez
and terrorism is their blatant lack of cooperation
with their neighbors as well as the Government of
the United States when it comes to sustainable action
against narcotics that come from Colombia and elsewhere
in the Andean region, which are then used in turn
to finance terrorism.
I was wondering, what level of cooperation on drugs
are we currently getting from Caracas, from the Chavez
Government at this point?
Page 46 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Ambassador SHAPIRO. At the police-to-police level,
we still are getting decent cooperation, Mr. Weller.
We have got an agreement, a bilateral counternarcotics
agreement, that we have been waiting to sign with
the Government of Venezuela since last December. We
had to negotiate this agreement because at some point,
a year or so ago, the coordinator for counternarcotics
actions by the Government of Venezuela accused DEA
of working to destabilize the Government of Venezuela
and to foment a coup, and so we have negotiated this
new agreement with them. We are waiting to sign that
agreement and implement that agreement.
Having said that, the cooperation we are getting is
at low-level technical cooperation.
We have got tremendous concerns. As drug flows shift,
there are a number of identified aircraft tracks.
These are planes that have not filed flight plans—some
of them presumably are innocent, some of them are
not—going from Venezuela to the Island of Hispaniola;
and our concern is that many of those are, in fact,
carrying narcotics en route to the United States.
Mr. WELLER. In the past year, can you cite instances
where the Venezuelan Government, their interior ministry,
their national police, their own counternarcotics
program, have apprehended narcotraffickers, internationally
recognized narcotraffickers, and delivered them to
the United States or to their neighbors for prosecution
or, in their own case, prosecuted them?
Page 47 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Ambassador SHAPIRO. They have arrested people inside
Venezuela. They have made seizures of drugs inside
Venezuela. To my knowledge, in the last year they
have not extradited or deported anyone to another
country.
The Government of Colombia, in fact, is seeking a
Colombian narcotics trafficker who is in—whom
the Colombians believe to be operating inside Venezuela.
Mr. WELLER. Speaking of Colombia, which I believe
is the longest-standing democracy in South America,
certainly an ally of ours, a friend, trading partner,
has a democratically-elected government and recently
successfully underwent elections returning President
Uribe to office, what is the level of cooperation
between the Chavez Government and Colombia when it
comes to border security, when it comes to cooperative
efforts in working with the Government of Colombia
regarding counterterrorism? And also, will you just
talk about if you differentiate between the frontier
between the two countries as well as in the Caribbean?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. I was fortunate enough to be in
Colombia on Monday with Director of National Drug
Control Policy, John Walters, and our Assistant Secretary
for Counternarcotics, international narcotics matters,
Ann Patterson. We met with President Uribe on Monday.
He had met with President Chavez over the weekend,
and he was hopeful that they would be able to improve
the level of cooperation between those two countries.
Now with the minister of defense, the commanders of
the Colombian national police, army, navy and air
force, they, too, they want to improve the level of
cooperation with Venezuela. The sense that I get from
them, and I have had Colombian officials tell me this
before, is that—not that they expect Venezuela
to see all the, I think it is 2,100-kilometer-long
border between those two countries, but that they
get the same imperfect, admittedly, level of cooperation
from Venezuela that they are receiving from their
own neighbors, Panama, Ecuador, Peru.
Page 48 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. WELLER. In comparing what you have described between
Venezuela, the Government of Hugo Chavez and Venezuela
and as the neighbor of Colombia, is that situation
identical with, say, Brazil or, I believe, Guyana,
which are the other two nations that share a frontier
with Venezuela? Do they have the same—would
you say it is the same level of cooperation, is there
a difference in——
Ambassador SHAPIRO. To our knowledge, first of all,
is the Colombian terrorist organizations are using
Venezuela as a safe area. Venezuela doesn't have the
same issue with—let me change around. Guyana
and Brazil don't have that same issue with Venezuela.
Drugs from Colombia are moving through Venezuela.
Again, I don't want to say there is no drugs going
across Venezuela's borders with Guyana or Brazil in
either direction. It certainly is nowhere near the
level of that between Colombia and Venezuela.
Mr. WELLER. So I think it would be a fact to say that
the Colombian navy and the Colombian police want cooperation
from their next-door neighbor and the Government of
Venezuela headed by Hugo Chavez, but they are not
getting it today. Is that safe to say?
Ambassador SHAPIRO. Yes. The mechanisms are in place,
in writing for hotlines, the commanders on both sides
of the border, the unit level, but——
Mr. WELLER. So there is hope and there is talk, but
there is no demonstrable example of cooperation with
the Chavez Government?
Page 49 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Ambassador SHAPIRO. I would rather have the Government
of Colombia speak for itself, of course, but they
would like to see better cooperation with Venezuela.
