Alexander the Great couldn’t do; Queen
Victoria couldn’t do it; three successive
Soviet general-secretaries from 1979 to 1985
couldn’t do it. Both his writings and
his first two months in office indicate that
President Obama is a man of great confidence
and persistence. Unfortunately, he is likely
to join his predecessors in failing to stabilize
the political and economic foundations of Afghanistan.
Obama’s persistence, in this case, will
lead to persistent warfare. Added to this, he
has taken on the Sisyphean challenges of strengthening
Pakistan’s democracy with $7.5 billion
in economic aid over the next five years; forging
economic and military cooperation between Afghanistan
and Pakistan; and stabilizing relations between
India and Pakistan. Afghanistan will now become
Obama’s war, and Southwest Asia may well
become his briar patch.
In March 1985, President Mikhail Gorbachev acceded
to power; within several weeks he repudiated
his predecessors and gave a secret speech to
the Politburo that referred to Afghanistan as
Moscow’s “bleeding wound.”
In December, the Politburo made the political
decision to withdraw. Gorbachev went public
with the decision in February 1986, and a year
later offered to specify a withdrawal timetable
in exchange for US support for a coalition government
in Kabul. Unfortunately, Secretary of State
George Shultz’s refusal to cooperate delayed
Soviet withdrawal to 1989 and set the stage
for the ultimate triumph of the Taliban in the
1990s. President Bush abandoned the struggle
in 2003, when his administration invaded Iraq.
Once again, Taliban forces are positioned to
triumph in Afghanistan.
Rather than emulate Gorbachev’s decisive
withdrawal, Obama has endorsed a compromise
plan that combines good advice from Vice President
Biden, with bad advice from General David Petraeus,
and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. Petraeus,
who has been given too much credit for his counterinsurgency
doctrine and his support for the surge in Iraq,
clearly favors a long-term commitment in Afghanistan,
an effort to protect the Afghan population,
and a campaign to win the hearts and minds of
the populace. Holbrooke, who cut his teeth on
a failed Vietnam policy in the 1960s as a junior
Foreign Service Officer, wants to widen assistance
programs to corrupt and incompetent governments
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Only Biden
appears to understand that our only objective
in Afghanistan is making sure that al Qaeda
does not gain another sanctuary in Afghanistan
for planning operations against the United States
and that it does not require a stronger military
presence in Afghanistan to achieve such an objective.
Rather, a stronger military presence will undermine
our broader objectives.
Obama has given Petraeus more troops and Holbrooke
more assistance programs. The additional 21,000
troops will not change the military situation
as long as the Taliban, al Qaeda, and various
tribal elements have a sanctuary in western
Pakistan. The application of increased military
power in Pakistan will only increase the political
power of fundamentalist forces and weaken the
Pakistan government’s ability to deal
with such forces. The assistance package will
be accompanied by a “drastic increase
in our civilian effort,” but the political
corruption of the Afghan government and the
economic domination of a booming narcotics trade
will ensure continued violence and unpredictability
in the entire region. Corrupt governments in
Afghanistan and Pakistan will ensure that both
countries will slow roll us to death with our
assistance and reconstruction dollars; we will
throw billions of dollars at this fool’s
errand. Obama believes that “increased
funding for a strong Inspector General (IG)
at both the State Department and the Agency
for International Development…and a Special
Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction”
will stop waste and corruption, but IG reports
have regularly tracked--but not stopped--the
corruption and venality within the Afghan Army
and Police. No amount of American forces or
American aid dollars will stabilize Afghanistan,
let alone create a democratic government.
At least, we can be thankful that Obama ignored
the polemics of Senators John McCain and Joe
Lieberman, who favor a large-scale military
buildup, which begs such questions as where
the force structure for a major expansion of
forces would come from and how do we deal with
the logistical nightmare that already complicates
our military presence. The mujahideen forces
in the 1980s shut down the Salang Tunnel on
a regular basis, compromising the Soviet military
campaign. The opposition in western Pakistan
has successfully hampered our supply route through
the Khyber Pass, and Kyrgyzstan is poised to
shut down a major transportation center at Manes
Airbase. There are many amateurs debating strategy
for Afghanistan, but we need military professionals
to recognize the importance of logistics and
the overwhelming limitations on a U.S. military
presence at any level.
We invaded Iraq six years ago when there was
no connection whatsoever between that country
and American national, let alone vital, interests
and now we are committing greater forces and
resources to Afghanistan where there is no connection
between that country and American vital interests.
Our only concern should be making sure that
al Qaeda or some other international terrorist
force does not gain a safe haven in Afghanistan,
and it does not require a large-scale troop
presence in Afghanistan to achieve that mission.
Sea-based air power and air bases in the Persian
Gulf could contain any government in Afghanistan,
even a Taliban one, and disrupt al Qaeda operations
and facilities in that country. It took the
United States far too long to discuss a timetable
for withdrawal from Iraq; it is essential to
deal with a timetable for Afghanistan as soon
as possible. It is time to support the Afghan
government’s accommodation with insurgent
groups and begin our own process of political
accommodation.
Melvin A. Goodman is senior fellow at the
Center for International Policy and adjunct
professor of government at Johns Hopkins University.
He spent 42 years with the CIA, the National
War College, and the U.S. Army; his latest book
is “Failure of Intelligence: The Decline
and Fall of the CIA.”
Copyright 2009 The Public
Record
