October 27, 2006
Counter-drug military construction projects in 2005
Here, thanks to a FOIA request, is a list of US-funded base construction projects paid for in 2005 with Defense Department counternarcotics funds.
It comes from a report, required by Congress in the 2006 Defense Authorization law, that was supposed to total Defense-budget counter-drug aid to every country in the world. For some reason, the report only includes Defense-budget counter-drug construction aid, which is only a fraction of what most countries' militaries get through the Pentagon's budget.
Nonetheless, the Western Hemisphere section below is worth a look.
SOUTHCOM
Bahamas (Caribbean Region) ($2.213M)
Company Housing and Furnishings/Facility Maintenance. Funding provided for company housing and the furnishings on an operating base in Georgetown, Greater Exuma Island. Also included is the maintenance of the operating facility. On this operating base, US. Army helicopter operations are conducted in support of Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos Counter-drug. (PC2307) Total FY05 Funding: $2.213M Cost breakout is as follows:
- Base Construction funding ($1,400K)
- Operational funding ($312K)
- Furnishings ($441K)
- Facility maintenance/upkeep ($60K)
Bolivia ($0.590M)
Cochabamba Shoot House. Provided critical training facility for military and police CNT units undergoing U.S. training for operations. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.06M.
Caranavi Joint Task Force Base Camp. Project provided improved utilities, force protection, logistics support facilities and additional berthing to support establishment of a joint Bolivian CNT task force between national police, air force, and army engineer forces. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.45M.
Tocopilla Force Protection Improvements. Provided perimeter fence and lighting, guard posts, and other improvements to Bolivian navy outposts assigned riverine patrol missions. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.04M.
Colomi Army Camp Utilities Upgrade. Project provided water treatment and conditioning to domestic water supply to improve sanitation and health conditions at existing outpost. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.04M.
Colombia ($5.548M)
Training Facility located in San Andres, Colombia. Funding was provided to operate a training facility at the San Andres, Colombia radar site to train Colombian Air Force technicians in the skills needed to assume maintenance responsibilities for Hemispheric Radar System radar sites. FY05 funding supports English language training in Bogota and on-the-job training at each radar site and Bogota and associated force protection for supporting personnel. Funding also for the refinement of formal course training material, instructors, and development and implementation of on-job-training program. (PC4208) Total FY05 Funding: $1.08M
Puerto Leguizamo/La Tagua Road Improvements. Provided critical improvements to the only road link between these two forward outposts astride the Putumayo and Caqueta Rivers. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.800M.
Airfield Improvements to Tres Esquinas. Supported critical airfield used to support Plan Patriota operations. FY05 funds used to execute the design portion. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.150M.
Depot Level Maintenance Facility in Bogota. Supported establishment of a depot level riverine maintenance facility.
FY05 funds used to execute the design portion. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.080M.Improvements to CACOM 3 Apron and Taxiways. Supported the primary reception and staging site for U.S. units providing critical training to COLMIL forces and COLAF units supporting Plan Patriota IIB operations. FY05 funds used to execute the design portion. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.4M.
Ammunition Storage Point at Larandia. Provided critical ammunition storage capability for units assigned to JTF-Omega and directly supporting Plan Patriota. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.6M.
Runway Improvements at Juanacho. Project supported needed taxiway and ramp upgrades. Juancacho provides forward staging and support facility for JTF-Omega. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.3M.
Combat Training Center at Larandia. Provided a national training center for COLAR forces supporting Plan Patriota IIB and IIC operations. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.9M.
Riverine Facilities at Puerto Carreno. Project provided for extensive upgrades to include barracks, walkways, electrical, ramps, fuel storage, and maintenance. Project provided needed sustainment for Battalion 40 and COLMAR support to JTF-Omega. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.2M.
Electrical Upgrades at Larandia. Project completed upgrades to the Larandia electrical grid required as a result of the rapid expansion/growth of Larandia as a major technical/operationa1 base for the COLMIL. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.5M.
Tumaco Pier. Project provided essential staging and fueling point for COLMAR forces operating on the Pacific Coast. Project was primarily focused on the interdiction of drugs/arms traffickers using the river systems on the Pacific Coast as a staging base for illegal drug/arms movement. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.12M.
Puerto Leguizamo Airfield. Provided for critical repairs to the Puerto Leguizamo airfield. Repairs included runway,
taxiway, and tamp improvements needed to sustain this key forward operating base along the southern border of
Colombia. Puerto Leguizamo is the primary training and staging base for COLMAR operations in the Pase IIB area
of operations. Completed design work in FY05. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.08M.Tolemaida Force Protection Upgrades. Project provided for a perimeter fence to be constructed around the newly completed SF compound in Tolemaida. Project provided needed standoff distance and isolation from other facilities. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.2M.
4 Office Trailers/Facility Maintenance. Funding provided for 4 office trailers and the maintenance of the Forward Operating Site in Apiay, Colombia that conducts Joint ISR aircraft operations in support of Plan Colombia. (PC2416) Total FY05 Funding: $0.138M
Ecuador ($14.734M)
Forward Operating Location (FOL). Funding was provided to maintain and operate the FOL in Manta, which consists of 127 facilities of which 48 are buildings. FOL Manta provides a base of operations to facilitate counterdrug detection and monitoring operations within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. FOL Manta provides basing and logistical support for a steady state of six aircraft and 450 personnel with a capacity to surge to eight aircraft for two week periods. (PC9500) Total FY05 Funding: $14.134M. Cost breakout is as follows:
- Air Expeditionary Forces (Force Protection and Firemen) travel and per diem ($377K)
- Erosion project for runway required for CN missions ($607K)
- Supplies and equipment that can only be bought through the Standard Base Supply System ($233K)
- Communication personnel TDY from Headquarters ($54K)
- Procurement of AGE equipment ($142K)
- Base operating support contract ($12,721K)
Operational Support for the Northern Border. Project supported units assigned to Ecuadorian defense forces along the northern border with Colombia. Two projects programmed for design/construction in FY05. First project provided needed ammunition storage facility for the 39th Infantry Battalion in the Carchi Province. Second project provide critical force protection upgrades to the 55th Infantry Battalion assigned to the 19th Jungle Brigade. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.6M.
El Salvador ($0.925M)
Forward Operating Location (FOL). Funding was provided to maintain and operate the FOL in Comalapa. FY05 funding was provided for installation of water supply tank and fire pumps for autonomous fire suppression capability, procurement and installation of a generator and transfer switch for new warehouse/office building, electrical driveways to warehouse bays doors, upgrade pistol range, and lighting protection for the FOL. (PC9500) Total FY05 Funding: $0.925M.
Jamaica ($0.8M)
Pedro Cayes Water/Fuel Storage Facilities. Project provided for water/fuel storage facilities in support of Jamaican Coast Guard drug interdiction efforts against "go fast" targets. Supported both surface and helicopter assets directed against the "go-fast" threat. (PC9493) Total FY05 Funding: $0.8M.
Netherlands Antilles ($16.426M)
Forward Operating Location (FOL). Funding was provided to maintain and operate the FOL in Curacao. This FOL consists of 40 facilities of which 15 are buildings. FOL Curacao provides a base of operations to facilitate counterdrug detection and monitoring operations within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. FOL Curacao provides basing and logistical support for a steady state of six aircraft and 250 personnel with a capacity to surge to eight aircraft for two week periods. (PC9500) Total FY05 Funding: $14.892M. Cost breakout is as follows:
- Air Expeditionary Forces (Force Protection and Firemen) travel and per diem ($2,153K)
- Contract lodging permanent party ($266K)
- Supplies and equipment that can only be bought through the Standard Base Supply System ($220K)
- Engineering study for fire station shelter in Curacao ($77K)
- Contracting support for FOL oversight ($470K)
- Base Operating Support contract ($11,706K)
Forward Operating Location (FOL). Funding was provided to maintain and operate the FOL in Aruba. This FOL
consists of 1 facility which is a building. FOL Aruba provides an overflow capability to facilitate counterdrug detection and monitoring operations within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. FOL Aruba provides communication and contracting support to aircrews. (PC9500) Total FY05 Funding: $1.534M. Cost breakout is as follows:
- Bandwidth expense ($500K)
- Civil engineering/contracting support to building/ramp projects ($552K)
- Direct support to include Air Expeditionary Forces Communication person per diem and travel, lodging, environmental baseline study, and miscellaneous contracts ($430K)
- Air Combat Command Program Management System expense ($50K)
- Base operating support contract support ($2K)
Peru ($0.175M)
El Estrecho Navy Forward Operating Base. Project increased berthing and life support at remote outpost conducting riverine interdiction and joint operations with national police. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.1M.
Mazamari and Lima Small Arms Ranges. Project repaired and upgraded small arms ranges used to train counterdrug police conducting infiltration, interdiction, and associated counter-terrorism missions. (PC9201) Total FY05 Funding: $0.075M.
Posted by isacson at 04:47 PM | Comments (0)
October 26, 2006
10,393 Colombian military trainees in 2005
The State and Defense Departments have finally released, and posted to State's website, the Foreign Military Training Report covering 2005. There, you will find out that the United States gave military, police, or defense-policy training to 10,393 Colombians last year. That is over 1,500 more trainees than in 2004, though short of the 2003 high of 12,947.
The report's statistics portray Colombia as the number one recipient of U.S. military training in the world. The report, however, severely under-reports training in Iraq and Afghanistan - either because training of those countries' security forces is classified, or because budgeting does not separate such training from the cost of U.S. military operations in those countries. So Colombia was, in fact, the second or third largest U.S. training recipient last year.
Nonetheless, the report makes clear that no other Latin American country came close to Colombia in 2005 (in fact, no other country in the hemisphere even exceeded 1,000 trainees).
A big PDF file identifying courses given and recipient military units is available here by clicking on "Western Hemisphere."
Posted by isacson at 11:52 PM | Comments (0)
October 25, 2006
Nicholas Burns: No cut in aid - but less "cheerleading"
In a sit-down last week with reporters, the outgoing head of U.S. Southern Command, Gen. John Craddock, said that reductions in aid to Colombia were on their way. Added the Associated Press, "Craddock said Colombia's defense minister, Juan Manuel Santos, is in agreement with reductions in U.S. military funding."
This was the latest repetition of the idea that reductions in aid to Colombia - the first reductions in about fifteen years - would be forthcoming in the administration's 2008 budget request to Congress (which comes out next February). We have been told to expect less aid in the 2008 request during recent meetings with U.S. officials, and we have read it in recent press coverage, including a piece in Saturday's edition of El Tiempo:
An initial cut of a bit more than 50 million dollars is being discussed, which would go against accounts for the Police Carabineros program, the demobilizations and others. And while this is a small amount, compared to the annual total that is delivered (some 700 million dollars), it will increase with each passing year. In other words, from here to 2010 - the year in which Uribe will finish his second term - the country will be receiving a bit more than half of what it gets today.
And these are not speculations. The director of Narcotics Affairs at the Department of State, Anne Patterson, and the "drug czar," John Walters, said it in an interview with this newspaper. And the head of the Southern Command, John Craddock, repeated it this week.
The theory is that Colombia has begun "to turn the page," and that it is time for it to take on more responsibilities. "We have sustained aid levels for six years. It is logical to suppose, and this was the plan from the beginning, that we would arrive at a point where there would be reductions," says a source at the State Department.
Well, maybe not. It appears that plans to begin reducing U.S. aid next year have been shelved for now. That, at least, was the message of Nicholas Burns, the acting number-two official at the State Department, who is leading a seventeen-member delegation to Bogotá that arrived yesterday and leaves tomorrow. "'We intend to ask our Congress to maintain the current level of funding' for 2007 and 2008," Burns told reporters yesterday.
That apparent change of direction is the big story - so far - of the Burns visit, which is the biggest and highest-level U.S. delegation to visit Colombia in quite a while.
Also noteworthy are strong indications that Burns, Anne Patterson, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon, Drug Czar John Walters and others are not in Bogotá just to praise and celebrate Uribe and Plan Colombia. The U.S. officials also appear to be voicing some serious concerns about the policy's results, the human-rights climate, and the paramilitary process. Note these excerpts from a Reuters interview with Burns, which went on the wires a couple of hours ago.
"We think the counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts have been very successful but there could be further progress."
"If the military is responsible for human rights violations then those people need to be held accountable, they need to be prosecuted."
"We think this [the "Justice and Peace" Law] is a necessary law ... we are in favor of the effort but there are some questions about whether some of sentences are too lenient, whether people who are responsible for horrible crimes are getting off too easily. ... It is up to Colombia to work through that but as we are funding some of these programs these questions are being asked."
Especially significant is that the U.S. officials did not come to Colombia bearing a new certification of improvements in the Colombian military's human-rights performance. By law, the State Department must issue two such certifications each year; 25 percent of that year's military aid remains frozen - it cannot be spent - until the certifications occur (each one frees up half of the frozen aid). No certification for any 2006 aid has yet been issued, largely due to concerns about military abuses and the inability to punish past cases.
Posted by isacson at 12:47 PM | Comments (2)
September 28, 2006
"Elephant-sized worry" in Colombia
Dare we say it? Today's Robert Novak column is actually worth a read:
The situation is summarized in a Sept. 19 memo by a well-informed source: ''The Colombian Army is hemorrhaging with problems. The chief problem is that we took a very mediocre barracks-bound military force, gave it some little amount of training and lots of equipment but never demanded the structural reform like we did with the Colombian National Police some 12 years ago . . . Everyone seems incapable of seeing the 'elephant in the room' and realizing that years of cooperation with the paramilitary forces have corrupted the Colombian Army officer corps all the way up, and the institution requires a dramatic house cleaning and structural reform . . .''
Posted by isacson at 06:21 AM | Comments (2)
September 26, 2006
Some updated U.S. aid numbers
We've just posted a big and long-overdue update to our estimates of U.S. aid to every country in Latin America. To see aid broken down further, with explanations of what each program does, visit www.ciponline.org/facts/country.htm.
In 2005, these were the top five overall recipients of U.S. aid in the Western Hemisphere:
Colombia
Haiti
Peru
Bolivia
Mexico
The above charts include four of the five top military aid recipients as well. Here is the fifth:
Ecuador
Again, more information - including the numbers themselves - is at www.ciponline.org/facts/country.htm.
Here is what aid to Colombia looks like since 2004. This table includes how the House and Senate versions of the 2007 foreign aid bill would affect aid amounts. The House and Senate appropriations committees have finished work on the 2007 aid bill, and the House has passed it. The full Senate has yet to consider the bill and appears to be unlikely to do so before the midterm elections in early November. A table going back to 1997 can be viewed here.
| Military and Police Assistance Programs (millions of dollars; numbers underlined and italicized are estimates taken by averaging previous two years) |
| | | | 2007, request | 2007, House version of foreign aid bill | 2007, Senate version of foreign aid bill | |
| International Narcotics Control (INC) State Department-managed counter-drug arms transfers, training, and services | 0 | | | 0 | 18.9 | 0 |
| "Andean Counterdrug Initiative" Basically the same as INC above, but separated out for the Andes | | | | 366.6 | 384.1 | 369.6 |
| Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Grants for defense articles, training and services | 98.5 | 99.2 | 89.1 | 90.0 | 90.0 | 90.0 |
| International Military Education and Training (IMET) Training, usually not counter-drug | | | | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| "Section 1004" Authority to use the defense budget for some types of counter-drug aid | | | | 161.0 | 161.0 | 161.0 |
| Emergency Drawdowns Presidential authority to grant counter-drug equipment from U.S. arsenal | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Antiterrorism Assistance (NADR/ATA) Grants for anti-terrorism defense articles, training and services | | | | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| Demining (NADR/HD) Grants for landmine removal | | | | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Small Arms / Light Weapons (NADR/SALW) Grants to assist in halting trafficking in small arms | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Counter-Terror Fellowship Program (CTFP) Grants for training in counter-terrorism through a Defense Department program established in 2002 | | | | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) Grants for education in defense management at a Defense-Department school in Washington | | | | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Authority to transfer "excess" equipment | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Discretionary Funds from the Office of National Drug Control Policy | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | 555.6 | 642.5 | 590.9 | 623.6 | 660.0 | 626.6 |
| Percentage of total | 80.5% | 82.7% | 81.2% | 82.5% | 82.3% | 82.5% |
| Economic and Social Assistance Programs (millions of dollars) |
| | | 2006, estimate | 2007, request | 2007, House version of foreign aid bill | 2007, Senate version of foreign aid bill | |
| International Narcotics Control (INC) State Department-managed counter-drug arms transfers, training, and services | | | | 0 | 7.3 | 0 |
| "Andean Counterdrug Initiative" Basically the same as INC above, but separated out for the Andes | | | | 132.3 | 0 | 132.9 |
| Economic Support Funds (ESF) Transfers to the recipient government | | | | 0 | 135.0 | 0 |
| P.L. 480 "Food for Peace" Humanitarian deliveries of food | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | | | | 132.3 | 142.3 | 132.9 |
| Percentage of total | 19.5% | 17.3% | 18.8% | 17.5% | 17.7% | 17.5% |
| | | |||||
| Grand Total | 690.1 | 777.2 | 728.1 | 755.9 | 802.3 | 759.5 |
Posted by isacson at 05:47 PM | Comments (3)
September 24, 2006
Notes from last week's hearings
On Tuesday, the Senate Armed Services Committee considered the nomination of Vice Admiral James Stavridis to be the next commander of the U.S. Southern Command, which governs the U.S. military's activities in nearly all of Latin America and the Caribbean. (Adm. Stavridis, today's New York Times informs us, has been a regular squash partner of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.)
On Thursday, meanwhile, two House subcommittees met jointly to discuss "The Need for European Assistance to Colombia for the Fight against Illicit Drugs."
CIP Intern Mariam Khokhar attended both hearings. Here are her notes.
Committee on Armed Services
Senate Hart Building
Tuesday, September 19, 2006 9:30 am
Vice Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN
(For appointment to be admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Southern Command)
Adm. Stavridis shared a panel with Gen. Bantz Craddock, the current chief of U.S. Southern Command, who has been nominated to head the European Command. Stavridis' responses to senators' written questions are available as a PDF file.
Stavridis's opening statement
Stavridis stated that it is an honor and privilege to be considered and thanked the committee for their time. If confirmed, he said that "this job will receive my full energy and attention."
Committee Chairman Sen. John Warner (R-Virginia) asked Stavridis to explain the importance of Panama today.
Stavridis replied that the canal is very important, as 65% of the ships passing through the canal go to U.S. ports. The Panamanian president is seeking the public's approval for a new referendum to expand the canal. The money for this project will come from public and private investors. The United States has to follow especially the private investment in order to be aware of Chinese economic and military connections in Panama.
Sen. Warner added that the United States has to respect Panama's sovereignty. Still, he highlighted the fact that the canal is of great importance to the United States.
Sen. Warner then asked Stavridis what he hopes to achieve in Venezuela.
Stavridis replied by stating that historically, the US has enjoyed good relations with Venezuela. Still, the country's recent ties with Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Belarus are "disturbing." There is concern that Venezuela is influencing a bloc of Latin American countries to be anti-U.S. Venezuela just purchased new arms, including rifles and jets, from Russia. Oil money is also a big concern in the region. Due to all this, Venezuela's actions "have to be of concern."
The ranking Democrat, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Michigan), attended the hearing but did not pose any questions to Stavridis.
Sen. John McCain (R-Arizona) attended but did not pose any questions to Stavridis.
Sen. Jack Reed (D-Rhode Island) did not pose any questions to Stavridis or the other nominee, General Craddock. He only stated his "disappointment" in Craddock's refusal to discipline Gen. Geoffrey Miller for detainee abuse that allegedly occurred while he commanded the Guantanamo prison facility.
Sen. Ben Nelson (D-Nebraska) asked Stavridis to elaborate on the current situation in Cuba, particularly Fidel Castro's health and the probability of his brother, Raúl, might take power for good.
Stavridis replied that "Cuba is front and center" and it will be at the center of his work. He said he is hopeful of a peaceful transition to a democratic regime, but that he is not hopeful that this will happen anytime soon. Raúl will take the reins of power and "very little will change." Cuba is facing many problems. The country, he said, has a very weak economy that is only propped up by Venezuelan oil subsidies, there are over 800 migrants a year to the United States, and Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. In taking action, the "U.S. will support the Cuban people."
Sen. Nelson then asked Stavridis to comment on Nicaragua and Daniel Ortega.
Stavridis stated that "I am not an expert at all" on Nicaraguan politics. But it is common sense to state that Ortega is an opponent of the United States. Although he conceded that the elections appear to be fair and that Nicaragua is a sovereign nation, he is "very concerned" about the linkage between Nicaragua and nations like Cuba and Venezuela, in what he referred to as an "anti-U.S. bloc."
Sen. Nelson posed a third question to Stavridis regarding the IMET program [International Military Education and Training, the main source of U.S. funding for non-drug military training in Latin America]. He stated that he initially thought that the United States was doing other nations a favor with the program. Now, he believes that the United States is the beneficiary of the IMET program. Furthermore, if the United States does not continue with the program - which has been suspended in twelve Latin American countries who do not exempt U.S. personnel in their territory from the International Criminal Court - then nations like China will step in and offer the training.
Stavridis responded to this question after Gen. Craddock already addressed it. Craddock stated that we want servicemen to be protected. The United States is losing engagement opportunities with other cultures, and that the United States benefits from foreign military personnel coming here to see our culture and our democracy. We are losing this in key countries. Stavridis stated that he "associates" himself with all of General Craddock's comments.
Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas) raised a concern about Hezbollah being "in our backyard," asserting that the terrorist organization can easily expand its base of actions to the Western Hemisphere. What should we be doing?
Stavridis responded that he has read many reports, both classified and unclassified, about Hezbollah's presence in Latin America. It appears that "Hezbollah has a foothold" in the Southern Command's area of responsibility, especially in the tri-border area shared by Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. The organization is largely concerned with financing and fundraising in the region, but this could come to include human trafficking. There have been reports of surveillance at the Panama Canal. This is cause for "real concern." The United States' role is "to be plugged into intelligence," which means it has to work with partners, both on a one-to-one basis and regionally. The United States needs to fortify alliances and to be very aware of the situation.
Sen. Cornyn then asked about narco-trafficking and terrorism in Colombia. The FARC, he said, is setting up a safe haven in Venezuela. He asserted that the United States' aid, namely in coca eradication, has been very helpful. What should we do about these recent developments with Venezuela, a nation that associates itself with U.S. enemies?
Stavridis started by saying that "Colombia has made tremendous progress" over the past four or five years, adding that the military is handling the FARC, the AUC is demobilizing, and the economy is doing well. The United States has to support Colombia in strengthening its borders. The issue is "of concern." Stavridis stated that he could not say much more because much of the intelligence is classified.
Sen. Cornyn agreed with his comments, adding that the Department of Defense has to protect U.S. borders (with all of Latin America) by improving use of technology.
The Chairman concluded the panel by thanking both nominees for their "direct answers."
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Joint Oversight Hearing (Government Reform Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, and the International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere)
House Rayburn Building
September 21, 2006 11:30 AM
"The Need for European Assistance to Colombia for the Fight against Illicit Drugs"
House Republicans, faced with continued high levels of coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking in Colombia, have not chosen to reconsider their strategy. Instead, they have begun to blame Europe, where demand for cocaine is rising. They charge that European donors have failed to match U.S. aid to Colombia, which is overwhelmingly military in focus, with similar levels of so-called "soft" aid to fight poverty and strengthen civilian institutions.
Opening Statements
Rep. Howard Coble (R-Texas), chairman of the Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee
Rep. Coble said it is believed that 40-60% of Colombian cocaine finds its way to Europe because it is more "geographically convenient" due to the European Union's open borders. The price of cocaine per kilo in Europe is three times that in the United States. The DEA reports that the FARC and the AUC are penetrating Spain. Europe needs to recognize the "imminent danger" of these groups. The chairman stated that he was "disappointed" that the EU members who were invited to testify did not come.
Rep. Dan Burton (R-Indiana), chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
Rep. Burton stated that Colombia is at a "critical junction." Spain and Portugal have become "the portals" to Europe. The "drug flow to Europe is undermining" all of the United States' efforts in Colombia. "I hope somebody in Europe is listening, because they should be here today." Europe must begin to pay its pledges for "soft-side assistance" in Colombia.
Rep. Bobby Scott (D-Virginia), ranking Democrat on the Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee
Rep. Scott stated, "My hope is that Europe will do a better job" than the United States has done. The United States has spent billions on security and the military instead of social programs, like education. The United States may have helped increase the supply of cocaine by breaking up large cartels into smaller, less detectable ones.
Rep. Eliot Engel (New York), ranking Democrat on the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
Representative Engel stated that the United States needs to cooperate with Europe on many matters and current issues - Iran, Afghanistan, and Colombia. "I hope this hearing will be viewed positively on the other side of the Atlantic." The hearing should highlight commonalities instead of looking at differences.
Rep. Coble introduced the three witnesses - Michael A. Braun (Chief of Operations - DEA), Sandro Calvani (UN Office on Drugs and Crime), and, in absentia, Rosso Jose Serrano (Former head of Colombia's National Police, now Ambassador of Colombia in Austria)
Mr. Braun
Cocaine trafficking to Europe can be directly linked to Colombia. The single most important objective is to dismantle cartels. Cartels rule and operate like terrorist organizations, using fear, corruption, and violence. No state in the world has stronger laws than the United States. Because of this, the last thing a trafficker wants is "to face justice in U.S. courthouses." The United States should be proud of this.
Dr. Calvani
The lack of government control of territory allows for the continuing growing of coca. Eradication must be backed with strong economic incentives for farmers. A current project gives farmers $265 per month on a three year basis. The results have been very positive. 80% of the coca plants eliminated have been eliminated for good. Only 0.9% of these farmers say they will go back to cultivating illicit crops. Still, nations, especially in Europe, must work to reduce demand.
Major Lopez (speaking on behalf of Ambassador Serrano)
UN reports show there is an increase in cocaine consumption in Europe, especially in the UK and Spain. It is important to charge the EU to take action and recognize the "shared responsibility" of fighting cocaine trafficking.
Questioning
Rep. Coble: Portugal may surpass Spain as the port of Europe. Does the DEA have an office there?
Braun: The DEA is looking into it, but currently has a "hiring freeze." People from the Madrid office will visit Lisbon regularly.
Rep. Coble: How much does trafficking influence terrorism?
Braun: "Franchised terrorist cells" must fund their operations and many do it through the $322 billion drug industry. The Tri-Border Region is a "breeding ground for terrorism."
Rep. Scott: How much is the United States spending on source-control in Colombia?
Braun: A lot. (He was not aware of the exact numbers.)
Rep. Scott: What is the trend in the cocaine price on the streets of the United States?
Braun: It remains about the same while the purity has declined.
Rep. Scott: How much supply would we have to reduce to have an effect on the price on U.S. streets?
Braun: The DEA doesn't measure success in price. It measures success in the disruption of cartels. Mr. Braun stated that many reports would refute Mr. Scott's numbers.
Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio): Chabot stated that he went to Colombia and saw the military and police counter-drug units and was impressed with their work. European countries have opposed aerial spraying and have adopted an"environmental attitude." The spray is "'Round-Up,' so it's not like we don't know what it is." Manual coca "plucking" is very dangerous.
Lopez: In a national park, terrorists were killing individuals who were manually eradicating coca. 19 soldiers, 10, police officers, and 12 civilians were killed. In the end, the park had to be sprayed.
Rep. Engel: Is the U.S. counter-drug policy (Plan Colombia) working?
Braun: "When we hit the traffickers hard," they have the ability to bounce back. They have tremendous potential margin.
Engel: To what extent has Plan Colombia resulted in an increase of cocaine trafficking from Peru and Bolivia?
Braun: (He did not have any numbers).
Engel: Plan Colombia is controversial in Europe. What are the criticisms?
Calvani: They say the US and Colombia do not consult with them. They want to apply alternative development programs to Colombia (similar to those applied in Laos and Thailand).
Rep. Coble: Colombian cultivation has increased by 8%. Why has eradication become harder?
Calvani: There has been only a "very slight" increase after a reduction of 51% over the past few years. Alternative development programs have been reduced and demand for cocaine has not decreased. Production in Bolivia and Peru has gone up. Also, people are going into the forest and are planting smaller plots of coca.
Rep. Coble: Cocaine flow to Europe is massive. How many Spanish anti-drug police are in Bogota?
Lopez: There is one Spanish anti-drug police officer and 125 DEA agents.
Rep. Scott: Can you comment on the health implications of spraying?
Calvani: So far, it has not been possible to detect any effect. The product used to spray is widely used in Colombia and the United States.
Rep. Coble: What does organized crime in Russia have to do with the increase of cocaine in Europe?
Braun: It isn't a "significant threat."
Calvani: They are involved in other drugs, like heroin from Afghanistan.
Burton: Doesn't the increase of cocaine in Europe undercut the United States' work? What does the DEA have to say?
Braun: He would have to think about the question.
The Chairman adjourned the hearing.
Posted by isacson at 11:19 PM | Comments (0)
September 20, 2006
Maps of poverty, coca, fumigation and alternative development
In a conversation today, a House staffer preparing for tomorrow's Colombia hearing asked, "wouldn't it be nice to see the following information side-by-side on a map?"
Yes, it would. Here are four graphics showing poverty levels, coca-growing, fumigation and alternative-development spending by department in Colombia. To see all four on one page, download this PDF file (106KB).
Posted by isacson at 04:03 PM | Comments (5)
September 19, 2006
Where in Colombia does U.S. military aid go?
| The map below shows the locations of the vetted recipient units from Colombia's army, navy and air force. |
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The so-called "Leahy Law" is a provision that has appeared in the U.S. foreign aid bill every year since 1997. Named for its principal proponent, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), its purpose is straightforward. It states that if a foreign military unit includes people who have committed gross human-rights violations, and they are not being credibly investigated, tried or punished, then that unit cannot receive U.S. assistance.
The Leahy Law is not frequently invoked, though it has on occasion forced the U.S. government to refuse aid to army units in Colombia, or to cut off aid to units already receiving it (as happened in January 2003, when an air force command saw its aid cut off for non-cooperation with authorities investigating the 1998 Santo Domingo massacre).
In order to comply with the Leahy Law, the U.S. embassy in Colombia (and, presumably, in every country that gets military aid) must keep a database of individual military personnel who face credible allegations of human rights abuse, and must ensure that none of these names appear on the roster of a military unit being considered for U.S. assistance. This process is called "vetting" the unit.
We had never seen a list of which units had been vetted and approved for U.S. aid - until now. Thanks to the efforts of the Fellowship of Reconciliation's Colombia Program, we now have recent lists of all Colombian military and police units:
- That have been vetted and approved for assistance, and
- That are using U.S.-provided helicopters.
A few quick notes about these lists:
- If a unit does not appear on the list of approved units, that doesn't necessarily mean that the U.S. government has refused aid for human-rights reasons. It does mean, however, that the unit is not getting U.S. aid.
- When the aid in question is training (as opposed to weapons, equipment or intelligence), the definition of "unit" becomes much more flexible. The U.S. government only considers the human-rights background of the individual who has been proposed for training. The individual is the "unit." It is conceivable, then, that an individual from a notoriously abusive unit can receive training, as long as his name does not appear in the vetting database.
- It was surprising to see the 11th Brigade listed. This unit is based in Montería, Córdoba, and its area of responsibility is one of the paramilitaries' principal historic strongholds. Yet the 11th Brigade has almost no record of combating the paramilitary groups that operate in its midst.
- For the most part, other units that operate in paramilitary-heavy areas - the 17th (Urabá), the 4th (Antioquia), the 5th (Magdalena Medio and Catatumbo), the 14th (Magdalena Medio), and the 10th (Cesar) - do not receive assistance. Exceptions include the above-mentioned 11th Brigade, the 16th Brigade (Casanare), and naval units in Sucre.
- Many recipient army units are concentrated in the southern Colombian zone where the "Plan Patriota" offensive has been occurring (Caquetá, Meta and Guaviare departments, including the former demilitarized zone where peace talks with the FARC took place between 1998 and 2002). Another zone of concentration are the oil-producing departments of Arauca and Casanare. (In 2002, the U.S. Congress approved a Bush administration request for $100 million in military aid to protect an oil pipeline in Arauca.)
- Surprisingly, none of the military units in the department of Putumayo - where Plan Colombia began in 2000 - is receiving aid, with the exception of the Navy Riverine Battalion and an Army Counter-Narcotics Brigade that only spends some of its time in Putumayo.
- In the list of units cleared to use helicopters, "TF Omega" is the task force involved in the Plan Patriota offensive. "PCHP" stands for "Plan Colombia Helicopter Program."
Posted by isacson at 07:16 PM | Comments (3)
September 11, 2006
Fumigation and "defoliation"
The International Journal of Remote Sensing is a periodical that you'll rarely find on our reading list. But we were very interested to read a paper recently published there about "Defoliation and the war on drugs in Putumayo, Colombia." An abstract of the paper is available here, but unfortunately you have to pay to read the whole thing.
Much of the paper looks like this:
Or like this:
But the authors' conclusion is easy enough to understand:
[A]erial spraying of defoliants under the US ‘Plan Colombia’ programme impacted broad swaths of the landscape and had the unintended consequence of defoliating contiguous and interspersed native plant and food crop parcels. ... The complex spatial organization of the Colombian coca-producing landscape appeared to confound the spraying of defoliants, and as demonstrated here, many non-coca land cover classes have been affected adversely.
In other words, satellite imagery seems to vindicate all those Colombian campesinos claiming that the U.S.-funded herbicide fumigation, through inaccuracies and spray drift, destroys legal crops, alternative-development projects, and nearby forest.
This finding seems to contradict the State Department's regular certifications to the U.S. Congress that such environmental damage is not happening. The last certification, for instance, reads as follows:
The Government of Colombia regularly conducts studies to assess the spray program's environmental impact through ground truth verifications to estimate spray drift and the accuracy of the spray mixture application and during verification of all legitimate complaints about alleged spraying of crops or vegetation that are not coca or opium poppy. After one recent verification, the Government of Colombia’s Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development characterized spray drift in the following fashion:
The drift effects that were observed in areas visited on a random basis were temporary in nature and small in extent, and basically consisted of partial defoliation of the canopy of very high trees. No complementary collateral damage from spraying activities was observed at the sites selected and verified. In sprayed areas that were subsequently abandoned, it was noted that vegetation was starting to grow again, the predominant types being grasses and a number of herbaceous species (Attachment 2, p. 4)
The Department of State believes that the program’s rigid controls and operational guidelines have decreased the likelihood of adverse impacts of the eradication program on humans and the environment and that the herbicide mixture, in the manner it is being used, does not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment.
The International Journal of Remote Sensing paper charges that the problem is far more widespread than the U.S. and Colombian governments maintain, and that the environmental impact may indeed be quite serious.
The region is classic humid tropics, with cloud cover present almost every day. This has made both monitoring the situation more difficult and, conversely, hiding the effects from the public simpler. While this research should not be used to indict the UNODC or the organizations responsible for spraying, it should serve as a warning that the published reports on drug war results are open to interpretation and that some of the anecdotal, and usually dismissed, claims of misapplication of spraying may, in fact, be true.
Add to this the widespread anger and resentment in areas where development aid has failed to keep up with the spray planes. Yet even with all this collateral damage, the ends can't even be said to justify the means. The hugely expensive fumigation program has still failed to reduce coca-growing in Colombia.
Posted by isacson at 03:20 PM | Comments (2)
September 08, 2006
The paramilitary "extraditables"
Thanks to a communiqué [PDF] put out last week by the Colombian presidency, there is finally a public, more-or-less comprehensive list of paramilitary figures who face U.S. government extradition requests for narcotrafficking. It turns out that there are twenty-four of them.
Ten of them are still at large. Here they are, with photos where available.
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An August 30 article in El Tiempo adds the names of eight additional individuals facing extradition whom the paramilitaries have identified as members of the AUC. All of them already in Colombian jails.
- Álvaro Antonio Padilla Meléndez, alias "El Topo," Bloque Resistencia Tayrona;
- Álvaro Padilla Redondo, Bloque Resistencia Tayrona;
- Eduardo Enrique Vengoechea, Bloque Resistencia Tayrona;
- Fredy Castillo Carrillo, Bloque Resistencia Tayrona;
- Héctor Ignacio Rodríguez Acevedo, Bloque Resistencia Tayrona;
- Huber Aníbal Gómez, Bloque Resistencia Tayrona;
- Jhony or Jhon Eidelber Cano Correa, Bloque Resistencia Tayrona;
- Jhon Alexánder Posada Vergara, Bloque Norte.
Posted by isacson at 03:02 PM | Comments (0)
September 04, 2006
If the Democrats take the House...
Front-page stories in yesterday's Washington Post and today's New York Times report that the Republican Party, dragged down by President Bush's unpopularity, is increasingly likely to lose its majority control of the House of Representatives when the United States elects a new Congress in November.
In the U.S. system, the party that holds a majority of a congressional chamber - even if it is just a one-seat majority - controls almost everything the chamber does. That party gets to name the speaker of the House and the chairmen of all committees. That party decides which bills get debated on the floor and sets the rules for debate. That party's committee chairmen decide which bills get considered, draft the text of appropriations bills, decide the subject matter for hearings and have the power to subpoena witnesses. The balance between parties makes an enormous difference in the U.S. congressional system.
The election is more than sixty days away, and it is entirely possible that the Republicans will manage to hold onto their majority. However, if the Democrats do manage to take back the House for the first time since 1994, U.S. policy toward Colombia could change significantly.
If the Democrats win back the House, the likely leadership of the chamber, and the chairmen of all committees with jurisdiction over Colombia policy, will be made up of people with long records of criticizing the current U.S. policy toward Colombia. (Skip down to see who they are and what their records are.)
Most have expressed concerns about the lack of results against drugs, the Colombian armed forces' human-rights record, the open-ended U.S. mission, and the need for more development assistance. Most have consistently supported legislative efforts over the past six years to reduce the amount of military aid going to Colombia and to do more to address poverty and human-rights abuse.
It has been reported that the Bush administration plans to begin reducing aid to Colombia in 2008 or 2009. Because a Democratic House would probably approve more money for foreign aid worldwide, it would be less likely to implement such cuts - or at least it would not cut aid as deeply as a Republican Congress might.
While the overall amount of aid from a Democratic House would likely be larger, though, the ratio between military to economic aid would probably be significantly different from the current 80 percent to 20 percent split. U.S. aid would become less military in focus, with more funding for priorities like alternative development, civilian governance, judicial reform, aid to the displaced and human rights. Aid would be more strongly conditioned on the Colombian military's human-rights performance, and the aerial herbicide fumigation program, which has not reduced coca-growing, will come up for particular scrutiny. A Democratic chamber would also increase investment in drug demand reduction at home, particularly treatment for addicts.
(The fate of the free-trade agreement the two countries have signed is harder to predict. However, it's worth recalling that CAFTA was barely ratified last year, passing the House by only one vote. And only 15 Democrats voted for it.)
Here are the House Democrats who would be likely to take over leadership positions if their party wins control of the House in November. In one of her last duties this summer, now-departed intern Christina Sanabria compiled each member's record on the ten Colombia-related amendments that have come to a vote since aid to Plan Colombia was first debated in 2000. (A description of each amendment is below, and all members' Colombia voting records are here.)
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Posted by isacson at 11:11 PM | Comments (2)
August 31, 2006
Still swatting flies in Caquetá
In a post to the Democracy Arsenal blog, I discuss USAID's plans to ignore Caquetá department completely, even while the "Plan Patriota" military offensive continues there. It seems to say a lot about how little the U.S. government understands the challenge of dealing with insurgencies.
Does USAID really mean to say that it will only invest in zones where the economy is already viable and where guerrilla presence is low? Does the United States make similar choices in Iraq, too? ("Forget about the Sunni Triangle, let's get the electricity flowing in the few towns where the locals are happy to have us.") If so, that would explain quite a bit.
Posted by isacson at 05:21 PM | Comments (1)
August 29, 2006
Putumayo's white elephant, or how not to win hearts and minds
While driving through the troubled department of Putumayo in southern Colombia late last month, our group decided to branch off the main road to pay a quick visit to Orito, the main town in the municipality (county) of the same name. We had heard that one of the largest projects funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Putumayo, an animal-food concentrates processing plant in the town, was having some difficulties, and we hoped to be able to find out what was going on.
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The plant's concept appeared to make sense: take crops that are easily grown in Putumayo, like yuca and corn, and turn them into food for cows, pigs, chickens and other livestock. USAID and its contractors helped to set up a publicly traded company to run the plant and invested somewhere in the neighborhood of US$2 million to build the facility, buy machinery and perform studies (feasibility, environmental impact, etc.).
This high-profile project, it was hoped, would help wean thousands of Putumayo's farmers away from coca-growing, while turning a profit for its shareholders. It greatly raised expectations among a population battered by massive coca cultivation, relentless fumigation, chronic government neglect and constant violence at the hands of illegal armed groups.
We found the concentrates plant easily enough, as it was located right next to Orito's oil refinery and the base of the local Army energy-infrastructure protection battalion. It is a great-looking facility, modern and clean, with intricate machinery, a cafeteria, meeting spaces, and a big plaque thanking USAID for making the whole thing possible.
Everything looked great, except the whole scene was strangely quiet. The expensive-looking machinery was idle. There were no animal-feed concentrates, yucca or corn to be seen anywhere. The plant was not functioning.
The big building was not empty, though. About forty people were using it as a meeting space. When we arrived, several people had gathered for a job-training workshop organized by a local non-profit. Others, including two Orito council members, were assembled elsewhere in the building. When they saw us arrive, all stopped what they were doing and gethered around us - and especially me, the lone gringo in the group.
Once I explained that I wasn't from the U.S. government, but an independent investigator trying to figure out what happened, everyone started talking at once. It was like being hit by a big wave of anger and frustration. Things soon calmed down, and I tried to take notes as quickly as I could. This is more or less what the residents of Orito told me.
- The concentrates plant cost about 6 billion pesos (US$2.5 million) to establish. It opened in late 2003 and shut its doors in mid-2005. There are no plans to re-open it. The plant's machinery is already being sold off, and some had already been carted away. Residents who had been convinced to invest in the plant had lost money.
- The main reason the concentrates plant failed was a lack of inputs. Nobody wanted to sell it yuca or corn because it offered to buy it at prices considered to be ridiculously low.
The plant offered to pay 120,000 pesos - about US$50 - for a ton of yuca. That's 5 U.S. cents per kilo or 2.2 cents per pound. The same kilo of yuca could be sold in local produce markets for about eight times as much money. I was told that the cost of renting a vehicle and transporting that ton of yuca through roadless Putumayo to the processing plant would eat up more than one-third of those 120,000 pesos.
It made no sense for local farmers to sell yuca or corn to the concentrates plant, when they were guaranteed to lose money at the prices offered. The plant's managers apparently took a "take it or leave it" attitude, not budging on the price (and it is possible that they could not make money at a higher price). The farmers, of course, were happy to "leave it," selling yuca at better prices elsewhere, or braving the U.S.-funded herbicide fumigations and re-planting coca. - The plant was plagued by other problems that should have been foreseen. The machinery, most of which was apparently used and refurbished, never worked at anywhere near top efficiency. Storage of yucca and seeds was a problem in Orito's very humid climate.
- Those with whom I spoke wondered how the idea of a concentrates plant was chosen, alleging that the community was never asked. Others wondered why it was located in oil-producing Orito, when better soils for growing yuca and corn were located in municipalities about an hour's drive to the south.
Since 2000, U.S.-funded planes have sprayed herbicides over 155,534 hectares (about 390,000 acres) of Putumayo, making it the second most-fumigated of Colombia's thirty-two departments during this period. The "stick" of fumigation has been strong and swift, but the "carrot" of development aid has not only been smaller - only 20 percent of U.S. aid to Colombia is non-military - but it has been slower to arrive, haphazardly planned, and has largely failed to improve lives and livelihoods. "Orito today is in its worst economic crisis," a councilmember told me.
After about half an hour, we left the plant and got back on the road. I lamely promised those assembled at the plant that I would at least inform my fellow citizens and my lawmakers about what I saw there.
My nauseating experience in Orito was made possible by one of the most frustrating things about watching U.S. policy unfold in Colombia over the past several years: its systematic undervaluing and neglect of all things non-military.
For planners of U.S. assistance to Colombia, non-military programs have always been an afterthought. Four out of five dollars in U.S. aid goes to Colombia's armed forces, police, and fumigation program. Policymakers have placed a far lower priority on the rest of the aid, which is intended to support governance and development.
Too often, these funds go to programs that are improvised, uncoordinated, left entirely up to contractors, carry high overhead costs, and appear to ignore completely the lessons of similar efforts taken elsewhere. Oversight is weak, dubious claims of success go unquestioned, higher-level officials show little interest. It's easy to get the impression that nobody in charge of these projects cares whether they succeed or not: the point is to spend the money and demonstrate that an objective was fulfilled. The Orito concentrates plant is a perfect example.
The U.S. and Colombian governments have claimed to be pursuing many goals in Colombia, from fighting drugs to fighting guerrillas to simply making Colombia a more just, lawful, prosperous society. To achieve any of these goals, a strategy will fail if it lacks a major investment in governance and development - especially in the vast, stateless rural areas where armed groups and drug crops thrive. Spray planes and military sweeps cannot do it on their own.
But look no further than Putumayo to see the tragedy of alternative development in Colombia. Plan Colombia began in 2000 with Putumayo in mind: at the time, this province of 350,000 people had more coca than any other in the country, and was overrun by guerrillas and paramilitaries. A U.S.-funded "push to the south" would insert new military units in Putumayo and initiate a massive campaign of aerial herbicide fumigation. Next would come aid to help the region's coca farmers to switch to legal crops.
Yet five years later, the United Nations found that Putumayo was still the country's number-three coca-growing department. Today, it is still overrun by armed groups, and it is safe to say that Putumayo's population has not experienced a flowering of affection for its government institutions.
It is not news that progress will be only temporary until Colombians who live in depressed rural areas like Orito - a minority of the population living in the majority of the country's territory - can trust their government to protect them, to enforce laws and to make a functioning legal economy possible. Counter-insurgency experts have said for decades that "the people are the center of gravity."
But in Orito, Putumayo - right in the middle of one of the main battlegrounds for the Colombian government's U.S.-aided counter-insurgency effort - the people I talked to are very, very angry. The angrier and more distrustful they get, the more likely it is that even the small security gains that the Uribe government has achieved will be reversed.
Posted by isacson at 12:44 PM | Comments (2)
August 23, 2006
Colombian contractors in Iraq
Here are some excerpts, translated into English, from the shocking and sad cover story in this week's edition of the Colombian magazine Semana. It tells of thirty-five retired Colombian military officers who were recruited to serve as security guards in Iraq.
A subsidiary of Blackwater USA, the major U.S. contractor whose private guards have even protected U.S. generals in Iraq, recruited the Colombians with promises of salaries of $4,000 per month - more than most doctors or lawyers earn in Colombia. After undergoing training on a Colombian military base (!), they were rushed off to Baghdad - where they found that their salaries would be only $1,000 per month. When they complained, the U.S. company took away their return tickets.
Here is the story. There is much more in the Spanish version that is worth a read as well, such as the reaction of these officers, all of them veterans of Colombia's violence, to the incomparably worse security situation in Iraq ("This is hell: there are bombings all the time, shots, helicopters near and far, sirens day and night. There is no rest. One feels a permanent tension in his chest.")
“The group of 35 of us, and another 34 that arrived about two weeks later, we want to return to Colombia, but they won’t let us. When they find out that we’ve talked about what they’re doing to us, we don’t know what could happen. But the truth is that the people here in Baghdad are desperate,” said Esteban Osorio, a retired captain of the National Army.
… Retired Army Major Juan Carlos Forero went to an office near downtown Bogotá to submit his resumé. “The company is called ID Systems… it’s the representative in Colombia for the American firm called Blackwater. It is one of the biggest private security contracting firms in the world and they work for the U.S. government,” said Major Forero.
“[At ID Systems] we were received by Captain (Gonzalo) Guevara, who works with that firm and is retired from the Army. He told us that basically we had to provide security for military facilities. He told us salaries were around $4,000 USD per month,” Forero said.
Finally, in early June of this year, the representatives of ID Systems told the recruited Colombians that the time had come. “On the evening of the first of June, they asked twelve of us to meet at the office and told us that we were leaving for Iraq the next day. There they told us that the salary wouldn’t be $4,000, but $2,700. We didn’t like that because we had always been convinced that it would be $4,000, but there wasn’t anything we could do at that point.” Why? Because by then none of them had jobs anymore (they had quit in anticipation of the trip) and were desperate to support their families.
At midnight of June 1, Forero and his companions were made to sign contracts, and were given a copy. “We weren’t able to read anything in the contract. We just signed and left in a hurry because when they gave us the contracts they told us we had to be at the airport in four hours and since everything was so rushed, we barely had time to say goodbye to our families, get our bags together and leave for the airport,” said Forero.
From Bogotá they left for Caracas, from there to Frankfurt, where they waited for twelve hours for a flight to Amman, Jordan, and from there a last plane to Baghdad. “Since in the Frankfurt airport we had to wait so long, we started reading the contract, and there we realized that there was something wrong because it said they would pay us $34 a day. That is, our salary would be $1,000 a month, and not $2,700,” recalls Forero.
… The mission of the group… consisted in replacing a group of Romanian contractors that had finished their contracts. “When we linked up with the Romanians they asked us how much we were being paid, and we told them $1,000.” They responded with mockery. “No sane person in the world comes to Baghdad for only $1,000,” they said.
The Romanians told them that for the same work they were being paid $4,000. That fact gave way to uneasiness among the other contractors on the base. The mood turned hostile against the Colombians because if each soldier establishes his own conditions for fighting in a foreign country, there is always a benefit because in the end they are risking their lives. No one spoke to the Colombians and when they did, it was to offend them and treat them like cheap labor.
On June 9th, before they had spent even a week in Baghdad, the 35 drafted and signed a letter addressed to the ID Systems and Blackwater representatives. In the letter, they said that if they didn’t pay the $2,700 that were promised, they wanted an immediate return to Colombia for the entire group.
The letter in which the Colombians demanded their rights was interpreted as rebellion, and the consequences were unexpected. “When we arrived at the base, they took away all our return flight tickets. After the letter they gathered us together and said that if we wanted to return, we should do it through our own means. Ironically, in a show of antipatriotism, one of the people who was most against us was a former captain of the Colombian Army, (Edgar Ernesto) Méndez, who is the link here in Iraq of the contractor in Colombia,” said retired Captain (Estaban) Osorio from Baghdad.
“To force us to comply with the contract, they began to pressure us. They threatened to kick us out of the base facilities to the streets of Baghdad, where you are exposed to being killed or, in the best of cases, kidnapped,” said Osorio.
…What’s more, when they were hired in Bogotá, the retired military men were told they would have eight-hour shifts. After the protest, the shifts became twelve-hour shifts. When the group complained, the response was that they would lose their potable water or that they wouldn’t receive the same food as the others on the base. At the time of recruitment in Bogotá, they were told that they would have medical insurance, dentists, and access to recreation zones within the base and life insurance for $1.5 million dollars. Just like the salary they were offered, nothing turned out to be true. Then came the health deterioration. “Several have gotten sick or have had accidents and it has not been possible for them to receive medical attention. When we asked for an explanation, the only thing we are told is that our contract does not cover that kind of services,” says Forero.
The contractors insist on the influence that the company has on the Army and the government, and that the company could close the doors for them to find jobs back in Colombia. And the threats go even further. “We are afraid for the consequences, not only that we risk being left without a job when we return to Colombia, but that they have also told us to remember that they have all the information about our families and children and that, simply put, is a threat,” said Forero.
Although the Ministry of Defense, the Army and the United States Embassy in Colombia are aware of the recruitment of retired soldiers, it has been a matter dealt with a low profile in which nobody accepts any responsibility.
The closest to it is that the Defense Ministry and Army staff accept that they’re “doing a favor” by lending (ID Systems) a Colombian military base for the training of retired soldiers that are sent to Iraq. “It’s a company endorsed by the U.S. government that asked the Army for cooperation, which consists of allowing them the use of the base, as long as they do not recruit active personnel. There is no agreement, contract or any other type of relationship with them, and therefore, the Colombian government has no responsibility. Whatever happens between retired soldiers and the company that recruits them is basically an agreement between an individual and a foreign company,” said a high-level government official.
For their part, an official from the U.S. State Department in Washington, DC, determined that “The State Deparment believes that this is a private commercial dispute between the Colombian employees and their employer.” The official said that any other comment should be made by Blackwater. Semana Magazine called Chris Taylor, vice president of that company, over ten times, and sent him a written set of questions but never received a response. It was also impossible to obtain a response from the representatives of ID Systems in Colombia, the retired captain Gonzalo Guevara or the owner of ID Systems, José Arturo Zuluaga.
(All the names have been changed for security reasons.)
Posted by isacson at 08:18 AM | Comments (2)
August 15, 2006
Notes from Putumayo
This was my third visit since 2001 to Putumayo, a small department in Colombia's far south, along the border with Ecuador. I've also taken two other trips very close to Putumayo, one to the Ecuadorian side of the international border, and one to a meeting of Putumayo community leaders just over the departmental border in eastern Nariño.
I keep coming back to Putumayo because there is no better place to gauge the impact, the success or failure, of U.S. policy in Colombia. This province of perhaps 350,000 people is where Plan Colombia basically got started, back in 2000-2001.
At that time, Putumayo had far more coca than any of Colombia's 32 departments, along with a very heavy FARC guerrilla presence, while its principal towns were being methodically, brutally taken over by paramilitaries. Putumayo was the focus of the military "Push to the South" that lay at the heart of the Clinton Administration's big 2000 aid package. Supported by U.S. funds, trainers and contractors, a new Colombian Army Counter-Narcotics Brigade, bristling with helicopters, would clear Putumayo's coca-growing zones of armed groups, while augmented counter-narcotics police would coordinate vastly increased herbicide fumigation. In their wake would come alternative-development programs to help Putumayo's farmers participate in the legal economy.
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A U.S.-donated Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police Blackhawk parked at the Puerto Asís airport. |
Six years and untold hundreds of millions of dollars later, did the strategy work in Putumayo? No, mostly not, though there are a few bright spots.
Like much else in Colombia, the results in Putumayo tell us that the strategy needs to be very long-term, must consult closely with local leaders and organizations, and must go way, way beyond military operations and fumigation. And by all appearances, these lessons haven't come close to sinking in yet.
Here is a closer look, based on my all-too-brief visit.
The security situation appeared to be better, for now at least, though the last few years have shown that levels of security tend to oscillate wildly between relative safety and extreme danger. Right now, travel along main roads is possible, with the likelihood of running into guerrillas considered to be low. Road travel at night is still inadvisable, though doable.
We passed through more army and police checkpoints than I had seen before, and the security forces' presence was greater in general. Small contingents of soldiers were reliably stationed at key infrastructure points, including the rebuilt bridge over the Guamués River, which the FARC had blown up before my last visit in 2004, forcing us to board canoes to get across. Many of the soldiers and cops we saw were clearly from elite units, judging from their physical size and the quality of their equipment. (The soldiers who patted us down at checkpoints, however, were generally smaller and younger.)
Some small towns along the main road that had no police presence before, such as El Tigre or Buenos Aires, now had police stations. Also notable, especially in the oil-producing town of Orito, was the presence of troops from a new energy and road infrastructure-protection army brigade. Soldiers and police in many posts sat behind bags of cement piled high into walls, a bulletproof defense that resembled preparations for a flood.
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Though I've never run into uniformed guerrillas on any of my visits to Putumayo, one usually sees evidence of their activity. Guerrilla graffiti - once so common that it was even spray-painted on the sides of tractor-trailers that had passed through FARC roadblocks - was faded, when visible at all.
There was abundant evidence, though, of the last flare-up of guerrilla violence in the department, at the beginning of this year in the run-up to the March legislative elections. A guerrilla "armed stoppage" (paro armado) halted road traffic between towns for weeks, bringing shortages, while attacks on power lines left much of Putumayo in the dark. Along the main road were burned patches from trucks that the guerrillas set afire for disobeying the stoppage. As on previous visits, blackened trees and pools of sludge indicated places where the guerrillas had recently blown holes in the oil pipeline that follows the main road for much of its length.
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Faded guerrilla graffiti. |
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A common sight on the main road - a recently blown-up patch of pipeline with a pool of oil sludge. |
The increased military and police presence - in part a response to the wave of violence at the beginning of the year - had made conditions more secure in general. However, several local leaders indicated, flare-ups of guerrilla activity were still common and could happen at any time. One likely reason was that a U.S.-supported military offensive immediately to the north of Putumayo, a two-year-old effort known as "Plan Patriota," had forced many guerrillas to relocate, increasing their numbers particularly in border departments like Putumayo, Nariño, Vaupés and Norte de Santander. By all accounts, the guerrillas' grip on Putumayo's rural zones - the majority of the department's territory, away from the principal towns, the main road and the most-traveled rivers - was unchanged.
While the frequency of FARC attacks in the department was reduced and limited to more remote areas, their intensity when they do occur has been greater. Body counts per attack have been much higher and damage to infrastructure has been more costly. Just before I arrived, guerrillas had kidnapped thirteen medical personnel in the rural zone of Puerto Asís municipality, eventually releasing all but one of them. While I was present, combat was taking place along the Ecuadorian border; one night in La Hormiga I could hear the periodic soft thud of what sounded like mortar rounds going off many miles away to the south.
For the most part, I heard few strong complaints about the increased military and police presence in Putumayo. Nobody with whom I spoke denounced cases of serious abuse or large-scale corruption at the hands of police or soldiers, with the exception of some instances of rough treatment or disrespectful language.
Two issues, though, require attention. First, several indigenous leaders expressed concern about the recent construction of a military installation, part of the government's larger Center for Attention to the Border Zone (CENAF), on land belonging to an indigenous reserve in San Miguel municipality. Though I've found little additional information about this new base, I heard numerous complaints about the way in which it was installed - with a refusal to dialogue and an insistence on national security priorities and the government's right to be present wherever it wishes - and concerns that the CENAF leaves the indigenous reserve more vulnerable than ever to guerrilla attack.
The other issue was a general consensus that military and police efforts against "former" paramilitaries in Putumayo are still minimal to nonexistent. Since 1999-2001, paramilitaries have dominated Putumayo's main towns and vied with the FARC for income from coca cultivation and processing. They have maintained this dominance through a combination of brutality (first massacres, then selective killings and "social cleansing" that continue today), providing security for urban residents and businesses, and a nearly complete absence of opposition from the security forces. (This absence was chillingly documented in Human Rights Watch's 2001 report, "The Sixth Division.")
At some point around 2002 or 2003, the leadership of the Putumayo paramilitaries shifted from Carlos Castaño's Córdoba and Urabá Self-Defense Groups (ACCU), which claimed to seek less involvement in the drug trade, to the powerful Central Bolívar Bloc (BCB), which actively sought narco funding. Though the BCB officially demobilized early this year, its Putumayo branch appears to have continued its activities with few changes. They still dispute control over drugs and territory with the guerrillas, and continue to carry out selective killings on a near-daily basis. "Macaco's guys are still everywhere," said one interviewee, referring to the BCB's most feared, if not most visible, leader.
While this was the first time I visited Putumayo without seeing uniformed paramilitaries, their plainclothes presence was still in evidence. "Paraco," mouthed a traveling companion as we sat in a Puerto Asís restaurant, nodding nervously toward two men passing slowly by on a motorcycle.
A few miles north of Puerto Asís, close to the large military base in the suburb of Santana, sits Villa Sandra, a large compound with a big house, a pond and recreational facilities. During the paramilitaries' bloody takeover of Putumayo's town centers, and then during the beginning of Plan Colombia's execution, Villa Sandra was the paramilitaries' center of operations. Everyone in Puerto Asís - except, apparently, the military and police - knew that the paras were headquartered there, and that many of their victims were taken there and never left.
During my 2001 visit to Putumayo, Villa Sandra was very much in use. When I returned in 2004, it was abandoned, and remains that way now, with its facilities in evident disrepair behind a high chain-link fence. Many in Putumayo believe that an inspection of the compound's grounds would reveal much about the paramilitaries' activities in the zone - including, in some likelihood, mass graves. That Villa Sandra remains untouched and uninvestigated is eloquent evidence of the paramilitaries' continued influence over Putumayo, despite the recent demobilizations.
If the security situation is mixed but trending slightly better, patterns of coca cultivation are mixed but trending worse. When I visited Putumayo in early 2001 after Plan Colombia's first round of spraying, the department was Colombia's undisputed coca capital - the UN measured 66,000 hectares of the plant there in 2000. Coca was in abundance, with large plots easily visible from the main road, especially in the Guamués River valley.
When I visited in April 2004, Putumayo had been hit with massive herbicide fumigation - over 125,000 hectares between 2000 and the end of 2003. Coca was no longer visible from the main road, while overgrown fields indicated where it had been before. Coca was still present - a short drive down any side road made that clear enough, where plots, most of them smaller than before and often newly planted, were easy to find - but the spray planes had deeply cut back cultivation. By the end of 2004, the UN's satellite data found only 4,400 hectares of coca in all of Putumayo.
This stunning reduction is proving to be temporary. As coca cultivation moved to other parts of the country, particularly the neighboring department of Nariño, the spray planes and counter-narcotics brigades left Putumayo to follow it.
In the absence of better economic options, the absence of massive eradication has had a predictable result: coca is returning to Putumayo, and it is doing so quickly. The UN noted a doubling of coca cultivation in the department between 2004 and 2005 (from 4,400 to nearly 9,000 hectares), and replanting continues. What I saw in Putumayo bears this out: unlike 2004, I was once again able to spot coca cultivation from the main road, in apparent defiance of the increased military and police presence along that same road. Plots are smaller than they were in 2001, and a bit harder to see - on hillsides or even amid overgrowth - but they are definitely back. Meanwhile, prices offered for coca paste remain low - about 1.6 million pesos or $650 - indicating that scarcity is not a problem for buyers.
While the recent increase in coca hasn't been great enough to bring a return to the late-nineties gold-rush boom years, there is money in Putumayo's economy - at least its illegal sector. The discos and boutiques in jungle boomtowns like La Hormiga and Puerto Asís remain open for business - I saw no empty storefronts, and the bars and billiard halls were overflowing in La Hormiga on Saturday night. Many people continue to be getting paid.
It is unlikely, though, that most are doing so legally. Many with whom I spoke used the word "depressed" to describe the state of Putumayo's legal economy. The reduction of coca-growing from 1999-2001 levels has meant less money circulating overall, a situation that has been compounded by a stagnation in prices offered for most legal crops.
A symptom of the department's rural economic crisis is a notable increase in migration from the countryside to town centers. A vivid example was on display from the road on the way into the town of Orito, where a large number of people from the municipality's rural zone (800 was the estimate I heard) had just invaded a patch of land whose ownership was unclear. Living out in the open under sheets of plastic, the settlers hoped to succeed in staking a claim on a bit of soil near the oil-producing town, where they believed that their economic prospects would be slightly better. It was a sight one would expect to find perhaps on the outskirts of Medellín or Cali - but not Orito, a town of perhaps 25,000 people.
Land-invasion tent city in Orito. |
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The state of Putumayo's legal economy has not been helped appreciably by the alternative development programs that were supposed to be the "soft" or "carrot" side of the fumigation strategy, helping sprayed coca-growers to find new ways to make a living. It is hard to believe that the U.S. and Colombian governments have invested well over $50 million - perhaps as much as $80 million - in Putumayo since 2000. While some projects appear to be having success and buy-in, particularly cooperatives, assistance to indigenous communities, and specialty crops like black pepper and vanilla, the overall reaction I heard was one of frustration.
A major frustration is the road network, a crucial priority if legal crops are to have any hope of making it to market. Lack of roads not only adds to the isolation of communities that remain in the grip of armed groups; it makes it very difficult to get any crops to market - with the exception of coca paste, which allows several hectares' harvest to fit in one bag.
Nearly six years after Plan Colombia began in Putumayo, even the main road between its capital, Mocoa, and its largest city, Puerto Asís - a stretch of less than 100 miles - has not been paved. The road is dirt. (However, paving is currently underway between Puerto Asís and Santana, covering about the first eight miles of the trip to Mocoa.) The segment of road that is paved, between Santana and La Dorada, was paved well before Plan Colombia began, funded by the state oil company in order to service the pipeline that runs along that section of road - and even this has deteriorated since my first visit to Putumayo. All other roads, including those leading to significant towns and villages off the main road, are unpaved and in bone-jarringly bad condition, if they exist at all.
Beyond the road network, I heard several complaints about alternative development projects' design and management. For the most part, these concerns are common to alternative development projects - indeed, rural development efforts - all over the world. People complained that their communities were not consulted in the projects' design, that outside experts unfamiliar with the region told them what crops were most promising, and were often wrong. (The bitter experience of a multimillion-dollar animal-feed plant in Orito, which opened in 2003 and closed in 2005, is an excellent example.) They cited a lack of help with marketing crops once they had been produced: transporting the product on the poor road network and making connections with buyers willing to pay enough for the farmer to clear a profit. Many said that credit was still impossible to come by, and even when it was available, lenders often failed to take into account that many crops take years to produce their first harvest.
Many with whom I spoke were particularly resentful of perceived layers of "middlemen" in the development assistance process. In their view, USAID's contractors, and their Colombian (and rarely Putumayo-based) subcontractors, have accrued the lion's share of development assistance for themselves. Each link in the chain, they assert, has squandered resources on overhead, salaries, consultants, and in some cases petty corruption, leaving only a trickle of investment for the recipient communities. Development practitioners who have worked in Putumayo may find this characterization to be unfair and even provably untrue; nonetheless it is a widespread, nearly unanimous perception. It is the most frequent response to the question, "Why is there so little evidence that many millions of dollars have been spent here on development?"
In defense of the alternative development programs, those I spoke with had few concrete suggestions for alternative crops that could prosper in Putumayo - at least in the absence of decent roads, reliable security, enforceable property rights, access to credit, and much else.
However, I did hear a good deal of interest in developing a market for the many Amazon-basin fruits that Putumayo produces in abundance but are rarely available elsewhere, even elsewhere in Colombia. I recall that ten or fifteen years ago in the northeastern United States, it was very unusual to find mangoes, papayas, or yuca in supermarkets, but now these and other tropical products are commonplace and profitable. If products like chontaduro, lulo, manzana de agua, tomate de árbol, arazá, or uchuva could catch on similarly, Putumayo's farmers would have a potential answer to the alternative development challenge. But right now, outside demand is so low that such fruits command rock-bottom prices. We shared a ride with a farmer who lost a pile of money trying to grow arazá last year, only to find that the prices were laughably low. He said he was thankful that he had kept a little bit of coca to give himself a financial cushion.
While in La Hormiga, I was able to attend a day-long meeting attended by governors of indigenous reservations. Most of the twelve indigenous nations found in Putumayo were represented: Cofán, Inga, Pasto, Nasa, Awá, Embera, Yanacona, and others. They had gathered to discuss Plan Colombia: how it has impacted them, what was to come and what they could do to prepare for it.
It was a great opportunity to listen to communities that had the deepest roots in Putumayo. For the department's indigenous residents, Plan Colombia is only the latest of several close encounters that has left them wary of western "modernity" and the global economy.
A century ago, Putumayo was at the center of a boom in rubber production, during which the region's indigenous people were enslaved and terrorized by the mostly foreign owners of rubber plantations. (Read a harrowing account of this period in anthropologist Michael Taussig's classic 1987 study Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wild Man.) During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the discovery of oil led to another rush of investors and settlers. Today, Putumayo is number two, behind Arauca, among Colombia's oil-producing departments. [Correction as of 8/22: Putumayo's actually 3rd, I forgot Casanare.] As in Arauca, one sees little evidence of the oil wealth, and plans for new drilling continue to be frequent subjects of controversy. Twenty years ago, Putumayo played host to a new export-oriented bonanza that brought in even more settlers from elsewhere in Colombia: the boom in coca production that persists today and continues to make the department one of Colombia's most violent.
For Putumayo's indigenous communities, each of these events has meant an influx of outsiders, theft of land, displacement from territory, and a weakening of the social fabric and cultural traditions. It is unsurprising, then, that they discuss Plan Colombia as inseparable from Colombia's free trade agreement with the United States, big foreign investments (particularly in oil), and fears of massive "megaprojects" that would evict them from their land.
The picture is more complicated than that, not least because several Putumayo indigenous communities have accepted, and benefited from, significant amounts of assistance through USAID-funded Plan Colombia programs. But these communities clearly fear that the "next phase" of Plan Colombia will involve "desterritorialización" - forced displacement from ancestral lands - in favor of foreign investment projects. The installation of the CENAF military base and recent disputes with a Canadian oil company are being viewed as harbingers of what is to come as Plan Colombia proceeds. The U.S. and Colombian governments must endeavor, through adherence to the rule of law and through non-military investments, to convince them that this is not the case.
Flying out of Puerto Asís, one can easily spot plots of coca carved out of Putumayo's swiftly disappearing jungle. One also sees evidence of the near-total isolation in which too many of the department's citizens live. Looking east to the edge of visibility are hundreds of parcels of land gouged from the surrounding forest, most with houses in the middle. No roads or rivers appear to penetrate anywhere near these landholdings. Pushed by a lack of opportunity elsewhere and pulled by the perverse incentives of the coca economy, a small but significant portion of southern Colombia's rural population continues to live far beyond the reach of its government (with the exception of the government's spray planes).
Whether viewed from the air or from the ground, Putumayo offers an abundance of reminders of how much needs to be done to make citizens out of millions of marginalized Colombians. And how little Plan Colombia - with its emphasis on military force and fumigation - has helped to achieve that goal.
No roads or power lines go anywhere near these houses, on one of many very isolated plots of land visible from the air. The light green vegetation in the top picture is probably coca. |
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Posted by isacson at 03:54 PM | Comments (4)
July 12, 2006
Leaving so soon?
Andrés Pastrana has left us, after less than a year as Colombia's ambassador in Washington. He quit in a storm of anger: the very moment that President Uribe named another former president, narco-money-tainted Ernesto Samper, to be ambassador in France, Pastrana canceled all his appointments, flew to Bogotá, held a long meeting with Uribe and quit his job.
Pastrana and Samper could not be worse enemies. After Samper defeated him in the 1994 elections, it was Pastrana who leaked evidence that Samper had received large amounts of campaign cash from the Cali cartel. This evidence did not lead to Samper’s impeachment or punishment, but the U.S. government found it sufficient to deny Samper a visa, and it touched off a huge scandal that essentially destroyed Samper’s presidency.
Naming Samper to the embassy in Paris was the latest of several moves the Uribe government has taken lately that no doubt displease the Bush administration. These include:
- Planning a visit to Cuba, inviting Fidel Castro to his inauguration in August, and entering into trade talks with his government.
- Making clear, as Interior Minister Sabas Pretelt said in a newspaper interview on Sunday, that paramilitary leaders wanted in the United States for drug trafficking will not be extradited if they stay within the lenient confines of the “Justice and Peace” law.
- Signing a deal with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez for a trans-border gas pipeline.
- According to conservative columnist Robert Novak, refusing a request by George W. Bush last month to be “our man in the Andes,” backing the U.S. effort to isolate Chávez. Writes Novak, “Bush was dissatisfied with Uribe's noncommittal reaction in the Oval Office when the U.S. president said he was counting on him to lead the struggle against Chavez.”
Taken together, these moves indicate that Álvaro Uribe is willing to test the boundaries of his friendship with the United States. Realizing that the Bush administration lacks similarly close allies in Latin America, Uribe appears to be both seeking to demonstrate that (a) he is not a tool of the Bush administration and (b) he can get away with doing many things that make Washington uncomfortable, thanks to his privileged position as the United States’ chief partner in the volatile Andes.
But back to Pastrana. The former president’s sudden resignation leaves many of us here in Washington wondering what else is going on. The naming of a sworn political enemy and fellow ex-president to another ambassadorial post no doubt outraged Pastrana; he told reporters that it was a “moral impossibility” for him to serve in the same administration as Samper.
But it was not a “moral impossibility” for Pastrana to serve in the same Foreign Ministry as Jorge Noguera, the consul in Milan who allegedly placed the presidential intelligence agency (the DAS) at the service of paramilitaries and drug traffickers during his three-year tenure as its director. Nor was it a “moral impossibility” for Pastrana to serve a government that has given a most lenient treatment to paramilitary leaders involved in epic levels of criminality. Before being named to the ambassadorship, Pastrana had criticized the Uribe government’s talks with the paramilitaries as “improvised” and “hermetic,” and had voiced concerns about growing paramilitary power under Uribe and the effect it would have on the next elections.
Pastrana’s sudden exit has a whiff of pretext to it. It feels as if the ambassador was ready to leave Washington anyway, and Samper’s nomination gave him a reason. Keep in mind that:
- Pastrana was never an Uribe supporter. In fact, in 2004 and early 2005, the two leaders exchanged strong words on a few occasions. Pastrana accused Uribe of buying votes in the Congress in order to win the right to run for re-election. Uribe responded that Pastrana, during his failed attempt to talk with the FARC guerrillas, engaged in “flirting with violent groups to buy smiles for the cameras.” These two men are not good friends.
- Pastrana was likely bothered by Uribe’s style. He was rumored to be unhappy, for instance, that Uribe gave him only a few days to prepare for a sudden February 2006 presidential visit to Washington to give a push for free trade negotiations.
- Pastrana, an ex-president and one of Colombia’s most recognized politicians, may simply have grown a bit bored with a life in semi-exile in Washington, out of Bogotá’s political fray.
Pastrana has most likely left us for a combination of these reasons, and perhaps others. But the naming of Samper to the Paris ambassadorship is not, on its own, a satisfying explanation for why he would be leaving so soon, and so abruptly.
Posted by isacson at 03:14 PM | Comments (13)
July 11, 2006
Energy integration, seen from Washington
Here is an English translation of a column published on Sunday in Colombia’s El Espectador newspaper. While energy supplies are not a topic we’ve worked on closely, this is an important security issue.
Energy integration, seen from Washington
Adam Isacson
The U.S. government is not very worried about the construction of a new natural gas pipeline between Venezuela and Colombia. Likewise, Washington did not complain publicly about the gas-sector nationalization carried out by Evo Morales in Bolivia.
The reason is simple: the United States does not depend on natural-gas imports. According to the Natural Gas Supply Association, the United States only imports 15 percent of the gas it uses, and almost all of that comes from Canada. In fact, the United States is a net exporter of gas to Mexico.
So the Bush administration doesn’t have major reasons to complain about the building of a gas pipeline between Maracaibo and La Guajira. The greatest concern would probably have to do with the administration’s general aversion to any initiative that smells of Hugo Chávez. The dominant role of PDVSA (the Venezuelan state energy company) might make them uncomfortable.
The Bush administration might also be disappointed by this evidence that Álvaro Uribe does not wish to participate in the U.S. effort to isolate Chávez. Instead, the Colombian president has prioritized his commercial interests over serving as “our man in the Andes,” as George Bush asked of him during his last visit to Washington.
Gas deals don’t bother Washington much. But if the gas pipeline were an oil pipeline, the U.S. reaction would be quite different, and much stronger.
The United States imports 4 million barrels of Latin American oil each day, mainly from Venezuela, Ecuador and Mexico. This represents almost 30 percent of all U.S. oil imports, and more than 20 percent of all oil that the United States uses.
Washington is worried about the stability of petroleum flows from Latin America. At the end of June, the Financial Times of London ran a story about a recent internal report of the U.S. Southern Command expressing concern for the growth of “resource nationalism” in the region. The tendency toward nationalization, the military report claims, could “increase inefficiencies” and complicate petroleum supplies. In March, meanwhile, a House of Representatives committee hearing aired concerns about disturbances to the hemispheric oil market due to recent political tendencies.
Ecuador’s recent confiscation of Occidental Petroleum’s installations so angered the Bush administration that its representatives abandoned free-trade negotiations. The declared interest of Ecopetrol (the Colombian state oil company) in investing in these Ecuadorian oil fields earned Álvaro Uribe a rare scolding from Condoleezza Rice during his June visit to Washington.
Every time Hugo Chávez speculates about the possibility of boycotting oil sales to the United States, the U.S. government notices and becomes concerned. But cutting off sales to Venezuela’s largest customer is not a realistic option for Chávez.
Venezuela, without a port on the Pacific, cannot easily reach alternative markets in Asia, especially China’s increasing demand. Where oil is concerned, Hugo Chávez and George Bush need each other, at least for now.
This situation of co-dependency could rupture, however, if Colombia and Venezuela make progress toward another joint project that has been under discussion: the building of an oil pipeline from Venezuela and across Colombia, ending at a port on Colombia’s Pacific.
This pipeline would give Venezuela much greater access to Asian demand, and Venezuela would depend much less on the U.S. market. With Venezuela’s worldwide oil sales diversified by a trans-Colombian oil pipeline, Hugo Chávez would be much more able to consider the possibility of selling less oil to the United States – or of boycotting the “gringos” completely.
If the plans to build this oil pipeline grow closer to reality, then, we can expect some strong pressure from Washington to stop the project.
Posted by isacson at 11:36 PM | Comments (4)
June 28, 2006
Robert Novak's war
Once or twice each year, conservative syndicated columnist and TV pundit Robert Novak publishes a piece about Colombia. These are written with very heavy input from House Republican congressional staffers who, over the years, have played a leading role in making U.S. policy toward Colombia what it is today.
Hence the headline of Novak’s latest missive, which appeared in the Washington Post and elsewhere: “Dems balk at support for Colombia’s drug war.” Novak filed the column from Colombia, where he is paying a visit this week to vacationing President Álvaro Uribe at his ranch in rural Córdoba department (a zone so dominated by right-wing paramilitaries that it is practically an independent republic).
Recall that the Republicans are facing the possibility of losing control of the House of Representatives in November’s elections. It shouldn’t surprise us, then, that Novak and others are reverting to the tired old tactic of tarring as “soft on drugs” everyone who opposes the present U.S. strategy in Colombia – in this case, congressional Democrats.
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| Novak's column came with this illustration in Rep. McGovern's hometown Boston Herald. |
But Novak’s latest column goes still further. Those who would cut funding from aerial herbicide fumigation, he argues, are delivering a slap in the face to hundreds of brave Colombian policemen risking their lives to stop cocaine and heroin from coming to the United States.
He cites the debate three weeks ago over Rep. Jim McGovern’s (D-Massachusetts) unsuccessful attempt to transfer $30 million out of the U.S.-funded fumigation program in Colombia. “Democrats in the House voted 161-28 for McGovern's disastrous cut in U.S. aid,” Novak writes. “The House Republicans saved Colombia, but ardent young officers of the national police are anxious to win this war.”
Novak doesn't ask why these brave police are being asked to risk their lives for a strategy that, after more than a decade of fumigation, hasn't done a thing about coca or opium in Colombia. Both the U.S. government and the UN tell us that Colombian coca cultivation increased last year, despite record levels of spraying, and that Plan Colombia, begun in 2000, has proved unable to alter supplies of cocaine. The price of the drug on U.S. streets is lower than it was when Plan Colombia began.
