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| `1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.'. |
The purpose of H.R. 5020 is to authorize the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2007 in order to enhance the national security of the United States, to support and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of the United States. The bill also clarifies certain Intelligence Community authorities and makes technical corrections flowing from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act.
The classified annex to this report includes the classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory language. The Committee views the classified annex as an integral part of this legislation. The classified annex contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the guidance and limitations set forth as associated language therein. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In addition, Section 105 of the bill incorporates reporting requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint Explanatory Statement into the Act.
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee, including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), formerly the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. The NIP consists of all activities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as well as those national foreign intelligence, intelligence-related, and/or counterintelligence activities conducted by: (1) the Central Intelligence Agency; (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the National Security Agency; (5) the National Reconnaissance Office; (6) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (7) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (8) the Department of State; (9) the Department of the Treasury; (10) the Department of Energy; (11) the Department of Justice; (12) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (13) the U.S. Coast Guard; (14) the Department of Homeland Security; and (15) the Drug Enforcement Administration. The Committee has exclusive legislative, authorizing and oversight jurisdiction of these programs.
The Committee completed its review of the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request, carrying out its annual responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close examination of the U.S. government's intelligence programs and proposed expenditures. In a deliberate departure from past practice, the Committee decided to mark up the budget request much earlier in the calendar year than normal. This required that the Committee's focus be more strategic in nature. Instead of many budget-related hearings with witnesses from each intelligence program, the Committee held only three, two of which had the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the primary witness, and one with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Despite the limited number of formal hearings, Members and Staff took dozens of briefings covering all major intelligence programs within the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). This review covered all functional capabilities, such as human intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, open source intelligence, analysis, counterintelligence, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings and briefings. The actions taken in this bill are the result of the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community. This oversight activity includes the scores of Committee and subcommittee hearings and briefings, site visits, and fact-finding trips, and studies of intelligence capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges throughout the year.
Director of National Intelligence
As was the case for its fiscal year 2006 review, the Committee notes the time and attention it has devoted to the creation of an empowered, capable and agile U.S. Intelligence Community for the 21st Century. Since the end of calendar year 2004 when it passed sweeping legislation reforming the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Congress, and particularly this committee, has continued to oversee, assist in, comment on, and as necessary, criticize the Administration's effort to realize the goals and vision of that legislation. This oversight has focused on, but not been limited to, the standup of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). With the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Congress intended to create a responsible authority that would oversee and orchestrate a coordinated effort by the entire Community. The Committee has concern that the DNI is pursuing a path that will make the ODNI less an intended `orchestration mechanism,' and more another layer of large, unintended and unnecessary bureaucracy. Despite this concern, the Committee is committed to supporting all efforts that will make the DNI successful in better integrating the disparate members of the Intelligence Community and creating the best possible intelligence capabilities for America. In that respect, the Committee notes, with pleasure, that this year's budget request was the first that was fully determined by the DNI, and that effort by the DNI to create an Intelligence Community that is greater than the sum of its parts is beginning to bear fruit.
The war on terrorism and the Terrorist Surveillance Program
There is no question about the respect and admiration that this Committee has for the intelligence professionals that serve all of us in quiet, unheralded service, often in dangerous places and situations around the world. In the conduct of its oversight responsibilities, the Committee has had the opportunity to meet and work with intelligence professionals throughout the Community. The work that our intelligence personnel do is truly the first line of defense for all Americans. We owe them a great deal of gratitude, and we owe them every effort to give them the tools, resources, and authorities necessary to protect our nation.
Unfortunately, these honorable men and women have been poorly served by a small few who have taken it upon themselves to, for political or other motives, recklessly and illegally disclose America's necessary secrets and national security information. The issue of unauthorized disclosures of classified information has been extremely troubling and a focus of a major work effort for the Committee. The Committee has written to the President expressing its concern that there appears to be no reasonable expectation of consequences for those who harm America's national security by leaking classified information. Each of these perpetrators, whether they provide information to the media or to sworn enemies, is committing a crime and violating an oath to which they have sworn. Further, the Committee finds reprehensible the irresponsible reporting of extremely sensitive national security information. Such reporting does not serve well the national interests, costs untold millions of dollars in lost intelligence collection capabilities funded by U.S. taxpayers, literally puts lives in jeopardy, and makes the work by the honorable people of our Intelligence Community far more difficult. Instead of chastising this Community for its lawful and protective efforts, we should be fully supporting them with all remedies possible to stop these unauthorized disclosures. The Committee's work plan for this fiscal year includes reviewing all legal avenues to bring to justice those who violate the law, including those who knowingly receive, what is essentially, stolen classified information.
One of the most damaging leaks of national security information was the revelation of the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program. As a direct result of this illegal compromise of classified information, the ability of the United States to protect itself from terrorists has been compromised. It can be argued that what factually correct information was disclosed in the press was done so for profit and to inflict political harm. However, beyond disclosure of the classified facts, false and reprehensible claims of improper or illegal activities are even more troubling. For example, the Minority, in its views accompanying this report, state that the President has violated the law by failing to `keep the Committee `fully and currently' informed of all intelligence activities of the United States.' In point of fact, leaders in Congress had been briefed more than a dozen times on the authorization and related activities. Further, the Attorney General and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence briefed the full Committee at length on the legal issues and certain operational details. What the Minority further continues to omit in the public version of its position is that the National Security Act of 1947 clearly provides that `the President and the congressional intelligence committees shall each establish such procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title' and that the requirement to keep the committees `fully and currently' informed is to be done `to the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters.' In full accordance with those two provisions of the law, the Committee has determined that the extraordinary sensitivities of the operational aspects of this program would be limited to select Members and Staff of the Committee. That procedure has allowed the Committee to get full and current briefings on this program to monitor the communications of known terrorists. Therefore, it is the Committee position that the President of the United States has in no way violated the law with respect to notifying the Congress on these activities.
With respect to the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Committee is fully supportive of this defensive measure to understand efforts by known Al Qaeda or its affiliates to attack America or its allies. The Committee's position is taken with the full understanding that we are a nation at war. This is a global war on terrorism: a war that is not being fought primarily by conventional military forces on the traditional field of battle and governed by time-tested rules of land warfare. This is a war of asymmetry: a war to attack the hearts and minds of civilized nations; and a war, the battlefield of which, includes the homeland, something not seen in more than 100 years. To combat the elusive, smart, and agile enemy, America must think differently, act differently, and be more flexible. America's major weapon in this war is the ability to create knowledge about the enemy. The primary responsibility to `man this weapon' rests on the Intelligence Community. We, as a nation, must not tie the hands of those who are charged with defending us, and we must at the same time, and as a culture, protect the civil liberties we hold dear. The Terrorist Surveillance Program is critical to our national security, and the Committee believes firmly that the National Security Agency program provides the proper balance between the two. Accordingly, the Committee's Republican Majority rejected an effort by the Democratic Minority to withhold twenty percent of the funding for the overall operation of the National Security Agency until the Executive Branch provided cost data on this single, extremely small, program. The Majority found that it would be completely irresponsible in a time of war to withhold funding from an Intelligence Community agency that is providing real-time information on terrorists and other foreign intelligence targets in a time of war.
Continuing Intelligence Community reform
In the unclassified report accompanying the fiscal year 2006 legislation, the Committee commented extensively on the need for change within the Intelligence Community. Those comments focused on the need to respond positively to the criticisms and `failures' of intelligence that prompted reviews by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission). The Committee agreed with many of the recommendations of those commissions, stating that some of the needed changes will require cultural change and, moreover, a real need for the Intelligence Community to adopt a more receptive attitude to change. Ultimately, such will be necessary to improve the Community's overall product--knowledge. The Committee continues to believe that a number of systemic and focus area changes need to occur, and has, once again, in this legislation attempted to put emphasis on those areas of most concern: human intelligence, intelligence analysis, community infrastructure, and counter-intelligence.
The Committee notes that the President's budget makes good progress in improving human intelligence capabilities--delivering a plan to increase the number of core collectors and analysts by fifty percent. The Committee further notes that the DNI has had some good success in improving long-standing analytic process and tradecraft problems. The Committee's funding recommendations further enhances both the human intelligence and analytic areas by attempting to drive improved changes. With respect to infrastructure issues, the Committee is very concerned about the state of basic facilities and, in some cases, services throughout the Community. These include the relatively mundane, but extraordinarily important, things such as power and water utilities, the capacity of training facilities and instructors, and support to field operations. All of these supporting infrastructure functions are critical to collection, analysis and information dissemination, and have captured the long-term interest of the Committee. Finally, the Committee has focused attention on the issue of counterintelligence. There appears to be an alarming increase by nation-state and non-nation-state actors to conduct intelligence operations against the United States. The Committee notes that certain nations are conducting espionage efforts against this country at a level not seen since before the end of the Cold War. It is nearly inherent that when a country is, as we are, at war and focused on that war, its enemies will increase their intelligence efforts against it. We should expect this to continue as we pursue the Global War on Terrorism. This is an alarming situation, and the Committee believes that the Intelligence Community must refocus, and moreover, reemphasize its counter-intelligence capabilities and methodologies.