And they—again, President Uribe met with President
Chavez over this past weekend. Interestingly, President
Chavez asked Colombia for help on fighting kidnappings
of Venezuelans by Venezuelans and that the kidnapping
has been reduced dramatically in Colombia and has
asked the Colombians to share some techniques with
them. So we will see what comes of that.
So they are hopeful that this would lead to something.
Mr. WELLER. I would certainly hope the Government
of Hugo Chavez would hope, with what certainly appears
to be a direct relationship with the FARC, to seek
the freedom for the Presidential candidate in the
previous Presidential election in Colombia who was
kidnapped by the FARC and has been held ever since,
as well as other elected officials and judges and
citizens of Colombia that are being held by FARC as
well as three Americans.
Ambassador SHAPIRO. Absolutely.
Mr. WELLER. I think as citizens of the hemisphere
as well as the world that they would want to demonstrate
their commitment and use those relationships for something
positive.
You know, Mr. Urbancic, let me ask a simple question.
In today's world, do you find the vast majority of
governments around the world certainly want to eliminate
any appearance of having any ties to terrorist groups
or to remove any doubt that they may have connections
or provide any support for any internationally recognized
terrorist groups?
Page 50 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. URBANCIC. All reputable governments do, and most
disreputable governments also want to because they
want to act like they are in the family of nations.
It is a very perplexing situation down there.
Mr. WELLER. Well, it is the 21st century. We have
a global war on terrorism going on. I would think
that any government that wanted to be a good citizen
and a good neighbor would wish to demonstrate that
by removing all doubt that there is a terrorist element
that finds refuge inside their sovereign borders,
and I would certainly encourage my friends—I
have had the opportunity to meet the Chavez Government
as well as elsewhere in Venezuela—to seek that
goal. Because I would think that demonstration would
send a pretty loud message, you know, the doubts that
have been raised are false; and I hope they are.
But, clearly, they need to remove all those doubts
by cooperating more on the war on terror, certainly
on cooperating when it comes to counternarcotics and
eliminating the presence and representation of various
terrorist groups, not only from the Middle East, but
from our own hemisphere who appear to be operating
freely and having representatives that are freely
walking the streets of Caracas and elsewhere in Venezuela.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this important hearing.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Weller.
In conclusion, let me make the observation that news
reports reflect that thousands of Venezuelan identity
documents are being distributed to foreigners from
Middle Eastern nations, including Syria, Pakistan,
Egypt and Lebanon. This is certainly not in the best
interests of people from Venezuela. It is certainly
not in the national interests of the United States,
to have these used as identity documents for anyone
coming into the United States, especially given the
fact that the integrity over this passport security
process in Venezuela is now being contracted out to
the Government of Cuba. So, unfortunately, we need
to make it mandatory that these are not valid travel
documents into the United States.
Page 51 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Let me say that in a post 9/11 world this takes on
all the more significance. The families of the victims
of the 9/11 tragedy are certainly very disconcerted
that the Government of Venezuela will not cooperate
in any way with the intelligence services regarding
the activities of the Venezuelans of Middle Eastern
descent who attended the flight school training with
other 9/11 hijackers. This gives us great pause in
terms of the motivations of Hugo Chavez with respect
to his lack of cooperation on international terrorism
and his turning a blind eye to what is happening inside
his country.
I thank you both for appearing on the panel today.
We appreciate your testimony.
This Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A
P P E N D I X
Material
Submitted for the Hearing Record
PREPARED
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Sherman, thank you
for holding this important and timely hearing on Venezuela's
role in global antiterrorism efforts.
Page 52 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Along with its unclear connection to Latin American
FTOs, Venezuela, deemed a ''not cooperating fully''
state by the State Department, continues to deepen
its involvement with countries such as Iran and Cuba,
two state sponsors of terrorism. President Hugo Chavez
has defended Iran's nuclear proliferation aims in
spite of UN and IAEA concerns. Equally worrisome is
President Hugo Chavez's efforts to build up his country's
arms. The ''not cooperating fully'' designation is
often seen as an intermediate step towards a clean
bill of health for a state, yet Venezuela has not
shown any moves toward cooperation that previously
listed states such as Afghanistan and Sudan have demonstrated.
As we look at the struggle for consensus regarding
current conflicts in the Middle East, we must once
again appreciate the importance of multilateral efforts
in addressing the threat that terrorist organizations
such as Hamas and Hezbollah pose. Moreover, we must
remember that terrorism anywhere in the world requires
the cooperation of countries on both hemispheres.
Thus, Venezuela's designation as ''not cooperating
fully'' with U.S. antiterrorism pursuits remains an
essential issue for Congress to ponder.
Mr. Urbancic, I welcome you to our committee and look
forward to hearing your testimony. I am particularly
interested in hearing your thoughts on future U.S.-Venezuelan
relations, and what more the Congress can do to address
this issue. Thank you for being here today.
|