Novak also faults Democratic critics for being concerned about the May incident in Jamundí, south of Cali, in which a military patrol apparently in the service of drug traffickers massacred an elite police counter-drug unit. Novak cites as “evidence of Colombia’s escape from degradation as a narco-terrorist state” the mere fact that the colonel who headed the army brigade has been detained while the attorney-general investigates.
What does Novak propose to turn the tide and start showing results? Nothing more than the same strategy that has so far failed to show any results.
He quotes a police official who calls on the U.S. government to add 15 new fumigation planes to Colombia’s current U.S.-supported fleet of 21 planes. This 70 percent increase in capacity would allow fumigation to grow from the current 140,000 to about 240,000 hectares per year. Each plane would need at least two new escort helicopters, plus contractor pilots, maintenance, fuel and all other associated costs. Novak’s (and thus the House Republicans’) proposal would cost hundreds of millions more dollars per year.
We’ve been down this road before. Plan Colombia in 2000 made possible a tripling of fumigation in Colombia. $4.7 billion later, it didn't work. Why would a near-doubling be any different?
Instead of acknowledging real failures and joining the search for a policy that actually works, Novak and his congressional ghostwriters have decided that the best defense is a good offense. The column launches yet another desperate attack on the policy’s growing circle of critics.
In Novak’s worldview, those who dare to find fault with the current approach are soft on drugs, cruel to Colombia’s self-sacrificing police, “left-wing,” and perhaps even in thrall to narcotraffickers. He cites Rosso José Serrano, a former Colombian police chief who is a hero to U.S. drug warriors, who told him that claims of environmental damage from fumigation stem from “the campaign, all over the world, of the drug traffickers,” and that pressure from narco-terrorists is the only reason why European governments refuse to support fumigation.
Why is Novak recurring to such irresponsible and baseless attacks? Clearly, because his side of the discussion has lost the debate on its merits. They see no other way to defend their chosen strategy. They see no other way to avoid a turn toward governance and poverty reduction, and away from spray planes and helicopters.
Tactics like Novak’s are often successful in Washington, and can do much to forestall a revision of our failed anti-drug policy in Colombia. But it is vital that this revision come soon, despite the efforts of Novak and his allies. We owe it to the hundreds of Colombian police who continue to risk their lives for a strategy that simply isn’t working.
Posted by isacson at 07:12 AM | Comments (11)
June 27, 2006
Notes from a House hearing on Latin America
Colombia Program Intern Christina Sanabria attended last Wednesday's House International Relations Committee hearing on "Democracy in Latin America." Here are highlights from her notes.
Notes on Hearing before House International Relations Committee
“Democracy in Latin America: Successes, Challenges and the Future”
June 21, 2006
Panelists:
- Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs, US Department of State (Testimony – PDF)
- Adolfo Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID (Testimony – PDF)
- Tom Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, US Department of State
- Christopher Sabatini, Ph.D., Senior Director of Policy, Council of the Americas/Americas Society (Testimony – PDF)
- Francisco Flores, former president of El Salvador (did not attend, but submitted testimony – PDF)
Opening statement, Tom Lantos (D-California, ranking Democrat on the committee):
- Latin American voters are angry, but their rage is directed against traditional systems, not democracy.
- Latin Americans prefer democracy and would not support a military dictatorship
- Lantos made his strongest public criticism to date of the Hugo Chávez government in Venezuela. He said he saw Venezuelan democracy at major risk – it is a “façade of democracy”
- Within Venezuela:
- Compromise of “democratic principles and fundamental freedoms”
- In recent Congressional elections, all the winning candidates were “candidates subservient to Chávez, just like the old Soviet elections”, and he has “packed the Supreme Court” with sympathizers
- The Law of Radio and Television restricts the media
- Venezuelan foreign policy:
- Chávez has actively campaigned in foreign elections, such as Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and Nicaragua
- He is “actively courting Iran and North Korea, and Hamas terrorists”
- The “Caracas-Havana Axis” compromises the US’ security interests by financing terrorism and undermining counternarcotics efforts
- Within Venezuela:
Opening statements from other committee members:
- Barbara Lee (D-California): We cannot engage in some situations and look the other way in others. Approach should be symmetrical towards right- and left-leaning leaders.
- Gregory Meeks (D-New York): “Twin issues” of democracy and poverty; “poverty is democracy’s parasite.” We need to address poverty for there to be true democratic participation.
- Dana Rohrabacher (R-California): “China is playing a malevolent influence” in Latin America, including alliances with Chávez and Castro. A swing to the left in Latin American countries’ domestic politics is not helpful to their prospects for prosperity.
Questions of witnesses:
- Dan Burton (R-Indiana, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee chairman): Concerned that the US has invested a great deal of aid money in Colombia, but of about 40,000 FARC and ELN ex-combatants, fewer than 100 have been trained for other pursuits and many have returned to being armed and planting coca. “Time is of the essence” and the process needs to be sped up.
- Response from Adolfo Franco (USAID): The U.S. government plans to invest $48 million in demobilization programs. The process will take an estimated $190 million.
- Response from Adolfo Franco (USAID): The U.S. government plans to invest $48 million in demobilization programs. The process will take an estimated $190 million.
- Burton: “Populism issue is of concern.” Venezuelan president Chávez is sending money and other commodities for electioneering in other countries. For example, in Nicaragua millions and millions of dollars through diplomatic channels for the Sandinistas.
- Response from Paula Dobriansky (State / G): Populism in and of itself is not necessarily bad. We are responding by sending $13 million to Nicaragua for assistance to train poll workers and political parties.
- Response from Tom Shannon (State / WHA): Voters in many nations, like Peru for example, recognize that kind of assistance for what it is. What we can do is ensure that the vote is free and fair and highlight that our interaction is with the state to ensure credibility and strengthen institutions.
- Eliot Engel (D-New York, ranking Democrat on the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee): 41% of the region’s population is in poverty. How can you justify three consecutive years in cuts to core development accounts?
- Dobriansky: We using a “transformational diplomacy” approach, looking at countries in greater need. Overall assistance has increased from 2001 to the present from about $800 million to $1.7 billion.
[Note: Secretary of State Rice’s “transformational diplomacy” approach has generally meant aid cuts for Latin America. The claim that development aid has more than doubled since 2001 is extremely deceptive, as this analysis (PDF) from the Latin America Working Group explains.]
- Dobriansky: We using a “transformational diplomacy” approach, looking at countries in greater need. Overall assistance has increased from 2001 to the present from about $800 million to $1.7 billion.
- Engel: about 12 countries have refused to sign article 98 agreements exempting U.S. personnel from the International Criminal Court, and are seeing cuts to their non-drug military aid as well as Economic Support Funds (ESF). What are you doing about it?
- Dobriansky: The sanctions do not curtail ESF to NGOs and civil society, and since a big part of our aid goes through those channels, the sanctions currently do not present a tremendous concern.
- Dobriansky: The sanctions do not curtail ESF to NGOs and civil society, and since a big part of our aid goes through those channels, the sanctions currently do not present a tremendous concern.
- Meeks: There are countries in the region where half of the people are poor. Democracy doesn’t make a significant change in the day-to-day lives of people who are poor. Why cut aid three years in a row?
- Dobriansky: Much of that poverty is due to corruption and mismanaged government. We are looking to work on “accountable governments.”
- Shannon: “We want this money to be catalytic.”
- Rohrabacher: China is buying port facilities in Panama and making oil deals with Chávez and Castro.
- Shannon: We believe China has a legitimate interest in raw materials, not in politics. Unethical actions and our concern for them are not exclusive to China.
- Shannon: We believe China has a legitimate interest in raw materials, not in politics. Unethical actions and our concern for them are not exclusive to China.
- Jerry Weller (R-Illinois): There is $3-17 billion in Venezuelan oil money “sloshing around.” (The congressman showed photos from the Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa, dated March 16 and June 5, of helicopters and rolls of fertilizer, sent by the Chávez government to the Sandinistas on the eve of presidential elections.) There are reports of 20 thousand tons of fertilizer, one-third of a typical year’s use, and three helicopters sent to the Sandinistas.
- Shannon: “I think (voters) understand what this is.”
- Shannon: “I think (voters) understand what this is.”
- Tom Tancredo (R-Colorado): Minimizing poverty “is a task greater than the imposition of democracy.” Corruption is endemic – what to do?
- Dobriansky: Strengthening the judiciary, e.g. training judges and lawyers, exchanges, like when the Panamanian Supreme Court met with the US Supreme Court. In Colombia, program called “Culture of Lawfulness” works for a better understanding of the role of law enforcement, incorporating mothers, lawyers, educators and others. Also, helped in the transition to an accusatorial judicial system.
- Dobriansky: Strengthening the judiciary, e.g. training judges and lawyers, exchanges, like when the Panamanian Supreme Court met with the US Supreme Court. In Colombia, program called “Culture of Lawfulness” works for a better understanding of the role of law enforcement, incorporating mothers, lawyers, educators and others. Also, helped in the transition to an accusatorial judicial system.
- Burton: Concern with Venezuela’s influence in other countries. US-trained poll workers cannot counteract Venezuelan helicopters and fertilizer in Nicaragua.
- Chris Sabatini (Council on the Americas): we should find ways to introduce our principles and introduce other countries to the global economy, with scholarships, for example, for Latin Americans to learn English. Venezuelan donations of fertilizer are violations of international norms, and we need more international awareness.
- Chris Sabatini (Council on the Americas): we should find ways to introduce our principles and introduce other countries to the global economy, with scholarships, for example, for Latin Americans to learn English. Venezuelan donations of fertilizer are violations of international norms, and we need more international awareness.
- Meeks: is it useful to have trade capacity-building provisions on trade agreements?
- Sabatini: useful and essential. Latin American countries do not have true market economies; we must address endemic and internal race – and geography-based distortions as part of our trade agenda.
- infrastructure, like roads and wells: for lack of them, 40% of Peruvians not engaged in market economy
- education, especially basic literacy and English
- judiciary and labor rights.
- Sabatini: useful and essential. Latin American countries do not have true market economies; we must address endemic and internal race – and geography-based distortions as part of our trade agenda.
- Meeks: despite Plan Colombia, certain sectors in Colombia are not seeing benefits.
- Sabatini: Plan Colombia has been successful in demobilizing paramilitaries and lowering violence, not successful in narco reduction. We need a “second-generation Plan Colombia” that will focus on establishing justice, roads and a stronger economy.
- Sabatini: Plan Colombia has been successful in demobilizing paramilitaries and lowering violence, not successful in narco reduction. We need a “second-generation Plan Colombia” that will focus on establishing justice, roads and a stronger economy.
- Burton: countries with which the United States has trade agreements should have a strong educational infrastructure so that the greatest possible number of their citizens can participate in the global economy.
Posted by isacson at 10:54 AM | Comments (0)
June 24, 2006
The UN's data on Colombian coca-growing
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime released its annual Andean Coca Survey on Tuesday. It found an 8 percent increase in the amount of coca grown in Colombia in 2005. Similarly, U.S. estimates released in April found either an increase in 2005, or an adjustment to reflect more area under measurement.
If you want to know about drug-crop cultivation in Colombia and the rest of the region, this document is absolutely required reading. How much coca was grown in each department of Colombia last year? How much land was fumigated in each department? How extensively do alternative development programs cover affected populations? What prices are coca-growers are being paid for their product? For answers to these and many other questions that an informed counter-drug strategy must answer, this report is the only source available.
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The U.S. government, by contrast, just provides an overall number of hectares of coca estimated to have been grown in each country, and little else. The State Department's annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, released each March, are not useful for discerning trends, since they either omit or play down information that might indicate that the strategy is not working.
For its part, the UNODC provides its own coca-growing estimates for Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Like the U.S. numbers, these estimates are based on satellite data. The divergence between U.S. and UN numbers is increasing, however: the U.S. estimate for Colombia is now two-thirds higher than the UN number, and while UN figures showed decreases in Bolivia and Peru last year, the U.S. data show coca cultivation on the rise in both countries. If this makes anything clear, it is the fact that we have only a vague idea of how much coca is being grown in the Andes.
Because the UN document makes it easier to discern trends, it is hard not to notice one in particular: the current anti-drug strategy, which favors forced eradication over governance and development, has failed utterly.
Of course, the UNODC - which gets much funding from the United States, and whose crop-monitoring program works in tandem with Colombia's National Police - is not going to argue that aerial fumigation has failed. In fact, the UN agency contends that fumigation has somewhat reduced Andean coca-growing over the past five years (a contention that U.S. statistics, which show coca acreage holding steady throughout the Andes, do not uphold).
However, its latest report offers abundant evidence that the current strategy is no longer reducing coca-growing in the Andes, and is unlikely to do so in the future. "Coca Cultivation in Andes Stabilizes in 2005," reads the UNODC press release accompanying the report. Their point is that current massive levels of U.S. aid for fumigation and interdiction are able to bring only stability at current levels of coca cultivation. More reductions in coca-growing are unlikely, and a region-wide increase is a distinct possibility.
What is needed now, the UN agency argues, is much more donor-country investment in rural development. "Our aid efforts need to be multiplied at least tenfold in order to reach all impoverished farmers who need support," says UNODC Director Antonio Mario Costa.
Here are some of the report's most interesting findings.
- In response to fumigation, coca cultivation continues to move geographically within Colombia. As fumigation intensified in Nariño and in the "Plan Patriota" zone in southern Colombia, coca-growing increased elsewhere. Putumayo department, which was the epicenter of coca cultivation when "Plan Colombia" began in 2000, registered its first increase in coca-growing since that year. Paramilitary-controlled zones in Córdoba, northern Antioquia and southern Bolívar all increased, as did zones under guerrilla influence such as Meta's Macarena National Park and the Uva River basin in Vichada, the sparsely populated department near the Venezuelan border. In all, the UN survey detected coca in 23 of Colombia's 32 departments.
- Massive amounts of spraying in a single department appear to achieve short-term reductions, which don't appear to be sustainable without a government presence on the ground.
Large-scale spraying in 2001-2002 reduced coca-growing in Putumayo. Once spraying declined in this poor, neglected department, reductions ceased, and coca-growing in fact doubled last year in Putumayo. The amount of coca remains far below 2000-2001 levels, though, largely due to the presence of alternative-development programs. The new Putumayo coca, according to UNODC, is being planted in the department's far western foothills, near the borders with Nariño and Cauca - a region that had little coca before, but has little state presence or alternative development investment. 
In vast, sparsely populated, nearly ungoverned Vichada, far-flung coca cultivation has made spraying difficult, and measures of the crop have increased. A similar dynamic has happened in Meta, though some of the increase there owes to planting in the Macarena National Park. 
In Nariño and Antioquia, increased spraying has yet to affect coca-growing significantly. 
In Caquetá, Guaviare and Norte de Santander, coca has been reduced. Some of this owes to high levels of spraying, though these have been tapering off. Much credit in fact goes to a greater presence of government personnel on the ground. In Caquetá and Guaviare, those personnel are mostly soldiers participating in the "Plan Patriota" military offensive; their presence is temporary, and we can expect coca to increase if their numbers are drawn down. In Norte de Santander, the UNODC gives robust alternative-development programs the credit for the sharp reduction in coca cultivation. 
- Farmers have been re-planting coca at a staggering rate. Fumigation, in the absence of other alternatives, is not deterring coca cultivation. 44 percent of the coca fields the UNODC satellites detected in 2005, making up 61 percent of all coca detected, did not exist in 2001-2004.
- Coca fields are getting even smaller. The average coca plot that UNODC detected last year was 1.13 hectares, down from 1.3 in 2004 and 2.05 in 2000. "A possible explanation," according to the report, "could be that farmers are reducing the size of their coca fields to avoid detection and aerial spraying."
- Polling of coca-growers makes apparent that spraying is merely an inconvenience, disrupting but not stopping their income stream from coca. According to the report, "Once their fields have been sprayed, the farmers responded that in 45% of the cases they would just wait for the coca plants to recover, in 20% of the cases they would cut the damaged coca plants, in 12% of the cases they would re-plant their fields, while the remaining 23% adopted for a combination of these solutions." According to UNODC, farmers can prune sprayed coca bushes to a height of one foot "to obtain a renewal of the bush in about six months." The report also notes that "when heavy rain occurs or bushes are washed by the farmers immediately after the spraying, the loss in coca leaf can be reduced and the crop recovered quickly."
- New UNODC research indicates that more cocaine is being extracted from the same amount of coca. The UN had previously estimated that a hectare of coca yielded about 4.7 kilograms of pure cocaine each year. They have revised this estimate to 7.7 kilograms. "Based on this data, the total cocaine production in Colombia for 2005 reached 640 metric tons cocaine," reads the report; this is higher than the U.S. government estimate of 545 tons. Increased yields, the UNODC indicates, "may help to explain why the price and purity of cocaine have remained steady on the streets of consuming countries despite the overall reduction in world supply."
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Prices paid for coca paste in Colombia are not rising, which means that fumigation is not reducing coca-leaf supplies. Prices in 2005 rose in dollar terms, but shrank in peso terms (the dollar weakened against the peso last year). "After a sharp increase in 2001, which can be seen in connection with the successful efforts of governments to stop the trafficking of cocaine base from Peru to Colombia, prices for coca paste in Colombia tend to oscillate around 2,100,000 Colombian Pesos (US$ 900) per kilogramme."
- Coca farmers - who are hit hardest by the U.S.-supported focus on eradication - are not rich. The UNODC estimates that 68,600 families grow coca, a total of about 336,150 people (0.8 percent of Colombia's population). Each family takes in about $12,300 per year, minus all production costs (herbicides, pesticides, fertilizers, wages for coca-pickers, and of course extortion payments to armed groups). Notes the report, "It seems that even the gross per capita income derived from coca cultivation is well below the average GDP per capita, confirming that coca farmers belong the economically worse off part of the population. The figures for Peru and Bolivia show a similar scenario." The UNODC adds, "In most cases, the emergence of illicit crops does not significantly increase peasants’ income, but can improve their basic subsistence when other income generating activities are not present."
- Rural development offers the only way out. The UNODC makes this point in every one of its annual coca surveys: "There is evidence that giving farmers alternative sources of income so they do not have to grow coca can work…. However, the scale is still very small and needs to be multiplied at least tenfold in order to reach all impoverished farmers who need support. This is a major undertaking, but it could reduce poverty and the world supply of cocaine at the same time." Despite this evidence, alternative development is underfunded and opportunities are scarce. "In Colombia, a study by the Colombian government and UNODC revealed that only 9% of the coca farmers interviewed reported having received any kind of assistance to stop growing coca plants."
The present mix of policies - heavy eradication, little development aid - has brought such a persistent and frustrating lack of results, common sense would dictate that the United States and other donor countries immediately shift their strategies and boost alternative development. Common sense, however, has not driven this policy.
The UN's estimates tell us that between 1999-2000 and 2003-2004, a tripling of fumigation cut Colombian coca cultivation in half. (Fumigation went from about 40,000 hectares per year to 130,000; coca went from about 160,000 hectares to 80,000.)
In the absence of alternative development, then, what would it take to reduce Colombian coca by half again, to 40,000 hectares? Another tripling of fumigation, to 400,000 hectares (and well over half a billion dollars) per year? Would it take a further tripling (1.2 million hectares sprayed, $1.5 billion) to halve it again, to 20,000 hectares?
This strategy has run its course. Rural development, with a state presence in neglected areas - along with more demand-reduction in consuming countries like the United States - offers the only way out of the dead end that U.S. fumigation has proven to be.
The UNODC's report won't say that. But its findings point pretty clearly in that direction.
Posted by isacson at 07:37 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 16, 2006
A mysterious drop in cocaine seizures
Colombia's security forces interdicted 48.5 tons of cocaine between January and May of this year, according to a press release that appeared Wednesday on the Colombia's presidency's website.
This sounds impressive, but it actually puts Colombia on a pace to interdict one-third less cocaine than it did in 2005. In 2005, Colombia seized 171 tons - a record, though merely a fraction of the 545 tons that were produced in Colombia last year, according to the U.S. Drug Czar's conservative estimate.
At this year's rate, Colombia will have seized about 116.4 tons of cocaine by December 31. After years of increased interdiction levels, this would represent a drop to 2003 levels. 116.4 tons is only slightly more than Colombia seized in just the first seven months of last year (108.3 tons between January and July of last year, according to an August 2005 communiqué from the Colombian presidency).
Why is so much less cocaine being seized, especially when U.S. anti-drug military aid to Colombia remains constant or even increasing? We don't know, but there are three leading explanations. Two of them are obvious and one is alarming, though impossible to dismiss.
1. Colombian authorities are simply finding less of the product. It is possible that Colombian traffickers, after years of increasing losses, have adapted and are using new routes and new methods of getting cocaine out of the country.
2. Colombian coca-growers are producing less of the product, thanks to eradication. This outcome is unlikely, though, since U.S. governmnent figures show that coca-growing has been steady, if not increasing, for many years now.
3. The big paramilitary pre-demobilization "sell-off" is over. Last year, Colombian officials speculated that the cocaine market was being flooded by paramilitary leaders who, facing imminent demobilization, were selling off their cocaine stockpiles, rushing to convert it to cash before being amnestied. This could explain the spike in cocaine seizures in 2005 - including a surprising number of multiple-ton finds - though it is less likely to explain a similar spike in 2004, when a final agreement with the paramilitaries was still far off.
If this hypothesis is true, however, it might explain why less cocaine might be "in the pipeline" now that the paramilitary leadership is officially "demobilized." And more disturbingly, it means that top paramilitary leaders, who appear likely to avoid extradition to the United States for sending drugs here, successfully managed to cash in one last time. They may have gotten away with sending even more tons of drugs here just before the final deadline for submitting to the "Justice and Peace" law.
Posted by isacson at 04:30 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
June 14, 2006
Rural development, in 400 words or less
Last year, Democrats on the House Appropriations Committee wanted to improve the balance between military and economic aid on the 2006 foreign aid bill.
Committee members like Sam Farr (D-California), who was once a Peace Corps volunteer in Colombia, wanted to see more U.S. investment in rural Colombia, where drug crops and armed groups are as pervasive as ever. Instead of an 80 percent military strategy, Farr and others argued, more must be done to address the total absence of civilian government from much of Colombia’s territory. Colombia’s problems will continue to bedevil us, they argued, as long as state absence continues to go hand-in-hand with very high rural poverty rates. (Colombia’s Comptroller’s Office estimated in 2004 that 85 percent of rural Colombians live below the poverty line.)
The Democrats’ appeals for more rural development aid hit a brick wall of Republican opposition. Majority-party appropriators refused to budge on aid priorities or to provide more non-military money. They had plenty of funds available, of course, for fumigation and other military efforts.
The most that the Democrats managed to do was add language to the non-binding narrative report that the Appropriations Committee writes to accompany the foreign aid bill. They inserted the following sentences recognizing the importance of development aid in Colombia, and asking the U.S. Agency for International Development to provide a report.
The Committee strongly supports USAID’s continuing alternative development strategy that focuses on the historic underdevelopment of Colombia’s outlying regions. The programs concentrate on local infrastructure needs (roads, electricity, water) and delivery of services at the community level. This focus on an entire community increases the social pressure for eradication and also helps organize the community to identify and prioritize local needs. It is the Committee’s view that alternative development integrated with the presence of the state and the presence of law enforcement and security are fundamentally the key to long term peace and security in Colombia.
The Committee directs USAID to report back to the Committee no later than 60 days after enactment of this Act what detailed steps the Government of Colombia is taking to develop a comprehensive rural development strategy.
USAID produced this report in February, and we obtained a copy today (PDF).
“Disappointing” doesn’t even come close to describing the product that was turned over to Congress. How seriously does the Bush administration take congressional concerns about development and governance in rural Colombia? Your answer is evident in the length of this report: less than 400 words.
And most of those words are generalities, statements of principles and aspirations lifted from official Colombian government text. Concerned members of Congress can learn, for example, that “the government of Colombia’s agricultural policy is guided by the principles of equity, competitiveness, sustainability and decentralization.” Or that “the strategy will lead to a more competitive agricultural sector, capable of generating rural employment through combined public and private efforts.”
What rural development strategy doesn’t share such objectives? (North Korea’s, maybe.) A reader of this report will learn almost nothing about Colombia’s rural plans, and will more likely come away concerned that Colombia in fact has no coherent strategy, and the U.S. government has no intention of supporting these goals.
The report fails to answer even very basic questions like these:
Who in rural Colombia is being most heavily targeted by this strategy? Agribusiness? Small farmers? Cooperatives? Displaced and other vulnerable groups? People in drug-producing areas? Producers for export or for the domestic market? Light industry or services enterprises in rural towns?
Who is making decisions for the design of development projects? Do communities themselves get to participate, or is it a statist, top-down approach?
What Colombian government agencies are carrying out this strategy? How does USAID evaluate their efficiency and effectiveness?
What crops, beyond the fruit, cacao, cassava, rubber, fisheries and controversial African palm the report alludes to, are being encouraged?
Where in rural Colombia is this strategy being carried out? What parts of the country are getting the most public resources, private investment and U.S. aid? Is the strategy reaching inhabitants of historically neglected zones with little state presence, where need is greatest, or is it principally benefiting people in territories that are already more integrated into the national and global economies?
When does this strategy expect to achieve its benchmarks and goals, such as number of jobs created or reduction of poverty rates to a certain percentage of the rural population? Do such benchmarks and goals exist? They don’t appear in the report.
Why did the report not even touch on specific concerns the committee listed in its report, like infrastructure, work with entire communities, and integration with security and law enforcement? What is being done in those areas, if anything?
How much does this strategy cost? How much would come from Colombian government resources, whether new spending or incentives to private investment, and how much from international donors? How is the U.S. government specifically supporting this strategy?
How is the rural development strategy being coordinated with security efforts, in order to avoid having some regions militarized but otherwise forgotten, and other regions with well-funded projects vulnerable to guerrilla attack or extortion?
What is the U.S. government’s opinion of this strategy? Is it viable and sufficiently resourced? Are there elements that USAID feels are less deserving of support than others?
A real report to Congress would have made at least some effort to address questions like these. But the brief, vague, and useless document the appropriators received doesn’t even come close.
Let’s hope this 400-word brush-off is not a true reflection of the importance that the U.S. government places on Colombia’s rural development challenges. If it is, then we are doomed to be confronting drug trafficking, violence, and other by-products of Colombia’s rural poverty and statelessness for many years to come.
The Appropriations Committee should demand a genuine explanation of rural development strategy in Colombia, with specific recommendations for how the U.S. government could be more supportive. It should also actively discourage the executive branch from responding in this fashion to its requests for information.
Posted by isacson at 05:59 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
June 12, 2006
In harmony, for the moment
Here is a translation of a column which appeared in yesterday’s edition of the Colombian newspaper El Espectador. This version is a bit longer than what appeared in print, due to a small snafu (they had asked for 900 words, then determined that they couldn’t fit that much).
In harmony, for the moment
It shouldn’t surprise us that the Bush administration and the Republican majority in the U.S. Congress were very pleased with Álvaro Uribe’s reelection. They can now be sure that, for four more years, they can remain in harmony with one of the few unconditional allies they still have in Latin America, and one of the few loyal adherents to the “Washington Consensus.”
The State Department’s happiness was evident. Within 48 hours it announced a much-delayed “certification” of Colombia. Twice each year, the law requires a certification that the Colombian armed forces are improving their human-rights performance; each certification frees up approximately $35 million in “frozen” military aid. This process has been controversial, because it has been difficult to show improvements.
The House Republicans have sought even closer relations with Uribe. In mid-May, the House Appropriations Committee changed the structure of aid to Colombia for 2007, transferring economic aid (about $140 million) from the counter-narcotics program to “regular,” non-drug economic aid. “It is time to move away from treating Colombia as a narcostate,” said Rep. Jim Kolbe, the committee’s Republican chairman.
The Bush administration and the Republican legislative majority, which dominate Washington right now, continue to seek perfect harmony with Colombia, and we will hear them all singing together when Uribe visits the United States next week.
But there is a minority that has not lost the ability to express doubts and ask questions. While it is politically difficult to challenge someone who just won an election with 62 percent of the vote, the message from the Democrats and some less-right-wing Republicans is: Colombia has not been written a blank check.
On the Democratic side, several important legislators are concerned about the human-rights climate in Colombia, which they see as worsening quickly. They have noted the serious trends documented in the UN High Commissioner’s annual report and other new accusations of military participation in abuses. They have noted the increases in displacement, forced disappearances, and the wave of threats against unionists, journalists, and human-rights defenders. Key Democratic senators know about the murder of Jaime Gómez and the massive use of force against indigenous protests in Cauca three weeks ago. They have strong doubts, to say the least, about the ongoing process with the paramilitaries. And they are upset about scandals like the infiltration of the DAS, the torture of recruits in Tolima, and the military massacre of a police counter-drug unit in Jamundí.
The Democrats are taking action. As I write this, Rep. Jim McGovern is promoting an amendment in the House to cut funding from fumigations. Three weeks ago, three prominent senators – Patrick Leahy, Chris Dodd and Barack Obama – wrote a strong letter [PDF] to Nicholas Burns, the number-three official at the Department of State, criticizing a blindly optimistic column he wrote about Colombia in the Miami Herald. “There are reasons to be seriously concerned about whether our current policy can achieve its goals,” they warned.
This week, Sen. Leahy disputed the human-rights certification that had been issued after Uribe’s reelection. As the Senate’s ranking Democrat in charge of foreign aid, he took the unusual step of temporarily halting the military aid that had just been “unfrozen.”
Meanwhile, some Republicans are unsatisfied with the results of the drug war under Plan Colombia. The revelation in April that there was more coca measured in Colombia in 2005 than in 2000 – the year Plan Colombia began – dropped like a bomb on the current policy. Important senators and representatives from the moderate wing of Republicanism (Charles Grassley, Richard Lugar, Jim Kolbe) have expressed unhappiness with the evident failure of fumigations as the strategy’s principal axis. But most Republicans remain firmly in support of glyphosate.
The current panorama in Washington, then, involves on one side, those who hold power and support Uribe almost unconditionally, and on the other side, a minority that – while it does not oppose such a popular president – is uncomfortable and wants to see changes.
This panorama could change significantly this November, when the United States elects a new House and one-third of its Senate. Uribe’s allies in Washington are awaiting this date with some apprehension, because at the moment their popularity is at its lowest point. Polls indicate President Bush’s approval ratings at around 30 per cent, and there is a growing possibility that the Democrats might win a majority in the House, and perhaps the Senate, in November.
If the Democrats win in November, the new speaker of the House will be Nancy Pelosi, and the new chairman of the Appropriations Committee will be David Obey; both are critics of Plan Colombia. And Rep. McGovern, who tries every year to amend the law to reduce military aid, would be one of the chief members of the powerful Rules Committee. In the Senate, Patrick Leahy – who is currently holding up military aid funds – would be the senator who writes the basic draft of the foreign aid bill each year.
Putting them in charge of the Congress would not mean an immediate end to fumigations or Plan Patriota. But there would be much more human-rights scrutiny and concern about the quality of Colombia’s democratic institutions. There would be less emphasis on fumigation, and more resources to strengthen governance and fight poverty, priorities which today account for less than 20 percent of U.S. aid to Colombia.
Even with a strengthened Democratic congressional bloc, though, Álvaro Uribe would still be the closest U.S. ally in Latin America. The Bush administration, which is in power through 2008, will see to that. But the embrace would be less close, and criticisms and conditions would be stronger.
Of course, it remains quite possible that nothing will change in November. It is hard to bet against the Republicans, who have won every legislative and presidential election since 2000. If everything remains the same after November, Washington and Bogotá will continue to sing the same tune, in perfect harmony.
Posted by isacson at 08:09 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 09, 2006
Holding ground in the House
This afternoon, after an hour of lively debate, the House of Representatives defeated an amendment that sought to reduce military and police aid to Colombia by $30 million. The measure, introduced by Reps. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts), Jim Leach (R-Iowa), and 5 other members of Congress, sought to transfer that $30 million to emergency refugee-assistance programs worldwide.
It lost by a vote of 174 to 229, with 43.2 percent of those in attendance voting in favor.
Votes on amendments similar to today's measure have happened at least once every year since 2000 (with the exception of 2004). During this period, nine amendments seeking to cut or limit U.S. military aid to Colombia have been defeated, and a tenth seeking to increase military aid succeeded.
This gives us a list of ten votes which we can use as a rough gauge of how supportively or skeptically the House, which has been dominated by Republicans during this entire period, has viewed the U.S. strategy toward Colombia.
Though no amendment has succeeded, congressional skepticism has been strong and steady. On average, amendments seeking to cut or limit military aid to Colombia have had the support of 43.8 percent of representatives who voted.
Today's vote was no exception. A 174-229 margin means that, of those who voted, 43.2 percent supported the McGovern-Leach-et.al. amendment.
To be only 0.6 percent below average is a perfectly acceptable result, if not a big step forward. To have held the same ground is an achievement in the wake of Alvaro Uribe's resounding re-election, and in the 109th Congress, which is the most conservative in the period being measured.
Today's vote shows that the U.S. Congress has not given an unconditional green light to the Bush and Uribe administrations. Many members of Congress are concerned about the lack of results against the drug trade, the grave human-rights situation, and the unbalanced U.S. strategy, which favors military aid over economic aid by a 4-to-1 ratio. The vote on today's amendment shows that, despite official claims of the policy's success, congressional skepticism remains healthy and robust.
Many thanks are due to the amendment's sponsors: Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts); Jim Leach (R-Iowa); Donald Payne (D-New Jersey); Zoe Lofgren (D-California); Raúl Grijalva (D-Arizona); Jan Schakowsky (D-Illinois); and Betty McCollum (D-Minnesota). Thanks are due as well to those who spoke on behalf of the amendment: Reps. McGovern, Leach, Schakowsky, and Lofgren; plus Ike Skelton (D-Missouri, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee); Sam Farr (D-California); Barbara Lee (D-California); and David Obey (D-Wisconsin, the ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee).
| Vote | Yea | Nay | Percentage of those voting |
| mar 00 (obey) | 186 | 239 | 43.8% |
| mar 00 (ramstad) | 159 | 262 | 37.8% |
| jul 01 (mcgovern et al) | 179 | 240 | 42.7% |
| jul 01 (lee-leach) | 188 | 240 | 43.9% |
| may 02 (supp) | 192 | 225 | 46.0% |
| apr 03 (supp) | 209 | 216 | 49.2% |
| jul 03 (for ops) | 195 | 226 | 46.3% |
| jun 05 (for ops) | 189 | 234 | 44.7% |
| mar 06 (supp, burton - reverse yea and nay) | 172 | 250 | 40.8% |
| jun 06 (for ops) | 174 | 229 | 43.2% |
| Average | 184 | 236 | 43.8% |
Key:
mar 00 (obey): Amendment introduced by Rep. David Obey (D-Wisconsin) to delay consideration of military aid during the March 29-30, 2000 debate on the "Plan Colombia" supplemental appropriation.
mar 00 (ramstad): Amendment introduced by Rep. Jim Ramstad (R-Minnesota) to cut all aid to Colombia during the March 29-30, 2000 debate on the "Plan Colombia" supplemental appropriation.
jul 01 (mcgovern et al): Amendment, introduced by Rep. Jim Mcgovern (D -Massachusetts) and several others, that would have cut $100 million from the Andean aid to pay for increased assistance for anti-tuberculosis programs during the July 24, 2001 debate on aid for 2002.
jul 01 (lee-leach): Amendment, proposed by Representatives Barbara Lee (D -California) and Jim Leach (R -Iowa), to shift funding from the Andean Counter-drug Initiative to the Global AIDS Trust Fund during the July 24, 2001 debate on aid for 2002.
may 02 (supp): Amendment, introduced by Reps. Jim Mcgovern (D -Massachusetts) and Ike Skelton (D-Missouri), that would have cut language broadening the mission of U.S. military assistance in Colombia to include combat against illegal armed groups, during the May 22-23, 2002 debate on supplemental appropriations legislation.
apr 03 (supp): Amendment, introduced by Reps. Jim Mcgovern (D -Massachusetts), Ike Skelton (D-Missouri), and Rosa DeLauro (D-Connecticut), that would have cut military aid for Colombia that was included in a supplemental appropriation, April 3, 2003.
jul 03 (for ops): Amendment, introduced by Reps. Jim Mcgovern (D -Massachusetts) and Ike Skelton (D-Missouri), that would have cut military aid for Colombia and transferred it to HIV-AIDS programs, July 23, 2003 debate on foreign aid for 2004.
jun 05 (for ops): Amendment, introduced by Reps. Jim McGovern (D -Massachusetts), Betty McCollum (D-Minnesota) and Dennis Moore (D-Kansas), that would have cut military aid for Colombia, June 28, 2005 debate on foreign aid for 2006.
mar 06 (supp, burton - reverse yea and nay): Amendment, introduced by Rep. Dan Burton (R-Indiana) that added $26.3 million in military aid to Colombia to a supplemental appropriations bill, March 17, 2006. Yeas and nays are reversed on this table, because opponents of the current policy voted against this amendment.
jun 06 (for ops): Amendment, introduced by Reps. Jim Mcgovern (D -Massachusetts), Jim Leach (R-Iowa), and several others, seeking to transfer $30 million in military aid to Colombia to refugee programs worldwide, in debate on the 2007 aid bill, June 9, 2006.
Posted by isacson at 03:55 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
June 08, 2006
"Stay the Course?" No thanks
Here is a point-by-point response to a letter being circulated in the House of Representatives by four Republican congressmen who are considered the House's leading proponents of the current policy toward Colombia.
The letters' authors are:
Dan Burton (R-Indiana, the chairman of the House International Relations Western Hemisphere Subcommittee),
Henry Hyde (R-Illinois, the chairman of the House International Relations Committee),
Tom Davis (R-Virginia, the chairman of the House Government Reform Committee), and
Mark Souder (R-Indiana, the chairman of the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources).
Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515
Stay the Course in Colombia!
Dear Colleague,
This week we will take up consideration of the Appropriations Foreign Operations Bill with provisions relating to Colombia and the Andean Region where critical campaigns in the Global War on Drugs and Terrorism are being waged. As we prepare to take up H.R. 5522 (Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2007), let us draw your attention to the critical need to maintain our support for the newly re-elected President Uribe and bilateral cooperation against the scourge of narco-terrorism. Below are excerpts from House Report 109-486.
Excerpts from the Appropriations Committee Report accompanying H.R. 5522 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2007
"...It is the Committee's view that the time has come to transition from assistance directed at counter-narcotics programs, to assistance designed to develop and promote the stable democracy that Colombia has become."
It is time to provide Colombia with assistance to develop and promote a stable democracy. But our current aid to Colombia doesn't do that.
77.4 percent of the aid to Colombia in the Foreign Operations bill (and about 82 percent of overall aid) will go to Colombia's security forces. This is the same as in previous years - there is no "transition" to speak of.
Over $200 million will go simply to maintain planes and helicopters given to Colombia in the past; plans to have Colombia assume more of the maintenance costs have gone nowhere. Still more will go to an aerial herbicide fumigation program that, after more than 10 years and almost 3,000 square miles sprayed, has not reduced the amount of coca grown in Colombia by one acre.
Only 22.6 percent of the aid in the foreign ops bill will pay for the kind of assistance we usually think of when we talk about "developing and promoting democracy." This includes efforts to create a legal economy in poor, violent parts of Colombia; to strengthen civilian governance where none exists; to help Colombia's beleaguered judicial system; and to assist Colombia's huge and growing population of victims displaced by the violence.
These needs are urgent, and they deserve far more assistance than they are getting. But the military component of the aid package continues to predominate.
"The Committee has noted the successes of Plan Colombia and the measurable improvements that have resulted in the everyday lives of the Colombian people. Some have declared Colombia the `greatest success story in Latin America.' In fact, the Colombian Government's success in combating the cultivation of drugs and in restoring democracy can be measured in may ways:
- Coca eradication through spraying has gone from 47,000 hectares the first year of Plan Colombia to 138,775 last year;
Eradication has increased - but has achieved absolutely no results. There is even more coca in Colombia today than there was in Plan Colombia's first year.
In 2000, the year in which Plan Colombia began, the U.S. government measured 136,200 hectares (336,500 acres) of coca in Colombia. In 2005, the U.S. government measured 144,000 hectares (355,800 acres) - an increase of 6 percent!
(Plan Colombia's original goal was to decrease coca-growing by 50 percent by 2005.)
- By regaining sovereignty over most of its air space, Colombia has decreased by 56 percent suspected drug trafficker flights;
- Drug flow to the United States has dropped by 7 percent;
Despite this rough figure based on coca cultivation estimates, the supply of Colombian cocaine in the United States appears to be all too stable. A key measure of that is the price of the drug on U.S. streets.
In 2000, the U.S. government estimated that a gram of cocaine sold for an average of $161.28 on U.S. streets. In September 2005, using a different methodology, the Drug Czar's office estimated the price of a gram at about $170.
There has been no statistically significant change in the price, purity or availability of Colombian cocaine since Plan Colombia began.
- Kidnappings are down 51 percent and homicides 13 percent;
Some violence statistics are going in the wrong direction.
- The International Committee of the Red Cross found a 13.6 percent increase in forced disappearances between 2004 and 2005.
- According CODHES, the Colombian non-governmental organization that maintains data on forced displacement, the number of people forced from their homes by violence increased by 8 percent from 2004 to 2005.
- "Recorded cases of harassment against trade unionists increased" in 2005, according to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
- The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported "an increase in allegations of actions attributed to members of the security forces, particularly the army," in 2005.
- All 1098 Colombian municipalities have a permanent government presence;
Unfortunately, in too many of these municipalities (or counties), that presence amounts to little more than a few dozen police or military personnel charged with securing vast areas.
Consolidating a real government presence - with civilian government officials building infrastructure, resolving disputes, guaranteeing property rights, teaching children and providing other basic services - should be the central goal of U.S. aid to Colombia. But it is not. Our main focus continues to be on military assistance and on drug-fighting methods that have proven not to work.
- Over 30,000 paramilitary have been demobilized;
To be more precise, as of April 30,150 paramilitaries had laid down 16,077 weapons (0.52 guns per person).
Their "former" leaders, who sent many tons of drugs to the United States, have no fear of being extradited to face justice here. Meanwhile, the OAS observer mission warns that new paramilitary groups are forming in areas where demobilizations took place.
- 200,000 acres of legal crops have been planted and 64,000 farm families have a `legal' farming option;
This is an important and worthwhile program. And it needs more funding so that rural development, and rural governance, can bring permanent reductions in coca cultivation.
Today, the spray planes are far ahead of the development effort: of the nine provinces of Colombia that were sprayed the most between 1999 and 2004, only two have received more than $15 million in development assistance from all international donors during that same period.
- Unemployment has dropped from 20 percent to an estimated 11 percent;
This is an important gain. However, underemployment – the percentage of workers who do not have full-time jobs in the formal economy, and thus are probably not even earning minimum wage – has actually increased since 2004, from 31.8 to 32.6 percent of the workforce at the end of 2005.
Add that to the 11 percent who are unemployed, and over 2 out of 5 Colombians who want a full-time job in the formal economy are unable to find one.
- In December, implementation of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States is expected to drop unemployment even more.
Clearly, Colombia has made remarkable progress. The Committee believes it is time to fund assistance to Colombia through the same mechanisms used to fund other strategic partners."
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June 06, 2006
Colombia debate coming soon in Congress
It’s that time of year again: the House of Representatives will begin considering the 2007 foreign aid bill as early as Thursday. The House bill includes $641 million in new aid for Colombia, about $496 million of it military/police assistance. (An additional $160 million or so in military/police aid will go through the Defense budget.)
Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts) plans to introduce an amendment that would cut $30 million from Colombia’s counter-drug military/police aid – aimed particularly at the failed fumigation program – and transfer it to refugee assistance programs worldwide. (The House rules of debate simply don’t allow a cleaner transfer specifically to aid Colombia’s displaced population.)
This is not a huge transfer of funds. The amendment’s main purpose is to send a strong signal that the U.S. Congress is concerned about the counter-drug strategy’s lack of results, and that assistance for refugees and displaced people must be a higher priority.
Here is the Latin America Working Group’s action alert on the amendment. If you are a U.S. citizen and want to send a message about the need to reconsider the current U.S. policy toward Colombia, please follow these guidelines and contact your House representative today.
There are unlikely to be any similar opportunities this year.
Taken from http://www.lawg.org/countries/colombia/fy07action.htm:
Below is an action for refugees and displaced people fleeing from violence around the world. Congress has begun work on the foreign aid bill for 2007, and it’s time for us to demand that U.S. aid help the victims of conflict instead of aiding the abettors.
The foreign operations appropriations bill, which dictates how much Colombia receives from the United States each year, will reach the House floor for a vote this week. Congressman Jim McGovern (D-MA) will offer an amendment to the bill to transfer $30 million from funds for aerial fumigation of drug crops in Colombia to emergency humanitarian relief efforts for refugees around the world. U.S. assistance abroad should generate goodwill by helping those suffering most from famine, war and natural disasters, and should reflect our belief in the right to human life and dignity. This is one of the key congressional actions relating to Colombia that we expect to see this year.
Take Action! Beginning tomorrow - Tuesday and Wednesday - call your member of Congress in the House. Ask that s/he vote YES on the McGovern amendment to the foreign operations appropriations bill transferring $30 million in military aid for Colombia to humanitarian assistance for refugees of political violence and natural disaster. Call the Capitol Switchboard at 202-224-3121 to be connected with the office of your representative. Speak with – or leave a message for – the foreign policy aide. Here’s the basic message:
”I urge my representative to vote YES on the McGovern Amendment to the foreign operations appropriations bill, which transfers funds from aerial spraying in Colombia to aid for refugees and emergency humanitarian relief around the world. I want my tax dollars to help people fleeing war and natural disasters, not spent on harsh aerial spraying programs in Colombia that do nothing to stop the problem of drug abuse at home.”
In the past few years we’ve witnessed all too many major humanitarian crises caused by political violence and natural disaster. We continue to hear about millions of refugees and displaced people in Sudan and millions more fleeing from violence in other parts of Africa. We’ve seen refugees forced to abandon their homes after destructive natural disasters, like the colossal tsunami in South Asia, the earthquake in Pakistan and last fall’s Hurricane Stan which caused mudslides and devastation in Central America. Not to mention the suffering that we’ve experienced here at home due to Hurricane Katrina.
We see that there is a need for greater response to humanitarian crises worldwide, and we know that this need far outweighs the desire of the Colombian military to receive more helicopters and spray planes from the United States. The Colombian military has received $3.8 billion since 2000, which has largely supported the purchasing and maintenance of military helicopters, spray planes and related accessories. This equipment is used in Colombia for aerial fumigation of drug crops – a strategy that is failing miserably – and for the war effort.
The War on Drugs in Colombia is a failure. Aerial fumigation of coca plants has proved to be one of the most ineffective ways of reducing coca production in the Andes and the availability of cocaine on U.S. streets. When one area is destroyed by fumigation, farmers simply move to another. Moreover, aerial spraying is inhumane. The chemicals sprayed from planes contaminate water sources, are harmful to human skin and routinely destroy farm families’ food crops.
Here are some talking points for your call:
U.S. Priorities Abroad.
- I believe that my tax dollars should be used to promote goodwill abroad by addressing human suffering and humanitarian crises. Refugees fleeing from political violence and natural disaster deserve greater aid from the United States.
- Humanitarian crises around the globe demand international aid for emergency relief. The U.S. should be at the forefront of the efforts. We need to prioritize assistance to refugees and others suffering from large-scale disasters and intense political violence.
We should not continue to throw our money at a failing drug strategy in Colombia.
- Plan Colombia fails dramatically to achieve its top goal: to curb drug production and abuse. Over $4.7 billion later, the amount of coca produced in Colombia is more than when this massive aid program began in 2000, and the availability of cocaine on U.S. streets has not changed. Our aid money can be put to better use, which is why I support transferring these funds to help refugees.
- Aerial fumigation is both inhumane and ineffective. Coca farmers replant rapidly and relocate to other zones, spreading coca production from one area to the next. Aerial spraying destroys food crops along with coca planted by small farmers with no alternatives. U.S.-funded alternative development programs only reach a fraction of Colombian farmers.
o We need to invest in drug treatment and prevention programs here at home, and in the Andes, in alternative development programs that help small farmers transition permanently from growing illicit crops.
Humanitarian crisis.
- Colombia is facing the worst humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere, and one of the worst in the world. According to the UN, 2 to 3 million people have had to flee their homes from violence in recent years, making Colombia second only to Sudan in its number of internally displaced persons.
- This amendment reflects how I would like to see U.S. funds spent in Colombia. The U.S. has provided nearly $5 billion to Colombia since 2000, yet only a shamefully small percentage of it has aided victims of the conflict, including vulnerable Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.
Human rights in Colombia.
- The human rights situation remains grave due to violence from all armed actors. Despite massive U.S. aid, the human rights record of Colombia’s military has worsened. The UN reported that the number of grave violations of human rights by Colombian security forces was higher in 2005 than any year prior. The U.S. should not turn a blind eye to these abuses by an army partially funded by our tax dollars. Refugees around the world are more deserving of our aid than the Colombian military.
- In 2005, 70 trade unionists were murdered, exceeding the number of those murdered in the rest of the world combined.
- Paramilitary and drug trafficking networks retain a powerful hold over Colombian society. Despite the paramilitary demobilization process that has taken place over the last year, the OAS has documented that these combatants have formed criminal groups which are often still armed and are involved in extortion, drug trafficking, arms sales and intimidation of civilian populations.
Posted by isacson at 11:55 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 01, 2006
Another human-rights certification
The State Department waited until after Colombia’s elections to announce its latest certification of the Colombian military’s human-rights performance. That is, it waited until the morning of the first working day after the elections to announce that it had made the certification decision late last week.
The Colombia human-rights certification requirement has been part of foreign aid law, in varying forms, every year since Plan Colombia began in 2000. The current version freezes 25 percent of Colombia’s military aid (not police aid, and not aid in the defense budget, leaving about $80 million frozen).
This aid can only be “unfrozen” twice each year, whenever the State Department issues a document to Congress certifying that Colombia has met six conditions having to do with progress on investigations of past human rights violations, cutting ties to paramilitaries, and respecting indigenous populations. Each time the State Department sends a certification document, half of that year’s frozen military aid (12.5 percent of the total, or about $40 million) is made available to Colombia. (To see the text of the Colombia certification requirement, read the 2006 foreign aid law here and find Section 556.)
There are no doubt many in the Bush State Department who despise this procedure; on several occasions we’ve heard comments like “you know, human rights is just one of many interests the United States has in Colombia” or “of course, we would rather not have any conditions attached to what we do.” But the whole State Department bureaucracy clearly does not feel that way. Some, particularly the Democracy, Human Rights and Labor bureau, have taken the legal conditions quite seriously, and the last few certifications have been delayed amid internal discussions.
The certifications have been delayed for so long that the decision announced this week frees up only the remaining 12.5 percent of 2005 military aid; all 25 percent of 2006 aid remains in the freezer. And in fact, the last two certifications appear to have been shaken loose only by important events unrelated to human rights. The last certification, in August 2005, coincided with President Álvaro Uribe’s visit to President Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. The current one coincides with Uribe’s re-election.
But the delays owe to more than just bureaucratic disagreements. More importantly, the Colombian government has not been making it easy for the State Department to certify. Though punishment of past abuses would seem to be a fundamental element of the rule of law, the Uribe government has shown very little willingness to make it happen. Dozens of cases of alleged military human-rights abuse seem to exist only as piles of files in prosecutors’ offices. The few cases that come to trial are stuck in Colombia’s slow-moving courts, while others are quietly archived or never seem to leave the preliminary investigation stage.
Impunity is the rule, but there are also strong pressures to keep the military aid flowing. In order to issue some kind of certification – even one that does not pass the laugh test – State Department officials find themselves repeatedly asking the Colombians for some evidence of progress on a few key “benchmark” cases of human rights abuse.
Under President Uribe, who views military officers as heroes who must use all necessary means to protect the patria, the Colombian government has fiercely resisted the State Department’s entreaties to try or punish a few of the worst offenders. It has offered only the scarcest possible evidence of progress in punishing past abuses, and forced State Department officials to be very creative when drafting their justifications to Congress of how exactly Colombia has improved.
The latest justification document is not yet available (see the last few here, here and here), so we do not yet know what improvements in the Colombian military’s performance the State Department was able to cite. However, two very recent events probably made the certification possible.
- Colombia’s Procuraduría (sort of an internal-affairs agency that can fire or dock the pay of government employees, but not put them in jail) decided to fire seven army personnel, including four officers, tied to the August 2004 murder of three union leaders in Arauca.
- Colombia’s Fiscalía (the attorney-general’s office, which prosecutes criminal cases) has moved forward with arrest warrants for an officer and a soldier involved in a 2003 massacre in Cajamarca, Tolima.
It’s not clear what other cases the State Department can cite, beyond these two examples from the past week or two. The investigation into the February 2005 massacre of two families in San José de Apartadó, Antioquia, remains stuck (though the community’s refusal to talk to the Fiscalía offers the Colombian government a handy excuse to do nothing). Gen. Jaime Uscátegui’s trial for allowing the 1997 paramilitary massacre in Mapiripán continues to drag on. Nobody has been punished for the 1998 bombing of civilians in Santo Domingo, Arauca. The investigation of Operation Dragon, a plot against union leaders and other Cali activists revealed in 2004, has not moved a bit. The list goes on.
Worse, Colombia’s human rights climate appears to be getting more serious, which makes the decision to certify “improvements” especially poorly timed. The past two months have seen repeated e-mail threats sent to human-rights groups, break-ins at several human-rights defenders’ offices and homes, the murder of one human-rights activist’s bodyguard, the murder of an advisor to a senator who opposes Uribe, and iron-fisted responses to protests from indigenous groups and coca growers. Not to mention scandals surrounding paramilitary infiltration of the president’s security and intelligence service (the DAS), and the massacre of an entire police anti-drug unit at the hands of a military patrol.
The human-rights certification process is frustrating. It puts a “seal of approval” on a human rights record that is not improving, and may in fact be going the wrong way. It simply ignores the majority of outstanding cases of past abuse, cases that have gone nowhere. The focus on “benchmark cases” has put U.S. diplomats in an uncomfortable position – at times they appear to be demanding the heads of a few military personnel in exchange for aid money.
Nonetheless, the certification process is necessary. Lately, it seems to be the only bit of leverage available to bring past human-rights abuses to justice. By requiring some evidence of progress, each certification brings at least a few cases closer to judgment and punishment.
Moreover, the mere fact that the past few certifications have been delayed for so long shows why they are necessary. The delays reveal some important truths about the Colombian military’s commitment to human rights.
The failure to move forward on investigations and prosecutions reveals that when it comes to punishing abuses, Colombia’s security forces have yet to internalize human rights as an important value. The certification delays put a badly needed spotlight on that problem. They make painfully obvious how troubled the Colombian military’s human-rights performance remains. Despite improvements in training and some officers’ positive efforts, the overall record remains so bad that even the military’s main foreign benefactor, the U.S. government, cannot approve of it without a long, drawn-out argument.
The certification process is messy and pleases nobody. But as abuse investigations become ever more stuck and the overall climate worsens, it’s more necessary than ever.
Posted by isacson at 08:45 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
May 26, 2006
From southern Colombia to northwest Washington
Washington DC has one of the United States' most inflated real-estate markets. So when my wife and I decided in 2003 to buy a home, we found our choices limited by our two non-profit salaries. We ended up in a neighborhood that is "transitioning," as they say in the real-estate business.
"Transitioning" means that even as houses get renovated and new condo buildings sprout up, there's still quite a bit of crime, most of it drug-related. We have a crew of tough-looking kids (late teens-early twenties) who camp out on our corner every few weeks for several days at a time. Addicts from nearby neighborhoods, and lots of cars with Maryland and Virginia plates, come by to do furtive business. Calling the cops is almost useless, even if we do see a "transaction" take place - response times tend to be poor, the dealers are always on the lookout for a coming police vehicle, and they are usually careful to keep their drug stash hidden nearby, not on their persons.
For their part, the dealers leave the neighborhood's residents alone, and some neighbors even argue that having them there makes us a bit safer because it keeps out other undesirables. (Just as many Colombians in dangerous zones profess gratitude for paramilitaries' protection.) Some even seem angrier at the local liquor store that sells single cans of beer.
They're wrong of course - nobody is safer, least of all the dealers themselves. Yesterday evening, as I was putting our one-year-old to bed, we heard a series of loud shots outside. Within a minute or two, the police were on the scene and a helicopter was overhead, its spotlight illuminating our back alley and nearby streets.
 |
| The view from our bedroom window last night. |
As more cops arrived and began putting up yellow crime-scene tape, I went outside to find out what happened - as did almost all of our neighbors, some of whom I hadn't seen in months. (A neighbor from around the corner has posted her account of the incident, which seems to have been a drive-by, to her excellent blog about the neighborhood.)
Across the intersection, which was full of police cars, I could see one of the corner guys doubled over in pain, being held upright by two companions. Word is he was hit in the groin, which is painful but not fatal. An ambulance quickly came and wheeled him away.
Police stayed in the area for a couple of hours, talking to us about what we heard, looking for stray bullet casings, and who knows what else. Safe in our house, we got on with our evening. The baby to sleep, we answered some e-mails, talked a bit and went to bed.
As the police vehicles' lights flashed outside, I couldn't help thinking about Colombia. After all, the shooting outside likely had something to do with drugs, and those drugs may have been produced in Colombia.
But it's more than that. Between my job and my neighborhood, I regularly get to see both ends of the drug production and distribution chain. I see the coca plants in the fields in Colombia, and I see the dealers on the corners in the United States. And I'm really struck by the similarities between the poor Colombians who make a living growing or picking coca leaves, and the dead-end U.S. kids who spend their days selling the finished product to addicts.
Now, I'm not talking about the people in the middle of the chain, where the big money is. Most of the drug trade's profits end up in the hands of the narco (or armed-group member) who buys the coca-growers' crude paste, the criminal who distributes the finished product to street dealers, and everybody in betweeen.
On either extreme, though, the grower and the dealer are basically exploited. A coca-grower with a hectare of the plant, the UN has estimated (big PowerPoint file), ends up netting only about $199 per month, or just over $6 per day. As for the small-time dealers on the corner - the bestselling book Freakonomics, which has a chapter entitled "Why Do Drug Dealers Still Live with Their Moms?," accurately describes what a lousy deal they have. These kids spend all day in the heat or the cold, dealing with a rather unpleasant customer base, and end up with so little money that they don't even have cars - they ride off on bicycles.
Not only do they see very little money, both the coca-grower and the street dealer are the most exposed to the violence that accompanies the drug trade. Colombia's coca-growing regions are war zones in which extrajudicial executions are the order of the day. For their part, the foot soldiers on the corners of neighborhoods like mine never know when someone might drive by and shoot them in the groin.
At the same time, both the coca-grower and the street dealer are hit hardest by their governments' horribly failed policies. In rural Colombia and urban America, chronic misgovernment - or a total lack of governance - has reduced opportunities in the legal economy. Residents of both areas live in poverty, with little or no access to education (Washington, for instance, is notorious for having one of the nation's worst public-school systems), chronic insecurity and a weak social fabric. To many in both rural Colombia and urban America, the drug trade simply appears to be a rational way to make a living, despite the obvious risks.
But neither coca-growers nor small-time dealers are exactly ignored by their governments. In fact, both are by far the most likely to bear the brunt of law enforcement efforts. Coca growers are being fumigated on a massive scale, in the majority of cases with no offers of alternative development opportunities. In the United States, over 500,000 non-violent drug offenders are behind bars, about a quarter of the entire prison population.
In both Colombia and the United States, the small-timers - the growers and the dealers on the corner - have become the main target. And the result is an utter failure whose consequences are plainly visible not just in rural Colombia, but outside my bedroom window last night.
Posted by isacson at 01:31 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
May 21, 2006
Congress begins considering 2007 aid
The House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee met early on Friday morning to approve their version of the 2007 foreign aid bill. This bill’s text is not yet available – there isn’t even a bill number assigned yet – and we probably won’t see it until after the full Appropriations Committee, which now must consider the bill, gives its approval. That is scheduled to happen before the end of the week, since Congress goes away Friday for a week-long Memorial Day recess.
We do know, though, that the House bill would make several changes to next year’s U.S. aid to Colombia. Right now, the best overview of these changes can be found in Sergio Gómez’s reporting in the Colombian daily El Tiempo (here and here in Spanish).
We know of three changes in particular.
1. Military and police aid to Colombia would increase by $29 million over the Bush administration’s request. The State Department’s request to Congress included about $477 million in military assistance to Colombia through the foreign aid bill. (Approximately $150-160 million more will go to Colombia through the Defense Department budget, which would make a total of about $630-640 million in military and police aid next year, similar to the past few years.)
The request, submitted in February, looked like this:
- $381 million through Andean Counter-Drug Initiative (including $41 million through a regional “Critical Flight Safety” program and $26 million in “rule of law” programs that are mostly police assistance).
- $90 million through Foreign Military Financing, the main non-drug military aid program in the foreign aid budget.
- $1.7 million through International Military Education and Training, the main non-drug military training program in the foreign aid budget.
- $3.9 million in Anti-Terrorism Assistance, a relatively small program that provides mostly training.
- $200,000 for Small Arms and Light Weapons control.
(Note: the true amount of military aid could in fact be $5-10 million lower, depending on how much “rule of law” assistance goes to civilian institutions within the Colombian government.)
At the insistence of Rep. Dan Burton (R-Indiana), the chairman of the House Western Hemisphere International Relations Subcommittee, the House bill increases military aid by $29 million more, in order to pay for upgrades to Colombian helicopters, spray planes and other aircraft. This $29 million would be added to the “Critical Flight Safety” program within the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative account.
The House bill, then, would give Colombia $506 million in military and police aid. Add approximately $160 million from the Defense budget bill, and Colombia would get over $660 million in military and police aid next year – the highest amount since 2000, the year that Plan Colombia’s launch gave aid levels a one-time boost.
2. Economic aid to Colombia would increase by $10 million over the Bush administration’s request. The State Department’s request to Congress included $125 million for “alternative development and institution-building” – that is, rural development aid, assistance to displaced people, judicial reform and human-rights efforts. The House bill would make that $135 million.
(Note: the true amount of economic aid could in fact be $5-10 million higher, depending on how much “rule of law” assistance goes to civilian institutions within the Colombian government.)
That’s a very positive change, as non-military governance desperately needs more emphasis in Colombia. But it does not change the overall proportion of military to economic aid. The House bill would provide Colombia with a total of $641 million in aid; only 21 percent of that would be economic aid.
Including funds through the Defense budget, the House bill could result in Colombia getting over $800 million in U.S. aid next year. Of that amount, only 17 percent would be economic aid.
3. Colombia’s economic aid would no longer go through counter-narcotics programs. All economic aid to Colombia since 2001 has gone through the State Department-managed “Andean Counter-Drug Initiative” account, the largest single source of Colombia’s aid, which mixes military and economic aid together with the drug war as its main purpose.
Subcommittee Chairman Jim Kolbe (R-Arizona), with the apparent agreement of the State Department, has decided to change that, moving Colombia’s $135 million economic aid appropriation into a non-drug funding category. That program, Economic Support Funds or ESF, is an account managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Though ESF programs are still often micro-managed, this program does offer much more flexibility than the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative. Aid doesn’t necessarily have to be farmed out to companies and non-profits who bid for USAID contracts; in some cases, it can even be in the form of cash payments to governments. ESF recipient governments generally get to play a leading role in determining how the aid is to be spent, rather than having those decisions largely made in Washington. “If Colombia wants to build a bridge and demonstrates to the U.S. government that this is good for its development,” a U.S. government source told El Tiempo, “they can do it with those funds.”
If the House gets its way, Colombia would become the only country outside the Middle East to receive more than $100 million per year from the ESF account. While not an earth-shaking change in the makeup of U.S. assistance, releasing economic aid from the constraints of the drug war is a positive step. It is also a big step away from the failed counter-narcotics architecture that underlay Plan Colombia six years ago.
Because we haven’t seen the aid bill’s text yet, a few things remain unclear. Is Colombia’s extra $39 million in aid ($29 million military plus $10 million economic) new assistance, or did it have to come from cuts in aid to other countries? Does the bill still include cuts in aid – both military and economic – to many of Colombia’s neighbors, like Peru, Ecuador and especially Bolivia? Beyond amounts, does the bill include any other surprising stipulations, like a further broadening of the aid mission or a tweaking of the human-rights conditions?
We simply don’t know yet, but we will post information as it becomes available.
Posted by isacson at 10:52 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
May 14, 2006
U.S. military aid: the Pentagon’s role keeps growing
On Thursday, the House of Representatives passed its version of the 2007 Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 5122). In addition to approving a budget of more than half a trillion dollars for the Pentagon next year, this bill solidifies the Defense Department’s role as a major and growing source of military assistance to Latin America and the rest of the world.
Two Defense Department counter-narcotics aid programs begun on a temporary basis in the 1990s would be made permanent and expanded in scope. The bill would also expand a counter-terror training program begun in 2002.
Why does this matter, you might ask? Shouldn’t the U.S. military budget provide U.S. military aid?
The answer to that question is forty-five years old. Back in 1961, U.S. foreign aid was growing as the cold war intensified. But it was a mess. Military and economic aid were divided among many overlapping programs carried out by different departments of the government, and overseen by different congressional committees. With every department doing its own thing, there was no coordination, poor accountability, and little congruence with U.S. foreign policy goals. Nobody was in charge, and nobody was minding the store.
“No objective supporter of foreign aid can be satisfied with the existing program – actually a multiplicity of programs,” said the new president, John F. Kennedy. “Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure covering at least four departments and several other agencies.”
The fix came with the September 1961 passage of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), which created a legal framework to put all foreign aid programs under the same umbrella. The FAA put the State Department in charge of all aid programs, both military and economic. This increased civilian diplomats’ control over arms transfers and training programs for the world’s militaries. A new U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was created to manage economic aid.
Legislatively, all foreign aid came to be funded through one single budget bill, the annual appropriation for Foreign Operations. Oversight of all aid became the responsibility of the congressional foreign relations committees and foreign operations appropriations committees. Since foreign aid is unpopular in some quarters and doesn’t send funds to legislators’ own districts, these committees usually pay strict attention to how these funds are being spent.
Over the years, amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act have sought to keep aid from going to militaries that grossly abuse their own citizens. Other amendments banned aid to countries “decertified” for failing to cooperate in the drug war, or to countries that fail to exempt U.S. personnel on their soil from the International Criminal Court. Still other amendments have required detailed reporting to Congress and the public about foreign aid. The resulting transparency allowed citizens to have at least a rough idea of how much aid every country received and what it provided.
Not everyone was happy with this arrangement, though. Conservatives complained that human-rights protections in the FAA made it difficult to send weapons to allies who happened to be dictators. Public reporting revealed some inconvenient truths about who was receiving lethal aid. Skepticism about foreign aid made it difficult to create new programs or increase funding within the annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill, which was always small (around 1 percent of the federal budget).
Pressures built to find ways to aid the world’s militaries without dealing with the foreign aid bill’s “impractical” human-rights conditions, “burdensome” reporting, and stingy proportions. The most obvious way around these limitations was to fund some military assistance through the Defense Department’s massive budget.
Since the defense budget is governed by a separate section of the U.S. Code, none of the human-rights conditions and other protections in the Foreign Assistance Act can touch it. Reporting to Congress is not compulsory unless otherwise specified. Congressional oversight of military aid in the defense bill is almost nonexistent: a few hundred million dollars hardly demand the attention of the few dozen Armed Services Committee staffers who must oversee a $500 billion-plus budget. (Three years ago a House Armed Services Committee staff member told me that, to oversee the entire Pentagon, the committee had a bipartisan staff of 45 people, including administrative support staff.) Besides, since much of the defense budget creates employment in their own districts, committee members feel far less incentive to question every dollar that is spent.
Moving military aid back into the defense budget, out of the jurisdiction of the State Department and the congressional foreign relations committees, represents a big step back from the reforms of 1961. It means a return to the time when our overseas assistance was “fragmented, awkward, slow, diffused, haphazard and irrational.”
But the lure of the Pentagon budget is proving to be irresistible. Certainly, joint military exercises and Special Forces training deployments have always occurred with defense funds (the excuse being that their “primary purpose” was to train U.S. forces involved). But the first major foray beyond the Foreign Assistance Act and into the defense bill took place fifteen years ago, as the drug war intensified in Latin America.
The progression since then has been inexorable. The following timeline tells the story of the Pentagon’s increasing role in funding and managing military aid. Above all, note the impossibility of ending a program once it has begun. Once a military-aid program gets a toehold in the defense budget, it grows and grows, even if – as is the case with counter-drug programs – it consistently fails to achieve its stated goals.
- 1989: As the Bush 41 administration ratchets up the drug war in Latin America, Congress designates the Defense Department as the “lead agency” for the detection and monitoring of illegal drugs coming from overseas.
- 1991: Congress clarifies the Pentagon’s new role, interpreting it to mean that the Defense Department may use its counter-drug budget to provide several kinds of non-lethal aid to foreign militaries and police forces. Section 1004 of the 1991 Defense Authorization law allows defense funds to pay for training, equipment upgrades, construction, intelligence and a few other types of assistance. What comes to be known as “Section 1004” aid is now a principal source of military funding for Latin America. Today, more Latin American military personnel are trained by Section 1004 funds than by any other military-aid program. Section 1004 is not permanent law, however; it is envisioned as a temporary authority set to expire in 1995.
- 1995: The 1995 Defense Authorization law renews Section 1004 until 1999.
- 1997: Section 1031 of the 1997 Defense Authorization law allows up to $8 million in non-lethal counter-drug military aid to Mexico. “Section 1031” aid expires at the end of 1998 and is not renewed.
- 1998: Section 1033 of the 1998 Defense Authorization law creates yet another parallel counter-drug military-aid program for Latin America. Also known as the “Riverine Program,” Section 1033 allows the Pentagon to use its budget to give boats and other non-lethal equipment to Colombia and Peru, to help both countries’ navies and police fight drug trafficking on rivers. It provides for a combined $9 million in 1998 and $20 million for each following year. Section 1033 is set to expire in 2002.
- 1998: A series of articles in the Washington Post reveals that, under the Special Forces’ Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, defense-budget funds are being used to train with militaries, and units of militaries, that are banned from receiving U.S. aid through the Foreign Assistance Act. The series notes, “JCETs often appear to bring America's premier soldiers into conflict with aims of American diplomacy enunciated in Washington.”
- 1999: The 1999 Defense Authorization law renews Section 1004 for a second time, until 2002.
- 1999: Following a December 1998 agreement between U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo Lloreda, Section 1004 funds are used to train and partially equip a new Counter-Narcotics Battalion within the Colombian Army. This is the first significant counter-narcotics aid to the Colombian Army in many years, but few congressional oversight personnel on the foreign relations committees are aware of it. Also in 1999, Section 1033 funds help the Colombian Navy to establish a Riverine Brigade.
- 1999: The 1999 Defense Appropriations law includes the first human-rights condition on Pentagon military aid: a version of the “Leahy Law” (named after Vermont Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy) prohibiting aid to foreign military units that commit gross human-rights violations with impunity. This version of the Leahy Law is weaker than that found in the regular foreign aid bill, however: it allows the Secretary of Defense to waive the conditions entirely, and allows aid to flow freely as long as undefined “corrective steps” are taken. Because it is on an appropriations law, the Leahy Law, just like its counterpart on the foreign aid bill, must be renewed every year.
- 2000: Congress passes a special $1.3 billion “emergency appropriation” for Plan Colombia. Of the $642 million in military and police aid for Colombia in the bill, about $155 million is appropriated through the Defense Department.
- 2001: The 2001 Defense Authorization law slightly scales back the Section 1033 Riverine Program, cutting out Peru and effectively making it a Colombia-only program. However, it extends the program – which was to expire in 2002 – through 2006.
- 2001: The 2001 Defense Authorization law also requires, for the first time, a report on Section 1004 expenditures for the previous year. For the first time, Congress gets a country-by-country breakdown of Section 1004 aid and a rough idea of what it paid for.
- 2002: The 2002 Defense Authorization law renews Section 1004 for a third time, until 2006.
- 2002: The 2002 Defense Appropriations law creates a new Counter-Terror Fellowship Program (CTFP) to provide non-lethal training and education in counter-terrorism doctrine and techniques. Though the program closely resembles training programs that already exist in the Foreign Assistance Act, the CTFP is given an initial $17.9 million.
- 2002: Language in a supplemental appropriation for the “war on terror” expands the purpose of counter-drug aid to Colombia, whether through the foreign aid law or the defense budget law. From now on, aid to Colombia through counter-narcotics programs (such as Section 1004 and Section 1033) may now be employed in a “unified campaign” against drugs, the FARC, the ELN and the AUC.
- 2003: The report on Section 1004 aid disappears from the 2003 Defense Authorization law.
- 2004: The 2004 Defense Authorization law expands the Section 1033 Riverine Program. The word “riverine” is removed to make it a more general-purpose counter-drug aid program. The list of eligible countries is expanded from the existing one (Colombia) to nine: Peru is reinstated and joins Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and five Central Asian states (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Pakistan). The maximum annual budget for Section 1033 is increased from $20 million to $40 million.
- 2004: The Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program begun in 2002 is made permanent by the 2004 Defense Authorization law, which includes it as Section 2249c to Title 10, U.S. Code. The annual budget of the CTFP is raised to $20 million per year, and it is permitted to provide lethal training. The program went from training 431 students from four Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2003 to 1,107 students from 22 countries in 2004.
- 2004: As it does every year, the Pentagon submits a draft Defense Authorization bill for 2005, presenting its idea of “ideal language” for the annual legislation. Its draft includes an attempt to allow all defense-budget counter-drug aid to be used to combat terrorism in every country in Latin America, from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego. Neither congressional armed-services committee adopts this audacious proposal in its version of the 2005 bill.
- 2006: Section 1206 of the 2006 Defense Authorization law allows up to $200 million from the defense budget to be used as aid to foreign militaries, completely outside the Foreign Assistance Act framework. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had originally wanted $750 million for this military-aid “slush fund,” and had strong-armed the State Department into offering its assent, but resistance from some legislators (notably Indiana Republican Senator Richard Lugar) reduced the amount. Because it is so general – not specifically tied to the drug war, for instance – this “authority to build the capacity of foreign military forces” represents the biggest shift of military-aid authority to date from the State Department to the Defense Department.
In a May 5 memo, the White House determines that the recipient militaries will be those of Algeria, the Bahamas, Cameroon, Chad, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen.
- 2006: The 2006 Defense Authorization law reinstates the report on Section 1004 aid that appeared in 2001 and 2002. It was to be submitted by April 15; we have yet to see a copy.
- 2006: The House approved its version of the 2007 Defense Authorization bill on May 11; the Senate Armed Services Committee sent its version to the full Senate on May 9. The bills break still more new ground for defense-budget military assistance.
- The Senate bill would renew Section 1004 for a fourth time, until 2011, even though the program, after fifteen years, has utterly failed to affect the supply of drugs on U.S. streets. The House bill would go still further by making Section 1004 permanent, enshrining it as a new Section 383 of Title 10, U.S. Code.
- The Senate bill would renew Section 1033 (the ex-Riverine Program) for a second time, until 2011. It would also expand it, doubling its budget to $80 million per year and making it available to twenty-four countries: the current nine plus Belize, Guatemala, Panama and twelve others (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chad, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Philippines, and Thailand). The House bill would make Section 1033 permanent, as a new Section 384 of Title 10, U.S. Code. The House would also expand the program’s budget to $60 million while adding six new eligible countries – Belize, Guatemala, Panama and three central Asian countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) – for a total of fifteen.
- Both houses’ versions of the 2007 Defense Authorization bill would increase the annual budget of the Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program, from $20 million to $25 million.
- The Defense Department’s draft “ideal language” for the 2007 Defense Authorization bill includes an attempt to revive the “Section 1031” program, which benefited Mexico in 1997 and 1998 and was thought to be long since dead (see 1997 above). This time, it would be a non-country-specific counter-drug program. Neither house of Congress includes this proposal in its version of the 2007 bill.
- The Senate bill would renew Section 1004 for a fourth time, until 2011, even though the program, after fifteen years, has utterly failed to affect the supply of drugs on U.S. streets. The House bill would go still further by making Section 1004 permanent, enshrining it as a new Section 383 of Title 10, U.S. Code.
As this long story makes clear, when it comes to Defense Department authority to provide military aid, if you give them an inch, they take a yard, then a mile. The amount of foreign military assistance falling under the Defense Department’s sole jurisdiction keeps growing each year.
The reasons given are familiar – “the defense bill is where the money is,” “the foreign aid process is too cumbersome and bureaucratic,” “the cold war is over, we’re in the 21st century now” – but the consequences are the same. U.S. military assistance – a risky foreign policy tool in the developing world, even at the best of times – is increasingly responding to narrow defense priorities, while our diplomats and our congressional overseers, who are charged with guarding our larger national interest, simply stand by.
CIP is not the only organization sounding the alarm about this trend. George Withers, a Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America and a former House Armed Services Committee staffer, wrote an excellent memo on the subject [PDF] back in January.
Why are Latin America-focused programs making the most noise about the Defense Department’s growing military-aid role? In large part because the trend began in Latin America, with the drug war fifteen years ago. But this problem is too important to be left up to regional specialists at non-governmental organizations.
Those being steamrolled by the Defense Department’s yearly power grabs need to start sticking up for themselves. The State Department must defend the central role that the Foreign Assistance Act gives it in guiding military-aid priorities. The congressional foreign relations and foreign operations appropriations committees must defend their turf, lest the programs they fund continue to shrink in relative size and influence.
The Defense Department should not be given the right to manage military aid as it sees fit, with few safeguards and minimal legislative oversight. Back in 1961, the Foreign Assistance Act and its State Department-managed architecture were put in place for a reason. It is important to recall that reason and to get U.S. military aid programs back under control.
Posted by isacson at 11:31 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
May 02, 2006
Sen. Grassley takes on the drug czar
“[W]e have seen for the first time a decline in the purity of cocaine in the United States and an increase in price at the retail level … Roughly, in February of this year, cocaine availability in the United States, as measured in terms of purity and price, purity has gone down and price has gone up.”
Those were the words of White House Drug Czar John Walters six months ago, when he pulled together a press conference to announce new data showing that cocaine prices, as of September 2005, had risen to levels last seen in early 2004. Since then, Walters and other Bush administration officials have repeated that claim. (Recent examples include assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Anne Patterson [PDF format], Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) official David Murray).
The price rise, they say, is a proud achievement of Plan Colombia and the U.S. counter-drug strategy in the Andes. This strategy, of course, devotes much more resources to military force, eradication and interdiction than to development or rule-of-law improvements. Groups like CIP and WOLA voiced strong doubts about the November cocaine-price figures, which only showed a small short-term gain and ran counter to many other indicators that supplies of the drug are stable or even increasing.
But when it comes to calling into question the Drug Czar’s triumphal claims, nothing we can say will ever carry as much weight as the words of a Republican senator with a long track record as an architect of U.S. drug policy.
Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) has raised his voice to charge, essentially, that the Drug Czar’s office is cooking the books. In a strongly worded letter to John Walters dated April 26, Grassley charges him with using tentative and incomplete information to show progress where none may exist, and then to base policy decisions on what may be inaccurate claims.
Grassley’s letter deals another strong blow to the current anti-drug policy in the Andes; it shows that the strategy’s failure is becoming ever more obvious to everyone. Here are a few excerpts.
On Walters’ trumpeting of higher cocaine prices: “My principal concern is that these statements are based not only on data from sources that were never intended for such purposes, but that they also utilize data from different selected sources to provide a rosier but not necessarily more accurate, picture of the current situation.”
“I believe that these assumptions may be premature and perhaps even unfounded. Furthermore, these statements raise serious concerns within Congress about our ability to effectively combat the narco-traffickers.”
On the strange discrepancy between 1981-2003 cocaine-price data, which show 22 years of steady price decreases, and the 2003-2005 data presented at Walters’ November press conference: “I am also concerned about the reliability of these statements because, according to the 2004 report ‘Price and Purity of Illicit Drugs: 1981 Through the Second Quarter of 2003’, which is based on STRIDE [DEA “System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence”] data and is currently available on the ONDCP website, the price of a pure gram of cocaine during the first two months of 2003 was $106 (for less than 2 grams) and had not been above the $200 mark since 1990.”
Here, Grassley refers to a weird hiccup in official U.S. data. While DEA statistics were showing cocaine available on U.S. streets for about $106 per gram in mid-2003, the graph Walters presented at his press conference showed cocaine at over $200 per gram in July 2003. Here it is side-by-side:
(from page 58 of “Price and Purity of Illicit Drugs”)
(from Walters’ November press conference)
On the drug czar’s April announcement that coca cultivation was higher in Colombia in 2005, but lower in areas of Colombia that were previously measured: “ONDCP's April 14th press release regarding coca cultivation in Colombia references an eight percent reduction in those areas in 2005 that also were imaged in 2004. This is potentially misleading since it includes the areas that were heavily sprayed, which likely resulted in growers leaving those areas and moving to others. Research shows that those in the drug trade adapt to pressure to eradicate and interdict their product.”
“We have been concerned about the accuracy of the numbers for years due to their methodology. How do we even know that these numbers are accurate?”
Unrelated postscript added at 5:15 PM EDT: This, from yesterday's "In the Loop" column in the Washington Post, is too remarkable not to share.
Try Some Chips on Immigration?
The focus on immigration has sparked creative ideas on how to deal with the issue. Sens. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) and Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), on their recent trip to Latin America, picked up some unusual suggestions in a chat with Colombian President Alvaro Uribe .
The senators, according to an account Specter put in the Congressional Record, asked Uribe about seasonal workers who don't return home. Uribe had a nifty solution.
"President Uribe said he would consider having Colombian workers have microchips implanted into their bodies before they are permitted to enter the United States to work on a seasonal basis," Specter reported.
"I doubted whether the implantation of microchips would be effective," Specter reflected, "since the immigrant worker might be able to remove them."
Posted by isacson at 02:05 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
April 30, 2006
"People shouldn't be living there"
Go hiking in Shenandoah National Park, about an hour and a half west of Washington, and you might come across foundations or other remains of old houses. It turns out that the heavily forested spot on which you are enjoying scenery and wildlife was once cleared farmland where rural families scratched out a living.
A National Parks Service website explains the history:
In the 1930s, Shenandoah National Park was pieced together from over 3,000 individual tracts of land, purchased or condemned by the Commonwealth of Virginia and presented to the Federal Government. In the process, at least 500 families – described as “almost completely cut off from the current of American life” – were displaced in what was considered by some to be a humanitarian act.
Archeologists in the park have since found “an array of kitchen and dining wares, pharmaceutical glass, military items, mail order toys, 78 RPM record fragments, specialized agricultural tools, store-bought shoes, and even automobiles.”
I was reminded of this by a debate Monday night before a George Washington University class. I was paired with Jaime Ruiz, a principal author of Plan Colombia who is now Ambassador Pastrana’s number-two at the Colombian embassy in Washington.
I made the argument (often expressed in this weblog) that Colombia will not resolve the twin challenges of insurgency and illicit crops until it is able to govern – to enforce laws and provide services – in the remote, neglected areas where both thrive. Ruiz disagreed strongly, using an argument that I’ve heard before and have found difficult to dispute.
While I’m paraphrasing, the argument runs along the lines of “Colombia is far too vast to expect the government to be present in every last corner of the country where a few people decide to live. Many of these ungoverned spaces are dense jungles that were only settled because of the coca economy. The soils are terrible, and markets are very far away. People should not be living in these areas to begin with.”
Never mind that there are many places with near-zero government presence where people have been living for generations (think afro-Colombian communities on the Pacific coast, or the paramilitary-dominated towns across northern Colombia). For many areas, Ruiz’s argument applies, and the population’s isolation is a big challenge.
But these people are there now. As much as 3-4 percent of Colombia’s population are newcomers to areas that were largely empty before the 1960s or 1970s. Many participate in the coca economy, and many form the “social base” of armed groups active in these regions. What should the Colombian government be doing for these forgotten citizens?
The United States, which also has huge expanses of nearly empty territory, offers an interesting counterexample. According to the House of Representatives’ Committee on Resources, 29.6 percent of U.S. national territory is owned by the federal government. (This includes 91.9 percent of Nevada, over 66 percent of Alaska, Utah and Idaho, and half of Wyoming and Arizona.) A smaller but significant number is in the hands of state, county and municipal governments.
On this land, you can’t just settle in and plant crops (legal or illegal) and try to make a living. (Though as we’ve noted before, that doesn’t stop everyone from trying to grow marijuana in national parks and reserves.) You can’t build a vacation home either (though some permits for doing that in national forests were issued until the 1960s). And even if you have a clear claim to private land, there’s always the possibility – however remote – that the government, citing the “greater good” and the need to bring you out of isolation and into modernity, could leave you in the same situation as the former inhabitants of Shenandoah National Park.
In Colombia’s ungoverned zones, of course, land tenure is more ambiguous. The Colombian government is generally unable (and at times unwilling) to evict colonos (“colonizers”) from national parks, indigenous reservations and public lands, much less empty wilderness zones.
And it’s not clear whether it should be doing so. To begin evicting people and relocating them closer to the country’s core would be a huge, costly and complicated effort. It would face legal and human rights challenges. It would have to grant concessions to indigenous groups – including nomadic, barely contacted tribes – who were in these areas first. For Colombia to approach the U.S. model of government dominion over unused land would be a long and painful process.
What to do, then? The 1999 “Plan Colombia” document, written largely by Jaime Ruiz, offers the outlines of a solution.
It is estimated that as much as 60 percent of the coca-producing areas are far from potential markets and in areas that are poorly suited to any sort of sustained agricultural production. To offer legal income opportunities to small farmers and laborers in such areas, the Colombian Government envisions three possible responses: First, farmers and others with an agricultural vocation will be offered the opportunity to move from the coca-producing areas and resettled on land that has been seized from narcotics traffickers or provided by the land reform institute, INCORA; second, economic opportunities in small- and micro-enterprise will be offered in the urban areas of origin for migrant coca farmers, to remove the economic incentive for that migration; third, the Colombian Government will work with indigenous groups and local governments to launch economically feasible environmental protection activities that conserve the forested areas in an effort to slow the advance of the agricultural frontier into inappropriate areas.
Very little of this has happened, needless to say. There have been some efforts along these lines: USAID has supported the second idea with productive projects to generate employment in some small cities near coca-growing zones, while the third idea is reflected in the Uribe government’s “forest-guard families” program, which pays about 30,000 families in several dozen municipalities to keep forests from being felled.
If you’re not one of the lucky few rural Colombians to benefit from these small programs, however, the U.S. and Colombian governments have probably already made it clear to you that they don’t want you to be living where you’re living. You may have been fumigated, perhaps several times. Military offensives and other combat may take place nearby, though these efforts to push out guerrillas have not included any attempt to win your support by providing you with basic services.
Fumigation and military pushes into these zones usually cause de-population as residents are displaced. U.S. and Colombian officials consider this de-population to be a sign of progress toward their goals. The Colombian government estimated that Putumayo’s population declined from about 320,000 in 2000 to about 270,000 by the end of 2002. It’s considered good news that Plan Patriota has turned several coca boomtowns in southern Colombia – Peñas Coloradas, Caquetá, Miraflores, Guaviare – into near-ghost towns.
Where did these tens of thousands of people go? Did they give up the coca economy, or have they re-planted the crop elsewhere? (Statistics show that re-planting has been very robust.) Have they made common cause with an armed group? How are they and their children feeding themselves? Can they really be considered citizens of Colombia?
It is entirely unacceptable that the U.S. and Colombian governments can only answer these questions with a big “I don’t know.”
Even a mass relocation – loading people and their belongings on trucks and giving them land titles in more-governed areas – would be more humane than the current policy. Even the Shenandoah solution would be an improvement. Not only is the current strategy inhumane, it’s ineffective if the goal is truly to reduce coca-growing and strengthen the Colombian state.
Posted by isacson at 09:44 AM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
April 26, 2006
“Mission Accomplished,” says State’s Nicholas Burns
The Bush administration’s ability to portray failure as success – and to believe its own spin – is by now so legendary that it barely needs to be acknowledged here. From Tim Russert to Jon Stewart, commentators repeatedly note the yawning gap between perception and reality in current U.S. policymaking.
We know all about the divorce from reality in Iraq (“Mission Accomplished,” “pockets of dead-enders,” “last throes”), the blindness to Hurricane Katrina’s urgency (“Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job,” “I don't think anybody anticipated the breach of the levees,”), the denial of a human role in global warming (“There is a natural greenhouse effect that contributes to warming”), and the list goes on.
But this willful blindness to bad news – and resulting failure to change course – never ceases to amaze. Today’s exhibit A is an op-ed about Colombia that appears in today’s Miami Herald. Its author is Nicholas Burns, who as undersecretary for political affairs is the third highest-ranking official in the State Department.
“Stunning recovery warrants continued U.S. support” is the title. Burns argues that since Plan Colombia got underway five years ago, “the Colombian people have produced the single greatest success story in Latin America.” Arguing that “Colombia is clearly a better place than it was before we embarked on our joint undertaking,” Burns enumerates several claims for the success of Plan Colombia and U.S. policy, while speaking in the vaguest possible terms about remaining challenges (“there is still a war to be won in this strategically important country”).
Now, every government in the world tries to put the best possible face on its policies. And the Bush administration is probably concerned that a distracted U.S. Congress might be losing interest in funding Colombia to the tune of more than $700 million per year. And indeed Colombia has made some achievements, particularly in the area of citizen security – though that owes mainly to the Colombian government’s use of its own resources. (Most U.S. funds have instead gone to counter-drug programs, which protect nobody and haven’t even reduced drugs.)
Of course U.S. officials will do their utmost to put the most positive spin on something for which they’ve spent $4.7 billion since 2000. Of course they will try to play down failures and disappointments when communicating with the media or Congress (neither of which is paying very close attention anyway).
The danger here is that, as in Iraq and elsewhere, these officials actually believe their own spin, and then go on to make their decisions based on a highly distorted version of reality.
Let’s hope, for instance, that Nicholas Burns and others are not right now making policy decisions based on these arguments from today’s op-ed.
- “Less than a decade ago, Colombia was a country under siege. Guerrillas on the left and paramilitaries on the right controlled wide swaths of its territory. Political institutions were corroded by drug money. And drug trafficking to the United States was at an all-time high.”
If U.S. government officials fail to recognize that guerrillas and paramilitaries still control wide swaths of territory, that political institutions are still corroded by drug money (have they missed the DAS scandal?), and cocaine is even cheaper on U.S. streets than it was when Plan Colombia began, then they are designing a policy for a version of Colombia that only exists in their own fevered imaginations.
- “Last week yet another murderous paramilitary organization laid down its weapons. More than 30,000 ''paras'' have done so over the past two years.”
To be more precise, 30,150 paramilitaries laid down 16,077 weapons (0.52 guns per person). Of those, all but 604 (2 percent) are automatically exonerated for any previous crimes. Worse, new paramilitary groups are forming in areas where demobilizations took place. The head of the OAS observer mission, Sergio Caramagna, said just yesterday, “We know so far that new groups are emerging in regions like Norte de Santander, Nariño, Antioquia and in rural zones like Puerto Libertador and Tierra Alta in Córdoba.”
- “More than 300 criminals have been extradited to the United States during the Uribe administration.”
However, some of the biggest drug traffickers – the AUC paramilitaries’ top leadership – will avoid extradition, thanks to the deal they struck with the Colombian government. It remains to be seen whether or not these individuals have actually stopped sending drugs to the United States. Meanwhile, during the past month witnesses have alleged that the Colombian Presidency’s own intelligence service, the DAS, has been helping some of the country’s most-wanted drug traffickers to avoid capture.
- “Both common crime and human rights abuses are declining.”
The claim about human rights abuses is simply inaccurate. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported last month that its Bogotá office last year “observed an increase in allegations of actions attributed to members of the security forces, particularly the army.”
- “Together we seized more than 223 metric tons of cocaine in 2005 alone and more than 700 tons since 2001.”
That is impressive, but is only 40.9 percent of the 545 tons that the U.S. Drug Czar’s office conservatively estimates were produced just last year in Colombia.
- “We helped the government of Colombia eradicate more than 340,000 acres of coca and 3,900 acres of opium poppy in 2005.”
Yet the U.S. government found more coca in Colombia last year than it found in 2000, the year Plan Colombia began.
- “We have provided humanitarian assistance to more than two million people displaced by the conflict.”
The U.S. government has spent about $210.1 million on assistance to displaced persons since this aid first began flowing in 2000. This impressive amount, if truly distributed among two million people, adds up to only about $105 per person – a few weeks’ worth of food. The figure of 2 million, incidentally, gives credibility to Colombian NGOs’ estimates of Colombia’s displaced population. The Colombian government contends that only 1.8 million people have been displaced by the conflict – less than the segment of the population that the United States claims to have aided – while non-governmental organizations insist that the number is much higher.
Burns ends his piece with a call on the U.S. Congress to maintain current assistance to Colombia. “We seek the support of the U.S. Congress to finish the job we embarked on together -- creating a secure and peaceful Colombia for the benefit of both the American and Colombian peoples.”
We share this goal, and we hope that Congress does not cut aid to Colombia in 2007. But Congress should look beyond the inflated claims coming out of the State Department and consider a change in strategy. The policy’s results are much more disappointing than Burns’ piece indicates, and they demand a shift toward development, institution-building, citizen security and humanitarian assistance.
This Congress may simply respond to Burns’ appeal by applauding his “stunning” success and writing another big check for the same old strategy. (“You’re doing a heck of a job, Burnie.”) That would be another big mistake. If the U.S. government ends up making its decisions based on a version of events as wildly optimistic as this, blithely believing that big changes are unnecessary, then the policy will crash into cold, hard reality sooner rather than later – and the consequences will be disastrous for Colombia.
Posted by isacson at 01:49 PM | Comments (5) | TrackBack
April 15, 2006
Colombian coca cultivation in 2005
Here is a memo (PDF format) CIP is sending out to media, congressional staff and other colleagues this morning.
At 5:00 yesterday, Good Friday, the U.S. government announced that coca cultivation in Colombia last year totaled 144,000 hectares, a level not seen since 2002. While this appears to be a 30,000-hectare increase over 2004 levels, the White House Drug Czar’s press release cautions that much of the increase owes to newly discovered coca in areas that U.S. satellites were not monitoring before.
No matter what the reason for the huge increase measured in 2005, the following points are indisputable.
1. According to an October 2000 White House report, “The goal of President Pastrana’s Plan Colombia (October 1999) is to reduce Colombia’s cultivation, processing, and distribution of drugs by 50 percent over six years.” The 2005 coca-cultivation figures reported yesterday show that Plan Colombia has demonstrably failed to reach that goal. It hasn’t even come close.
The figure of 144,000 hectares in 2005 exceeds the U.S. government’s measures of Colombian coca-growing in 1999, the year before Plan Colombia began (122,500 hectares), and 2000, the plan’s first year (136,200 hectares).
Even if we accept the U.S. government’s argument that the high 2005 estimate owes to measurement in new areas, it is impossible to claim that Plan Colombia has brought a 50 percent reduction in coca-growing in six years. It cannot plausibly be claimed that better measurement would have shown coca-growing to be twice as extensive – 288,000 hectares – in 1999 and 2000.
|
| 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 |
| Colombia | 79,500 | 101,800 | 122,500 | 136,200 | 169,800 | 144,400 | 113,850 | 114,000 | 144,000 |
| Peru | 68,800 | 51,000 | 38,700 | 34,100 | 34,000 | 36,600 | 31,150 | 27,500 | 38,000 |
| Bolivia | 45,800 | 38,000 | 21,800 | 14,600 | 19,900 | 21,600 | 23,200 | 24,600 | 26,500 |
| Total | 194,100 | 190,800 | 183,000 | 184,900 | 223,700 | 202,000 | 168,200 | 166,100 | 208,500 |
|
| 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 |
| Colombia | 34,000 | 42,400 | 40,100 | 37,500 | 37,100 | 39,700 | 44,700 | 50,900 | 57,200 |
| Peru | 115,530 | 121,685 | 121,300 | 120,800 | 129,100 | 108,800 | 108,600 | 115,300 | 94,400 |
| Bolivia | 48,925 | 52,900 | 50,300 | 47,900 | 45,500 | 47,200 | 48,100 | 48,600 | 48,100 |
| Total | 198,455 | 216,985 | 211,700 | 206,200 | 211,700 | 195,700 | 201,400 | 214,800 | 199,700 |
2. The figure of 144,000 hectares in 2005 represents the most coca measured in Colombia since 2002, when the U.S. government reported 144,400 hectares. That was the second-highest year ever.
Either Colombia has returned to this level of cultivation, or the “reductions” reported in 2002 and 2003 were false due to poor measurement. If the reductions were false, then U.S. officials for several years have unwittingly made false and misleading claims about the success of aerial fumigation in Colombia. Three of many examples:
o Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Robert Charles, October 29, 2003: “One of Plan Colombia's goals was to reduce coca cultivation by 50% by 2005. President Uribe's aggressive support for spraying, and the professionalism and efficiency of State Department contractors may well have put us ahead of that mark.”
o February 27, 2003 press release from the Drug Czar’s office regarding 2002 coca reduction: “These figures capture the dramatic improvement attributable to activities to control coca production that commenced in August with the inauguration of President Uribe. … ‘Our anti-drug efforts in Colombia are now paying off, and we believe that this represents a turning point,’ said John Walters, Director of National Drug Control Policy.”
o Testimony of Assistant USAID Administrator for Latin America Adolfo Franco, May 11, 2005: “The reduction of coca cultivation in the region has been most significant in Colombia. Aerial eradication has impressively reduced regional production capacity and has raised pressure on traffickers to bear the cost of replanting and field reconstitution. … As the final year of Plan Colombia comes to an end, however, success is measurable and is a good reason to redouble efforts on programs that have caused traffickers the greatest damage.”
3. The U.S. government’s 2005 estimates for the three principal Andean coca-producing countries – Colombia, Bolivia and Peru – show that 208,500 hectares of coca were grown in the Andean region last year. That is the highest estimate since 2001. It is the sixth-highest estimate in the 18 years since 1988.
4. 2005 was the first year since 1995 that U.S. data showed coca increasing simultaneously in all three Andean countries.
5. Attempted coca production in Colombia – defined as eradicated plus uneradicated coca – has surged from 183,500 hectares in 2000 to 315,400 hectares in 2005. That’s a five-year increase of 72 percent. In response to fumigation, growers have cut down forests and planted coca in 72 percent more territory last year than they did in 2000, including in national parks. That – more than the effects of glyphosate – is the real environmental disaster brought by fumigation.
The Andean region as a whole has seen attempted coca cultivation increase 62 percent, from 246,124 hectares in 2000 to 398,100 hectares in 2005.
|
| 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 |
| Uneradicated Coca Colombia | 57,200 | 79,500 | 101,800 | 122,500 | 136,200 | 169,800 | 144,400 | 113,850 | 114,000 | 144,000 |
| Eradication Colombia | 5,600 | 19,000 | 31,123* | 43,246 | 47,371 | 84,251 | 122,695 | 132,817 | 136,555 | 171,400 |
| Uneradicated Coca Peru | 94,400 | 68,800 | 51,000 | 38,700 | 34,100 | 34,000 | 36,000 | 31,150 | 27,500 | 38,000 |
| Eradication Peru | 1,259 | 3,462 | 7,825 | 13,800 | 6,200 | 3,900 | 7,000 | 11,313 | 10,339 | 12,200 |
| Uneradicated Coca Bolivia | 48,100 | 45,800 | 38,000 | 21,800 | 14,600 | 19,900 | 24,400 | 28,450 | 24,600 | 26,500 |
| Eradication Bolivia | 7,512 | 7,026 | 11,621 | 16,999 | 7,653 | 9,435 | 11,839 | 10,000 | 8,437 | 6,000 |
| Total | 214,071 | 223,588 | 241,369 | 257,045 | 246,124 | 321,286 | 346,334 | 327,580 | 321,431 | 398,100 |
6. A dozen years of aerial herbicide fumigation in Colombia has shown one thing clearly: spraying people who have no other economic alternatives is effective only at reducing coca-growing in a specific zone for a specific period of time. (In fact, we are surprised that the Drug Czar’s press release indicated only a 10 percent coca reduction last year in areas that were being sprayed; we would have expected that figure to be higher.)
But people with no economic alternatives have not been deterred by fumigation. They replant rapidly (the UN reported last year that 62 percent of the coca plots their satellites detected in 2004 did not exist in 2003), and they relocate to other zones – including zones that U.S. government satellites apparently had not bothered to measure before.
The 2005 coca data show that six years after Plan Colombia, coca-growers are still several steps ahead of the spray planes. Colombia has no shortage of remote, hard-to-reach jungle and savannah where few people live, government presence is zero, and coca can be planted and harvested. These zones, taken together, are at least the size of California – yet since 2000 the U.S. spray fleet has only been able to cover an area a bit larger than Delaware.
A few more spray planes will not make any difference. Doubling the current fleet of about twenty planes (which nobody proposes due to the cost) would make little difference.
7. The real lesson we can draw from the 2005 coca numbers is that fumigating an area is no substitute for governing it. Aerial herbicide fumigation appeared to be a shortcut, a cheap way to reduce drug supplies without having to engage in “nation-building,” establishing a government presence and a legal economy in Colombia’s vast, neglected, impoverished rural zones. Only governance – which will require a costly, long-term political and military effort with mostly Colombian funds – will bring real reductions in Colombia’s coca crop. Fumigation is a poor substitute. Instead of a shortcut, fumigation has proven to be a dead end.
8. CIP has been predicting the 2005 outcome for several years:
- March 22, 2004: One thing the drug war has shown us over the past twenty years is that drug crops move around. The common response to eradication in one zone is new cultivation in other areas. … Though U.S. statistics are showing less coca, there are several reasons why supply has continued to meet demand so effectively. It is possible that new coca cultivation is appearing in areas not measured by satellite imagery.
- February 27, 2003: While supporters of the program will laud the findings as evidence of the effectiveness of fumigation, the numbers cannot be taken to reflect a country- or region-wide decrease, as they were not designed to measure the replanting of coca in areas outside of the target areas that were fumigated. … We’ve seen that fumigation is able to reduce coca-growing temporarily in a limited area, but re-planting in new areas will occur as quickly as the laws of supply and demand dictate.
- April 11, 2002: It is obvious to all that Colombia’s problems go well beyond narcotics, and we have argued for years that our emphasis on military responses and fumigation would do little more than push drug cultivation around the map of South America.
- September 10, 2001: Instead of reducing coca-growing, fumigation has only proven able to move the plants around geographically. Spray in one place, and coca appears elsewhere. This sort of cat-and-mouse game can go on indefinitely: all coca planted in South America in 2000 could fit in a land area two-thirds the size of Rhode Island. Colombia’s Amazon-basin jungles and plains alone are the size of California.
- April 2000: Colombian peasants will continue growing coca and heroin as long as U.S. demand exists and rural Colombia lacks economic opportunity. It's a matter of survival. Aerial fumigation won't change that - if anything, it will push coca-growing into more remote guerrilla-controlled areas.
Posted by isacson at 09:55 AM | Comments (10) | TrackBack
April 02, 2006
Demilitarizing foreign policy - but calling it "counterinsurgency"
Greetings from Bogotá, where I’m on a quick trip to take part in a meeting of social organizations from several conflictive regions of Colombia (Meta, Caquetá, Nariño, Arauca, Putumayo, Cauca, Guaviare and others), plus Peru and Ecuador. [Update as of Saturday morning: I’m now in the Bogotá airport with no Internet access. I’ll post this as soon as I can and apologize for the lack of posts this week.] I’ve learned a lot and am still digesting what I’ve heard, so I’m not going to write about that yet.
Instead, I want to draw attention to this op-ed in Tuesday’s Boston Globe about a “global counterinsurgency” to guide U.S. foreign policy. This sounds horrible on the surface: “let’s do what we did in El Salvador all over the world!” And the authors – one from the U.S. Institute of Peace and one from the Joint Special Operations University – make their case by using language that a group like CIP would never use. (Example: “In Iraq and around the world, we will never peacefully dissuade those dedicated to violence against us. They must be captured or killed.”)
But reading further, the authors make several points that (a) make a lot of sense and (b) are perfectly applicable to Colombia.
- “We have to convince those who passively support the insurgency that we are not their enemy. Unfortunately, our current strategy overemphasizing military force drives undecided millions into the insurgents’ arms. Not only are we fighting the war wrong, we are fighting the wrong war.”
- “Overwhelming firepower is often counterproductive.”
- “Comprehensive reconstruction and information efforts win hearts and minds.”
- “Those who prioritize national missile defense over either special-operations capabilities or non-military tools of foreign policy understand neither the nature of our greatest threat nor how to defeat it.”
- “We must promote America's charity, while exposing the enemy's hypocrisy. Civil affairs, ''development" in non-military terms, is aggressive economic and political development as well as cultivation of civil society institutions and human rights. Only when populations in the developing world obtain genuine economic opportunity, social dignity, and political empowerment will they no longer incubate the global insurgency.”
That’s good stuff. But these seem like such basic pieces of advice: Economic development is important. Winning populations’ trust is important. Treating civilians well and respecting their human rights is important. Sweeps, raids, large-scale bombing and other military “shock and awe” tactics drive the local population into the insurgency’s arms. “Non-military tools of foreign policy,” like economic aid, are neglected at one’s peril. You mean we don’t know that?
These seem like such elementary suggestions that an op-ed making them would seem unnecessary. Yet the U.S. government has failed to follow them in Iraq, and the U.S.-aided Colombian government has failed to follow them in its own conflict. The extreme distrust for the U.S. and new Iraqi forces among residents of places like Anbar province is mirrored by the extreme distrust for the Colombian state in places like Caquetá department.
The most interesting thing about this op-ed is the language it uses. Though it advocates elements of the sort of less-military approach that is usually associated with peacenik liberals, it omits catch-phrases that would make a Republican or Pentagon audience shut down and stop listening. Terms like “nation-building,” “inequality,” “governability,” or “human security” do not appear (though “human rights” does sneak in). Instead, there’s lots of muscular talk of “severing insurgents’ connections to populations,” “isolat[ing] and smother[ing]” the “enemy,” “effective police operations,” and, of course, “counterinsurgency.”
I’m not recommending inserting tough-sounding language into everything we say and write. In particular, there is a huge gap between counterinsurgency as a doctrine and counterinsurgency as the United States and its proxies have disastrously practiced it. But some familiarity with this defense-and-security argot can ease communication with many who don’t automatically see things our way.
Like the U.S. strategy in Iraq, Plan Colombia is proving to be hugely ineffective and in need of drastic revision and de-militarization. As that becomes increasingly evident to all, people and groups on our side of the debate will have much more opportunity to propose changes. When we do, we will sometimes – not all the time, but sometimes – have to use language like that seen in Tuesday’s Globe.
Posted by isacson at 09:18 PM | Comments (7) | TrackBack
March 28, 2006
The FARC indictments
There was little surprising about last week’s indictment of fifty FARC leaders for drug trafficking. It is not news that the FARC raises much of its funds by processing and transshipping cocaine, and that many of its top leaders have played a role in it, or at least explicitly approved it. If you don’t understand that much of the fighting in Colombia lately has been concentrated in drug-producing areas and drug-trafficking corridors, then you don’t understand Colombia’s conflict.
So it’s not surprising that the U.S. government would eventually get around to indicting more than the handful of FARC leaders already accused of sending cocaine to U.S. shores. As in the case of paramilitary leaders who face similar indictments and extradition requests, the argument can be made that these individuals conspired to violate U.S. law on U.S. soil.
Some elements of the indictment were surprising, though.
- The allegation that the FARC now controls 50 percent of the drug trade, and 60 percent of drugs entering the United States, was brand-new. Even the Colombian military has never publicly used such a large figure. U.S. Ambassador William Wood said in 2004 (cited in this ICG report) that the AUC controlled 40 percent of the drug trade. Does this mean that the FARC has since increased its share at the paramilitaries’ expense? What about the hundreds of smaller drug organizations, sometimes called cartelitos, that continue to traffic drugs independently of armed groups?
- Also new was the allegation that the FARC has made $25 billion from cocaine trafficking in the United States alone, nearly all of it in the past ten to fifteen years. (DEA Administrator Karen Tandy said, “Americans are responsible for giving the FARC their lifeblood to the amount of $25 billion for 2,500 metric tons of cocaine.”) This would place the guerrillas’ annual income at $2 billion to $2.5 billion per year, plus whatever they gain from cocaine sent to other countries, plus whatever they make through kidnapping and extortion. This blows away all previous estimates of the FARC’s annual income (such as this one, this one, this one and this one), which were usually within the $200 to $600 million per year range, with only outliers estimating it at as high as a billion dollars. Tandy’s estimate of 2,500 tons of cocaine was also new; if accurate, it would represent over 160 tons of cocaine per year over the past fifteen years, or somewhere between one-quarter and one-half of all cocaine sent to the United States during that period. That sounds rather high.
- Also surprising, of course, was the decision to include 50 individuals in the indictment, including the entire FARC leadership. Though it’s entirely possible that the entire FARC Secretariat and Estado Mayor has had a hand in the drug trade, it’s surprising that the Justice Department believes it has evidence pointing to this many individuals’ specific involvement in shipments of drugs to the United States. It could be that merely holding a leadership position in the FARC is being considered evidence enough of responsibility for narcotrafficking; if so, however, a similar standard has not been applied to paramilitary leaders, whose indictments have proceeded on a case-by-case basis.
Despite these new allegations, there is no reason to expect the indictment to make much difference. Don’t expect a wave of extradited FARC leaders coming to the United States. Of the fifty individuals listed, forty-seven are still at large. The three in Colombian government custody – including one who was captured last year in Venezuela and extradited by the Chávez government – are relatively low-ranking.
In order to extradite the “big fish” and the others on the list of forty-seven wanted individuals, one must catch them first. That will be exceedingly difficult: to apprehend the FARC’s top leadership would require a massive, complex and expensive intelligence operation, involving sophisticated technology and generous incentives to informants. Yet, other than an offer of reward money, the indictment came with no announcement of increased funding to locate and arrest wanted guerrilla leaders.
Mark Bowden’s 2001 book Killing Pablo noted that, during the 1992-93 manhunt for drug boss Pablo Escobar, “there were so many American spy planes over Medellín, at one point 17 at once, that the Air Force had to assign an airborne command and control center to keep track of them.” That manhunt, including a special unit (“Bloque de Búsqueda”) and an aerial intelligence operation (“Centra Spike”), was a huge effort to capture a target who mainly kept to an urban setting, Medellín and its suburbs, protected by bodyguards and bribes. By contrast, the FARC’s “fugitives” move throughout Colombia’s vast jungle, command armies and are protected by rings of security.
Such an ambitious manhunt would be difficult and expensive – and to be credible it would also have to target indicted “former” paramilitary leaders who are still involved in the drug trade. Unless the U.S. or Colombian governments are about to assume the large expense that this would require – which doesn’t appear to be the case – last week’s indictment is just a piece of paper.
The indictment would also become worthless should the FARC ever agree to negotiate with the Colombian government at some point in the future. As the paramilitary talks have shown us, the “Justice and Peace” law will shield a group’s leaders from extradition – even if these leaders include narcotraffickers with little or no experience as members of an armed group, and even if the leaders’ organization has not truly dismantled itself and continues to traffic drugs even today.
So if it is neither surprising nor likely to lead to extraditions, why did the U.S. government choose to issue this indictment now? A few reasons come to mind.
- It offers a low-cost way – without increasing the U.S. financial or military commitment – to declare that the Bush administration now considers the FARC to be its main target in Colombia.
- It offers a low-cost way – without facing charges of electioneering – to support President Uribe as he heads for re-election, endorsing his hard line against the guerrillas.
- By referring to the group as the “Farc Drug Cartel,” it strikes a blow against the FARC’s claims to status as a political organization or a belligerent party in Colombia’s conflict.
- It offers a distraction from coming bad news on coca cultivation in Colombia. We expect the Bush administration to be forced to announce in April that coca did not decrease in 2005, for the second year in a row.
- It offers a distraction from the very bad news coming from the paramilitary demobilization process, including evidence that groups have not fully demobilized, that some groups’ members are re-arming, and that nearly all demobilized paramilitary members are still unemployed. The OAS mission’s March 1 report [MS Word (.doc) format] on the demobilization process offers numerous reasons to be very alarmed about where it is headed.
Finally, here are four pieces of advice, lest U.S. officials really believe that their indictment signals “the beginning of the end of the FARC,” in DEA Administrator Karen Tandy’s tough-sounding words.
1. Don’t forget about the “former” paramilitaries. It was very disturbing that none of the officials at last Wednesday’s press conference even mentioned the words “paramilitary,” “self-defense group” or “AUC.” (When asked about paramilitary drug traffickers, Attorney-General Gonzales ducked the question.) This left the impression that the U.S. focus is now entirely on the FARC, and not on the dozen or so indicted paramilitary leaders who now need not fear extradition because they have “demobilized” from the AUC.
In fact, the at-large paramilitary leaders should be an even greater concern. There is no evidence that top paramilitaries have in fact pulled out of the drug trade. In fact, since the current demobilization process is unlikely to dismantle AUC leaders’ criminal networks, they could well be sending cocaine to U.S. shores right now. Yet while the Colombian authorities are presumably doing all they can to capture FARC leaders, very little effort is being made to monitor, much less capture, paramilitary leaders who may still be exporting drugs.
2. Don’t confuse the FARC with a cartel. The “decapitation” methods used to take down the Medellín and Cali drug cartels – arrest top leaders and watch the organization disintegrate – will not work against the FARC. Instead of a mafia led by a few individuals who use most of their gains for personal enrichment, the FARC continues to be a military organization that controls territory and has a (small, perhaps enthusiastic) base of support among the inhabitants of Colombia’s most neglected rural zones. As far as we can tell, the FARC is plowing its drug money back into guns, not swimming pools and Swiss bank accounts.
If top leaders are captured, then, the group’s fragmentation and demise are far from guaranteed. In fact, it can have a galvanizing effect on the organization’s members as mid-level leaders rise to take the captured ones’ place. While calling the FARC a “cartel” may be a useful rhetorical device, it is not a good guide for a strategy. Try to fight the FARC using methods used against cartels, and you’ll lose.
3. You’ll also lose if you think that the FARC is your principal target, as the State Department’s Anne Patterson indicated in this interview with El Tiempo. Yes, the FARC are brutal, abusive, and most Colombians despise them. But a strategy that holds up their defeat as an ultimate goal – most likely through a war of attrition against a guerrilla rank-and-file that is more than half women and/or children – will not end Colombia’s larger problem of endemic violence and ungovernability.
If the FARC disappeared tomorrow, most of Colombia’s populated territory would still be lawless and impoverished, with inhabitants forced to protect themselves against threats to their security. It wouldn’t be long until something came along to take the FARC’s place. The U.S. government’s principal target, then, should not be defeating the FARC. It should be helping Colombia’s government to protect its own citizens from all threats, to win the trust of citizens of long-neglected zones, and to bring the law and civilian governance to thousands of communities that know no state presence. Make progress in those areas, and the FARC will lose both strength and relevance.
4. Remember that if the FARC’s leadership were arrested tomorrow, it wouldn’t affect the flow of cocaine to the United States. It could cause a hiccup in the market, but just as we saw after the demise of the Medellín and Cali cartels, the drug trade will easily adjust to new management. Whether the FARC Secretariat ends up behind bars or not, torrents of cocaine will continue to flow northward as long as these other trends continue:
- U.S. demand remains strong, thanks to a population of hard-core addicts with little access to treatment;
- Potential profits remain astronomical, due to the “price support” that our supply-side anti-drug strategy provides;
- The law still fails to reach into much of Colombia’s territory, making the risk of getting caught low enough to tempt new “kingpins” into the drug trade; and
- A lack of rural economic opportunity continues to push poor farmers into growing drug crops.
As long as those problems remain unaddressed, a few dozen indictments against guerrilla leaders who are nowhere near capture is simply, to borrow from Macbeth, “sound and fury, signifying nothing.”
Posted by isacson at 02:30 PM | Comments (17) | TrackBack
March 08, 2006
What’s happening in Congress
A few weeks ago, we noted that no money for Colombia was in the White House’s latest supplemental funding request to Congress [PDF format] for Iraq and the “war on terror.” Once again, the Colombian government had failed to get Washington to say “yes” to its year-old proposal for as much as $150 million worth of new spray planes, helicopters and other military equipment.
We weren’t the only ones to notice this “oversight.” Yesterday’s Washington Times reports that some of the House Republicans’ leading drug warriors plan to add almost $100 million in new military and police aid to Colombia when the supplemental budget bill comes under consideration.
Some members of Congress, angry that appeals by Colombian President Alvaro Uribe for help in rebuilding his depleted and aging fleet of surveillance and interdiction aircraft have been ignored, plan to bypass the White House by dipping into a $72.4 billion supplemental appropriation for the war on terrorism to fund $99.4 million in military and police aid to Colombia.
An amendment to the pending emergency supplemental bill likely will be offered by Republican Reps. Henry J. Hyde of Illinois, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Dan Burton of Indiana, a member of the House Government Reform Committee. It would pay for three DC-3 marine patrol aircraft for the Colombian navy and two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and 10 Huey II helicopters for the Colombian national police.
“Just because Hyde and Burton propose it doesn’t mean it will happen,” a colleague at another organization cautions. However, they and their allies have had some past success in getting helicopters and weapons to Colombia, at least when they have had the House Republican leadership on their side. We don’t have a sense yet whether the House Republican leadership supports this proposed amendment, which would require $99.4 million in cuts from the war effort in Iraq and other programs in the Middle East.
The Washington Times article portrays the Hyde-Burton request as focused on stopping the maritime flow of smuggled drugs near Colombia’s Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Unlike past proposals from Uribe via Hyde and Burton, the article makes no mention of money for new spray planes to expand herbicide fumigation.
This is surprising. Sometime this month, several sources have strongly hinted, the U.S. government will be forced to announce that Colombian coca cultivation failed to decrease in 2005, despite record levels of fumigation, for the second consecutive year. (It may have even increased.) When that happens, we expect the Bush administration to respond by arguing for even more spraying capacity. Yet no fumigation planes seem to be in Hyde and Burton’s proposal.
If they’re not calling for more spray planes, how will the House Republicans respond if the 2005 Colombia coca numbers turn out to be dismal? One possibility: we may see a renewed push to begin spraying mycoherbicides – coca-killing fungi, a terrible idea for a host of reasons – in Colombia.
H.R. 2829, the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act, which is being debated on the House floor Thursday, already includes text requiring the Drug Czar to come up with “a plan to conduct controlled scientific testing in a major drug producing nation of mycoherbicide naturally existing in the producing nation.” (See Section 106(m).) Who added this text? Rep. Burton once again, this time along with Rep. Mark Souder (R-Indiana).
We’ll be watching the supplemental funding request, the coca numbers and the possibility of a renewed push for mycoherbicides. Stay tuned.
Posted by isacson at 11:46 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
March 03, 2006
A "unified campaign" to contain Venezuela?
In 2002, at the Bush administration’s request, the U.S. Congress broadened the purpose of U.S. military assistance to Colombia (despite an unsuccessful 192-225 House vote to stop it). Ever since then, each year’s foreign aid bill has included a sentence permitting all aid given through counter-narcotics programs – including helicopters, boats, and other lethal equipment – to be used in a “unified campaign” against both drugs and the three Colombian groups on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations (the FARC, ELN and AUC).
This year, the Bush administration wants to expand the military-aid mission yet again. And this time it appears to have more than just drugs and guerrillas on its mind.
The proposed mission expansion is buried deep within the appendix to the proposed 2007 budget, available on the website of the White House Office of Management and Budget. (Go here, click on “Department of State and Other International Programs,” then find “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” on the resulting PDF file. A major hat-tip goes to the congressional staffer who pointed this out to me yesterday.) This is where the Bush administration tells Congress what its ideal foreign aid bill for 2007 would look like – basically, they take the text of the previous year’s bill and show what wording they would cut and what they would insert.
The proposed language would expand the purpose of U.S. military aid to Colombia in three ways.
- Instead of a “unified campaign” against drugs and specifically against the FARC, ELN and AUC, it would strike the armed groups’ names and replace them with the blanket term “terrorist activities.”
- It would add a new, rather vague purpose for the use of U.S. counter-drug military aid to Colombia: “to address other threats to Colombia’s national security.”
- It would allow all U.S. funds to be used for this expanded mission, “notwithstanding any other provision of law” – that is, any previous limits on the purpose of drug-war funding for Colombia (including past years’ “unified campaign” clauses) would disappear.
The administration might defend the first proposed change by arguing that the AUC could cease to exist this year, and though we don’t know what might replace it, the United States must help Colombia to combat re-constituted or un-dismantled paramilitary structures. However, the term “terrorist activities” is not sufficiently specific; as we have seen in Bolivia and elsewhere, the “terrorist” label is too often used against social movements. If the “unified campaign” sentence must stay in the law, better language would read “against the FARC, ELN, AUC and any paramilitary successor groups.”
Even more worrisome is the wording calling for counter-drug aid to be used “to address other threats to Colombia’s national security.” This definition is so broad that you can drive a truck through it. What “other threats,” beyond guerrilla and paramilitary activity, does the administration have in mind? Common crime and gangs? Street protests?
We all know what the most likely answer to that question is. The “security threat” the White House probably has in mind wears a red beret, has a big mouth, and runs the country just to Colombia’s east. It could only be Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela.
It’s hard to imagine Colombia needing to repel a Venezuelan invasion force, of course. But this may be the White House’s attempt to respond to Caracas’ large (and admittedly worrisome) recent arms purchases from Europe. It also would fit into the administration’s declared intention to isolate or contain Venezuela by partnering more closely with pro-U.S. governments in the region.
If Venezuela is indeed the rationale for this proposed legislative change – and that is certainly how Caracas will perceive it – it represents an unwise and irresponsible escalation of tensions in the Andean region. Venezuela could use it as a pretext to ratchet up its weapons-buying spree, bringing with it the specter of a destabilizing regional arms race.
Worse, it will be the first example since the Cold War of U.S. military aid being used explicitly to counter a political tendency in the Americas. We have said it before, and we will say it again and again: Confronting the spread of leftist politics in Latin America should not be a mission for U.S. military assistance to the region. The U.S. government must not view Latin America’s militaries as a bulwark or counterweight against leftist political movements. We have made that mistake before with tragic consequences, and it must not be repeated.
This proposed military-aid mission expansion is dangerous and unhelpful, and Congress should scrap it.
| The “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” section of the 2006 foreign aid law says: | In fiscal year 2006, funds available to the Department of State for assistance to the Government of Colombia shall be available to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations. |
| The Bush administration wants to change that language to: | Assistance provided to the Government of Colombia with funds appropriated under this or any prior appropriations act may be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities, to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, and to address other threats to Colombia’s national security. |
Posted by isacson at 12:34 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
March 02, 2006
What a difference a year makes
Continuing the theme of yesterday's post:
- March 4, 2005: “[T]he balloon effect, the notion that somehow, when you win in one country, which we saw over the last 15 years -- I've watched this evolution up and down and when we won in Peru and Bolivia, to a large extent, it somehow moved us over into Colombia. What's fascinating on the metrics is that we are really not seeing the balloon effect. In terms of the entire region in 2003, there was an overall regional reduction of 16 percent of cultivation. That's a remarkable thing by itself.”
– Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Robert Charles
- March 2, 2006: “Tony Arias, director of the Americas program at the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, told The Miami Herald the balloon effect is ‘frankly … evident.’
‘You're successful in one part and then the traffickers will look wherever they can to continue their business,’ he said.”
– The Miami Herald
Posted by isacson at 12:29 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
March 01, 2006
Andean coca increases, while Andean aid drops
The State Department’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, released today, includes some seriously bad news about drug production in the Andes.
While data for Colombia are still forthcoming, the report shows a sharp increase in the production of coca, the plant used to make cocaine, elsewhere in the Andes last year.
- Bolivia: “Overall coca cultivation increased 8 percent from 2004 to 2005, to 26,500 hectares.”
- Peru: “The USG estimates there are 38,000 hectares of coca cultivation in Peru, including 4,000 hectares in new areas.” This represents a stunning 38 percent increase from 2004 to 2005. The combined one-year increase in Peru and Bolivia was 12,400 hectares, or 24 percent.
- Ecuador: “Ecuadorian security forces located and destroyed about 36,160 cultivated coca plants in small, scattered sites in 2005. While not commercially significant, the extent of cultivation was about double that of 2004. Together with the discovery of a small, partially harvested opium poppy plantation, they suggest that growers are testing the feasibility of drug crop cultivation in Ecuador.”
Colombia’s coca-cultivation estimate for 2005 has not yet been made public, and probably will not be for a few more weeks. If it ends up revealing that eradication failed to reduce coca cultivation in Colombia last year – as was the case in 2004 – then official U.S. statistics will show a 7.5 percent increase in coca cultivation throughout the Andean region.
Such a result would be a stark admission of failure, since Washington has spent more than $6 billion on counter-narcotics in the Andes since “Plan Colombia” began in 2000.
If Colombia is found to have registered some coca reduction in 2005, the 12,400-hectare increase in Bolivia and Peru will almost certainly prove to be big enough to wipe it out. Official data are unlikely to show Colombian coca cultivation dropping by that much. To do so would mean a one-year reduction of 11 percent, after a slight net gain in 2004.
The new data show that the “balloon effect” is alive and well in the Andes. (The term refers to squeezing one part of a balloon, only to see it bulge out elsewhere, the way that drug crops respond to forced eradication.) Andean cocaine supplies are likely to be sustaining current levels, or even increasing.
The strategy, once again, is not working. But not only is the Bush administration contemplating no changes, it is also planning a deep cut in counter-drug aid to Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in 2007. The president’s 2007 foreign-aid request to Congress contemplates a two-year overall cut of 21.4 percent in these three countries’ “drug war” aid through the State Department’s Andean Counterdrug Initiative account. Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru will see a 17.5% cut in military aid and a 25.8% cut in economic aid (see table).
While drug-crop cultivation increases rapidly, U.S. aid – whether to help destitute rural producers, to interdict drug flows, or even just to eradicate crops – is dropping precipitously.
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (the principal anti-drug aid program for the Andes)
(Thousands of dollars)
|
| 2005 | 2006, estimate | 2007, request | Aid cut from 2005 to 2007 |
| Bolivia military / police | $48,608 | $42,570 | $35,000 | -28.0% |
| Bolivia economic / social | $41,664 | $36,630 | $31,000 | -25.6% |
| Bolivia subtotal | $90,272 | $79,200 | $66,000 | -26.9% |
| Peru military / police | $61,504 | $58,410 | $56,000 | -8.9% |
| Peru economic / social | $53,866 | $48,510 | $42,500 | -21.1% |
| Peru subtotal | $115,370 | $106,920 | $98,500 | -14.6% |
| Ecuador military / police | $10,912 | $8,375 | $8,900 | -18.4% |
| Ecuador economic / social | $14,880 | $11,425 | $8,400 | -43.5% |
| Ecuador subtotal | $25,792 | $19,800 | $17,300 | -32.9% |
| Military / police subtotal | $121,024 | $109,355 | $99,900 | -17.5% |
| Economic / social subtotal | $110,410 | $96,565 | $81,900 | -25.8% |
| Total | $231,434 | $205,920 | $181,800 | -21.4% |
Coca cultivation in the Andes
(Hectares)
|
| 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 |
| Colombia | 57,200 | 79,500 | 101,800 | 122,500 | 136,200 | 169,800 | 144,400 | 113,850 | 114,000 | ? |
| Peru | 94,400 | 68,800 | 51,000 | 38,700 | 34,100 | 34,000 | 36,000 | 31,150 | 27,500 | 38,000 |
| Bolivia | 48,100 | 45,800 | 38,000 | 21,800 | 14,600 | 19,900 | 21,600 | 23,200 | 24,600 | 26,500 |
| Total | 199,700 | 194,100 | 190,800 | 183,000 | 184,900 | 223,700 | 202,000 | 168,200 | 166,100 | ? |
|
| ||||||||||
| 2005 total if Colombia unchanged: | 178,500 | |||||||||
| which would be a regional increase of: | 7.5% | |||||||||
Posted by isacson at 05:56 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
February 25, 2006
A good consultation with USAID; if only they had money
CIP was among several NGOs invited to spend a few hours yesterday afternoon in a “consultation” with officials in charge of USAID’s human rights program in Colombia. Part of USAID’s $20 million-per-year “democracy” program area in Colombia [PDF format], the human-rights section supports Colombian government agencies, civil-society human rights groups, and a government “early warning system” to prevent abuses. It overlaps closely with other USAID programs like judicial reform, physical protection of human-rights defenders, and support for displaced people and ex-combatants.
The meeting was quite detailed and frank. There was general consensus about what wasn’t working – the early-warning system, and especially the costly and utterly results-free work of the Colombian vice-president’s human rights program. There was praise for what was working – assistance to the Procuraduría human-rights unit and the Defensoría, the flawed but necessary Interior Ministry protection program, and efforts to ensure that human-rights groups critical of U.S. policy may still receive assistance, despite a past controversy.
Though the meeting was positive, it was marked throughout by an air of frustration. Our frustration wasn’t aimed at the USAID officials, most of whom are top-notch public servants trying to do a difficult job under very challenging circumstances. In fact, they no doubt share our dismay at a theme that kept coming up: the chronic lack of resources available to carry out these critically important programs, and the likelihood that no increases will be forthcoming.
We had a long “wish list”: more assistance to groups and government agencies fighting impunity; more aid to the Defensoría and Procuraduría, especially in conflictive regions, as well as the human-rights unit of the Fiscalía; funding for agencies responsible for identifying and seizing demobilized paramilitaries’ stolen land and assets; more focus on gender, race, and economic, social and cultural rights; and many others.
You can guess the response our “wish-list” items received. There’s no money. Resources are tight. We have to make do with what we have.
There's no money, even though for every dollar USAID gets, four go to military and police programs, from fumigation to “Plan Patriota,” most of which are yielding few if any results.
There's no money, even though the “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” (ACI) account – which provides USAID with all the money it gets for work in Colombia, and within which money can be moved around without an act of Congress – gives USAID only about $135 million, while military and police efforts get 2 ½ times as much (about $340 million).
There's no money, even though just a ten percent cut in what the ACI spends on fumigation, or in what it spends to maintain aircraft given to Colombia in past years, could free up enough funding to double the size of USAID’s democracy program in Colombia, more than fulfilling the items on our wish list.
Yesterday’s meeting was very useful for us, and we hope for USAID as well, and we hope to do it again sometime soon. CIP laments the resource scarcity that became a recurrent theme in the meeting, and which forces USAID to make such hard choices.
The frustrating part is, we know that the money is actually there, it’s being appropriated for Colombia already – but that it’s going to weapons and herbicides, not for human rights. We will continue to channel our frustration: not by complaining to USAID, but by helping those in Congress who are trying to change U.S. priorities in Colombia.
Posted by isacson at 01:29 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
February 23, 2006
CIP doesn't invite terrorists to the United States
Leonida Zurita is a cocalera peasant leader, a close ally of Bolivian President Evo Morales, and now an alternate senator in Bolivia’s Congress. She has published an op-ed in the New York Times, spoken at Harvard University and several other U.S. schools, and is by far one of the most prominent women in Bolivian politics.
Senator Zurita is supposed to be in Florida right now, on the first leg of a three-week speaking tour that would take her to Florida International University, the University of Florida, Stanford University, the University of Vermont, and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, among others. She was to be in Washington two weeks from now, and the Center for International Policy was helping to organize a public event and a few meetings for her on Capitol Hill.
We at CIP have never met her, though we have heard much about her, and we were looking forward to hearing what she would have to say about U.S.-Bolivian relations, now that Evo Morales has assumed the presidency in La Paz.
We will have to wait a while longer to have that opportunity. Senator Zurita was to visit the United States on a ten-year, multiple-entry visa she obtained in 1998 and has used several times. However, when she came to the American Airlines check-in counter in Santa Cruz three days ago, she was told that the U.S. embassy had called specifically to warn them not to honor her visa, which had been revoked.
 |
| Leonida Zurita shows her canceled U.S. visa. (From La Razón) |
“At the airport, we were told that we could not travel, by order of the ambassador,” Zurita told Bolivia’s daily La Razón. “Later, Ms. Julie [Grant], the consul [in La Paz], gave me a letter explaining that my visa is suspended or canceled because of involvement in terrorism and some other things.”
The letter, according to La Razón, informed Sen. Zurita that her visa was revoked on May 27, 2004 under Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the USA-PATRIOT Act. This section prohibits entry to the United States of foreigners whom the consul believes to have “engaged in a terrorist activity,” incited terrorist activity “under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm,” or “used [his or her] position of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist organization, in a way that the Secretary of State has determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities,” among other criteria.
Let’s be clear here. The Center for International Policy doesn’t invite terrorists to the United States. Neither do Stanford, Harvard or other U.S. universities. So what is the State Department talking about?
In Bolivia, where the word “terrorism” is too often used to brand one’s political opponents, Sen. Zurita has been arrested on at least two occasions for alleged incitement of terrorist activity. Like all of the cocalero movement’s most prominent leaders, Zurita has organized many protests. Authorities tried unsuccessfully in the past to punish her for some of the rare occasions when such protests involved outbreaks of violence. Zurita has never been found guilty, and she currently faces no charges.
In one case from 2000, Zurita was accused of a protest-related murder that in fact took place when she was in Prague. In another case, Zurita was among 43 cocalero leaders detained in relation to the 2003 arrest of Francisco “Pacho” Cortés, a Colombian peasant leader accused of trying to expand ELN guerrilla activity into Bolivia. Colombia’s human-rights community considers these charges to be baseless, and indeed they do seem ridiculous given the ELN’s precarious state within Colombia. Following a detention determined to be arbitrary by the UN Human Rights Commission’s Arbitrary Detentions Working Group, Cortés was recently released from house arrest, as prosecutors determined that insufficient evidence exists to keep him in custody.
If the terrorism label does not stick – and we strongly believe it does not – the reason for the visa decision must be politics. Sen. Zurita is a strong critic of U.S. policy toward Bolivia, and – like most MAS candidates, including Evo Morales – campaigned under the slogan “Long live coca, death to the Yankees.” (A Reuters piece about Zurita’s visa cancellation identifies her as “a close ally of President Evo Morales known for her raucous chanting” of that slogan.)
Those words are repugnant and unhelpful, of course. But moderating that attitude has been a central goal of the U.S. government since Evo Morales’ stunning election victory. The Bush administration’s praiseworthy decision to seek dialogue with the new government in La Paz – at least for now – appears to be bearing fruit, as the Washington Post’s Pamela Constable noted on Tuesday: “Morales, 46, has already toned down the harsh anti-American rhetoric that peppered his campaign speeches. Most significantly, he has backed off from a blanket condemnation of U.S. anti-drug programs as an excuse for military intervention and has said he will allow such operations to continue if they abide by Bolivian law.”
In this context, it makes no sense to close the door on Zurita, one of Morales’s closest political allies. Actions like these, which appear petty and vindictive before a Bolivian audience, will serve only to radicalize, not moderate, Bolivia’s new leadership.
If Zurita’s visa was indeed canceled because of her political views – which she planned to express in university settings – then the revocation, as a squelching of freedom of expression, is more un-American than merely chanting “death to the United States.” This embarrassing decision must be reversed now.
Posted by isacson at 02:06 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
February 19, 2006
WOLA's John Walsh: what the drug czar didn't say
Even while funding for fumigation and counter-drug military aid to Colombia remain constant, the Bush administration's 2007 budget request includes deep cuts in funding for domestic drug treatment. This, even though study after study has found treatment to be the most effective way of reducing drug abuse in the United States.
One of the officials most responsible for this bizarre mismatch in priorities, Drug Czar John Walters, testified in the House on Thursday. Here is an account of Walters' performance from John Walsh, who works on drug policy at the Washington Office on Latin America. John notes that the drug czar failed even to mention the supposed increase in U.S. cocaine prices that his office documented, with much fanfare, back in November. Nor did Walters even hint that coca cultivation in Colombia might have decreased last year.
ONDCP Director John Walters testified yesterday (2/16/06) before the House Government Reform Committee’s Drug Policy Subcommittee. His written statement included passages on Colombia and Bolivia below (with my comments in parentheses). Just as noteworthy is what Walters did not say.
Walters made no reference in either his written statement or in his oral remarks to the price and purity figures that he has recently been citing as evidence of drug war progress, and which are featured prominently in the new national drug control strategy. This may suggest Walters’ wariness over inviting closer scrutiny of the data he has cited (which are clearly at odds with the RAND data posted by ONDCP just last February).
Walters’ written statement mentions that the Colombian government “reported spraying more than 138,000 hectares of coca and manually eradicating more than 31,000 hectares in 2005.” But Walters gave no hint that the net coca cultivation estimate for 2005 – which is likely to be made public within the next several weeks – will be significantly lower than the 2004 estimate, which was itself virtually the same as the 2003 figure. The sense that fumigation is no longer achieving reductions in net cultivation, despite new spray records each year, is reinforced by recent off-the-record comments by other U.S. officials, and by Walters’ own insistence on the need for increased spray capabilities (see below). If the U.S. estimate of the net area under cultivation for 2005 is not significantly lower than in 2004, it will be especially noteworthy given the sharp increase in manual eradication (up from 10,279 hectares in 2004 to 31,000 hectares in 2005). Alternatively, if the 2005 estimate is appreciably lower than the 2004 figure, it could be attributable to the increase in manual eradication. As underscored by a recent GAO report [PDF format], all of these figures need to be taken with a grain of salt, and should be considered understatements of the true extent of coca cultivation and potential cocaine production.
Walters on Colombia:
“Increased aerial eradication capability is necessary to attack replanting efforts more swiftly. Additional focus must be placed on identifying new cultivation of coca and opium poppy, particularly in more remote areas.”(Despite this stance, the administration’s FY2007 request does not appear to seek to increase eradication capability.)
Walters on Bolivia:
President Morales has “expressed concern with the military’s participation in eradication operations and has talked of removing them from the process. This would further undermine containment [of coca], as their experience and equipment make them mission-essential to any and all eradication efforts.”(It would be nice to know whether Assistant Secretary Shannon and Ambassador Greenlee also consider the Bolivian military to be “mission-essential.”)
Posted by isacson at 04:22 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
February 17, 2006
Washington says "no" to President Uribe
Álvaro Uribe is having a difficult time on his visit to Washington this week. Not only is he suffering from a high fever even as he goes from meeting to meeting, he can’t seem to get much of what he is asking for.
He has so far been unable to get the Bush administration to budge on the agricultural component of free trade talks, the main purpose of his visit. Today’s editorial in the Washington Post goes embarrassingly far in its hero-worship of Uribe, but its main argument is right on: the U.S. government must give significant ground to Colombia on agricultural trade in order to avoid dealing a strong blow to a countryside already ravaged by coca and conflict.
Uribe’s pleas appear to be going unheard. He was unable to get President Bush to say that the U.S. government is committed to reaching a trade agreement soon (“espero que sí” and “vamos a ver” were Bush’s Spanish replies). Upon emerging from his White House meeting, noted the Associated Press, “The jovial and even joking Uribe of the past had been substituted by an evidently tense Uribe.”
Meanwhile, despite the protestations of House International Relations Committee Chairman Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Illinois), Uribe has been unable to convince the Bush administration to increase military and police aid to Colombia beyond current levels. Since at least the middle of last year, Uribe has been asking for $150 million in new assistance, in the form of spray planes and facilities, helicopters and boats. That additional funding appeal did not make it into the 2006 foreign aid funding bill, nor does it appear in the administration’s 2007 aid request to Congress, which would basically hold aid to Colombia at approximately the same level as it has been since 2003.
With no additional aid foreseen in the regular 2006 or 2007 budgets, Uribe’s only hope would have been to have his package of planes and helicopters put in an additional, or “supplemental,” funding request. Usually, such supplemental requests are submitted to Congress once or twice a year, for unforeseen “emergency” expenses like the “war on terror,” Iraq, or Hurricane Katrina; funding for additional priorities, like aid to Colombia, is sometimes thrown in. (Back in January 2000, Plan Colombia began as a supplemental budget request to Congress.)
Yesterday, the White House sent to Congress its latest supplemental request for Iraq and the terror war [PDF format]. Despite President Uribe’s efforts, this request does not include any new funding for Colombia. (Or anywhere else in Latin America, as far as I can tell from reading it.) That pretty much closes the door on the possibility of any new money for Colombia in 2006.
The failure to secure new U.S. aid goes beyond spray planes. It also means no significant U.S. funding will ever go toward Colombia’s paramilitary demobilization process.
The 2006 aid law allows the State Department to spend up to $20 million this year on the reintegration of ex-paramilitaries, but only (1) if it finds that money by cutting other existing aid programs – no new money was appropriated; and (2) if the State Department certifies that the Colombian government is cooperating with paramilitary narcotraffickers’ extraditions, and asking demobilizing paramilitaries for information necessary to dismantle their networks. (Neither condition appears to be being met.) The 2007 aid request includes no increase in assistance to Colombia, which means little new money for the paramilitary process. And no demobilization money is in yesterday’s supplemental request.
With only a trickle of U.S. money forthcoming, Colombia will have to look elsewhere to pay for a demobilization and reintegration process that is appearing to be ever more expensive. Nobody really knows how expensive, but here is a back-of-the-envelope estimate that probably misses much:
- Income support, job training, psychological counseling and other aid to demobilized individuals: perhaps $8,000 each for 26,000 people = $208 million
- Disarmament, background checks, legal processes, monitoring and location of arms caches, investigation into asset holdings, and verification to ensure that individuals remain outside of paramilitarism: $2,000 each for 26,000 people = $52 million
- Reparations to victims who come forward, in excess of whatever assets are recovered: $1,000 each to 500,000 people or more = $500 million or more
- Providing security in zones previously dominated by paramilitaries: add 10 percent to Colombia’s defense budget, $400 million x 2 years = $800 million
This gives a very rough, very preliminary, very conservative total of $1.56 billion, $260 million without reparations and security. Obviously, $20 million per year from the U.S. government hardly makes a dent.
Does the U.S. human rights community get the blame for the lack of U.S. funding for the paramilitary process? Only to the extent that we have raised strong concerns about the process (and the UN has been at least as effective in expressing the same concerns). More credit goes to the Uribe government for passing a “Justice and Peace law” that displeases even many conservative U.S. legislators. Most were unenthusiastic about giving leniency to people who may even now be sending tons of drugs to our shores, while depriving Colombian authorities of the tools needed to guarantee that paramilitary criminal networks are disappearing.
As a result, the Bush administration did not push hard to get Congress to be generous. Nor is it responding to President Uribe’s appeals in Washington this week.
The outcome is that Colombia will have to pay most of the demobilization and reintegration costs itself, by collecting more resources from its wealthiest citizens. They can bear these costs by organizing a well-planned, well-financed program of job creation, asset seizure and reparations (and soon – time is running out). Or, they can bear these costs by seeing investors scared away, local economies depressed, and the judicial system overwhelmed by tens of thousands of unemployed, low-skilled young men experienced in the use of violence – as well as their impoverished, embittered victims.
Posted by isacson at 04:31 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
February 14, 2006
Manual eradication in parks: set up to fail?
Years of U.S.-supported aerial herbicide fumigation have caused thousands of Colombian coca-growing peasants, presented with no viable legal alternatives, to plant coca in Colombia’s national park system. More than 10,000 hectares of coca are now planted in national parks, out of approximately 80,000-115,000 hectares planted nationwide. While fumigation is currently prohibited in parks, Colombians have been debating whether to expand the spraying of “Round-Up” into these natural reserves.
Those who are horrified by this idea cite the potential damage that the glyphosate-based herbicide could do to fragile ecosystems. They point out that fumigation elsewhere has caused a huge increase in “attempted” coca-growing – the area sprayed plus the area left over – which means that hundreds of thousands of additional acres of forest, much of it in parks, could disappear.
On the other side of the debate is the U.S. government, which spends nearly $200 million each year on the spray program (the cost of contractor pilots and mechanics, plane maintenance, herbicides, and protection provided by Colombian national police and army anti-narcotics units), and doesn’t want to see any Colombian territory declared off-limits to spraying. Most officials in the Uribe government want to spray the parks, though those in charge of environmental protection are objecting. Colombian environmental experts and activists, as well as several influential columnists in the national media (most notably El Tiempo pundit Daniel Samper) have vocally opposed any Roundup in the parks.
Opponents of fumigation insist on manual eradication – sending in people to pull the plants out of the ground, as is done in Peru and Bolivia. This is slower and more dangerous than spraying from overhead. On the other hand, it doesn’t involve chemicals, it actually removes the plants for good, and – if done right – it puts the government on the ground, in contact with forgotten, isolated segments of a population that it’s supposed to be governing.
In 2005, the Colombian government dramatically expanded manual eradication in Colombia; the president’s “Advisor for Social Action” (which is also in charge of alternative development and aid to the displaced) deployed nearly 2,000 eradicators who pulled up more than 31,000 hectares of coca. (A hectare is 2.5 acres.) This was nearly triple the 11,000 hectares manually eradicated the year before. Meanwhile, nearly 140,000 more hectares were sprayed last year.
Most of this manual eradication went on without incident. This changed on December 28, when FARC guerrillas killed twenty-nine Colombian soldiers guarding the perimeter while eradicators destroyed coca in the Macarena National Park.
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 (Photos from El Tiempo; maps from www.invias.gov.co) |
By all accounts Macarena, in western Meta department, is a strikingly beautiful place, a standalone ridge of mountains in the middle of otherwise flat jungle. Though it is only about 170 miles south of (and a very long day’s drive from) Bogotá, it is a park that few Colombians have seen. La Macarena and its environs have long been a FARC stronghold. It was part of the despeje zone that President Andrés Pastrana temporarily ceded to the guerrillas so that peace talks could take place. Today, La Macarena is a key battleground in “Plan Patriota,” the Colombian government’s two-year-old, U.S.-backed military offensive to “re-take” the FARC’s longtime jungle rearguard.
Two years into Plan Patriota, however, El Tiempo estimates that between 500 and 700 guerrillas remain in La Macarena and its vicinity. The authorities contend that the park contains over 4,500 hectares of coca crops, scattered in innumerable small plots throughout a total area of 630,000 hectares.
President Uribe could have reacted to the FARC’s December 28 attack by halting the manual eradication effort in La Macarena and sending in the spray planes for their first use in a park. This would have been a politically unpopular step to take in the midst of a re-election campaign, however, and his opponents would have made much of it. Instead, Uribe ordered a manual-eradication offensive of unprecedented proportions.
Operation “Colombia Verde” (Green Colombia) was launched on January 20, with the participation of 930 hired coca-eradicators, protected by 1,500 police and some military elements, along with a huge logistical effort to keep everyone fed, sheltered and transported. President Uribe helicoptered into Macarena to launch the effort; he pulled up 40 coca plants himself in front of the cameras.
Sending 900 civilians into a FARC-controlled park is dangerous, even with police protection. But for President Uribe, it’s a win-win proposition. If the eradicators manage to destroy 4,500 hectares of coca, then they’ve disrupted an income stream for the FARC and shown that the government can stop illegal coca-growing in parks. On the other hand, if they fail in the face of guerrilla violence and logistical snafus, then Uribe can cite this experience as proof that fumigation is the only answer for the national parks. The U.S. government – which has indicated no enthusiasm for Operation “Colombia Verde” – would likely be pleased with the latter outcome.
If the goal were to prove that manual eradication in parks can work, then one would have expected to see an all-out security effort, ensuring that eradicators could do their job without risk of exposure to guerrilla attack. We have not seen such an effort. While the deployment of up to 1,500 police agents is a good step, there has been much less involvement from the army, which is in fact trained to confront guerrillas, and already has a strong presence in the Plan Patriota zone.
In particular, why did Operation “Colombia Verde” begin without protection from elements of the Colombian Army’s 2,300-man Counter-Narcotics Brigade, which was created at much U.S. government expense when Plan Colombia began in 2000? An elite mobile unit with three battalions and access to lots of helicopters, the Brigade’s original purpose, in the words of Clinton administration State Department official Thomas Pickering, was to “accompany and back up police eradication and interdiction efforts” and to “provide secure conditions for the implementation of aid programs, including alternative development and relocation assistance.”
One of the Counter-Narcotics Brigade’s most basic purposes is to create security conditions for eradication. Normally, this unit coordinates closely with the fumigation program, ensuring that there are fewer guerrillas or paramilitaries on the ground to shoot at the spray planes. (When the brigade has failed to coordinate well with the spray program, as in the Catatumbo region in 2003, planes have been shot down.) Improving security conditions for Operation “Colombia Verde” appears to be an ideal mission for the Counter-Narcotics Brigade. Why, after spending so much money on this Brigade (with so few results from fumigation), was it not sent immediately to La Macarena? Did the U.S. government object, perhaps?
With insufficient security, this operation in the FARC’s backyard has run up against fierce guerrilla resistance. In its first two weeks, security forces faced eight guerrilla attacks. Six police were killed in a firefight on February 6. Three soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb on February 8. The eradicators must work with extreme caution, since the fields are planted not just with coca, but with land mines. The FARC have further complicated efforts by declaring an “armed stoppage,” prohibiting road traffic, throughout the nearby municipality (county) of Macarena.
The number of eradicators in the zone has dropped rapidly, from 930 at the beginning to only about 310 today. Fear of guerrilla attack is one reason, but the Colombian media have also reported extensively on the workers’ complaints about poor conditions. They cannot listen to radios or smoke at night, in order to avoid revealing their positions to guerrillas. They have faced chronic shortages of food and other supplies. Payments have been delivered very late, if at all.
The eradication operation is hanging by a thread. Nearly a month after its start, only 400 hectares of coca, less than 10 percent of the total, have been pulled up. The operation’s timeframe has been extended from 3 to 6 months. President Uribe is now promising housing subsidies for those eradicators who stick it out.
This experience so far raises many questions. Here are five:
1. Was the Macarena eradication project programmed to fail, in order to provide a rationale for fumigation in parks? “I suspect that the program is a smokescreen to justify herbicide fumigation,” a “local official” in Macarena said to the Associated Press last week. Indeed, the inadequacy of the security provided – especially the absence of the Counter-Narcotics Brigade – arouses suspicions that not all has been done to ensure the operation’s success.
On the other hand, this operation has received a lot of high-profile support from President Uribe, and if it fails due to poor execution it might reflect badly on him, in the middle of an election campaign. It’s also possible that the Uribe government – believing that Plan Patriota has hit the guerrillas harder than it has – simply underestimated the security risk in the zone.
2. Does the FARC prefer that the Colombian government spray? Spraying often has only a short-term impact on coca cultivation. Colombian Counter-Narcotics Police chief Col. Henry Gamboa recently told Cali’s El País, “What happens is that each hectare of coca has a productive potential of four harvests per year [some say up to six]. That is, when we spray we are only eliminating one harvest.” Manual eradication, on the other hand, is permanent: it removes the coca plants completely, and the growers must start over with seedlings. Manual eradication may be slow and labor-intensive, but it likely does much more to disrupt the FARC’s income stream.
Plus, unlike fumigation, manual eradication involves a long-term presence of government security forces (and, hopefully, civilian government representatives) on the ground. The government is placed in contact with population – often for the first time – in a previously abandoned zone that the guerrillas have become accustomed to controlling.
For these reasons, manual eradication may in fact hurt the guerrillas much more than fumigation. By responding aggressively to Operation “Colombia Verde” and perhaps inviting fumigation in the park, then, the FARC could be acting very much in its own interest.
3. Is the U.S. Government – which wants badly to fumigate everywhere – quietly opposed to Uribe’s manual eradication offensive in La Macarena? It could be that U.S. support is simply invisible, but there have been no celebratory announcements from the U.S. embassy, and no sign of U.S. officials accompanying President Uribe on his trips to the zone. Is Colombia on its own here? Has the U.S. embassy decided not to lend Operation “Colombia Verde” its resources and logistical expertise?
4. Won’t fumigation cause even more parkland to be destroyed for further coca-growing? Visit this page from the State Department’s last annual “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.” Scroll down to the Colombia drug statistics table (or search for the words “Colombia Statistics”). Note that the amount of coca estimated in Colombia (“Potential Harvest”) has shrunk slightly from 122,500 hectares in 1999 to 113,850 in 2003 (it was 114,000 in 2004). However, note that the total amount of coca planted in Colombia (“Estimated Cultivation”) has exploded, from 167,746 hectares in 1999 to 246,667 hectares in 2003 (and a similar amount in 2004). That’s a four-year increase in “attempted” coca growing of 47 percent!
The conclusion is that vastly increased fumigation is not dissuading Colombia’s economically desperate coca-growers. Instead, it’s leading them to grow more coca. This means they are cutting down more forest, moving into new areas, and polluting more ecosystems. If eradication fails to come with economic alternatives – and if the Colombian government still cannot control its nature reserves – won’t coca growers, following the same pattern, simply respond by destroying more parkland?
5. Most importantly, what about the approximately 11,000 impoverished human beings who live in the Macarena park? The conditions of the park’s colonos are an old problem, as columnist and author Alfredo Molano wrote in last Sunday’s El Espectador. “Twenty-five years go, the colonos of La Macarena marched to San José del Guaviare to demand an effective and permanent solution to their problems: land titles, credit, roads, health, access to markets. The government responded that as long as they occupied land inside the park, there would be no aid at all. Some protesters were wounded, and several were murdered afterward. There was no solution.”
Only a very desperate person would move himself and his family into a remote, guerrilla-controlled park, to grow or pick coca in primitive, off-the-grid conditions, often to be paid only in guerrilla scrip instead of real currency. A government that actually intended to govern areas like La Macarena – to truly wrest them from guerrilla control – would recognize this desperation and help those who live there to establish themselves in the legal economy.
That is not happening. While some wish to spray these people from overhead, never to be in contact with them at all, the reigning policy is to send teams of eradicators, accompanied by security forces, to destroy their illegal crops. No effort is being made to make these people true citizens of Colombia; in fact, the majority are abandoning the zone for economic or security reasons, adding themselves once again to Colombia’s population of over three million internally displaced people.
If the current plan seeks merely to forcibly eradicate and displace people – whether by coca-pullers or by spray planes – without asserting a real state presence or providing the most basic of services, it will fail miserably. There will still be plenty of coca in La Macarena a year for now. And there will still be plenty of guerrillas, too. As Cambio magazine columnist María Elvira Samper notes, “It is a temporary operation, and as a result the most likely outcome is that, once the coca is eradicated, the situation will go back to what it always was: the state absent and the FARC present.”
Posted by isacson at 02:24 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack
February 08, 2006
Aid to Latin America in the 2007 request
Here are a few quick observations on the Bush administration’s proposed aid to Latin America in 2007. Don’t expect too much detail because at this early stage, we only have information from one document: the State Department’s bare-bones summary of its “Function 150” (foreign affairs) request.
(If you’re interested, more detailed information will be available in about a week when the State Department issues its 1,000-page Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations; then in April, when the State Department’s narcotics bureau releases its own detailed budget justification; on April 15, when the Defense Department must submit a newly required report on its own counter-narcotics aid; and in April or May when the State and Defense Departments release a detailed report on foreign military training in 2005. Links to these and other reports will always be here.)
1. Aid to Colombia will be largely unchanged in 2007, as expected. We estimate that Colombia would get about $724 million under the Bush administration’s plan for 2007. This would be about $17 million less than what Colombia received in 2006 – but since this is an estimate, we could be off by about that much. It is nonetheless safe to say that aid to Colombia is not growing.
The most notable things about the Colombia request are those that do not appear. Funding for the so-called “airbridge denial” program – the effort to interdict suspicious aircraft, which had been given its own budget line in the 2005 and 2006 requests – has been “zeroed out” for 2007, and probably lumped together with Colombia’s existing aid. Non-military aid money does not increase, which means that no big plans are afoot to fund paramilitaries’ demobilization and reintegration. President Uribe’s mid-2005 request for $150 million in additional aid for spray planes, helicopters and boats seems to have been all but forgotten.
2. Elsewhere in the Andes, the drug war is in full retreat. Colombia’s neighbors are to see a 23% cut in their “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” aid, both military and economic, from 2005 levels:
Andean Counterdrug Initiative aid to Colombia’s neighbors (millions of $)
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| 2005 | 2006, estimate | 2007, request | Change 2005-2007 | |
| Bolivia military/police | 48,608 | 42,570 | 35,000 | -13,608 | -28% |
| Bolivia economic | 41,664 | 36,630 | 31,000 | -10,664 | -26% |
| Bolivia total | 90,272 | 79,200 | 66,000 | -24,272 | -27% |
| Brazil total | 8,928 | 5,940 | 4,000 | -4,928 | -55% |
| Ecuador military/police | 10,912 | 8,375 | 8,900 | -2,012 | -18% |
| Ecuador economic | 14,880 | 11,425 | 8,400 | -6,480 | -44% |
| Ecuador total | 25,792 | 19,800 | 17,300 | -8,492 | -33% |
| Panama total | 5,952 | 4,455 | 4,000 | -1,952 | -33% |
| Peru military/police | 61,504 | 58,410 | 56,000 | -5,504 | -9% |
| Peru economic | 53,866 | 48,510 | 42,500 | -11,366 | -21% |
| Peru total | 115,370 | 106,920 | 98,500 | -16,870 | -15% |
| Venezuela total | 2,976 | 2,229 | 1,000 | -1,976 | -66% |
| Total | 249,290 | 218,544 | 190,800 | -58,490 | -23% |
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative account is the main source of drug-war aid to Colombia’s neighbors. All of these countries have seen their counter-drug assistance rise steadily since the mid-1990s. It is remarkable, then, to see their aid levels decrease so rapidly.