Lastly, the Committee finds that the Intelligence Community must embrace more fully unconventional and open sources of information. Many estimate that large percentages of information needs can be satisfied by open source materials, and the Committee believes that the growth of the internet and mass media has dramatically altered the amount of information available through open and unconventional sources. To ignore the value of such information is dangerous. The Committee is, therefore, pleased that the DNI has moved quickly to make the use of open source (unclassified) materials an institutional imperative throughout the analytic community. However, it will take a dramatic change in cultural philosophy to trust and use open source materials that weren't collected or discovered by `secret means.' Conversely, the
Committee is not pleased by the reticence of the Community, including the DNI, to more fully embrace the notion of unconventional sources of information. For example, and to its credit, the ODNI recently began releasing to the general public unclassified documents captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom. This project will allow the world community to help understand the Iraqi positions prior to the start of the war. Already this project has brought to light many of the intentions and efforts by the Saddam regime to hide materials from the United Nations inspectors and its ties with terrorists. However, the Committee's effort to get these unconventionally collected materials released was not supported by the DNI until forced to do so. Additionally, the Community all too often appears to be less-than-enthusiastic in following up on information brought to it by people outside the Community, including former government officials, experts in particular fields, or even authors who have more expertise on specific issues than anyone within the Intelligence Community. The Committee finds that opportunities are lost and information leads on things such as possible weapons of mass destruction locations are not properly followed. This is not the hallmark of a flexible and agile-thinking intelligence function that was envisioned in the intelligence reform legislation. The Committee intends to monitor closely the efforts to improve the use of these open source and unconventional sources of information.
The Intelligence Community today is one of transition. There is a continuing mission transition from old mindsets of a bipolar world to one of a network-based world. There is a philosophical transition from a DCI-centric community of disparate agencies to a more corporate-centric community orchestrated by the DNI. And, there is a need to recognize that transition `back to the basics' of good human intelligence to act as a basis for our unparalleled technical intelligence capabilities is critical. As we continue these transitions, we must recognize that there are gaps in capabilities, particularly in our ability to persistently stare at targets, which must be corrected. And, we must fully recognize that the need to focus on the issue of terrorism cannot be an excuse for not producing intelligence on the `traditional' foreign intelligence targets like Iran and North Korea, as well as the transnational problem sets, such as illegal narcotics and human smuggling. Some of these issues are specifically addressed in the `Areas of Special Interest/General Provisions' section immediately following. A complete discussion of the Committee's oversight findings and recommendations is contained in the classified annex to this report.
The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended authorizations for the President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget request. This includes an authorization for the intelligence portion of the funding for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Committee views these funds as an integral part of the Fiscal Year 2007 budget and has decided to specifically authorize these activities for the full year in this legislation at this time.
H.R. 5020 provides strategic and substantial enhancements in funding for critical world-wide intelligence capabilities. The Committee believes there is a need to improve certain intelligence capabilities, including human intelligence, counterintelligence, analysis, and infrastructure. For a number of reasons fully explained in the classified annex, the Committee has made some specific and major recommendations to realign funding. These changes include:
In addition to authorization for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, the bill includes provisions intended to clarify certain authorities of the DNI. These provisions are intended to further refine and strengthen the authorities provided to the DNI to oversee, coordinate, and manage Intelligence Community activities.
Finally, just as in last year's bill, the Committee has focused on the Nation's overhead imagery architecture. Last year, a decision was made to terminate a part of the Future Imagery Architecture program. Although this tough decision had certain positive aspects, one disadvantage is that it is essential to ensure that there are no future gaps in capability. In this bill, the Committee vigorously urge the Intelligence Community toward one of a very limited number of options, so that the Nation will have the imagery capability it needs in the future. The Committee's action in this area will begin a process of fundamental change for the Future Imagery Architecture program. Although the Committee expects some discomfort within the Intelligence Community with this and other provisions, it continues to agree with outside observers that the Intelligence Community appears incapable of meaningful change without significant outside assistance. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 is intended to provide such assistance.
In this section, the Committee highlights areas of concern that it believes must be addressed as a high priority by the Director of National Intelligence in leading the Intelligence Community into the future.
Strategic review process
The Committee believes that achieving the necessary reforms of the Intelligence Community will only occur through a strategic planning process. Accordingly, Section 425 of the bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to, in consultation with the heads of the Intelligence Community elements, manage and oversee the conduct of a strategic review to develop intelligence capabilities required to address threats to national security.
A formalized, periodic, and structured review, much like the Quadrennial Defense Review process used by the Department of Defense, is intended to identify the breadth and depth of national security threats, the capabilities existing and needed to combat those threats, and better identify the alignment of resources, authorities, and personnel needed to support those required capabilities. Such a review will enable the Intelligence Community to more readily make and accept change, infuse flexibility into its management and operational structures, and enable the DNI to gain better insight on intelligence and intelligence-related activities throughout the U.S. Government. The review also is expected to influence the National Intelligence
Strategy by examining requirements necessary to address national priorities and objectives, determine which intelligence disciplines can provide the best support, and properly identify budget resources should be allocated to those priorities and objectives.
The Committee requests that the DNI provide the Committee with his plan for initiating and conducting this review.
Reporting regarding Iran and North Korea
The development by Iran and North Korea of nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them are among the most significant potential threats to the United States. The Committee believes that it is imperative that the Intelligence Community continue to improve its collection and analysis of intelligence information on Iran and North Korea.
This point was highlighted by the bipartisan WMD Commission. The Commission's 2005 report stated: `Across the board, the Intelligence Community knows disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of the world's most dangerous actors. In some cases, it knows less now than it did five or ten years ago.' This statement aptly describes the challenge faced by U.S. policymakers with regard to Iran and North Korea's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.
If the President and Congress are to develop effective policies to counter Iran's and North Korea's weapons programs, such policies must be based on accurate and timely intelligence. The Committee has conducted regular and ongoing oversight of these efforts, and expects the DNI to ensure that the Intelligence Community continues to provide timely, detailed, and frequent reporting on the current intentions and capabilities on Iran and North Korea's nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, and missile programs, as well as the Intelligence Community's capabilities to understand and evaluate these programs.
In particular, the Committee is interested in receiving on an ongoing basis: (1) current assessments of Iran's and North Korea's nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and missile programs; (2) information on new intelligence developed, including intelligence collected from both open and clandestine sources; and (3) full discussion of any gaps in knowledge, dissents, caveats, or other information that would tend to reduce confidence in the overall assessment.
The Committee believes that these reports will provide timely information to help better inform Congress as it is asked to make decisions regarding U.S. policy towards Iran and North Korea.
Risk-taking and discouragement of risk averse culture
Intelligence is an art, not a science, and therefore imperfect, and it takes significant time to hone the operational skills necessary to conduct effective intelligence operations. The Committee recognizes that setbacks and shortcomings are inevitable while developing and conducting operations, especially against extremely difficult targets. However, fear of setbacks or `failures' should never be a deterrent to conducting high risk, essential intelligence operations.
As the Intelligence Community increases operations in exceptionally dangerous circumstances and against unpredictable targets, mistakes may occur. However, the Committee believes it is more realistic to measure success in the effort and initiative exhibited and not necessarily in the interim result. Lessons learned from failed operations should highlight shortcomings, and changes should be made. Only in this way can mission success be achieved. Although the Committee supports the notion `failure is not an option,' strict adherence to such a view may contribute to the development of a risk adverse culture in which certain operations are not conducted because of a fear of answering for failure. Although the Committee is responsible for investigating intelligence failures, it understands that honest mistakes will be made in highly fluid and complex operational environments. Our Intelligence Community must constantly strive for the `perfect,' but be willing to accept and take responsibility for failure; we must not foster a risk averse society.
The men and women of the Intelligence Community are among the bravest in the country, readily accepting the extreme personal risks inherent in their chosen profession. The Committee honors the sacrifices they make daily in their professional and personal lives and commits to the notion that honest failure is a price we must pay for being bold and proactive.
Unauthorized disclosures of classified information
As previously stated, the Committee remains gravely concerned with the problem of unauthorized disclosures of classified information, which harms national security, places American citizens and intelligence community personnel at increased risk, and inevitably results in substantial consequences to the United States--both tangible and intangible.
The Committee continues to address this important issue through two separate endeavors. It is continuing a legislative review, including hearings, to examine relevant issues and what changes to the law may be desirable. Those efforts have clearly established that prosecution under current laws relating to unauthorized disclosure has not been an effective deterrent tool, although it remains unclear whether this lack of effectiveness requires changes in the law or is due to other factors. In either event, the Committee believes that additional and more creative steps to deter unauthorized disclosures are warranted. Section 413 of the bill is a first step, requiring the DNI to review whether current law or administrative authorities enable the revocation of pensions of intelligence community personnel who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
In addition, the Committee has initiated a review of certain specific potential unauthorized disclosures of classified information at the request of the Speaker of the House. That review primarily is concentrating on an investigation of four cases to develop a better understanding of the related facts and circumstances. The investigation is in turn expected to better enable the Committee to understand how and why unauthorized disclosures occur, and how the protection of classified information is perceived in practice.
