Arms Uncontrol
A Second Year in Which the United States Outsells All Others Combined
By James R. Morrell

Data: Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000" (Washington: Congressional Research Service, August 16, 2001)

A Publication of the Center for International Policy

     The United States has reached such a dominance of the world arms market that it is beginning to outsell all other nations combined. In the 1990s it was by far the largest single arms merchant in the world with 41 percent of worldwide sales.

      For 1999 the United States was briefly reported as achieving, for the first time and by the narrowest margin, the distinction of outseller of them all in one major category. It delivered more arms to the Third World than all other exporters combined. In the next year's series with updated data, the U.S. share was shaved back to 49.6 percent.

      But that new series showed the United States again as outseller of them all in another category, namely arms agreements to the whole world.

      Whether as merely number one or as outseller of them all, the data show the United States as becoming predominant in the international arms market. The costs to the larger goals of U.S. foreign policy are huge.

     Oscar Arias has written, "As the leader in promoting arms sales, the United States is in the unique position to take the lead in reducing arms sales, and in particular, in subjecting arms exports to a Code of Conduct which would prevent military technology from being transferred to undemocratic or repressive regimes." 

      As the market dominator, the United States could lead downward without losing market share. It could set the example without losing its dominance and work by cooperative agreements with the other major exporters to move downward together. That way no nation need fear it was being exploited for its restraint and all could work in harmony for a safer world.

      Also, the rampant arms sales interfere with other, more important goals. Unable to restrain its own sales, the United States is weakened in its efforts to restrain those of others. In his State of the Union address, President Bush singled out an "axis of evil" including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. While arms sales to Iraq are prohibited by Security Council resolution, North Korean missile exports and Russian sales of military technology to Iran are thriving. The United States forfeits the high ground that will be needed to pressure these countries successfully at the U.N. Security Council and other forums. Obviously, moral example alone would not persuade a cash-hungry regime to refrain from such a profitable trade. But the predominance of U.S. arms trade gives Russia and other exporters the perfect excuse. Because of this very dominance, exporters like Russia and North Korea are largely restricted to niche markets which they will be reluctant to lose.

      The following charts and graphs show the shocking reality behind the bare statistics presented by the annual Congressional Research Service report. As in 1999, the degree by which the United States topped the 50-percent mark was only a fraction of a percentage point. By a minor revision the United States might again be downgraded to merely the largest seller rather than the outseller of them all. Nevertheless, we stress the United States' dubious distinction in this category because it has been missed by press coverage of the CRS report.

      This report is the sixth in a series by our Demilitarization and Democracy program. Oscar Arias was the originator of the Arms Trade Code of Conduct which from the mid-1990s has sought to nudge the conscience of the world towards cutbacks in the trade. In his foreword to our report last year, he wrote, "An ugly practice continues to nullify progress in human development, and that is the international arms trade." It was a trade that placed "profit and short-term strategic interests before the value of human life, or even the ideals of democracy which these exporting countries purport to defend."

      Arias noted that 90 percent of casualties in today's wars are civilians: "When will we say that it is enough, and that producing more arms only produces more death?"

      Jan Willem Bertens of the Netherlands was the chair of the European Parliament committee on disarmament. He led the European Parliament in adopting a Code of Conduct with some teeth; the version that passed in the United States was advisory only. He wrote in our fourth annual report, "This report documents a consistent record of irresponsibility, laying bare the central role played by the United States in the reckless proliferation of weapons around the world."

  Arms Sales in Year 2000

Small-Minded Approach to Small Arms

            One of the most important initiatives in 2001 to restrain arms sales was the U.N. draft treaty against the black market in small arms. The Bush administration opposed the treaty, which was preeminently in the U.S. interest, in order to pander to the domestic gun lobby. As a result, the treaty was gutted.

      The treaty was the culmination of a two-year campaign by European governments and world nongovernmental organizations, inspired by the international campaign that produced the Ottawa treaty against land mines, for an accord to clamp down on illicit sales to rebel units and rogue regimes. The International Action Network Against Small Arms (IANSA), of which CIP is a member, galvanized the world's conscience against this pernicious trade.

      Even for an administration that has set a record in rejecting international agreements, the small-arms treaty should have been easy to sign. It would not even have required sacrificing commercial profit, as the larger arms restraint in the "legal" trade called for by President Arias above might have done. The U.S. Arms Export Control Act already, for many decades, has required tough end-user verification to make sure U.S. military exports are not diverted.
      Nevertheless, Undersecretary of State John Bolton told the the conference on July 9, "Like many countries, the United States has a cultural tradition of hunting and sport shooting." Therefore, "The United States will not join consensus on a final document that contains measures abrogating the Constitutional right to bear arms. We do not support measures that prohibit civilian possession of small arms."