The cut owes chiefly to the lack of money in the U.S. budget, as the federal deficit approaches 4 percent of GDP. However, some countries – including Colombia – have been saved from the ax because the Bush administration feels they are essential to the “war on terror” or other key interests. It speaks volumes that these countries’ importance to U.S. counter-narcotics efforts is not enough to save them from across-the-board cuts. The drug war – which wasn’t working anyway – is being put on the back burner.
Yesterday, Bolivia’s Evo Morales called on Washington to reconsider, saying “I want to ask publicly that the U.S. government revise its position and join together to try for zero drug trafficking.” It is not clear yet exactly which programs for Bolivia are to be cut, though eradication (which Morales opposes) and alternative development are good guesses.
Though Colombia is not increasing and the rest of the Andes is getting cut, the State Department will insist that the overall request for the Andean region remains almost unchanged. Indeed, they are seeking $721.5 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative in 2007, only $13 million less than what Congress appropriated for this account in 2006. But the State Department has chosen to cut aid to Colombia’s neighbors in order to make room for a $65.7 million “Critical Flight Safety Program.”
This program will pay for repairs to over 200 planes and helicopters that State’s anti-drug bureau uses for its operations, such as fumigation and transportation. It is not really aid to the Andes, since the State Department (with its contractors) owns and operates the planes. State had sought $40 million for the “Critical Flight Safety Program” in its 2006 request, but it was not popular in Congress. The Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee refused to fund it at all. (“The Committee provides no funding for the Critical Flight Safety Program,” reads its June 2005 report.) The full Congress ultimately recommended $30 million for 2006, which State plans to spend. But they want to more than double that amount in 2007, without increasing their overall request for the Andes. The result is seen in the cuts to Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru.
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative is not these countries’ only source of aid. However, nearly all of Colombia’s neighbors – Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela – are subject to a total cutoff in non-drug military aid because of the “American Servicemembers’ Protection Act.” This 2002 law cuts off much military and economic aid to countries that do not grant U.S. soldiers on their soil immunity from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. In all, at least twelve countries in Latin America currently have aid frozen for this reason.
3. Mexico is the latest country to have its non-drug military aid slashed by the “American Servicemembers’ Protection Act.” In 2006, Mexico was to receive $1.1 million in military-training funds through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, making it one of Latin America’s top six IMET recipients. For the first time, Mexico was also to get $2.5 million in 2006 military aid through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, which provides grants of weapons and equipment. But in October 2005, Mexico ratified the Rome Statute, making it a signatory to the International Criminal Court. So until Mexico grants immunity from the ICC to U.S. soldiers – which is hugely unlikely, given Mexican sensitivities about U.S. bullying – its IMET and FMF funds are frozen. Indeed, they are “zeroed out” in the 2007 request. Add this to a rapidly growing list of grievances currently roiling U.S.-Mexican relations.
4. The State Department isn’t even trying to get Foreign Military Financing for Guatemala this year. In its 2006 request, the State Department included $500,000 in FMF for Guatemala. This would have been the first time Guatemala had received military aid through this account since 1990, when it was cut off after Guatemalan troops killed a U.S. citizen. Congress shot down this request last year, however, citing the Guatemalan military’s lack of progress in complying with its commitments under the 1996 peace accords. This year, Guatemala does not appear in the 2007 FMF request.
5. Aid to Latin America through the three main traditional economic-aid accounts is to drop 17 percent from 2005 to 2007, from 555 million to 462 million. These economic-aid programs – Development Assistance (DA), Child Survival and Health (CSH), and Economic Support Funds (ESF) – are designed to help the poorest citizens of the poorest countries. (Colombia, for instance, is usually considered too high-income to receive DA, CSH or ESF.) But as the table below indicates, these programs are being slashed heavily as the Bush administration moves its priorities elsewhere.
Two big, new economic-aid programs do benefit four countries in the hemisphere: Haiti and Guyana are to get over $80 million in funding to fight HIV-AIDS, and Honduras and Nicaragua are receiving big multi-year economic-aid packages through the “Millennium Challenge” program, which offers assistance to poor countries that are at least minimally well-governed. However, note in the table below that Honduras and Nicaragua are to see deep cuts in their “traditional” economic aid in 2007, which will undercut much of what they gain from the new “Millennium Challenge” money.
Combined totals, DA / CSH / ESF (thousands of dollars)
| Country | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | Change 2005-2007 | |
| Dominican Republic | 23,447 | 21,766 | 29,347 | 5,900 | 25% |
| Brazil | 12,189 | 11,076 | 13,985 | 1,796 | 15% |
| Guyana | 3,572 | 3,960 | 4,000 | 428 | 12% |
| Guatemala | 28,087 | 26,194 | 31,353 | 3,266 | 12% |
| Paraguay | 7,907 | 9,249 | 8,236 | 329 | 4% |
| Cuba opposition | 8,928 | 10,890 | 9,000 | 72 | 1% |
| Bolivia | 32,617 | 32,510 | 30,689 | -1,928 | -6% |
| Peru | 30,002 | 26,618 | 25,736 | -4,266 | -14% |
| Haiti | 103,930 | 99,001 | 88,955 | -14,975 | -14% |
| Honduras | 34,048 | 31,964 | 25,460 | -8,588 | -25% |
| Ecuador | 18,510 | 9,548 | 13,644 | -4,866 | -26% |
| El Salvador | 34,230 | 30,655 | 24,905 | -9,325 | -27% |
| Mexico | 31,681 | 27,083 | 22,002 | -9,679 | -31% |
| Venezuela | 2,432 | 0 | 1,500 | -932 | -38% |
| Jamaica | 16,761 | 14,051 | 10,201 | -6,560 | -39% |
| Nicaragua | 38,228 | 31,908 | 22,657 | -15,571 | -41% |
| Panama | 8,101 | 5,325 | 3,180 | -4,921 | -61% |
| Regional programs | 120,216 | 124,253 | 97,130 | -23,086 | -19% |
| Total | 554,886 | 516,051 | 461,980 | -92,906 | -17% |
Posted by isacson at 03:05 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
February 04, 2006
A visit to Southern Command
I spent most of last week in Miami, where I paid a visit to Southern Command and some of a conference on security in the Americas, along with colleagues from several other NGOs. We discussed and debated topics ranging from Colombia to terrorism to "populism" to gangs to Guantánamo, and much else. There were strong disagreements and concerns, of course, but also some areas of agreement. I've posted my trip report as a sort of "encore post" to Democracy Arsenal. It discusses three new things I learned, three things we agreed on, three things on which we disagreed, and three things about which I'm not sure whether we agreed or not.
Posted by isacson at 11:42 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
January 28, 2006
Notes on a Senate staff trip to Colombia
Carl Meacham, a staffer for Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, paid a visit to Bogotá on December 11-14. A moderate Republican (one of a disappearing breed), Sen. Lugar has been generally supportive of Plan Colombia. However, he has been one of the U.S. Congress’ chief critics of the paramilitary demobilization process. As the chairman of the committee, he plays an important role.
Meacham’s report (big PDF file) is a worthwhile read. I disagree with his analysis of Plan Patriota’s “success” and his recommendations for continued aid in its present form. I also wish he had taken the time to meet with representatives of Colombia’s human rights community and with other centrist analysts who hold a less sanguine view of Colombia’s security situation (such as CERAC and the Security and Democracy Foundation).
Nonetheless, the report differs strongly from the reigning view that everything is going wonderfully in Colombia. And it does contain some information that I hadn’t heard before, or at least hadn’t seen in writing before.
For example, the Colombian government has submitted a draft request for a five-year aid package to succeed Plan Colombia, from 2006-2010. The request was turned over to the State Department back on September 23, and the Uribe government calls it “Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase (PCCP).”
Though the U.S. Congress hasn’t been given a look at it yet, the draft document apparently includes four “pillars.”
The PCCP envisages four programmatic pillars that roughly correspond to the areas the USG supported through Plan Colombia (Pillars I-III), with the addition of the peace process (including demobilization and reintegration) as pillar IV. These pillars are:
- Fight Against Terrorism, Narcotics Trafficking, and International Organized Crime
- Strengthening Governmental Institutions and the Justice System
- Economics and Social Revitalization
- Process for Peace and Re-Integration
Meacham doesn’t recommend buying into the whole five-year “Plan Colombia II.” Instead, he recommends going one year at a time while keeping a close eye on Colombia and its neighbors.
In order to remain flexible, staff strongly recommends that USG [U.S. Government] support for Plan Colombia be extended on a year to year basis. … Policies toward the GOC [Government of Colombia] must be continually evaluated, given very fluid circumstances inside Colombia and its neighboring countries.
“Failure to address Congress’ concerns,” Meacham adds, “could weaken support for future extensions of Plan Colombia in the U.S. Congress.”
The report expresses disappointment in the lack of progress Plan Colombia has made against drugs and paramilitaries, given the size of U.S. investment.
The lack of reliable evidence of well-documented progress in the war against drugs and neutralizing paramilitaries is disappointing considering the billions of dollars the U.S. Congress has appropriated to finance drug interdiction and eradication since 2000.
Meacham sees a lack of consensus on whether drug supplies have been affected at all by Plan Colombia. While the Drug Czar’s office is claiming success, he notes, a recent report [PDF format] by the Congress’s independent Government Accountability Office casts doubt on the reliability of their measurements.
[S]ome Colombian officials have cautioned that while the statistics presented by the UN and White House are encouraging, more time is needed to determine if current efforts will yield real progress. They refer, for instance, to the impact of possible drug warehousing in Venezuela and Mexico on price and supply. However, given the absence of a consensus from respected organizations on the success of Plan Colombia in stemming the flow of cocaine to the United States, this does not bode well for efforts to push for its extension, at least at its current funding levels, without policy changes.
The report includes the following two maps, produced by the Southern Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force in Key West. The first shows the paths of suspected drug-smuggling boats detected during 2005. The second shows the paths of suspected drug-smuggling aircraft detected during 2005.
While the first shows most boats leaving Colombia, the second, surprisingly, shows most planes leaving Venezuela. Also surprisingly, both show no boats and very few planes landing in Cuba – Castro’s island appears here as an impenetrable barrier blocking drug smugglers’ progress toward the United States.
The report makes clear that Sen. Lugar continues to maintain a critical posture toward the paramilitary negotiations and demobilization. It notes that “the Uribe administration’s own study on demobilization, prepared two years ago, concluded that paramilitaries are responsible for at least 40 percent of the cocaine trafficking in Colombia.”
It makes clear that Colombia’s so-called “Justice and Peace Law,” passed in mid-2005 to govern paramilitary demobilizations, is inadequate and will allow paramilitary leaders to continue to enjoy great power as mafia-style bosses.
Staff’s opinion is that the law will be ineffective because it relies on the AUC’s willingness to co-operate in the implementation of its own demise. In addition the GOC has not built a strong framework for the law’s implementation. … Under the law there is a very real possibility that Commanders convicted of atrocities will receive very short sentences, even if it becomes clear that they have lied to prosecutors, kept most of their illegal assets, drug labs and wealth, or continued to engage in illegal paramilitary activity after they have ‘‘demobilized.’’ When these leaders re-enter society, their wealth, political power, and criminal networks will have remained intact, allowing them to replace their weapons and troops with ease if they choose, or form their own laundered and ‘‘legitimate’’ narco-gangs.
Meacham also worries that the “Justice and Peace Law” will make it impossible to extradite paramilitary drug traffickers to the United States.
[O]f particular concern to the United States under the new ‘‘Peace and Justice Law’’ is its ambiguity regarding the extradition of paramilitary commanders who have been indicted in the United States. It appears they can escape extradition by serving reduced sentences for their crimes in Colombia and then claim double jeopardy.
The committee report recommends that strong conditions be applied to any future aid for the paramilitary demobilization process.
The report expresses a surprising level of optimism about the progress of “Plan Patriota,” the Uribe government’s mostly military effort to re-take guerrilla-held territory with tens of thousands of troops and much U.S. aid. It reproduces a series of statistics about the offensive’s results (guerrillas killed, arms recovered, FARC encampments found) that the State Department has obtained from Colombia’s Defense Ministry.
According to the report, “The Colombian military claims that Plan Patriota has reduced the FARC ranks from 18,000 to 12,000 in the past year.” The past year? In September 2004 – fifteen months before Meacham’s visit – Gen. Carlos Ospina, the head of Colombia’s armed forces, cited the same statistic to me in answer to a question at a Georgetown University conference.
The report does include some new information (new to me at least) about “Plan Patriota.” For instance, a third phase of the military offensive (technically, a “Phase 2C”) is soon to be launched in Colombia’s populous department of Antioquia, whose capital is Medellín.
Plan Patriota, the GOC’s military campaign to extend government control and security presence throughout the national territory, is composed of two major phases: Phase 1, the planning and preparation for the forceful removal of armed groups; and Phase 2, which was divided into three components: 2A, 2B, and 2C, to implement Phase 2. Phase 2A, which took place from June to December 2003, resulted in the removal of the FARC from Bogotá and Cundinamarca Department. Phase 2B, which began in February 2004 and continues, includes Meta, Caqueta, and Guaviare Departments, involved the removal of the FARC from those areas. This is a large part of the area that comprised the “despeje,” or the area President Pastrana had conceded to the FARC. Phase 2C, which is the forceful removal of FARC from Antioquia Department, was scheduled to begin late in 2005, but has been postponed.
CIP has frequently criticized “Plan Patriota” for relying so heavily on military force, failing to address neglected regions’ extreme poverty or to establish a presence of the rest of the government. Meacham’s report discusses efforts so far to address non-military needs in the “Plan Patriota” zone through a so-called “Center for Coordinated Integral Action,” a military-led plan to bring in social services and civilian government institutions.
In addition, with support from the U.S. Military Group (MILGRP), the Colombia Government formed an interagency center to facilitate social services in seven areas that have traditionally suffered from little state presence and pressure from illegal armed groups. The “Center for Coordinated Integral Action” focuses on providing immediate social services, including documentation and medical clinics, and establishing longer term projects, such as economic reactivation. Approximately 40,000 individuals have been enrolled in state health care, judges, investigators, and public defenders have been placed in all 16 municipalities of the Plan Patriota area, and a public library was recently opened in the town of San Vicente del Caguan.
With the “Center for Coordinated Integral Action,” the planners of “Plan Patriota” at least acknowledge the need for non-military investment in the “re-taken” zone. But Meacham’s report does not give us a sense of the effort’s scale. Where statistics are elsewhere in evidence, we don’t know how many medical clinics or documentation projects have been established, much less how many exist outside of the “Plan Patriota” zone’s largest towns. Enrolling 40,000 individuals in health care is important, but over 1 million people live in the “Plan Patriota” zone, and there is a difference between enrolling people in the system and actually providing doctors, hospitals, medicines and access to care.
Meanwhile, a public library in San Vicente is great, but it really only benefits the people who live very close to the town center. I’ve been to San Vicente and can attest that the surrounding roads are so lunar-surface poor that those who live even 15 miles from the town would have to drive for an hour, in a four-wheel-drive vehicle, just to take out a book.
Posted by isacson at 11:05 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
January 18, 2006
Did Plan Colombia work? A look at the numbers
In another guest-post to Democracy Arsenal, I commemorate the 6th anniversary of Bill Clinton's introduction of the "Plan Colombia" aid package. Perhaps too predictably, the article finds that "the results of U.S. aid to Colombia have been remarkably disappointing."
But "rather than explain why with an exhaustive, point-by-point disquisition," the post borrows heavily from the Harper's Index, with 69 different arguments in numerical form. Draw your own conclusion.
Posted by isacson at 04:59 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
January 17, 2006
The Kent memo and oversight of the DEA
Narconews.com is an informative website that performs a very aggressive brand of investigative journalism. Their radical politics and their willingness to take risks can put them on the leading edge of important stories, though at other times it can lead them down a blind alley. (Would-be blockbusters that went nowhere include the 1,100 U.S. Marines allegedly inserted in southern Colombia three years ago, or the U.S. contractors in Peru being paid to kill guerrillas crossing the border from Colombia.)
This time, though, Narconews may be on to something big. Reporter Bill Conroy has obtained a December 2004 Justice Department memo alleging massive, murderous corruption in the Bogotá office of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and a cover-up by DEA and Justice Department internal-affairs officials. The memo is written by Thomas M. Kent, an attorney in the wiretap unit of the Justice Department’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs Section (DEA is part of the Justice Department). It makes four allegations that are summarized here as briefly as possible. (For more detail, see the memo itself [PDF format] or – with more context – Conroy’s piece.)
First allegation: informants from the drug underworld who had begun cooperating with the DEA in Florida alleged that DEA agents in Bogotá were helping them with drug shipments. Specifically, the Bogotá agents were providing them with information about U.S. and Colombian law enforcement operations. The informants were even able to provide Florida agents with confidential reports that the Bogotá DEA agents had given them. One Bogotá agent was put on administrative leave. During that time, an informant was killed as he left a meeting with DEA agents in Bogotá. Other informants who worked with the Florida DEA were also murdered. “Each murder was preceded by a request for their identity by an agent in Bogotá.”
Second allegation: informants were to bring a sample of cocaine infused in acrylic plastic from Colombia, in order to show DEA chemists in Florida how the cocaine could be extracted. This was agreed with the Bogotá DEA office. But when the informants ended up being arrested in the Bogotá airport, the Bogotá DEA told the Colombian authorities to “lock them up and throw away the key.” The informants spent nine months in jail before it was determined that the Bogotá agents were lying. After his release, one of the informants was kidnapped and murdered in Bogotá.
Third allegation: Bogotá agents “identified as corrupt” by the first two allegations repeatedly frustrated contact between the Florida DEA and an informant who claimed that he (a) had been approached by the FARC to provide communications equipment and (b) had information about weapons-grade nuclear material for sale in Spain. Finally it was agreed that the informant would provide the FARC with communications equipment that the U.S. government could intercept. Wiretaps appeared to reveal that several DEA agents based in Bogotá and perhaps Washington were on the payroll of narcotraffickers. The informant was intimidated by an anonymous fax of a document identifying him as a DEA informer on the FARC.
Fourth allegation: an internal investigation into money-laundering by corrupt agents was shut down under unclear circumstances. “The same agent connected to the murders of the informants described in the first allegation then began to call my case agent to learn the identity of his informants.”
The problem continues today, Kent indicates. “One of the corrupt agents from Bogotá, who was central to the second and third allegations, was recently intercepted over a wiretap. … [I]n it he discusses his involvement in laundering money for the AUC. That call has been documented by the DEA and that agent is now in charge of numerous narcotics and money laundering investigations.”
The Narconews allegations, which Conroy writes were corroborated with unnamed law-enforcement officials, are starting to find their way into more mainstream media. The Miami Herald’s Gerardo Reyes got a former DEA official – albeit one who has a grievance against the agency – to go on record.
Sandalio González, former deputy director of the DEA in Miami and former chief of the agency’s El Paso bureau, told El Nuevo Herald the memo is accurate and reflects the state of moral decay of some departments in the agency. “The information contained in the memo is accurate as far as I know, because I was involved in some of those cases,” said González, who is suing the DEA for discrimination. “The DEA is unable to police itself.”
Semana, Colombia’s most-circulated newsmagazine, put the story on its cover. It added two more allegations of DEA corruption in Colombia.
In 1999, during Operation Millennium, one of the largest antinarcotics operations in the history of the drug war, some DEA agents and Colombian investigators who carried out a series of recordings in the office of drug lord Alejandro Bernal Madrigal, alias “Juvenal,” documented … a conversation with several of his partners, in which the capo told them that DEA agent Richard Meyer had given him a million dollars to leave him alone. “The recording with the drug lord’s statements launched an internal investigation in the DEA, but nothing happened. In order to avoid problems, the only thing they did was transfer the agent. When ‘Juvenal’ was extradited to the United States and began to collaborate with U.S. justice, they made him retract those statements,” one of the officials who participated in Operation Millennium with the DEA told Semana….
One of the most common complaints has to do with what some call “the extradition business.” This basically means that when a narcotrafficker is arrested and is going to be extradited, he receives a visit in prison from a DEA agent. “What he does is tell the narco: your situation is very difficult and in the United States many years in jail await you. Then the agent tells the narco that he knows a very good lawyer who could help him to negotiate. These lawyers are called ‘fixers.’ The agent puts the narco in contact with the lawyer, and the lawyer gives a percentage of what he charges his client to the DEA agent,” says the official, who knows several of these cases closely and who works with the DEA in Colombia.
A Justice Department official told the Associated Press that further investigation into Kent’s allegations “found no wrongdoing.” That should not be enough to stop reporters from asking many more questions, nor should it stop Congress from performing its oversight role, including requesting access to some of the extensive evidence to which Kent’s memo refers.
Whether these allegations are just the tip of the iceberg or an exaggeration of a smaller problem, one thing is clear: oversight of the DEA is atrociously bad. While it’s easy to appreciate why its agents need to operate in secrecy, somebody has to be minding the store. Secrecy without accountability leads too easily to situations like the one the Kent memo describes.
DEA’s internal-affairs office, or Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), appears to be dysfunctional. “When confronted with the allegations,” Kent writes, “the investigators at OPR treated the reporting agents as if they had a disease and did not want to have anything to do with them or the evidence they amassed.”
The internal-affairs structure at the Justice Department (which includes DEA) also appears to be unable to do its job. Kent’s memo states that an investigator at the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector-General “was advised up front that the allegations would make his career, but the process of holding those responsible accountable may destroy his career. … He was recently removed from the investigation for reasons that still remain a mystery.”
Outside the executive branch, things aren’t much better. Congress goes years at a time without holding hearings on the DEA’s performance, and oversight staff rarely ask tough questions. Reporters rarely look into DEA’s operations, and even when they attempt to do so they find it difficult to get information out of the agency. The experience of CIP and other NGOs seeking to monitor DEA’s relationship with Latin America’s security forces has been similarly frustrating. (A common joke is that DEA stands for “Don’t Even Ask.”)
Congratulations to Narconews for breaking this story. While we hope that the mainstream media follows this lead and investigate it further, we especially urge Congress to do its job and find out what is really happening at DEA. Legislative staff need to be asking questions and holding hearings to determine whether criminal behavior and a cover-up have been undermining the Bogotá office’s work, and whether people whose salaries are paid by U.S. taxpayers are perversely helping to bring drugs to the United States, with impunity.
Posted by isacson at 02:41 AM | Comments (16) | TrackBack
January 11, 2006
The Latin Americanist's lament
Over the next ten days or so, I'll be dividing my blogging time between "Plan Colombia and Beyond" and a more generalist (and highly recommended) foreign policy blog, the Security and Peace Initiative's "Democracy Arsenal," where I'm filling in as a guest contributor. When I post there and not here, I'll put a link from this site to that one.
My inaugural post to that blog notes that a frustration of being a Latin Americanist "is watching the United States today repeating mistakes worldwide that it used to make only in Latin America." It's even got a multiple-choice quiz.
Posted by isacson at 10:17 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
January 09, 2006
U.S. aid to Colombia today: a quick walk-through
Right now, here are our best estimates of the aid Colombia has received from the United States since 2004. (For estimates going all the way back to 1997, visit this page.)
2004: $690.1 million ($555.1 million, or 80 percent, military and police aid; the rest economic and social aid).
2005, estimate: $774.6 million ($643.3 million, or 83 percent, military and police aid; the rest economic and social aid).
2006, request: $751.0 million ($612.5 million, or 82 percent, military and police aid; the rest economic and social aid).
The 2004 number is pretty solid. The 2005 number reflects what, as of several months ago, the U.S. government estimated it might spend; actual amounts for 2005 won’t be available for another month or so. The 2006 number reflects what the Bush administration asked Congress to fund for this year.
Where do these numbers come from? What do they pay for? Here, as briefly as possible, is a walk through U.S. aid to Colombia. We hope to provide a more detailed overview in February, after the Bush administration makes its 2007 request to Congress.
I. Military and police aid
(2004: $555.1 million / 2005 estimate: $643.3 million / 2006 request: $612.9 million)
I.A. Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)
(2004: $332.1 million / 2005 estimate: $336.1 million / 2006 request: $344.6 million)The biggest single source of funding for Colombia comes through the ACI, managed by the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, or INL. (The INL bureau is now headed by Assistant Secretary of State Anne Patterson, a former U.S. ambassador to Colombia.) It is the only program in the U.S. budget that can pay for both military and economic aid, ranging from crop eradication to drug interdiction to alternative-development programs to demobilizing combatants, among others. (For ACI economic-aid amounts, see II.A. below.)
INL’s budget funds aid to many countries worldwide, especially Afghanistan. In 2001, however – after Plan Colombia’s passage – the State Department chose to request aid to Colombia and six of its Andean neighbors as a separate account: the ACI. The message to Congress, essentially, was “the Andes are a priority region for us, do not cut this aid.” For 2006, Congress has approved $734.5 million for the ACI; most of this military and economic aid (we estimate $483.1 million) will go to Colombia, the rest will go to Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Brazil, and (to a lesser extent) Venezuela. Some explanation of what ACI pays for is available in the annual INL Congressional Budget Justification documents.
Though ACI is a counter-drug funding account, the law since 2002 has allowed counter-drug funds to pay for Colombia’s fight against guerrilla (and presumably paramilitary) groups. For the most part, though, ACI aid is still mainly counter-drug aid.
It pays for the aerial herbicide fumigation program – the upkeep of aircraft, the contractor pilots, mechanics, logistics and search-and-rescue personnel, the cost of Colombian police involvement (including police helicopters that escort the spray planes), and the herbicides themselves. It pays for much of the Colombian military’s aerial interdiction or “Air Bridge Denial” program (that is, detecting and forcing down aircraft suspected of carrying drugs). It also funds much of the cost of efforts to stop drugs being smuggled on river and roads. Each year, $200 million or more of ACI aid to Colombia’s military and police goes simply to "aviation": maintaining all of the planes and helicopters that Colombia has been given over the past several years. (Recall that it costs nearly $3,000 to operate a Black Hawk helicopter for one hour.)
- ACI military aid (2004: $159.4 million / 2005 estimate: $144.5 million / 2006 request: $152.8 million). Most ACI aid to Colombia’s armed forces pays for the Colombian Army’s Aviation Brigade, which manages and flies all of the planes and helicopters used by all of the army’s other units. Smaller amounts support the 2,000-man Counter-Drug Brigade that was initially formed with Plan Colombia funds, the “Air Bridge Denial” program, and naval drug interdiction (mainly in the ocean, since river interdiction is funded elsewhere). A small amount pays for “institutional reform for the Ministry of Defense.”
- ACI police aid (2004: $173.2 million / 2005 estimate: $191.6 million / 2006 request: $191.9 million). The fumigation program makes up the bulk of ACI police aid – in 2005, $82.5 million was to go to “support for eradication,” and much of the $70 million “aviation support” category was to maintain police aircraft involved somehow in the fumigation effort. (An additional cost of fumigation comes from the operations of military units, such as the Counter-Drug Brigade mentioned in the previous paragraph, which secure conditions on the ground before spraying begins.) Much of this aid in fact goes straight to private contractors – pilots, mechanics and the like – who are “supporting” the police-led fumigation effort. Other police aid paid for river and road drug interdiction, bomb squad units, and support for the Uribe government’s effort to station police in zones with little or no police presence.
ACI military aid pays for much training; in 2004, it paid for 903 out of the 8,801 Colombians trained by the U.S. military. (To find out what courses were offered and what units were trained by this or any other program, visit the website of the State and Defense Department’s Foreign Military Training Report, choose a year, click on “Country Training Activities” and click on “Western Hemisphere” to download a big PDF file.)
Twenty-five percent of ACI military (not police) aid ($38.2 million in 2006) is frozen until the State Department certifies that Colombia is properly investigating and punishing military human-rights violations and paramilitary collaboration. Eighty percent of funding for herbicides is frozen until the State Department certifies that fumigation “does not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment,” people are being compensated for damage to legal crops, and alternative-development opportunities exist in spraying zones.
I.B. Defense Department counter-drug aid (“Section 1004”)
(2004: $122.0 million / 2005 estimate: $200.0 million / 2006 request: unknown; average of previous two years is $161.0 million)The second-largest source of military-aid funds to Colombia cannot be found in foreign-aid legislation, and is not overseen by the State Department. Since 1991 the law has allowed the Defense Department to use its $400 billion-plus budget to provide its own military and police aid for counter-drug purposes. The 1991 law in question was Section 1004 of that year’s Defense Authorization bill, as a result, the Pentagon’s anti-drug aid is generally referred to by the rather innocuous-sounding name “Section 1004.”
“Section 1004” cannot pay for helicopters, weapons or, in general, other items that can kill people. It can pay for training, however – and the Defense Department's counter-drug aid is now by far the number-one source of funding for training of Colombian military and police personnel (it paid for 6,472 of Colombia’s 8,801 trainees in 2004).
It also pays for “establishment and operation of bases of operation;” maintenance, repair or upgrading of equipment; intelligence and “aerial and ground reconnaissance.” Since 1998, a similar Defense Department provision (known as “Section 1033”) has allowed the Pentagon to help Colombia interdict drugs on rivers, providing boats, training, and helping to build bases. And since 2002, all of this aid may be used not just to fight drugs, but to fight guerrillas and paramilitaries.
“Section 1004” funded much of the creation of the Colombian Army’s Counter-Drug Brigade. It is very likely that this account has since helped the Colombian military to create new mobile and Special Forces brigades throughout the country, as well as to upgrade some of its facilities. The three U.S. contractors who have been FARC hostages since 2003 were likely on a Section 1004-funded aerial reconnaissance mission.
Because it is in the Defense budget, this aid is not subject to the human-rights and other conditions that apply to programs in the foreign aid budget. For instance, none of this military aid is “frozen” pending a State Department human-rights certification. (The Defense budget does have a version of the so-called “Leahy Law” that cuts aid to military units that violate human rights with impunity, but the provision is significantly weaker than the Leahy Law in the foreign aid bill.)
It is difficult to get detailed information about what “Section 1004” aid pays for in Colombia. Most years, the law has required no public reporting or reporting to Congress. As a result, in some years it has been very difficult for us to get a decent estimate even of the overall amount of aid Colombia has received.
It follows that this is the part of our aid estimate in which we have the least confidence. The $200 million figure we cite for 2005 comes from the Congressional Research Service (PDF format), whose researcher was only able to obtain it in a phone conversation with a Defense Department counter-narcotics official. Thankfully, we should be able to get a more solid dollar figure for 2005, and perhaps more detail, by April 15 of this year. Congress wisely approved a new reporting requirement for “Section 1004” aid in its 2006 Defense Authorization bill (section 1021 of H.R. 1815, which President Bush just signed into law).
I.C. Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
(2004: $98.5 million / 2005 estimate: $99.2 million / 2006 request: $90.0 million)Let’s leave the defense budget and move back to the foreign aid process, in which programs are managed by the State Department and congressional oversight is more thorough. After the ACI, the foreign aid bill's second-largest source of military aid is Foreign Military Financing.
FMF is the largest military-aid program in U.S. law. It can buy weapons or defense services for any purpose – it’s not limited to counter-narcotics, for instance. It was used heavily in Central America twenty years ago, and most of it goes to the Middle East today.
Colombia got almost no FMF during the 1990s, when the focus of U.S. aid was counter-drugs only. That changed in 2003, after the Bush administration asked for (and received) a big package of FMF to help the Colombian military protect the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline in the northeastern department of Arauca. FMF paid for helicopters and other equipment, weapons, training and improvement of facilities, among other things, for Colombian military and police units in Arauca, especially the army’s 18th Brigade. (See the recent report on this program [PDF format] by the Government Accountability Office, or GAO, of the U.S. Congress.)
Today, FMF is the main source of aid specifically for the Colombian military’s fight against armed groups, supporting many specialized and mobile units with training, parts, and equipment like weapons and night-vision goggles. It funds a host of initiatives, from medical evacuation, improved logistics, boats and aircraft for the navy and air force, and above all, support for “Plan Patriota,” the Uribe government’s effort to re-take guerrilla-held territory by military force. FMF probably does not pay for any police aid.
FMF generally does not pay for training; in 2004, it funded only 58 Colombian trainees. Twenty-five percent of FMF military aid, about $22.5 million in 2006, is frozen until the State Department certifies that Colombia is properly investigating and punishing military human-rights violations and paramilitary collaboration.
I.D. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (NADR/ATA)
(2004: $0 / 2005 estimate: $3.9 million / 2006 request: $3.9 million)Though one might expect a program called “Anti-Terrorism Assistance” to be one of the biggest accounts in the entire foreign aid budget, it is actually a rather small program that mainly provides training and minor equipment. It is a subset of the State Department’s Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funding account. In Colombia, it has chiefly paid for an “anti-kidnapping initiative.” According to the 2006 Foreign Assistance Budget Justification [PDF format], this has meant giving “tactical and investigative training and equipment to the Colombian Government's military and police anti-kidnapping units (Unified Action Groups for Personal Liberty-Spanish acronym ‘GAULA’.)” Twenty-five percent of ATA military aid (not police aid) is subject to human-rights conditions; this amount, however, is probably quite small, less than half a million dollars.
I.E. International Military Education and Training (IMET)
(2004: $1.7 million / 2005 estimate: $1.7 million / 2006 request: $1.7 million)IMET is the main military-training program in the foreign aid budget. Like FMF, ACI and ATA, it is overseen by the State Department. For the most part, it pays for training in non-drug subjects. It is usually the main source of funding, for instance, for students at the successor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. IMET paid for the training of 704 Colombians in 2004. Twenty-five percent of any IMET for the Colombian military is subject to human-rights certification.
I.F. Smaller programs
(2004: $0.8 million / 2005 estimate: $2.4 million / 2006 request: $2.3 million)Smaller amounts of aid sometimes trickle through the following accounts.
In foreign aid legislation and overseen by the State Department:
- Excess Defense Articles (EDA): Transfers of equipment and weapons considered to be “surplus” or excess.
- Emergency Drawdowns: Presidential authority to take non-excess defense articles from existing stocks and give them to other countries to address a “counter-narcotics emergency.” This authority has not been used since 1999.
- Small Arms / Light Weapons (NADR/SALW): Grants to assist in halting trafficking in small arms.
In the Defense Department’s budget:
- Counter-Terror Fellowship Program (CTFP): sort of a Pentagon clone of IMET, for counter-terror purposes. Established in 2002, the CTFP funded the training of 542 Colombians in 2004.
- Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS): Grants for education in defense management at a Defense-Department school in Washington. Many of the 30-70 Colombian students each year are civilians.
II. Economic and social aid
(2004: $135.0 million / 2005 estimate: $131.3 million / 2006 request: $138.5 million)
II.A.Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)
(2004: $135.0 million / 2005 estimate: $131.3 million / 2006 request: $138.5 million)The largest source of military aid to Colombia also accounts for nearly all economic aid to Colombia. Colombia is considered too “wealthy” for the development programs that USAID normally administers (compared to Nicaragua, Bolivia or Haiti, it is wealthy). As a result, funding for priorities like alternative development, aid to displaced people, judicial reform and human rights goes to the State Department’s narcotics bureau, which then passes much of it on to USAID. This arrangement has been the source of endless bureaucratic battles, which Congress has sought to address by requiring that a minimum of ACI money go straight to USAID.
The aid that goes to USAID is divided into three categories. See USAID’s 2006 Budget Justification for more detail about what these categories pay for.
- Support for Democracy (2004: $24.0 million / 2005 estimate: $22.0 million / 2006 request: $19.0 million). This category includes improving the efficiency of Colombia’s justice system ($4.8 million in 2005); human rights, including the government’s early-warning system ($6.9 million); anti-corruption and democratic institutions ($4.1 million); and strengthening political parties ($0.5 million).
This is also where aid to peace processes would be funded – including support for the paramilitary talks. USAID had planned to spend $5.8 million on this priority in 2005, and $6 million in 2006. This would mainly be funding for the OAS verification mission and Colombian government logistical costs (such as aid to units of the attorney-general’s office and Interior Ministry). The most controversial part of funding for the AUC process - aid to demobilized combatants – would come from the “support for vulnerable groups” category below.
- Alternative Development (2004: $59.8 million / 2005 estimate: $70.7 million / 2006 request: $83.3 million). Subcategories here include “Strengthen National and Local Economic Institutions” ($0.6 million in 2005); “Expand and Improve Rural Economic and Social Infrastructure” ($8.9 million); “Support Democratic Local Government and Decentralization” ($6.6 million); “Develop and Expand Economic and Social Alternatives” ($42.6 million); “Improve Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Environment” ($7.5 million); and administrative costs.
- Support for Vulnerable Groups and Internally Displaced Persons (2004: $42.6 million / 2005 estimate: $32.0 million / 2006 request: $22.5 million). This includes funds for emergency humanitarian assistance, help with income-generating projects, “strengthening strengthening the institutional capacity of Colombian organizations that benefit IDPs,” assistance for child combatants, and – probably – some assistance to adult ex-combatants. $5 million of the amount for 2004 was a grant to the State Department’s Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) program, which runs a parallel effort to provide emergency aid to displaced Colombians.
Congress has allowed USAID to spend up to $20 million to support the paramilitary process, including a portion for the demobilization of former AUC members. That portion would be funded through the “Vulnerable Groups” category. Congress did not, however, appropriate any new money for this priority. If the State Department and USAID want to spend the full $20 million – and the Uribe government is strongly urging them to do so – they will have to find that money elsewhere in the budget. Most of the “Democracy” and “Vulnerable Groups” categories are already committed to other priorities in Colombia. No decision has yet been made about where to find any additional funds for paramilitary demobilizations.Through the ACI, the State Department's Narcotics Bureau also manages a few non-military aid programs under the category of "Promote the Rule of Law." These include prison security, judicial reform, reduction of Colombia's domestic drug demand, a "culture of lawfulness program," and a very small amount ($363,000 expected in 2006) for a "reinsertion program for armed groups."
II.B. Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
This State Department bureau manages a program, with funds in the foreign aid bill, to provide emergency assistance to refugees and displaced persons. MRA spends more than $20 million per year in the Western Hemisphere, including Colombia, its neighbors, Central America, Haiti and UNHCR and Red Cross activities region-wide.
That’s it. It all adds up to an aid package that places Colombia fifth in the world – behind Iraq, Israel, Afghanistan, and Egypt – in both military/police aid and overall aid. Four of every five dollars goes to Colombia’s security forces, and counter-drug programs still account for most of it.
Every U.S. government source we’ve consulted says not to expect any radical departure from this pattern when the Bush administration issues its 2007 foreign aid request to Congress during the first week of February. We'll keep you posted.
Posted by isacson at 07:52 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
January 06, 2006
Where is Washington's counter-offer?
Bolivia’s president-elect, Evo Morales, paid a visit to Venezuela on Tuesday, as part of a “world tour” prior to his late January inauguration. There, he met with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and with Ollanta Humala, a populist who holds a slim lead in polls for Peru’s April presidential elections. Chávez celebrated the formation of what he called a new “axis of good” in Latin America, and Morales said he and Chávez were uniting in “a fight against neoliberalism and imperialism.”
The Bolivian president-elect did not leave empty-handed. In a signed agreement, Chávez committed Venezuela to providing Bolivia with the following:
- An immediate $30 million donation to pay for social programs.
- According to Bolivia’s La Razón newspaper, “Venezuela will supply all of the fuel that the Bolivian population consumes, which has an approximate cost of $150 million per year, in exchange for food produced in Bolivia.”
- Technical assistance for gas and oil exploration, and assistance in overhauling Bolivia’s energy sector.
- A commitment to help Bolivia build highways, both within the country and between Bolivia and its neighbors.
- Educational assistance to Bolivia, including a literacy program with the goal of eradicating illiteracy within thirty months.
- Venezuelan assistance with land reform, agriculture and healthcare.
At a moment where most observers are wondering what kind of leftist Evo Morales is going to be – a Chávez or a Lula, to use the oversimplified terms used often here in Washington – this package of aid is likely to mean a big push in Venezuela’s direction.
What is the U.S. government doing to counteract this, to keep Morales and the MAS from abandoning the center, and to keep relations cordial and constructive? U.S. relations with Morales have traditionally been horrible, as one would expect relations to be between a coca-growers’ movement leader and the main promoter of forced coca eradication.
For now, U.S. officials are taking a “wait and see” attitude. “We'll see what kinds of policies President Morales pursues and, based on that, we'll see what kind of relationship the United States and Bolivia will have,” State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said on Tuesday. Before leaving for Venezuela, Morales and U.S. Ambassador David Greenlee even sat down for an hour for their first-ever conversation.
That’s nice, but when Chávez is promising Morales cash, social programs and fuel, what is the U.S. counter-offer?
Well, there is none. In fact, it’s worse. Here’s what the U.S. government has to offer Bolivia (and what it would have offered to any other Bolivian candidate, had he won).
- A projected $8.5 million, or 5 percent, cut in aid (military plus economic) from 2004 to 2006, from $157.8 million to $149.3 million.
- From that amount, a cutoff of at least $2.6 million in military aid and up to $8 million in economic aid per year, because Bolivia hasn’t granted U.S. military personnel on Bolivian soil immunity from the International Criminal Court.
- The risk of being de-certified, and having even more aid and credit cut off, if it is determined that Morales’ government is not sufficiently cooperating in the war on drugs. Not to mention a likely big fight over forced coca eradication, on which the U.S. government currently spends well over $11 million per year.
- A take-it-or-leave-it approach to a free-trade agreement, even though the U.S. terms would cause a severe shock to Bolivia’s agricultural sector.
- A dwindling likelihood that Bolivia will get aid through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), though Bolivia is among only four Latin American countries invited to submit proposals for assistance.
By the way, why didn’t Morales consider visiting the United States on his “world tour,” which includes Cuba, Venezuela, Spain, Belgium, South Africa, China and Brazil? “Mr Morales would have gone to Washington had he been invited,” a spokesman told the BBC. But no invitation has been issued.
If one were to design a policy deliberately aimed at pushing Morales away from the center-left and into Hugo Chávez’s warm embrace, it wouldn’t look much different from this one.
Posted by isacson at 05:50 PM | Comments (5) | TrackBack
January 05, 2006
"Clear and hold"
It was startling to hear President Bush prominently use the phrase “Clear, Hold and Build” several weeks ago, when he was presenting his National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. He was referring to their security objective of “clearing” a zone of insurgents through military force, “holding” onto the newly conquered zone, then bringing in the government to “build” a state presence.
I was startled because “clear and hold” is a bit of jargon I’ve heard repeatedly in discussions over the past few years with U.S. advisors and officials working in Colombia. They like to use the term to describe how they’re trying to help the Colombian government take back territory from guerrilla groups. In particular, it is the stated objective of “Plan Patriota,” an large-scale, two-year-old Colombian military offensive taking place, with heavy U.S. support, in the country’s southern jungles and elsewhere.
The reappearance of “clear and hold” in the Iraqi context is no coincidence. In recent interviews, the president and those close to him have let slip that they have been thinking about Colombia when thinking about Iraq. They may even be considering Colombia to be a model for the way forward in Iraq.
Sounds crazy? Here are two examples:
PRESIDENT BUSH (on the PBS NewsHour, December 16, 2005): We achieved a, by kicking Saddam Hussein out, you know, a milestone. But there's still work to help this country develop its own democracy and there's no question there's difficulties because of the past history and the fact that he starved an infrastructure and the reconstruction efforts have been uneven. … I'll give you an interesting example. I think it is. That would be the FARC in Colombia. You'll remember there was a period of time when there was a real battle about the heart and soul of Colombia. Slowly but surely FARC has become--
JIM LEHRER: That's the left-wing rebel group.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Right.
JIM LEHRER: Yeah.
PRESIDENT BUSH: That used profits from drug sales and arms to enforce its, enforce its way. That at one point in time, if I'm not mistaken, looked like the, the, the--democracy was in the balance. And slowly but surely they're becoming marginalized and becoming--now they're still dangerous, don't get me wrong, but they're not nearly as dangerous as they were a-- you know--a decade ago, for example.Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, interview with NBC Editorial Board, September 15, 2005: “[I]t took the Iraqis – they’re making some progress on the reconstruction front. They’re making quite a lot of progress in the building of their security forces. And they’re making real progress on the political front. And that’s how I would assess it. … There are other governments that have survived that and come out on top, among them the Colombian Government, as an example, which at one point, Colombia had 30 percent of its territory in FARC hands. One of the first things Uribe did was he said, I’m going to reestablish control over those areas that I don’t have control. And you remember, many of you who are foreign affairs reporters, you will remember that, what, Andrea, ten years ago, bombs went off in Bogotá every week.”
Statements like these always make my jaw drop. The disconnect with what is actually going on in Colombia is absolutely stunning. Not only do the guerrillas continue to roam freely over well over 30 percent of Colombia's territory, the FARC did not get weaker in 2005. In fact, the scale and frequency of its attacks increased as the year progressed.
“The guerrillas ended what had been a ‘tactical retreat’ over the past few years, and as of months ago they have begun a gradual counter-offensive that will probably increase over the next few months,” observes Alfredo Rangel of the widely cited Security and Democracy Foundation. The last two-and-a-half weeks have been particularly rough, as guerrillas killed dozens of soldiers and police in massive attacks in Chocó and Meta, then blew up eight oil wells and other energy infrastructure in Putumayo. Meanwhile, 2005 saw a sharp spike in the number of attacks on civilians by right-wing, pro-government paramilitaries.
We should be very worried about Colombia, not touting it as a model for, of all places, Iraq.
However, Colombia does carry several lessons for any U.S. effort to “clear, hold and build” in - then get out of - Iraq. But these lessons are quite different from those that the Bush administration seems to be learning.
All of the following quotes come from articles published since early December.
In both countries, repeated military offensives in the same zones fail to “secure” the zones.
Iraq:
- “Samarra, Fallouja, Mosul, Tal Afar, Qaim, Buhruz—how many times had I attended press briefings and heard Sunni rebel strongholds declared 'secured,' only to be contested again?” – Patrick J. McDonnell, reflecting on over two years of covering Iraq for the Los Angeles Times
- “In our last conversation, Augie complained that the cost in lives to clear insurgents was 'less and less worth it,' because Marines have to keep coming back to clear the same places. Marine commanders in the field say the same thing.” - Paul E. Schroeder, father of a Marine corporal killed in Iraq, in The Washington Post
Colombia:
- “[The FARC] take advantage of offensives launched against them, leaving small forces in the zones where they are attacked, while extending themselves into new zones. With particular skill, they wait until their enemy’s lines are stretched to the point where it is forced to station small or mid-size contingents, which they can then attack or overwhelm. They also benefit from the government’s failure to pay attention to the social and political aspects of its military campaigns.” – León Valencia, a columnist and former ELN guerrilla, writing in Medellín’s El Colombiano newspaper
- “Zones re-conquered by the security forces, like [the central province of] Cundinamarca, instead of seeing government control consolidated have seen some parts taken over by paramilitaries.” – Marta Ruiz, security editor of Semana magazine
In both countries, human rights abuses with impunity hurt the U.S. forces’, and U.S.-aided forces’, credibility.
Iraq:
- “In Jordan and Pakistan, Osama bin Laden is more popular than Bush. The graphic images and detailed stories of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib have done enormous damage to the credibility and soft power that we need to win this struggle. It does little good for Karen Hughes, the new undersecretary of state for public diplomacy, to tour the Muslim world with messages of goodwill if her administration threatens to veto a measure to prevent torture.” – Joseph Nye of Harvard University in The Chicago Tribune
- “People [in the new U.S.-trained Iraqi government forces] are doing the same as [in] Saddam's time and worse. It is an appropriate comparison. People are remembering the days of Saddam. These were the precise reasons that we fought Saddam and now we are seeing the same things.” – Ayad Allawi, former Iraqi prime minister in The Observer (UK)
Colombia:
- “[T]here was an increase in government killings of civilians in the first half of 2005. This trend, although from a very low level, is worrisome, and the government needs to study in detail where these are occurring and why.” - Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC), a Bogotá-based think-tank
- “Repression committed by the armed forces against the population increases the number of sympathizers to the guerrilla cause. The armed forces have done much to help the guerrillas fulfill this objective.” – Instituto de Pensamiento Liberal (the think-tank of Colombia’s Liberal Party)
In both countries, an insecure population remains highly distrustful of the U.S.-aided government.
Iraq:
- “Ferocious search-and-destroy sallies by the US Marines do not project power, only death and resentment.” – Simon Jenkins, The Times (UK)
- “To save their own skins, some Iraqis have even taken to selling the addresses of members of the new Iraqi security forces to terrorist death squads for a few dinars.” – a December Der Spiegel article reprinted on Salon.com
Colombia:
- “On multiple occasions [the communities of Chocó’s lower Atrato region] have stated that they are not inherently opposed to the presence of the armed forces. Nevertheless, they believe that in the current conditions of conflict, the presence of armed forces in their communities is counterproductive, among other reasons because of the lack of transparency shown by the Police, Army and Navy in Atrato, all of which have links to paramilitary groups, and because the very intervention by government forces often puts the majority of the local population in harms way.” - Ascoba - CINEP's Lower Atrato Team, in Plataforma Colombiana, Beyond the Spell
In both countries, the military campaign far outpaces any effort to improve the population’s economic well-being.
Iraq:
- “The United States will spend $437 million on border fortresses and guards, about $100 million more than the amount dedicated to roads, bridges and public buildings, including schools. Education programs have been allocated $99 million; the United States is spending $107 million to build a secure communications network for security forces.” – The Washington Post
Colombia:
- “President Álvaro Uribe told the country he would take on the problems of security and extreme poverty. His high approval ratings owe his efforts against the first of those problems. But his debt on the social front remains unpaid: his socio-economic performance has been poor, one might even say insignificant.” – Editorial in El Tiempo
- “It was supposed that a first phase of ‘Plan Patriota’ would involve the security forces’ arrival in all of the national territory. Afterward would come the consolidation phase, with the arrival of other state institutions, social investment and a promise of progress for the regions suffering the war. … But in many areas, the soldiers have been left all by themselves.” – Marta Ruiz, security editor, Semana
“Clear and hold” isn’t working, either in Colombia or in Iraq. U.S. and U.S.-aided forces have become quite skilled at clearing territory. But that's relatively easy because guerrilla groups, by their very nature, rarely confront a determined offensive directly – they melt away into the hinterland.
But in neither Colombia nor Iraq have we figured out the “hold” part of the strategy. Invariably, U.S. or U.S.-aided forces find themselves forced to carry out repeated offensives or sweeps into territory that they thought they had “cleared.” Insurgents, relying on a population that is afraid of them and distrustful of the government, have had no trouble re-establishing themselves in territories believed to be secured. U.S. and U.S.-aided forces find themselves on a treadmill, with territorial gains unraveled, populations less secure and ever less confident in the government, and casualties mounting.
What should a “hold” strategy look like, then, whether for Colombia, Iraq, or somewhere else? Here are a few suggestions, many of which I hope to develop further in future postings.
- Don’t consider your mission to be to defeat an insurgency. The mission is to protect citizens, and to expand the number of citizens who are credibly protected by their government.
- Protecting citizens means respecting their human rights. Respecting human rights means punishing abuses, when they happen, visibly and swiftly. It also means not treating the population, in day-to-day interactions, as potential adversaries.
- The government must have the monopoly of the use of pro-government force. Do not tolerate the formation of independent citizen militias or paramilitaries, no matter how pro-government they claim to be.
- If citizens believe you will protect them, they will trust you. If they trust you, they will give you intelligence willingly, without you having to bribe them with reward money.
- Body counts don’t matter, especially when so many of the dead are scared, uneducated young people (the FARC, for instance, are believed to be about one-third minors and 40 percent female). Winning public support matters much more than killing enemies or putting your flag in new territory.
- Protecting citizens requires more than just guns. It also means giving them the conditions necessary to stay healthy and make a living. Nothing wins loyalty like safe water, electricity, disease prevention and care for the sick, emergency food and shelter, civilian police that respond to calls for help, and a functioning judiciary to punish crimes and settle disputes.
- The military is only a small part of this strategy. Its role should be seen as opening the door for the civilian part of the government. Civilian government institutions have to be equipped to walk through that door. And that will cost several times more than the military part.
- Yes, this is “nation building.” That’s not a dirty word, it’s a necessity. Get used to it. Embrace it.
By now, you’d think the Bush administration and Colombia’s Uribe government would be vigorously searching for “hold” strategies that actually work. You’d think they’d be reorienting resources, making new investments, putting human rights at the center of things, and shaking up the bureaucracy in order to stop making the same mistakes over and over again.
Well, you’d be wrong.
As the Washington Post reported on Monday, the Bush administration does not plan to ask Congress for any more reconstruction aid for Iraq - from now on, it's all military. In Colombia, meanwhile, less than 20 percent of U.S. aid is non-military, and that is not likely to change in the 2007 aid request. The U.S. human-rights record in Iraq has been battered by everything from Abu Ghraib to the CIA torture debate, while the State Department has outraged human-rights groups by certifying that the Colombian military is respecting rights.
In both countries, then, we may be on the treadmill for some time to come.
Posted by isacson at 12:42 PM | Comments (5) | TrackBack
December 31, 2005
Out on a limb: 13 predictions for 2006
On this final day of 2005, here are thirteen things we expect to happen in Colombia in the next year. Most of these predictions are pretty safe, if not obvious. But not all of them. It will be interesting to look back on this post a few months from now to see which of these turned out be dead wrong.
1. Alvaro Uribe will win re-election in May, but by a surprisingly thin margin. As the 2003 referendum and municipal elections made clear, Uribe’s high standing in the polls doesn’t always carry all the way to the ballot box. Uribe has a few Achilles’ heels: stubbornly high underemployment and poverty; the highly questioned talks with paramilitaries; the sharp recent increase in FARC activity gnawing at his banner security policies. Plus, he faces strong opponents: a unified left, former Bogotá mayor Antanas Mockus, and a Liberal Party machine that still has some get-out-the-vote capability for its chosen candidate (who, unfortunately, might again be Horacio Serpa, Colombia’s Adlai Stevenson). Expect Uribe to win somewhere around 50 percent of the vote, not the 70-80 percent that his approval ratings might indicate. It’s even possible that Uribe might fail to win a majority in the first round of May’s elections.
2. The left will gain in March congressional elections. But the paramilitaries will gain more. With increased unity, organizational capability, public financing, and the tug of a Latin America-wide turn to the left, it’s reasonable to expect the Polo Democrático Alternativo, smaller left-of-center parties, and the social-democratic wing of the Liberal Party to gain seats, and to become a powerful minority opposition bloc in Colombia’s Congress. Likely gaining even more seats – often as candidates from traditional and pro-Uribe parties – will be candidates from parts of Colombia under near-total paramilitary domination, especially the north. In many cases, these new legislators will have won without any opposition, thanks to threats against would-be opponents, and with the clear backing of their regions’ warlords. After the 2002 elections, AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso famously told a reporter that the paramilitaries controlled 30 percent of the Congress. Though that number may have been high, it could very plausibly be met or exceeded next March.
3. The Bush Administration’s 2007 aid request to Congress will look a lot like the past several years’, but there will be no “Plan Colombia 2.” Don’t expect any announcements of ambitious five or six year plans to lavish Colombia with mostly military aid. The deficit is high, Iraq is expensive, Katrina carries a big price tag, and Colombia is getting very little attention in Washington. For now, U.S. assistance will be a year-to-year affair. With the policy on autopilot and Uribe requesting mainly military aid, the 2007 request to Congress will, once again, be something along the lines of $700-750 million in aid, with about $550-600 million of it military. There’s even a modest chance of a slim across-the-board decrease. Do not expect a significant rise in aid for paramilitary demobilizations, which the Bush administration claims to support but did not push hard for in Congress in 2005.
4. Official measures of 2005 coca-growing, usually released in March, will show some decline, unlike 2004. But much new cultivation will go undetected. The Bush administration was embarrassed to admit last March that record levels of fumigation failed to bring any decrease in Colombian coca-growing in 2004. Next year, expect a triumphant release of estimates of satellite data showing some (probably small) reduction in coca-growing in 2005. This may be possible not because of spraying, but because Colombian Police manual eradication of coca grew by more than ten times in 2005, to over 30,000 hectares. Overall coca/cocaine supplies will barely be affected, however, due to new, undetected planting in other parts of Colombia – deeper into the Amazon and Orinoco basins, the Pacific coast, and Meta and Casanare departments – and increases in Peru and Bolivia.
5. The first half of 2006 may be the bloodiest six-month period in Colombia so far this decade. 2005 saw more FARC activity than any other year of Álvaro Uribe’s presidency, and it appears to be growing more frequent. During the second half of December, we saw the FARC launch two large-scale attacks on military and police contingents in Chocó and Meta. The pace and scale of such attacks – likely to include some targeting civilians – may be sustained or even increase during the months of the election campaign, as the guerrillas seek to undermine President Uribe’s claims that his security policies have succeeded. Meanwhile, some elements of the paramilitaries are likely to continue the sharp increase in extrajudicial killings, many in violation of a declared cease-fire, that we witnessed in 2005. We may even see a return of paramilitary massacres, such as the one that took place in Curumaní, Cesar, in early December.
6. Guerrillas will re-take some formerly paramilitary-controlled rural areas. Urban areas will remain in the control of “demobilized” paramilitaries. In some rural zones, guerrillas may fill the “security vacuum” left by demobilizations of paramilitary groups. We are seeing signs that this is happening, for instance, in the countryside of northeastern Colombia’s Catatumbo region and Putumayo in Colombia’s far south. Even in these areas, however, the towns remain under the solid control of paramilitaries – whether active or supposedly demobilized. No matter what, there is little reason to expect that the Colombian government will be able to provide security in most of these zones.
7. The paramilitaries will not be fully demobilized by mid-February. It is hard to imagine that all remaining AUC members will have lain down their weapons six or seven weeks from now. Too many disagreements remain to be ironed out: the Justice and Peace Law’s operation in practice, the seizure of paramilitary leaders’ assets, the sad shape of programs for ex-combatants, the lack of security in zones where demobilizations are happening, disputes between paramilitary commanders, and of course extradition, among many others. Expect another delay in the process, which will not be helpful to Uribe’s re-election campaign.
8. “Jorge 40” will replace “Don Berna” as the biggest headache among paramilitary leaders. While Diego Murillo or “Don Berna” occupies a luxurious suite in the Itagüí prison just south of Medellín, he continues to cooperate with the Colombian government in the demobilization of his men. “Berna” also is widely believed to have ordered his followers in Medellín to abstain from committing violent crimes, which may be a big factor in the city’s sharply lower murder rate. “Berna” clearly hopes that government gratitude for his cooperation will result in lenient treatment and non-extradition, and is trying to keep his profile low while appearing to be a nice guy (see his Christmas message on the AUC website). By contrast, another paramilitary leader wanted by U.S. authorities for drug trafficking, Rodrigo Tovar or “Jorge 40,” has been much less interested in the success of the AUC’s negotiations with the government. “Jorge 40,” the powerful head of the AUC’s Northern Bloc, has demobilized few (if any) of his men and has reportedly been the most hostile and uncooperative AUC leader during recent talks. His men are killing civilians as frequently as ever, including this month’s massacre in Curumaní, Cesar.
9. Programs to reintegrate ex-combatants will be near collapse, if they do not implode entirely. These programs are woefully underfunded. They lack international support because few foreign donors believe that the Justice and Peace law can guarantee that ex-paramilitaries are truly ex-paramilitaries. They lack domestic support, as municipalities have rejected the opening of hostels for former combatants, and as the private sector has not rushed to hire them. The Uribe government’s practice of using ex-fighters as paid informants endangers all of them, since guerrillas and paramilitaries routinely kill anyone whom they believe to be a sapo or snitch. Reintegration programs (in Colombia, they usually use the harsher word “reinsertion”) are already in deep crisis, and no plan to address the situation appears to exist.
10. No human-rights case will result in the conviction of an officer over the rank of lieutenant. This prediction is based on the past few years’ experience, as trials drag on or never even start. The only thing that can prove it wrong would be a determined State Department effort to enforce human-rights conditions in U.S. foreign aid law.
11. Colombia’s economy will grow rapidly, but poverty will not decrease significantly, if at all. If you have money to invest in a high-risk emerging market, put it in Colombia’s stock exchange, which has performed very well the past few years. With security better in cities and along main roads, foreign direct investment has increased during the Uribe years as well. Like much of Latin America, Colombia experienced one of its highest GDP growth rates in years in 2005, and most economists expect the same to be the case in 2006. However, if you’re one of the 55-65 percent of Colombians who live in poverty, not only do you not have any money to invest, you’re unlikely to see much of Colombia’s new wealth trickle down to you. While Colombia’s official unemployment rate has decreased somewhat during the Uribe years, the situation is dire for those who lack skills necessary to compete in the global economy. Underemployment – the percentage of workers who do not have full-time jobs in the formal economy, and thus are probably not even earning minimum wage – has actually increased since 2004, from 31.8 to 32.6 percent of the workforce [MSWord format]. Add that to the 10 percent who are unemployed, and over 2 out of 5 Colombians who want a full-time job in the formal economy is unable to find one. And rural areas continue to be hardest-hit. This frustrating combination of macroeconomic growth combined with stubbornly high poverty is visible throughout much of Latin America, including Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, to the great benefit of populist politicians.
12. Colombia and the United States will sign a free-trade agreement, but 2006 will end without passage in the U.S. Congress. This agreement will not be signed immediately, since U.S. negotiators are taking a tough line and the Colombian government expects (a) better treatment, given its close relationship with Washington, and (b) more concessions to avoid shocks to the rural sector, in order to prevent increased coca and opium-poppy growing. But it will probably be signed sometime in 2006. However, the U.S. Congress will not act: 2006 is a legislative election year, and free-trade treaties are not usually popular with U.S. voters, who fear losing jobs to low-wage countries. Free-trade bills tend to get passed in odd-numbered years (e.g. NAFTA 1993, CAFTA 2005).
13. Colombia’s neighbors – not Colombia – will get more attention from the United States and the international community. Washington’s attention span is short, and for many policymakers Colombia – with its pro-U.S. president who insists that drug crops are being reduced and the war is being won – can safely be placed on the back burner. Compare that to Venezuela and Bolivia, which have elected leaders highly critical of the United States, or Peru, where populist candidate Ollanta Humala suddenly has a slim lead in the polls. In 2006, we may see these other Andean countries get more press coverage and appear more prominently in diplomats’ statements and congressional speeches.
And that’s it for 2005. Thank you for visiting this blog, and best wishes for a happy New Year.
Posted by isacson at 07:56 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
December 27, 2005
An ugly environmental law, with U.S.-aided lobbying
During the two weeks before Christmas, Colombia’s Congress quickly approved, and President Uribe signed, a very controversial “Forestry Law.” The bill, whose purpose is to regulate Colombia’s millions of acres of primary forests and timber plantations, looks like something Dick Cheney might have written.
“From a law whose purpose was to define rules and incentives for tree-planting, it has become a measure with a strong bias toward the timber industry,” reads an analysis from Bogotá’s University of the Andes and German development agencies. “It is not clear whether this is a forestry law or a clear-cutting regime.” Others are more blunt. In a December 15 editorial, El Tiempo said, “instead of a forestry law it simply seems like a timber-exploitation law.” Several Colombian environmental and ethnic organizations called it “a fatal blow to Colombia’s primary forests.” A December 20 article by Inter-Press Service – which appears to have done the only English-language reporting on the topic – cites environmentalists’ opinion that the law “will set the country back half a century in terms of conservation of forests.”
For explanations of some of the law’s more troubling provisions, let’s cite other sources.
El Tiempo, December 12 editorial: “The law creates the concept of ‘vuelo forestal,’ which separates the land from the trees and all else above ground level, opening the possibility for new forms of exploitation. It gives agronomists who are employed by the timber companies the power to ‘supervise’ the commercial harvesting of forests by the same companies. It has been said that the law opens the door to the forests’ exploitation by multinational companies.”
Inter-Press Service: “[F]orests that are collectively owned by indigenous and black communities, amounting to some 28 million hectares, will not be granted in concession to logging interests. But under the new law, the adjoining land, which according to former environment minister Manuel Rodríguez, president of the National Environmental Forum, ‘belongs to these communities as part of their cultural and historical space,’ can be granted in concession.”
El Tiempo columnist María Jimena Duzán: “The law is based not on an interest in preserving primary forests, as the ministers of agriculture and environment disingenuously affirm, but on regulating their exploitation, to the disadvantage of campesino, black and indigenous communities, who were never consulted. Not to mention the way this government reacted to an alert from the government Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo), which warned of the theft of lands that indigenous and black communities in Chocó [a department, or province, in northwestern Colombia] are suffering at the hands of paramilitaries and African palm companies. Instead of protecting these communities’ rights, the government chose to give a hand to the businessmen who are planting these [oil palm] crops.”
The law’s impact on forests traditionally owned by afro-Colombian and indigenous communities – a large percentage of the nation’s total – is a major concern. In most cases, these communities hold their lands in common. The national process of titling these properties began only recently. In zones like northern Chocó, the common landholdings of afro-Colombian communities, which have been in their possession for up to a century and a half, are being appropriated by paramilitaries (both active and “demobilized”). The paramilitaries, in tandem with private companies, are clear-cutting these areas and planting exotic African oil palms in their place. In Chocó, “the oil palm plantations expanded in the wake of the rifles,” said Father Napoleón García of the diocese of Quibdó, at a December 5 press conference commemorating the diocese’s receipt of Colombia’s 2005 National Peace Prize.
Due to opposition from many quarters – environmentalists, the government’s comptroller and internal-affairs office (Procuraduría), former ministers of the environment, and indigenous, afro-Colombian and campesino organizations – this law failed to pass during ten previous congressional sessions. This time, thanks a surprisingly strong push from top ministers in Álvaro Uribe’s government, the Forestry Law managed to squeak through. It passed Colombia’s lower house on December 13 with a bare quorum present, 92 out of 166 members. This vote occurred, according to El Tiempo, “without the congressmen who attended the session having seen the text they were to approve.”
What a shameful way to approve a law that could lead to massive, irresponsible, unsustainable exploitation of Colombia’s remaining forests.
But that’s not all. The U.S. government played a role too. It did so through its supposedly well well-intentioned economic aid programs to Colombia, managed by the U.S. Agency of International Development.
Within USAID’s outlay for “Alternative Development” is a sub-category called “Improve Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Environment” (US$7.5 million in 2006). Among other things, this pays for a program called “Colombia Forestal,” a sustainable forestry program run by USAID contractor Chemonics, Inc.
With USAID money, Chemonics lobbied Colombia’s Congress to draft and pass the Forestry Law. According to Inter-Press Service, “Former [Environment] minister [Manuel] Rodríguez said Chemonics brought experts ‘with close links’ to USAID to Colombia, who drafted parts of the new forestry bill ‘behind closed doors.’”
Colombian Congressman Pedro Arenas, a principal opponent of the law and a member of the legislative committee responsible for drafting it, wrote recently about one of Chemonics’ lobbying efforts: a congressional delegation to Chile and Bolivia. (Pedro Arenas’ recent decision not to run for re-election, due to paramilitary threats, is discussed in an earlier posting.)
A year ago, the Environment Minister organized a trip with the goal of giving the members of the congressional environment committees a first-hand look at how forestry laws work in Bolivia and Chile, and thus to gain support for the controversial bill nearing approval in the lower house. … Upon arrival in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, the congressmen were received by personnel from the multinacional Chemonics, a U.S. company that managed the rest of the trip. They paid per diems to the legislators and explained that they paid for the trip to help Colombia establish legal norms to allow it to take advantage of its immense forest resources. … They took us to visit a company called Parket, which left me with many questions. There I learned how Colombia’s Forestry Law might work. … This company pays the municipality of Concepción [Bolivia] one dollar for every hectare “utilized” in the area of the logging concession. This way, if in a year they “utilize” 1,000 hectares they only pay US$1,000. The “utilization” consists of felling and cutting valuable wood trees found in the area. A forestry engineer is in charge of ‘vigilance’ to guarantee that the management plan is respected, and he receives the title of ‘external auxiliary agent’ of the government, although his salary is paid by the multinational allowed to exploit the forest. … The logging company gets a profitable and easy way to make money, while the Bolivian government is left with only a few dollars per year, and the population with only a few jobs cutting down trees, driving trucks and working in sawmills, all of which Parket can pay for by selling a few sheets of hardwood flooring in Europe.
A source at Chemonics acknowledged to me that the company did indeed promote passage of Colombia’s Forestry Law. It did so because “seeking policy reform” is part of its contract with USAID. Since both USAID and the Uribe government supported the Forestry Law, this was the sort of “policy reform” that our economic-aid tax dollars ended up paying for.
We still support a strong increase in non-military aid for Colombia. But the Forestry Law experience makes clear that we urgently need to monitor more closely how this aid gets spent.
Posted by isacson at 08:07 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 19, 2005
Ambassador Wood is right
No, that’s not a typo. Friday saw a rare occasion in which the U.S. government publicly differed from President Uribe, and did the right thing.
In a speech before the Prosecutor General's Course on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, U.S. Ambassador William Wood brought up some concerns that have been important causes for U.S. and Colombian human rights groups.
Despite advances, the investigation and prosecution of past violations are still very show and complicated, while new violations continue to occur. For example, the kidnapping and murder of Afro-Colombian leader Orlando Valencia more than a month ago still has not been clarified.
Ambassador Wood also expressed important concern over the paramilitaries’ evident influence over next year’s elections (congressional in March, presidential in May) in much of the country.
Colombia still suffers from political violence and intimidation. This is not new, but it is serious. I recall the concern in the local and regional elections of 2003 at the number of unopposed candidates whose legitimate opponents had been corrupted, frightened away or, in some cases, murdered. There is wide concern that similar corrupt electoral practices may occur in the elections of 2006, notably by paramilitaries.
Last summer in the debate on the Justice and Peace Law, the embassy asked if an attempt to pervert the democratic process through corruption or intimidation by the paramilitaries would be deemed a fundamental violation and would remove all benefits. The negotiators on the law assured us that it would: we take them at their word. But we also want to make clear that we will urge the elimination of all benefits to any beneficiary under the Justice and Peace law who is involved directly or indirectly in corruption or intimidation in the elections.
Paramilitary influence over local politics and government is a big and increasing problem, despite the ongoing demobilizations that have dominated Colombia’s headlines. In a post last month, we discussed a congressman from the southern department of Guaviare who has been forced to withdraw his candidacy by paramilitary threats. Elsewhere in Colombia, particularly across the country’s northern tier, paramilitary dominance of politics is even stronger, and few candidates will be able to run for mayor, governor or congress without paramilitary approval.
One would expect the Uribe government, which is working so closely with the United States, to respond to the ambassador’s comments by recognizing that paramilitary power is a big potential problem, and by publicly committing to doing more to stop it (even if it has no real will to do so). That did not happen.
Instead, the Colombian government immediately released a curt three-sentence statement reminding Ambassador Wood that “the Colombian government does not accept foreign governments’ interference, even from the United States,” and that “Plan Colombia [that is, U.S. aid] cannot be used by the United States as an element of pressure over our country.”
Wrong answer! The problem of paramilitary power over the elections is very real, and Bogotá’s statement does nothing to reassure us that the Colombian government intends to do much to stop it. (Yes, Friday’s response to the ambassador includes a flat statement that armed groups’ involvement in politics is illegal, violating the “Justice and Peace” law that governs the paramilitary demobilizations. Yes, we know it’s illegal. But lots of illegal things happen in Colombia, with impunity, all the time.)
The real message this statement sends is: the Colombian government rarely disagrees publicly with Washington, but is willing to go to the mat where paramilitary influence is concerned. That is a terrible message to send – if anything, international pressure like Ambassador Wood’s statement should be seen as giving the government welcome leverage in the difficult task of reducing paramilitary power. The message is especially grim at the end of a week during which paramilitary leader Iván Roberto Duque called for the creation of two unelected seats in Colombia’s Congress for “former” paramilitaries.
Since this posting began with praise for Ambassador Wood and criticism of the Uribe government, let’s end on another unusual note: praise for Álvaro Uribe the candidate.
As Colombia’s election season has entered full swing, Uribe has managed to convince the ELN to begin peace talks in Cuba, and is at least offering to pull the military out of small areas in order to talk with the FARC about a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. (Yes, the FARC is unlikely to settle for less than a demilitarization of two entire municipalities, so those offers may go nowhere – though they at least give the appearance of government action and flexibility.)
Critics charge that these peace gestures are a cynical election-year ploy to silence critics who charge that Uribe is only interested in negotiating with the paramilitaries. Indeed, the recent peace push may owe much to electoral politics.
But even if it does, it’s still remarkable. Uribe was elected in 2002 as the pro-war candidate who rose to national prominence as one of the harshest critics of then-President Andrés Pastrana’s talks with the FARC. By agreeing to enter into talks with the ELN without a cease-fire in place, and by offering demilitarized zones (however small) to the FARC, the 2006 Uribe is making moves that would have been repugnant to the 2002 Uribe.
With his approval ratings over 70 percent, he could have chosen to run with a Karl Rove strategy of rallying his hard-line base, avoiding any moves to the center, and opting for confrontation over consensus. Instead, Uribe seems to be moving in an Ariel Sharon direction – making peace concessions that risk alienating his traditional hard-right constituency.
Even if it’s just an election-year stunt, Uribe’s gestures toward the guerrillas are significant because of that they signal about Colombia’s national mood. Whereas talk of negotiations would have been a recipe for electoral defeat in 2002, even Uribe feels a need to establish his bona fides as a peacemaker in 2006. And that alone is a good sign.
Posted by isacson at 08:57 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
December 15, 2005
"Erasing the Lines" - top ten lists
Together with the Latin America Working Group Ed Fund and the Washington Office on Latin Ameiica, we held a press conference this morning to launch our newest joint report on U.S. military assistance to Latin America. Entitled "Erasing the Lines," the report lays out eleven trends in the U.S.-Latin American military relationship this year. You can download it as a PDF here (and here in Spanish), or just read a 3-page executive summary PDF here (or here in Spanish).
Meanwhile, here is the text of a handout we prepared for today's event, which shows some interesting results from crunching the military and economic aid numbers for the region. Thanks to program intern Robin Rahe for adding most of these up.
Top Ten Lists
(From data compiled by the CIP-LAWGEF-WOLA “Just the Facts” project)
Western Hemisphere military and police aid recipients, 2004:
(millions of U.S. dollars)
| 1. Colombia | 555.07 |
| 2. Peru | 68.87 |
| 3. Mexico | 55.48 |
| 4. Bolivia | 55.07 |
| 5. Ecuador | 35.81 |
| 6. Brazil | 10.75 |
| 7. Panama | 8.78 |
| 8. El Salvador | 8.49 |
| 9. Honduras | 4.61 |
| 10. Dominican Republic | 4.14 |
Western Hemisphere economic aid recipients, 2004:
(millions of U.S. dollars)
| 1. Colombia | 134.98 |
| 2. Haiti | 131.58 |
| 3. Peru | 116.39 |
| 4. Bolivia | 102.72 |
| 5. Guatemala | 47.78 |
| 6. Honduras | 47.09 |
| 7. Nicaragua | 42.49 |
| 8. El Salvador | 37.09 |
| 9. Ecuador | 35.90 |
| 10. Dominican Republic | 31.00 |
Military and police aid per capita, 2004:
(U.S. dollars)
| 1. Colombia | 12.92 |
| 2. Bahamas | 9.17 |
| 3. Bolivia | 6.22 |
| 4. Belize | 3.15 |
| 5. Panama | 2.89 |
| 6. Ecuador | 2.68 |
| 7. Peru | 2.47 |
| 8. El Salvador | 1.27 |
| 9. Jamaica | 1.17 |
| 10. Honduras | 0.66 |
Economic aid per capita, 2004:
(U.S. dollars)
| 1. Haiti | 16.20 |
| 2. Guyana | 14.56 |
| 3. Bolivia | 11.59 |
| 4. Jamaica | 7.85 |
| 5. Honduras | 6.75 |
| 6. Belize | 5.78 |
| 7. El Salvador | 5.54 |
| 8. Peru | 4.17 |
| 9. Dominican Republic | 3.46 |
| 10. Guatemala | 3.26 |
Military and police trainees, 2004:
| 1. Colombia | 8,801 |
| 2. Bolivia | 1,975 |
| 3. Mexico | 892 |
| 4. Argentina | 679 |
| 5. El Salvador | 415 |
| 6. Peru | 402 |
| 7. Chile | 369 |
| 8. Honduras | 282 |
| 9. Paraguay | 237 |
| 10. Panama | 217 |
Military and police trainees as a percentage of total armed forces, 2004:
| 1. Bahamas | 7.9% |
| 2. Bolivia | 6.2% |
| 3. Colombia | 5.8% |
| 4. Trinidad and Tobago | 3.5% |
| 5. Honduras | 3.5% |
| 6. Belize | 3.4% |
| 7. Jamaica | 3.0% |
| 8. Guyana | 2.5% |
| 9. Suriname | 2.5% |
| 10. El Salvador | 2.4% |
Military and police aid from counter-drug accounts, 2004:
(millions of U.S. dollars)
| 1. Colombia | 454.12 |
| 2. Peru | 68.29 |
| 3. Mexico | 53.69 |
| 4. Bolivia | 50.06 |
| 5. Ecuador | 35.39 |
| 6. Brazil | 10.54 |
| 7. Panama | 6.04 |
| 8. Venezuela | 4.06 |
| 9. Haiti | 2.93 |
| 10. Guatemala | 2.82 |
Military and police aid from non-drug accounts, 2004:
(millions of U.S. dollars)
| 1. Colombia | 100.95 |
| 2. El Salvador | 6.63 |
| 3. Bolivia | 5.01 |
| 4. Honduras | 3.99 |
| 5. Dominican Republic | 3.53 |
| 6. Panama | 2.74 |
| 7. Nicaragua | 2.53 |
| 8. Mexico | 1.79 |
| 9. Argentina | 1.78 |
| 10. Jamaica | 1.53 |
Military and police aid as a proportion of national defense budget, 2004:
| 1. Bolivia | 5:12 |
| 2. Colombia | 1:6 |
| 3. Haiti | 11:78 |
| 4. Jamaica | 5:49 |
| 5. Peru | 1:12 |
| 6. Nicaragua | 6:73 |
| 7. Guyana | 7:90 |
| 8. Panama | 4:67 |
| 9. Ecuador | 4:73 |
| 10. El Salvador | 2:37 |
GDP divided by military and police aid, 2004:
| 1. Bolivia | 418 |
| 2. Colombia | 511 |
| 3. Ecuador | 1,380 |
| 4. Bahamas | 1,931 |
| 5. Belize | 2,063 |
| 6. Peru | 2,270 |
| 7. Panama | 2,390 |
| 8. Haiti | 3,323 |
| 9. Honduras | 4,236 |
| 10. Nicaragua | 4,668 |
GDP divided by economic aid, 2004:
| 1. Haiti | 93 |
| 2. Bolivia | 224 |
| 3. Guyana | 261 |
| 4. Nicaragua | 296 |
| 5. Honduras | 415 |
| 6. Jamaica | 522 |
| 7. El Salvador | 885 |
| 8. Belize | 1,124 |
| 9. Guatemala | 1,289 |
| 10. Peru | 1,343 |
Military and police aid divided by land area (square km), 2004:
(U.S. dollars)
| 1. Colombia | 487.37 |
| 2. El Salvador | 403.52 |
| 3. Jamaica | 289.42 |
| 4. Bahamas | 197.92 |
| 5. Haiti | 132.07 |
| 6. Ecuador | 126.29 |
| 7. Panama | 112.23 |
| 8. Trinidad and Tobago | 95.94 |
| 9. Dominican Republic | 84.98 |
| 10. Peru | 53.59 |
Posted by isacson at 02:33 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
November 29, 2005
SOA/WHINSEC and beyond
Many congratulations to School of the Americas Watch and the other organizers of the annual protest at Fort Benning ten days ago. A record number of people, 16,000 to 19,000, gathered to demand closure of the military-training institution that is now called the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC).