It is important to emphasize that the Committee's concern is in no way intended to limit or reduce proper oversight of intelligence community activities or of activities with heightened potential to affect civil liberties. As one of the primary bodies intended to conduct oversight of intelligence activities on behalf of the American people, we are mindful of the need for ongoing and thorough review of such activities. However, the delicate balance between protecting national security and safeguarding civil liberties must be carried out in a manner that fully protects both interests, through mechanisms such as regular reporting to the congressional intelligence committees and the use of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act. By definition, no individual--whether a journalist, government official, or intelligence community employee--can or should singlehandedly presume to determine what information `deserves' to be withheld from disclosure in order to protect national security, especially without full knowledge of the surrounding context.
Prosecution of espionage
Investigators, analysts, inspectors, and prosecutors from the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security are working together in an effort to combat espionage. The Committee is pleased to note that since 2005, their combined efforts have resulted in the arrest of at least ten individuals in the United States accused of spying on behalf of a number of foreign countries.
The Committee is concerned, however, that these individuals will face relatively light sentences if found guilty. All of them are charged under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 793 (gathering, transferring, or losing defense information) or 18 U.S.C. 951 (agents of foreign governments), which carry penalties of no more than ten years imprisonment. The Committee notes that most, if not all, were not charged under 18 U.S.C. 794 (gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign governments), which carries penalties ranging from life imprisonment to death. The Committee also notes that some of these individuals stand accused of stealing defense-related trade secrets from U.S. companies. However, none of these suspects were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 1831 (economic espionage), which carries a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment for stealing trade secrets to benefit a foreign government.
The Committee believes that the penalties facing these accused spies are not an effective deterrent to espionage. Americans tempted to spy on behalf of a foreign power should understand clearly that doing so will have extremely negative consequences, resulting in their arrest, conviction, and long-term imprisonment.
The Committee notes the effective work of Justice Department prosecutors, but encourages the Attorney General to review the Department's counterespionage strategies. The review should address the following questions: Is the current strategy an effective deterrent to espionage? Are those convicted of espionage and related charges receiving the punishment they deserve? Why are more spies not charged under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 794 and 1831? Would stricter penalties for violating 18 U.S.C. 793 act as a better deterrent to espionage? The Committee expects the Attorney General to update it periodically on the status of such a review.
Counterintelligence field activity
The Committee remains concerned about improper instances of maintaining information regarding U.S. persons at the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) within the Department of Defense, and believes it is important to highlight the incident as well as the corrective actions promptly taken by the Department to address those practices.
CIFA was established to bring leadership to counterintelligence efforts within the Department. The counterintelligence mission involves the identification and neutralization of the pervasive foreign intelligence and terrorism threat directed globally against the Department of Defense and the U.S. Government. CIFA is responsible for overseeing counterintelligence investigations, operations, and services within the Department; overseeing and conducting joint CI advanced training and analyzing counterintelligence information to identify and target the threat in our increasingly complex and asymmetrical world.
In the course of gathering information believed to relate to force protection, CIFA improperly collected and retained information on U.S. persons engaged in constitutionally-protected protests at the University of California. In response to a congressional inquiry, the Department of Defense acknowledged that CIFA failed to follow policies regarding the collection and retention of information about U.S. persons. These failures were especially troubling in light of CIFA's important mission to set the standards while protecting the Constitutional rights of American citizens.
The Department of Defense subsequently has assessed that approximately 260 records out of 13,000 records in a classified CIFA database, or two percent of the total, improperly contained information relating to U.S. persons. Department leadership has responded to this assessment and directed that the database should be used only to report information regarding possible international terrorist activity, required supervisors to review all reports before inclusion in the database, and provided for refresher training for Department personnel on what information properly may be included in the database.
The Committee understands that the Department of Defense Inspector General is in the process of preparing a report addressing at least some of these issues. The Committee requests that the Inspector General submit no later than February 1, 2007 a report which includes the results of any audits relating to CIFA including but not limited to the collection, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons. In addition, the Department of Defense shall submit no later than February 1, 2007, a report containing the results of any internal department review or investigation of policies, guidelines, and practices of CIFA related to the collection, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons, as well as a description of remedial actions taken to address the findings and recommendations of the Inspector General and any other internal review.
Intelligence support for transformational diplomacy strategy
The Secretary of State has launched a major initiative to reposition U.S. diplomatic personnel across the world. This includes moving hundreds of positions to critical emerging areas in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East over the next several years. This
year alone, the Department will move approximately 100 positions out of Washington and European capitals. Enhancements to the Department's ability to monitor Iran--through the establishment of a new Office of Iranian Affairs and the creation of Iran `watcher' positions in Dubai, London, Frankfurt, and other capitals--represent perhaps the most dramatic, and most critical, elements of this transformation.
Such a major realignment of strategic priorities and of diplomats working on the `front lines' may require a significant shift in intelligence support provided to Department policymakers by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). To its credit, INR analysts have worked on their areas of expertise longer, on average, than many of their colleagues in other agencies, and INR has one of the lowest personnel turnover rates in the Intelligence Community. However, the long tenure and low turnover of INR analysts may make it difficult for the Bureau to adjust to changing priorities.
This Committee has previously urged the Department to increase the resources provided to INR, which has remained relatively constant in recent years. Given the proposed transformations to the Department's overall strategy, the Committee strongly encourages the Secretary of State to examine INR's current allocation of human and financial resources to ensure that INR will be able to adequately support the Department's new strategic priorities.
Director of National Intelligence Office of the Inspector General
Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 provided the Director of National Intelligence with the authority to establish an Office of the Inspector General. On September 7, 2005, the DNI established such an office, `charged with detecting fraud, waste, and abuse; evaluating performance; and making recommendations to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the ODNI and the Intelligence Community.' Although the Committee supports the DNI's desire to have an Office of the Inspector General, it is concerned that it is currently chartered in a way that does not ensure the maximum utility of that office to act as a coordinating organization for all Intelligence Community Inspector Generals, specifically with regard to keeping the Committee informed of its activities and findings.
As an example, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act provided that any Office of the Inspector General created by the DNI would have the duties, responsibilities, and authorities contained in the Inspector General Act of 1978. That law requires each Inspector General to prepare semi-annual reports summarizing the activities of the office during the preceding six month period, which are to be forwarded to the agency head and transmitted to the appropriate committees of Congress. The DNI instruction calls for only an annual report, and makes no reference to a copy being provided to Congress.
The Inspector General Act also requires those offices to keep Congress and the appropriate Committees fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies it discovers as well as the necessity for and progress of corrective action. The Committee is concerned that the structure for congressional interaction with the DNI Inspector General outlined in the September 2005 Instruction is overly restrictive of the flow of information to the Committee. The Instruction states:
The Inspector General shall notify the DNI and the Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, of any request from the intelligence committees or any other committee or subcommittee of the Congress for any report or findings and recommendations of any inspection, investigation, audit, or other inquiry conducted by the Inspector General, and after consultation with the DNI, prepare an appropriate response to any such request.
Another area of Committee concern deals with the DNI's authority to direct the Inspector General not to initiate, carry out, or complete any review without notification to Congress. While other Inspectors General within the Intelligence Community operate subject to similar authority, there is also the requirement for a notification to Congress on the use of such authority. That requirement calls for statements to be submitted by both the affected Inspector General and the official who exercised the authority. The DNI's September 2005 Instruction has no such provision for Congressional notification.
One final area of concern relates to the reporting of `urgent concerns' from whistleblowers, and `particularly serious or flagrant' issues. In 1998, Congress created special whistleblower protections and procedures applicable within the Intelligence Community. The September 2005 Instruction makes reference to the DNI's Inspector General conducting reviews based on information from employees or contractors of the ODNI or any element of the intelligence community and states that they should `be subject to, and in accordance with, DNI policy and regulations concerning whistleblower protection.' However, it is unclear that these policies and regulations conform to existing law governing whistleblower protection and notification to Congress.
The Committee notes also that the CIA's Inspector General is required to report immediately to the Director of that agency `whenever he becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations.' The Director is to transfer such reports to the Committee within seven calendar days. The Committee believes that similarly prompt reporting of issues identified by the DNI Inspector General is necessary.
In order to strengthen the foundation on which the DNI Office of Inspector General was created and to ensure that the appropriate oversight committees receive the maximum utility from its efforts, the Committee requests that within 180 days of enactment of this legislation the DNI issue an updated notification that incorporates elements of the Inspector General Act and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 that relate to Congressional notification and whistleblower protections.
Enterprise architecture
The Committee continues to believe that well-formed and successfully executed Enterprise Architecture (EA) frameworks in individual intelligence agencies and across the Intelligence Community will ensure more reliable Information Technology (IT) financial management and planning. These EA structures guide the IT budget and decisionmaking processes, which in turn should facilitate informed strategic investments and unified controls. This belief led in large part to the inclusion of responsibilities relating to EA for the Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer (CIO) and other responsible officials in the Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
In 2005, the Committee noted its view that `the IC would benefit greatly by undertaking a formal IC-wide EA effort, as this process would take these `linkages' and fuse them together across the community in the form of standard business, performance, data and information, service component, and technical models.' H. Rept. 108-558, at 35. The Committee also directed that the Intelligence Community CIO in conjunction with the agency level CIOs to `draft the implementation plan for an IC-wide EA, which will conform the agencies' EAs to the broader IC strategy. * * *' The Committee understands that the creation and implementation of these EA frameworks is ongoing and urges the DNI to continue to work collaboratively with the Intelligence Community agencies to ensure that these are completed within the timeframe prescribed. The Committee directs that the fiscal year 2008 National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program budgets tie all IT spending to their respective EA frameworks at both the agency-level and Intelligence Community-wide.