      In fact, the United Nations draft carefully left the decision on internal gun ownership to national governments and concentrated on the international black market in firearms. Nevertheless, the Bush administration opposed codifying the action plan into international law and even opposed a review conference in 2006. Its litany of negatives contrasted strongly with the European Union's and Canada's enthusiastic support. As the Washington Post editorialized, "The Bush administration seems to have chosen to use the U.N. conference as a way to pander to the National Rifle Association, anti-U.N. zealots and far right conspiracy theories."

      "Africa is awash in arms," the European Union's chief envoy observed. It is not, however, the United States that is supplying rebel groups such as Rwanda's terrorist Interahamwe, Sierra Leone's limb-chopping Revolutionary United Front, or Angola's UNITA. Rather it's countries like Bulgaria that, for example, sold an enormous quantity of guns to Togo in 1998 knowing full well they would be re-exported to UNITA. For all its limitations, the U.S. Arms Export Control Act prevents such diversions. Its strict end-user controls and verification regime make sure that such re-exports are rare.

      Would the U.N. treaty have helped with countries like Bulgaria which depend on the trade to keep their rusting manufacturing plants busy? Bulgaria is also a country that aspires to join the European Union, which strongly backs the treaty. Flagrant violation of a treaty would be a strike against membership, and so there is leverage on countries like Bulgaria. U.S. rejection of the treaty let all the Bulgarias off the hook.

      In the wake of September 11, the U.N. initiative is all the more timely. Small arms are the terrorist's weapon of choice. They are a major contributor to the world's worst wars, especially in Africa. Of forty-nine major wars fought in the world in the past decade, forty-six were fought predominantly with small arms. And while small-arms proliferation is only one cause, it is the one most easily addressed by the West. It was this opportunity for sensible international action, for principles already consecrated in U.S. law, that the Bush administration threw away.

Proliferation of U.S. Military Training

      Since September 11, the war against terrorism has accelerated another disturbing trend in U.S. military policy that is likely to further stoke up the market for U.S. arms exports. This is the extension of U.S. military ties, especially training missions, to new countries, spreading U.S. soldiers further out around the globe than ever before and discarding hard-won U.S. human-rights standards. Even before September 11 the U.S. military had officers or trainers in 140 countries.

      It is moving to expand not only in Afghanistan but to Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Somalia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. "Overall, the military global presence is more pervasive today than at any point in American history," independent analyst John Pike has noted.

About agreements and deliveries

      Foreign aid and sales can be measured in two ways: the commitment to sell (the signing of an agreement), or the actual disbursement of funds or delivery of goods. There is no intrinsic advantage to either method. Generally, commitments are the more common reporting basis because they are more current and more consistently compiled. They tend to be more publicly reported as opposed to deliveries which may be seen as technical or accounting data. Commitments have the further advantage of indicating intent and future trends. Actual disbursements or deliveries, however, have the great advantage of precision because aid is frequently committed but not disbursed.

The Challenge Ahead

      The CRS report contains two other worrisome findings which have scarcely registered:

      1. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States is pre-positioned to continue and expand as the dominant supplier. This is both because of its military technology, which gives it an edge in new sales, and a reflection of the large number of countries already tied in to American weapons systems which need to be continually supported.

      2. The only visible constraint on far greater world arms trade is economic. Developing countries, except for the oil-rich Gulf states, have severe cash constraints and even Saudi Arabia has experienced financial retrenchment. Developed countries, for their part, have established high protective walls to protect their national arms industries and this is the chief limit to arms trade among them. These tariff and regulatory walls are the main reason why two-thirds of their arms exports are to vulnerable Third World countries. In 2000 the United States exported $18.6 billion in arms to developing nations, 68 percent of its total exports.

      Compared to this economic constraint the moral constraint comes in a distant second. There is no discernible effect of the world peace movement, of arms-control regimes, of U.N. initiatives, or the Arms Trade Code of Conduct in restraining arms sales, least of all U.S. sales. The only exceptions are country-specific arms embargoes such as the Security Council embargo on Iraq since the Gulf War.

In Their Own Words

Unseemly Spectacle

Powell to Europeans: Don't buy expensive fighter planes from Sweden because it takes away from your NATO obligations; but do buy them from us.

State Department Noon Briefing, December 18, 2001. Statements by Richard Boucher about recent decisions of Hungary and the Czech Republic to buy Swedish fighter jets over American competitors:

(Courtesy Arms Trade Newsletter)

QUESTION: Secretary Powell, when he was [in Eastern Europe], did he bring up with your staunch new NATO allies their decision to not buy U.S. fighter jets? I'm talking about the Czechs and the Hungarians. But also the Poles apparently are about to decide on this, and they are also leaning away from the American-made product.