Those kinds of numbers are usually unthinkable for an activist cause that is specific to Latin America, especially at a time when the news is overwhelming us with horrific accounts of U.S.-sponsored torture, indefinite detentions, secret prisons, white phosphorus, and civilian casualties elsewhere in the world.
Perhaps, though, all the bad news from the Middle East and beyond is the reason why Fort Benning is becoming more of a destination than ever. After all, you can’t protest at the gates of Guantánamo, thanks to the Cuba travel ban. You can’t really get a big group to go to Baghdad to protest the Iraq war – despite what the White House says, it’s just not safe there. We don’t even know the locations of the former Soviet prisons where the CIA is practicing “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” so on-site protests are out of the question. Meanwhile, most Colombian military bases where aerial fumigation planes operate, or where units with troubled human-rights records are trained, take place in rather dangerous parts of the country.
A much more accessible symbol of all that is wrong with U.S. foreign policy can be found at Fort Benning, in Columbus, Georgia on the border with Alabama. The WHINSEC offers protesters a military institution designed specifically to assist the militaries of Latin America – of all institutions in that region’s fragile democracies, the one that least needs assistance. WHINSEC offers protesters a U.S. facility that has yet to make an effort to come to terms with its nasty cold-war past. WHINSEC offers protesters a place where the U.S. government has committed mistakes in Latin America that it is now repeating elsewhere in the world, such as strengthening friendly dictatorships, teaching illegal interrogation techniques, or cultivating closer relationships with military leaders than with civilian ones.
The protesters’ main demand is that the WHINSEC be closed. The Bush administration, and even many moderate Democrats, unsurprisingly refuse. They argue that the School of the Americas reformed itself when it became the WHINSEC, an institution dedicated, as its website reads, “to promoting peace, democratic values, and respect for human rights through inter-American cooperation.”
The resulting debate has hardly budged during the last few years. One side cites the school’s many evil graduates and questions the need to give special attention to Latin militaries. The other side insists that the past has been abandoned and that the school now inculcates respect for democracy by developing relationships with key officers. The arguments and demands seem to be frozen in time, like a bug trapped in amber.
This may not seem like a big problem now, since the number of marchers and activists is growing every year. But if it doesn’t change, it poses a long-term challenge. It is hard to harness activists’ energy when your demands and arguments – however justified – remain unchanged for decades (ask anyone who has worked to end the 45-year-old Cuba embargo). In order to become “unstuck,” the close-the-SOA movement will have to at least address – if not answer – a few key questions.
1. Should nearly all energies still be directed at an institution that is a shadow of its former self? Though the movement has not closed the SOA/WHINSEC, it has had remarkable success. Constant pressure and scrutiny have brought about much more than a name change. Most of the old SOA’s combat courses, and all interrogation or “foreign internal defense” courses, have been eliminated (or taught in other venues, such as by teams of Special Forces sent to the trainees’ countries). With a few notable exceptions, most of the curriculum is now made up of non-lethal classroom education. All training has a human-rights component, unlike what is taught in most other U.S. military institutions. Unlike most facilities where U.S. military training occurs, the WHINSEC opens its doors to inquisitive visitors and its staff responds promptly to requests for information about what happens there.
Years of pressure to close the school have led to a strange paradox. While WHINSEC still remains open for business, it is now more transparent to citizen oversight, less lethal in its course content, and more aware of human rights than any other U.S. military training effort in Latin America. If only the rest of the U.S. training program operated similarly.
Meanwhile, though it is still a significant destination for Latin American military trainees, the WHINSEC today is not the center of the action. Its 800 or so students are just over 5 percent of the 15,000 or so Latin American military and police personnel whom the United States trains every year. Today, there are even fewer students at WHINSEC – not because of pressure from peace activists, but because of legislation promoted by conservative U.S. members of Congress. The “American Servicemembers’ Protection Act” has cut non-drug military aid to eleven Latin American countries (soon to include a twelfth, Mexico) that refuse to exempt U.S. personnel on their soil from the jurisdiction of the new International Criminal Court. The result is a preponderance of students from countries whose aid is not frozen, such as Colombia, Panama, El Salvador and Chile.
If WHINSEC has become more benign and is no longer the “death star” of Latin American military training, will closing it make much difference? The close-the-school movement’s main legislative vehicle seems to be asking that same question.
The “Latin America Military Training Review Act of 2005” (H.R. 1217) would not in fact close WHINSEC for good. (This tactical shift may in fact be a bow to political reality in the hard-line 109th Congress.) It would suspend the school’s operations for two years while creating two bipartisan commissions. The first would evaluate the purpose of military training for Latin America in the 21st century. The second would be a “truth commission” of sorts, investigating and documenting the human-rights mistakes committed in the school’s past. If the commissions do not recommend that the WHINSEC be shuttered, it could re-open. Since it would force the U.S. military-training establishment to undergo two thorough internal reviews, one of the past and one for the future, the bill is very worthy of support and has well over 100 co-sponsors. It is likely, though, that if it became law, H.R. 1217 would end up calling for a series of reforms while neither closing WHINSEC nor limiting training of Latin American military personnel.
2. Is closing the WHINSEC the goal, or is the larger objective to stop all military training in Latin America (or worldwide)? That has never been clear, and in fact there is no consensus on this among those gathered at Fort Benning, who range from committed pacifists to plain old “liberals” outraged by the Bush foreign policy.
Either way, the idea of a cutoff in all military aid and training to Latin America is a very long-term goal. And it’s not necessarily desirable. The United States should be developing relationships with – and helping to strengthen – all institutions in democratic countries with whom it has good relations. That includes legislatures, courts, local governments, educators, central bankers – and also militaries and police.
Over the past century, though, a major failing of U.S. policy toward Latin America has been a neglect of civilian institutions and an overemphasis on relations with militaries. In the part of the world with the highest levels of inequality, the United States has routinely chosen to forge closest ties with governments’ repressive apparatus, the institution that has most threatened the work of would-be reformers in civil society.
Military cooperation has been so dominant, in fact, that the U.S. Army for more than half a century has maintained a special school just for Latin American military personnel. It is a shame that there is a school for Latin American militaries, but not one for Latin American judges or prosecutors (including those who have to investigate cases of military corruption or human-rights abuse), for Latin American congresspeople, for Latin American mayors and governors, for government health-care, education or social-service professionals, for energy, transportation or trade officials. Why is it that only the soldiers are elevated to this special counterpart status?
The U.S. government should treat Latin American militaries as only one of many institutions with which relationships should be developed and cultivated. The military should not be the main institution with which we interact, nor should it be the most important one. This means that there is simply no need to maintain a special school just for the region’s militaries.
On the other hand, since militaries are a part of the governments the United States works with, a total cutoff of military assistance is not appropriate (as long as the recipient country is democratic and does not systematically violate human rights). But this military aid should be reduced from today’s levels, it should be far less lethal than it is today, and it should be nowhere near as secretive as it is today. The military-to-military relationship should get far less emphasis than the relationship with civilian leaders.
3. If the WHINSEC did close, what would the next step be? It is reasonable to fear that if WHINSEC closed tomorrow, it wouldn’t make any difference for U.S. training of Latin American militaries. The numbers of trainees wouldn’t change, the course content wouldn’t change, and military-to-military relationships would remain paramount in too many countries. Only the location of the training would change. And Fort Benning would cease to be a destination and a symbol for a movement that has begun to take on a larger significance.
If WHINSEC did close, however, there would still be no shortage of targets for future protests.
- Of the 95 percent of Latin American military trainees who don’t attend the Institute, roughly more than half get trained in their own countries by teams of U.S. military instructors. But the rest attend about 100 military installations in the United States (including two that teach in Spanish: the Air Force’s Inter-American Air Forces Academy and the Navy’s Small Craft school). For an idea of where Latin American military and police students have taken courses lately, visit the government’s annual Foreign Military Training Report, click on a year, then “Country Training Activities,” then click on “Western Hemisphere.” The resulting big PDF file lists all training events in that year, and includes the training location in the table’s third column.
- There is no shortage of U.S. corporations that have profited from U.S. military aid to Latin America, such as contractors, arms manufacturers, or companies that have lobbied for military aid to help protect their investments in the region. Others have run into trouble for involvement in human-rights abuses, labor-rights violations, or environmental degradation.
- Various parts of the U.S. government are worthy of outrage for their systematic neglect of non-military priorities in Latin America. In particular, the Congress repeatedly appropriates money for WHINSEC and other institutions, but does not offer similar educational opportunities to civilians in Latin America’s governments and civil societies. The U.S. Agency for International Development, for its part, must be encouraged to stick up for itself and demand greater resources to shore up democratic institutions and civil society in the hemisphere.
To those who made the trip to Fort Benning this year: congratulations, and please, keep up the pressure. Your work is extremely important and it’s sending a message about the centrality of human rights, overcoming inequality, and demilitarizing the U.S. approach to the entire world, not just Latin America. But while keeping your eyes on one building at Fort Benning, it’s important to have at least the beginnings of a strategy for dealing with the much larger problem it symbolizes. Moving on to the next step can happen now. It’s not something to put off until after the school finally closes.
Posted by isacson at 11:31 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
November 27, 2005
Southern Colombia and Northern California
Steve Dudley has a decent piece in today's Miami Herald discussing the ongoing debate in Colombia about whether to expand the aerial fumigation program in the country's national park system. (In another post, this blog argued that spraying in Colombia's parks is a bad idea - not because of the potential harm that glyphosate might do, but because fumigation does not discourage coca growers: it has led them to cut down even more forest and attempt to plant even more coca.)
Juxtapose the Herald article with a short piece in today's Washington Post, which notes that the United States has the same problem:
California's national parks and forests have long been known as havens of wildlife and natural beauty. They are also, increasingly, the refuge of gun-toting drug cartels growing large tracts of marijuana. Authorities seized 1.1 million marijuana plants during this year's fall harvest, nearly twice as many as last year, itself a record. Almost three-quarters of the marijuana seized was grown on public land.
We can't help but note, however, that nobody is proposing to fumigate Sequoia National Park.
Posted by isacson at 11:21 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
November 17, 2005
Plan Colombia rolls cocaine prices back to 2004 levels. Hooray?
I was perplexed when I heard that Drug Czar John Walters, in a press conference this morning, had announced a 19 percent increase in U.S. street cocaine prices and a 15 percent decrease in cocaine purity between February and September 2005. How could that be true when so many other indicators – coca acreage, coca-base prices, size and frequency of illegal drug-smuggling shipments – appeared to indicate that cocaine supplies were not reducing? Could it be that we’ve missed something, and that the deeply flawed U.S. approach to drugs in Colombia is finally working?
That, of course, was the main argument behind today’s press conference. But the Drug Czar’s office thoroughly undermined its own argument when it distributed – and prominently displayed on its website – the following chart to back up its claim. Look at it closely for a moment.
The big achievement being trumpeted here is that cocaine price and purity levels (about $170/gram and 65%, respectively) have been pushed back to what they were in… early 2004. Early 2004? A year and a half ago? That wasn't exactly a golden age for drug supply reduction. And didn’t Plan Colombia start five years ago?
Holding a press conference to celebrate cocaine prices rising to 2004 levels reminds me of Lewis Black's comedy routine making fun of Bill Clinton's 1992 campaign boast that, as governor of Arkansas, he had moved the state's educational performance from 50th to 49th place in the United States. (Paraphrasing: "Wow. What's the miracle? Do they have pencils now?")
The chart raises another interesting question: what happened in 2004 to make price plummet and purity increase? (We didn’t know about that remarkable hiccup until today, since until now the last year for which official data were available was 2003.) Why does the chart begin in July 2003, when Plan Colombia started in 2000? Some journalists with whom I’ve spoken today say that the Drug Czar’s data actually show prices declining and purities rising since 2002.
Put in this broader context, the rise in prices since April 2005 looks like little more than a very partial correction to whatever happened in 2002-2004 to glut the market with cocaine. While we can’t discount the possibility that it is a new trend of cocaine scarcity, it’s at least as likely to be a normal fluctuation within the same “band” of prices and purities we’ve seen since before Plan Colombia. It’s possible, then, that the Drug Czar’s office is making too much out of just a few months of data.
With so much confusion and evident fluctuation in the data, it is far too early to judge whether this is a trend or just a hiccup – much less what is causing it. I can understand the political pressures that might be motivating the Drug Czar’s office to rush these numbers out, but should prices start to go down again, they will have some very serious explaining to do. (Just kidding – there won’t be any explaining, just a period of silence with no releases of new numbers, which will end the next time they can show another few months of price increases.)
P.S.: A more technical question. I have yet to learn why the price data presented today do not match what we have seen from the Drug Czar’s office before. Today’s chart starts with a sky-high estimate of $210 per gram of cocaine in mid-2003. This doesn’t correspond at all with the Drug Czar’s previously released historical cocaine-price figures, which the Washington Office on Latin America has done such a thorough job of compiling. Look at the table of official price estimates below, pasted from WOLA’s website (I used this table for the price data in Monday’s blog posting). According to WOLA, ONDCP estimated in June 2003 that a gram of cocaine was being sold for $106 – but the chart from today’s press conference has it at nearly twice as much. If I find a reason for this incredibly broad discrepancy, I will post it here.
Posted by isacson at 11:20 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
November 14, 2005
Drug Czar: fumigation opponents support narcoterrorists
While on a visit to Colombia last week, Drug Czar John Walters said that his office will soon announce data indicating that supplies of cocaine in the United States are going down. He did not indicate whether that means that prices have gone up and purities have dropped, or whether he is using some other measure.
This may be the case. The question will be: have prices risen above the levels they had attained in 1999, before Plan Colombia and massive aerial herbicide fumigation began? Or have we merely crawled back to where things stood when Plan Colombia started?
Here’s what I mean – the average price of a gram of cocaine on U.S. streets, according to figures compiled by the Drug Czar’s office (the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, or ONDCP), fell steadily from 1999 to 2003, even while fumigation was expanding rapidly. (Eradication presumably should make the product scarcer, and thus more expensive.)
Average price of a gram of cocaine in
1998: $132.09
1999: $135.51
2000: $161.28
2001: $168.39
2002: $124.54
2003: $106.54
That sharp drop in 2002 and 2003, quite frankly, doesn’t make sense. It’s never been clear why the price of cocaine might have dropped so sharply – to all-time record lows – in the midst of a stepped-up anti-drug effort. It’s reasonable to expect some correction in the market – a rise in price back to a level somewhere between 1999 ($135) 2000 ($160). If the Drug Czar’s figures do not show an increase beyond what we saw five or six years ago, then he has not proven that fumigation has had any effect on supply.
Drug Czar Walters said something else remarkable, though, that deserves comment. According to Agénce France Presse, while giving a joint press conference with Colombian Vice-President Francisco Santos, Walters offered a defense of the U.S. policy of fumigating hundreds of thousands of acres each year with herbicides sprayed from aircraft. “Round-Up” – the mixture of the herbicide glyphosate with other chemicals to make it adhere to leaves – “is the safest herbicide in use worldwide,” Walters said. He added:
There are two reasons why people are opposed to its use. First, because they are ignorant about this fact. The other reason why they say that glyphosate is dangerous is because they support terrorism and narcotraffickers.
Yes indeed: another gratuitious use of the terrorist threat to attack one's political enemies. It's not only offensive, it's getting boring. But wait - was Walters referring to people like us?
CIP Colombia Program staff have spent years following the research on the health and environmental effects of Round-Up, including several visits to areas where people have been sprayed. So we can’t be ignorant. That must make us, according to the U.S. Drug Czar, supporters of terrorism and narcotrafficking. Mr. Walters didn’t allow for any third choice.
If only the picture were as clear as the Drug Czar makes it out to be. Since the spring, U.S. officials have been pointing to a U.S.-funded study carried out by the OAS counter-drug agency, CICAD, which mostly gives the fumigation program a clean bill of health. Never mind that Colombia’s National University and others immediately came out with strong critiques of the OAS methodology. Never mind that other recent science points to glyphosate doing great harm to amphibians. The message from the White House is: if you don’t believe the CICAD findings, you’re either a dupe or a willing accomplice of narco-terrorists.
My own estimation? I’m no scientist, but I have traveled to several fumigated areas (in Guaviare, Putumayo and Nariño), I’ve talked to people who have been fumigated, leaders of the communities they belong to (both elected and religious), and local doctors and health officials. From that experience, I’m at least convinced that fumigation is giving people severe gastrointestinal, respiratory and skin-irritation illnesses that last for a week or two.
Another unscientific reason why I suspect there may be something to the locals’ health claims can be found in your neighborhood garden store. This is a scan of a label from a bottle of Roundup I bought at my neighborhood Home Depot back in 2003. (It did a great job killing weeds that had sprouted in between bricks near the roof of our very old Washington rowhouse.) Note the parts highlighted in yellow.
Wash hands thoroughly after handling? Keep people and pets out of the area until the spray has dried? These are not anything like the conditions under which small farmers and their homes are sprayed in Colombia, where the herbicide mixture is several times more potent than what you can buy in a U.S. retail store. The planes come, and you had better get out of the way, if you can. The parts about avoiding drift and keeping the spray from water are also interesting. Even the OAS-CICAD study cites harm done by spraying the herbicide over shallow standing water.
But don’t take our word against Drug Czar Walters’. Instead, read some of the many reports questioning the program’s health and environmental effects that have been produced over the last few years. A big sample of reports that can be found online is listed below.
If the Drug Czar’s best response to these experts is to dismiss them as narco-terrorist supporters, then he has lost the argument, by a landslide. Unfortunately there appears to be quite a time lag between losing the argument and actually seeing a change in policy.
- Latin America Working Group, “New Science on Roundup: Threats to Human Health and Wildlife,” by Rachel Massey, June 20, 2005
- Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense, “Critical Omissions in the CICAD Environmental and Health Assessment of the Aerial Eradication Program in Colombia,” June 2005
- National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, “Differential Effects of Glyphosate and Roundup on Human Placental Cells and Aromatase,” Environmental Health Perspectives Volume 113, Number 6, June 2005
- Transnational Institute, “A Few Comments about the OAS-CICAD Study of the Impact of Glyphosate used in the Eradication of Illicit Crops in Colombia,” by Ricardo Vargas, May 30, 2005.
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Instituto de Estudios Ambientales, “Observaciones al ‘Estudio de los efectos del programa de Erradicación de Cultivos Ilícitos mediante la aspersión aérea con el herbicida Glifosato (PECIG) y de los cultivos ilícitos en la salud humana y en el medio ambiente,’” various authors, May 11, 2005.
- Open letter from Alberto Rueda, former senior advisor for drug policy, Colombian Ministry of Interior and Justice, “Urgente aterrizaje del informe de la OEA sobre los efectos de la fumigación de los cultivos ilícitos,” May 4, 2005.
- R.A. Relyea, Univ. of Pittsburgh, “The Lethal Impacts of Roundup and Predatory Stress on Six Species of North American Tadpoles,” Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology v.48, n.3, April 1, 2005
- Informe de la Misión de Observación sobre los Efectos del Plan Colombia en los Departamentos de Nariño y Putumayo, report issued jointly by CIP and several Colombian and Ecuadorian NGOs, November 2004
- Resignation letter of Alberto Rueda, senior advisor for drug policy, Colombian Ministry of Interior and Justice, October 2004
- Debate en el Congreso de Colombia: “El impacto de las fumigaciones aéreas con glifosato contra los cultivos ilícitos en el medio ambiente del pais, y especialmente en los parques nacionales,” March 30, 2004.
- Latin America Working Group: "Going to Extremes: The U.S.-Funded Aerial Eradication Program in Colombia," by Betsy Marsh, February 2004.
- Latin America Working Group, “Top Ten Myths about the U.S. Supported Aerial Coca Eradication Program in Colombia,” July 22, 2003.
- Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia, “Resolución Defensorial No. 26: Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario en el Marco del Conflicto Armado y de las Fumigaciones de Coca en el Departamento del Putumayo,” 9 de octubre del 2002.
- Several organizations, “Informe Misión de Verificación: “Impactos en Ecuador de las fumigaciones realizadas en el Putumayo dentro del Plan Colombia,” octubre del 2002.
- Amazon Alliance, “Findings from Independent Reviews of the State Department Report on Aerial Spraying in Colombia Regarding Compliance with Requirements in the FY2002 Foreign Appropriations Act,” September 2002.
- “Comments by Ted Schettler MD, MPH Science Director, Science and Environmental Health Network; Boston Medical Center, Boston, MA; Greater Boston Physicians for Social Responsibility,” September 2002.
- “Comments by Anna Cederstav, PhD, Staff Scientist, Earthjustice and Interamerican Assocation for Environmental Defense,” September 2002.
- “Comments by Ivette Perfecto, PhD, Associate Professor, School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan; and John Vandermeer, PhD, Margaret Davis Collegiate Professor, Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Michigan,” September 2002.
- “Letter to The Honorable Joseph B. Biden by David B. Sandalow, Executive Vice President, World Wildlife Fund,” September 2002.
- “Comments by Rachel Massey, Research Fellow; and Jim Oldham, Amazon Project Director, Institute for Science and Interdisciplinary Studies,” September 2002.
- Sierra Club, Sierra Magazine, “Lethal Dose,” by Vikki Kratz, July-August 2002.
- Pesticide Action Network, “Urge the U.S. EPA to Fully Evaluate Aerial Herbicide Spraying in Colombia,” July 26, 2002.
- Doctora Maria Elena Arroyave, Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia, “Análisis al ‘Informe Final; Estudio de las Denuncias de Daños a la Salud Relacionadas con la Erradicación Aérea en Colombia,’” May 2002.
- Ana Cederstav, EarthJustice, “Validity of the reports presented by the US Department of State as evidence that no human health impacts are caused by the 'Plan Colombia' aerial herbicide spraying in coca-producing regions,” March 2002.
- Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia, “Posición de la Defensoría del Pueblo: La ejecución de la estrategia de erradicación aérea de los cultivos ilícitos, con químicos, desde una perspectiva constitucional,” April 18, 2002.
- Kimberly Stanton, RFK Memorial; Lisa Haugaard, Latin America Working Group; Betsy Marsh, Amazon Alliance; Adam Isacson, Center for International Policy, “Compliance with Fumigation Conditions in the Andean Counterdrug Initiative,” April 10, 2002.
- Red de Acción en Plaguicidas y Alternativas - América Latina, “Cultivos Ilícitos y Guerra Biológica, compilado por Elsa Nivia de RAPALMIRA-Colombia y editado por Luis Gomero de RAP-AL Andino,” December 2001.
- World Wildlife Fund, “Letter to Sen. Russell Feingold regarding herbicide spraying in Colombia,” November 21, 2001.
- Discurso del Senador Rafael Orduz, Congreso de Colombia, August 14, 2001.
- Instituto Departamental de Salud de Nariño, “Verificación del uso y manejo de plaguicidas,” 26 de julio del 2001.
- Contraloría General de la República de Colombia, “Auditoría Especial a la Política de Erradicación de Cultivos Ilícitos,” July 19, 2001.
- Red de Acción en Plaguicidas y Alternativas - América Latina, “Las fumigaciones aéreas sobre cultivos ilícitos sí son peligrosas – Algunas aproximaciones, Elsa Nivia, Directora Ejecutiva,” May 2001.
- Center for International Policy, “Plan Colombia’s ‘Ground Zero,’” April 2001.
- Departamento Administrativo de Salud, Gobernación del Putumayo, “Efectos de la Fumigación,” February 2001.
- Organización de los Pueblos Indígenas de la Amazonía Colombiana, “Impactos de las Fumigaciones Sobre los Pueblos Indígenas de la Amazonía Colombiana,” November 17, 2000.
- Lauren Spurrier, World Wildlife Fund, “Comments on Glyphosate,” October 30, 2000.
- Censat Agua Viva, “Plan Colombia y Medio Ambiente,” October 2000.
Posted by isacson at 10:49 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
November 11, 2005
A conversation with the governor of Putumayo
Five years ago right now, Plan Colombia was just getting underway. Hundreds of millions of dollars of recently approved U.S. funds were being spent on helicopters, spray planes, and new military counter-narcotics units.
Plan Colombia’s main geographic focus at the time was the department of Putumayo, along the border with Ecuador and Peru. Putumayo was the largest producer of coca in Colombia in 1999-2000. It was also one of Colombia’s most violent departments, with frequent clashes between guerrillas and paramilitaries and untold numbers of civilians murdered. During the fall of 2000, the FARC declared an “armed stoppage” that halted the department’s road traffic for months.
The U.S.-funded response was to strengthen Colombian military and police units active in Putumayo, including two brand-new units: an Army Counter-Narcotics Brigade and a Navy Riverine Brigade. The police fumigation program expanded dramatically throughout Putumayo. And a smaller, though significant, amount of investment in alternative-development projects gradually began to flow into the zone.
Did the strategy work? Five years later, what has been the impact of this mostly military investment on conditions in Putumayo? Is the department safer? Has the drug trade subsided? Are alternative-development programs bringing prosperity?
The answer to all these questions is an emphatic no.
While on a visit to Bogotá last week, I had a chance to sit down with Carlos Palacios, the governor of Putumayo. Palacios now has one of the least desirable jobs on the planet: trying to govern and represent a department that remains overrun by illegal armed groups – all of whom have threatened his life. Because of the threats, Palacios – a former priest and community leader – never goes anywhere without several bodyguards.
“This has been the most violent year in memory in Putumayo,” Palacios said. “Open combat has been happening daily.” In 2005 so far, more soldiers have been killed in Putumayo than in any other department of Colombia. The FARC declared another “armed strike” that paralyzed the department in July and much of August. Yet another attack on power pylons left eight of Putumayo’s thirteen municipalities (counties) in the dark last week.
The hardest-hit municipality has been San Miguel, in Putumayo’s far southwest on the Ecuadorian border, whose county seat is La Dorada. As in much of Putumayo, San Miguel still has extensive coca cultivations, control of which is disputed between the FARC and the Liberators of the South paramilitary bloc (a unit of the Central Bolívar Bloc of the AUC, headed by “Javier Montáñez” or “Macaco,” who himself once worked as a coca buyer / middleman in Putumayo). The FARC tend to dominate rural San Miguel, and the paramilitaries dominate the few town centers. In La Dorada, an effort by local merchants earlier this year to protest the paramilitaries’ presence was met with a wave of threats and selective killings. The governor’s office has counted 87 armed-group attacks in this small municipality since the beginning of 2004 – nearly one per week.
The violence has increased this year for three reasons, said Palacios.
- The “Plan Patriota” military offensive taking place just to the north has displaced many guerrillas into Putumayo. This has been accompanied by an increase in FARC attacks and sabotage in Putumayo, in an effort to show that the guerrillas “are not defeated” and can still act at will.
- The proximity of the border has drawn armed groups to Putumayo; there are numerous clandestine routes into Ecuador through which drugs exit and arms enter. The FARC, Palacios said, have taken to launching attacks from the Ecuadorian side of the border; they have encampments and “practically a base of operations” in the northern Ecuadorian province of Sucumbíos.
- Strategically, Putumayo is still a very important zone. It borders Caquetá and Nariño, two key drug-crop producing areas. Several rivers in Putumayo are practically highways that lead to the Amazon basin, and control of river traffic is vital. Economically, Putumayo accounts for as much as 30 percent of Colombia’s potential oil reserves (though much of the oil is of a lower quality than that found to the northeast, in and around Arauca and Casanare).
The Colombian Army has moved 2,000 men into the department, but so far the violence has not subsided. Six official “early warnings” have been issued this year, but with no effective response. The Colombian Navy has a U.S.-funded Riverine Brigade, equipped with numerous well-armed boats, which has reduced FARC control of key rivers and riverside towns. However, Palacios notes, due to varying water levels, most rivers are navigable to the Navy’s boats only six months out of the year. During those six months, the rivers and nearby towns essentially return to FARC control.
Though Putumayo has been Colombia’s most fumigated department since Plan Colombia began, coca-growing persists and thrives in the department, governor Palacios warned. He estimated that there may be as much as 30,000 hectares of coca in Putumayo right now – far more than the United Nations’ 2004 satellite estimate of 4,386 hectares. The governor said that coca-growers are finding new ways to evade detection by satellites and aircraft – everything from very small plots, to new varieties that grow in shade, even to rumors of hydroponically-grown coca.
Governor Palacios opposes fumigation, which he sees as cruel and counterproductive. He points out that more than 16,000 hectares have been eradicated through alternative-development programs under the USAID-supported “early eradication” scheme, in which an entire community eradicates its coca in exchange for a package of projects and benefits.
However, Palacios says that he has been hearing more and more complaints about the “early eradication” aid. Communities, he says, were not asked what they would want to produce instead of coca, and instead had livelihoods assigned to them, such as raising pigs or growing fruit for a produce-concentrate processing plant in Orito municipality. Unfortunately, the pigs distributed with USAID funding mostly died of disease, as they were not well-suited to Putumayo’s climate and conditions. Of 152 pig-pens built throughout Putumayo, nearly all are now empty. The concentrates plant, which Palacios called “a white elephant,” is operating at a small fraction of capacity because it is offering very low prices to local growers.
Instead of dictating what people should produce, Palacios strongly suggests that USAID and its contractors do the following:
- Consult closely with communities in the elaboration of their own development and business plans.
- Make existing local organizations, particularly the juntas de acción comunal (elected “local action councils” that play an advisory role in governance), central actors in this process. This in turn will strengthen democracy, local participation and the social fabric.
- Provide generous credit instead of small grants. To the greatest extent possible, credits should be given to organizations, such as cooperatives, instead of individuals.
- Pave the department’s roads, which are in terrible shape if they exist at all. Putumayo’s roughly 200 kilometers of main road would cost about US$40 million to pave.
Governor Palacios has been seeking 30 billion pesos (about US$14 million) for an agricultural development plan for the department: a mix of credits and projects for goods that can get a decent price, particularly fish farming, small-scale family cattle breeding, and service jobs. But he has been unable to convince the U.S. or Bogotá governments to contribute.
Governor Palacios truly has one of the most frustrating jobs that one can have. It is worsened by the sad fact that, five years after beginning operations in Putumayo, Plan Colombia has done almost nothing to improve security, poverty and drug trafficking in the department. Halfway through his four-year term, Governor Carlos Palacios must deal with the disappointing aftermath. Still, we wish him the best of luck and look forward to talking to him again.
Posted by isacson at 02:53 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
November 09, 2005
The 2006 foreign aid outcome
While I was in Colombia last week, the U.S. Congress quickly approved the final version of the 2006 foreign aid law, with both good and bad news for aid to Colombia. Here is an English translation of the overview I wrote in Sunday's edition of the Colombian newspaper El Espectador.
Adam Isacson
The U.S. Congress finally approved its foreign-aid bill for 2006. And the Uribe government can't be happy.
They are by now used to winning their legislative battles in Washington, and in the new aid law, they did get nearly all they asked for. But their victory was very far from total. This time, the current policy's critics managed to make a dent.
The overall amount of aid didn't change: $483.5 million will go to Colombia through the "Andean Counterdrug Initiative" program, plus another $250 million or so in military aid through other accounts in the budget. But this time the amount includes a record level of social and economic aid, some $158.6 million - $6 million more than in 2005.
Of course, this is just a 4 percent increase. But this increase requires a similar decrease in military aid, something that has never happened. While this cannot be considered a change of course, it is certainly a brake on past years' military-aid momentum.
The biggest defeat, however, had to do with the paramilitary process, which is still strongly questioned among members of both parties in Washington. It was known that the Uribe government hoped to win a contribution of up to $80 million for demobilization and reinsertion programs; according to the Interior and Justice Ministry, these efforts would cost $180 million (400 billion pesos) in 2006.
The Bush administration didn't want to turn down a request from its closest ally in South America. But it apparently did not spend much political capital in its lobbying effort. The Congress ended up approving an almost symbolic sum of $20 million. While this amount sounds big, it isn't: it equals the cost of one and a half Black Hawk helicopters (the United States has given Colombia more than 25 Black Hawks since 1999). It probably equals what Don Berna or Vicente Castaño makes in about three months. While it is possible that more aid to the process may come in 2006 through a supplemental budget request, few currently see that as likely.
The Uribe government's defeat is put in sharper relief when one reads the text of the conditions that the Congress attached to these $20 million. While these conditions are less stringent than those that the Senate added to its version of the law in July, they are still quite strong. The Senate ceded to the House - whose version of the law did not include conditions - on the issue of human rights, abandoning the ban on aid to the process should those who committed crimes against humanity not receive "proportional punishment." But it remained firm on those conditions that had to do with the dismantlement of paramilitarism and the extradition of high-ranking leaders.
The law specifies that the $20 million cannot be spent on the demobilization of individuals until the State Department certifies that they "have (A) verifiably renounced and terminated any affiliation or involvement with FTOs [Foreign Terrorist Organizations] or other illegal armed groups, and (B) are meeting all the requirements of the Colombia Demobilization Program, including having disclosed their involvement in past crimes and their knowledge of the FTO's structure, financing sources, illegal assets, and the location of kidnapping victims and bodies of the disappeared." Therefore, aid to the process will stop if evidence arises that ex-paramilitaries are participating in new violent groups or structures.
The conditions also require demobilized individuals to give a much more complete confession than that contemplated in the "Justice and Peace" law. The aid law prohibits the use of these $20 million until the State Department certifies that "the Government of Colombia is providing full cooperation to the Government of the United States to extradite the leaders and members of the FTOs who have been indicted in the United States." Yes, the language is vague. But it is difficult to imagine the State Department certifying that the presence of Don Berna in a suite at the Itagüí prison is an example of "full cooperation."
These conditions will be difficult to satisfy, and to do so will only free up a relatively small amount of money. The new aid law, then, cannot be seen as a major support to the process with the "paras." It is a nominal contribution to a process that still suffers from a lack of credibility.
Posted by isacson at 07:53 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
October 04, 2005
Don Berna and the drug war
“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,” Ralph Waldo Emerson said more than 150 years ago. Good advice for people in Washington who have a penchant for declaring “war on” problems, like drugs or terrorism.
Once you’ve declared “war” on something, after all, you’ve promised an all-out effort behind a hard-line, no-compromise strategy. You’d better be prepared to fight that thing in all of its manifestations. If you don’t – if you fight some badguys, but, in the name of expediency, treat others with leniency or even kindness – the credibility of your “war” disappears. People will stop rallying to your cause, and you’ll be farther from achieving your crusade’s goals. By declaring war, you’ve locked yourself into a foolish consistency.
Two recent extradition-related examples in Latin America – one from the “war on terror,” one from the “war on drugs” – are stark reminders of how a “war” can be undermined when the foolish consistency it requires begins to break down.
Last week, a U.S. immigration judge in El Paso denied the extradition to Venezuela of Cuban exile extremist Luis Posada Carriles. Posada, who worked with the CIA in the 1960s and 1970s, escaped in 1985 from a Venezuelan jail, where he was serving a sentence for his role in the October 1976 bombing of a commercial Cuban airliner, an act of terrorism that killed 73 people.
When Posada suddenly showed up in Miami this year and was apprehended by U.S. authorities, it appeared that Venezuela had a strong case for his extradition. But relations with the Venezuelan government aren’t very good right now, and Posada is thought of rather fondly in some quarters of the south Florida exile community. So fondly, in fact, that two years ago, when Posada was being held in Panama, three Miami-area Republican congresspeople - Lincoln Díaz-Balart, Mario Díaz-Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen – wrote a letter to Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso asking for his pardon.
Maintaining a consistent, credible “war on terror” would have required these and other hardliners in Congress and the Bush administration to hold their noses and hand Posada over to the Chávez government. But they chose not to do this. They successfully convinced the Texas judge that Posada could not be extradited to Venezuela because of the likelihood that he would be tortured.
Never mind that the Chávez government – which justly faces some human-rights criticism – does not have a record of systematic torture. And never mind that, through its notorious policy of “extraordinary renditions,” the Bush administration has already sent several suspected terrorists to very likely torture in countries like Egypt, Morocco and Syria. “The long and short of it is that we are harboring a terrorist,” CIP’s Wayne Smith told Inter-Press Service last week. By refusing to extradite a terrorist who happened to hold pro-U.S. views, the administration has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of its “global war on terrorism.”
The other example, of course, is the blow to the “war on drugs” inflicted last week, when Colombia refused to honor an extradition request for paramilitary leader Diego Fernando Murillo, or “Don Berna” – and U.S. drug warriors said… nothing.
Calling him the “de facto leader” of the AUC paramilitaries, a New York prosecutor indicted Don Berna last year on charges of shipping large quantities of cocaine to the United States. In late May 2005, after he apparently ordered the murder of a provincial legislator and was taken into Colombian government custody, the extradition request was formalized.
Last month, Colombia’s Supreme Court gave the green light to Berna’s extradition, forcing President Alvaro Uribe to decide whether to honor the request. Last week, Uribe decided to suspend the feared paramilitary chieftain’s extradition, as long as Don Berna continued to participate in negotiations with the Colombian government.
This sort of thing won’t do if you’re trying to maintain a consistent hard line in your “war on drugs.” The U.S. Embassy, apparently recognizing this, released a statement expressing its disappointment at Berna’s non-extradition. This required them to take the big step of releasing their tight embrace of President Uribe and distancing themselves publicly from him on something, for the first time in a while.
President Uribe ordered that Berna be sent from house arrest at his ranch to a maximum-security prison in Boyacá. The embassy released another statement praising the move, and the criticisms ceased.
While the embassy at least briefly raised its voice in favor of a consistent hard line, most other voices – including all of the architects of today’s drug war – have been strangely silent.
While we disagree with their strategy, we would expect them at least to be consistent about the prosecution of their “war.” So where is the outrage from Reps. Dan Burton, Mark Souder, John Mica and Henry Hyde? Why aren’t senators like Mike DeWine and Jeff Sessions howling about Colombia’s refusal to hand over a notorious drug trafficker? What does Drug Czar John Walters have to say? Where is the outcry from the Justice Department? Why the silence from the authors of the annual “certification” process, the people who denied Ernesto Samper a visa, the people who opposed President Pastrana’s attempts to negotiate with “narco-terrorists,” the people who thought it would be a good idea to cut off your college financial aid if you were ever caught with a nickel bag on your person? Where are the anguished cries from the people who were so incensed about the flow of drugs from Colombia that they have spent billions to spray herbicides on coca-growing peasants? Isn’t their silence an insult to the DEA agents and Colombian police who risk their lives every day trying to bring down drug kingpins like Don Berna?
In our view, extraditions – and other anti-drug goals – can be sacrificed on occasion for a larger good, such as the possibility of peace. (On the other hand, the threat of extradition – as we have seen – can also be a useful tool to keep the other side at the negotiating table. It’s a powerful bargaining chip.)
If Don Berna really demobilizes, ceases his violent and drug-trafficking activity, becomes a law-abiding citizen and encourages his followers to do the same (we’ll be amazed if this actually happens), then he should not be extradited. The same goes for Mono Jojoy and other FARC leaders wanted for drug trafficking, if negotiations with the guerrillas ever get that far.
That’s our position. But we’re not drug warriors. If America’s drug warriors agree with us in Don Berna’s case, then they have to explain themselves. They should say explicitly that they think, in this case, another goal – demobilization of the AUC – is worth sacrificing the anti-drug goal.
Doing so could be a big first step toward a more flexible approach to the drug problem, if it leads to a broader recognition that other policy goals are sometimes more important, and that the hardest-line solution is often not the best one. It would be a big move from a foolish consistency to a wise one.
That would be great, but for now the drug warriors are deafeningly silent. Until they explain why they’re not howling about the extradition of a drug lord who happens to be a right winger, their position is inconsistent, their credibility suffers, and their “war on drugs” is in tatters.
Posted by isacson at 12:13 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
September 29, 2005
Fumigating parks: the worst environmental risk isn't "Round-Up"
After months of study, the Colombian government may soon announce that it will allow U.S.-funded counter-drug fumigation planes to spray herbicides over the country’s national parks. On September 15, Interior Minister Sabas Pretelt acknowledged that plans and guidelines for such spraying have been finalized. National Police chief Gen. Jorge Daniel Castro told the Associated Press this week, “We’re waiting for the order” to start spraying in the parks.
The same AP story estimates that 28,000 acres (about 11,300 hectares) of coca are planted in Colombia’s fragile nature preserves, where aerial spraying continues to be forbidden. That is a small fraction of all coca estimated to have been grown in Colombia in 2004: either one-seventh of what the UN estimated (198,000 acres / 80,000 hectares) or one-tenth of what the United States estimated (282,000 acres / 114,000 hectares).
But coca cultivation, pushed by fumigation elsewhere, is increasing in Colombia’s parks, causing Bush and Uribe administration officials to increase their calls for an end to the ban on spraying in parks. They argue that the damage wrought by the cocaine industry (deforestation, chemicals for processing the drugs) is greater than any damage the glyphosate-based spray mixture would cause.
That would be true if the spraying’s immediate chemical effects were the only impact it made on the environment. But it is not, and environmentalists opposing spraying in parks do not need to fund expensive studies to determine the impact of glyphosate on rainforest soils, water and species.
In fact, the worst environmental impact of fumigation is not the glyphosate mixture itself (though Roundup is far from benign, especially where standing water is concerned). The worst damage is done when fumigation encourages growers to plant more coca than they did before.
Nine years of steadily increasing spraying in Colombia has made brutally, abundantly clear that forced eradication, when not combined with alternative development, does not discourage people from growing coca. This seems obvious when coca is the most reliably profitable crop in remote, conflictive, neglected zones of the country. But the numbers bear it out.
- The UN Office of Drugs and Crime, in its June 2005 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey [PDF format], reported the remarkable statistic that 62 percent of the coca fields its satellites detected in 2004 weren’t there in 2003. The majority of coca plantings were brand new. Campesinos, undiscouraged by the spraying, were planting the crop in new places.
- The State Department’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports tell us how much coca the Colombian government (with U.S. funds) eradicated each year, plus how much coca they estimate was left over afterward. Adding those two numbers together tells us roughly how much coca Colombian campesinos tried to plant each year. As fumigation has increased, the rate of “attempted coca-growing” has risen sharply.
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| 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| Coca left over | 57,200 | 79,500 | 101,800 | 122,500 | 136,200 | 169,800 | 144,400 | 113,850 | 114,000 |
| Eradicated coca | 5,600 | 19,000 | 31,123 | 43,246 | 47,371 | 84,251 | 122,695 | 132,817 | 136,555 |
| Total attempted coca-growing | 62,800 | 98,500 | 132,923 | 165,746 | 183,571 | 254,051 | 267,095 | 246,667 | 250,555 |
| Change, 2000-2004 | 36% |
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| (All figures in hectares.) |
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As more is sprayed, more is planted – 36 percent more just since Plan Colombia began in 2000. Much of these new plantings take place in areas that had not known coca before: pushed along by fumigation, growers are cutting down new forest and planting in new departments, new municipalities – and new nature reserves.
Given that experience, it’s not hard to imagine what will happen when fumigation is extended into Colombia’s parks. Growers will move deeper into the parks and other pristine areas and re-plant again. When the other option is to face deprivation – either in an urban slum or in depressed rural areas beyond the reach of government and economy – it almost seems rational for growers to try and profit from another few harvests before the spray planes find them again.
Fumigation pushed growers into Colombia’s national parks. If it is allowed to happen within the parks themselves, it will push growers deeper into these and other unspoiled areas.
What other option exists? The Colombian government, with U.S. support, can work on the ground.
This means manual eradication. The Colombian police claim to have eradicated 17,000 hectares of coca plants so far this year, employing 1,800 people. That’s 50 percent more coca than is believed to be in Colombia’s parks, so we know that the capacity to carry out this eradication exists. (Colombia’s park service could do much as well, if it were not so woefully underfunded.)
Of course, the main reason why the United States supports fumigation in Colombia and nowhere else is security, the danger that manual eradicators would be subject to guerrilla or paramilitary attack. But even if the Colombian government cannot control its territory despite years of military aid and investment, it should at least be able to control its parkland for the periods when eradication would take place. “It is said that there are places where manual eradication is difficult due to security,” writes El Tiempo columnist Daniel Samper. “Of course it is difficult. One elects governments to solve difficult problems with imagination and without inflicting social damage. To choose a deluge of poison is very easy, something that would occur to an above-average private.”
But working on the ground also means helping people who are so isolated and economically desperate that they have chosen to grow coca in national parks. Just like ex-combatants, just like displaced people, these individuals and families need their government’s help. Nearly all of them will voluntarily pull up their own coca plants if they could live with some semblance of law and order, with access to medicine and drinkable water, with a hope that their kids might be educated, in proximity to a road that led to places where people might buy their legal products, and with credit and assistance to help them produce and market those legal products. Most would welcome regular contact with civilians who represent their government.
Instead, though, U.S. policy does not aim to improve the Colombian government’s presence on the ground. By working from the air only, the fumigation strategy will do nothing but drive coca-growers deeper into Colombia’s parks.
Posted by isacson at 09:05 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
September 21, 2005
Unconsidered evidence
The State Department’s semi-annual human-rights certification process – in which some military aid to Colombia is held up until State affirms that five conditions have been met – is necessary and important, but it is frustrating for all involved.
Confronted with abundant evidence that the Colombian military’s human-rights performance is not improving – especially where impunity is concerned – U.S. diplomats have tended to delay their certification decision for months. Ultimately, though, pressures to keep the military aid flowing have forced them to yield in exchange for very minimal concessions, such as arrests of a few privates or sergeants in two or three serious cases of abuse. The Colombian military ends up benefiting the most from the whole process: it refuses for months to take steps to punish violators, then, in exchange for taking a couple of very small steps, it gets a document bearing the Secretary of State’s signature conferring a U.S. “seal of approval” of its human-rights performance.
Many of Colombia’s national human-rights groups have nonetheless taken this process seriously. They meet with U.S. embassy officials and offer documentation of cases in which military involvement in abuse appears likely, but the Colombian government has failed to investigate or prosecute those believed to be responsible.
The Colombian groups have expressed frustration that most of the evidence they present to the State Department does not appear to be considered when the certification decisions get made. “Though we supply information and cases about serious human rights abuses in which government security forces are involved, these are not taken into account at the moment in which certifications are considered,” reads a lengthy document [PDF format] produced by seven Colombian organizations in July 2005.
This document, which the Colombian groups produced specifically to inform the State Department’s last certification decision (made at the beginning of August) summarizes over forty cases of actual or probable Colombian military involvement in human rights abuse. It is not an exhaustive list of all allegations against the Colombian military; those listed in the July document are intended to be “benchmark” cases in which evidence is most compelling and government efforts to investigate and prosecute have been most lacking.
In August, the State Department issued a justification document explaining its decision to certify. This document also cites cases where State officials claim to have seen progress. Comparing the cases listed in the Colombian groups’ document with those mentioned in the State Department justification shows plainly that the Colombian groups have a point: the vast majority of the cases they present are not mentioned in the U.S. certification document.
The table below lists most of the “benchmark” cases presented in the Colombian human-rights groups’ document. (Consult the groups' document to read more details about each case.) Of these, only nine are mentioned in the State Department’s justification, and only four of these mentions refer to criminal investigations or prosecutions – the rest are administrative investigations or dismissals, the dropping of cases, or the writing of a “risk report.”
Presenting the information in this format shows starkly how much alarming information the State Department had to overlook in order to issue its August certification decision. Before certifying again, State must take these other cases into account. At the very least, the department’s justification document must recognize these cases’ existence, and explain specifically why it chose to leave them out of its decision-making process. A lot of good work by brave human-rights investigators is being ignored.
(Many thanks to CIP Intern Robin Rahe for her help in compiling this table.)
| Name | Location | Year | Mention in State Department Certification Justification |
| 1. Santo Domingo Massacre | Tame, Arauca | 1998 | State Department suspended assistance to Combat Air Command 1 of Colombian Air Force; trials for Air Force Captain César Romero Pradilla, Lieutenant Johan Jiménez Valencia & Technician Mario Hernández Acosta continue |
| 2. Extrajudicial executions in Las Palmeras | Mocoa, Putumayo | 1991 | (none) |
| 3. Forced disappearance & execution of Nidya Erika Bautista | Bogotá | 1987 | (none) |
| 4. Illegal wiretapping of NGOs | Medellín, Antioquia | 1997 | Dismissal of Colonel Mauricio Santoya Velasco |
| 5. Extrajudicial execution of Uberney Giraldo Castro and Jose Evelio Gallo | La Galleta, Antioquia | 2000 | Army Corporals Humberto Jesús Blandon Vargas and Sandro Fernando Barerro dismissed from Army on Nov 8, 2004 |
| 6. 370 Crimes in peace community of San Jose de Apartadó | San Jose de Apartadó, Antioquia | 1997-present | Administrative charges filed by Inspector-General (Procuraduría) against retired Generals Carlos Enrique Vargas Forero and Pablo Alberto Rodriguez Laverde, and Colonels Guillermo Arturo Suárez Forero and Javier Vicente Hernández Acosta for 2000-2001 killings; no assistance to 17th Brigade |
| 7. Torture and assassination of Wilfredo Quiñones Bárcenas | La Floresta de Barrancabermeja (Bucaramanga) | 1995 | (none) |
| 8. Mapiripán Massacre | Mapiripán, Meta | 1997 | Case against General Jaime Uscátegui moved from Villavicencio to Bogotá; on February 17 Colombian government acknowledged some responsibility for death of 22 civilians; Army Colonel Lino Sánchez sentenced to 40 years |
| 9. Assassination of Carlos Manuel Prada and Evelio Bolaño Castro |
| 1993 | (none) |
| 10. Assassination of three unionists | Saravena, Arauca | 2004 | Charges of aggravated homicide against 4 soldiers;,Army Soldier Oscár Saúl Cuta Hernández Suárez indicted |
| 11. Extrajudicial execution of Isnardo León Mendoza | Tame, Arauca | 2005 | (none) |
| 12. Operation Dragón (plot against union activists) | Cali, Valle del Cauca | 2004 | (none) |
| 13. Forced disappearances of Ángel Quintero and Claudia Patricia Monsalve | Medellín, Antioquia | 2000 | (none) |
| 14. Execution of farmers | Cajamarca, Tolima | 2004 | Preventive detention against 7 soldiers of Army's 6th Brigade |
| 15. Execution of Francisco Guerrero Guerrero and sexual assault of Inocencia Pineda Pavón | Arauquita, Arauca | 2002 | (none) |
| 16. Execution of Geiny Jaimes Pinzón (committed by Brigades 18 and 21 of Natl Army) | Tame, Arauca | 2001 | (none) |
| 17. Los Tupes Massacre | San Diego, Cesar | 2001 | (none) |
| 18. Kankuamo indigenous group | Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta | 1986-present | “The Government of Colombia established a regional risk report for the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta region” |
| 19. Chengue Massacre | Ovejas, Sucre | 2001 | Prosecutor General's Office closed case against Rear Admiral Rodrigo Quiñónez |
| 20. Assassination of Gina Paola Acosta | Cumaribo, Vichada | 2002 | (none) |
| 21. Murder of Aida Cecilia Lasso & Sindy Paola Rondon | San Alberto, Cesar | 2000 | (none) |
| 22. Attack against Rita Alicia Riveros de Ospina |
| 2000 | (none) |
| 23. Assassination of Oscar Orlando Zetuain Delgado | Bogotá | 1997 | (none) |
| 24. Mondoñedo Massacre | Cundinamarca | 1996 | (none) |
| 25. Extrajudicial execution and torture of Beidin Buitrago | La Virginia, Risaralda | 2001 | (none) |
| 26. Murder of Pedro Hernando Barrera Suancha and Guillermo Gómez Suancha | Mosquera, Cundinamarca | 2001 | (none) |
| 27. Murder of Héctor Harvey Valencia | La Unión Peneya, Montañita, Caquetá | 2004 | (none) |
| 28. Murder of José Albeiro Aguirre | Puerto Matilde, Antioquia | 2004 | (none) |
| 29. Murder of Arlinson Duque Flórez | La Laguna, Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá | 2004 | (none) |
| 30. Wounding of minors | El Billar, Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá | 2004 | (none) |
| 31. Woundings from attack in school | Lejanías, Meta | 2004 | (none) |
| 32. Extrajudicial execution of Elkin Arbey Ortiz and Jose Rodríguez Villamizar | Medellín, Antioquia | 2002 | (none) |
| 33. Torture of Gladys Rocio Cardenas Sanchez |
| 2003 | (none) |
| 34. Detention and death of Telso Barrera Acosta | Botalón, Saravena, Arauca | 2004 | (none) |
| 35. Extrajudicial execution of Fredy Humberto Gutiérrez Cruz and Rafael Antonio Triviño | Mesetas, Meta | 2002 | (none) |
| 36. Extrajudicial execution of Marco Antonio Rodríguez Moreno & Ricardo Espejo Galindo | Cajamarca, Tolima | 2003 | (none) |
| 37. Extrajudicial execution of Mileidy Dayana David Tuberquía | San Jose de Apartadó, Antioquia | 2003 | (none) |
| 38. Extrajudicial execution in Páramo del Sumapaz | Bogotá | 2005 | (none) |
| 39. Wounding of Joselín Carreño Jejen |
|
| (none) |
| 40. Extrajudicial execution of Javier Correa Arias and torture of Nini Johana Oviedo Lozano | Buga, Valle del Cauca | 2004 | (none) |
| 41. Forced disappearance of Olga Lucía Ladino & María Graciela Rivera | San José del Guaviare | 2000 | (none) |
| 42. Military operation with paramilitary assistance | Remedios and Yondó, Antioquia | 2005 | (none) |
Posted by isacson at 07:08 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
September 19, 2005
Getting it seriously wrong
Here are three comments about Colombia that high officials, both current and former, have made during the past three weeks. There is almost no need to comment on them, other than to marvel at the extreme isolation from reality that these remarks reveal.
These statements appear to indicate that high-level U.S. policymakers from both parties (1) only get their information from Colombian and U.S. government officials, who depend on them for their budgets and have a strong incentive to defend the strategies they designed; and (2) are either unaware of, or broadly dismissive of, the mountains of contrary information produced by dozens of U.S. and Colombian scholars, reporters, activists and political figures. The result is that top leaders believe things that are patently untrue, these beliefs spread across the upper strata of government, media and elite opinion – and very bad policy gets made.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, interview with NBC Editorial Board, September 15, 2005: “[I]t took the Iraqis – they’re making some progress on the reconstruction front. They’re making quite a lot of progress in the building of their security forces. And they’re making real progress on the political front. And that’s how I would assess it. … There are other governments that have survived that and come out on top, among them the Colombian Government, as an example, which at one point, Colombia had 30 percent of its territory in FARC hands. One of the first things Uribe did was he said, I’m going to reestablish control over those areas that I don’t have control. And you remember, many of you who are foreign affairs reporters, you will remember that, what, Andrea, ten years ago, bombs went off in Bogotá every week.”
If Secretary Rice really believes that Colombia could be a model for U.S. operations in Iraq, the future in Baghdad is even bleaker than we thought.
The Colombia comparison is false. At least 30 percent of Colombian territory – most of it rural and sparsely populated, as before – is still in FARC hands. Remote municipalities several hundred square miles in size have not seen “government control reestablished” just because the Colombian government has sent a few dozen police to their largest towns.
Worse, Colombia’s guerrillas remain all too active. According to a recent report [PDF format] by Colombia’s Security and Democracy Foundation – not a left-wing outfit – guerrilla attacks against military and police targets were 69 percent more frequent during the first three years of the Uribe government than during those of his predecessor, Andrés Pastrana. And the frequency and scale of FARC attacks has risen dramatically since about late February or early March of this year.
Incidentally, the FARC have never had the capacity to set off bombs in Bogotá every week, as Ms. Rice claims occurred “ten years ago.” The Secretary was probably thinking about the Medellín drug cartel, which carried out an urban bombing campaign fifteen years ago to pressure against its leaders’ extradition. If anything, as the 2002 inauguration bombings, the February 2003 El Nogal bombing and other incidents have shown, the guerrillas appear to be bombing cities slightly more often than before.
Drug Czar John Walters, speech before the Hudson Institute, August 31, 2005: “In the course of wringing out that trouble, economic growth, better rights environment than I believe any nation on Earth, frankly, has had in terms of improvement in the last two years, have occurred. Yet the example of Colombia, as I say, is not talked about with, I think, the focus and attention it deserves.”
The State Department’s “Washington File” helpfully translates this statement as meaning “in the area of human rights, Colombia has witnessed more improvement over the last two years than ‘any other nation on earth.’”
This is inaccurate; in fact, the last two years have not been good ones for human rights in Colombia. The State Department’s own human-rights certification documents show that there has been no increased effort to suspend, investigate or prosecute military personnel for human-rights crimes, even though hundreds of cases remain unresolved (several dozen are documented in this recent report [PDF format] from several Colombian human-rights groups). Impunity remains nearly total for higher-ranking officers who may have ordered human-rights abuses or collaborated with paramilitaries. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ last report cited “[A]n increase in reports of extrajudicial executions attributed to members of the security forces and other public officials.” And a disturbing policy of mass, and often arbitrary, arrests has darkened the human-rights picture still further.
Former President Bill Clinton, interview with ABC News This Week, September 18, 2005: “When 13,000 armed guerrillas and paramilitaries in Colombia give up their weapons and rejoin civil society, and President Uribe, who's been so tough on them, offers them a chance to reconcile, why are they doing that? Because they know they're not going to win anymore, and they want to be part of a political process.”
It is encouraging that guerrilla desertion rates are up, though nearly all of those turning themselves in are very young, recent recruits – not leaders looking to participate in “a political process.” At the negotiating table, though, the Uribe government has made almost no progress toward peace with Colombian guerrillas. We can only hope that increased efforts with the ELN this month hold some promise.
President Clinton may have been thinking of the Uribe government’s talks with paramilitary groups, which have involved massive demobilizations. However, the paramilitaries are not turning in their weapons because they’ve realized “they’re not going to win” – after all, they claim to be pro-government. And it’s doubtful that the AUC chose to negotiate because the government was “tough on them”: in December 2002, when the paramilitary leadership declared a “cease-fire” and began the negotiation process, government attacks against the AUC were infrequent, perhaps a few dozen per year.
Before he once again sings the praises of the paramilitary process, we suggest that President Clinton – who was known as an avid reader – glance at one of the following reports.
- “Smoke and Mirrors: Colombia’s demobilization of paramilitary groups,” by Human Rights Watch, August 2005.
- “The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization?” by Amnesty International, September 1, 2005.
- “Peace – Or Paramilitarization?” by the Center for International Policy, July 2005.
- “Demobilising the Paramilitaries in Colombia: An Achievable Goal?” by the International Crisis Group, August 5, 2004
Posted by isacson at 07:58 AM | Comments (8) | TrackBack
September 16, 2005
The AUC's big cocaine sell-off
In preparation for their upcoming demobilizations, paramilitary leaders may be selling off cocaine so quickly that the inflow of dollars is disrupting Colombia’s entire economy.
Associated Press reporter Kim Housego reported yesterday that the Colombian peso “has risen 17 percent against the dollar during the past 20 months amid a heavy influx of dollars.” The amount of dollars entering the country during the last eighteen months, El Tiempo reported Sunday, “practically equals the size of Colombia’s external debt [about $35 billion].”
The wave of dollars has strengthened the peso so much that Colombian exports might become too expensive to compete with those of other countries. In a vain effort to make dollars scarcer and thus weaken the peso, Colombia’s central bank has bought up billions of dollars, increasing Colombia’s dollar reserves to record levels.
According to Housego, the dollars come “from rising foreign direct investment, a trade surplus and more dollars being sent home from Colombians working abroad.” Colombian government officials are quick to add that President Uribe’s security policies have made the country far more attractive to investors.
These factors probably underlie some of the peso’s recent strength. But it’s likely that the flow of dollars also owes to something more sinister. According to El Tiempo, some financial analysts “believe that many of these new ‘investors’ come from Ralito (Córdoba), the zone where the ‘para’ chiefs are concentrated” as they prepare to demobilize under the new “Justice and Peace” Law.
The Associated Press reported on this phenomenon in June.
Navy chief Adm. Mauricio Soto said in an interview … that the paramilitary United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, is shipping an unprecedented amount of stored cocaine from the country ahead of their demobilization. … “[The paramilitaries] are desperate. They urgently need to sell what they have,” Soto said. “They need the money, because if they are going to demobilize, what interests them is the cash.”
El Tiempo added yesterday, “A high-ranking National Police oficial, expert in narco-trafficking, said that more drugs are being interdicted lately because the ‘paras’ who are negotiating with the government need to divest themselves of their drug stores. ‘They need cash, they need to have dollars instead of stockpiles of drugs, at the moment they demobilize.’”
(Some analysts cited by El Tiempo speculate that guerrillas too may be selling off stores of coca paste in southern Colombia, “in order to obtain resources and to finance their counter-offensive against the Army’s “Plan Patriota.”)
The paramilitary leaders are certainly in a hurry, as most are expected to demobilize at the end of the year. Under the so-called “Justice and Peace” law, they will be subject to jail sentences of 5 to 8 years (minus time spent negotiating: 3 ½ to 6 ½ years) for all of their previous crimes – including narco-trafficking, which they will argue was a means to fund the paramilitary cause. Between now and the end of the year, then, paramilitary leaders involved in the drug trade (that is, most of them) are in a race against time to unload their stores of drugs, hide the money and demobilize with what appears to be a clean slate.
As a result of the big selloff, cocaine seizures have increased dramatically during the past several months, as illegal shipments become larger and more frequent. Yesterday’s El Tiempo reported that Colombia’s police have interdicted 60.1 tons of cocaine so far this year, compared to 60.3 tons during all of last year. The Navy has interdicted 61.5 tons of cocaine, one ton more than during all of 2004.
Just this week, 2.5 tons of cocaine were found on a fishing boat near the Pacific port of Buenaventura, while another boat was found near the Galápagos Islands towing a metal “submarine” with 2.1 tons of cocaine inside. For every ton that is caught, at least an equal amount – possibly a multiple – finds its way to the United States, Europe and elsewhere.
Remarkably, some recent shipments have pooled guerrilla and paramilitary cocaine, such as a 15-ton cache found in May on the Mira River near the town of Tumaco. (Just last weekend, a guerrilla attack on the Mira River killed 2 employees of Colombia’s Attorney-General’s Office and 3 Colombian Marines.) Increasingly, the paramilitaries and the guerrillas have been acting more like rival mafias than like sworn enemies. As a May article in the Houston Chronicle reported, “‘These two groups rely on each other to see that (drug production) runs smoothly and that everybody gets their money,’ said a U.S. counterdrug official, who insisted on anonymity for security reasons. ‘Our intelligence tells us that this is happening at an increasing rate.’”
The paramilitaries’ big cocaine sell-off appears to be joined by a parallel money-laundering effort. The dollars flooding into paramilitary coffers are being hidden by investments in cattle, land and construction, contributing to a building boom in Bogotá and some other cities; use of other people’s bank accounts in exchange for commissions; or accepting lower rates in black-market peso exchanges.
A very large amount of money appears to be being laundered by mis-pricing of imports and exports. Normally, a strengthening of the peso should hurt Colombia’s export sector. But the opposite has happened: while the peso strengthens against the dollar, El Tiempo reports, non-traditional exports have increased this year by 27.8 percent. While some of that may owe to increased demand from Venezuela, which is in the midst of an oil-fueled boom, much of these increased exports may be fictitious. El Tiempo explains:
[Economist Javier] Fernández Riva says he has reason to suspect that something more is behind the extraordinary growth in some exports, at the same time the exchange rate has fallen sharply. And the authorities appear to prove him right: fictitious exports are considered a leading method of money-laundering. One of the exports that has grown the most are those of live animals (221 percent), which FEDEGAN (the Colombian cattlemen’s federation) attributes to differences in the exchange rate with Venezuela. But according to money-changers in the border zone, this is the activity that launders money most: “the tactic is to register the same transaction twice,” one of them explained.
Remember the paramilitary sell-off next year, when U.S. and Colombian officials announce dramatically increased amounts of cocaine interdicted in 2005. They may have simply found the same-sized portion of a pie that was made larger by the AUC leadership’s preparation for its imminent demobilization.
The question to ask now, not later, is: why is all of this being allowed to happen? The leaders of Colombia’s paramilitary groups aren’t fugitives – they are easy to find, usually in the Ralito zone, and they are in constant contact with Colombian government officials. It should be relatively easy to detect these leaders’ trafficking and money-laundering, and arrest them while there whereabouts are known. Even if that proves difficult, it should at least be possible to prevent Ralito from becoming the center of a money-laundering operation of historic proportions, on the eve of paramilitary leaders’ entry into a process that will allow them to keep most of their ill-gotten assets and avoid extradition to the United States.
But nothing appears to be being done to prevent the big cocaine sell-off. In particular, where is the pressure from the government of the United States, the country on whose streets much of this cocaine will soon arrive?
Posted by isacson at 05:37 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Statistics, again
Normally, when President Álvaro Uribe cites reams of statistics about the seemingly miraculous success of his policies, it’s hard to contradict him, no matter how fishy the numbers sound. Who but Colombia’s government, for instance, is able to keep comprehensive data about homicides or attacks on infrastructure?
Occasionally, though, the Uribe government’s official statistics make no sense objectively, as in the case of numbers of guerrillas and paramilitaries killed, captured and demobilized. At other times, they contradict the findings of respected non-governmental organizations, as in the case of measures of new forced displacement, which diverge widely from the statistics maintained by CODHES.
Yesterday in Washington, one of President Uribe’s principal claims clearly contradicted the statistics maintained by both the U.S. government and the United Nations.
One of the Colombian Presidency’s press releases from yesterday reads, “According to the President, Colombia’s advancement in issues like eradication of illicit crops through fumigation has had such visible results as a drop from 180,000 hectares of drug crops at the beginning of his government in 2002, to 80,000 in 2004.”
We hope that President Uribe wasn’t making this astounding claim at all of his meetings on Capitol Hill yesterday, because it’s wrong. It’s not even close.
U.S. government figures (see our coca-growing data webpage for more information):
|
| 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| Hectares of coca | 101,800 | 122,500 | 136,200 | 169,800 | 144,400 | 113,850 | 114,000 |
UN Office on Drugs and Crime figures (see our coca-growing data webpage for more information):
|
| 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| Hectares of coca | 102,000 | 160,000 | 163,000 | 145,000 | 102,000 | 86,000 | 80,000 |
In Washington yesterday, President Uribe claimed a 56 percent decrease in coca-growing since his term began in August 2002. In fact, the U.S. government has registered only a 21 percent decrease, and the UN estimates show a 22 percent decrease. Worse, Uribe has presided over a virtual stagnation in coca eradication between 2003 and 2004 – the U.S. government figures found no reduction at all last year, and the UN found only a reduction of 6,000 hectares, accompanied by increases in Peru and Bolivia.
President Uribe is in fact presiding over the failure of a model based on all-out fumigation combined with woefully insufficient alternative development. That’s nothing to brag about.
Meanwhile, however, the fumigation strategy marches on. It was easy to miss this amid all the other U.S. policy-related news yesterday, but Cali’s El País is reporting this morning that “The [Colombian] government has finalized its plan to fumigate in national parks,” adding that while fumigations in parks have not yet begun, “the police are ready to carry out the plan.”
Posted by isacson at 11:36 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
September 14, 2005
Uribe on Capitol Hill
President Uribe will be here in Washington tomorrow, stopping by for the day on his way to the UN General Assembly in New York. It appears that he will be spending all of his time on Capitol Hill, meeting with key representatives and senators. We’ve heard that meetings include Republican leaders Rep. Dennis Hastert and Sen. Bill Frist, members of the House and Senate International Relations and Foreign Relations Committees and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittees, members of the Congressional Black Caucus, and other House Democrats who have an interest in Colombia.
It is doubtful that Uribe will be making specific requests for new money (such as funding for paramilitary demobilizations or $150 million for new spray planes and helicopters); it would be rather crass to come here with shopping list in hand two weeks after Hurricane Katrina. His message, though, is likely to include (1) another sales pitch on behalf of the “Justice and Peace” law and the paramilitary process and (2) an effort to influence the House-Senate Conference Committee that will soon meet to reconcile both houses’ version of the 2006 foreign aid bill.
The Senate bill would require more economic aid and less military aid for Colombia, and would place several conditions on aid to the paramilitary demobilization process; the House bill contains no such requirements. It’s likely that Uribe will be encouraging the conferees to go with the House version of the bill’s Colombia provisions, instead of the much better Senate language.
Here is a list of possible questions for President Uribe that we’ve circulated to congressional staff whose bosses might be having brief meetings with him tomorrow. The goal of these questions isn’t to play “gotcha” – no member of Congress wants to hold a hostile interrogation session with a foreign leader. But none of these are softballs, either.
Drug-crop supply and eradication
Statistics published by the U.S. government and the United Nations indicate that, despite a record amount of aerial herbicide fumigation in 2004, Colombia saw little or no decrease in the amount of land planted with coca bushes.[1] U.S. government figures, meanwhile, show that cocaine has neither increased in price nor decreased in purity since Plan Colombia began.[2]
- Why, in your estimation, were the 2004 eradication results so disappointing?
- Is more fumigation really the answer, or should we consider a change in strategy? Given a limited amount of available funding, should the priority instead be interdiction, alternative development opportunities, or something else?
Talks with paramilitaries
In early August, more than 2½ years after launching negotiations with right-wing paramilitaries, President Uribe signed into law the so-called “Justice and Peace” law, which will govern the demobilization of members of paramilitary and guerrilla groups. This law has been widely criticized for failing to give Colombian government representatives the tools necessary to guarantee that paramilitary groups will cease to exist. “Access to the truth is not guaranteed,” the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted in June. “Without this, the illegal structures cannot be confronted adequately to guarantee their real dismantlement.”[3]
1. Dismantlement: In most peace processes, it is safely assumed that the armed group in question will disappear – or at least cease all illegal political activity – after negotiations conclude. It is not certain that this is happening in the case of the AUC.
- Do you believe that paramilitary groups are truly dismantling themselves, or are their leaders maintaining their power through other means, such as demobilizing partially, keeping most of their weapons, maintaining de facto control over zones they dominate, or even continuing to recruit?
- Do you believe that demobilizing paramilitaries are truly declaring all of their ill-gotten wealth and fully dismantling their networks of crime and violence?
2. Security: If paramilitary groups are truly dismantling, is the Colombian government truly able to fill the vacuum and guarantee security in areas that the AUC formerly controlled? Is there a danger that guerrilla groups will expand their presence in these zones?
3. Naming and punishing human rights abusers: The Colombian newsmagazine Semana recently published a disturbing article about the town of Chengue in northern Colombia, where a group of 80 paramilitaries massacred two dozen people in January 2001.[4] In mid-July, the paramilitary unit that included the 80 who carried out that massacre (the Montes de María Bloc) demobilized in a public ceremony. Of the 594 who turned in their weapons, all but nine were immediately absolved of any wrongdoing because they currently have no charges against them. These 585 individuals were sent home. Only the nine will face any likelihood of spending a maximum of eight years in jail.
- Is the Chengue case typical? Are the vast majority of those who demobilize being freed without any suspicion of involvement in serious abuses?
- Do you believe that current procedures are enough to ensure that mass murderers aren’t walking free, living among their former victims?
4. The big drug selloff: The chief of Colombia’s navy, Admiral Mauricio Soto, has said that paramilitary narco-traffickers who are about to demobilize have been selling off their drug stocks as fast as possible, flooding the market with cocaine. According to Colombian press reports, this big sell-off has brought so many U.S. dollars into Colombia that it has depressed the exchange rate.[5] How can this be happening, while the same paramilitary leaders are negotiating with the government? Are the Colombian authorities investigating this, and will arrests of paramilitary narco-traffickers result?
5. Extradition: On July 1, President Uribe told the Voice of America “in some cases, extraditions [of paramilitary leaders wanted for sending tons of drugs to the United States] will have to be suspended.”[6] What does President Uribe mean by this? Will paramilitaries who sent drugs to our shores ever face U.S. justice?
6. The case of “Gordo Lindo”: On August 27, Francisco Javier Zuluaga Lindo (“Gordo Lindo”), the “political chief” of the AUC’s Pacific Bloc, demobilized. Zuluaga is a longtime narcotrafficker: he was part of the organization of Medellín cartel figures Fabio and Jorge Ochoa in the 1980s and early 1990s. Later, after the Medellín and Cali cartels disappeared, he worked with Alejandro “Juvenal” Bernal Madrigal, one of the largest drug-traffickers of the late 1990s. Zuluaga narrowly escaped capture in 1999, when “Juvenal” was arrested in “Operation Millennium,” a major DEA-Colombian Police sting operation. Since then, he has been a fugitive, maintaining ties to the country’s largest drug organization, the Northern Valle cartel. In 1999, a court in Fort Lauderdale indicted him for narcotrafficking. About three years ago, just as the Uribe government was beginning its negotiations with the paramilitaries, “Gordo Lindo” became a member of the AUC. Speaking on the floor of Colombia’s Senate in August, Senator Jimmy Chamorro denounced that “Gordo Lindo” paid $5 million for his paramilitary status. He “opened his checkbook and bought a franchise to convert himself from a narcotrafficker into a paramilitary chief. This cannot be allowed.”[7]
“Gordo Lindo” now hopes to avoid long jail terms, or extradition to the United States, by demobilizing. What is President Uribe’s government doing to ensure that narco-traffickers like “Gordo Lindo” do not abuse the demobilization process to avoid strong punishment or extradition to the United States?
7. Senate conditions: The Senate’s version of the 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill would only allow U.S. aid for the AUC demobilization process if Colombian law requires each demobilizing paramilitary member to offer “full disclosure of his knowledge of the FTO’s [foreign terrorist organization’s] structure, financing sources, and illegal assets.” Though this information is critical to any effort to dismantle paramilitary networks, the “Justice and Peace” law doesn’t require that this information be confessed, and President Uribe’s administration opposed legislative efforts to include this requirement in the law. Does President Uribe regard this condition on U.S. aid to be fair? Why did he oppose any requirement that demobilizing paramilitaries (or guerrillas) reveal information about their group’s structure, financing sources and illegal assets?
Recent dynamics of the conflict
We note with concern that the frequency and scale of FARC guerrilla attacks, on both military and civilian targets, has increased in 2005. (Prominent recent examples include a month-long siege of indigenous towns in northern Cauca department in April and May; several large-scale attacks, and a month-long stoppage of road traffic, in Putumayo department in July and August; and the murder of fourteen coca-growing peasants in Antioquia department in late August.)
- After two years of reduced guerrilla activity, is a FARC counter-offensive underway?
- Why are the guerrillas still able to launch attacks of this scale so frequently, even after several years of dramatically increased military expenditures and aggressive security policies?
- Why does the security situation remain so bad in Putumayo department, where U.S.-funded operations under Plan Colombia began in 2000-2001?
Peace with guerrillas
President Uribe has taken significant steps in the past few weeks to establish dialogues with the ELN guerrilla group, and to begin talks with FARC guerrillas about the release of hostages – including three U.S. citizens – whom they have been holding for years. How can the U.S. government be more helpful to this effort?
[1] - U.S. figure: 2003 = 113,850 hectares; 2004 = 114,000 hectares. United States, White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “2004 Coca and Opium Poppy Estimates for Colombia and the Andes” (Washington: March 25, 2005) <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press05/032505.html>.
- UN figure: 2003 = 86,000 hectares; 2004 = 80,000 hectares. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia coca cultivation survey for 2004 (Vienna: June 2005) <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/andean/Part3_Colombia.pdf>.
[2] Office of National Drug Control Policy data cited in Washington Office on Latin America, “Data used in ‘Are We There Yet?’ from the Drug War Monitor series” (Washington: WOLA, November 2004) <http://www.wola.org/ddhr/ddhr_data_measures.htm>.
United States, Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2005 (Washington: February 2005) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs11/12620/index.htm>.
[3] United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rights Bogotá Field Office, “Consideraciones sobre la ley de ‘Justicia y Paz’” (Bogotá: June 27, 2005) <http://www.hchr.org.co/publico/comunicados/2005/comunicados2005.php3?cod=35&cat=58>.
[4] “La ley del embudo,” Semana 1216 (Bogotá: August 21, 2005) <http://semana2.terra.com.co/opencms/opencms/Semana/sumario.html?id=1216>.
[5] “Parte de los 21.400 millones de dólares que circulan en el país viene de Ralito,” El Tiempo (Bogotá: September 10, 2005) <http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/judi/2005-09-11/ARTICULO-WEB-_NOTA_INTERIOR-2523956.html>.
[6] Presidencia de Colombia, “El Presidente en la Voz de América,” (Bogotá: Sistema de Noticias del Estado, July 1, 2005) <http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2005/julio/01/02012005.htm>.
[7] “‘Paras’ han convertido la extradición en ‘rey de burlas,’” El Heraldo (Barranquilla, Colombia: August 25, 2005).
Posted by isacson at 05:57 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
September 08, 2005
A carefully scripted event in New Jersey
During last year’s presidential election, most of President Bush’s campaign appearances were closed to anyone who did not first sign a form declaring his or her support for the President. This ensured that there would be no unpleasant surprises amid the cheering crowds at pro-Bush rallies and the softball questioners at heavily scripted “town hall meetings.” President Bush was not forced to confront his critics, and nothing marred the image being presented for the cameras.
Colombian President Álvaro Uribe isn’t being quite that extreme. No loyalty oaths will be needed to attend the town-hall meeting (“consejo coumitario”) he will hold with Colombians living in the United States, in the New York suburb of Elizabeth, NJ, on September 18. (Uribe will be in the area after attending next week’s annual kickoff of the UN General Assembly.) The meeting is modeled on the nationally televised consejos that Uribe holds throughout Colombia, in which he answers questions or hears complaints from local citizens.
But don’t think that this means you can just show up at Elizabeth’s Ritz Theater and ask a tough question or make a critical comment. Taking a page from the Bush campaign’s playbook, the meeting’s organizers are carefully staging it.
You can only attend the event if you have first called [(212)798 9012, (212)798 9019 or (212)798 9041] and arranged to have an invitation mailed to you. You will only be allowed to ask a question if you have first faxed it in [(908) 245 6969] and had it approved.
The President's handlers hope to project images of a can-do president spontaneously fielding questions from concerned citizens. But what they are putting together is a publicity stunt with hand-picked questions from a pre-arranged crowd.