Space acquisition programs--personnel
There is a general acknowledgement that the U.S. space acquisition programs at the National Reconnaissance Office and the Space and Missile Systems Center are in trouble. Simply put, expensive and complex acquisition endeavors always take longer, and therefore end up costing more than the initial estimates. Unanticipated delays can cause budgetary problems for other Intelligence Community programs, particularly when competition for resources leaves very little reserve to absorb unplanned cost overruns.
The Committee is interested in promoting greater continuity of personnel assigned to intelligence-related acquisition programs. It is not uncommon for space acquisition programs to take ten years, beginning with concept exploration, then developing an acquisition strategy, performing the source selection, and ultimately developing, launching, initializing, and operating the system (which can last decades). A seasoned acquisition professional will experience the interdependencies of all of these phases, and more importantly, gains an understanding of how the consequences of decisions made in any one phase ultimately affect the following phases. The Committee notes that previous personnel policies allowed uniformed military officers to remain assigned to NRO programs for the entire duration of an acquisition--in fact many Air Force officers made an entire career in the NRO. These extended assignments contributed to a sense of ownership, dedication, and commitment that is immeasurable and invaluable.
As anecdotally suggested, today's two-year rotational assignments do not provide an effective environment for successful space acquisitions. The Committee understands the military's desire to develop future leaders that have a breadth of experience, including experience focused in space related assignments. However, the Committee believes the mission to provide effective space acquisition professionals and to deliver these critical systems to the country far outweigh the need to develop well-rounded senior officers who are generalists.
Simply put, complex space systems acquisition requires extraordinarily specialized knowledge, skills, and dedicated effort overtime. This specialty deserves a focused, protected, long-term career status. The Committee believes that recreating a protected career field that focuses on acquisition of space systems is a key to fixing the underlying problems with our space developments.
Further, the Committee believes that current personnel assignment policies should be improved to allow space acquisition professionals to obtain greater experience and technical depth. Today's policies place a high degree of importance on rotational assignments to obtain broad experience. This model leads to high turnover rate in personnel and impedes military officers from developing the technical expertise required to manage complex space programs. In contrast, civilian acquisition personnel career progression is rooted in specific program management experience and a high degree of relevant continuing education. The Committee believes that such longer-term assignments for military officers would provide the acquisition professionals with more experience, with better judgment, and result in more personal commitment to success, than the current short rotational assignments.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of National Reconnaissance Office and the Secretary of the Air Force, to commission a study to determine the value and feasibility of establishing a protected career service for space acquisition professionals (similar to the JAG or Medical Corps) and how such a policy can be implemented. The Committee directs that the report be delivered to the congressional intelligence committees no later than 120 days after enactment of this legislation.
Many of the studies and reports that have emphasized the need for reform within various federal departments and agencies have also highlighted the need to modernize congressional oversight. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (`9/11 Commission') labeled congressional oversight of intelligence `dysfunctional' (p. 420). Many of the criticisms can be summarized by stating that `Congress is engaged in too much of the wrong kind of oversight--too few national debates on major issues and far too much time and energy being spent on relatively minor and parochial issues.' (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, March 2004.)
Specific recommendations of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) to improve congressional oversight include:
Both the House and the Senate intelligence committees have indicated their intention to establish oversight subcommittees. But these subcommittees will not improve intelligence if they simply demand additional testimony from top intelligence officials on the crisis or scandal of the day. We suggest that, if created, the oversight subcommittees limit their activities to `strategic oversight,' meaning they would set an agenda at the start of the year or session of Congress, based on top priorities such as information sharing, and stick to that agenda. (p. 338).
Encourage more informal discussions and collaboration between the Intelligence Community and its congressional overseers. (p. 340).
The Committee takes such recommendations seriously and is determined to improve congressional oversight for the benefit of our national goals. At the beginning of the 109th Congress, the Committee created the Subcommittee on Oversight, which is specifically charged with conducting strategic oversight. Among the subject areas assigned to the Subcommittee are the responsibility for overseeing implementation of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, including the creation of the office of DNI, and specific oversight emphasis items, such as information sharing, unauthorized disclosures of classified information, intelligence analysis, and information assurance. This subcommittee has taken a number of steps to improve congressional oversight, including developing performance criteria to measure Intelligence Community progress and studying the practice of Congressionally Directed Actions.
Metrics within the intelligence community
To facilitate increased oversight, the Committee has placed special attention on the development of objective oversight metrics. Few organizations outside of government do not use objective measurements as a tool to gauge success and to track progress. Many government organizations, even without the profit motive, have found effective ways to measure progress and improvement through objective measurements. For example, some agencies have developed measurements to track use of their products and modify them when customers aren't using them.
Logically, every intelligence agency should use some set of metrics as a management tool. Correspondingly, the Committee in its oversight role needs to have a useful set of metrics, likely somewhat different than those used by program managers, to evaluate the productivity of the Community. The standards should not be too different, however, because all branches of the U.S. Government should be working toward the same goal.
The Director of the National Quality Program at the National Institute of Standards and Technology observed that `We generally measure the easy, rather than the important. The challenge is to define the important.' The Committee seeks to work in partnership with the Intelligence Community to jointly identify and understand what is important--or at least that which points to the important. A former Speaker of the House has noted that `It's what you inspect, not what you expect' that drives what agencies do in response to oversight. The Committee is not interested in receiving reporting merely for the sake of reporting or in creating data for its own end.
Any effective measurements should be tied to clear goals and objectives. As illustrated by the observation `if you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there,' it will be hard to measure progress without understanding what the Intelligence Community needs to achieve and where it needs to go. Once the Community and Congress clearly understand those objectives they can determine how to measure and understand what is aiding or hindering progress on important issues. The Committee seeks to work closely with leaders of the Intelligence Community and develop meaningful metrics to measure the progress in reforming intelligence and improving important processes within the Intelligence Community.
The Subcommittee on Oversight has conducted an intensive review with outside experts. In particular, the Committee has reviewed the Baldridge review process and notes that significant improvements have taken place in companies and government agencies that have participated in the process. The Committee encourages the DNI to review this process and determine how it could be adapted and implemented within the Intelligence Community.
Congressionally directed actions
Historically, the Committee has included congressionally directed actions (CDAs) as part of the report language of yearly Intelligence Authorization Acts as a way to direct specific actions or to formally obtain information that could not be obtained through other means. CDAs also spark debate on key issues or gaps that, in the Committee's opinion, are not receiving the required attention of Intelligence Community agencies, leadership, and management. However, the Committee believes that responses to CDAs often do not satisfy the intent of the request, do not include a sufficient level of detail, and may not be properly used when received.
In the recent past, neither the Intelligence Community nor the Committee have had consistent processes in place to track, review or provide feedback on congressionally directed actions. Now is the time to improve the quality of both CDA tasking and their responses. It is the Committee's intent to move CDA reporting from the insufficient, resource draining exercise it has often been to the worthwhile information exchange it was intended to be. The Committee hopes to increase the quality of CDA responses from the Intelligence Community and decrease duplication or unnecessary reporting requirements tasked to the Intelligence Community.
The Committee notes that some CDAs are the result of internal congressional compromises or carry annual reporting requirements without sunset provisions, resulting in a growing list of required reports that may have lost relevance. For instance, in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the President is required to submit annual reports on the Public Identification of Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers. The Committee is at a loss as to why it currently needs specific reporting of the names of convicted narcotics traffickers, especially when other processes are in place to ensure proper efforts are undertaken against such traffickers. More broadly, the Intelligence Community currently must answer 72 annual CDAs, in addition to those newly assigned each year. Many contain useful information needed to perform the Committee's oversight responsibilities. Fiscal Year 2005 marked a high point for CDA tasking in the past ten years, with the Intelligence Community answering 248, while in Fiscal Year 2006 the Intelligence Community was tasked with 197 CDAs.
In the spirit of congressional oversight reform, the Committee would like to establish uniform procedures with respect to CDAs. For example, the Committee may agree that a briefing would satisfy certain CDA requests where that format is most conductive to the exchange of information. In addition, the Subcommittee on Oversight is conducting a thorough review of all annual reporting requirements to assess the usefulness and the cost to prepare the other reports now required. As a result of an initial review, the Committee-reported bill repeals provisions of law requiring several of these annual reports. It is a good beginning.
The Committee would like to acknowledge the work put into CDA responses by the Intelligence Community workforce, and by the ODNI to ensure that all CDAs are answered in a timely, worthwhile manner. Going forward, it is in the best interest of our national security to minimize duplication and waste in all areas, and the Committee sees the clarification and restructuring of CDAs as a perfect opportunity.