MR. BOUCHER: The Secretary has been a staunch supporter of American aircraft sales, and in his meetings from the very beginning of the Administration, he has raised the fortunes of American companies and the fact that we make the best airplanes in the world. He has pressed that in a variety of meetings. So we are disappointed that the Czech Republic and Hungary recently took steps forward in procuring advanced supersonic fighter aircraft. We recognize these big decisions also have implications for their military reform programs, their abilities to meet force goal obligations to NATO. As the Czech Republic and Hungary determine their future military requirements, we urge them to avoid major defense procurements that could jeopardize other urgently needed military reforms. The Secretary has raised these issues about the cost, the spending, the implication for other programs. But in the end, he has always said if you're going to buy airplanes, you ought to buy American ones. And as far as the Polish matter goes, yes, the Secretary met yesterday with the Polish Foreign Minister and again said if they were going to procure advanced fighter aircraft, we felt that we made the best ones and are strongly supportive of our American companies.

QUESTION: So do you think that their purchase of these jets and using them could affect badly - - adversely affect NATO in some way?

MR. BOUCHER: We have -- I think we have tried to make clear all along that, as nations address these force requirements and these purchases, they needed to consider the overall impact on military reform programs and abilities to meet their broader global force obligations to NATO. And those are important questions that we think need to be considered.

QUESTION: And your caveat on that to [Hungary and the Czech Republic] applies also to Poland?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes. If you're going to buy, buy American. But consider carefully how you can meet your overall obligations.

QUESTION: Richard, you seem to be saying -- let me get this straight. Do you think it was unwise of these two governments to decide to buy planes instead of doing something else with the money?

MR. BOUCHER: As I said, we think that they should avoid major defense procurements, which could jeopardize other urgently needed military reforms.

QUESTION: But if they are going to make them, they should buy from the States and not from --

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

QUESTION: . . . are you saying that, say, French aircraft or British aircraft are not interoperable within the NATO scheme of things? I mean, these countries fly their own planes. Why can't -- why do the Czechs have to buy your planes, and why can't they buy from someone -- I mean, I can understand if they were buying from China, or from -- (laughter) -- what's the deal?
MR. BOUCHER: Nobody said they can't buy some other airplane. We haven't argued that these other airplanes cannot be interoperable with NATO -- with American airplanes or NATO airplanes or other airplanes that NATO maintains in its inventory. Our view has been that when it comes to airplanes, first of all, we make the best ones. And second of all, we make airplanes that have been deployed throughout the world, that have been proven in combat, that have been proven in lots of different situations. And they have a demonstrated record of interoperability, as well as performance. And we think we make the best. So we make that clear to other countries when we talk to them.

QUESTION: But can't you let, you know, Boeing and Lockheed Martin make their own sales pitch for them?

MR. BOUCHER: We like to support American workers, American companies.

Arms Sales to Third World, 1993-2000. In billions of constant U.S. dollars

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Total 1993-2000
United States	15.8	7.7	4.7	7.5	3.5	6.7	8.6	12.7	67.3
Russia	1.4	4.3	6	4.5	3.7	2.4	3.2	7.4	33
France	4.6	9.4	2.7	1.2	4.7	2.7	0.3	2.1	27.7
Britain	2.7	0.8	0.7	3	1.1	1.1	0.6	0	10
China	0.6	0.7	0.2	1	1.4	0.7	2.7	0.4	7.8
Germany	1.2	0	0.2	0	0.1	1.6	2.1	1	6.2
Italy	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.3	0.3	0	0.6	0	2.8
All other Europe	0.6	2	2.7	3.2	1.8	1.4	4.5	0.9	17.1
All others	0.7	0.6	1.8	1.9	1.2	1.1	0.9	1	9.2
Total	27.9	25.7	20.1	22.7	17.9	17.6	23.6	25.4	181

Data: Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 16, 2001). Large 1993-94 totals reflect post-Gulf War purchases by Saudi Arabia and Gulf states. Agreements basis

 

 

Arms Sales to Third World, 1993-2000. In billions of constant U.S. dollars. Summarizes preceding table.

U.S. Arms Sales to Middle East, 1993-2000 billions of dollars
	1993-96	1997-2000
Bahrain	0.3	0.7
Egypt	3.7	5.7
Israel	3.9	5.2
Jordan	0.3	0.2
Kuwait	2.5	0.5
Lebanon	0.1	0
Morocco	0.1	0
Saudi Arabia	11.8	4.3
Tunisia	0.1	0
United Arab Emirates	0.2	6.8

 

U.S. Weapons Sold to Third World, 1997-2000
Missiles	1,358
Tanks	1,703
Warships	12
Helicopters	170
Warplanes	468

 

U.S. Share of Arms Sales By Region