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September 07, 2005
Don't call it counter-insurgency
“I don't think we will put much energy into trying, the old saying, win hearts and minds. I don't look at that as one of the metrics of success.” – Gen. Thomas F. Metz, a senior U.S. commander in Iraq, August 2004
In a recent meeting with a senior Colombian Army official, the subject turned to U.S. military assistance. He told me that he had found U.S. helicopters, equipment and intelligence to be useful – but that U.S. military training was of little benefit. “You [the United States] don’t know how to fight insurgencies. Look at Iraq.”
He has a point, but it’s not clear that they are having much more success in Colombia, where one military offensive after another fails to hold onto territory, and the FARC guerrillas have increased the frequency of their attacks, especially this year. The guerrillas have weathered the Colombian government’s U.S.-supported military campaign of the past few years, despite their evident unpopularity throughout the country.
In both Iraq and Colombia, the failure of counter-insurgency strategies is plain to see. Iraqi insurgents have not been weakened by the U.S. approach, which combines search-and-destroy military sweeps, detentions and interrogations, and excruciatingly slow investment in economic needs and civilian governance. Similarly, the U.S.-aided “Democratic Security” effort in Colombia – which combines large-scale military offensives like “Plan Patriota,” fumigations, informant networks, mass arrests and insufficient social and economic aid – is also getting bogged down.
As a result, military analysts of both Iraq and Colombia have been busily writing about how to fine-tune counter-insurgency strategies. U.S. trainers are trying to hand off more responsibility to new Iraqi forces, while urging the Colombians to work jointly and increase their mobility. The Rand Corporation [PDF format] and others urge a return to the “hearts and minds” efforts that marked counter-insurgency efforts of colonial powers half a century ago. Alfredo Rangel, the oft-quoted director of Colombia’s Security and Democracy Foundation, says that Colombia’s military should be fighting not in empty areas like the “Plan Patriota” zone, but to start by clearing the guerrillas from where people actually live. A similar strategy for Iraq is proposed in an article by Andrew Krepinevich in the current issue of Foreign Affairs; the author urges U.S. forces to expand the zone of security for Iraqi citizens like an “oil spot” expands on the surface of water.
One thing these critics have in common is that they all are calling on governments to do more to win the support of the people who live in the conflict zones. “Rather than focusing on killing insurgents, they should concentrate on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people, thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need,” writes Krepinevich. Cautions Rand’s Bruce Hoffman, “A supposedly well-known military aphorism asserts, ‘Ignoring the civil side of counterinsurgency . . . [is like] playing chess while the enemy is playing poker.’” Adds Rangel [PDF format], “Obviously, the Gordian knot of this conflict [in Colombia] cannot be untied exclusively with the policy of the sword, but it will also necessarily require the sword of politics.”
It’s refreshing to hear counter-insurgency experts admit that overwhelming military force alone won’t end the violence – that improving governance and building the civilian population’s trust in the government actually matter too. It’s good to hear them suggest that it’s not such a good idea for a government to introduce itself to long-neglected citizens by rounding them up and arresting them. It’s good to hear more talk about protecting citizens and providing basic services. It’s good to hear more of a recognition that poverty and lack of opportunity contribute to the problem. (President Uribe, on the other hand, has said on several occasions [like this one] that “terrorism” is the cause of Colombia’s poverty, and not the other way around.)
These critics are right when they point out that racking up body counts will never bring victory – particularly against a group like the FARC, whose fighters are at least one-third minors and 40% female, many recruited because they saw no other options, and who are easily replaced. They are right when they criticize a strategy of carrying out military sweeps through regions, leaving no part of the civilian government behind, only to see the armed groups return when the soldiers leave. They are right when they point out the damage done when military personnel commit arbitrary abuses (or tolerate paramilitary abuses) with impunity, and when government representatives establish an adversarial relationship with the population through searches, seizures, mass arrests and a general attitude of disdain and disrespect.
But these critics don’t go anywhere near far enough. They are military strategists, and while they write at length about the security aspects of ideas like the “oil spot” strategy, they are often frustratingly vague about what it means to win “hearts and minds.” For the most part, it’s hard to tell whether they’re calling for a big investment in civilian governance and a “Marshall Plan” for long-neglected zones, or whether they think the soldiers themselves can handle the problem by building a few wells and roads while being nicer to the local population. Counter-insurgency proponents rarely talk with any specificity about strengthening the non-military part of the government and helping to deliver services to neglected populations. That seems to be left up to the politicians.
Our side – the human rights community, the peace movement, advocates of economic justice – needs to take part in this debate. We have to take on the counter-insurgency people because they have got it completely wrong – after all, they’ve made counter-insurgency their main purpose. In fact, their narrow focus on defeating insurgents is a big reason why they are failing.
But our side has been too quiet – absent, really – in this debate. There is a good reason for this: terms like “counter-insurgency” or “expanding government authority” raise images of soldiers abusing civilians, people disappearing, and small economic elites expanding their stranglehold over unequal societies. Why participate in a debate about how best to use military force to preserve an unjust order?
Instead, we call for respecting human rights, increasing economic aid, and renewing negotiations. (In Iraq, we call for withdrawal, often without discussing what we would leave behind.) But we haven’t coherently framed it as an answer to the question: when armed groups are killing civilians, how do you propose to protect them?
We would answer that question by transcending the narrow, failed focus on counter-insurgency. We should put it as clearly as possible: in Colombia, the main goal is not to defeat the FARC. The main goal is to protect citizens, help them prosper, and give them a functioning government ruled by law. If progress can be made toward that goal, the guerrillas’ eventual decline and fall will be just one of many side benefits. Achieving this goal, after all, would require a revolutionary change in the way that Colombia’s government – and its small economic elite – relates to its people. (Not to mention in the way that the United States relates to Latin America.)
This doesn’t mean rejecting all of the precepts of counter-insurgency. It makes sense to focus on winning hearts and minds, and by recognizing that the mission is mainly political, not military. The “oil spot” approach is promising, too; it makes sense to impose the rule of law and to protect and serve the population over an ever-expanding geographic area.
But the effort must be mostly non-military, and most resources have to go to non-military needs. (By contrast, 80 percent of U.S. aid to Colombia since 2000 has gone to the military and police. This is terribly misguided.) Soldiers – when they act with full respect for human rights, and are punished when they violate them – do have a key role to play. They are needed to expand the “oil spot” initially. They must be seen as escorting the rest of the government into areas where it has not been present – and Colombia has an abundance of such areas. But the zone of government control will shrink right back unless the following happens immediately.
1. Citizen security. The population must feel that the government can protect them, from armed groups as well as common crime. This means bringing in police who are trained in working with civilians (as opposed to military personnel trained to destroy an enemy). These security professionals must not only be equipped to respond to threats, but they must win the trust of local populations accustomed to living under the sway of illegal groups. This means punishing any abuses, corruption and predatory behavior in their ranks systematically, transparently and promptly. In day-to-day interactions, it means treating citizens as potential allies instead of suspected guerrilla supporters.
2. Justice. In order to punish abuses and common crime, as well as to resolve disputes before they get out of hand, and to guarantee that citizens can exercise their rights (ranging from free speech to protection of their landholdings), the justice system has to establish a quick presence. Judges and prosecutors will need to be equipped to do their jobs, and will need decent security if they are to pursue cases against powerful defendants.
3. Humanitarian assistance. The best way that the government can win the population’s support is by attending to its most urgent concerns beyond security: food, shelter, and health care. Most conflictive areas have a large population of internally displaced people, and nearly 85 percent of rural Colombians live in poverty. Emergency assistance to help meet these immediate needs will greatly increase the government’s credibility.
4. Infrastructure and basic services. Efforts to meet urgent needs must be followed by efforts to make the region’s legal economy viable. This means getting power and clean water to areas that need them, paving well-traveled roads and extending the reach of the education and health systems. It means offering credit and technical assistance in exchange for voluntary eradication of drug crops.
This is the most expensive part of the entire effort. It’s the sort of thing that used to be derided as “nation-building.” That term has a negative connotation, however, only if it’s all happening with U.S. funds. If Colombian elites are contributing the lion’s share of the cost of building their own nation, the picture changes dramatically. The richest Colombians, who control most of the country’s wealth, must contribute much more. In turn, these resources are managed transparently, with swift punishment for corruption or mismanagement. It will require a significant improvement in local government’s ability to administer them. While expensive, these investments will do the most to build long-term loyalty to the government – and will deal the greatest blow to the insurgents.
Increasing the “oil spot” of civilian governance will require a sharp reordering of the U.S. and Colombian governments’ priorities. Resources must be channeled away from costly military offensives. But even with enough resources, it will not be easy. Even if all of the above efforts are made, the “oil spot” will shrink right back if these interlocking efforts don’t happen all at once, in a coordinated way. There’s no sense introducing the government into a zone if abuses aren’t going to be punished; that would just increase ill will and no citizen will turn to the authorities for protection. There’s no sense in building infrastructure if there’s no “sheriff” present to keep it from being sabotaged. But there’s no sense in deploying police if the illegal groups who kill cops are the only ones doing any hiring. And there’s absolutely no sense in antagonizing the population with mass or arbitrary arrests, fumigations or unpunished human-rights abuses.
This is, in very general terms, what our side would propose, instead of just “a new approach to counter-insurgency,” in Krepinevich’s words. Expanding the government’s non-military presence into new territories, enforcing the laws, providing badly needed services and punishing abuses when they happen, is not only the best way to govern Colombia, it’s the best possible way to weaken Colombian insurgents. A population that trusts its government and wants it to stay will offer intelligence willingly, and it will shun those who join or support violent groups. By contrast, a population that sees only its government’s soldiers and spray planes will take no risks and choose no sides, focusing merely on what it needs to do to survive.
Expanding the non-military “oil spot” would not only make Colombia more socially just and well-governed, it would deal a stronger blow to violent groups and the drug trade than Plan Colombia could ever have contemplated. But in order to promote an alternative to the failed strategy of the present, we have to start talking about it more coherently and consistently.
Posted by isacson at 01:36 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
August 25, 2005
Alberto Gonzales, meet "Gordo Lindo"
Yesterday, U.S. Attorney-General Alberto Gonzales was in Bogotá praising the Uribe government to the skies, calling Colombia a “beacon to the world.”
Gonzales emphasized the Colombian government’s increased willingness to extradite drug suspects to the United States.
Extradition is a critical tool for both our countries in the battle to ensure that criminals are brought to justice. The extradition partnership the United States has with Colombia is the best we have in the world. This important relationship enables both countries to deal effectively and forcefully with serious criminal organizations and individuals.
Well, not all serious criminal organizations and individuals.
At the same time Gonzales was making his remarks, the main front of the AUC’s Pacific Bloc was demobilizing, in a ceremony presided over by a longtime narcotrafficker who, though indicted by a U.S. court, is unlikely ever to face U.S. justice.
The front’s 150 members turned in 144 weapons Tuesday in the department of Chocó. They did so in the presence of their “political chief,” Francisco Javier Zuluaga Lindo, known as “Gordo Lindo” (which translates as “fat pretty man”).
Zuluaga himself will formally demobilize on Saturday. When he does, it will be a major victory for all Colombian narcotraffickers who joined the AUC in the hope of avoiding extradition to the United States.
The 35-year-old Zuluaga does not have a long history in the AUC, though he has been in the drug-trafficking business since the days of the Medellín cartel fifteen or so years ago. He was part of the organization of Medellín cartel figures Fabio and Jorge Ochoa. Later, after the Medellín and Cali cartels disappeared, he worked with Alejandro “Juvenal” Bernal Madrigal, one of the largest drug-traffickers of the late 1990s. Zuluaga narrowly escaped capture in 1999, when “Juvenal” was arrested in “Operation Millennium,” a major DEA-Colombian Police sting operation. Since then, he has been a fugitive, maintaining ties to the country’s largest drug organization, the Northern Valle cartel. In 1999, a court in Fort Lauderdale indicted him for narcotrafficking.
None of this stopped him from winning a position in the AUC. About three years ago, just as the Uribe government was beginning its negotiations with the paramilitaries, AUC leader Diego Fernando Murillo (“Don Berna,” another recently arrived paramilitary with a long history in the drug underworld) made him the political chief of the Pacific Bloc, which operates in the departments of Chocó and Valle del Cauca (from just south of Panama to just south of Cali).
Colombian Senator Jimmy Chamorro denounced this week that “Gordo Lindo” paid $5 million for his paramilitary status. He “opened his checkbook and bought a franchise to convert himself from a narcotrafficker into a paramilitary chief. This cannot be allowed.”
Zuluaga’s tenuous status in the AUC was evidenced by this bizarre exchange with Pacific Bloc commander “Johnatan Guevara” on Tuesday on Colombia’s “La W” radio network, reported by El Tiempo.
The man who answered the call not only denied having participated in the drug business but also denied that “Gordo Lindo” is the maximum leader of the “Pacific”: “Since the process began, many people who are commanders have come to Ralito [the zone where negotiations have taken place]. … We didn’t even know their names, and we’ve only seen them for the first time now.”
He added that “Zuluaga has not been in this zone. We have nothing to do with him. No narcotrafficking has happened here,” said the man, with a Chocó accent.
Minutes later, one of the reporters [from “La W”] received a call. It was “Comandante Johnatan,” asking to rectify the comments that had been transmitted over “La W” about the Pacific Bloc and its relationship with “Gordo Lindo.”
… “I think one of the muchachos who picked up my phone thought someone was playing a practical joke. He never thought that it would be the press, so he started to say stupid things,” assured “Johnatan Guevara,” military chief of the Pacific Bloc.
The new incident reinforced doubts about the status of Francisco Javier Zuluaga, alias “Gordo Lindo,” as a true paramilitary chief, instead of a narco-trafficker who “parachuted” into the ranks of the AUC.
… Another interview was arranged, which was to take place on the same cellphone. But the paramilitary chief never answered again.
As a demobilizing paramilitary, “Gordo Lindo” will benefit from the very lenient so-called “Justice and Peace” law that the Colombian Congress narrowly passed, at the Uribe government’s urging, in June. He will be required to confess to past crimes, including narcotrafficking, which he will argue was fundraising for the paramilitary cause. For his misdeeds he will be sentenced to 5 to 8 years – really 3 ½ to 6 ½ years, subtracting time spent negotiating – in a “prison” that might actually be house arrest at a rural estate.
Having paid this light penalty, “Gordo Lindo” may not be extradited, as under Colombian law this would be “double jeopardy” – being punished twice for the same crime. The “Justice and Peace” law also considers paramilitarism to be a “political crime,” which the Colombian Constitution states is not an extraditable offense; if Zuluaga’s lawyers can argue that his narcotrafficking was “connected” to the political crime of paramilitarism, he may not be extradited for his drug-dealing.
According to Senator Chamorro, with the cases of “Gordo Lindo” and other narcos-turned-paramilitary-leaders, “the government has made extradition into a huge joke.”
Yesterday, Colombian reporters did ask Attorney-General Gonzales whether the cases of “Gordo Lindo” and other paramilitary traffickers don’t call into question the U.S.-Colombian “extradition partnership” he had praised so highly in his comments. He responded vaguely: “Our general objective is to bring to justice any person who commits crimes against the American people, or who carries out criminal activities against U.S. interests.”
What is happening right now with “Gordo Lindo” and other demobilizing AUC leaders violates that “general objective” in both letter and spirit. Yet the U.S. Attorney-General, our maximum law-enforcement official, did not condemn it when given an opportunity to do so.
Why, then, did he bother to visit Bogotá?
Posted by isacson at 12:37 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
August 23, 2005
Rep. McGovern: The U.S. should change course
Here's an English translation of the op-ed that Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts) published in the Colombian daily El Tiempo last Saturday.
El Tiempo, August 20, 2005
The U.S. Should Change Course in Colombia
U.S. Congressman James P. McGovern, Democratic Representative of Massachusetts
For the past few years, I have offered amendments in the U.S. House of Representatives to cut, limit or condition military aid to Colombia. My hope was never to walk away from Colombia, but to achieve a better balance in our failing strategy toward Colombia.
Colombia is not just the source of 90 percent of cocaine on U.S. streets. Many of your own people suffer from an intractable forty-year war with groups the State Department considers terrorists. Vast stretches of the national territory are totally ungoverned.
Yet Colombia was facing exactly the same set of challenges five years ago, when President Clinton signed into law "Plan Colombia." After five years and $4 billion, making Colombia the largest U.S. aid recipient outside the Middle East, little has changed.
This money has not paid for a balanced strategy. Eighty percent has gone to Colombia's military and police. For every four dollars spent on helicopters, guns and military trainers, only one has gone to feed millions of displaced families, to make a broken judicial system function, or to help people in neglected rural areas make a decent, legal living.
The results in the United States have also been depressing but predictable. Not only is cocaine just as cheap and plentiful here as it was in 2000, but last year saw no drop in the amount of coca being grown in Colombia.
While President Uribe deserves congratulations for reducing several measures of violence, such as kidnappings, guerrilla groups remain far from the negotiating table, territorial gains have been very few, forced displacement is increasing, and recent months have seen a spike in guerrilla attacks. Worse, for the past two years the United Nations has documented an increase in human rights violations by military personnel. Meanwhile, President Uribe's main step toward "peace" has been a likely deal with the paramilitaries that will allow them to pay brief sentences in luxurious jails despite having massacred thousands of innocent people, while avoiding extradition despite having sent tons of drugs to my country.
During his visit to Texas, President Uribe asked President Bush for additional funds to support this deal with the paramilitaries. He also asked for more military assistance and more planes to spray herbicides over coca-growing peasants.
Rather than more military aid, the United States instead should have offered more resources to help the Colombian government regain control of territory by utilizing all of the nation's resources - not just soldiers but courts, schools, clinics and roads, and funds for the necessary teachers, health care workers, legal experts and construction workers. The United States should help demobilize the paramilitaries, but only if we can be confident that the process does not leave mass murderers in charge of politically powerful criminal networks.
Our drug policy could do much more if we reduced demand by providing treatment for our own addicts, while carrying out a genuine effort to alleviate the economic desperation that pushes poor farmers into the coca and poppy trade in Colombia. Sadly, President Bush chose to follow the status quo of more military aid, despite continued impunty on key Colombian human rights cases.
I have visited some of the poorest, most conflictive corners of Colombia. And as member of the U.S. Congress, I want to support a policy for Colombia that promotes stability, justice, human rights and peace. For that to happen, both the Colombian government and the U.S. government must change course. Immediately.
Posted by isacson at 09:54 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
August 17, 2005
2 op-eds that didn't make it
In a feature that we hope won't be a regular one, we present two recent op-eds that no newspaper was willing to publish. Though they're now too outdated to re-submit, we post them here so that at least somebody gets to read them.
Neither Justice Nor Peace in Colombia
By Winifred Tate and Adam Isacson
Late July 2005
The president of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe, will visit President Bush at his Crawford, Texas ranch on August 4. While the United States has given Colombia $4 billion in aid since 2000, Mr. Uribe will come to Crawford asking for still more.
High on his list will be a request for as much as $80 million to demobilize 20,000 fighters from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a powerful umbrella organization of private, pro-government militias known as "paramilitaries." On its face, this request would merit consideration. Uribe has been a staunch ally of the Bush Administration, and he claims that getting these fighters off the battlefield can help his government focus on ending its 40-year-old war against leftist insurgents.
But after more than two years of talks with the AUC, the process looks less likely to dismantle the paramilitaries than to "re-brand" them.
The paramilitaries are not freedom fighters keeping Colombian peasants safe from guerrillas. The AUC is a major drug-trafficking organization on the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). At least eleven of its leaders, many of whom are sitting down with Colombian government representatives in a demilitarized zone, face indictments for shipping drugs to the United States, and the AUC continues to send tons of cocaine to our shores.
Diego Murillo ("Don Berna") is typical of the AUC leadership. Starting out as a mid-level bagman in Pablo Escobar's Medellín Cartel, Murillo went on to work for the Cali cartel, then led a band of hitmen feared throughout Medellín, before finding his way into the AUC in 2000 or 2001. In July 2004 a New York prosecutor, calling him the AUC's "de facto leader," indicted Murillo for narco-trafficking.
On May 30, Colombia's Attorney General ordered his arrest for planning a state legislator's murder. Instead of being arrested, however, Murillo was allowed to "demobilize" and granted the right to pass his time in a rural estate, while he is likely to receive a light sentence under a so-called "Justice and Peace Law" passed in June by a slim majority of Colombia's Congress.
This new law, which promises neither justice nor peace, is alarming to anybody who cares about human rights or counter-narcotics. It allows sentences - even for hardened criminals involved in hundreds of cases of murder and drug trafficking - of five to eight years maximum, which may be served in "rural estates." These penalties can be reduced to less than four years with credits for "time served" while negotiating.
After demobilized paramilitaries give voluntary statements - in which they are not required to reveal what they know about their leadership and support networks - the law gives a total of 20 prosecutors 36 hours to file charges, and 60 days to complete their investigations. Given that we are talking about hundreds of individuals and thousands of very serious crimes, the chances of adequate investigations are remote at best.
The new law would cripple the war on drugs, preventing paramilitary narco-traffickers from being extradited to the United States. The provision makes paramilitary activity - which almost certainly includes drug-trafficking to support the AUC cause - a "political crime," which under Colombia's constitution cannot be subject to extradition.
Worse, the law does little to dismantle a paramilitary power structure that is increasing its grip over Colombia's illegal economy and local politics. In most peace processes, it is safely assumed that the armed group in question will disappear - or at least stop killing people and breaking the law - after negotiations conclude. This is not a likely result of the AUC talks: the weak "Justice and Peace" law does not prevent the paramilitaries from transforming themselves into a powerful combination of mafia and death squad.
As AUC leaders receive clean slates and get to keep most of their power, Colombia will have taken a huge step toward becoming the "narco-democracy" that U.S. policymakers have feared for so long. The Bush Administration and Congress would do well to beware this Trojan horse, writing no checks for a process that promises peace but instead will make clear to Colombians that, in their country, crime does pay.
What are we certifying in Colombia?
By Robert E. White
Late June / early July 2005
(Robert White, a former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador, is president of the Center for International Policy in Washington.)
When Bill Clinton introduced "Plan Colombia" in 2000 - a $1.3 billion package of mostly military aid to Colombia - it was billed as a program to eradicate coca plants in order to make cocaine too expensive and hard to buy in this country. Many lawmakers had doubts, because the Colombian military was to be the main recipient of the package. Colombia's armed forces have the worst human rights record in the hemisphere, with a long record of supporting paramilitary death squads that the United States lists among international terrorist groups.
But some doubters were appeased, because a portion of the military aid would be subject to the State Department's certification, twice each year, that the Colombian government was vigorously prosecuting violators and breaking ties with paramilitary organizations.
Five years and four billion dollars later, the drug trade continues unabated. The price of cocaine on U.S. streets is even lower, and the number of users - including high school students - is higher.
The human rights situation remains critical, despite the State Department's certification requirement. In the face of persistent evidence of collaboration between the Colombian military and paramilitary organizations, the State Department has regularly certified Colombian progress on human rights. But the accumulated evidence and events this year gave Bush administration officials hesitation.
On February 21, eight residents of San José de Apartadó, a community in a combat area that has publicly declared that it does not support any armed group, were brutally murdered. Residents stated that army troops committed the massacre, but Vice President Francisco Santos made public statements implicating guerrillas before any investigation had occurred. Meanwhile, at the crime sites, soldiers tampered with murder weapons in front of many witnesses.
To the west, in the Afro-Colombian region of Chocó near the Pacific Ocean, paramilitary forces operate freely, threatening communities in areas under ostensible military control. "We ask ourselves with more and more discomfort whom the Armed Forces protect and whom they fight," three Catholic bishops from the area wrote President Alvaro Uribe in April, "because we continue to suffer on a daily basis situations that would be completely unacceptable for a country with the rule of law."
The systematic nature of government-paramilitary collaboration can be seen in the Colombian law passed last week that defines Colombia's future relationship with paramilitary commanders. It allows those who organized and committed massacres and other atrocities to serve little or no jail time, to keep lands they seized from their victims, and to go on without confessing to their crimes, which include extensive drug trafficking. Several of these terrorist leaders are wanted in the United States on charges of trafficking in tons of cocaine, but by classifying the commanders as "political" opponents, the new law exempts them from extradition.
The human rights conditions in U.S. law require the Colombian military to suspend soldiers or police credibly reported to have committed violations, but the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reports having no knowledge of suspensions for any serious human rights violations by security force personnel.
As a supplier of more than $700 million in annual assistance, the United States has enormous leverage to generate the political will needed to investigate and prosecute the men responsible for the torrent of brutal abuses of Colombian civilians. The United States should follow the law and decline to certify the Colombian military's human rights record, withholding some $90 million in equipment until the law's requirements are met. The pressure thus exerted could finally bring the Colombian government to take seriously the demands of ethics and law, to respect the victims of these crimes, and to prosecute the perpetrators.
Posted by isacson at 03:18 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
August 13, 2005
Why mycoherbicides are still a stupid idea
The idea of spraying spores and fungi over Colombia’s coca-growing zones is like one of those horror movie villains who keeps appearing to be dead once and for all, only to pop up again in the next scene (or sequel). Like a lot of bad ideas in Washington, the use of mycoherbicides – particularly Fusarium oxysporum – is still in play thanks to a small corps of House Republican hardliners.
Mycoherbicides popped up yet again on June 16, when Indiana Republican Reps. Dan Burton and Mark Souder slipped an amendment into the House Government Reform Committee’s draft of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act (H.R. 2829), which makes changes to the law governing the White House Drug Czar’s office. (The text of the bill, as changed by the committee, is still not available online.) As part of a “manager’s amendment” – a series of changes proposed by the committee’s chairman – the mycoherbicide provision was subject to no debate and no separate vote.
The amendment would require the Drug Czar to produce a “plan of action” for carrying out scientific research about mycoherbicides, and a similar plan “to conduct controlled scientific testing of naturally existing mycoherbicide in a major drug producing nation” (such as Colombia, the only country that allows any fumigation at all).
In the two members’ press release, Rep. Souder insists that “mycoherbicide research needs to be investigated, and we need to begin testing it in the field. The potential benefit of these fungi is tremendous.” (Souder is also the reason why, as tens of thousands of kids have found, being arrested for drug possession means you’ll never get financial aid for college, no matter whether you’ve cleaned up your act. Bad ideas just seem to stick to him like flypaper.)
The bill probably won’t go anywhere; the Senate doesn’t even have a version of its own, and is unlikely to approve something so controversial anyway. But it’s still remarkable that this idea isn’t completely dead.
As herbicide expert Jeremy Bigwood (who maintains the mycoherbicide.info website) has thoroughly documented, there is good reason to be strongly concerned about the health and environmental impact of mycoherbicides. There is no guarantee, for instance, that they will kill only coca, how readily they will mutate, and how quickly they could spread into the ecosystem even if only tested.
Bigwood wrote a recent piece on the NarcoNews website recounting the history of attempts to push mycoherbicides both at home and abroad. It’s too much to summarize here, but it’s worth recalling that the fungi were briefly part of the original Plan Colombia law.
In the language of the original Plan Colombia appropriation back in 2000, Souder, Burton and a few other House Republicans had added a condition – in the same section as human rights conditions! – requiring the Colombian government to agree to a counternarcotics strategy including “tested, environmentally safe mycoherbicides.” The law allowed the Clinton Administration to waive the entire section of conditions – that is, to skip the whole process entirely, human rights, mycoherbicides and all – which it did immediately. Future human-rights conditions did not include a waiver provision, and the mycoherbicide language also disappeared.
The Bush Administration, too, is reluctant to support the idea. When Rep. Burton (calling them “micro-herbicides”) asked about the possibility of testing them during a May committee hearing, Drug Czar John Walters said no, citing “concern about other agents being introduced to the environment. The Colombian government has also said that it is not interested. Again, it is not clear that this particular organism is specific to coca… If you were to drop [spray] it – and it is not specific to coca – it could cause considerable damage to the environment which in Colombia is very delicate.”
While health and environment concerns should be enough to drive a stake through the heart of the mycoherbicide monster, there is an even more compelling reason why their use is a dumb idea. Mycoherbicides – like fumigation itself – are just another shortcut, another seemingly cheap, short-term fix to a problem that has much deeper roots.
Imagine that years and millions of dollars’ worth of research finally comes up with a fungus that somehow kills only coca, without mutating into anything else or doing any damage to human health or ecosystems. This magic organism would probably disrupt the cocaine market for several years, forcing wealthy drug lords to shift production to other countries, or to alter the coca genome to come up with some magic coca bush that resists the fungus.
For a few years, this disruption would likely take some money out of Colombia’s conflict. Guerrillas and paramilitaries – who currently get at least half of their funding from the drug trade – would be forced to adjust by increasing kidnapping, extortion, production of other drugs, or other profitable organized-crime activity. It would take the armed groups up to a few years to recover their earlier revenue streams.
That’s about all the impact this magic mycoherbicide would have, though. In the absence of social investment in Colombia’s neglected, violent rural areas, 85 percent of the population would continue to live in poverty as it does today. Rural Colombians would continue to distrust a government that sends soldiers and fungi in lieu of doctors, roads or teachers.
In fact, by taking away a crop that was feeding them and replacing it with nothing, the magic mycoherbicide would probably increase anger at the Colombian government, working to the guerrillas’ or paramilitaries’ advantage. It would be counterinsurgency in reverse.
Meanwhile, in the absence of investment in Colombia’s beleaguered and inefficient judicial system, impunity would still be the rule, and those who engage in illegal activity would have little to fear from judges and prosecutors whom they can bribe and intimidate. Violence and organized crime would still thrive, even if fungi killed all the coca.
Even the most perfect herbicide wouldn’t bring Colombia’s conflict to an end. Guerrillas and paramilitaries would still be able to draw on a reserve army of people with no other economic opportunities and no reason to trust their government. They, and those who support them, would still remain above the law.
The most perfect mycoherbicide would only eliminate coca bushes. It wouldn’t eliminate poverty, impunity, corruption, or the Colombian government’s inability to administer its territory. Even the most perfect mycoherbicide would be yet another misguided shortcut, a gimmick to avoid doing what really needs to be done. That’s why it’s a stupid idea. This particular horror movie needs no sequel.
Posted by isacson at 11:55 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
August 10, 2005
More Colombia aid this fall?
Since September 11, 2001, and especially after the Iraq invasion, the Bush Administration has come to Congress once every year with additional budget requests – called “emergency supplementals” – to fund the “war on terror.” (H.R. 2888 was signed into law on September 18, 2001. H.R. 4775 on August 2, 2002. H.R. 1559 on April 16, 2003. H.R. 3289 on November 6, 2003. H.R. 1268 on May 11, 2005.)
These emergency supplementals have occasionally included funds for Colombia. The last two have not – but the next one probably will. The Bush Administration is likely to ask for more Colombia aid in its next request, which could come before Congress as early as this fall.
For the U.S. government’s budget, 2006 begins on October 1, when the new “fiscal year” gets underway. With a new budget year may come a new request, and Congress – undistracted by campaigning in a non-election year – will be around to consider it. Several sources have indicated to me that a supplemental request may indeed be on its way before the end of the year.
If that happens, we may see one or both of the following requests for Colombia:
1. Up to $150 million for new spray planes, helicopters, DC-3 aircraft and electronic intercept equipment for Colombia’s security forces. This request, formulated by President Uribe, was presented in a May letter to House appropriators from four prominent Republicans (and discussed by us here). The request went nowhere, largely because by May, the appropriators would have had to cut $150 million from other countries’ aid in order to fund it, and the State Department did not push for it.
But the push for the additional package continues. It was the subject of a syndicated column by Robert Novak (written with heavy input from Republican House staff) published Monday, and a letter last week from Rep. Dan Burton (R-Indiana) to President Bush. According to Novak and other sources, when Uribe mentioned this request to President Bush at the two leaders’ meeting last Thursday in Crawford, Texas, Bush turned to the State Department officials present and told them (paraphrasing) “to get Uribe what he needs.”
So expect this request, or something like it, to be in the next emergency supplemental. We, of course, oppose it. First of all, the request would really be more than $150 million: since the United States pays nearly all maintenance costs for the hardware it has already donated, the upkeep, parts, fuel and related costs – most paid to contractors, since Colombia has assumed little maintenance responsibility – will add another $10-20 million per year to future aid packages.
Second, most of the request will pay to expand fumigations, a cruel strategy that has already proven unable to reduce the availability of Colombian drugs here at home. If the United States really has an additional $150 million available to reduce drug supplies coming from Colombia, it should go to expand alternative development in parts of Colombia that have seen a lot of fumigation but almost no investment in economic alternatives, such as Nariño, Meta, Guaviare or Caquetá. $150 million in new economic aid would go far toward fixing our terribly unbalanced strategy in Colombia.
2. An unknown amount to support the paramilitary demobilization process. According to a Reuters report from yesterday, the Justice Department has issued a secret legal opinion that gives a green light to U.S. aid for the re-integration of demobilized paramilitaries. The opinion should end more than a year of bureaucratic wrangling over whether aiding former members of the AUC, a group on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations, would constitute “material support to terrorists” under the PATRIOT act.
The Uribe government has been asking the Bush administration to aid this process, which CIP, many other organizations, and many key members of the U.S. Congress believe is going to trample victims’ rights, legalize stolen assets, and leave much of the AUC intact. The 2006 foreign aid request includes little or no money for U.S. aid to the paramilitary demobilizations. If the Bush Administration plans to fund the process, then, the next emergency supplemental will be its only opportunity to do so before 2007.
As we have recommended several times elsewhere, and as Human Rights Watch cogently argues in a report released last week, the United States should distance itself from this very flawed process. We understand, though, that the paramilitaries’ rank-and-file includes thousands of young men who have not committed “crimes against humanity” and now find themselves unemployed and with few opportunities. We are not opposed to aiding these individuals if – and this is a big “if” – the United States can identify ex-paramilitaries who (1) are not guilty of gross violations and (2) have verifiably cut their links with their old commanders, and are not part of new paramilitary structures.
However, the “Justice and Peace” law Colombia’s government is using to verify innocence and dismantlement is too weak. Just because a demobilized paramilitary has been cleared by the Colombian government’s rapid, disorganized verification process – which relies on voluntary confessions and a 60-day time limit for overworked investigators to do their job – does not give us enough confidence that he is truly innocent of crimes against humanity and has truly left the orbit of the AUC. If the United States is to provide any aid to demobilized rank-and-file paramilitaries, it will have to hold them to a higher standard of verification.
Finally, a note of caution about this posting. All of the above is a prediction, based on recent discussions, and it could be way off. It’s entirely possible that neither of these aid requests for Colombia will end up in the emergency supplemental. It’s even possible that there won’t be an emergency supplemental at all before the end of the year. But for now, we’re operating on the assumption that we’ll be facing another big Colombia aid debate this fall.
Posted by isacson at 12:27 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
August 08, 2005
Catching up after an eventful week
I apologize for the lack of postings during the past seven days, due to a long-planned week of vacation, with minimal Internet access.
I had thought that the first week of August – usually a slower-paced time in Washington, with Congress away and academia shut down – would be a good time to be absent. Instead, it turned out to be a very eventful week. At least six events passed me by:
1. Álvaro Uribe met President Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas. And apparently nothing happened. The visit received surprisingly little attention. Of the top 25 most-circulated newspapers in the country, only the Miami Herald, Houston Chronicle, and LA Times reported on it, while the Washington Post gave it a few paragraphs in a larger story. Other papers ran wire-service accounts or nothing at all.
Why so little ink? Apparently, because there was little to report about. As he did on a brief visit to Cartagena last November, President Bush offered Uribe – one of his administration’s only firm allies in the hemisphere – strong words of support and declarations of a commitment to “stay the course.” But no new initiatives were announced, and neither president revealed significant details about their planned future cooperation.
So the media largely ignored the visit. Even many questions at the two presidents’ press conference had nothing to do with Colombia. (President Bush did, however, get a chance to refer to his Secretary of State as “Condoleezza Arroz.”)
If anything, the meeting makes it appear likely that next year, the Bush administration will once again request aid to Colombia totaling over $700 million for 2007. However, an unnamed State Department official told Reuters that a reduction may in fact be in the offing: “We would like them [the Colombians] to share more of the burden.”
The meeting left unclear how committed the Bush administration is to funding the demobilization of paramilitary groups. Officials like Ambassador William Wood and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns have defended the loophole-ridden law that Colombia passed to govern the paramilitary process. President Bush, however, was non-committal when a questioner gave him an opportunity to express support.
Likewise, it remains unclear whether the Bush administration will support President Uribe’s request for $150 million in additional spray planes, helicopters and other equipment, a request that several House Republicans had forwarded to appropriators in May, only to be turned down for lack of room in the foreign-aid budget. This request is clearly not dead, as syndicated columnist and live-TV-profanity-spewer Robert Novak – who gets input from House Republican staff for his periodic pieces about Colombia – today blames the State Department for blocking the additional funding.
2. The State Department issued its first human rights certification in eleven months. As we’d warned two weeks earlier, the State Department on August 1 fulfilled a legal requirement by certifying to Congress that Colombia’s human rights performance has improved. The decision freed up 12.5 percent of military aid for 2004, and another 12.5 percent for 2005, that had been frozen: a total of $70 or $80 million.
The State Department – which for months was simply unable to document any significant advances against impunity for abusers in the Colombian military – deserved praise for holding out as long as it did. But it got little in the way of human-rights improvements. In the end, arrests were made or charges brought against one second lieutenant, one corporal and eight privates for their involvement in two 2004 killings of civilians. No discernible progress has been made in dozens of other cases that remain in impunity, including nearly all of those mentioned in a July 1 letter to Secretary of State Rice from 22 senators [PDF format].
Without progress on human rights, the State Department should not have certified. To do so sends a poor message. It says that the United States cares about human rights in Colombia, to the point where it will freeze aid for months – but if Colombia’s military stands firm and refuses to punish abusers in its ranks, the United States will eventually give in and keep the military aid flowing. The incentive for Colombia’s military is clear: don’t give any ground, for there will be no sanction for inaction.
3. Former President Andrés Pastrana was nominated to be Colombia’s next ambassador to the United States. In July, Colombia’s longtime ambassador, Luis Alberto Moreno, was named to the presidency of the Inter-American Development Bank. Moreno – a tireless lobbyist who required his staff to meet as regularly as possible with congressional staff – is leaving a big vacuum, which President Uribe has chosen to fill with Pastrana, the man who gave Moreno the ambassadorship back in 1998. Pastrana, who has been a harsh and outspoken critic of many of Uribe’s policies, is an odd choice; Uribe, in true Machiavellian fashion, is clearly trying to “keep his enemies close” – but out of the country – as the re-election campaign approaches.
Congressional Republicans – who associate Pastrana with the “soft on terror” approach of having attempted negotiations with the FARC – have made their displeasure known. Republican staffers contacted Colombia’s El Tiempo newspaper to make clear that “Uribe has the right to name whoever he wants, but he should not forget that U.S. support is not guaranteed and he will have to work for it.” Their protests run along the lines of a letter to the editor of the Miami Herald from a Colombian-American Miami state legislator, who wrote that “Pastrana, with his silver-spoon political pedigree, does not have the strength of character to make a difference.”
Never mind that Pastrana brought about Plan Colombia and oversaw an even bigger military buildup than what Uribe has managed. Right-wing Colombians and Americans simply don’t forgive him for trying to negotiate peace with guerrillas.
In fact, the real reasons why proponents of current policies should be worried are Pastrana’s lack of enthusiasm for many of Uribe’s strategies, and his general lack of dynamism. Pastrana has loudly criticized the paramilitary demobilization process, a process he will now find himself trying to defend, and to sell to skeptical congressional funders. The former president, meanwhile, is not known to be an indefatigable worker. While it would be unfair to call him lazy, his style is a contrast to President Uribe – who appears to work 7 days per week, 20 hours per day – and Ambassador Moreno.
4. The Washington Post echoed the Colombian government’s line in an editorial about the paramilitary demobilization process. The August 1 piece, calling on the U.S. government “to do what it can to give this crucial initiative by a democratic ally every chance to succeed,” contrasts sharply with a July 4 New York Times editorial condemning the process as a “capitulation” to the AUC.
The editorial board of the Post, a key voice of the Washington establishment, has a record of hawkishness and insensate pragmatism that includes support for both Plan Colombia and the Iraq war. Its members met with Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos during his mid-July visit to Washington, and the text of their editorial does not stray from the arguments Santos presented. (Compare the Post editorial, for instance, with the speech the vice-president delivered that week at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars [Word (.doc) format].)
5. Human Rights Watch produced an excellent report on the failings of the paramilitary demobilization process. Clearly the Post didn’t consider the arguments laid out in “Smoke and Mirrors: Colombia’s demobilization of paramilitary groups,” a devastating 60-page report released on August 1.
The document, HRW’s first major investigative report on Colombia in nearly two years, brilliantly presents the many failings of the Justice and Peace law, and the growing power of paramilitarism in Colombian politics and society. While much of that ground has been trod by other groups, “Smoke and Mirrors” adds a detailed, step-by-step look at how the demobilization process is playing out, clearly showing the many opportunities it affords paramilitaries to enjoy impunity for atrocities, to avoid paying reparations, and to avoid seeing their groups dismantled. The report, which draws from interviews with demobilized paramilitaries, is highly recommended.
6. Roger Noriega resigned his position as assistant secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Noriega, the senior State Department official for Latin America, had held his post since July of 2003. A former staffer for retired Sen. Jesse Helms known for his archconservative views, Noriega was particularly known for his hard line on Cuba – which came to be accompanied by antipathy to Venezuela. He devoted relatively little attention to Colombia, visiting the country and speaking publicly about it only rarely.
Noriega’s resignation was not a major shock; he had a difficult tenure. The low point was probably the State Department’s repeated inability to win regional support for the United States’ favored candidates to the OAS secretary-generalship. Marcela Sánchez’s Washington Post column on Friday did not mince words:
As a Senate staffer, Noriega often complained about the lack of a comprehensive strategy toward the region. Unfortunately his words and actions during his two years as assistant secretary of state revealed a strategy whose only logic was its anti-Castro obsession. … His frequent miscalculations had exhausted the patience of officials in Washington, many of whom felt, as a Senate Republican aide said this week, that the role of the top U.S. diplomat for Latin America cannot be filled with someone who “only satisfies domestic political concerns.”
Thomas Shannon, a career diplomat who worked with Condoleezza Rice at the National Security Council, is Noriega’s likely successor. While his appointment won’t bring a 180-degree turn in the Bush administration’s approach to Latin America, it is positive that U.S. relations with the region will no longer be managed by individuals with political axes to grind, like Noriega and his immediate predecessor, Otto Reich.
Posted by isacson at 03:37 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
July 26, 2005
Coca buybacks: a new gimmick
“Hand over the coca and take the cash, similar to a country fair: Hand over the pig, take the cash,” President Uribe said on Saturday, announcing a government initiative to buy farmers’ illegal coca harvests. According to AP’s coverage of Uribe’s surprise statement, coca-growers in southern Meta department “should approach the nearest police or army commander without fear of arrest and hand over their crops of coca or poppy, which is used to make heroin. The price would be negotiated at the point of sale.”
This proposal – which may have been a bit of presidential rhetorical improvisation – is likely to die a quiet death. Either way, it’s a strange about-face for a president who has repeatedly promised to “spray and spray” all coca in the country, and to expropriate all lands with coca planted on them. And it is interesting that he would propose it in Meta, the department of Colombia that, according to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, had the most coca in 2004.
Never mind whether paying farmers for their coca is even legal in Colombia. Can something like this work?
It certainly does have some advantages over anonymously spraying herbicides from above. It’s more humane. It encourages contact between citizens and government officials (unfortunately, not civilian government officials) in areas that have known little government presence. It helps to break down mistrust of the government in zones that have spent decades under guerrilla or paramilitary control.
But coca buybacks on their own are unlikely to do much to reduce coca-growing. A 2002 report [PDF format] from the U.S. General Accounting Office discusses a somewhat similar program that USAID funded in Bolivia for eleven years.
Between 1987 and 1998, the U.S. embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section funded a Bolivian program to pay individuals cash for not growing coca. The Bolivian National Directorate for Agricultural Reconversion paid $2,000 per hectare to peasant farmers who voluntarily reduced their coca plantings. The directorate’s operating costs and the compensation paid to farmers came from U.S. cash transfers to Bolivia. U.S. officials in Bolivia estimated that the Bolivian government spent the equivalent of approximately $100 million.
U.S. officials told us the program was poorly implemented and failed to produce net coca reductions. USAID officials told us that individuals were paid to not grow coca in particular areas, but they continued to cultivate coca in other areas, thus defeating the purpose of the program. In addition, two U.S. audits by the USAID inspector general found several material weaknesses in the program’s management, including inadequate verification procedures and ineligible beneficiaries.
Ultimately, partial measures like fumigation and coca buybacks are gimmicks. They are poor substitutes for an on-the-ground presence of government representatives, who can both create the conditions for a legal economy (land titles, dispute resolution, credit, farm-to-market roads, etc.) and verify that illicit crops aren’t being replanted.
In a place like southern Meta, where the only government presence is the military or police post where farmers are to bring their coca harvest, a buyback program will create a perverse set of incentives. Residents of southern Meta who do not grow coca will feel cheated, as their coca-growing neighbors get a big handout from the government. Meanwhile, with no access to markets for legal crops, coca-growing farmers will be sorely tempted to re-plant the crop after selling their harvest to the government. Since the government lacks the ability to verify that they are not replanting, it will be all too easy to give in to this temptation.
Posted by isacson at 05:15 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
July 20, 2005
Gagged, again, in the House
“We have got a war against drugs and you are standing here saying, okay, let us not do this, let us not do this, but the drug problem exists so what do you want to do about it?” asked Indiana Republican Rep. Dan Burton during last month’s House debate on foreign aid, addressing Reps. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts), Betty McCollum (D-Minnesota), Dennis Moore (D-Kansas) and others who were seeking to cut $100 million in military aid to Colombia. “Unless you have got some constructive alternative, I think you ought to take a hard look at what has been talked about here today by the colleagues on our side of the aisle.”
Rep. McGovern and his colleagues have a “constructive alternative,” of course; it runs along the same general lines as the recommendations laid out in the Blueprint for a New Colombia Policy that CIP co-published earlier this year (PDF format). But they had no opportunity to present it during the debate on the foreign aid bill.
Since it is an appropriations bill, the rules of the House only allowed them either to cut funds or to move funds between accounts (as we’ve explained elsewhere). And since most Colombia aid in that particular bill goes through one account – the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which includes both military and economic aid – there was nowhere to transfer it. Any attempt to specify how exactly the ACI money could be spent would have been against the rules, and thus found to be “out of order” and thrown out. So they were stuck supporting a cut in military aid – and facing Dan Burton’s unfair charge that they have no proposals of their own.
This year, however, the House International Relations Committee has managed to produce a Foreign Relations Authorization bill (HR 2601), which actually seeks to set policy, guidelines and amounts governing State Department and foreign aid programs. This bill, which went to the House floor for debate yesterday, is not an appropriations bill. It doesn’t carry the same strict rules of debate that would keep amendments from being introduced.
As a result, two Democratic Representatives had planned to introduce amendments:
- Rep. McGovern was to add conditions on U.S. support for paramilitary demobilizations identical to those on the Senate’s much better version of the foreign aid appropriations bill. McGovern’s conditions would have superseded some very vague, easily fudged conditions that Rep. Burton had added to HR 2601. In a dissenting opinion added to the International Relations Committee’s report on the bill, the committee’s ranking Democrats, Tom Lantos (D-California) and Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey), warned that the Burton conditions “should be strengthened in a meaningful way before this Committee authorizes assistance to a process that could cost the U.S. taxpayer an estimated $80 million over three years and could establish a lenient precedent for future processes through which terrorists around the world could shield themselves.”
- Rep. Barbara Lee (D-California) was to add a requirement that 40 percent of aid to Colombia through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative account be non-military aid for economic and social needs (alternative development, aid to the displaced, judicial reform and similar efforts). This would have boosted economic aid to Colombia by about $40 million more than the current $152 million.
While these two amendments should have been perfectly acceptable under the rules of debate for HR 2601, they still had to pass through one obstacle: the House Rules Committee, a powerful body that meets before every bill is debated on the House floor, and decides which amendments may be introduced. Members of Congress had submitted 90 amendments for consideration in yesterday’s debate, and on Monday night the Rules Committee met to whittle that number down.
In the end – even though Rep. McGovern is a member of this committee – neither Colombia amendment survived the Rules Committee’s axe. With no pretext beyond “we don’t want to discuss that,” the committee’s Republican majority prohibited both the McGovern and the Lee amendments from getting any hearing in the full House.
House opponents of the current policy toward Colombia were denied an opportunity to answer Rep. Burton’s charge that all they do is criticize without offering alternatives. Meanwhile (para colmo, as they say in Colombia), the Rules Committee gave Mr. Burton a green light to introduce an amendment authorizing $25 million to buy new aircraft for Colombia’s Navy. (This amendment, likely to be approved by voice vote, doesn’t mean that the aircraft are on their way – money for them still has to be appropriated in an appropriations bill.)
HR 2601 was introduced yesterday and probably will come to a vote today. Yesterday, at the outset of the debate, Rep. McGovern vented his very justified anger at the silencing of dissent on Colombia policy. Let’s quote him at length.
Last night the Republican leadership decided to refuse this House the right to debate U.S. policy towards Colombia. Out of the 90 amendments submitted to Rules, only two dealt substantively with U.S.-Colombia policy.
I offered an amendment to match language approved by the Senate that would strengthen the accountability over U.S. funds for Colombia’s demobilization of right-wing paramilitary forces.
The gentlelady from California, Congresswoman Barbara Lee, offered another amendment to ensure that 40 percent of U.S. aid to Colombia would be used for alternative economic development, human rights, rule of law and strengthening democratic institutions.
Well, Mr. Speaker, when it comes to strengthening democratic institutions, the Republican leadership certainly doesn’t believe in teaching the Colombians by example.
At the end of June, I stood here on the House floor, during debate on military aid to Colombia, and was criticized by Republicans for not talking about what kind of policy I stood for.
But here we are today, taking up a bill that only comes to the House floor every two years, and is one of the only bills where an amendment on U.S.-Colombia policy can actually be offered – and both the Lee and the McGovern amendments are banned from debate.
Mr. Speaker, once again, the Republican leadership has rejected any attempt to bring some kind of accountability to our policy on Colombia.
Once again, the Republican leadership is serving as the chief apologist for the Colombian government.
When it comes to Colombia, the Republican leadership continues to engage in a policy of see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil.
Once again, the House is being asked to look the other way -- to sit down and shut up – as Colombia moves towards carrying out what appears to be a deeply flawed plan for demobilizing the right-wing paramilitary forces, forces that are on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations.
The State Department estimates it will cost about $80 million to carry out the demobilization.
Who do you think the Colombian government is going to ask to bankroll this process? The American tax payer, that’s who.
Well, before we spend one more single solitary U.S. tax dollar on this demobilization process, I for one want to make sure that my tax dollars are not paying for some sweetheart deal for Colombian drug lords, terrorists and killers to escape extradition to the United States or serve a couple of years under house arrest on their country estate.
These are the paramilitary masterminds and commanders who have flooded our streets and neighborhoods with cocaine and heroin. Yet, on July 1st, President Uribe told the Voice of America that their extradition warrants would have to be suspended.
If Colombia wants to stand in the way of these drug lords facing U.S. justice, then that’s Colombia’s decision – They can just do it without U.S. tax dollar support.
I want to make sure that my constituents hard-earned tax dollars are not paying for a process that will allow paramilitary money-laundering and organizational structures to remain intact – so that they can transform themselves into mafia-like political, social and criminal networks.
The OAS has denounced the Colombian law on the paramilitary demobilization. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have denounced it. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia has raised grave concerns about it.
So, why then, Mr. Speaker, is it so hard for this House to even have a debate over having some accountability if the Colombian government asks us to fund this process?
That’s all I want, Mr. Speaker, is a little bit of accountability.
Quite frankly, the majority on the Rules Committee and the Republican leadership should be ashamed of themselves for running away from this debate – and for being complicit in a policy that will very likely end up protecting drug lords, terrorists, killers and their profits from facing any kind of genuine justice.
Posted by isacson at 04:05 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
July 16, 2005
Human rights certification? Not yet
We’ve been hearing rumors for a while, but it looks like a State Department certification of the Colombian military’s human rights performance – the first since September 2004 – may finally be imminent.
I don’t make this prediction based on any Washington gossip I’ve heard. Instead, like waiting for the groundhog to emerge from his hole, we’ve been watching for sudden signs of progress in human-rights prosecutions of Colombian soldiers.
After a long time without any significant movement on military human-rights investigations, we suddenly have two examples. On July 1st Colombia’s Attorney-General ordered the arrest of a corporal and five privates for the April 2004 killing of five campesinos in Cajamarca, Tolima. On Tuesday the 12th, the Attorney-General filed homicide charges against a second lieutenant and three privates for the killing of three unionists in Saravena, Arauca.
These sorts of “breakthroughs” – however minor – are quite rare in Colombia, where it is very difficult to punish human-rights abusers in the security forces. If two high-profile cases move forward in two weeks, the U.S. certification process almost definitely had something to do with it.
For those unfamiliar with this complex but necessary semi-annual ritual, U.S. foreign aid law mandates that every year, 25 percent of aid to Colombia’s military be frozen until the State Department can certify that the Colombian armed forces’ human rights performance has improved. This 25 percent of aid to Colombia’s military (not police) in the foreign aid bill (not the defense budget) adds up to approximately $70-80 million being held up each year.
The law requires two certifications per year, each of which frees up 12.5 percent of the frozen military aid (about $35-40 million). After consulting with “internationally recognized human rights groups,” the State Department must submit to Congress an official certification that the following is happening:
- Colombia’s armed forces are suspending members who face credible allegations of committing gross human rights violations, or of aiding or abetting paramilitaries.
- These members of Colombia’s armed forces are being vigorously investigated and prosecuted, and promptly punished if found guilty.
- Colombia’s armed forces are making substantial progress toward cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities working on these human rights cases, including providing requested information, access to witnesses, relevant military documents, and similar information.
- Colombia’s armed forces are making substantial progress in severing links with paramilitary organizations (including denying access to military intelligence, vehicles, and other equipment or supplies, and ceasing other forms of active or tacit cooperation).
- Colombia’s government is dismantling paramilitary leadership and financial networks by arresting commanders and financial backers.
While the Colombian government often releases statistics indicating improved human-rights performance (such as numbers of paramilitaries killed or captured), the U.S. aid conditions focus on the Achilles’ heel of the Colombian military’s human-rights performance: impunity. The Colombian government can muster no statistics to show progress toward punishing abuses after they happen. In fact, as past State Department certifications have acknowledged, indictments and successful prosecutions for military human-rights abuses are exceedingly rare, especially for high-ranking officers.
To its credit, the State Department has been taking the certification requirements seriously. While their threshold for approval is far lower than where CIP and human-rights groups would place it, U.S. diplomats have shown themselves willing to hold up aid for a long time when they feel they lack enough evidence to issue even an embarrassingly lukewarm certification. (Part of the reason for their fortitude, of course, is an unwillingness to anger the congressional authors of the certification requirement, whose support is necessary to keep the entire aid program flowing.)
State issued a certification only once in 2004 (in September), which means that 12.5 percent of fiscal-year 2004 military aid is still “in the freezer” along with 25 percent of 2005 aid.
As far as we can tell, the certification ritual has tended to play out as follows:
- U.S. diplomats indicate to the Colombians that they need to be able to demonstrate progress in order to free up aid.
- Nothing happens – or consultations with congressional staff indicate that whatever “progress” may have occurred is nowhere near enough.
- Months pass. Pressure for certification builds as military-aid programs start to feel the pinch (in some cases – we’ve heard but can’t confirm – contracts even get postponed, and fuel and spare parts become scarce).
- Exasperated, U.S. diplomats ask the Colombians to “throw them a bone,” naming a few high-profile cases of abuse in which a sign of judicial progress might help them to certify. Sometimes, the atmosphere for certification is poisoned by a new abuse – such as the August 2004 Arauca unionists’ murder, or the February 2005 San José de Apartadó massacre – which rises to the top of the list of cases. More months pass.
- Finally, the Colombian government grudgingly allows a few arrests, indictments, or other judicial processes (probably not convictions) to move forward. The State Department issues a certification, the 12.5 percent of aid is delivered, and all human-rights groups complain.
- Go back to (1.)
With the recent news on the Cajamarca and Saravena cases, we seem to be moving into step (5.) Nonetheless, it is our strongly held view that these two minor “breakthroughs” are nowhere near enough to merit a certification.
It is imperative that the State Departmetn hold out longer, because – perversely – the U.S. certification process has become the main bit of leverage available to those seeking to end impunity in Colombia. Lately it seems that arrests or judicial breakthroughs in high-profile human-rights cases do not happen on their own in Colombia. High-profile cases either languish or are dropped. Forward movement only seems to result from U.S. government pressure, as diplomats seek evidence necessary to prove that Colombia’s human-rights situation is improving, thereby freeing up frozen military aid.
Evidence of improvement is still sorely needed on several high-profile cases. There has been no movement, for instance, in the investigation of the San José de Apartadó massacre. The Colombian government has been blaming the residents of the “peace community” there for this lack of progress, as they have proved to be too fearful and distrustful to speak to investigators from the attorney-general’s office. The community’s members have told other investigators (like these, these and these) that they believe the army killed eight of their neighbors in February. President Uribe, however, continues to insist otherwise, telling the Voice of America on July 1, “The security forces and the citizens of Apartadó have said that this massacre, unfortunately, which cost the lives of so many citizens, was committed by the FARC terrorist group.”
Meanwhile, the trial of Gen. Jaime Uscátegui continues to drag on for his alleged role in allowing paramilitaries to massacre dozens of people in Mapiripán, Meta, in July 1997. There have been no reports of progress in this case since we wrote this update in early February.
In a July 1 letter to Secretary of State Rice [PDF format], 22 senators – mostly Democrats – ask her not to certify yet because of a lack of progress on key cases. In addition to San José de Apartadó and Saravena, they cite:
- The March 2004 dismissal of the case against Gen. Rito Alejo del Río for aiding and abetting paramilitary groups.
- The January 2005 dismissal of the case against Rear Admiral Rodrigo Quiñónez for the 2001 Chengue massacre.
- The November 2004 escape of Major Cesar Alonso Maldonado, convicted for trying to kill union leader-turned congressman Wilson Borja, from a military brig.
- The lack of trials or sentences for the 1998 Santo Domingo bombings.
- The lack of progress in investigating “Operación Dragón,” an intelligence operation targeting union organizers and human-rights defenders in Cali.
- Reports of continued military-paramilitary collaboration in Chocó department, and failure to prevent paramilitary massacres in zones of heavy military presence in Arauca and La Guajira.
“We believe it is time for the State Department to make clear to the Colombian government that further progress regarding its own security forces is necessary prior to certification,” the senators conclude. That’s exactly right. We congratulate the State Department for waiting ten months as they hold out for signs of progress. We ask, though, that they wait a bit longer.
Posted by isacson at 01:47 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
July 08, 2005
Two cheers for the Senate
The annual foreign-aid budget bill (H.R. 3057) continues to move through Congress, a bit ahead of schedule this year. The House passed its version of the bill on June 28, and gave the Bush Administration exactly what it wanted where Colombia is concerned, despite the best efforts of the policy’s many opponents.
Now it’s the Senate’s turn. Sometime in July, that body is likely to debate its version of the bill. Before they left for the July 4 break, the Senate Appropriations Committee drafted its text, whose Colombia provisions are unlikely to change much when the full Senate considers the bill.
As usual, the Colombia provisions in the Senate’s version are significantly better than those that come out of the House of Representatives. While of course they’re far from the strategy that we think would work, they at least do a much better job of reflecting the challenging reality faced by U.S. aid programs in Colombia.
Two elements in the Senate text are especially noteworthy: a slight improvement in the balance between military and economic aid, and an excellent set of conditions that must be met before any U.S. funds go to support paramilitary demobilizations.
Aid amounts: toward a better balance
While aid to Colombia flows through several different accounts in the foreign aid and defense budgets, the biggest single source of aid is the “Andean Counterdrug Initiative.” Overseen by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Control, the “ACI” provides both military and non-military aid to Colombia and six of its neighbors. It pays for fumigation and alternative development, helicopter maintenance and aid to the displaced, patrol boats and aid to the OAS verification mission. In fact, the ACI supplies Colombia with almost all the non-military aid that it gets, most of it passed directly to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
Since Plan Colombia began, U.S. aid to Colombia has been heavily weighted in favor of Colombia’s security forces. For every dollar in economic and social aid to Colombia, the United States has given four dollars to Colombia’s armed forces and police. Improving this balance would require a change to the amounts of military and non-military aid in the ACI.
The Senate bill makes an effort to do this. For the first time, it puts a “ceiling” on the amount of ACI aid that can go to Colombia’s military: “not more than $278,450,000 shall be made available for assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces and National Police.” That is over $53 million less than what the Bush Administration’s ACI aid request for 2006 (PDF format) had anticipated giving to the Colombian security forces.
The bill also raises a “floor” for economic aid that first appeared (thanks to the Senate) in the 2005 bill. It specifies that “not less than $149,757,000 shall be made available for alternative development/institution building in Colombia, which shall be apportioned directly to the United States Agency for International Development.” This is $24 million higher than the similar “floor” for USAID assistance to Colombia in the 2005 foreign aid bill.
A bit more ACI non-military assistance – for “rule of law” programs – does not go through USAID, and is in addition to this “floor.” If the Senate language passes, then, non-military aid to Colombia in 2006 could total $177.15 million, $25 million more than the Bush Administration’s request.
If this ceiling-and-floor language were to pass, it would not bring an earth-shaking change in aid amounts. Considering expected 2006 funding from all aid programs, it would merely shift the overall ratio of military to economic aid from 80-20 to 75-25. Nonetheless, it would be a big step in the right direction after five years of mostly-military anti-drug programs that have failed to affect drug supplies in the United States. Most significantly, it would get some badly needed funding to worthy, resource-starved efforts to expand rural development aid to new areas, to help displaced people, and to help Colombia’s civilian institutions improve their ability to govern.
In the House of Representatives, Democrats on the Appropriations Committee, led by Rep. Sam Farr (D-California), sought to improve the balance between military and economic aid in the ACI. Their effort was shut down by the unyielding opposition of the committee’s Republican leadership. Since the House bill includes no ceiling-and-floor language whatsoever, the aid ratios will no doubt be a subject of much debate later this year, when a House-Senate Conference Committee meets to resolve the differences between both chambers’ versions of the bill.
Military and police aid
| (All amounts in thousands of US dollars) | 2004 funding | 2005 estimate | 2006 – administration request | 2006 – Senate Appropriations Committee |
| ACI military / police assistance: interdiction | 324,621 | 310,694 | 310,850 | Unspecified |
| ACI military / police assistance: airbridge denial | 0 | 11,111 | 21,000 | Unspecified |
| Subtotal: ACI military / police assistance | 324,621 | 321,805 | 331,850 | 278,450 |
| Military /police assistance from other programs (see our summary table) | 222,200 | 307,500 | 258,300 | Unspecified |
| Total military / police assistance | 546,621 (79%) | 629,305 (81%) | 590,150 (80%) | 536,750 (75%) |
Economic and social aid
| (All amounts in thousands of US dollars) | 2004 funding | 2005 estimate | 2006 – administration request | 2006 – Senate Appropriations Committee |
| ACI economic / social assistance: alternative development / institution-building (USAID) | 149,279 | 124,694 | 124,757 | 149,757 |
| ACI economic / social assistance: rule of law | 0 | 27,379 | 27,393 | Unspecified |
| Subtotal: ACI economic / social assistance | 149,279 | 152,073 | 152,150 | 177,150 |
| Economic / social assistance from other programs (est. – see our summary table) | Small amounts of economic assistance (well under $10 million total per year) have come from regional funds of the State Department’s Migration and Refugee Affairs program and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. | |||
| Total economic / social assistance | 149,279 (21%) | 152,073 (19%) | 152,150 (20%) | 177,150 (25%) |
Conditions on aid for demobilization and reintegration
Two weeks ago, Colombia’s Congress passed a so-called “Justice and Peace” law giving very lenient treatment to demobilizing paramilitary leaders (something an editorial in Monday’s New York Times called a “capitulation” to the AUC). Widespread criticism of this law had made significant U.S. funding for the AUC demobilization process much less likely, despite the Uribe government’s appeal for aid and Ambassador William Wood’s inexplicable support for the “Justice and Peace” law.
As indicated in Thursday’s New York Times, the Senate version of the foreign aid bill includes a lengthy section with a list of very specific, common-sense conditions that Colombia’s process must meet in order to merit U.S. support. No similar conditions appear in the House of Representatives’ version.
Aimed at preventing U.S. aid for a bad process, the conditions – meant to apply to any future demobilization of guerrillas as well as the current paramilitary process – probe some of the glaring weaknesses in the “Justice and Peace” law.
The Senate language states that funds for demobilizations may only pay for “limited activities,” and only then after the State Department certifies that the following conditions have been met
The Senate conditions (Section 6110 of H.R. 3057)
1. The Colombian government has not adopted any law or policy that inhibits extraditions of “members and former members” of Colombian terrorist organizations.
This condition is unlikely to be met, even though U.S. prosecutors have sought to extradite several AUC leaders. A week ago, President Uribe told the Voice of America that “in some cases, extraditions will have to be suspended.”
2. Colombia’s “legal framework” for demobilizations “provides for effective investigation, prosecution and punishment, in proportion to the crimes committed, of gross violations of humanitarian law and drug trafficking.”
This condition is unlikely to be met, unless a few years of house arrest in rural haciendas is considered a punishment “in proportion” to crimes like ordering massacres, disappearances and displacement. Meanwhile, many crimes will go unprosecuted because of a sixty-day limit for prosecutors to initiate cases.
3. Colombia’s “legal framework” for demobilizations conditions sentence reductions “on a full and truthful confession” of each demobilizing individual’s “involvement in criminal activity; full disclosure of his knowledge of the FTO’s structure, financing sources, and illegal assets; and turnover of the totality of his illegal assets.”
This condition is unlikely to be met. While some Colombian legislators had sought to put this “full disclosure” mechanism in the “Justice and Peace” law, their efforts were blocked. Colombian Interior Minister Sabas Pretelt said, incredibly, that to require such “full disclosure” would have made the law into a “snitch law” risking bloodshed and endangering informants’ security. This is an odd argument to hear from a government that has set up a network of tens of thousands of civilian informants to help fight its war.
4. Colombia’s “legal framework” for demobilizations requires that, in order to get reduced sentences, each demobilizing commander ceases “illegal activity by the troops under his command” and turns over all of his group’s illegal assets.
This condition is unlikely to be met. As we argue elsewhere, the “Justice and Peace” law leaves a high probability that paramilitary groups may continue to exist in another, powerful form – something akin to mafias – and to continue their illegal activity.
5. Colombia’s “legal framework” for demobilizations provides for revocation of sentence reductions if demobilizing individuals “are subsequently found to have withheld illegal assets, lied to the authorities about their criminal activities in the group, rejoined the same or another FTO, or engaged in new illegal activities.”
This condition is unlikely to be met. The “Justice and Peace” law allows paramilitaries to confess later to crimes they had neglected to admit earlier.
6. “An inter-agency working group consisting of representatives from the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Justice, and the Departments of State and Defense” must consult with a wide variety of experts and authorities and report to Congress that:
a. The group that is demobilizing “is not violating any ceasefire and has ceased illegal activities, including narco-trafficking, extortion, and violations of international humanitarian law.”
b. The group’s “criminal and financial structure is being destroyed” and the group, “or any part thereof, is not regrouping to continue illegal activities.”
c. The Colombian government “is conducting effective investigations and prosecutions” of the group’s commanders for crimes, including human rights and international humanitarian law violations, “and, when appropriate, extraditing them to the United States.
d. The Colombian government “is aggressively implementing an effective procedure to locate and confiscate illegal assets, held directly or through third parties.”
e. The Colombian government is enforcing ceasefires by barring ceasefire violators from receiving reduced sentences or other demobilization benefits.The “working group” is likely to be unable to say that these five things are happening, because the “Justice and Peace” law does not give the Colombian government effective tools to make them happen. Letter (e) alone will be impossible to certify if paramilitary leader Diego Murillo (“Don Berna”) benefits from lighter sentences – as is likely – even though he was arrested in late May for ordering the murder of a provincial legislator.
While the Bush Administration 2006 aid request asked Congress for very little funding to support paramilitary demobilizations, the Senate conditions could stop even that small trickle from flowing.
One significant thing to note about these conditions: human rights and the “balance between justice and peace” is not a main concern. The importance of proportional punishment appears in the second condition only. Most of the conditions have to do with dismantling paramilitaries, and keeping them from continuing to exist as powerful mafia / death squads after they “demobilize.” This focus on dismantlement is right on the mark, because there is strong reason to believe that the current process is likely to leave the paramilitaries’ structures intact.
Since the House has no such conditions in its version of the bill, will the conditions survive the House-Senate Conference Committee that will reconcile differences in the two chambers’ bills? Last year, a more basic set of four conditions appeared in the Senate’s bill, but the Conference Committee stripped them out, moving them to its narrative report on the bill, which is non-binding. (See the texts of the various versions of last year’s bill on this page, which I admit is a bit difficult to read.)
This year, though, the Senate conditions are unlikely to disappear. Their specificity and extensiveness indicates that some serious bipartisan thought went into them, and the Senate won’t just lie down in the face of House opposition – if there is any. If anything, the conditions may be pared down a bit, but they will still likely be strong enough either to encourage Colombia’s government to do more to dismantle paramilitarism, or to keep U.S. aid from flowing at all.
At some point, though, several House Republicans (especially Rep. Henry Hyde of Illinois, the chairman of the House International Relations Committee) will fight for a pet project that the Senate’s language would make impossible to fund. This group wants to help the Colombian government to employ hundreds (or even thousands) of demobilized rank-and-file guerrillas and paramilitaries as manual coca-eradicators, flying throughout the country on U.S.-donated DC-3 aircraft to cut down coca and poppy plants.
(My view about this proposal: it’s far more humane than fumigation, and it does provide at least a short-term income stream for former combatants. But it must meet three conditions in order to be worthwhile. (1) Those who participate must be rigorously investigated, including full confession requirements, to ensure that major narcotraffickers or war criminals aren’t being hired as coca-cutters. (2) Any abuses or human-rights violations committed in conjunction with eradication activities must be promptly punished – if they are not, the U.S. must pull the plug on funding. (3) All farmers whose crops are eradicated must immediately receive significant assistance in meeting short-term food needs and moving to legal crops or employment. If conditions are safe enough for manual eradication, they’re safe enough for infrastructure-building, education, healthcare, agricultural assistance and marketing support. If these three conditions are met, then hiring former combatants as manual eradicators could work. If they are not, the result will be marauding gangs of thugs who abuse campesinos while destroying their livelihoods and leaving nothing behind, thus pushing them into the arms of the guerrillas and paramilitaries.)
A few other good things in the Senate bill
Several other provisions in the Senate bill, making smaller contributions, do not appear in the House bill.
- Human rights certification: the Senate and House bills both repeat the five human-rights conditions on military aid that have appeared in the law for years. The Senate, however, adds a sixth condition: that “the Colombian Armed Forces are respecting the legal, cultural, and territorial rights of Colombia’s indigenous communities.” The Senate bill would also require the State Department to consult with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia before certifying.
- Earmarks: The Senate bill would require that a minimum of $8 million be devoted to judicial-reform programs in Colombia. At least $10 million would go “to the United States Agency for International Development for organizations and programs to protect human rights.” At least $2 million would “be made available through nongovernmental organizations for programs to protect biodiversity and indigenous reserves in Colombia.”
- Fumigation certification: The Senate bill renews language, which has been in each bill since 2003, holding up all but 20 percent of funding for herbicides until the State Department certifies that aerial fumigation of drug crops is occurring within a series of guidelines for health, environment, compensation for those unjustly sprayed, and availability of alternative development. The fumigation conditions do not appear in the House bill.
- Fumigation in national parks: The Senate bill specifies that “funds appropriated by this Act may be used for aerial fumigation in Colombia’s national parks or reserves only if the Secretary of State determines that it is in accordance with Colombian laws and that there are no effective alternatives to reduce drug cultivation in these areas.” This is a weak provision, unlikely to stop an eventual restarting of fumigation in parks. But even this doesn’t appear in the House bill.
- Bolivia conditions: The Senate bill renews language, which first appeared in the 2004 bill, establishing human-rights conditions on military aid to Bolivia. Before this aid can be delivered, the Secretary of State must certify “that the Bolivian military is respecting human rights, and civilian judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting, with the military’s cooperation, military personnel who have been implicated in gross violations of human rights.”
- Report language: The Senate Appropriations Committee’s non-binding narrative report includes several interesting provisions with regard to Colombia:
- Fumigation: “The Committee is increasingly concerned ... that the aerial eradication program is falling far short of predictions and that coca cultivation is shifting to new locations. Since the start of Plan Colombia, over 525,000 hectares of coca crops have been sprayed, yet coca cultivation has decreased by only 7 percent. Last year alone, 136,555 hectares were sprayed, but the total area under cultivation, estimated by the State Department at 114,000 hectares, remained essentially unchanged from the previous year. There is no indication that the quantity of cocaine entering the United States has decreased. … The Committee directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the EPA and appropriate Colombian authorities, to submit a report not later than 180 days after enactment of the Act, with the following information: the results of a GIS analysis of the proximity of small, shallow water bodies to coca and poppy fields and of tests to determine the toxicity of the spray mixture to Colombian amphibians; and, an assessment of potential impacts of the spray program on threatened species, including in Colombia’s national parks.”
- Afro-Colombians: “The Committee is aware that Afro-Colombians face many difficult problems, including poverty and discrimination. The Committee recommends assistance to address the economic and social needs of Afro-Colombians, particularly IDPs in the Choco region, through the Afro-Latino Development Alliance.”
Why the Senate's bill is better
Why is the Senate’s Colombia language consistently so much better than the House’s? One key reason is that the senior Democrat on the subcommittee that writes the foreign aid bill – a position that offers heavy input into what goes into the bill’s draft – is Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont. Leahy and his staff know Colombia and closely follow what happens there, and have made a priority of ensuring that the policy includes some economic assistance and human-rights safeguards.
That’s not to say House members (mainly the Democrats, though there are some Republicans) aren’t equally committed to human rights and more economic aid to Colombia. But they have been shut down by a much more ideologically driven Republican leadership, which limits debate and strongly discourages dissent within the Republican party. No doubt acting on orders from the party leadership – Speaker Dennis Hastert is a major supporter of Plan Colombia and has traveled to Colombia many times – the chairman of the House subcommittee that drafts the foreign aid bill, Arizona Republican Jim Kolbe, allowed no changes at all to the Bush Administration’s aid request. The Senate – for now at least – doesn’t face similar rigidity from the Republican majority on this issue. And where aid to the paramilitaries is concerned, there seems to be a basic consensus that the process is rotten.
The next step for the foreign aid bill is approval in the full Senate (a debate on Colombia is not anticipated). Then representatives of both the House and Senate will form a “Conference Committee” to resolve differences between the two versions. There could be some intense debate and bargaining in the Conference Committee on the bill’s Colombia provisions, given the sharp differences outlined here. Let’s hope that the Senate stands firm.
Postscript
Meanwhile, a human-rights certification decision could be coming from the State Department at any moment. It’s long overdue – the failure to be able to certify has held up 12.5 percent of aid from 2004. The arrests in the Cajamarca case last week indicate that the Colombian military is reluctantly throwing a few bones to give the illusion of progress against impunity. (Other investigations and prosecutions, however – such as the February 2005 massacre in San José de Apartadó, the 1997 massacre in Mapiripán, and the August 2004 massacre of three union leaders in Arauca – have made little or no progress.) A large group of mostly Democratic Senators has sent a letter to Secretary of State Rice asking her not to certify yet; I hope to post that letter and list of signers to our site later today. Stay tuned.
Posted by isacson at 12:40 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 29, 2005
Lessons from yesterday's House vote
Our side lost again in Congress last night – a 189-234 vote in the House of Representatives against the McGovern-McCollum-Moore amendment, a measure that sought to cut $100 million in military aid to Colombia from the 2006 foreign aid bill.
The vote margin was similar to past defeats going back to 2001. Opponents of Plan Colombia did not gain ground, unfortunately – but at least we did not lose ground in the most conservative House we have ever faced.
I take three lessons from this experience.
- Winning the debate isn’t enough. The speakers in favor of the McGovern-McCollum-Moore amendment dominated the debate. They had all the facts to show that the policy, five years and $4 billion later, is a failure. They were well-briefed, and had command of as many statistics and sources as a champion high-school debate team.
They made mincemeat of the amendment’s opponents, an all-Republican team who were content merely to repeat, over and over, talking points taken from a June 27 letter from Rep. Mark Souder (R-Indiana), the über-drug warrior who heads the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Drug Policy. This letter’s points were easy to rebut, as this PDF file shows.
So our side won the debate – but ended up with 45 percent of the vote. Why? Mainly because the Republican party remained in solid, near-unanimous opposition to the amendment. Only 19 Republican members, out of 226 present, voted with our side. (169 of 196 Democrats voted with our side – so don’t believe any claims that the current policy has bipartisan support.)
The other 207 undoubtedly include many members who, even based on what little they know about Colombia, have doubts about the wisdom of the current policy. But the Republican House leadership, particularly Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Illinois), who traveled regularly to Colombia when he was an ordinary congressman, and who remains a strong drug warrior, made clear to the members of the party that this vote was important to them.
- A cutting amendment isn’t enough to convince Republican members to defy their leadership and vote against military aid. As discussed in the last posting, the restrictive rules of House debate on appropriations bills allow only amendments seeking to change aid amounts, either by shifting it from one account to another, or cutting it entirely. Several times in the past few years, House opponents of the Colombia policy have advocated “transfer” amendments, which would have cut Colombia military aid and moved it to other foreign aid priorities (such as child disease survival programs or HIV-AIDS programs). These amendments all failed in the face of an ironclad Republican majority.
This year, the amendment’s sponsors decided to try a straight $100 million cut in aid, in the hope of peeling off votes from some bedrock-conservative Republicans who hate government spending, hate big deficits, or hate foreign aid in general. That strategy appeared to be paying off when the National Taxpayers’ Union voiced strong support for the amendment and sent an alert to Congress urging members to vote for it.
In the end, though, only 19 Republicans cast votes in favor, and the majority stuck with Speaker Hastert. That is one of the highest Republican vote counts an anti-Plan Colombia amendment has received, and it did gain the support of Republican members known for being deficit hawks (Duncan of Tennessee, Flake of Arizona, Paul of Texas, Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin). But they weren’t enough – and they were canceled out by “no” votes from a handful of Democratic members who could not stomach any cut to a foreign-aid bill that was already pathetically small and stingy.
The amendment’s backers made the mistake of assuming that the Republican Party still includes a lot of fiscal conservatives. Times have clearly changed. They won’t make that mistake again.