On March 30, 2006, the Committee met in open and closed session and ordered the bill H.R. 5020 favorably reported, as amended.
In open session, the Committee considered the text of the bill H.R. 5020.
Chairman Hoekstra offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 5020. The contents of the amendment in the nature of a substitute are described in the Section-by-Section analysis and the Explanation of Amendment. The Committee considered the following amendments to the amendment in the nature of a substitute:
Mr. Hastings offered an amendment to require the President to submit a separate statement of the proposed budget for the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and to authorize appropriations. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 8 ayes to 10 noes:
Mr. Everett offered an amendment to limit termination of the U-2 aircraft program. It was agreed to by voice vote.
Ms. Harman then moved to close the meeting because national security would be endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 15 ayes to 0 noes:
Ms. Eshoo offered an amendment to provide that not more than 80 percent of the funds specified for a program in the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be authorized until the President submits a report on the cost of the program described in the weekly radio address of the President on December 17, 2005.
After debate, the Committee returned to open session by unanimous consent. The amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 8 ayes to 10 noes:
The Committee then adopted the amendment in the nature of a substitute by voice vote.
Ms. Harman then moved to close the meeting because national security would be endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 15 ayes to 0 noes:
Ms. Eshoo offered an amendment to modify the funding level for a program contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. In lieu of the amendment, the Schedule of Authorizations was modified by unanimous consent.
Mr. Boswell offered an amendment to modify the funding levels for programs contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 7 ayes to 10 noes:
The Committee then adopted the classified Schedule of Authorizations by voice vote.
By unanimous consent, the Committee returned to open session.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the Chairman to favorably report the bill H.R. 5020 to the House, as amended.
Section 1--Short title and table of contents
Section 1 contains the short title for the bill and the Table of Contents.
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 of the bill authorizes appropriations for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of these elements of the United States Government: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Section 102--Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 provides that the amounts and personnel ceilings authorized under Section 101 shall be specified in the accompanying classified Schedule of Authorizations, which shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations and to the President.
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 permits the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the authorized number when the DNI determines that it is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions and promptly notifies the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 104--Intelligence community management account
Section 104 authorizes specified funds, as well as classified amounts, for the Intelligence Community Management Account and provides that personnel detailed to that staff from other agencies are detailed on a reimbursable basis.
Section 105--Incorporation of reporting requirements
Section 105 provides that each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill is incorporated into the Act and made a requirement in law.
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes funds for the CIA Retirement and Disability System.
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law
Section 301 permits the authorized amounts to be increased to provide increases in compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of funds in this act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 303--Clarification of definition of intelligence community under the National Security Act of 1947
Section 303 provides a technical clarification with respect to designation of members of the Intelligence Community.
Section 304--Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel
Section 304 permits the DNI to delegate authority to approve certain travel on common carriers to the heads of individual Intelligence Community elements.
Section 305--Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of the intelligence community
Section 305 authorizes intelligence community elements to accept, retain, and use certain amounts received from private parties as repayment of debts arising from negligent or willful damage or misconduct, or repayment for default on the terms of educational assistance.
Section 306--Availability of funds for travel and transportation of personal effects, household goods, and automobiles
Section 306 permits DNI and CIA travel expenses to be charged to the fiscal year in which travel begins, even if not concluded in that year.
Section 307--Purchases by elements of the intelligence community of products of Federal Prison Industries
Section 307 provides that intelligence community elements must determine that a product or service to be purchased from Federal Prison Industries best meets the needs of the Agency.
Section 401--Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming authority
Section 401 makes a technical clarification to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
Section 402--Clarification of limitation of co-location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 402 clarifies that the prohibition on the co-location of the DNI with any other intelligence community element applies only to the co-location of the headquarters of each.
Section 403--Additional duties for the DNI Director of Science and Technology
Section 403 provides that the DNI Science and Technology Committee shall prioritize research and development related to intelligence (in addition to coordinating such research and development), including identification of basic, applied, and advanced research programs to be carried out by the intelligence community. The DNI's Director of Science and Technology is also directed to assist the DNI in establishing goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet its technology needs. Section 403 further provides for a report to Congress by the DNI containing a strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence community through 2021.
Section 404--Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community
Section 404 clarifies that the Chief Information Officer for the DNI acts as the Chief Information Officer for the Intelligence Community, and provides that the position shall be directly appointed by the DNI.
Section 405--Leadership and location of certain offices and officials
Section 405 includes the Director of the National Counterproliferation Center and the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center in the list of officers within the ODNI, and provides that the NCPC Director shall be appointed by the DNI.
Section 406--Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 406 permits the DNI to provide incentive awards to federal employees and military personnel assigned to the Office of the DNI.
Section 407--Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
Section 407 makes conforming changes to incorporate the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive into the Office of the DNI.
Section 408--Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board
Section 408 adds the Director of National Intelligence to the Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Section 409--Temporary inapplicability to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence of certain financial reporting requirements
Section 409 exempts the DNI from the legal requirement to submit an audited financial statement for Fiscal Year 2005 or 2006 to facilitate transition to the DNI.
Section 410--Comprehensive inventory of special access programs
Section 410 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, by January 15, 2007, a classified comprehensive inventory of special access programs conducted within the National Intelligence Program.
Section 411--Sense of Congress on multi-level security clearances
Section 411 expresses the Sense of Congress that the DNI should promptly examine the need for establishing and overseeing the implementation of a multi-level security clearance system across the intelligence community to leverage the cultural and linguistic skills of subject matter experts and individuals proficient in foreign languages critical to national security.
Section 412--Access to information by staff and members of the Congressional Intelligence Committees
Section 412 requires the DNI to provide members and staff of the Congressional Intelligence Committees with access to the JWICS computer network no later than 180 days after the date of enactment.
Section 413--Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information
Section 412 requires the DNI to review whether current law or administrative authorities enable the revocation of pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Section 421--Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure
Section 421 restores the independent authority to the Director of the CIA to protect intelligence sources and methods.
Section 422--Additional exception to foreign language proficiency requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 422 `grandfathers' current Senior Intelligence Service personnel from certain new language proficiency requirements and permits waivers for individuals.
Section 423--Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 423 permits the CIA to provide a protective detail for the DNI and clarifies the arrest authorities of CIA protective personnel.
Section 424--Protective services for former officials of the intelligence community
Section 424 requires showing of a specific and credible threat to continue protective services to former senior intelligence community officials beginning one year after departure from the government.
Section 425--Strategic review process
Section 425 provides that not later than September 30, 2007, the DNI shall, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, manage and oversee the conduct of a strategic review of the intelligence community to develop intelligence capabilities required to address threats to national security and shall include estimates of the allocation of resources and structural change that should be reflected in future budget requests.
Section 431--Enhancements of National Security Agency training program
Section 431 clarifies that employees failing to maintain satisfactory academic performance in a contractually provided educational course of training shall be liable for repayment in lieu of any service obligation.
Section 432--Codification of authorities of National Security Agency protective personnel
Section 432 clarifies the arrest authorities of NSA protective personnel.
Section 441--Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration elements in the Intelligence Community
Section 441 formally includes the Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration in the list of Intelligence Community agencies included in the National Security Act.
Section 442--Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004
Section 442 makes a technical correction relating to the DNI's authorities regarding intelligence activities at the Department of the Treasury.
Section 501--Aerial reconnaissance platforms
Section 501 provides that the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study and certify the mission capability of the Global Hawk RQ-4 platform prior to termination of the U-2 platform program.
Section 502--Elimination of certain reporting requirements
Section 502 eliminates certain reporting requirements that are encompassed in other reports or no longer necessary.
Section 503--Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
Section 503 makes technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Section 504--Technical clarification of certain references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
Section 504 makes technical amendments clarifying transition from the Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities to the Military Intelligence Program.
Section 505--Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Section 505 makes technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Section 506--Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
Section 506 makes technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Section 507--Technical amendments relating to the Multiyear National Intelligence Program
Section 507 makes technical amendments to the Multiyear National Intelligence Program.
Section 508--Technical amendments relating to the Executive Schedule
Section 508 makes technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Section 509--Technical amendments relating to Redesignation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Section 509 makes technical amendments relating to redesignation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee held three hearings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 5020. Testimony was taken from the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Such testimony related to the activities and plans of the Intelligence Community covered by the provisions and authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.' The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects conclusions reached by the Committee in light of this oversight activity.
In accordance with Clause (3)(c) of House rule XIII, the Committee's performance goals and objectives are reflected in the descriptive portions of this report.
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States government are carried out to support the national security interests of the United States, to support and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of the United States.
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that `Congress shall have power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; * * *'; `to raise and support Armies, * * *' `to provide and maintain a Navy; * * *' and `to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution * * * all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.'
Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office included herein.
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to requirements of 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the following cost estimate for H.R. 5020 from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office:
Hon.
PETER HOEKSTRA,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5020, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason Wheelock.