- As long as Republicans remain in the majority, pressure from constituents will ultimately be the only way to get more Republican members to question the current policy. If significant numbers of voters are making clear to them that they oppose the current Colombia policy, Republican members will feel emboldened to break ranks and defy their party leadership.
More citizens contacted their representatives about Colombia aid in the past couple of weeks than we have seen do so in years. (This year, activism was not drawn off as heavily by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or by a presidential election campaign. Also, this year – with Plan Colombia “ending” – there is more of a feeling that a re-thinking of the policy is possible.) Look at the photo gallery on the peaceincolombia.org website to see how many cities hosted vigils in May to show solidarity with human-rights defenders and to protest Plan Colombia.
However, we are still only talking about a couple of thousand calls and letters nationwide. This is an impressive achievement, but doesn’t yet qualify as a “mass movement.” And many congresspeople representing solidly Republican districts probably didn’t get so much as a postcard (not a lot of Latin America activism in Oklahoma or South Carolina.) There’s still a lot of work to be done.
This sort of work won’t involve better research, better statistics or more policy wonkiness. It requires a lot more face-to-face involvement with activist groups around the country. It requires that we better articulate what we stand for, what we want to see happen, what our vision is for U.S. relations with Latin America and the rest of the world, and how our opposition to the current policy fits into it. (While it’s important to argue about hectares eradicated, for instance, we should be talking more about the lives of the people who live on those hectares, and how the United States can make the hemisphere safer and more prosperous by helping to improve those lives.)
The Blueprint for a New Colombia Policy (PDF format) we and others wrote back in March was a great step in that direction, but we’ve got many more steps to take.
Posted by isacson at 12:30 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 27, 2005
What's happening in Congress
The 2006 foreign aid bill is on the House of Representatives’ calendar for tomorrow. This will be the House’s big debate for the year on aid to Colombia post-2005.
We can expect a lively debate, so keep an eye on C-SPAN or its website on Tuesday afternoon. Reps. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts), Betty McCollum (D-Minnesota) and Dennis Moore (D-Kansas) plan to introduce an amendment that would cut $100 million from the $734.5 million “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” (ACI) account, which pays for both military and economic aid to Colombia and seven of its neighbors. The amendment’s proponents will make clear that they intend the $100 million cut to come from the $332 million of the ACI that is expected to go to military and police aid for Colombia.
Why are the amendment’s backers using such a blunt instrument? They have been forced into it by the House of Representatives’ very restrictive rules of debate. When considering an appropriations bill, amendments are only permitted to affect amounts of money, such as cuts or transfers to other accounts. An amendment saying, for instance, “no funds in this bill may go to the Colombian security forces” would be ruled out of order for committing the offense of “legislating on an appropriations bill.”
This rule is designed to speed debate in a chamber with 435 members. But it does leave members of the minority party with little opportunity for input into what goes in the bill. First, Democrats can try to convince the Republican subcommittee chairmen, who write the first drafts of all appropriations bills, to include their “asks” in this first draft (or “markup”).
If the chairman says no – as often happens – the Democrats’ second step is to try to get enough committee Republicans to defy their chairmen and vote with them, thus forming a majority in favor of their amendments. Rep. Sam Farr (D-California) tried to do that in the Appropriations Committee’s June 21 hearing on the foreign aid bill, introducing an amendment that would have guaranteed that a portion of funds for Colombia ($20 million more than in 2005) be economic aid. After a debate, when it became clear that he didn’t have the votes due to apparently unanimous opposition from the committee Republicans, Farr withdrew his amendment before it came to a vote.
If changes in committee prove impossible, Democrats are left with the final choice of introducing amendments when the bill goes to the full House of Representatives. When this happens, their amendments must comply with the very restrictive debate rule – which forces them to use very blunt instruments like across-the-board aid cuts.
So does the McGovern-McCollum-Moore amendment have a chance? Yes, but a slim one. Because it cuts aid, effectively shrinking the entire foreign aid budget by $100 million, some Democrats will be unwilling to support it, even though they may dislike the Colombia policy. Oddly, though, a cut may bring some support from rightwingers who hate foreign aid. Remarkably, the National Taxpayers’ Union, which disdains government spending in general, has come out strongly in favor of the M-M-M amendment and has announced that they will even include it on the list of votes they consider when they issue their annual ratings of Congress. (This has to be the only vote this year that will be scored, on the same side, by both the NTU and the United Steelworkers of America.)
Despite this incentive, it may be difficult to peel off more than a few Republican votes for the amendment. House Republicans are well aware that a hard-line drug policy is close to the heart of Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Illinois), who traveled regularly to Colombia to oversee police anti-drug programs during the 1990s, when he was a regular member of Congress. Hastert took the unusual step of testifying in favor of the current policy [PDF format] in a hearing of the House International Relations Committee last month, and wrote an op-ed favoring the policy in Colombia’s El Tiempo newspaper this month.
Republican congresspeople face a difficult dilemma: follow the NTU’s advice and cast a vote for small government and lower deficits, or follow Speaker Hastert’s lead and avoid defying a party leadership that has proven willing to exact retribution (passing members over for committee chairmanships, appropriating less for projects in their districts) in order to enforce discipline.
Meanwhile, we don’t know yet if other Colombia-related amendments are in the offing. There is at least some chance that key Republicans may be hatching an attempt to add $150 million more for fumigation in Colombia, in order to satisfy a request President Uribe has conveyed to them. Four Republican committee and subcommittee chairmen had sent a letter in May making that request to the Republican appropriators, but they were ultimately turned down in committee. To give Colombia this additional money, after all, would mean cutting $150 million from elsewhere in the world.
For more about what is in the foreign aid bill so far, read the detailed overview on CIP’s website.
Tomorrow will be an extremely busy day, as the Senate’s version of the foreign aid bill will simultaneously be undergoing “markup” (agreement on a draft) in subcommittee. The bill will go to the full Senate Appropriations Committee on Thursday, then be debated in the full Senate sometime in July. The Senate’s draft law is usually marginally better on Colombia than the House’s version, chiefly because Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, cares strongly about the issue and is able to add conditions, reporting requirements, and language requiring that a minimum of aid be non-military.
Meanwhile, keep an eye on the Foreign Relations authorization bills (H.R. 2601 and S. 600), which make changes to the permanent law governing several foreign aid programs. The bills, which often fail to come to a vote before the legislative year ends, have both been approved by their committees already, and are awaiting debate in the full House and Senate.
Both bills have something to say about U.S. support for the demobilization of Colombian paramilitary groups. The House International Relations Committee, whose version of the bill is still not publicly available, includes text added by an amendment from Rep. Dan Burton (R-Indiana), which restricts aid for the paramilitary process until the Secretary of State assures that (1) aid is only going to those who have renounced membership in the AUC; (2) the Colombian government is “cooperating” in the extradition of paramilitaries wanted for drug-trafficking, and (3) the “framework law” governing the demobilizations is able to dismantle the groups while “balancing both the need for reconciliation as well as the need for justice.” This provision was approved in committee with the sole dissent of its senior Democrat, Tom Lantos (D-California), who argued that these provisions are so vaguely worded that they create a loophole through which U.S. aid can go to a deeply flawed process.
The Senate version of the law includes little about the talks, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s non-binding narrative report, which accompanies the bill, has some strong words about possible U.S. support for the paramilitary process.
If the United States is to fund a significant share of the demobilization program, it should meet certain minimal standards. The committee believes it imperative that any demobilization program bring about the full dismantlement of the underlying structure, illegal sources of financing, and economic power of the AUC, which have been designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In this regard, the committee believes it is crucial that each paramilitary seeking sentence reductions or other benefits from demobilization be required to forfeit illegally acquired assets, confess past crimes, and fully disclose any knowledge of the operative structure, financing sources, and the criminal activities of the FTO and its individual members. Each demobilized AUC member's benefits should be fully revocable if judicial authorities find that he has failed to fulfill these requirements.
The committee believes it is critical that the groups of AUC leaders who receive sentence reductions or other benefits fully demobilize and comply with the cease-fire. The committee also believes that all perpetrators of atrocities must serve a minimum number of years in prison for their crimes. The committee urges the Government of Colombia to put in place effective mechanisms to monitor demobilized individuals to prevent them from continuing to engage in organized criminal activity. Finally, the committee urges the Government of Colombia to devise a legal framework that can be equally applicable to other FTOs in Colombia, such as the FARC.
Committee Chairman Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), a key Republican critic of the paramilitary process in its current form, gets much credit for this tough language.
The 2006 foreign aid bill, for its part, includes little money that could go to support the paramilitary process, and no money for this purpose was in the Bush administration’s aid request. If the Bush administration decides at some point that it wants to make a big push to fund the paramilitary process, it will have to go back to Congress and make the request on another piece of legislation.
Posted by isacson at 04:50 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
June 16, 2005
The UN's coca data
Once again, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has given us a fascinating look at current trends in coca cultivation in the Andes. The UNODC Coca Cultivation Surveys for Colombia, Bolivia and Peru released Tuesday are worth a close read.
Here are some of the most striking findings. For the most part, they do not reflect well on Plan Colombia or the current U.S. strategy.
- Neither the UN nor the U.S. government found a significant drop in Colombian coca cultivation in 2004. While the State Department showed Colombian coca holding steady at 114,000 hectares between 2003 and 2004, UN figures indicate a 7 percent drop, from 86,000 to 80,000 hectares.
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It is growing ever more difficult and costly to reduce each hectare of coca growing. The UN figures indicate that for every hectare of coca reduced in 2004, 22.8 hectares of coca were sprayed. This is the highest ratio since the UN began finding reductions in Colombian coca cultivation in 2001. (It’s still better than the ratio one would get from U.S. figures, since the State Department found no reduction whatsoever in coca-growing in 2004. You can’t divide by zero.)
According to former Colombian government drug-policy advisor Alberto Rueda, “Conservative estimates establish that fumigating a hectare costs US$626.” Multiply that by 22.8 and you get the staggering figure of $14,273 spent for every hectare of coca reduced. The UNODC has reported elsewhere (big PowerPoint file) that one hectare of coca gives a farmer a net income of $199 per month. In order to eradicate that hectare, then, the United States in 2004 spent the equivalent of what the farmer would earn from it in six years.
- UN estimates of coca-growing in Colombia continue to diverge widely from U.S. government estimates. The U.S. estimate of Colombian coca in 2004 (114,000 hectares) is 42.5 percent larger than the UN estimate (80,000 hectares). This is a remarkably large margin of error.
While the UN’s measurements show Colombian coca dropping by 51 percent since 2000, the U.S. government’s own figures show a drop of only 16 percent from 2000 levels. (See our comparison of U.S. and UN data for the Andes.)
- According to the UN, the “balloon effect” is alive and well. The UNODC figures found that the small reduction in Colombian coca-growing was more than offset by substantial increases in Bolivia (17 percent) and Peru (14 percent). For the first time since 2000, total Andean coca-growing increased (by 3 percent). This reduction in one country followed by increases elsewhere is another classic example of the “balloon effect” – a phenomenon likening drug-crop eradication to squeezing one part of a balloon, only to see it bulge out elsewhere.
This contradicts U.S. figures, which found no reductions in Colombia but small reductions in Bolivian and Peruvian coca-cultivation. (This led House International Relations Committee Chairman Rep. Henry Hyde [R-Illinois] to report, in a memo to the committee last month, that “We have not seen this balloon effect on coca, as there has not been substantial replanting of coca in Peru, Bolivia, and elsewhere.”) While UN and U.S. estimates diverge widely in Colombia, there isn’t even any agreement on the general trend of coca-growing in Bolivia and Peru.
- Which leads to the point that the satellite imagery used to estimate coca-growing is only able to offer a rough guess. Limitations of satellite methods not only lead to diverging estimates, they appear to allow substantial amounts of coca to go undetected. The UNODC’s reports reveal four such limitations.
1) In Colombia, the satellite coverage does not cover the entire national territory. As the map indicates, the satellites fail to cover much of several departments of Colombia known to have significant amounts of coca (Arauca, Meta, Vichada, Vaupés and Amazonas). They entirely miss the department of Casanare, which borders several coca-producing departments and is overrun by paramilitaries and guerrillas.
2) The satellites cannot detect small coca plots. The latest Coca Survey recognizes that coca cultivations of less than 0.25 hectares – that’s two-thirds of an acre – are undetectable.
3) The satellites cannot find newly planted or recently harvested coca. The 2003 Coca Survey declared that “Only productive coca plants can be identified by means of multi-spectral image analysis. Unproductive coca, i.e. seedlings, harvested stems or sprayed plants show the same spectral characteristics as bare soil or river banks, and are therefore classified accordingly.”
4) Coca-growers are finding other ways to hide their product. The Bolivia Coca Survey notes that farmers in the Chapare region are growing the bushes among dense weeds, making them “very difficult to detect, even from the ground.” It adds that farmers are increasingly planting coca under the shade of trees, out of the view of satellites and aircraft: “Farmers clear the lower vegetation of forested areas and plant coca seeds or transplant coca seedlings under taller trees. The density of coca plants is not high, but the plants receive enough sunlight to grow.”
- Within Colombia, the “balloon effect” continues. The UN data shows that departments that were a heavy focus of spraying in 2004, like Guaviare, Nariño, Caquetá and Putumayo, registered reductions in coca-growing. However, the reductions were almost completely negated by increases elsewhere. Coca cultivation grew by 46 percent in Meta department, 188 percent in Arauca, 21 percent in Antioquia and 23 percent in the far eastern Orinoco-basin department of Vichada.
Interestingly, Meta (part of the zone where the U.S.-supported “Plan Patriota” military offensive) and Arauca (where U.S. aid is helping Colombian troops guard an oil pipeline) are areas of particular focus for U.S. military assistance programs.
- 62 percent of coca fields detected in Colombia in 2004 were new. This is further evidence that fumigation, in the absence of legal alternatives, is not dissuading farmers from planting coca.
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Not only are cocaine prices not rising in the United States – coca base prices are hardly rising in Colombia. One would expect eradication to make the product scarcer, and cause its price to rise. Yet the UNODC reports that the price of coca base – the paste that farmers make from coca leaves – has barely increased in dollar terms, and has stayed about the same in Colombian pesos.
- Unlike the U.S. government, the UN found no decrease in opium poppy cultivation in Colombia last year. The Coca Survey reports, “Based on reconnaissance flights and spray operations conducted in 2004, DIRAN [The Colombian Police Antinarcotics Division] identified approximately 4,000 hectares of opium poppy under cultivation, a similar level compared to 2003.”
This flies in the face of U.S. claims that, in the words of a State Department narcotics official who testified before a House committee last month, “Cultivation of opium poppy in Colombia was reduced by over 65 percent in 2004.”
- In most of the country, UN figures show, spraying is not going hand-in-hand with alternative development. The strategy continues to be all stick and no carrot.
The above table shows coca cultivation, spraying, and alternative-development expenditure in Colombia’s top twelve coca-growing departments over the past several years. It indicates a stark reality: in several of the departments with the most coca and the most spraying, investment in alternative development has been minimal at best.
In Guaviare, the second most-sprayed department in the country, only $500,000 has been dedicated to alternative-development efforts. Nariño, the third most-sprayed department, has seen only $11 million, and most of that has gone to opium poppy-growing zones in the mountains. Caquetá has seen only $5.8 million, while Vichada and Arauca have seen no investment whatsoever – only fumigation.
- The UN reminds us that alternative development – not a further increase in forced eradication – is the key to reducing coca-growing. In Tuesday’s UNODC press release, Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa declares, “This could be a turning point for the Andean region -- farmers are ready to abandon coca cultivation, if legitimate means to earn a livelihood are available. … UNODC data indicates that farmers involved in its alternative livelihood programmes in the Andean region are able to earn more in actual income than counterparts involved in coca cultivation.”
CIP strongly seconds the Coca Survey’s principal recommendation:
There is a window of opportunity for the Andean region—in all three coca-producing countries, the overwhelming majority of farmers indicate their willingness to abandon illicit trade, if assisted in developing alternatives to poverty. The United Nations calls on the international community to focus even more sharply on the ways in which drugs, crime, and terrorism continue to sustain poverty and sabotage the rule of law in the Andean region. We invite greater support for alternative development, the most effective method of creating sustainable growth.
Posted by isacson at 02:36 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
May 18, 2005
They can't be serious
Take a look at this letter that four key Republican House members (all of them committee or subcommittee chairs) sent to the Appropriations Committee five days ago. They want the appropriators to find $150 million in the 2006 foreign aid bill to provide even more military and police aid to Colombia.
The letter basically transmits a request that President Uribe made to members of the House International Relations Committee on a recent visit. Through his congressional mouthpieces, Uribe is asking for four new spray planes (Colombia already has nineteen) and eight new helicopters (6 Huey IIs and 2 expensive Blackhawks). This equipment, which will be stationed at an additional fumigation base in southwestern Colombia, makes up the bulk of the request ($120 million). The request also includes two DC-3T aircraft for the Colombian Navy to perform interdiction ($22 million) and electronic interception equipment for Colombia’s judicial police (DIJIN).
This request – especially the $120 million for more fumigation – should be swatted down and forgotten, for at least three reasons.
- Fumigation isn’t working anyway. Every year since 2002, the ratio of acres sprayed to acres reduced has increased, meaning steadily less bang for the buck. We couldn’t even measure that ratio in 2004, because it’s mathematically impossible to divide by zero: record spraying last year failed to gain a reduction of even one acre of coca. State Department figures showed Colombia with 114,000 hectares (1 hectare = 2 ½ acres) of coca at the end of 2004, only 8,500 hectares less than in 1999, the year before Plan Colombia started. If fumigation is failing as a strategy, it’s madness to increase spending on fumigation by hundreds of millions of dollars. It’s time to alter the strategy.
- Who is making the policy? The left in Colombia often accuses the United States of acting imperialistically. If this request is granted, though, it should be clear to all that U.S. policy toward Colombia is now being made more in Bogotá than in Washington. The Bush administration has paid little attention to Colombia lately, while policymakers who work on Colombia have gone to great lengths to avoid any appearance of distance between themselves and President Uribe. This has led them to take positions that must make them uncomfortable, such as support for the paramilitary negotiations in their present form, or endorsement of Uribe’s view that there is no armed conflict, just a terrorist nuisance, in Colombia.
The U.S. government can’t just rubber-stamp all of the Uribe government’s requests, especially if they don’t make strategic sense. This latest request offers a perfect opportunity to draw the line – especially since the Colombian government is pressuring the U.S. Congress to adopt this package even before the executive branch (the Bush administration) has publicly offered its opinion of it.
- Where would one find another $150 million? If the authors of the May 13 letter get what they want, 2006 aid to Colombia would be bumped up to nearly $900 million, nearly $750 million of it for Colombia’s military and police. Somewhere around $725 million would have to come from just one U.S. budget bill, the annual foreign aid (or, formally, Foreign Operations) law.
The House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee is dealing with a small enough bill already. It has been allocated only $20.3 billion with which to distribute aid to the entire world (PDF format), and it has a host of urgent priorities elsewhere, from the insufficiently funded Millenium Challenge and HIV-AIDS initiatives, to tsunami aid, to increased assistance to the Middle East. Most of Latin America is already facing declines in both military and economic aid for 2006. If appropriators were to accede to the Uribe-Hyde-Davis-Burton-Souder request, they would face the unpleasant task of freeing up $150 million by cannibalizing other programs elsewhere in the world. For this reason, we doubt that this request is going to prosper, though it’s conceivable that some elements of it might still get approved.
If appropriators do somehow find that they have another $150 million available for Colombia, there are many, far better priorities on which to spend it. There are millions of displaced people living in extreme poverty, a potential source of future violence; thousands of rural hamlets without roads, electricity, potable water or credit (but with armed groups and drug-traffickers always nearby); hundreds of judges, prosecutors and investigators in need of protection, equipment, computers and transportation; and thousands of young ex-combatants who, if it can be proven that they did not commit gross abuses, need help starting new lives.
That is just the beginning of a very long list. Colombia has many other needs that are more urgent, and more important to long-term U.S. interests, than yet another shipment of helicopters.
Posted by isacson at 02:54 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
May 16, 2005
Plan Patriota: don't ask, don't tell
The Houston Chronicle put an excellent story on its Sunday front page about the twenty-five U.S. Special Forces troops supporting “Plan Patriota” from the Colombian Army base in Larandia, in western Caquetá department. The article offers a rare glimpse into the U.S. role in assisting the large-scale, year-and-a-half-old military offensive taking place in a large swath of southern Colombian jungle.
Few reporters, American or Colombian, have done any in-depth reporting from the Plan Patriota zone, and it has been difficult to get a sense of whether the offensive is having any success. It is worth noting that the Colombian defense ministry – which seems to put out a press release every time it captures a guerrilla – has kept its propaganda machine rather silent where Plan Patriota is concerned, offering only periodic glimpses that offer little new information. Meanwhile, articles on the website of the FARC and from outside guerrilla supporters (like this one, this one and this one) frequently proclaim that the offensive is failing, and the incisive criticisms of analysts like Sen. Antonio Navarro and the oft-cited Alfredo Rangel have gone unanswered.
Why the official secrecy about the biggest military offensive in the history of Colombia’s conflict? Consider U.S. operations in Iraq, where reporters from nearly all outlets – even Al Jazeera, to some extent – have been embedded with U.S. military units, often resulting in unabashedly supportive media coverage of that controversial war. By contrast, Houston Chronicle reporter John Otis could only get a few hours at the Larandia base, a visit that took some time to arrange.
By most accounts, the reluctance to share information about Plan Patriota comes from the Colombian side. The Colombian military is highly reluctant to grant journalists or outside observers any interviews, access to installations, or entry into theaters of operations. The most-stated reason is the need to keep sensitive tactical information from reaching the enemy – though it is hard to imagine anyone seriously believing that the Houston Chronicle might pass intelligence to the guerrillas if its reporters were allowed to see “too much.”
The more likely reason is nationalist sensitivity. Not only is the Colombian government likely to be unhappy about the prospect of foreign reporters sticking their noses into Plan Patriota, they are probably unwilling to make public the degree of U.S. participation in what they would prefer be considered a 100 percent Colombian offensive.
No matter what the reason, this level of secrecy is a mistake. It leads us to fear that things are going worse than they may in fact be going. It gives more credence to reports that as many as 1,000 Colombian soldiers have been killed, that they are bogged down and suffering from flesh-eating diseases, that they have done little more than capture relatively low-ranking guerrilla leaders and take over already-abandoned encampments, that morale is low, and that military operations have been accompanied by almost no social investment in these long-neglected zones.
This is fast becoming the mainstream view of Plan Patriota - a big, costly military effort that has yielded few results. Is this perception correct? Who knows. The only way we’ll find out is if the U.S. and Colombian governments stop neglecting public affairs and abandon their insistence on total secrecy.
Posted by isacson at 12:17 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
May 13, 2005
Notes on the 5/11 House Hearing
Wednesday’s hearing of the House International Relations Committee didn’t leave very much to write about. The witnesses, all from the Bush Administration, and the Reps from the Republican majority stayed close to their script of unqualified praise for Plan Colombia. The several Democrats who attended offered polite criticism in the few minutes available to them, though they did offer several tough questions (i.e. why are there no fewer U.S. cocaine and heroin addicts today than there were when Plan Colombia began?). Let’s hope they follow up on plans to submit much more in writing.
From my notes, here are a few things that were new, or at least noteworthy:
- The Committee Republicans, who had strongly encouraged the administration to give several old DC-3 airplanes to the Colombian National Police, now want to see those planes used to transport guerrilla and paramilitary deserters to sites where they will manually eradicate drug crops.
The committee’s Chairman, Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Illinois), Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Dan Burton (R-Indiana), and committee staff are pushing hard for this proposal. What’s stopping them is a still-unresolved debate between the State and Justice Departments about whether a program like this could be construed as “material support for terrorists” under current law (like Section 803 of the PATRIOT Act). This bizarre interpretation – which apparently considers ex-terrorists to still be terrorists – makes it impossible for the U.S. government to fund the demobilization and reintegration of any foreign terrorist group’s members, anywhere in the world.
“Some in the executive branch hold the misguided view that putting defectors on these planes to engage in manual drug eradication would somehow constitute material support for terrorism,” said Rep. Hyde. This was never the intent of Congress. We are needlessly and unwisely tying our own hands. How could having former members of a terrorist organization eliminate the very drugs that help finance the terrorist organization they have turned against possibly constitute material support for terrorism?”
We have no strong views about this proposal, and we agree that the current legal interpretation – which fails to admit the possibility that a terrorist can stop being a terrorist – is silly. We have four observations, however:
1) A guerrilla or paramilitary considering turning himself in might be discouraged by the prospect that he may find himself forced to eradicate crops in dangerous areas dominated by armed groups.
2) Proponents of fumigation in Colombia argue that the spraying is necessary because security conditions don’t allow manual eradication. So why are we proposing a big new manual eradication effort? Can we begin to reduce fumigation?
3) Why can’t this program operate now, even in the absence of demobilized guerrillas or paramilitaries? Colombia has double-digit unemployment, greater underemployment, and a huge displaced population – probably hundreds of thousands who would gladly participate in a make-work project like this in order to feed their families.
4) No matter what, forced manual eradication – just like fumigation – will fail unless it’s closely coordinated with a real effort to help the affected communities to make a living in the legal economy. Eradication without development assistance will increase rural residents’ anger at the state, push them into the arms of illegal groups, and lead many to re-plant after the eradicators leave.
- The committee also appears to be pushing the administration to do more to interdict drugs leaving Colombia by sea, noting that “marine air patrols” in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific slowed after September 11, when many patrol planes were called back to the “homeland.” It’s not clear what they expect the interdictors (mainly Defense Department, Coast Guard, and Customs) to do, since they are not appropriating money for those agencies to buy new planes.
- House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Illinois), who gave a statement as a witness but didn’t stay for questioning, made the remarkable claim that “Areas like Putumayo used to be like the wild, wild west…outlaw villages thriving off of the drug trade. Today, Putumayo has been reformed.” This is nonsense, and I address it in the last posting.
- Rep. Burton pushed Drug Czar John Walters very hard on the issue of mycoherbicides – fungi like Fusarium oxysporum that kill coca plants. (Burton, however, called them “micro-herbicides,” both at the hearing and in a written statement published in the Inter-American Dialogue’s daily “Latin America Advisor” newsletter.) We have been concerned that the Bush administration would push to use these fungi in Colombia, with potentially disastrous environmental effects. We were pleased, then, to hear Walters strongly refusing to consider even spending money to test mycoherbicides. I’m paraphrasing here – taking dictation is hard – but Walters said “We’re not sure that the mycoherbicide is specific to coca. If we were to drop it [from planes], it could cause significant environmental damage.”
- In his oral testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics Jonathan Farrar said that fumigation was discouraging coca-growing. A minute or so later, he said that lots of new coca was being planted “as the narco-terrorists plant more plants in an attempt to negate our record spray efforts.” Well, which is it? Are the growers discouraged, or are they planting more than ever?
If you guessed “more than ever,” you’re right. According to State Department figures, attempted coca-growing – the amount of coca eradicated plus the amount of coca left over – has skyrocketed in Colombia as fumigation has increased, from 166,000 hectares (415,000 acres) in 1999 to 251,000 hectares (627,500 acres) last year.
- Farrar also defended the idea of spraying coca in Colombia’s national parks – a proposal that Colombia’s government appears to be on the verge of adopting – by estimating that 6,000 to 12,000 hectares of coca are grown in parkland. That’s 5 to 10 percent of all coca grown in Colombia.
Why can’t this fraction be manually eradicated? Surely the government can maintain control over its own national parks long enough to allow manual eradication to take place instead of chemical spraying. Especially since, as indicated above, increased spraying has been shown to bring increased attempted coca-growing, which involves increased cutting down of forests – much of it, probably, in parks.
- I was confused – no, disturbed – by an exchange between Rep. Betty McCollum (D-Minnesota) and Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega. McCollum cited the arrest last week of two U.S. Special Forces non-commissioned officers for allegedly running guns to the paramilitaries. She then asked a simple question (I’m paraphrasing): “Can you categorically deny that no U.S. government agency is in contact with paramilitaries, or gives support to paramilitaries?”
The correct answer would have been a flat “yes,” but for some reason – was he confused by the question? – Noriega never offered a denial. Instead, he gave an answer at least fifty words long, at the end of which (paraphrasing, again), he said that the U.S. government is “categorically” rooting out any activity that goes against U.S. policy.
- In his testimony, Noriega indicated that, instead of committing itself to a multi-year Plan Colombia II, the State Department is keeping its options open post-2006: “We have made no decisions about specific funding assistance levels beyond FY 2006, but will continue working with the Congress as planning is further developed.”
- It is interesting to note what was not mentioned. Nobody uttered the words “Plan Patriota” or referred in any way to that large, year-long U.S.-supported military offensive. There was almost no mention at all of the Colombian government’s request for $130 million to create a new herbicide-fumigation base in Nariño, complete with 4 new spray planes and eight new helicopters (2 Blackhawks and 6 Hueys), described in detail in Tuesday’s El Tiempo. Though Barbara Lee (D-California) asked about the human rights conditions on military aid – no approval has been forthcoming because there’s no human rights progress to certify – she hardly got any answer.
Posted by isacson at 07:03 PM | Comments (5) | TrackBack
May 06, 2005
Welcome to the echo chamber
What better way to pass a dreary Wednesday afternoon than to stop by the Rayburn House of Representatives’ Office Building for “Plan Colombia: Major Successes and New Challenges,” a hearing being hosted by the House International Relations Committee at 2:00 on the 11th?.
The Republican majority, which is empowered to call the hearing and to invite all speakers, has lined up six witnesses. The six represent a broad range of views – from those who think that U.S. policy toward Colombia is going great, to those who think that it’s going super-great.
The first to testify will be none other than the Speaker of the House, Rep. Dennis Hastert (R-Illinois). Hastert took a strong interest in Colombia during the early to mid-1990s. During his days as a GOP backbencher, this former high-school wrestling coach became an energetic drug warrior, citing his desire to keep drugs away from kids like his former students. He traveled to Colombia frequently in those days, and was among a coterie of Republican representatives who (a) became quite enamored of the Colombian National Police (CNP), and (b) used the drug war as a weapon in partisan battles, frequently charging that Bill Clinton’s administration was too slow to send helicopters to the CNP and increase fumigation – and thus “soft on drugs.”
Now that those helicopters have long since been delivered, and fumigation has multiplied, you would think that Hastert and others would be chastened. After all, Colombian coca-growing is stuck at 1999-2000 levels, and kids like the Speaker’s former students can find Colombian cocaine and heroin just as easily now as they could during the 1990s. Yet Hastert will be present on Wednesday to testify in support of the current policy, repeating things that others have told him second-hand, since he has not visited Colombia for some time.
The real message of Hastert’s testimony is directed at congressional Republicans, who may be losing their enthusiasm for Plan Colombia. “If you oppose the current policy,” Hastert wants to make clear, “you are running afoul of the party leadership.” And the Republican leadership has shown itself willing to deal quite severely with any loose cannons among its ranks.
Next will be Drug Czar John Walters, prepared to give an objective evaluation of the programs that his own office has promoted and coordinated. In addition to cheerleading for Plan Colombia, maybe Walters will add to his string of predictions about when the price of cocaine is expected to rise.
- July 2003: “We expect to see in the next 6 to 9 months significant disruptions in the purity and availability of cocaine throughout the world.”
- August 2004: “These gains have allowed us to, for the first time, have intelligence estimates … that in the next 12 months we will see changes in the availability of cocaine in the United States.”
For the real story, look at the “National Drug Threat Assessment,” published in February by the Justice Department’s National Drug Intelligence Center.
“Key indicators of domestic cocaine availability show stable or slightly increased availability in drug markets throughout the country… Heroin is readily available in most major metropolitan areas in the United States, and availability remains relatively stable… [H]eroin availability continues to increase in rural and suburban areas.”
Walters will be followed by a panel of four representatives of agencies whose budgets and reputations depend on putting the best possible spin on events: USAID, the State Department’s Western Hemisphere and International Narcotics bureaus, and the Department of Homeland Security.
What about those who have a more critical – and more realistic – view of Plan Colombia, its results (or lack thereof), and what should be done instead? We’ll be there - sitting quietly in the audience of the hearing room, and talking to anyone who will listen in the hallway outside.
Why the lack of real debate on such a controversial policy? Who knows. Maybe they're feeling insecure and need to reassure each other. Maybe they're circling the wagons after a rash of bad news (no coca reduction, FARC counter-offensive, GIs arrested, etc.). Let's hope that even though the deck is stacked, the many congressional critics - particularly Democrats on the committee - show up, make strong statements and ask tough questions. Unless Representatives who question the policy make a good showing, it promises to be a dreary afternoon indeed.
Posted by isacson at 02:37 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
May 05, 2005
Trafficking arms to "a friend of a friend"
Today’s big story (Reuters – AP – LA Times – NY Times – Houston Chronicle – CNN) is the arrest, on Tuesday afternoon, of two U.S. soldiers in Colombia. Alan Tanquary and Jesús Hernández appear to have been caught red-handed by Colombian police with 32,000 rounds of ammunition. The Colombian authorities suspect that the materiel was probably destined for the paramilitaries.
For some, the episode raises the specter of Eugene Hasenfus, the U.S. citizen who was shot down over Nicaragua in 1986 while illegally supplying the contras for Ollie North. Are Tuesday’s arrests evidence of a secret U.S. plot to supply the paramilitaries, as a reporter asked during today’s State Department briefing?
Probably not. That doesn’t make much sense. Even leaving aside concerns like human rights, terrorism and narcotrafficking, as a counter-insurgency force the paramilitaries have proven to be erratic at best. Just like the five U.S. soldiers arrested in late March for trafficking drugs out of Meta province, Tanquary and Hernández were probably freelancing in order to make money on the side.
The more interesting question is: how did U.S. military personnel, confined to a military base and its environs and meant to be kept out of harm’s way, manage to make contact with paramilitaries?
The five U.S. soldiers arrested in March for trying to ship cocaine to the United States reportedly got the drugs from a Guaviare-based ring tied to the paramilitaries, while working at the Apiay airbase outside the city of Villavicencio. The two arrested on Tuesday were stationed at Tolemaida, the huge army base near Melgar, Tolima, where much U.S. training takes place and where many U.S.-donated helicopters are parked. (Paramilitary violence, incidentally, is common in Tolima province; last October Tolima’s local ombudsman said that the paramilitaries had killed 170 people since December 2002, when the AUC had declared a cease-fire. Is this why they need more bullets?)
How did the American troops manage to strike these deals? It’s not as though U.S. soldiers in Colombia are being pursued by members of the paramilitaries pestering them to run drugs and arms for them. This money-making opportunity will only knock if someone else first makes the introduction. Who, then, is helping the corrupt Americans to link up with their paramilitary customers? What bridges the two degrees of separation?
Obviously, the most likely "missing links" are the U.S. soldiers' counterparts in the Colombian military, who are co-located with them on bases like Apiay and Tolemaida. Could it be that Colombian military personnel – members of U.S.-aided units that have supposedly severed their ties with the paramilitaries – helped facilitate contacts with "friends" among the local paramilitaries?
The coming investigations – which had better be aggressive, thorough and transparent – must reveal how U.S. personnel came to be in contact with AUC members. If it turns out that the Colombian military indeed played a role, this will make it even more difficult for the U.S. State Department to certify that Colombia’s security forces are actively breaking links with the paramilitaries. And without this certification, 25 percent of U.S. military assistance to Colombia must remain frozen.
Posted by isacson at 06:03 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
April 26, 2005
Secretary Rice's trip: three non-Colombia issues
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is in Brazil, Colombia, Chile and El Salvador this week; she will spend a few hours in Bogotá tomorrow. CIP and the Latin America Working Group have distributed a memo making recommendations for the Colombia leg of her trip. Here are three more observations about other regional issues Dr. Rice will be confronting.
1. Venezuela. Hugo Chávez is legitimate, elected, and CIP firmly opposes anything that even remotely resembles a U.S. effort at regime change. We also applaud his channeling of Venezuelan oil wealth to badly needed social-services. Chávez is a complicated figure, though. Though he is usually called “leftist,” some of his government’s policies run counter to the goals of some important progressive causes.
- Those who value press freedom should be concerned about a recently passed law with vaguely worded language allowing the government to close down media outlets deemed to be inciting violence or threatening public order.
- Those who value demilitarization should be concerned about the host of new internal non-defense roles the new constitution has given the Venezuelan military, as well as President Chávez’s plan to create a 2 million-strong army reserve.
- Those who value respect for human rights should be concerned about limits on freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary, and about the role that “Bolivarian Circles” may be playing in intimidating dissent. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Watch have already registered concerns about these issues.
- Those who value equal rights and opportunities for women should be offended by President Chávez’s crude and suggestive comments about Condoleezza Rice in January.
- Those who want to limit global small-arms transfers should be worried about the Venezuelan government’s latest weapons-buying spree, including the purchase of 100,000 AK-47 assault rifles from Russia.
Press reports indicate that Dr. Rice will be discussing Venezuela during all four stops on her trip. It is perfectly acceptable for her to express concerns about human rights and democratic institutionality, on the diplomatic level, in discussions with other regional leaders.
Due to the immense amount of baggage in the U.S.-Latin American relationship, though, U.S. officials will do more harm than good if they choose to scold Venezuela unilaterally, as Donald Rumsfeld did on a trip to Brazil last month.
As the U.S. line toward Venezuela hardens (and vice versa), it does not make sense to pursue the strategies that have failed so miserably in Cuba, and have arguably helped to prop up Castro for almost half a century: diplomatic isolation, unilateral public criticism, assistance to opposition groups (who are then singled out for ostracism or harassment), or – and let’s hope that this isn’t being considered – the acts of sabotage and violence that used to be called “dirty tricks.” Even a whiff of suspicion that the United States is “bullying” or seeking regime change works immensely to Chávez’s political advantage.
(This, of course, applies well beyond Venezuela. Shortly before Bolivia’s 2002 presidential elections, U.S. Ambassador to La Paz Manuel Rocha warned that if Bolivians voted for cocalero leader Evo Morales – at the time not considered a main contender – the United States would cut its aid. The resulting tide of outrage led Morales to finish a close second in the first round of voting. Morales reportedly referred to Rocha as his “campaign manager.”)
It is still more complicated in Venezuela, though, as Washington is still trying to recover from the damage to its credibility inflicted during a failed April 2002 coup attempt. On that occasion, the Bush Administration and its then-assistant secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, did not endorse an OAS resolution invoking the Democratic Charter until after the coup had clearly failed.
Because they will so quickly be viewed as the antagonists in the region, administration officials should avoid fire-breathing rhetoric. Indeed, the overall U.S. approach to Venezuela will require intense adult supervision – it cannot be left up to the ideologues and true-believers who occupy too many key posts in the Bush administration.
As it is, these characters can do enough damage from the outside. Look no further than Otto Reich, whose rigidly ideological pronouncements clumsily play right into Chavista hands. Witness this passage (one among many) in a recent Reich piece in the National Review.
Not only is Castro still in power, but he is being kept afloat financially by Venezuela's oil-fueled charity; the Sandinistas are making a comeback in Nicaragua; and violent radical groups menace democracy from Bolivia to Haiti. In recent years, left-of-center leaders have come to power in Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay. Should we worry about these leftists? In general, yes. We know that socialist prescriptions do not provide a solution for the problems of developing nations-and as the chief importer of goods and of people in this hemisphere, the U.S. will pay the price of their success or failure. We would much rather pay the price in imported goods and services from successful societies than bear the cost of surplus populations, crime, and drugs exported by failed states.
Yes, that’s right: the Bush Administration’s last assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, a close friend of brother Jeb, thinks that any elected left-of-center government in Latin America is a potential threat we should “worry about.”
In her discussions of Venezuela this week, Dr. Rice would do well to distance herself from the views of the Otto / "New Axis of Evil in Latin America" faction. Only then will it be possible to get other moderate leaders in the region to help convey some very real concerns about freedoms and institutions in Venezuela.
Unfortunately, there are signs that the Bush administration may be headed further down the wrong path. Today’s New York Times reports that “the Bush administration is weighing a tougher approach [toward Hugo Chávez’s government], including funneling more money to foundations and business and political groups opposed to his leftist government.” That would be a disaster, virtually guaranteeing that the United States finds itself both going it alone and inadvertently strengthening the most hard-line elements in Chávez’s government.
2. Governance is expensive. According to today’s Miami Herald, Dr. Rice “is expected to send a clear message that reforms are needed to improve the lot of the region's poor and make democracy work for the masses, according to U.S. officials. The top issues: development of civil society, more free trade, government transparency and the fight against corruption.”
This message – the need to undergo reforms and improve governance in order to make democracy work for the poorest – is excellent. It would be even better, though, if it came with some money to pay for it. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration’s 2006 aid request anticipates cuts in the sorts of U.S. programs that are designed to strengthen reform and good governance in Latin America. It foresees region-wide drops from 2004 levels in Child Survival and Health Programs (-16%), Development Assistance (-14%), and Economic Support Funds (-4%).
The deficit and Iraq are chiefly to blame, but there could not be a worse time for these aid programs to be moving in the wrong direction.
3. Don’t downplay Ecuador. While nobody was fond of Lucio Gutiérrez, especially after he fired Ecuador’s Supreme Court late last year, it is important that Dr. Rice make clear that the United States is uncomfortable with the way he was forced from power last week. It is hard to characterize his violence-inspired exit as a constitutional transfer of power. We second the recommendation made in today’s Miami Herald’s editorial: “At the least, changes of government inspired by violence should be condemned without mincing words.”
Posted by isacson at 05:54 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack
April 19, 2005
Number three no more
Since the 1990s, it has been common for reporters and groups like ours to identify Colombia as “the third-largest recipient of U.S. military assistance.”
This actually has not been true for a couple of years. The Middle East has knocked Colombia out of the number-three spot since 2004. This year, if the Bush Administration’s supplemental request for Iraq, Afghanistan and its neighbors passes unchanged, Colombia will slip to number seven.
Here’s how we estimate that the military-aid rankings have changed since 2002. We do not provide numbers because we don’t have full confidence in our figures, but unless we indicate otherwise, our estimates show the countries listed to be at least $50 million apart.
| 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005, est. |
| 1.Israel | 1.Israel | 1.Iraq | 1.Iraq |
| 2.Egypt | 2.Egypt | 2.Israel | 2.Afghanistan |
| 3.Colombia | 3.Colombia | 3.Egypt | 3.Israel |
| 4.Pakistan* | 4.Jordan* | 4.Afghanistan | 4.Egypt |
| 5.Jordan | 5.Pakistan | 5.Colombia* | 5.Pakistan |
|
| 6.Afghanistan* | 6.Jordan | 6.Jordan* |
|
|
| 7.Pakistan | 7.Colombia* |
| * Estimated aid is only slightly less than that for the preceding country. 2005 figures include aid in the Bush Administration’s emergency supplemental funding request for Iraq. The Senate has not yet passed this bill. | |||
The decline in Colombia’s ranking doesn’t mean that military aid to Colombia has been reduced since 2002. In fact, our estimates show it to be significantly greater than 2002 levels, and has essentially held steady since 2003. The Bush Administration’s 2006 aid request would maintain current amounts, making Colombia one of the only countries in Latin America that is not expected to see a cutback.
However, if you accept the hypothesis that military assistance is a decent indicator of the Bush administration’s interest in a friendly country, the slippage in its ranking tells us that Colombia is a lower priority for the Bush administration than it was back in 2002. This is not news to anybody.
Meanwhile, it is still possible to say that Colombia is the number-one recipient of U.S. military assistance outside the Middle East. No other country comes close.
Posted by isacson at 08:53 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
April 15, 2005
The Senate's foreign aid authorization
Last week, the Senate debated, but has not yet approved, a Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 2006 and 2007 (S. 600).
(If you don’t want to wade through a technical explanation, skip the next five paragraphs to find out what in the bill is relevant to Latin America.)
Full authorizations of foreign aid – as opposed to appropriations – happen pretty rarely. Unlike the annual appropriations laws, which lay out money every year for existing programs, authorization bills are an effort to rewrite the underlying law governing foreign aid. Written by the Foreign/International Relations committees, they create new programs, eliminate others, and change still others (altering, for instance, their priorities, their limitations, or their reporting to Congress). Appropriators are supposed to limit themselves to assigning money to previously authorized programs.
Many of the most familiar foreign aid programs haven’t been touched by an authorization bill for years – they’ve just run on autopilot, getting money appropriated year after year. That’s brought some odd results – for instance, the permanent law governing the IMET military training program still specifies the program’s funding levels for 1986 and 1987, and nothing after.
Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, acknowledged the problem during last week’s debate.
Since the mid-1980s, Congress has not fulfilled its responsibility to pass an Omnibus Foreign Assistance Act. … [I]n the absence of a comprehensive authorization, much of the responsibility for providing guidance for foreign assistance policy has fallen to the appropriations committees. Appropriators have kept our foreign assistance programs going, but in many cases, they have had to do so without proper authorization. In some years, the Congress did pass a State Department authorization bill, but that bill only authorizes about 35 percent of the Function 150 [foreign aid] Account. To fund the remaining accounts, appropriators frequently had to waive the legal requirement to appropriate funds only following the passage of an authorization bill.
It’s still not clear whether the Senate will remedy this problem this year; debate on the 2006-2007 authorization bill halted on April 6 and has not resumed. The House may write its own foreign aid authorization in May.
Though the Senate’s bill is not done yet, a few measures deserve to be highlighted now. They are nearly all modest changes, and many are worthy of support. Some, however, are troubling.
Colombia military aid
The State Department’s International Narcotics Control (INC) aid program includes the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which provides the majority of Colombia’s aid. The section reauthorizing INC would extend through 2007 the “mission expansion” language specifying that counter-drug aid to Colombia may be used to fight guerrillas (and, presumably, paramilitaries). The authorization language calls for “a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities.” Since 2002, similar language has been repeated on every year’s foreign aid appropriations bill.
The same section would extend through 2006 the current “troop cap,” setting a maximum of 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 contractors who may be in Colombia at any given time.
It would also condition aid on a requirement “that no United States Armed Forces personnel and no employees of United States contractors participate in any combat operation in connection with such assistance.”
It would extend through 2007 the human rights conditions that currently apply to Colombia aid, which hold up 25 percent of military aid until the State Department certifies that (a) military personnel suspected of involvement in abuses are being suspended and (b) investigated, prosecuted, and punished; (c) military cooperation with civilian prosecutors and judges on human rights cases is improving; (d) the military is making substantial progress on severing links with paramilitaries, and (e) is working actively to dismantle paramilitary leadership and financial networks.
The Foreign Relations Committee’s non-binding narrative report includes this excellent language about U.S. support for paramilitary demobilizations. It calls for the existence of a legal framework to govern the process – a law with strong provisions for asset forfeiture, reparations, confession, and dismantlement. The law nearing approval in Colombia’s Congress, unfortunately, doesn’t even come close to meeting the standards laid out here.
The committee notes its interest in supporting, through funding, a program to implement the demobilization of AUC paramilitary combatants, and that such a process be conducted pursuant to a comprehensive legal framework, as determined by Colombians through good faith negotiations with the Colombian Congress. If the United States is to fund a significant share of the demobilization program, however, it should meet certain minimal standards. The committee believes it imperative that any demobilization program bring about the full dismantlement of the underlying structure, illegal sources of financing, and economic power of the AUC, which have been designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In this regard, the committee believes it is crucial that each paramilitary seeking sentence reductions or other benefits from demobilization be required to forfeit illegally acquired assets, confess past crimes, and fully disclose any knowledge of the operative structure, financing sources, and the criminal activities of the FTO and its individual members. Each demobilized AUC member's benefits should be fully revocable if judicial authorities find that he has failed to fulfill these requirements.
The committee believes it is critical that the groups of AUC leaders who receive sentence reductions or other benefits fully demobilize and comply with the cease-fire. The committee also believes that all perpetrators of atrocities must serve a minimum number of years in prison for their crimes. The committee urges the Government of Colombia to put in place effective mechanisms to monitor demobilized individuals to prevent them from continuing to engage in organized criminal activity. Finally, the committee urges the Government of Colombia to devise a legal framework that can be equally applicable to other FTOs in Colombia, such as the FARC.
These requirements are in report language, not legislation. If the bill passes, the paragraphs above would not become the law of the land – but they do indicate a widely held view among leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. If – as is likely – Colombia’s “legal framework” doesn’t meet the standards laid out here, the Bush administration would be going against the committee’s expressed wishes if it chooses to aid the paramilitary demobilizations. Rather than pick such a fight, the administration would probably choose not to offer the demobilizations a generous amount of aid.
Loosening the “American Servicemembers’ Protection Act”
The Rome Statute establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC) opened the remote possibility that U.S. military personnel and other citizens could be tried in the new tribunal for human rights crimes. The U.S. Congress reacted in 2002, passing the “American Service Members Projection Act” (ASPA). The law bans non-drug military aid to ICC signatory countries that do not sign an “Article 98” agreement – a document exempting U.S. personnel from the court’s jurisdiction. A 2004 amendment sponsored by Rep. George Nethercutt (R-Washington) broadened the ban to include an economic-aid program, Economic Support Funds (ESF).
Currently, at least eleven Latin American countries have their non-drug military aid (FMF, IMET, Excess Defense Articles) and their Economic Support Funds cut off because they have not ratified Article 98 agreements. (Colombia is one of a handful of Western Hemisphere states that has signed an agreement, allowing aid to keep flowing.) As a result, the number of military and police trainees from countries like Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Costa Rica and Uruguay has plummeted, as has attendance at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC, the former School of the Americas).
CIP has no position on this issue, which we see as a conflict between those who oppose the ICC and those who support maximum coverage for military aid programs. (Ironically, these are usually the same people.) We fit in neither category.
The Southern Command, which places a premium on the training of thousands of Latin American military personnel each year, is unhappy [PDF format] about the International Military Education and Training (IMET) ban imposed by ASPA. Its concern appears to be shared by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-Connecticut), who announced during the April 6 debate that he would soon introduce an amendment to permit IMET for Latin American countries that have not signed Article 98 agreements.
While the amendment’s text has not yet appeared, we understand that its first draft does not undo the Nethercutt Amendment for these eleven countries, leaving the possibility that they could see their IMET unfrozen but still be unable to get Economic Support Funds (ESF).
That would be a terrible shame. The 11 countries currently banned do not get a great deal of ESF, but freeing up only the IMET sends a poor message. Take Bolivia, for instance, which has been getting some ESF for balance-of-payments support over the past several years. It looks awfully mean-spirited to keep that aid frozen while freeing up Bolivia's military training funds.
New kinds of police aid
In 1974 Congress, moved by scandalous accounts of human-rights abuses committed in part with U.S. assistance, approved Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which banned aid to foreign police forces. Since then, Section 660 has been riddled with exceptions; police aid can now flow for many purposes, among them counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, post-conflict situations, democratic countries without a military, investigative techniques, and (as of this year) community policing.
Section 2220 of the Senate’s bill would add four more exceptions to Section 660, clearing the way for police aid (a) to fight corruption; (b) to provide “professional public safety training, including training in internationally recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy”; (c) to combat trafficking in persons; and (d) to give “assistance for constabularies or comparable law enforcement authorities in support of developing capabilities for and deployment to peace operations.”
These new police-aid authorities appear rather benign, though we need to look into the provision allowing “peace operation” assistance for constabularies. This term “constabulary,” meaning a police body organized like a military, applies to institutions ranging from the Chilean Carabineros to the Argentine Gendarmería to the Somoza family’s National Guard in mid-20th-century Nicaragua. We need more precision about this provision’s intent.
Database of arms transfers
The annual “Section 655” report on U.S. arms transfers to the world, required since 1998, is a very useful document, and we wholeheartedly endorse Section 2225 of the Senate bill, which would make this report’s contents much more accessible. The committee’s narrative report language explains:
In an effort to make the Section 655 report more user-friendly, this section requires the State Department to establish an Internet-accessible, interactive database, consisting of all the unclassified information currently available in the printed report. The database would be searchable by various criteria. Such criteria could include, among others, the recipient country, the United States Munitions List category of article or service provided, and the year of the sale or grant. With such a database, interested parties from academia, non-governmental organizations, the defense industry, and the Congress could access immediately cumulative data, cross-referenced among several categories. Because the Department already organizes the data in the Section 655 report through electronic processing, no new data collection will be required.
Posted by isacson at 02:17 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
April 03, 2005
Terrorist peasants!
In Latin America, the word “terrorism” is coming to mean everything and nothing at all. Our latest example comes from Bolivia.
According to an article in Wednesday’s Washington Times, Fernando Rodríguez was denied entry to the United States a month ago, when he was to come to Washington to present a case before the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission. A co-founder of the Bolivian chapter of the Inter-American Platform of Human Rights, Democracy and Development, Rodríguez is a member of a commission that develops the Bolivian government’s human rights policy.
Though his visa was valid until 2014 and he has traveled here several times, Rodríguez was detained for six hours at Miami International Airport. According to the Washington Times article, he was “questioned by four officials, two from the Homeland Security Department and two others who identified themselves as members of an ‘anti-terrorist task force.’”
The officials stripped Mr. Rodriguez of his visa. The reason they gave, according to Rodríguez: he had met with “terrorist peasants.”
Wait a minute. Terrorist peasants?
Rodríguez seemed confused too. “There is no terrorism in Bolivia,” he told the Washington Times. “There are no guerrillas either. There is no armed struggle. So I have no idea what peasants they're talking about.” Indeed, Bolivia has no groups on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Some peasants in Bolivia’s coca-growing zones have organized protests and roadblocks. A very small number have gone so far as to stage ambushes or lay booby traps that have killed or wounded troops and police who were forcibly eradicating coca (Bolivia, like Peru, refuses to allow aerial fumigation). These activities, which are hard to distinguish from criminal behavior since the political goal is unclear, are about the extent of what might approach terrorism in Bolivia. Of course, the ambushers and booby-trappers are only a fringe of Bolivia’s broad and politically powerful cocalero movement.
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| The terrorist peasants of Villa Tunari |
Don’t tell the Miami airport authorities, but I too have met with “terrorist peasants.” On a visit to Bolivia’s Chapare region last May, the Andean Information Network arranged a meeting with leaders of one of the coca syndicates in the town of Villa Tunari. Though its members chewed prodigious amounts of coca leaves during the meeting – a traditional use that is legal in Bolivia – their syndicate’s role goes well beyond coca. It carries out many local self-government duties, providing services and carrying out development projects. It coordinates these closely with the office of the mayor of Villa Tunari, who belongs to the MAS party, headed by cocalero leader and congressman Evo Morales.
Bizarrely, several of those at our meeting identified themselves as being “processed for terrorism.” Apparently, they have not been found guilty of anything, though cases are being developed against them. Because of their role in past highway roadblocks and other protests of forced coca eradication, they must check in with the local prosecutor’s office every few weeks. What a strange requirement for people suspected of a crime as serious as terrorism!
Apparently, Bolivia’s defines “terrorism” very differently than the United States does. Here, nobody accused of terrorism would be at large, active in local government and free to talk to visiting delegations. They would be locked away.
But U.S. policymakers make no distinctions. Terrorism is terrorism. The Washington Times article explains.
In Bolivia, U.S. Ambassador David Greenlee and his predecessor, Manuel Rocha, have alluded to links between the nation's combative indigenous-based social movements and both narco-trafficking and terrorism. … Neither Mr. Greenlee nor Mr. Rocha have presented any evidence of such a connection between indigenous leaders and terrorism, however.
Counterterrorism is also a declared objective of U.S. military aid to Bolivia. The Bush Administration’s 2006 aid request to Congress reads, “We are working with the military to better coordinate Bolivia’s counterterrorism activities and enhance support for their operations and ability to respond to threats through the acquisition of specialized equipment, training assistance and infrastructure improvement.”
Add to this the denial of visas to those known to have met with cocalero syndicates, and you have a U.S. policy that has lost all sense of perspective about terrorism. This could have serious consequences, because there has never been a time that demands more clarity about who the true terrorist enemy is.
If we are too vague or broad in our definition of this enemy, the definition will expand. If allowed to expand unchallenged in Latin America, it may come to include not just coca-growing peasants, but political parties, journalists, labor and peasant leaders, and others who strongly express views that run counter to those of the United States or its allied governments.
We must guard against the politicized misuse of the “terrorist” threat in Latin America. Instead, as Mr. Rodríguez’s experience in Miami indicates, we seem to be encouraging it.
Postscript as of April 7: The Andean Information Network informs me that terrorism charges have since been dropped against the peasants with whom we met. Good!
Posted by isacson at 08:14 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
March 30, 2005
The State Department's new coca data
In a press release dated March 25 (Good Friday), a document so little-noticed that I only stumbled upon it this afternoon, the office of the Drug Czar (White House Office of National Drug Control Policy) is forced to admit some very bad news.
The release reveals that coca cultivation in Colombia did not decrease in 2004, despite a record-high level of aerial herbicide fumigation.
State Department estimates show a total of 114,000 hectares of coca planted in Colombia at the end of last year – just 8,000 hectares less than Colombia had in 1999, the year before Plan Colombia began. This is statistically about the same as the 113,850 hectares measured in 2003.
Colombian coca cultivation in hectares, 1999-2004:
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1999
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2000
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2001
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2002
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2003
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2004
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Total coca cultivation |
165,746 |
183,571 |
254,051 |
267,145 |
246,667 |
250,555 |
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Herbicide fumigation |
43,246 |
47,371 |
84,251 |
122,695 |
132,817 |
136,555 |
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Coca left over |
122,500 |
136,200 |
169,800 |
144,400 |
113,850 |
114,000 |
Let's just pause and consider these two numbers from the above table:
- Total fumigation 1999-2004: 566,935 hectares (more than half the size of the state of Rhode Island).
- Reduction in Colombian coca 1999-2004: 8,500 hectares.
That's right: one hectare reduced for every 67 hectares sprayed.
Meanwhile, note that the total amount of Colombian land estimated to be under coca cultivation - combining what was fumigated and what was “left over” – was 250,555 hectares – more than 2003 and just shy of the all-time high registered in 2002.
The inescapable conclusion we can draw from this data: nearly a decade after large-scale spraying began in Colombia, our fumigation program is not discouraging Colombian peasants from growing coca.
That should not surprise us when:
- 85 percent of rural Colombia lives in poverty (less than about $3 per day);
- due to government absence and neglect, vast stretches of rural Colombia are so isolated from the country’s economic centers that transportation costs make legal crops unprofitable;
- those same neglected zones are host to armed groups that encourage coca-growing; and
- the United States' $35 million or so per year for alternative development in coca-growing zones is nowhere near enough to keep up with the pace of eradication (by contrast, the United States spends over $200 million each year just to maintain helicopters and planes it has already given to Colombia’s security forces).
Under these “all-stick-and-no-carrot” conditions, replanting has been rapid. Rather than seek alternatives that just don’t exist, growers are adapting to eradication.
Elsewhere in the Andes, it’s still not clear how much coca was detected in Bolivia and Peru last year. The State Department’s March 4 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report indicated a slight drop for Bolivia – not an increase, as the Drug Czar’s Good Friday press release claims. The March 4 report had no estimates for either Colombia or Peru, claiming that the numbers were not yet ready. We have still seen no figures for Peru, though the Drug Czar claims that there was some decrease. In January, however, the head of Peru’s anti-drug agency (DEVIDA), Fernando Hurtado, told Reuters that Peruvian coca cultivation probably rose in 2004 and is expected to increase again in 2005.
Posted by isacson at 05:33 PM | Comments (2)
March 16, 2005
Notes on the Southcom "Posture Statement"
Every year at about this time, the congressional armed-services committees meet to hear “posture statements” delivered by the four-star generals who head each of the U.S. military’s regional commands. These statements offer the military command’s view of the potential threats to U.S. interests in each region of the world, what the command is doing about them, any other goals the command is pursuing, and what it wants Congress to support in the coming year. Because the commands’ budgets and political clout are particularly high of late, these “posture statements” have become important declarations of U.S. policy toward each part of the world.
| U.S. Southern Command "Posture Statements"
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Gen. Bantz Craddock, who took over in November as head of the Miami-based U.S. Southern Command – which coordinates U.S. military activities in most of Latin America and the Caribbean –presented his statement to the House Armed Services Committee last Wednesday, and did the same in the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday. His statement makes clear that “prosecution of the war on terrorism” is Southcom’s number-one priority in the hemisphere. It adds, “The stability and prosperity of the SOUTHCOM AOR [area of responsibility] are threatened by transnational terrorism, narcoterrorism, illicit trafficking, forgery and money laundering, kidnapping, urban gangs, radical movements, natural disasters and mass migration.”
While still somewhat fire-breathing, the language of this year’s posture statement is far more measured than last year’s presentation from the now-departed Gen. James Hill, who warned that “terrorists throughout the Southern Command area of responsibility bomb, murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, transfer arms, launder money, and smuggle humans,” sounded alarms about the spread of elected leaders considered to be “radical populists,” as well as the proliferation of “ungoverned or ill-governed spaces and people, corruption, and clientalism [sic.].”
Gen. Craddock largely drops the “radical populism” rhetoric from this year’s statement; while this doesn’t necessarily mean that Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales can breathe easier, it is important that the Southern Command’s official statements do not hint at a view that such leaders are a threat requiring the sort of military response that is Southcom’s specialty. Gen. Craddock also includes a much more precise discussion of the terrorist threat in the hemisphere, recognizing that “we have not detected Islamic terrorist cells in the SOUTHCOM AOR that are preparing to conduct attacks against the US,” though such groups may do some fundraising in the region.
While there are many parts of the statement that we would agree with, none will mistake the newest Posture Statement for a document authored by CIP. Here are a few notes based on a reading of the statement.
Drugs
"SOUTHCOM, through its joint interagency task force (JIATF-South), in conjunction with multinational and interagency efforts, directly contributed to the seizure of over 222 metric tons of cocaine."
This is a significant achievement. However, the State Department’s annual narcotics reports indicate that Colombia, Peru and Bolivia produce over 700 metric tons of cocaine each year. Less than a third, then, was interdicted.
Terrorism
"At this time, we have not detected Islamic terrorist cells in the SOUTHCOM AOR that are preparing to conduct attacks against the US, although Islamic Radicals in the region have proven their operational capability in the past. We have, however detected a number of Islamic Radical Group facilitators that continue to participate in fundraising and logistical support activities such as money laundering, document forgery, and illicit trafficking. Proceeds from these activities are supporting worldwide terrorist activities."
This is a much clearer discussion of the threat posed by “terrorists with global reach” in the hemisphere than was contained in last year’s Posture Statement. It also seems to contradict the findings of a much-mentioned late 2003 U.S. News and World Report article that, citing “senior U.S. military and intelligence officials,” maintained that “Venezuela is emerging as a potential hub of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere, providing assistance to Islamic radicals from the Middle East and other terrorists.”
Crime and gangs
"[Continued from last citation] Not only do these activities serve to support Islamic terrorist groups in the Middle East, these same activities performed by other groups make up the greater criminal network so prominent in the AOR. Illicit activities, facilitated by the AOR's permissive environment, are the backbone for criminal entities like urban gangs, narco-terrorists, Islamic terrorists, and worldwide organized crime."
The profusion of organized crime networks is indeed a big problem in the region. (So is state involvement in these networks, from Guatemala to Paraguay to departmental governments in Colombia.) At issue – and this may be a big question over the next year or two – is whether the U.S. and Latin American militaries have much of a role to play in fighting these criminal networks. Successful efforts against crimes like “money laundering, document forgery, and illicit trafficking” have normally been carried out by civilian investigators, detectives, police and prosecutors – and not soldiers unless the criminals in question have a large amount of firepower.
There are estimated to be at least 70,000 gang members stretched across Central America. The level of sophistication and brutality of these gangs is without precedent. … Surges in gang violence sometimes overwhelm local law enforcement capabilities. As directed by their civilian leadership, military forces are assisting police to check this growing tide of gang violence and insecurity in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras.
Indeed, gang activity is a huge and growing problem, especially in Central America, Mexico and Brazil. In 2003 the Mara Salvatrucha even killed people in Washington’s Columbia Heights neighborhood, less than two miles from CIP’s offices. In much of the region, polls show that citizens rank common crime even above unemployment among the most urgent problems their countries face. The Bush administration, including Southcom, has indicated that it wants to help regional allies to fight gangs. So far, though, there has been no clarity about what they plan to do.
This brings us back to our recurring question: is a military response necessary? Currently, “surges” of gang activity do overwhelm civilian police capacities in places like El Salvador and Honduras. But we have to remember that many of the countries suffering the worst gang activity are places that have undergone a generation-long struggle to get the armed forces not just out of the presidential palace, but out of most internal security duties. Moving police forces out of defense ministries and placing them under civilian control was a major and difficult reform. Gangs should not be a reason for U.S. assistance programs to encourage the region’s militaries to return to the streets of places like San Salvador and Tegucigalpa.
When the gang problem boils over, militaries probably do have to play a role in supplementing the police (just as the 82nd Airborne did during the 1992 L.A. riots). But this role should be temporary, with either a deadline or another short-term benchmark to determine when the soldiers must return to the barracks. It should also come with an aggressive effort to punish any human rights abuses that occur: if the military’s main advantage over the police is that its members enjoy more impunity when they commit abuses, then they had better stay out of the gang problem.
Instead of helping militaries fight gangs, the United States would do better to (1) help strengthen civilian police as an alternative to military force, helping them to become trusted institutions that protect all citizens and seek cooperative – not adversarial – relations with communities; (2) generously support judicial reform, both to improve processing of arrested suspects and to promptly investigate and prosecute allegations of corruption and abuse in the security forces; and (3) increase investments in education, poverty alleviation and economic opportunity in order to decrease the economic desperation that pushes so many young people into gangs in the first place. There is little role for Southcom in any of these areas.
The ICC and military-aid cutoffs
"While the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) provides welcome support in our efforts to seek safeguards for our service-members from prosecution under the International Criminal Court, in my judgment, it has the unintended consequence of restricting our access to and interaction with many important partner nations. Sanctions enclosed in the ASPA statute prohibit International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds from going to certain countries that are parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Of the 22 nations worldwide affected by these sanctions, 11 of them are in Latin America, hampering the engagement and professional contact that is an essential element of our regional security cooperation strategy."
Passed by Congress in 2003, the American Servicemembers Protection Act bans non-drug military aid to countries that do not exempt U.S. forces on their soil from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. As a result, as Gen. Craddock indicates, several Latin American countries are getting no IMET or FMF military assistance. Attendance at WHINSEC – the former School of the Americas – is also down because of the funding freeze.
This is a bit ironic, since some of the most ardent opponents of the ICC are some of the most enthusiastic supporters of military aid to Latin America. Gen. Craddock’s plea for flexibility on the ASPA shows what happens when two right-wing agendas run at cross-purposes. (Of course, the ASPA gives the Bush administration the power to waive sanctions at any time, but the State Department, led by figures like John Bolton, has refused to do so.)
This year, the ASPA was toughened in an especially mean-spirited way: poor countries that refuse to grant immunity to U.S. troops will now see a cutoff in some of their economic aid as well (through Economic Support Funds (ESF), one of the main economic-aid programs).
Military engagement
"The IMET program provides partner nation students with the opportunity to attend U.S. military training, get a first-hand view of life in the U.S., and develop long-lasting friendships with U.S. military and other partner nation classmates."
How wonderful if there were a similar program for judges, legislators, mayors, environmental workers, securities regulators or any number of other civil servants. But there’s no money for that.
Venezuela
"I am also concerned with Venezuela's influence in the AOR. … SOUTHCOM supports the joint staff position to maintain military-to-military contact with the Venezuelan military in support of long-term interests in Venezuela and the region."
The continued pursuit of military-to-military contact with Venezuela is noteworthy. Nobody in the Reagan administration, after all, was proposing military-to-military contact with the Nicaraguan army in 1981. Why now in Venezuela, while President Chávez’s anti-Bush rhetoric continues to escalate? Does Southcom view the Venezuelan military as a potential political counterbalance to Chávez? Or is continued mil-to-mil contact meant to counterbalance Bush administration hardliners who would go so far as to cut all ties to Venezuela? Perhaps both.
Among Colombia's neighbors, Venezuela's record of cooperation remains mixed. We remain concerned that Colombia's FTOs consider the areas of the Venezuelan border with Colombia a safe area to rest, transship drugs and arms, and procure logistical supplies.
The same can be said about the border areas of Ecuador, Peru, or Panama, where armed groups routinely cross over with impunity. Is Venezuela’s lack of control the result of a Chávez government policy, or is it the result of a lack of manpower and resources to secure a 1,000-mile border? Colombia, too, reportedly has guerrilla and paramilitary safe havens on its side of that border.
China
| China’s recent moves in Latin America have received a lot of media attention lately:
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"An increasing presence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the region is an emerging dynamic that must not be ignored. … The PRC's 2004 Defense Strategy White Paper departs from the past and promotes a power-projection military, capable of securing strategic shipping lanes and protecting its growing economic interests abroad. In 2004, national level defense officials from the PRC made 20 visits to Latin American and Caribbean nations, while Ministers and Chiefs of Defense from nine countries in our AOR visited the PRC. Growing economic interests, presence and influence in the region are not a threat, but they are clearly components of a condition we should recognize and consider carefully as we form our own objectives, policies and engagement in the region."
If you want to hold a well-attended academic conference, get published, or just sound trendy, grab onto the new topic of the moment: China’s “inroads” into Latin America. Clearly, China, our rising geopolitical rival, is sharply increasing its trade and defense ties with the region. But as Gen. Craddock’s curious phrasing indicates – “components of a condition we should recognize and consider carefully”? – U.S. officialdom still doesn’t quite know what to make of it. It’s not quite a “threat” (is IBM selling its PC division to a Chinese company a threat?), but it’s easy to detect official discomfort with this potential challenge to the Monroe Doctrine.
Populist demagogues
"In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Perú distrust and loss of faith in failed institutions fuel the emergence of anti-US, anti-globalization, and anti-free trade demagogues, who, unwilling to shoulder the burden of participating in the democratic process and too impatient to undertake legitimate political action, incite violence against their own governments and their own people."
These words are as close as Gen. Craddock comes to repeating the alarmist language about “radical populism” that appeared in Gen. Hill’s statement last year. They raise three questions. First, who are these demagogues? Lots of politicians oppose free trade and are not fans of the United States, but they do not qualify for this epithet. Second, who is inciting violence with impunity? Road blockages – which Bolivia’s Evo Morales (one of the “demagogues” Gen. Craddock likely has in mind) frequently encourages – are usually peaceful, if disruptive. Third, does Southcom really envision a military role in containing or opposing these “demagogues”?
Guantánamo
"This command has continued to support the War on Terrorism through detainee operations at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where approximately 550 enemy combatants in the Global War on Terrorism are in custody. … In performing our intelligence mission, we continue to emphasize the U.S. government's commitment to treating detainees "humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva." Along these lines, we have a good working relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross. We take their recommendations seriously and act upon them when appropriate."
Beyond the scary news reports about abuses at Guantánamo, this extremely curious formulation is disturbing enough. The International Committee of the Red Cross does not have a reputation for offering “inappropriate” recommendations – in fact, they are exceedingly cautious. We wonder which of their recommendations could possibly have been rejected and why.
Colombia
Paramilitary negotiations:
"The Colombian government is making progress at removing combatants from the field and converting them into productive members of society. Once started, the Colombian government's demobilization program must succeed. The first combatants to demobilize are currently in the sunset phase of their demobilization and reintegration process and are ready to reintegrate themselves into Colombian society. Failure of this program will not only re-create the conditions for violence but also undermine current peace negotiations and incentive for further demobilization."
This is by far the rosiest view of the demobilization process that we’ve seen from a U.S. government agency. Most would describe the demobilizations so far as underfunded, chaotic, improvised, and potentially allowing too many human rights abusers to slip through the cracks. Instead of being “ready to reintegrate themselves,” the thousands of paramilitaries who demobilized late last year – even those who are actually in the system and reporting to their “centers of reference” for benefits – are staring into an abyss of unemployment and neglect. Of those who participated in the mass demobilizations of November 2003 and November 2004-January 2005, 48 have been killed.
While too optimistic, this is also a much narrower view of the paramilitary dialogues than we hear from the State Department or Congress. It indicates that Southcom has its eye only on what appears to be a favorable short-term military result: the removal of thousands of paramilitary combatants from the conflict. The language above shows no concern about guaranteeing the paramilitaries’ dismantlement, return of stolen property, justice and reparations to victims, or ensuring that drug lords don’t benefit. If these needs go ignored or unmet, paramilitary re-recruitment and high levels of violence are very likely to continue – yet the Posture Statement appears to be concerned only with demobilization and reintegration.
Going beyond a military response:
"The Colombian government's efforts to reassert or establish governance in areas previously controlled by narco-terrorists are essential to build on recent military successes. … To this end, the Government of Colombia established a Coordination Center for Integrated Action, which assembles representatives from 13 different ministries chaired by a board of directors that reports directly to the President of Colombia. The Center's responsibility is to develop policies and plans to ensure a coordinated and expeditious response that will re-establish government presence and services in territory reclaimed from narco-terrorists. To date, the Colombian Government has committed over $30 million to this effort."
For years, CIP and other organizations have argued that a policy of military offensives is doomed to failure as long as it goes unaccompanied by economic aid and fails to involve the non-uniformed part of the government. Even the ambitious “Plan Patriota,” however, has been an almost entirely military effort even after fifteen months of operations in southern Colombia.
The new Coordination Center for Integrated Action (CCIA) could, finally, be a first step toward correcting this imbalance. It intends to coordinate the arrival of the rest of Colombia’s state into long-neglected conflict zones. It’s a new effort, so we still do not know enough about the CCIA to say that we support it. We do not yet know, for instance, whether it is well-run, whether it is well-funded ($30 million, of course, will barely make a dent), and whether the design of development projects involves recipient populations or is left up to politicians who are courting voters for the next elections.
Facts and figures
"Over the past two and a half years, the FARC has been reduced from 18,000 to an estimated 12,500 members."
This is the lowest estimate of FARC strength we’ve yet seen from any source.
"In 2003 Colombia resumed a thoroughly vetted and robustly staffed Air Bridge Denial Program. Since then, 20 narco-trafficking aircraft have been destroyed and 6 have been impounded resulting in a total of 10.8 metric tons of seized cocaine."
This is the first estimate of aerial interdiction that we’ve seen. Again, with as much as 560 tons of cocaine coming out of Colombia alone (and over 700 from the entire Andean region) each year, 10.8 tons is not as impressive as it sounds.
"Defense spending as a percentage of GDP rose from 3.5% to 5% in 2004."
It’s not 5 percent. The 2004 defense budget was 11 trillion pesos [PowerPoint file]. 2004 GDP is provisionally estimated to have been 248.6 trillion pesos [Excel file]. Total: 4.4% of GDP.
"Colombia increased its tax revenue 17.4% in the first nine months of 2004."
This is perhaps the oddest statistic in the entire statement: did Colombia’s government really increase tax collection by one out of every six pesos in taxpayers’ pockets? If accurate, that tax increase would, in nine months, have moved more than 2 percent of the economy out of the private sector and into government coffers. Rising sales taxes – which hit the poor hard – may have played a role. Perhaps the statistic includes revenue from the state oil company (2004 oil prices were about 50% higher than in 2003).
"Colombia has seen growth in GDP since 2002 from 1.8% to 3.9% in 2003 and 2004."
Final 2004 numbers aren’t out yet, but Colombia’s National Planning Department (DNP) says that GDP grew by 3.9 percent in 2003 and 3.6 percent in 2004. [Excel file] The UN Economic Commission on Latin America estimated Colombia’s 2004 growth at 3.3 percent.
Poverty, inequality and corruption
"The roots of the region's poor security environment are poverty, inequality, and corruption. Forty-four percent of Latin America and the Caribbean are mired in the hopelessness and squalor of poverty. The free market reforms and privatization of the 1990's have not delivered on the promise of prosperity for Latin America. Unequal distribution of wealth exacerbates the poverty problem. The richest one tenth of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean earn 48% of the total income, while the poorest tenth earn only 1.6%. In industrialized countries, by contrast, the top tenth receive 29.1%, while the bottom tenth earn 2.5%. Uruguay has the least economic disparity of Latin American and Caribbean countries, but its unequal income distribution is still far worse than the most unequal country in Eastern Europe and the industrialized countries."
This language is a very welcome addition to Southcom’s analysis. We can’t help but note that people who said things like this in 1980s El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras were branded “communists” and often lived in fear of their countries’ U.S.-funded militaries. We hope that the U.S. defense establishment will be more vocal in its advocacy of other U.S. agencies’ poverty-alleviation efforts, which would ease their own security efforts. Some vocal advocacy is badly needed, since most of the region is looking at a sharp economic-aid cut in the Bush administration’s 2006 budget request.
"If we in the US government are honest with ourselves, we can look at the region today and see that we are not tending the fields with the same zeal we showed in planting the seeds of democracy. Too many of the democracies in our AOR are lacking some or all of the vital democratic institutions: a functional legislative body, an independent judiciary, a free press, a transparent electoral process that guarantees the rights of the people, security forces which are subordinate to civil authority and economic opportunity for the people."
This is not at all the way we would say it – Latin America’s “fields” are not ours to tend! – but the analysis is otherwise right. Unfortunately, no government witnesses ever argue so forcefully for these non-military priorities when they appear before committees that actually fund democracy and development programs. And that is a shame.
Posted by isacson at 02:35 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
March 07, 2005
State's latest narcotics report: nothing to report
Every March 1, the State Department releases its “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report” (INCSR), a phone-book-sized document laying out what the United States and other governments did (or did not do) to fight drug trafficking in the previous year. Though the report often strains credibility in an effort to put a good spin on events, it is a decent source of statistics and details about U.S. policy that are otherwise hard to find. (It used to include the U.S. government’s list of countries “decertified” for being insufficiently cooperative in the drug war. That list now comes out in September.)
This report had been released exactly on March 1 during each of the past several years. Last week, however, the release was postponed from the first (a Tuesday) to the afternoon of the fourth (a Friday). Though the official reason for the delay was that Secretary of State Rice “wants to be able to have the opportunity to review it as thoroughly as possible before presenting it,” those of us who have been in Washington for a few years know that Friday afternoons are made for the release of bad or embarrassing news. (Television ratings and newspaper sales indicate that Friday night through Saturday is the least-noticed news cycle of the week.)
The main bad news that State’s Narcotics Bureau needed to bury, of course, was the explosion of opium-poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. In the Andes too, though, the administration probably did not want to draw attention to the fact that it had nothing new to report.
Coca cultivation
The INCSR used to include estimates of coca cultivation in each Andean country during the previous year. During the last few years, the number of hectares planted with coca in Colombia was not available in time for the report’s release – the report included a blank space which was filled weeks later. In this year’s report, blank spaces for 2004 appear for both Colombia and Peru.
“I think they’ll be available at the end of this month, that’s something that’s out of my control,” Bobby Charles, the soon-to-be-resigning Assistant Secretary for Narcotics and Law Enforcement, said at the report’s Friday afternoon rollout. However, Charles appeared to be preparing reporters for a smaller reduction in Colombian coca-growing than we have seen every year since 2001.