Sincerely,
Donald B. Marron,
Acting Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 5020--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
H.R. 5020 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for intelligence activities of the U.S. government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $550 million in 2007 and just under $1 billion over the 2007-2011 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary funds, as shown in the following table.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATIONS 1
Intelligence Community Management Account:
Authorization Level 990 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays 545 347 69 20 9
CIARDS: 2
Estimated Authorization Level 5 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays 5 0 0 0 0
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization Level 995 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays 550 347 69 20 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 104 would authorize the appropriation of $990 million for the Intelligence Community Management Account, which provides the principal source of funding for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and provides resources for coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management of the intelligence agencies. CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost $545 million in 2007 and $980 million over the 2007-2011 period, assuming appropriation of the specified amounts.
Section 201 would authorize a mandatory appropriation of $256 million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to military service and various unfunded liabilities. This authorization is above CBO's March 2006 baseline and would increase outlays by $5 million in 2007 over that baseline, assuming appropriation of the authorized amount.
Section 305 would authorize elements of the Intelligence Community to accept and spend reimbursements from private parties and employees of the Intelligence Community who damage equipment purchased through appropriated funds or default on the terms of any form of education assistance provided by such elements. Since these reimbursements would otherwise be returned to the Treasury, this section would affect direct spending. However, CBO cannot provide an estimate as the data necessary to estimate the impact of this provision are classified.
The unclassified sections of this bill contain no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jason Wheelock. This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
| TABLE OF CONTENTS |
| Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. |
| Title I--Coordination for National Security |
| * * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ Sec.
114A. Annual report on improvement of financial
statements for auditing purposes. ][<-Struck
out] |
| * * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ Sec.
118. Semiannual report on financial intelligence
on terrorist assets. ][<-Struck
out] |
| * * * * * * * |
| Title III--Miscellaneous |
| Sec. 301. National Security Agency voluntary separation. |
[Struck out->][ Sec.
301. Compensation of Secretaries. ][<-Struck
out] |
| * * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ Sec.
302. Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries.
][<-Struck out] |
| * * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ Sec.
304. Status of transferred civilian personnel.
][<-Struck out] |
[Struck out->][ Sec.
305. Saving provisions. ][<-Struck
out] |
[Struck out->][ Sec.
306. Transfer of funds. ][<-Struck
out] |
| Sec. 304. Protective services for former officials of the intelligence community. |
| * * * * * * * |
| TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS |
| Sec. 1101. Applicability to United States intelligence activities of Federal laws implementing international treaties and agreements. |
| * * * * * * * |
| Sec. 1103. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of the intelligence community. |
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
, including the Office of Intelligence of the
Coast Guard ][<-Struck
out] .
[
other ][<-Struck out]
department or agency as may be designated by the
President, or designated jointly by the Director
of National Intelligence and the head of the department
or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence
community.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence
Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities ][<-Struck out]
annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program
or any successor program or programs.
* * * * * * *
[ section ][<-Struck
out] subsection.
* * * * * * *
[ Joint Military Intelligence
Program ][<-Struck out]
Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs.
* * * * * * *
[ subparagraph (A)
][<-Struck out] paragraph
(1)(A)--
* * * * * * *
[ or personnel ][<-Struck
out] may be made under this subsection only if--
* * * * * * *
[
or agency involved ][<-Struck
out] involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)
to the deputy of such officer.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
section ][<-Struck out]
paragraph.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (9) ][<-Struck
out] (13) Such other offices and officials
as may be established by law or the Director may
establish or designate in the Office, including
national intelligence centers.
* * * * * * *
[
WITH ][<-Struck out] OF
HEADQUARTERS WITH HEADQUARTERS OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- Commencing as of October 1,
2008, the headquarters of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence may not be co-located
with [Struck out->][ any
other element ][<-Struck
out] the headquarters of any other element
of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
and ][<-Struck out]
[ (5) ][<-Struck
out] (6) perform other such duties as may
be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence
or specified by law.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate ][<-Struck
out] the Director of National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
and ][<-Struck out]
[ (4) ][<-Struck
out] (5) perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the national
security as the President or the Director of National
Intelligence may direct.
* * * * * * *
[
paragraph (2) ][<-Struck
out] paragraphs (2) and (3), an individual
may not be appointed to a position in the Senior Intelligence
Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence
Agency unless the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency determines that the individual--
* * * * * * *
[
position or category of positions ][<-Struck
out] individual, individuals, position, or category
of positions otherwise covered by that paragraph
if the Director determines that foreign language proficiency
is not necessary for the successful performance of
the duties and responsibilities of such [Struck out->][
position or category of positions ][<-Struck
out] individual, individuals, position, or category
of positions.
* * * * * * *
[ (b) ANNUAL
and Special Reports- (1) The President shall report
annually to the appropriate committees of Congress
on the types and volume of intelligence provided to
the United Nations and the purposes for which it was
provided during the period covered by the report.
The President shall also report to the appropriate
committees of Congress within 15 days after it has
become known to the United States Government that
there has been an unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
provided by the United States to the United Nations.
][<-Struck out]
[ (2) The
requirement for periodic reports under the first sentence
of paragraph (1) shall not apply to the provision
of intelligence that is provided only to, and for
the use of, appropriately cleared United States Government
personnel serving with the United Nations. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (3) In the
case of the annual reports required to be submitted
under the first sentence of paragraph (1) to the congressional
intelligence committees, the submittal dates for such
reports shall be as provided in section 507. ][<-Struck
out]
* * * * * * *
[ ANNUAL REPORT
ON IMPROVEMENT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR AUDITING
PURPOSES ][<-Struck out][ SEC. 114A.
Not later each year than the date provided in section
507, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the National Security Agency, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency shall each submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report
describing the activities being undertaken by such
official to ensure that the financial statements of
such agency can be audited in accordance with applicable
law and requirements of the Office of Management and
Budget. ][<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[
may only delegate the authority granted by this section
to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,
or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency, to the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. ][<-Struck out]
may delegate the authority in subsection (a) to
the head of any other element of the intelligence
community.
* * * * * * *
[ SEMIANNUAL
REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS
][<-Struck out][ SEC. 118.
(a) SEMIANNUAL REPORT- On a semiannual basis, the
Secretary of the Treasury (acting through the head
of the Office of Intelligence Support) shall submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees
that fully informs the committees concerning operations
against terrorist financial networks. Each such report
shall include with respect to the preceding six-month
period-- ][<-Struck out]
[ (1) the
total number of asset seizures, designations, and
other actions against individuals or entities found
to have engaged in financial support of terrorism;
][<-Struck out]
[ (2) the
total number of applications for asset seizure and
designations of individuals or entities suspected
of having engaged in financial support of terrorist
activities that were granted, modified, or denied;
][<-Struck out]
[ (3) the
total number of physical searches of offices, residences,
or financial records of individuals or entities
suspected of having engaged in financial support
for terrorist activity; and ][<-Struck
out]
[ (4) whether
the financial intelligence information seized in
these cases has been shared on a full and timely
basis with the all departments, agencies, and other
entities of the United States Government involved
in intelligence activities participating in the
Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (b) IMMEDIATE
NOTIFICATION FOR EMERGENCY DESIGNATION- In the case
of a designation of an individual or entity, or the
assets of an individual or entity, as having been
found to have engaged in terrorist activities, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall report such designation
within 24 hours of such a designation to the appropriate
congressional committees. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (c) SUBMITTAL
DATE OF REPORTS TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES-
In the case of the reports required to be submitted
under subsection (a) to the congressional intelligence
committees, the submittal dates for such reports shall
be as provided in section 507. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (d) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED- In this section,
the term `appropriate congressional committees' means
the following: ][<-Struck
out]
[ (1) The
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
][<-Struck out]
[ (2) The
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee
on Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate. ][<-Struck
out]
* * * * * * *
[ (h) ][<-Struck
out] (i).
* * * * * * *
[
ESTABLISHMENT- Not later than 18 months after the
date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence
Reform Act of 2004, the ][<-Struck
out] (1) ESTABLISHMENT- The President
shall establish a National Counter Proliferation Center,
taking into account all appropriate government tools
to prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related
materials and technologies.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ Director
of Central Intelligence ][<-Struck
out] Director of National Intelligence with
respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
of the Department of the Treasury as an element of
the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
by the Central Intelligence Agency ][<-Struck
out] by an element of the intelligence community
(as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) from Federal
Prison Industries shall be made only if [Struck out->][
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency determines
that the product or service ][<-Struck
out] the head of that element determines that
the product or service (including a surveying or mapping
service) to be purchased from Federal Prison
Industries best meets the needs of the Agency.
* * * * * * *
-
[
(a) The Director of Central Intelligence may exercise
the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5,
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees
and members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned
to the Central Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence
Community Staff, in the same manner as such authority
may be exercised with respect to the personnel of
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence
Community Staff. ][<-Struck
out]
[ subsection
(a) of this section ][<-Struck
out] subsection (a) may be exercised with
respect to Federal employees or members of the Armed
Forces detailed or assigned [Struck out->][
to the Central Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence
Community Staff ][<-Struck
out] to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency
on or after [Struck out->][
a date five years before the date of enactment of
this section ][<-Struck
out] December 9, 1978.
[ (c) During
fiscal year 1987, the Director of Central Intelligence
may exercise the authority granted in section 4503(2)
of title 5, United States Code, with respect to members
of the Armed Forces who are assigned to foreign intelligence
duties at the time of the conduct which gives rise
to the exercise of such authority. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (d) ][<-Struck
out] (c) PAYMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF AWARDS-
An award made by the [Struck out->][
Director of Central Intelligence ][<-Struck
out] Director of National Intelligence or Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency to an employee
or member of the Armed Forces under the authority
of section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, or
this section may be paid and accepted notwithstanding--
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
[ (d) GENERAL
COUNSEL- (1) There shall be in the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel who
shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National
Counterintelligence Executive. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (2) The
general counsel shall-- ][<-Struck
out]
[ (A) provide
legal advice and counsel to the Executive on matters
relating to functions of the Office; ][<-Struck
out]
[ (B) ensure
that the Office complies with all applicable laws,
regulations, Executive orders, and guidelines; and
][<-Struck out]
[ (C) carry
out such other duties as the Executive may specify.
][<-Struck out]
[ (e) ][<-Struck
out] (d) FUNCTIONS- Subject to the direction
and control of the National Counterintelligence Executive,
the functions of the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive shall be as follows:
[
(f) ][<-Struck out] (e),
in consultation with appropriate department and
agencies of the United States Government, and private
sector entities, to produce on an annual basis a
strategic planning assessment of the counterintelligence
requirements of the United States to be known as
the National Threat Identification and Prioritization
Assessment.
[
(f) ][<-Struck out] (e),
in consultation with appropriate department and
agencies of the United States Government, and private
sector entities, and based on the most current National
Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment
under paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis
a strategy for the counterintelligence programs
and activities of the United States Government to
be known as the National Counterintelligence Strategy.
* * * * * * *
[ (f) ][<-Struck
out] (e) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING
NATIONAL THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND PRIORITIZATION
ASSESSMENT AND NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY-
(1) * * *
[
(e)(2) ][<-Struck out]
(d)(2), and any modification of such strategy,
shall not go into effect until approved by the President.
* * * * * * *
[ (g) PERSONNEL-
(1) Personnel of the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive may consist of personnel employed by the
Office or personnel on detail from any other department,
agency, or element of the Federal Government. Any
such detail may be on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable
basis, at the election of the head of the agency detailing
such personnel. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (2) Notwithstanding
section 104(d) or any other provision of law limiting
the period of the detail of personnel on a nonreimbursable
basis, the detail of an officer or employee of United
States or a member of the Armed Forces under paragraph
(1) on a nonreimbursable basis may be for any period
in excess of one year that the National Counterintelligence
Executive and the head of the department, agency,
or element concerned consider appropriate. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (3) The
employment of personnel by the Office, including the
appointment, compensation and benefits, management,
and separation of such personnel, shall be governed
by the provisions of law on such matters with respect
to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency,
except that, for purposes of the applicability of
such provisions of law to personnel of the Office,
the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be
treated as the head of the Office. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (4) Positions
in the Office shall be excepted service positions
for purposes of title 5, United States Code. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (h) SUPPORT-
(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and
Director of National Intelligence may each provide
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
such support as may be necessary to permit the Office
to carry out its functions under this section. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (2) Subject
to any terms and conditions specified by the Director
of National Intelligence, the Director may provide
administrative and contract support to the Office
as if the Office were an element of the Central Intelligence
Agency. ][<-Struck out]
[ (3) Support
provided under this subsection may be provided on
a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election
of the official providing such support. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (i) AVAILABILITY
OF FUNDS FOR REIMBURSEMENT- The National Counterintelligence
Executive may, from amounts available for the Office,
transfer to a department or agency detailing personnel
under subsection (g), or providing support under subsection
(h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to
reimburse such department or agency for the detail
of such personnel or the provision of such support,
as the case may be. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (j) CONTRACTS-
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National Counterintelligence
Executive may enter into any contract, lease, cooperative
agreement, or other transaction that the Executive
considers appropriate to carry out the functions of
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
under this section. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (2) The
authority under paragraph (1) to enter into contracts,
leases, cooperative agreements, and other transactions
shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and limitations
applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under
law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative
agreements, and other transactions. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (k) ][<-Struck
out] (f) TREATMENT OF ACTIVITIES UNDER CERTAIN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAWS- The files of the Office shall
be treated as operational files of the Central Intelligence
Agency for purposes of section 701 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent
such files meet criteria under subsection (b) of that
section for treatment of files as operational files
of an element of the Agency.
[ (l) ][<-Struck
out] (g) OVERSIGHT BY CONGRESS- The location
of the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence shall not be construed as affecting access
by Congress, or any committee of Congress, to--
* * * * * * *
[ (m) ][<-Struck
out] (h) CONSTRUCTION- Nothing in this section
shall be construed as affecting the authority of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
as provided or specified under the National Security
Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.
-
* * * * * * *
[ (F)
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
or the Director's designee. ][<-Struck
out]
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
[
authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103,
subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section
303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and
405) ][<-Struck out] authorized
under subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) of section
104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-4a), and any other Government agency is authorized
to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums
without regard to any provisions of law limiting or
prohibiting transfers between appropriations. Sums
transferred to the Agency in accordance with this
paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under
the authority of this Act without regard to limitations
of appropriations from which transferred;
* * * * * * *
[
and the protection ][<-Struck
out] the protection of current and former
Agency personnel and their immediate families, defectors
and their immediate families, and other persons in
the United States under Agency auspices [Struck out->][
; ][<-Struck out] ,
and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence
and such personnel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as the Director of National
Intelligence may designate;
* * * * * * *
[
section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947
that the Director of National Intelligence shall be
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure ][<-Struck
out] sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i), 403-4a(d)(4)),
the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of
sections 1 and 2, chapter 795 of the Act of August
28, 1935 (49 Stat. 956, 957; 5 U.S.C. 654), and the
provisions of any other laws which require the publication
or disclosure of the organization, functions, names,
official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel
employed by the Agency: Provided, That in
furtherance of this section, the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget shall make no reports to
the Congress in connection with the Agency under section
607, title VI, chapter 212 of the Act of June 30,
1945, as amended (5 U.S.C. 947(b)).
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
[
OF DCI ][<-Struck out]
- In the interests of the security of the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States and in
order further to implement [Struck out->][
section 102A(i) ][<-Struck
out] sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1))
that the Director [Struck out->][
of National Intelligence ][<-Struck
out] shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods of the Central Intelligence
Agency from unauthorized disclosure, and notwithstanding
the provisions of chapter 7 of title 5, United States
Code, or any other provision of law (except section
305(b) of this Act), any determination by the Director
authorized by this Act shall be final and conclusive
and shall not be subject to review by any court.
-
* * * * * * *
[
position or category of positions ][<-Struck
out] individual, individuals, position, or category
of positions so identified.
-
| Sec. |
| 3041. Power of courts and magistrates. |
| * * * * * * * |
| 3064. Powers of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. |
| 3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence Agency. |
| 3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security Agency. |
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
terminated either by the Agency due to misconduct
by the employee or by the employee voluntarily;
and ][<-Struck out] terminated--
* * * * * * *
[ (1)
When an employee is assigned under this section to
an institution, the Agency shall disclose to the institution
to which the employee is assigned that the Agency
employs the employee and that the Agency funds the
employee's education. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (2) Agency
efforts ][<-Struck out]
Agency efforts to recruit individuals at
educational institutions for participation in the
undergraduate training program established by this
section shall be made openly and according to the
common practices of universities and employers recruiting
at such institutions.
* * * * * * *
-
| Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. |
| TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS |
| * * * * * * * |
| Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports |
| Sec. 821. Annual report on threat of attack on the United States using weapons of mass destruction. |
| * * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ Sec.
826. Annual report on counterdrug intelligence
matters. ][<-Struck
out] |
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ SEC. 826.
ANNUAL REPORT ON COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
][<-Struck out][ (a) ANNUAL
REPORT- The Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating
Group shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress each year a report on current counterdrug
intelligence matters. The report shall include the
recommendations of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating
Group on the appropriate number of permanent staff,
and of detailed personnel, for the staff of the Counterdrug
Intelligence Executive Secretariat. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (b) SUBMITTAL
DATE- The date of the submittal each year of the report
required by subsection (a) shall be the date provided
in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947,
as added by section 811 of this Act. ][<-Struck
out]
[ (c) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED- In this section, the
term `appropriate committees of Congress' means--
][<-Struck out]
[ (1) the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House
of Representatives; and ][<-Struck
out]
[ (2) the
congressional intelligence committees (as defined
in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a)). ][<-Struck
out]
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ Attorney
General ][<-Struck
out] Department of Justice, in coordinating
with State, local, and tribal officials and the
private sector.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Intelligence Director ][<-Struck
out] Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Attorney General, determines
that it is necessary to withhold information requested
under paragraph (3) to protect the national security
interests of the United States, the head of the
department or agency concerned shall not furnish
such information to the Board.
* * * * * * *
[ National Intelligence
Director ][<-Struck out]
Director of National Intelligence, rules
and procedures of the Board for physical, communications,
computer, document, personnel, and other security
in relation to the work of the Board.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (1) ][<-Struck
out] The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking
`Director of Central Intelligence' each place it appears
and inserting `Director of National Intelligence'.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ the National Intelligence
Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)
][<-Struck out] the
Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent
with applicable law.
[
shall, ][<-Struck out]
shall establish a budget structure of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to reflect the four
principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
* * * * * * *
[
the ][<-Struck out] Federal,
State, or local agencies on a full-time, part-time,
or shared basis;
[ the
][<-Struck out] specific
translation services in certain languages, and recommendations
for meeting those needs;
* * * * * * *
-
[ SEC. 1403.
MULTIYEAR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM ][<-Struck
out][ FOREIGN ][<-Struck
out] INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM- The [Struck out->][
Director of Central Intelligence ][<-Struck
out] Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional committees specified in
subsection (d) each year a multiyear national [Struck
out->][ foreign ][<-Struck
out] intelligence program plan reflecting the estimated
expenditures and proposed appropriations required
to support that program. Any such multiyear national
[Struck out->][ foreign
][<-Struck out] intelligence
program plan shall cover the fiscal year with respect
to which the budget is submitted and at least four
succeeding fiscal years.
[ Director of Central
Intelligence ][<-Struck
out] Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the estimates
referred to in subsection (a) are consistent with
the budget estimates submitted to Congress pursuant
to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code,
for the fiscal year concerned and with the estimated
expenditures and proposed appropriations for the multiyear
defense program submitted pursuant to section 114a
of title 10, United States Code.
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, and, as determined
by the President, any Executive agency or unit
thereof the principal function of which is the
conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities; or
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ National Imagery
and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, Department of Defense
intelligence activities the civilian employees
of which are subject to section 1590 of title
10, and, as determined by the President, an Executive
agency, or unit thereof, whose principal function
is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities;
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, or any Executive
agency or unit thereof which is designated by
the President and the principal function of which
is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities; or
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, and, as determined
by the President, any Executive agency or unit
thereof which is designated by the President and
which has as its principal function the conduct
of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities; or
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense.
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ Director
of Central Intelligence. ][<-Struck
out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ General
Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence
Director. ][<-Struck
out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense;
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director
of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency; and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
or
* * * * * * *
-
| Sec. |
| 1301. Agriculture, Department of: report of Secretary. |
| * * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ 1336.
National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special
publications. ][<-Struck
out] |
| 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications. |
| * * * * * * * |
[ Sec. 1336.
National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications
][<-Struck out][
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
may authorize the printing of notices to mariners,
light lists, sailing directions, bulletins, and other
special publications of the [Struck out->][
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
in editions the interests of the Government and of
the public may require.
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
-
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the National Reconnaissance Office, or the National
Security Agency, or of a contractor of any of those
Agencies, who intends to report to Congress a complaint
or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report the complaint or information to the Inspector
General of the Department of Defense (or designee).
* * * * * * *
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National
Security Agency shall each submit to the congressional
intelligence committees each year a report that sets
forth the following:
* * * * * * *
-
[ National
Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
or the National Security Agency, or any individual
engaged in intelligence activities in any agency
of the United States, if the President finds or
has found that, due to the nature of the office
or position occupied by such individual, public
disclosure of such report would, be revealing the
identity of the individual or other sensitive information,
compromise the national interest of the United States;
and such individuals may be authorized, notwithstanding
section 104(a), to file such additional reports
as are necessary to protect their identity from
public disclosure if the President first finds or
has found that such filing is necessary in the national
interest; and
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[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
or the Central Intelligence Agency,
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-
[
National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck
out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
or the National Security Agency, or (C) printing from
other sources that is specifically authorized by law.
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In considering the Intelligence Authorization for fiscal year 2007, we are mindful of the bravery and sacrifice of the women and men who serve in U.S. intelligence agencies, often under-cover and usually in some of the most dangerous corners of the world. We have visited those dangerous corners, and appreciate the risks that these professionals take for our freedom.
Because the budget authorized by HR 5020 is classified--and therefore shielded from public scrutiny--four Committee's oversight must be all-the-more rigorous.
Certain features in the bill are worthy of special emphasis.
First, HR 5020 contained a provision to limit the overhead growth of the Office of the DNI (ODNI) absent a strategy from the DNI on how its requirements for additional funds and personnel would bring value to the management of the intelligence community. We want the ODNI to become a joint commander of the 16 intelligence agencies, not another bureaucracy, seeking more billets and buildings.
Second, the bill provides full-funding for counterterrorism. The President's budget had only requested 78% of what the intelligence community says it will need for counterterrorism operations in fiscal year 2007. That request was inadequate--and dangerous. Relying on supplemental funding for counterterrorism prevents operations in the field from planning operations, and it virtually eliminates this Committee's ability to conduct oversight over those funds. For years since 9-11, we have underscored the need to fully fund counterterrorism. This Authorization bill now does that.
Third, we are also pleased the Chairman has agreed to include, in the report to accompany HR 5020, enhanced reporting requirements on a number of key topics. This includes the domestic surveillance activities of the Department of Defense Counter Intelligence Field Activity (CIFA), as well as intelligence assessments on the WMD capabilities and intentions of Iran and North Korea--two countries where we must get it right.
Despite these attributes, the bill would have been stronger if it included three Amendments offered by Democratic members.
Representatives Hastings, Reyes and Holt offered an amendment to require a dedicated funding line for the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in the President's annual budget submission to Congress, and to authorize $3 million annually for the Board's activities.
The Board was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which was signed into law in December 2004. This Board was designed to serve as a civil liberties `watchdog' as the American people grow increasingly concerned about the potential erosion of Constitutional rights in the post-911 era. Fifteen months later, the Board is barely up and running. The President did not nominate the members of the Board for 9 months, and the Senate took five months to confirm the Chair and Vice Chair. In addition, the Administration budget request did not include a request for funds for the Board in fiscal year 2007.
The Hastings/Reyes/Holt Amendment would have sent an unmistakable signal that this Board deserves dedicated resources to carry out its vital mission. Unfortunately, the amendment was voted down on a party-line vote (10-8).
Representative Eshoo offered an amendment to fence, or withhold, 20% of the NSA's budget until the Executive Branch provides the Committee with the total cost of the President's NSA surveillance program.
The Eshoo Amendment was a modest, narrowly-tailored amendment. It would not have required the Administration to provide the full Committee with operational details about the program (although we believe the President is required to do so.) Nor would the Amendment have passed judgment on the legality of the program. The amendment simply asked for financial data, so that members casting a vote to authorize the budget would know how much money was dedicated to the program.
The Eshoo Amendment was defeated 10 to 8, with all Minority members and one Majority member voting for it. By defeating this amendment, the Majority members refused to employ a common oversight tool (a fence of funds) employed 14 other times in the bill's Annex--to require the President to tell the Committee how much this program has and will cost the American taxpayer. We strongly urge the full Committee to continue to seek this information.
Third, Representatives Tierney, Boswell and Holt offered an amendment to prevent the DNI from transferring budget and personnel related to national intelligence functions out of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) to the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). We believe these transfers are demonstrative of a lack of strong community leadership further compounded by a culture of resistance to change. If left unchecked, this could render DNI ineffectual and powerless to integrate intelligence efforts to respond to emerging crises.
The Tierney/Boswell/Holt Amendment was defeated 10 to 7. In defeating this Amendment, the Committee missed an opportunity to prevent the dismantling of statutory authorities of the DNI and the ceding of key budget authorities over large numbers of intelligence personnel and resources to the Pentagon.
Throughout the mark-up, Members expressed their views on a variety of topics of relating to the intelligence community. Perhaps no topic received more attention than the President's NSA surveillance program.
We strongly support intercepting the communications of Al Qaeda into and out of the United States. This capability is vital. However, we have become deeply concerned that the Executive Branch is engaging in two violations of law with respect to the NSA program.
First, in failing to brief the entire Committee on the operational details of the Program, the President is violating the National Security Act--which requires that the President shall keep the Committee `currently and fully' informed of all intelligence activities of the United States. Failure to brief the full Committee compromises our oversight and is a violation of law.
Second, eavesdropping on U.S. persons must fully comply with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Nobody has yet persuaded us why FISA, as currently drafted, cannot cover the entire Program. The law is unambiguous--all eavesdropping on Americans in America must comply with FISA.
Allowing the NSA surveillance program to proceed without fully complying with the law threatens to undermine our entire Constitutional order--our system of checks and balances. As Justice O'Connor wrote in the Hamdi case, `We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.'
In
authorizing the activities of the U.S. intelligence
community today, we are mindful of the words of Justice
O'Connor and the solemn duty our Committee has to
uphold the rule of law and the values we cherish as
a nation--for that is ultimately what our brave intelligence
professionals are fighting so hard to defend.
Jane Harman.
Alcee L. Hastings.
Silvestre Reyes.
Leonard L. Boswell.
Bud Cramer.
Anna G. Eshoo.
Rush Holt.
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.
John F. Tierney.
Note: Mr. Ruppersberger was unable to attend the mark-up due to the death of his father earlier in the week. We send him and his family our deepest sympathies.
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