In 2002, we saw a 21 percent reduction in cultivation. In 2003, we saw a 15 percent reduction. This is going to get harder as time goes on because you’re compressing the areas in both coca and in poppy. You’re compressing the areas. You’re making them -- they’re more highly protected, if you will, right now by the drug traffickers and the drug trafficking organizations which, in that country, are also narcoterrorist organizations. But there is real progress.
Let’s look at the Colombian coca data from the report:
| Colombian Coca | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000 | 1999 | 1998 | 1997 | 1996 |
| Potential Harvest (ha) | — | 113,850 | 144,450 | 169,800 | 136,200 | 122,500 | 101,800 | 79,500 | 67,200 |
| Eradication (ha) | 136,555 | 132,817 | 122,695 | 84,251 | 47,371 | 43,246 | — | 19,000 | 5,600 |
| Estimated Cultivation (ha) | — | 246,667 | 267,145 | 254,051 | 183,571 | 167,746 | — | 98,500 | 72,800 |
| HCl: Potential (mt) | 560- | 460 | 571 | 839 | 580 | 520 | 435 | 350 | 300 |
Even though we still know little about what happened in 2004, two things stand out sharply in this table:
1. Estimated cultivation: though the first row of this table (“potential harvest”) gets most of the attention, the third row tells another story. In fact, it seems to call into question fumigation’s effectiveness as a deterrent to planting coca. While the intensity of spraying increased by 48,000 hectares from 2001 to 2003, the amount of land planted with coca only decreased by 7,000 hectares. (Think of all the hundreds of millions of dollars spent to achieve this 7,000-hectare decrease!) We await a 2004 number; since eradication held relatively steady from 2003 to 2004, a tiny decrease (or even an increase) would effectively end the string of coca-cultivation declines that the U.S. and Colombian governments have been trumpeting since 2002.
2. HCl Potential: The fourth row is the estimate, in metric tons, of the cocaine produced in Colombia each year. Note that, for some reason, the State Department expects the tonnage to have increased by 100 tons – 22 percent! – from 2003 to 2004. The report’s text does not explain this number – instead, it confusingly refers to a reduction to 460 tons of pure cocaine, which equals 560 tons of “export-quality” cocaine; perhaps the 2003 and 2004 numbers were reversed by mistake. However, if – as is more likely – the table is correct and cocaine production increased for the first time since 2000-2001, it would indicate that Colombia’s coca-growers are adapting to massive fumigation. Either there is a lot of new cultivation that the satellites have not detected, or growers are “doing more with less” – growing more plants per hectare and using higher-yielding varieties, for instance – or both.
The “balloon effect”
Assistant Secretary Charles boasted that Plan Colombia appears to be the first anti-drug policy to avoid the “balloon effect” – a term that refers to squeezing one part of a balloon, only to see it bulge out elsewhere – since estimated coca cultivation does not seem to be increasing in Peru and Bolivia as quickly as it is declining in Colombia.
What’s fascinating on the metrics is that we are really not seeing the balloon effect. In terms of the entire region in 2003, there was an overall regional reduction of 16 percent of cultivation. That’s a remarkable thing by itself.
If there is no balloon effect, then the U.S. government has not only repealed the law of supply and demand, but it has managed to dissuade people from growing coca even though they live in ungoverned areas and have no other economic options. That’s no small feat.
Or, more likely, declarations of victory over the balloon effect are premature. Our colleague at the Washington Office on Latin America, John Walsh, said it best last month in the Financial Times: “Declaring the balloon effect dead now is a bit like jumping from a plane and believing that the law of gravity has been suspended because you haven’t hit the ground yet.”
Not only that, we don’t even know yet what happened in 2004. Of the three countries that grow nearly all of the world’s coca, the report released Friday only estimated 2004 coca cultivation in one, Bolivia. Granted, the report indicates a small drop in Bolivia’s “potential harvest” (to 24,600 hectares, from 28,450 in 2003 – the first drop since 2000), even though it fails to provide an estimate of coca-growing before eradication, indicates that eradication levels in fact decreased in 2004, and estimates an increase in the number of tons of cocaine produced. (Peru and Bolivia do not allow fumigation; illicit crops are eradicated manually, usually by counter-drug military and police units.)
Nonetheless, the report’s table of coca-growing in Peru – the second-largest coca producer – is almost totally blank for 2004. Peruvian authorities have already said that they expect the numbers to reveal a sharp increase in coca-growing last year. The head of Peru’s anti-drug agency (DEVIDA), Fernando Hurtado, said in January that he expected Peruvian coca cultivation to have risen in 2004 and to increase again in 2005. According to a Reuters story that ran at the time, “The rise in growing areas means some 160 tons of cocaine were produced in Peru in 2004 – 20 percent more than in 2003 – with a street value in the United States of $2 billion.”
A 20 percent increase in Peruvian coca production – even a 10 percent increase – would clearly signal that reports of the balloon effect’s demise are greatly exaggerated.
The price of drugs
When a product becomes scarcer, its price rises. Yet U.S. government data have shown the price of cocaine continuing to decrease on U.S. streets, extending a general downward trend that dates back over twenty years (see John Walsh’s December 2004 report for WOLA on the subject [PDF format]). Assistant Secretary Charles promised Friday that price increases will come soon.
The question that you haven’t asked me that I think is the tougher question is the question, “When are you going see the price and purity change here on the streets of America?” Because that’s going to be when it affects us directly. … And the hope is that you’re -- and I predict we will -- if we stay on this track, if the political will remains solid, I think within a year or two you will begin to see palpable, measurable, in things like stride data and other data points, you will be able to see changes in the -- I think you’ll actually see a change in price first and then you’ll see a change in measurable purity in major metropolitan areas.
We can probably take that promise in the same spirit as a series of similar statements over the past few years. Here are three from the White House’s drug czar, John Walters.
July 29, 2003: [W]e expect to see in the next 6 to 9 months significant disruptions in the purity and availability of cocaine throughout the world. ... The magnitude of this ought to be visible in reductions in purity, probably first, and then some availability problems. … [W]e expect this magnitude to affect the whole market and it should be visible in the next 6 to 12 months.
June 17, 2004: We believe, the latest intelligence reports that we have just completed, that project and look at flow, we believe we will see a change in availability into the United States, on the streets of the United States in the next 12 months as a result of what happens here. … We believe that will probably first appear in reductions in purity, because most of the market for this product, as you know, is dependent individuals. If you raise the price, they go into crisis.
August 10, 2004: These gains have allowed us to, for the first time, have intelligence estimates in the United States that in the next 12 months we will see changes in availability of cocaine in the United States, but in probably first lower purity and it could be followed by higher prices.
Better luck with next year’s report.
Posted by isacson at 01:17 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
February 23, 2005
State's Grossman on AUC talks, "conflict"
For the past four years, Marc Grossman has served as the undersecretary of State for political affairs, the number three position in the State Department and usually the most senior post held by a foreign service officer. In his occasional dealings with Colombia, Grossman has made some statements with which we strongly disagree, but he has been relatively thoughtful and measured. He has usually listened to other points of view, and his support of the current policy of military aid and fumigations can be described more as “managerial” than “passionately ideological.”
Grossman is leaving soon, to be replaced by Nicholas Burns (another non-neoconservative). Last week, while on what will probably be his last official trip to Colombia, the undersecretary gave a very noteworthy interview to El Tiempo. Noteworthy for both good and bad reasons.
Grossman’s most encouraging statements had to do with the conditions under which the United States would support for the Uribe government’s negotiations with paramilitary groups. Instead of equivocating, he went solidly on record in support of a strong “truth, justice and reparations” law that seeks the complete dismantlement of the AUC.
Q: What kind of law is needed?
A: We hope that it is a strong law, a law that should set a precedent for the FARC and the ELN. As such, it should guarantee the dismantlement of the AUC, stop its financing and confiscate its properties. It should also assure that justice is done, that the door is open for the reparation of victims, and it should be transparent. That is what we have said in this visit to President Uribe and Senator Pardo.
Q: Does the United States support the pardoning of paramilitary leaders in order to achieve peace?
A: We are on the side of justice and we believe that justice must be done. We think that whoever has committed a crime should pay for it and should be punished. And let there be no doubt that we consistently support the extradition of those who are wanted by the U.S. justice system.
Q: How does the United States view the probability that some leaders of the AUC might participate in politics after the negotiation process?
To us, the AUC is a terrorist organization, and at the end of the demobilization process, it should completely cease to exist.
While brief statements like these of course leave plenty of wiggle room, these are the strongest words about the paramilitary talks that we have heard from a U.S. official in months. By calling for asset seizures, reparations, punishment and dismantlement, Grossman appears to endorse a very strong law for dealing with demobilizing paramilitary leaders: something close to the legislation proposed by Sen. Rafael Pardo and other legislators, and something so strongly worded that, should it pass, Colombian government peace negotiator Luis Carlos Restrepo would probably submit his resignation again.
The rest of the interview is less encouraging. Grossman repeats the administration’s tough line on Venezuela, criticizing the “negative role” the Chávez government is playing in the region, while failing to make clear how U.S. policy is encouraging the moderates and isolating the extremists (instead of the opposite) in that very polarized country.
Then, in a real misstep, Grossman effectively denies that a conflict exists in Colombia.
Q: Is there an armed conflict or a terrorist threat in Colombia?
A: It is an attack on Colombian democracy by three narcoterrorist groups.
This is more than a semantic issue. If Colombia’s violence is not a “conflict” but just a criminal or terrorist nuisance, several things change. First, much of international humanitarian law goes out the window, since Protocol II of the Geneva accords does not apply. Second, it is impossible to consider negotiating any political demands with any of the armed groups (as happened in El Salvador and Guatemala) – just the terms of their surrender and disarmament. (We discuss the “is it a conflict” issue more thoroughly in another posting.)
At the Cartagena donors’ meeting earlier this month, the Uribe government tried to sell the idea that no conflict exists in Colombia. Most countries in attendance refused to buy into that notion – especially since, while the meeting was occurring, the FARC was proving itself able to hit military targets in several parts of the country – and the meeting’s final declaration includes a reference to the conflict in Colombia.
In his declaration as U.S. representative to the donors’ meeting, USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios was careful not to use the word “conflict,” but the U.S. position was still somewhat ambiguous. Grossman’s response last week left all ambiguity aside: the U.S. government is now on record endorsing the Uribe government’s view of the violence in Colombia. Because of its implications for humanitarian standards and future negotiations, this is a disturbing development.
Posted by isacson at 06:19 PM | Comments (6) | TrackBack
February 18, 2005
The 2006 aid request (2): the rest of the world, and the decline of the drug war
The governments of Peru and Bolivia have complained loudly about the Bush administration’s 2006 aid request. The request calls for 14 percent less aid for Peru in 2006, compared to 2004. Bolivia would get 8 percent less. (Both estimates use data from the 2006 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, a long but very useful document. They combine military and economic aid, and exclude programs, such as Defense Department counter-drug aid, that are not part of the foreign aid request.)
Peruvian anti-drug authorities are predicting that the cuts will make it harder to fight drug trafficking. Bolivia’s foreign minister has proposed a diplomatic alliance with Peru to lobby for aid.
Bolivia and Peru are not at all unusual, though. In fact, of the 109 countries that would get more than $1 million in aid in the 2006 request, at least 50 – nearly half – are expected to get less aid next year than they did last year. Many are looking at reductions of double-digit percentages. The reason, of course, is the ballooning budget deficit, which has forced the Bush administration to seek cuts in so many foreign and domestic programs.
As a result, aid cutbacks are in store for most of the countries that saw large and steady increases since the mid-1990s because of the “war on drugs.” In addition to Peru and Bolivia, less aid may also find its way to Panama (5% less in 2006 than in 2004), Mexico (9% less), Guatemala (16% less), Brazil (18% less), Ecuador (33% less) and – unsurprisingly – Venezuela (45% less).
For its part, Colombia is likely to stay about the same in 2006 as it was in 2004. (Though the chart below shows a 3% decrease for Colombia, keep in mind that the data are incomplete: nobody – not even the Pentagon – has any idea how much of its counter-drug account the Defense Department will use to aid Colombia in 2006; this large but poorly documented source of aid could more than make up for that 3% drop.) While the overall amount will be the same, we know that non-drug programs – from the Arauca pipeline protection effort to “Plan Patriota” – are taking up a larger share, leaving less aid for counter-narcotics programs like fumigation and aerial interdiction. Colombia therefore probably will see less specifically counter-narcotics aid in 2006 than 2004.
After so many years of increases, it is intriguing to see expected reductions in counter-drug aid to the Andes and to “transit” countries like Mexico and Guatemala. The ballooning budget deficit has forced the Bush administration to show what its real international priorities are – and the drug war didn’t qualify.
What does this mean? Is this the beginning of the end of the drug war? Well, probably not. But for the foreseeable future at least, the “war on drugs” is not going to be a growth industry.
The countries that have managed to save themselves from cutbacks are those that fit in one or more of a few categories:
- Countries considered vital to the “war on terror”;
- Countries with more than 200 troops in Iraq today;
- Countries getting assistance from the White House’s new Global HIV-AIDS initiative, even if aid from other accounts is declining;
- Countries invited to apply for aid under the Millennium Challenge Account – though not all will see their applications approved; and
- Four countries – West Bank/Gaza, Sudan, Chad and Laos – whose increases owe to peace processes, humanitarian emergencies, or de-mining programs.
Of the countries that do not meet these criteria, nearly all can expect an aid cutback in 2006. Here is the data.
“War on Terror” countries (thousands of dollars)
According to the budget request, the following countries will be getting more aid because they are considered vital to the “global war on terror.” Several are specifically mentioned in the 2005 supplemental request (PDF).
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| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2006 - 2004 | % change |
|
| 1.Morocco | 17,687 | 45,835 | 62,875 | 45,188 | 255% | Also invited for MCA |
| 2.Afghanistan | 1,798,746 | 980,460 | 4,165,000 | 2,366,254 | 132% | Included in 2005 supplemental |
| 3.Pakistan | 387,374 | 537,550 | 848,244 | 460,870 | 119% | Included in 2005 supplemental |
| 4.Malaysia | 1,169 | 2,120 | 2,550 | 1,381 | 118% |
|
| 5.Djibouti | 7,055 | 7,055 | 14,110 | 7,055 | 100% |
|
| 6.Libya | - | - | 1,000 | 1,000 | 100% |
|
| 7.Jordan | 558,565 | 456,212 | 759,000 | 200,435 | 36% | Included in 2005 supplemental |
| 8.Yemen | 33,471 | 27,125 | 43,400 | 9,929 | 30% |
|
| 9.Indonesia | 122,593 | 135,920 | 158,514 | 35,921 | 29% |
|
| 10.Turkmenistan | 6,540 | 7,649 | 6,600 | 60 | 1% | Included in 2005 supplemental |
| 11.Tunisia | 11,726 | 11,795 | 11,875 | 149 | 1% |
|
| 12.Tajikistan | 27,097 | 28,146 | 26,750 | (347) | -1% | Included in 2005 supplemental |
| 13.Uzbekistan | 36,372 | 46,412 | 35,100 | (1,272) | -3% | Included in 2005 supplemental |
Countries with more than 200 troops in Iraq (thousands of dollars)
|
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2006 - 2004 | % change |
|
| 1.Ukraine | 108,509 | 88,874 | 171,550 | 63,041 | 58% |
|
| 2.Romania | 39,029 | 40,162 | 50,500 | 11,471 | 29% |
|
| 3.Bulgaria | 39,748 | 36,083 | 48,800 | 9,052 | 23% |
|
| 4.El Salvador | 40,785 | 37,657 | 39,954 | (831) | -2% |
|
| 5.Georgia | 89,429 | 102,104 | 83,500 | (5,929) | -7% | Also invited for MCA |
| 6.Poland | 34,783 | 67,472 | 32,000 | (2,783) | -8% |
|
| 7.Iraq | 18,439,500 | - | 7,514,174 | (10,925,326) | -59% |
|
Countries in the Global HIV-AIDS initiative (thousands of dollars)
The following countries are beneficiaries of the White House’s Global HIV-AIDS initiative. Other aid programs to these countries, however, are generally declining.
|
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2006 - 2004 | % change |
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| 1.Botswana | 10,228 | 28,739 | 41,705 | 31,477 | 308% |
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| 2.Cote d'Ivoire | 7,523 | 20,912 | 29,956 | 22,433 | 298% |
|
| 3.Guyana | 10,101 | 17,009 | 25,700 | 15,599 | 154% |
|
| 4.Rwanda | 35,851 | 50,493 | 85,011 | 49,160 | 137% |
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| 5.Namibia | 24,743 | 41,562 | 56,119 | 31,376 | 127% |
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| 6.Tanzania | 56,394 | 100,713 | 124,909 | 68,515 | 121% |
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| 7.Nigeria | 80,240 | 130,099 | 175,728 | 95,488 | 119% |
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| 8.Kenya | 98,223 | 155,974 | 209,942 | 111,719 | 114% |
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| 9.Zambia | 78,658 | 110,353 | 156,739 | 78,081 | 99% |
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| 10.Uganda | 111,305 | 146,945 | 218,719 | 107,414 | 97% |
|
| 11.Ethiopia | 74,250 | 114,094 | 145,045 | 70,795 | 95% | Also getting Transition Initiatives aid |
| 12.South Africa | 95,971 | 136,170 | 186,490 | 90,519 | 94% |
|
| 13.Vietnam | 22,314 | 31,275 | 37,665 | 15,351 | 69% | Also invited for MCA |
| 14.Haiti | 100,451 | 124,501 | 162,530 | 62,079 | 62% |
|
| 15.Mozambique | 57,770 | 78,050 | 89,221 | 31,451 | 54% | Also invited for MCA |
Countries invited to apply for the Millennium Challenge program (thousands of dollars)
The Bush administration’s banner aid program, the Millennium Challenge, which will start giving aid in 2005, only assists countries that score well on a list of sixteen governance criteria (grouped under the categories of “Ruling Justly, Encouraging Economic Freedom, and Investing in People”). Eligibility does not guarantee aid: countries must submit proposals for aid and, if accepted, enter into “compacts” with the U.S. government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation. Two MCA-eligible countries, Lesotho and Vanuatu, do not appear in this list because they currently get less than $1 million in aid.
|
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2006 - 2004 | % change |
|
| 1.Morocco | 17,687 | 45,835 | 62,875 | 45,188 | 255% | Also considered a “war on terror” country |
| 2.Vietnam | 22,314 | 31,275 | 37,665 | 15,351 | 69% | Also in HIV-AIDS initiative |
| 3.Sri Lanka | 21,802 | 21,610 | 22,174 | 372 | 2% |
|
| 4.Madagascar | 21,076 | 20,539 | 20,594 | (482) | -2% |
|
| 5.Georgia | 89,429 | 102,104 | 83,500 | (5,929) | -7% | Also with troops in Iraq |
| 6.Bolivia | 130,199 | 129,316 | 119,941 | (10,258) | -8% |
|
| 7.Mongolia | 11,808 | 11,762 | 10,875 | (933) | -8% |
|
| 8.Benin | 15,759 | 14,602 | 14,377 | (1,382) | -9% |
|
| 9.Mali | 39,467 | 34,494 | 35,423 | (4,044) | -10% |
|
| 10.Nicaragua | 35,459 | 40,466 | 30,512 | (4,947) | -14% |
|
| 11.Senegal | 30,608 | 26,106 | 26,223 | (4,385) | -14% |
|
| 12.Honduras | 39,258 | 37,038 | 32,878 | (6,380) | -16% |
|
| 13.Armenia | 78,212 | 78,986 | 61,450 | (16,762) | -21% |
|
| 14.Ghana | 38,923 | 37,454 | 30,575 | (8,348) | -21% |
|
Other special cases <;/b>(thousands of dollars)
|
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2006 - 2004 | % change | Reason why |
| 1.West Bank / Gaza | 74,558 | 74,400 | 350,000 | 275,442 | 369% | Peace process |
| 2.Sudan | 170,562 | 200,896 | 402,750 | 232,188 | 136% | Humanitarian emergency |
| 3.Chad | 1,524 | 1,245 | 3,250 | 1,726 | 113% | De-mining |
| 4.Laos | 3,412 | 4,534 | 4,050 | 638 | 19% | De-mining |
Everybody else (thousands of dollars)
Almost every country on this list will see a decrease in aid, as they do not meet any of the criteria in the tables above.
It is not clear why Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay are among the few anomalies with expected aid increases. Argentina’s and Chile’s increases will come entirely from non-drug military assistance; this is probably because they are among the handful of large Latin American countries that are still eligible for such assistance – most have been disqualified because they have not signed an “Article 98” agreement exempting U.S. personnel on their soil from the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. Paraguay’s slight increase owes to greater economic assistance and has no apparent cause.
|
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2006 - 2004 | % change |
| 1. Argentina | 1,087 | 1,867 | 2,200 | 1,113 | 102% |
| 2. Chile | 947 | 1,096 | 1,350 | 403 | 43% |
| 3. Somalia | 999 | 5,100 | 1,286 | 287 | 29% |
| 4. Paraguay | 9,447 | 9,011 | 10,865 | 1,418 | 15% |
| 5. India | 87,302 | 91,987 | 94,222 | 6,920 | 8% |
| 6. Azerbaijan | 45,419 | 51,086 | 46,400 | 981 | 2% |
| 7. Nepal | 43,206 | 40,638 | 44,042 | 836 | 2% |
| 8. Lebanon | 36,794 | 38,220 | 36,700 | (94) | 0% |
| 9. Sierra Leone | 9,172 | 11,252 | 8,994 | (178) | -2% |
| 10.Colombia | 574,026 | 567,787 | 558,820 | (15,206) | -3% |
| 11.Egypt | 1,865,307 | 1,821,520 | 1,796,200 | (69,107) | -4% |
| 12.Israel | 2,624,424 | 2,559,360 | 2,520,000 | (104,424) | -4% |
| 13.Burundi | 6,449 | 6,392 | 6,143 | (306) | -5% |
| 14.Albania | 35,033 | 32,476 | 33,215 | (1,818) | -5% |
| 15.Macedonia | 49,670 | 41,890 | 46,999 | (2,671) | -5% |
| 16.Panama | 15,707 | 15,722 | 14,854 | (853) | -5% |
| 17.Malawi | 32,656 | 30,948 | 30,636 | (2,020) | -6% |
| 18.Belarus | 8,055 | 6,800 | 7,550 | (505) | -6% |
| 19.Zimbabwe | 15,457 | 13,819 | 14,346 | (1,111) | -7% |
| 20.Guinea | 19,337 | 15,222 | 17,888 | (1,449) | -7% |
| 21.Cambodia | 52,926 | 60,176 | 48,850 | (4,076) | -8% |
| 22.Kosovo | 78,534 | 75,000 | 72,000 | (6,534) | -8% |
| 23.Mexico | 70,689 | 72,440 | 64,538 | (6,151) | -9% |
| 24.Angola | 23,350 | 21,509 | 20,744 | (2,606) | -11% |
| 25.Kazakhstan | 39,555 | 35,150 | 34,100 | (5,455) | -14% |
| 26.Peru | 154,821 | 150,316 | 132,854 | (21,967) | -14% |
| 27.Philippines | 108,393 | 126,424 | 92,975 | (15,418) | -14% |
| 28.Eritrea | 8,233 | 10,097 | 6,931 | (1,302) | -16% |
| 29.Guatemala | 32,237 | 29,794 | 26,957 | (5,280) | -16% |
| 30.Congo (DR) | 40,406 | 38,034 | 33,527 | (6,879) | -17% |
| 31.Oman | 26,075 | 21,340 | 21,600 | (4,475) | -17% |
| 32.Brazil | 28,243 | 26,279 | 23,198 | (5,045) | -18% |
| 33.Kyrgyzstan | 41,860 | 34,584 | 33,910 | (7,950) | -19% |
| 34.Bosnia | 64,726 | 45,280 | 51,975 | (12,751) | -20% |
| 35.Bangladesh | 59,533 | 54,093 | 47,800 | (11,733) | -20% |
| 36.Dominican Republic | 31,234 | 25,730 | 24,728 | (6,506) | -21% |
| 37.Slovakia | 7,983 | 6,460 | 6,250 | (1,733) | -22% |
| 38.Czech Republic | 10,145 | 7,852 | 7,900 | (2,245) | -22% |
| 39.Bahrain | 25,250 | 19,498 | 19,650 | (5,600) | -22% |
| 40.Turkey | 50,600 | 38,328 | 38,750 | (11,850) | -23% |
| 41.Jamaica | 21,578 | 20,224 | 16,497 | (5,081) | -24% |
| 42.Estonia | 8,382 | 7,160 | 6,300 | (2,082) | -25% |
| 43.Moldova | 25,398 | 19,191 | 18,720 | (6,678) | -26% |
| 44.Lithuania | 8,572 | 7,656 | 6,300 | (2,272) | -27% |
| 45.Cuba opposition | 21,369 | 8,928 | 15,000 | (6,369) | -30% |
| 46.Ecuador | 52,541 | 46,971 | 35,429 | (17,112) | -33% |
| 47.Bahamas | 1,264 | 1,331 | 840 | (424) | -34% |
| 48.Latvia | 10,018 | 7,160 | 6,300 | (3,718) | -37% |
| 49.Croatia | 25,703 | 20,740 | 15,960 | (9,743) | -38% |
| 50.Hungary | 8,982 | 7,852 | 5,575 | (3,407) | -38% |
| 51.Slovenia | 3,289 | 2,933 | 1,950 | (1,339) | -41% |
| 52.East Timor | 25,996 | 24,116 | 15,300 | (10,696) | -41% |
| 53.Serbia and Montenegro | 134,553 | 95,185 | 77,140 | (57,413) | -43% |
| 54.Burma | 12,293 | 7,936 | 7,000 | (5,293) | -43% |
| 55.Ireland | 21,870 | 21,824 | 12,000 | (9,870) | -45% |
| 56.Venezuela | 6,497 | 3,472 | 3,550 | (2,947) | -45% |
| 57.Cyprus | 38,820 | 13,792 | 20,200 | (18,620) | -48% |
| 58.Russia | 101,928 | 91,600 | 52,750 | (49,178) | -48% |
| 59.Liberia | 202,979 | 44,101 | 89,758 | (113,221) | -56% |
| Methodological notes:
|
Posted by isacson at 10:44 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
February 15, 2005
Cali's El País on fumigation contractors in Tumaco
Cali’s newspaper, El País, ran an interesting article on Sunday about the U.S. personnel, mostly private contractors, who fumigate coca in Tumaco, a port city on the Pacific coast in Nariño department, not far from Ecuador.
While the approximately 20 U.S. advisors for Plan Colombia – military and civilian – do not have much contact with the population of the “Pearl of the Pacific” [as Tumaco is sometimes called], so little contact that some in fact do not notice their presence, the Tumaqeños look poorly on the fact that foreign citizens are tied to activities that they consider an act of aggression.
I saw these fellow U.S. citizens when paying a visit to Tumaco last April. Actually, anyone who flies into Tumaco sees them because they’re right there at the airport.
I’ve been to other civilian airports in Colombia that have a police base attached with contract personnel doing the fumigation, such as San José del Guaviare or Villagarzón, Putumayo. But much tighter security at those facilities made it much harder to see the spray planes and contractors, who were confined to a separate area. Not so in Tumaco’s airport, they are they right there, mixed in with the traveling public.
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When getting off one’s plane on the tarmac, there they are. Walking the 50 yards or so to the terminal, you go between ranks of brand-new-looking spray aircraft. Once in the terminal, only a chain-link fence separates the often crowded, not-very-secure waiting area from the contractors’ planes and facilities only yards away. (Despite being very much out in the open, they and the Colombian police gave a hard time to a Colombian colleague who was documenting our trip on video and couldn’t resist taking footage of the planes from our table in the airport cafeteria.)
The contractors themselves are hard to miss as the regular flights to and from Cali come and go. Some are hanging out by their facility. Some are sitting around in the cafeteria, brushing off attempts to start a conversation. They seemed pretty bored in between missions; while waiting for our bags, in fact, we saw one of these goodwill ambassadors happily jogging down the runway, waving around one of those blow-up dolls they sell in adult shops while his buddies laughed.
Though it pays well – usually over $100,000 per year – theirs is a very strange life. Their stay in Tumaco only lasts a few weeks or months, then they go home for a while only to come back again. While there, they see little of the town or its people, limited to shuttling back and forth from the airport to their hotel (where we also found ourselves staying), and perhaps to the nearby naval base, in SUVs and buses with tinted windows and no license plates.
If they ventured out, they would see a city of 100,000-plus people that is an utter basket case. Poverty for much of the city’s Afro-Colombian majority is extreme, with squalid conditions, at times recalling Port-au-Prince, making Bogotá slums like Ciudad Bolívar look prosperous by comparison. The municipal government is broke and will be for years due to astronomical debts brought on by rampant corruption and mismanagement. Between 2001 and 2004, incredibly, the town went through 62 mayors.
The port city is part of a much larger county by the same name; the vast rural zone, with rivers flowing from jungle to the ocean, is full of mangrove swamps, generations-old afro-Colombian communities, fishing villages, and – in a development that didn’t exist even 7 or 8 years ago – coca fields. The rural zone is violent, with FARC guerrillas and paramilitaries constantly jockeying for control over coca money and trafficking routes. (On top of everything else, Tumaco is one of Colombia’s main export points for illegal drugs.)
In mid-2001, a major military offensive, “Operation Tsunami,” temporarily reduced the guerrilla presence in the area. In the operation’s aftermath, the guerrillas returned to rural Tumaco, and paramilitary groups – which had barely established themselves beforehand – greatly increased their presence in the urban center and control of neighborhoods. In 2001 and 2002 they carried out a wave of selective killings (including that of an activist nun, Yolanda Cerón) and “social cleansing” murders of prostitutes, street children and other “undesirables,” while extorting local businesspeople and hooking into local government.
The chief of the AUC’s local “Liberators of the South” bloc, Guillermo Pérez Alzate or “Pablo Sevillano,” is wanted in connection with a shipment of 11 tons of cocaine, and is believed to have coordinated the North Valle Cartel's “mule” operation (recruiting women to board planes to the United States after swallowing sealed packets of drugs). A recent convert to paramilitarism, he paid large sums to the AUC sometime after 2001 for control of southern Pacific coast narcotrafficking routes and for permission to wear the AUC label. According to Moritz Ackerman, a columnist for the Medellín daily El Colombiano, Perez's group routinely does business with guerrillas: “in the department of Nariño, in a region called ‘Coca City,’ the ‘Liberators of the South’ paramilitaries buy the harvest and the FARC's 29th Front supervises the refining of cocaine.”
I have no idea whether the U.S. citizens running the spray program in Tumaco, who hardly stray from the airport, the navy base and their hotel, know or care about any of this. But if you’re in Tumaco, it’s hard to miss them doing their job. Early in the morning, every morning I was there, you hear the “Apocalypse Now” sound of the spray planes’ police escort helicopters taking off. Shortly afterward, the U.S.-provided, U.S. citizen-piloted spray planes fly out, on their way to spray more herbicides over one of Colombia’s poorest, most neglected regions.
Posted by isacson at 08:58 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
February 08, 2005
The 2006 aid request
In an entry dated October 28, I made this bold prediction:
We don't expect the policy to remain on autopilot for much longer, though. As the next Congress debates the 2006 aid proposal, 2005 will be sort of a "crossroads" year for the U.S. strategy in Colombia, perhaps the first such year since 2000.
OK, maybe it’s not going to be a “crossroads” year, after all. At least not if the Bush administration gets its way.
After six years (2000-2005) and $4 billion in U.S. aid – $3.2 billion, or 80 percent of it, for the military and police – Plan Colombia is set to “expire” at the end of this year. This left open the possibility of a re-framing of U.S. assistance to Colombia beginning in 2006, with the three chief scenarios being (1) an increase in the military component; (2) a greater proportion for economic-aid programs; or (3) an across-the-board cut.
For now at least, it appears that the answer is “none of the above.”
Yesterday, the State Department released the broad outlines of its foreign aid request for 2006. As it turns out, the Bush administration’s plan for U.S. aid in the first post-Plan Colombia year is almost identical to the past few years’ aid packages.
Contrary to what I’d expected (and to what a couple of midlevel officials had hinted in recent off-the-record conversations), there is no shift in military versus economic priorities. We’re looking at a request for roughly $750 million more in aid for 2006, 80 percent of it – yet again – allocated for Colombia’s security forces. The budget document calls for at least $424 million in new military and police aid to Colombia, which rises to nearly $600 million when you include military aid that flows through the Pentagon’s budget. Economic aid remains stuck at $152 million, 20 percent of the total. The aid figures for 2006 are similar, in amount and proportions, to what we’ve seen each year since 2003.
There is no such thing, then, as the “end” of Plan Colombia – the post-2005 plan continues to be the same militarized, punitive approach we’ve seen for years.
We had been holding out a faint hope that the administration’s request would include somewhat more economic aid and less military aid. After all, even some conservatives and drug warriors had begun to talk about the need for economic aid to cement what they perceived to be Plan Colombia’s achievements.
In a late December article indicating that Plan Colombia “is to get a major overhaul once its five-year term ends at the end of 2005, with policymakers looking to give it more of a social and less of a military character,” the Miami Herald’s Pablo Bachelet quotes the assistant secretary of state for antinarcotics, Bobby Charles, calling for a “shift in the direction of greater attention to the social fabric in the country.”
The shift predicted by Charles (who, incidentally, is resigning his position effective in mid-March) did not come to pass. In today’s Herald Bachelet quotes a State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, explaining that “The intent is indeed to change the focus as the military phase achieves success. We are achieving success but we’re not there yet.”
The change in reasoning is subtle, but meaningful. Somewhere in the administration’s internal debate, those who argued “we’re not achieving our goals yet, we can’t shift strategy” beat out those who argued “we’re achieving our goals, it’s time to shift strategy.” (Those of us who argue “we’re not achieving our goals, it’s time to shift strategy” don’t have a seat at that particular table.)
The 2006 request, then, is an admission of failure. Instead of a shift toward economic aid “to consolidate our gains,” the administration is proposing continued militarization because “we’re not there yet.”
Indeed, it looks to be a while before we get “there.” Five years into Plan Colombia, cocaine is just as cheap and available now as it was when Plan Colombia began. The conflict is nowhere near resolution, and the guerrillas have proven to be resilient. Areas where the vast bulk of U.S. aid has been focused are not getting less violent. The United States has gotten much closer to the conflict. And not enough is being done to invest in neglected conflict zones.
That last point is a big reason why we’re not “there yet.” A widely held belief here in Washington maintains that helping Colombia to govern itself is a sequential process: first security assistance, then economic aid at some distant future date. The problem here is that while we await the magical day when “security conditions” are finally sufficient to allow the so-called “soft aid” to start, the Colombian state’s neglect of conflict and coca-growing zones continues. The local population’s already low levels of trust and belief in their government deteriorate.
An example: when reporters from El Tiempo visited the “Plan Patriota” zone in December 2004, they found no evidence of non-military aid for the region’s residents. “In part, what’s happening is good because it is getting rid of this disgraceful crop [coca],” a peasant in Cartagena del Chairá told the reporters. “But the government should think about the poverty here. Those who want to stay and work need credit [to plant legal crops].”
I don’t mean that the Colombian government should start building hospitals and setting up elaborate employment-generation programs in dangerous war zones. But it is never too early to set up the more basic conditions that governance involves, such as getting the judicial system working enough to reduce corruption and abuse; giving mayors and governors the skills and resources they need to administrate their territory; mapping out and titling landholdings; protecting human-rights defenders and other reformers; or increasing the coverage of assistance to the displaced.
In an excellent opinion piece that ran last July, Semana magazine editor María Teresa Ronderos explained some of the things that citizens should expect from their government, even when the government doesn’t have full control of the territory.
To establish “institutionality” is not, as the old cliché repeats, to bring in the ethereal and easily manipulated “social investment.” To bring the legitimate state is to de-marginalize the people who live in these regions and make them Colombians once again, with full enjoyment of citizenship. This means that they should have a national ID card, that they may vote in a clean system which guarantees that local powers do not buy their election, that they have legal titles and their properties are registered, that they pay taxes, that there is a judge and a prosecutor with basic work conditions – electricity, fax, paper – so they can mete out justice. Civilization won’t arrive either until minimum development requirements are met: access to a bank, a telephone, and national currency instead of coca base.
Why wait for the moment when “the military phase achieves success,” whenever that is? Investment in these more basic economic-aid priorities can begin anytime, but neither Colombian nor U.S. funds are coming close to meeting the huge need for it.
What a shame, then, that the 2006 request is, once again, mostly military assistance. As the foreign aid bill begins its journey through the Congress this spring, it had better go through some changes.
Posted by isacson at 11:08 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
February 04, 2005
Antonio Navarro: "Fumigation?"
Here, thanks to my intern David, is a translation of a Cambio magazine column written in late December by Colombian Senator Antonio Navarro Wolff. The second-highest vote-getter in Colombia’s last legislative elections, Sen. Navarro is a former leader of the M-19 guerrillas, which disbanded in a 1990-91 peace process. He is a key figure in the Pólo Democrático political party, which also includes Bogotá mayor Luis Eduardo Garzón.
This column, which calls into question the on-the-ground effectiveness of herbicide fumigation, closely parallels what I and others have seen when traveling to Colombia’s coca-growing zones in the past year or two. It inspired U.S. Ambassador William Wood to respond with a letter of his own, which appears on the embassy’s website.
12/29/2004
Fumigation?
Senator Antonio Navarro Wolff
Cambio magazine (Colombia)
Three months ago, the President invited all the members of Congress from Nariño [a department in Colombia’s far southwest, near Ecuador] to a security conference at the airport in Pasto [the capital city]. We were sitting next to the most powerful people—the ministers who deal with security issues and the region’s police and military commanders.
An issue that had to be addressed during the meeting was illegal crops. Over the course of the conversation, a surprising fact emerged: the Anti-Narcotics Police data on the presence of these crops in the department did not coincide with the information maintained by the provincial government and people familiar with the territory. While the police talked about 13,000 hectares [33,500 acres] of coca, the governor’s office estimated three times that amount. When comparing data from individual counties, the surprise was even greater. While the national data spoke of zero hectares of coca, all of us at the conference who were familiar with the region knew that these counties had thousands of planted hectares.
Later, I told them my personal experience from a visit I made in mid-2004 to Orito, Putumayo, where they were electing the mayor and my party, the PDI, had a candidate. As soon as I got on the helicopter that took me from Puerto Asís to Orito, the pilot told me that the land we would be flying over was full of coca. I didn’t believe him. Plan Colombia had begun in Putumayo [in 2000], and at some point former Interior Minister [Fernando] Londoño had said that there were no coca bushes left there. Yet the pilot showed me tons of crops on the way. Later, I spoke with many people who gave me the same information. Finally, by chance I met with an army official, who confirmed my thought that there was almost as much coca now as when Plan Colombia had started. When I finished the account of my trip, Uribe did not want to believe it. He lost his temper and asked that the official who had spoken to me be investigated.
Days later, the Chief of the Anti-Narcotics police visited Nariño and, I assume, Putumayo, where he was able to see for himself that the information they had did not correspond to the facts. Everything points to the fact that is a severe underreporting of the number of coca crops throughout the country.
This begins to cast a seed of doubt on the optimistic figures regarding eradication of coca as a result of the intense [aerial herbicide] fumigation of the last three years. Other facts point in the same direction. The amount of drugs seized on their way to the international market has reached the highest level in history. In 2004, all records in this area were broken.
Those who defend the success of fumigations believe this is due in large part to the increased presence of the Armed Forces throughout the country, making interdiction efforts much more effective. This could be true, but it can also be explained by the fact that production has not decreased significantly.
On the other hand, a study [PDF format] conducted by the U.S. based NGO WOLA [the Washington Office on Latin America] showed, among other things, that the price of drugs on U.S. streets had gone down in recent years. According to WOLA, this shows that supply has not decreased. The State Department replied that this conclusion was not true, since the drop in price could also explained by a drop in demand.
The truth is that the policy of fumigation “at any cost” is at a critical point. Its defenders hope for an abrupt decline of coca crops in Colombia in 2005. If this does not happen, has the time come to replace this policy? Will Bush accept this?
Posted by isacson at 07:31 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
January 31, 2005
A familiar scenario
Picture, if you will, the following scenario:
- Faced with a terrorist threat against his country's citizens, a deeply conservative president scornfully dismisses calls - mainly from the left - to address the poverty, inequality, ignorance and desperation that helped to nurture the threat in the first place.
- With patriotism and "democracy" at the center of his rhetoric, the president instead chooses to respond by launching and escalating a military campaign, limiting civil liberties, and rejecting dialogue.
- While the gap between rich and poor increases, the president proves reluctant to require the wealthiest citizens to sacrifice either money or lives for his military campaign.
- The president makes almost no effort to improve socioeconomic conditions in the ungoverned areas where the enemy thrives. Winning the support of local populations is given a far lower priority than the ongoing military offensive. Poverty rates refuse to budge.
- The military campaign nonetheless brings citizens a tenuous sense of security, and a sense that the government has regained the offensive.
- This greatly increases the president's popularity, making his re-election likely. Much of the congressional opposition cautiously decides to tone down its criticism and avoid controversy.
- Liberals, with their complaints about human rights abuses, concerns about a "quagmire," and exhortations to address the "root causes" of the violence, end up despised in much of the mainstream media - especially much-viewed networks with a conservative bent - and in popular opinion.
- Though its leadership is far more conservative than most of society, the military becomes the most respected institution in the country.
- However, the refusal to demand that wealthy citizens sacrifice soon plunges the national budget into a deficit so deep that it threatens the likelihood of further progress.
- Concerns about human rights abuses damage the country's worldwide reputation.
- Meanwhile, the terrorist group - though wounded - remains intact, with its top leadership unharmed, financing mechanisms largely in place, and recruitment unaffected.
Does this sound familiar? It should if you live in George W. Bush's United States or Álvaro Uribe's Colombia.
What comes next? Will the sense of security be sustained? Does the president further solidify his grip on power? Will civil liberties be preserved? Does the terrorist group strike back? Does the congressional opposition recover? Do the liberals' proposals get a fair hearing?
Stay tuned.
Posted by isacson at 02:16 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
January 23, 2005
Spreading liberty by arming dictators?
I know that the following isn't exactly on-topic for a Colombia weblog, but we're at a historic moment for U.S. foreign policy and some things just can't go unremarked.
For decades, many activists, scholars and groups like CIP have been calling for a U.S. foreign policy that promotes democracy. At the very least, we have called for a U.S. foreign policy that does not support tyranny around the world. Latin America in particular has seen far too much U.S.-supported tyranny, from the murderous military regimes of Central America, Argentina and Chile to pro-U.S. strongmen like Somoza, Trujillo, Duvalier and Fujimori.
If you take at face value the soaring rhetoric of his inaugural address, it would seem that President Bush has taken to heart at least the first part, about promoting democracy worldwide. “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world,” the president told us on Thursday.
Leave aside whether this is an after-the-fact justification for invading Iraq without WMDs. The idea of a U.S. foreign policy that actively supports democracy and opposes tyranny is something that we’ve been advocating for a very long time, and it’s good to hear a president say it so forcefully. When liberal internationalists like us have spoken like that, we’ve normally been rebuffed by self-proclaimed “realists” in power – usually in President Bush’s own party – who have insisted that promoting democracy (and its inseparable corollary, human rights) often runs counter to the security or economic interests of the United States. (Look no further than a touchstone document of the neoconservative movement, Jeane Kirkpatrick’s 1979 essay “Dictatorships and Double Standards.”)
We welcome Bush’s words. But we want to see some action. Putting his words into practice would require the president to do two things that, taken together, would represent a true revolution in U.S. foreign policy. First, he would have to tolerate elected leaders who oppose the United States (there are few of these, but Hugo Chávez is the obvious test case). Second, he would have to stop aiding dictators who support the United States.
Notice that I didn’t say “actively opposing” pro-U.S. dictators; neocon pundit Charles Krauthammer has a point when he argues that we can’t undermine dictators if it appears likely that whatever succeeds them would be either chaos or an even worse dictatorship. “In friendly dictatorships we push for democracy only up to the point of instability. We dare not risk regime change—yet,” Krauthammer contends.
But there’s a big difference between “not undermining” pro-U.S. dictatorships and actively propping them up, strengthening their instruments of repression by arming them and making them more lethal. The Bush administration continues to give massive amounts of military and police assistance to dictatorships worldwide, many of them Middle Eastern.
The amounts of military aid are more than you’d expect. You can look it up for yourself – not in the works of Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn, but in the documents and reports published online by our own Department of State. The list below is what you get when you juxtapose military aid and arms sales data (available in the State Department’s annual Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations) with assessments of how well recipient countries honor basic freedoms and tolerate dissent (from the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices).
- Egypt ($1.293 billion in military aid and $1.101 billion in military sales in 2003, the last year for which definitive data is available): “In 1999, President Hosni Mubarak was reelected unopposed to a fourth 6-year term in a national referendum. … The Government's human rights record remained poor and many serious problems remain … Citizens did not have the meaningful ability to change their government. … The 1981 Emergency law, extended in February for an additional 3 years, continued to restrict many basic rights. The security forces continued to mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, and occasionally engaged in mass arrests. Local police killed, tortured, and otherwise abused both criminal suspects and other persons. Police continued to arrest and detain homosexuals. The Government partially restricted freedom of the press and significantly restricted freedom of assembly and association. The Government placed some restrictions on freedom of religion.”
- Jordan ($607 million in military aid and $255 million in military sales in 2003): “Citizens did not have the right to change their government. Citizens may participate in the political system through their elected representatives to Parliament [lower house only]; however, the King has discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and upper house of Parliament, to dissolve Parliament, and to establish public policy. Reported continuing abuses included police abuse and mistreatment of detainees, allegations of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, lack of transparent investigations and of accountability within the security services, denial of due process of law stemming from the expanded authority of the State Security Court and interference in the judicial process, infringements on citizens' privacy rights, harassment of members of opposition political parties, and significant restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association.”
- Saudi Arabia (no military aid, but $842 million in military sales in 2003): “Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without elected representative institutions or political parties. … The Committee to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue, whose agents commonly are known as Mutawwa'in, or religious police, was a semiautonomous agency that enforced adherence to Sunni-Wahhabi Islamic norms by monitoring public behavior. ... Members of the security forces committed human rights abuses. … The Government's human rights record remained poor … Citizens did not have the right to change their government. There were credible reports that security forces continued to torture and abuse detainees and prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and hold them in incommunicado detention. There were cases in which Mutawwa'in continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and foreigners. There was no evidence that violators were held accountable for abuses. … The Government continued to restrict freedom of speech and press, although there has been an increase in press freedom over a series of years. The Government restricted freedom of assembly, association, religion, and movement.”
- Pakistan ($226 million in military aid and $314 million in military sales in 2003): “In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. … The National Assembly met during the year; however, no bills have been passed since 2002, with the exception of the national budget. President Musharraf, the intelligence services, and the military continued to dominate the Government. … Security forces used excessive force, at some times resulting in death, and committed or failed to prevent extrajudicial killings of suspected militants and civilians. … Police abused and raped citizens. Prison conditions remained extremely poor and life threatening, and police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. Several political leaders remained in detention or exile abroad at year's end.”
- United Arab Emirates (no military aid, but $493 million in military sales in 2003): “The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates established with no democratically elected institutions or political parties. … Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press. The press continued to practice self-censorship. The Government restricted free assembly and association.”
- Singapore (no military aid, but $335 million in military sales in 2003): “The Government has broad powers to limit citizens' rights and to handicap political opposition, which it used in practice. ... Caning, in addition to imprisonment, was a routine punishment for numerous offenses. … The Government continued to restrict significantly freedom of speech and freedom of the press, as well as to limit other civil and political rights. … The Government significantly restricted freedom of assembly and freedom of association.”
- Kuwait (no military aid, but $334 million in military sales in 2003): “Kuwait is a constitutional, hereditary emirate ruled by the Al-Sabah family, who governs in consultation with prominent families and community leaders. The Constitution provides for an elected National Assembly; however, it permits the Amir to suspend any or all of its provisions by decree. Approximately 14 percent of citizens have the right to vote (only males age 21 and over who have been citizens for at least 20 years and are not in the military or police forces). … Citizens do not have the right to change their government. … Security forces occasionally monitored the activities of persons and their communications. The Government placed some limits on freedom of speech and the press. The Government restricted freedom of assembly and association. Journalists practiced self-censorship. The Government placed some limits on freedom of religion and freedom of movement.”
- Bahrain ($90 million in military aid and $97 million in military sales in 2003): “The Al-Khalifa extended family has ruled the country since the late 18th century and continues to dominate all facets of society and government. … The Constitution gives the elected Council of Representatives a role in considering legislation, but most legislative authority still resides with the King and he appoints members of the Shura (Consultative) Council. … Citizens did not have the right to change their government. The Government prohibits political parties, and none exist. … The Government restricted the freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, and association. Journalists routinely practiced self-censorship. The Government also imposed some limits on freedom of religion and freedom of movement.”
- Oman ($82 million in military aid and $65 million in military sales in 2003): “The Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy ruled by Sultan Qaboos Al Bu Sa'id, who acceded to the throne in 1970. It has no political parties; however, the Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura) is a representative institution whose members are elected directly by voters. … [H]owever, the Consultative Council, which may recommend changes to new laws, has no binding legislative powers. … Citizens did not have the right to change their government. … The Government restricted freedom of expression and association. The Government must approve the establishment of all associations and prohibited human rights organizations.”
- Uzbekistan ($12 million in military aid and $1 million in military sales in 2003): “Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights. … President Islam Karimov and the centralized executive branch that serves him dominate political life and exercise nearly complete control over the other branches. Following a January 2002 referendum judged to be neither free nor fair, the President's term in office was extended by 2 years. Previous elections were neither free nor fair. … The Government's human rights remained very poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens could not exercise the right to change their government peacefully. Security force mistreatment likely resulted in the deaths of at least four citizens in custody. Police and NSS [National Security Service, former KGB] forces tortured, beat, and harassed persons. Prison conditions remained poor. … The number of persons in prison for political or religious reasons, primarily individuals the Government believed were associated with extremist Islamic political groups but also members of the secular opposition and human rights activists, was estimated to be between 5,300 and 5,800. Police and NSS forces infringed on citizens' privacy. The Government employed official and unofficial means to restrict severely freedom of speech and the press, and an atmosphere of repression stifled public criticism of the Government.”
- Tunisia ($6 million in military aid, and $12 million in military sales in 2003): “The Government's human rights record remained poor ... There were significant limitations on citizens' right to change their government. Members of the security forces tortured and physically abused prisoners and detainees. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals. ... The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Security forces physically abused, intimidated, and harassed citizens who voiced public criticism of the Government. The Government continued to impose significant restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press. Editors and journalists continued to practice self-censorship. The Government remained intolerant of public criticism and used physical abuse, criminal investigations, the court system, arbitrary arrests, residential restrictions, and travel controls (including denial of passports), to discourage criticism by human rights and opposition activists. The Government restricted freedom of assembly and association.”
- Azerbaijan ($8 million in military aid, and $1 million in military sales in 2003): “The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. The Government continued to restrict citizens' ability to change their government peacefully. ... Police tortured and beat persons in custody, including several opposition members, and used excessive force to extract confessions. … After the election, authorities conducted a wave of politically motivated detentions and arrests of more than 700 election officials, opposition members, and journalists; more than 100 remained in custody at year's end. The Government continued to hold many political prisoners and infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government continued to restrict some freedom of speech and of the press, and police used excessive force and continued to harass journalists during the year. Government officials sued journalists for defamation. The Government restricted freedom of assembly and forcibly dispersed several demonstrations held without a permit, and law enforcement officers beat protestors at several demonstrations during the year. The Government continued to restrict freedom of association by refusing to register some political parties and harassing domestic human rights activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”
- Yemen ($3 million in military aid, with much more expected for 2004, and $100,000 in military sales in 2003): “There were limitations on citizens' ability to change their Government. Security forces continued to arbitrarily arrest, detain, and torture persons. ... Despite constitutional constraints, security officers routinely monitored citizens' activities, searched their homes, detained citizens for questioning, and mistreated detainees. … There continued to be limits on freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government continued to harass and intimidate journalists despite a decline in detention of journalists from last year. Journalists practiced self-censorship. The Government at times limited freedom of assembly. The Government imposed some restrictions on freedom of religion and placed some limits on freedom of movement.”
There are other tyrannical regimes whose security forces get U.S. aid, but these are probably the largest amounts.
President Bush made quite a promise on Thursday. “All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors,” he said. “When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.” Next time you hear lofty rhetoric like this, think of the nations in the shameful list above. Those who “live in tyranny and hopelessness” in these countries are further from liberty, because the Bush administration is arming those who murder, jail and torture them.
Methodological note: I don’t include here a few smaller military-aid programs, such as Excess Defense Articles or Defense Department engagement programs, which would make military aid figures for 2003 slightly larger.
I used one government report in addition to the two mentioned above in order to estimate arms sales: the “Section 655” report available on the website of the Federation of American Scientists. This report provides data for the licensing of arms sold from U.S. companies to foreign governments. Not all of these licenses are fulfilled, so actual deliveries of weapons may be fewer; the sales figure I quote nonetheless indicates the amount of sales for which the U.S. government gave approval.
Meanwhile, this list doesn’t include dictatorships that don’t get aid but do a lot of business with us, such as China or Equatorial Guinea. Nor does it include aid to the militaries of countries that elect their leaders but routinely violate human rights with impunity, such as Israel, Indonesia, Nigeria – or, of course, Colombia.
Posted by isacson at 04:40 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
January 22, 2005
A visit to WHINSEC
I’m writing this on a delayed flight back to Washington, after spending the past two days at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the former U.S. Army School of the Americas, at Fort Benning in Columbus, Georgia. I’d been to Fort Benning before, to the annual November protests organized by School of the Americas Watch, but this was my first visit inside the gates.
For those unfamiliar with the Institute (known by its acronym WHINSEC, though most activists still call it SOA, recalling its initials until a 2001 name change), it’s a U.S. Army school offering Spanish-language training and education specifically for the militaries of Latin America. It has a controversial history. During the cold war, a time when much of the region was ruled by dictators, the school strengthened abusive militaries. It has a long list of notorious graduates. In the mid-1990s we learned that even some torture techniques were included in course materials. After years of activist efforts to close the school and legislative questioning of its role, Congress changed its name, added new layers of oversight, required more human rights content in all training, and got rid of many (though not all) courses teaching lethal skills. Today even Canadian soldiers attend.
Reformed or not, though, you might ask why the U.S. Army feels it necessary to maintain a special school, at taxpayer expense, just to help the region’s armies. Don’t these armies have histories of human rights abuse, a questionable commitment to open societies that tolerate dissent, outsize political clout and impunity for most wrongdoing? Why would we seek to strengthen what in so many countries is already the strongest state institution?
The official answer to these questions has changed over the years. For a long time, it was anticommunism at all costs. After the cold war, the school played only a small drug-war role but placed emphasis on “engagement,” building relationships with officers from the region. Its backers argued that contact with U.S. counterparts makes Latin America’s militaries more respectful of human rights and democracy. Now, the “war on terror” is of course a defining mission, though only one specific course has been added (the “Counter Narco-Terrorism Information Analyst Course”).
These answers still do not explain why we need a special school to do all of this (in fact, the WHINSEC accounts for well under five percent of the Latin American military personnel we train each year – 857 out of 22,855 students in 2003). Nor do they explain why training and engaging Latin American military personnel is a higher priority than training and engaging Latin American judges, legislators, mayors and governors, urban planners, tax collectors, first-responders, engineers, or social-service providers.
So why did I visit? I wanted to learn more about the part of the Institute’s mission that sounds most like something CIP would support: training in human rights, civil-military relations and the military’s role in a democracy. After years of monitoring the place, I also just wanted to see it firsthand and get to know the people who run it. I’d also read in past WHINSEC “Board of Visitors” reports and been told by relevant congressional staff that the Institute’s leadership was puzzled by NGOs’ past non-acceptance of invitations to visit. Why, they asked, do they criticize us but never even come to see for themselves?
So along with researchers from Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center, I accepted the invitation extended by Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy to attend a discussion of the school’s human rights and democracy programs and how they can be improved. A debate over whether the Institute should exist was not the purpose and therefore off the table.
Because of our concern that this visit could be misinterpreted as an endorsement of the Institute and its mission, the Institute’s staff agreed not to publicize it on their website or in their promotional materials. Likewise, I won’t reveal who-said-what details about the visit, but I do want to offer the following observations.- I was surprised by the preponderance of Colombians, even though we know that Colombia has been the number-one source of students at the SOA and WHINSEC since 1999 (if you don’t count Chilean cadets). The Institute’s deputy commandant is a Colombian colonel and its ranking guest non-commissioned officer is a Colombian sergeant. (The Colombian dominance is further strengthened by the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, a bit of Republican-inspired legislation that cuts off military aid to twelve Latin American countries that don’t exclude U.S. personnel on their soil from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. While Colombia agreed to sign one of these “Article 98” agreements granting immunity, students from the twelve banned countries may only attend counter-drug courses funded through counter-drug aid accounts, which are excluded from the ban.)
- I did find a genuine interest in making human rights more than just window-dressing to improve the school’s image. Clearly a lot of thought has gone into developing a curriculum and trying to integrate it into all courses, and the staff and instructors we met showed a strong belief in what they are doing. The training curriculum does a good job of introducing international human rights standards and goes well beyond the little human-rights training that U.S. personnel receive.
- However, I didn’t get a sense that the military trainees are internalizing the human rights lessons in a way that makes sense to them. The training heavily emphasizes human rights law (types of rights, past conventions), rules of engagement, proper interaction with civilian populations, and similar operational aspects – but there is less consideration of how this might play out in practice. A likely outcome is that personnel who graduate the Institute’s programs may end up with a rather compartmentalized idea of human rights.
- For instance, individuals may leave the school able to cite the International Declaration of Human Rights chapter and verse, but still convinced that non-violent critics of the state, especially leftists, are security threats that need to be reined in through force if necessary. Though freedom of speech and the right to dissent are on the list of inalienable rights, the training doesn’t explore the importance of tolerating – not to mention protecting – those who relentlessly criticize and seek deep reforms, but do not violate the law: human rights defenders, labor organizers, investigative journalists, whistleblowers and denouncers of abuse and corruption, among others. The famous phrase attributed to Voltaire – “I disapprove of what you say, but I’ll defend to the death your right to say it” – needs to be part of the training. That includes swallowing hard and explaining that even the speech of those who express anti-U.S. views is protected.
When covering these issues with military counterparts – whether at the Institute or in other forums – U.S. instructors have to be especially sensitive to armed forces’ interaction with non-governmental organizations. We held a very lively discussion with officers taking the year-long Command and General Staff course; the Colombian officers in particular revealed the familiar but all-too-common belief that NGOs are partial to the guerrillas, or even in solidarity with them or under their direct control. (It seems that in the minds of many, the Danish NGO that made a donation to the FARC last year is typical.)
It is important that U.S. personnel do more to convey the message that, unlike guerrillas which seek to destroy the state, there is a peaceful left that, by denouncing abuses, seeks to improve the state. Its goals are honorable: to discourage future abuses, to advocate for victims and to align the state with values – like due process, equality of opportunity and equal justice under law – that make states worth defending in the first place. Even if they are a pebble in the military’s shoe, these groups need to be protected. Right now, it’s not apparent that the training conveys this message clearly enough.
- The training also appeared largely to omit a common phenomenon in Latin America: the problem of armed groups that, like Colombia’s paramilitaries, are pro-government and fight the same enemy. While instructors use scenarios and hypothetical situations, including a good in-depth review of the 1968 massacre in My Lai, Vietnam, these generally center on the avoidance of direct human rights violations. Indirect violations – that is, collaboration with or toleration of other groups that do the dirty work – do not appear to be a prominent training topic.
Though U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine claims that citizen militias can be a useful tool, the experiences of Guatemala and Colombia indicate that helping them can make the situation far worse: they are difficult to control, and they end up escalating civilian killings, engaging in criminal activity (like the drug trade) and devastating the government’s legitimacy. The Institute’s instructors need to amend the old doctrine regarding paramilitary forces: the message should be that illegal violent groups must be combated regardless of their political leanings.
- The program has to do much more to tackle the question of impunity, which is a huge issue throughout Latin America. While it capably explains rules for operations, the program does not do enough to explain what must happen when these rules are violated – as they inevitably are, no matter how well-trained the force is. What happens to those responsible?
Obviously, in much of Latin America, those responsible avoid prosecution, often through intimidation of, or at least non-cooperation with, judges and investigators. Impunity in turn makes much human-rights training irrelevant: if a soldier in the field knows he can commit an abuse without punishment, the mere knowledge that the abuse is “wrong” will not always be enough to deter him.
It is essential that the Institute’s discussions of human rights abuses include the post-abuse environment. Instead of circling the wagons – the students should be told – a military that respects the rule of law collaborates fully with investigators and the justice system, even if it means giving incriminating eyewitness testimony. (The case study of the My Lai massacre – in which only one soldier, a lieutenant, was punished, and he was paroled by 1974 – is not exactly a model of fighting impunity here at home. If anything, the lesson students would draw from the My Lai case is a realization of how far even the United States has to go toward punishing crimes against humanity.)
- Of course, the present has no shortage of “teachable moments” for human rights as well. The Institute cannot comfortably ignore, and should thus encourage, frank dialogues about Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, “Camp 6,” the “enemy combatant” category, the “Salvador Option,” the televised killing of a wounded prisoner in Fallujah, the Gonzales torture memo, and other cases in the headlines. I did not get a sense of whether such dialogues are taking place, but they should be, since they are certainly on everyone’s minds. Are they examples of the United States not practicing what it preaches? Do they show our justice system working (the conviction of Spc. Graner, the important role that JAGs have played in Guantánamo) or failing (the lack of prosecutions against higher-ranking officers)?
- We spent much less time talking about the Institute’s training in civil-military relations and military support for democracy. As a result I don’t know how, or whether, the Institute takes on the most contentious civil-military issues in the region today. These would include where the jurisdiction of military justice ends and that of civilian justice begins; oversight, appropriations, and control of military expenditure; military investments in the private sector; or how the military is expected to function in ungoverned zones where the rest of the state is not present. I don’t know whether the Institute instructs militaries to obey elected leaders from the left (most Latin American soldiers and officers tend to be profoundly conservative, even more so than in the United States). I don’t now how instructors reinforce the idea that it is the judiciary, not the military, which gets to decide when an elected leader has violated his country’s constitutional order.
The latter question is an important one in the current regional climate. The Bush administration – as we heard in Thursday’s inaugural speech – has placed promotion of democracy at the center of its foreign-policy rhetoric. At the same time, administration officials consider “radical populism” to be a threat to U.S. interests. The trouble is, democracies occasionally elect “radical populists” or other leaders who are openly critical of the United States. The Institute should teach that even these leaders are legitimate and must be obeyed. Does it?
- A final suggestion, for now at least. Though it has changed its name, modified its mission and made significant improvements to its curriculum, the Institute must do still more to rid itself of the baggage of the School of the Americas. For one thing, the Army and the Defense Department have never formally admitted to any past mistakes. There has not been a public reckoning with how the school contributed to abuses and undemocratic behavior, how its graduates stopped civil-society reformers from confronting social injustice, how its excesses in fact undermined U.S. interests, and which past practices must never be repeated. Instead, in the often acrimonious debate with groups like SOA Watch, the school’s defenders have sought to play down past mistakes (“nobody condemns Harvard because the Unabomber was educated there”). This is the wrong way to go.
A clean conceptual break with the past is needed. Without it, in some future threat environment – for instance, one in which the United States perceives a greater hemispheric terror threat – the Institute could find itself quickly backsliding into old patterns of supporting repression. A thorough review and public report, by an independent panel representing many sectors and points of view, might offer a way to identify past errors, explain how they happened, and recommend ways to ensure they don’t happen again.
The plane will be landing soon, I’ll edit and post this shortly. That’s enough for now…
Posted by isacson at 02:31 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
January 10, 2005
That stubborn "balloon effect"
Critics of U.S. drug policy often speak of the “balloon effect” – a term that refers to squeezing one part of a balloon, only to see it bulge out elsewhere – to describe drug crops’ constant tendency to pop up in new areas in response to forced eradication campaigns. Indeed, the past twenty years have seen the bulk of coca cultivation shift from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia, and then from region to region within Colombia.
In August, Drug Czar John Walters told reporters that the Bush administration’s anti-drug program, centered on aggressive aerial herbicide fumigation in Colombia, had finally beaten the dreaded balloon effect.
In regard to coca cultivation, for the first time, I think, in the last 20 years, the aggressiveness with which things are being pressed in Colombia is so aggressive, it has not been able to respond by growing elsewhere. There have basically been static rates of cultivation in Peru and Bolivia, which have been the previous areas and still are areas of significant cultivation.
Indeed, State Department measures showed no significant increases in Peruvian and Bolivian coca cultivation in 2002 and 2003, even as Colombian coca acreage appeared to be shrinking.
One reason this may have been so was a stubborn inability of coca prices to increase. While the street price of cocaine has failed to rise (the effect you’d expect from a shrinking supply), nor had the price of the basic paste that campesinos make from coca leaves. As this graphic from a very useful early 2004 UN report (PDF format) indicates, the price of coca paste, measured in dollars, had not budged four years into Plan Colombia.
With coca paste averaging $793 per kilogram in 2003, the UN estimates (large PowerPoint file), a hectare of coca offered a peasant a net income of $199 per month, or just over $6 per day. (Meanwhile, each kilogram of coca will be turned into hundreds of grams of cocaine, each of which will sell on U.S. streets for roughly $100.) At those prices, it is likely that relatively few Peruvian and Bolivian campesinos were finding the illicit crop to be worth the risk.
That may be changing. Reuters reported this weekend that, for the first time in a while, the past few months have witnessed an increase in the price of coca paste. Fumigation, combined with the “Plan Patriota” military offensive in southern Colombia, may be making the raw material scarcer in Colombia.
It still looks unlikely, though, that this increase will affect the price and availability of cocaine in the United States, for a simple reason: the balloon effect is still with us.
Citing the head of Peru’s anti-drug agency (DEVIDA), Fernando Hurtado, the Reuters story notes that Peruvian coca cultivation probably rose in 2004 and is expected to increase again in 2005. “The rise in growing areas means some 160 tons of cocaine were produced in Peru in 2004 – 20 percent more than in 2003 – with a street value in the United States of $2 billion.”
So after years of coca cultivation rising in Colombia and falling in Peru, it looks as though we are now about to see the reverse happen – which would keep the region-wide cocaine supply from dropping. That, of course, is the very definition of the balloon effect. So here we go again.
Posted by isacson at 09:15 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
January 04, 2005
Rebutting the rebuttals
Administration officials have recently begun responding to U.S. papers' editorials criticizing U.S. policy in Colombia. While this posting hardly qualifies as "rapid response" - the editorials in question were published back in October - here are our rebuttals to the officials' letters.
January 3, 2005
Editorial Board
The Chicago Tribune
435 North Michigan Ave.
Chicago IL 60611
Dear Sir or Madam:
I write to thank you for your editorial of October 12, 2004 (“Sliding into Colombia’s morass,” reposted here) regarding increasing U.S. military involvement in Colombia. “American policy in Colombia is not working,” your editorial stated. “This nation needs to rethink its involvement in Colombia's civil war, rather than pouring more money and personnel into a failing enterprise.” The Center for International Policy completely supports this assertion, and shares your concerns about where the United States is headed in Colombia.
I also wish to respond to some of the assertions in the letters to the editor you received from Rafael Lemaitre, the deputy press secretary of the White House’s drug czar’s office (published October 22), and from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman (published October 27).
“Your analysis is inaccurate on several counts,” Mr. Grossman’s letter reads. Yet the officials’ letters themselves include several misstatements, or overstatements, which deserve a response.
- Mr. Grossman’s assertion that “violence in Colombia is at the lowest
level in decades” is an oversimplication. Common crime may be dropping,
but conflict-related violence persists. Interpreting data gathered by several
prominent Colombian human-rights organizations, the Colombian Commission of
Jurists reports that the drop has not been at all steep. In 2003,
6,335 people – over 17 per day – were killed by “sociopolitical violence.”
Corresponding numbers for past years were 6,639 in 2000, 6,641 in 2001, and
7,803 in 2002. If anything, violence had dropped to 2000 levels, not “the
lowest in decades.” The Colombian human-rights group CODHES meanwhile notes
that 130,346 people were violently displaced from their homes during the first
half of 2004, a 33.5 percent increase over the last six months of 2003.
- Mr. Grossman observes that “drug crop eradication, interdiction and drug-related
arrests are at record high levels,” while Mr. Lemaitre’s letter argues
that “the assertion that coca cultivation in Colombia has simply ‘just
moved from one place to another’ is false.” Mr. Grossman’s statement is
true, as far as it goes; indeed, aerial herbicide fumigation in drug crop-growing
areas has reached record levels, as have arrests and amounts of drugs confiscated.
Mr. Lemaitre’s argument is off base: even though satellites are showing some
reduction in coca acreage in Colombia, the product still moves from one place
to another with astonishing frequency.
Neither letter mentions the uncomfortable fact that, as U.S. government statistics show (PDF format), years of aid, eradication and interdiction have so far failed to affect the price, purity and availability of drugs in the United States. In dollar terms, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports (PDF format), the price of coca paste in Colombia’s illegal market has not risen either. This probably indicates that while satellite measurements are showing reduced coca acreage, growers are adapting. Coca plots are getting smaller and harder to detect, with plants sown closer together and even in shade. The crop is appearing in new, often very remote zones.
Meanwhile, leaders in some drug-producing areas claim that official estimates of reduced coca acreage are far too optimistic. Antonio Navarro, a prominent senator from southwestern Colombia, wrote of a recent meeting between police officials and local-government leaders in his home province of Nariño. “While the police spoke of 13,000 hectares [33,500 acres] of coca [in Nariño], the governor’s office estimated that the real amount is three times greater. When results were considered by county, it was even more surprising. While official statistics found zero hectares in various counties, every one of us present who is familiar with the region knew that there are thousands of hectares planted there.”
- “The Colombian economy grew by 3.7% in 2003, and is expected to grow
by 3.8% in 2004,” Mr. Grossman contends. Even if the 3.8 percent target
is reached – which may be unlikely, given a disappointing annualized third-quarter
GDP growth rate of 2.43 percent – Colombia still lags far behind the Latin American
average for 2004, which according to the Inter-American Development Bank has reached
5.5 percent. Is Colombia’s growth rate due to U.S. assistance, then, or is
its economy being modestly buoyed by a rising regional tide?
- Finally, Mr. Grossman writes, “you say that increasing the cap on U.S. personnel constitutes ‘mission creep.’ In fact the mission for these personnel is unchanged.” True, the nature of the U.S. military-aid mission did not expand on the day the troop cap was increased. But as your editorial points out, the U.S. mission has been steadily expanding since the 1990s. The latest innovation in 2004 was “Plan Patriota,” a large-scale military offensive in southern Colombia, in which over 15,000 Colombian personnel have been trying to conquer remote guerrilla-held jungle zones. The offensive depends in part on the logistical support, intelligence and advice provided by U.S. military and contractor personnel – a new level of involvement in counter-insurgency – and is a key reason why the Bush administration asked Congress to double the limit on U.S. troops in Colombia.
As both letters correctly note, U.S. military personnel are not involved in combat in Colombia. That threshold has not been crossed yet. I hope that it will not be. In order to avoid that outcome, we must keep on sounding the alarms about “mission creep” whenever we perceive it. For that reason, your editorial made a timely contribution to the continuing debate over where our country is headed in Colombia.
Sincerely,
Adam Isacson
Director, Colombia Program
Center for International Policy
January 3, 2005
Editorial Board
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
34 Blvd. of the Allies
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Dear Sir or Madam:
I write to thank you for your editorial of October 28, 2004 (“Blood for oil”) regarding U.S. military aid and U.S. oil firms’ exploration in Colombia. I also wish to respond to some of the assertions in the letter to the editor, published on November 3, you received from Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega.
“Your Oct. 28 editorial about our troop presence in Colombia contains a number of misstatements,” Mr. Noriega’s letter begins. I wish to reassure you that, although oil is only one of many interests the United States is pursuing in Colombia, your arguments are sound.
At the beginning of 2003 the Bush administration, having won a $99 million appropriation from Congress, began sending Special Forces personnel to the conflictive department of Arauca in northeastern Colombia. They have since trained and equipped thousands of members of the Colombian military charged with defending the Caño Limón oil pipeline from guerrilla bombings. It was the first major non-drug military aid program implemented after a 2002 expansion in the mission of U.S. aid to encompass “counter-terrorism.”
Forty-four percent of the oil in that pipeline is the property of a U.S. company, Occidental Petroleum (or “Oxy”). “While Oxy did not push specifically for a U.S.-funded training program,” the Los Angeles Times reported on December 28, “it waged a far more aggressive campaign to persuade the U.S. and Colombia to improve security for its operations than it has publicly acknowledged.” Since the initial $99 million outlay, smaller amounts of U.S. funds have continued to flow to the pipeline-protection program.
While Mr. Noriega’s letter accuses the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette of misstatements, his letter includes some of its own, several which deserve a response:
-
“Thanks to the Uribe administration, Colombia's government now has
retaken significant portions of its national territory that criminal groups
had once controlled and used to cultivate and transport illegal narcotics.”
To say that territory has been “retaken” is quite misleading. Yes, military and police presence has been increased in town centers and along main roads in many conflictive parts of Colombia. In general, though, security conditions and a lack of funds have kept the civilian part of Colombia’s government from making any appearance in “re-conquered” zones, and there has been little change in violence levels or illegal armed groups’ activity in these zones’ rural areas.
This is absolutely the case in two areas that have attracted the bulk of U.S. military assistance. In the coca-growing province of Putumayo in the south, and oil-producing Arauca in the northeast, guerrillas and paramilitaries continue to operate freely, attacks on infrastructure remain frequent, and murder is commonplace. Colombia’s non-governmental Security and Democracy Foundation noted (PDF format) that Arauca had the country’s highest murder rate in 2004, and that Putumayo’s murder rate increased by 19 percent last year. (On New Year’s Eve, meanwhile, FARC guerrillas faced no obstacles as they massacred sixteen civilians just south of the pipeline in Tame, Arauca.)
While Mr. Noriega credits the U.S. aid program with reducing the frequency of pipeline attacks, the cause-and-effect relationship is less clear. The State Department’s annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report notes that pipeline bombings dropped precipitiously in Colombia from 2001 (178) to 2002 (41). The Special Forces training program did not even begin until January 2003.
- “While more work needs to be done, the Colombian leader has made great
progress in reforming his country's military and political institutions, as
well as improving the security situation for Colombian citizens, while creating
the conditions that have spurred economic growth.”
Military reforms have included improvements to combat effectiveness, mobility, logistics, intelligence and similar measures. Almost no progress has been made, however, on a crucial measure of military and civilian institutions’ effectiveness: impunity. In a country where the judicial system fails to punish over 95 percent of crimes, it is exceedingly rare to see powerful individuals found guilty of human rights abuses or corruption. For instance, though the State Department’s regular certifications of Colombia’s human-rights performance acknowledge that “more needs to be done to protect human rights and to sever military-paramilitary ties,” the latest report cites only three examples of judicial or disciplinary action for human rights abuses against military officers above the rank of captain.
The point about economic growth is also disputable. Colombia’s 2004 economic growth was in fact anemic by the standards of Latin America, which saw GDP growth of about 5.5 percent last year, according to the Inter-American Development Bank. Colombia likely saw its hope of reaching 4 percent in 2004 dashed by third-quarter results showing growth at an annual rate of just 2.43 percent.
-
“If oil fields and the pipelines are more secure, that helps Colombia's
economy to provide more opportunities for its citizens and resources to
help fight the illicit narcotics trade.”
This argument could be applied to nearly all U.S. investments in Colombia, which of course employ at least some Colombians and generate at least some income for the country (and in the case of the Caño Limón oil pipeline, hundreds of millions for Oxy). In the name of “providing more opportunities and resources,” should U.S. military aid, trainers and taxpayer dollars be deployed to defend all enterprises – from mines to factories – that count U.S. citizens or corporations among their owners?
Your editorial’s main point is on the mark. Though Mr. Noriega’s letter makes it appear that the purpose of U.S. military assistance has been to promote the well-being of Colombians, most of our military presence, and the vast majority of our over $3 billion in military and police aid since 2000, has not gone to protect Colombians. It has paid to protect drug-crop spray planes and oil infrastructure that benefits U.S. companies. Though there are exceptions, when the Colombian government has sought to protect its citizens from harm, it has had to do so with its own funds.
Thanks again for your valuable contribution to the debate over U.S. policy toward Colombia.
Sincerely,
Adam Isacson
Director, Colombia Program
Center for International Policy
Posted by isacson at 02:28 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
December 31, 2004
2005: The year of non-military aid?
Faced with one of the worst tragedies in modern history, the U.S. government responded – with $15 million. OK, make that $35 million. This is our contribution to the effort to help eleven countries recover and limit the death toll after the Indian Ocean tsunami.
How much is $35 million? Not much, really. It’s enough to buy two souped-up (or three bare-bones) Blackhawk helicopters. (We gave Colombia 22 Blackhawks between 1999 and 2002.) It’s what it costs to run the aerial herbicide fumigation program in Colombia for about three months. It’s more or less what the Republican party plans to spend on inaugural celebrations.
No wonder the UN’s emergency relief coordinator (and former special representative for Colombia), Jan Egeland, allowed the word “stingy” to pass his lips when talking about wealthy nations’ contributions. As an editorial in Thursday’s New York Times correctly noted, “Mr. Egeland was right on target.”
Responding to this allegation on the PBS Newshour, USAID administrator Andrew Natsios on Wednesday blamed the perception of U.S. stinginess on “a European formula” for measuring generosity. This formula, “which we've never used in the United States in 55 years, … is to use a percentage of our Gross National Product” to measure overseas aid amounts.
No wonder we’ve never used this measure – it makes us look terribly stingy. With 0.13 percent of GDP devoted to overseas development assistance, the United States lags far behind other (though smaller) donor nations like Denmark (0.96 percent), Norway (0.89), France (0.38), the United Kingdom (0.31), and Canada (0.28), according to the UN Development Program (PDF file, look at table 16). In fact, by this measure, the United States is dead-last among donor countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Natsios then said something remarkable. The United States cannot try to catch up to other donors using this measure, he said, because “if we did, we would dominate the entire world and overwhelm everybody with the amount of money.”
Let’s stop there for a second. Is it actually undesirable for the United States to “dominate the world” with development assistance? How is it that we can be so comfortable dominating the world in so many other measures – from scientific achievement to pop culture, from nuclear warheads to aircraft carriers to armored divisions – but that we want to avoid dominating the world in aid to fight hunger, poverty, ignorance and disease?
As we enter a new year, more than three years into the “war on terror,” it’s time Americans started asking that question. The tsunami-aid spat, combined with the way that military action has far outpaced efforts to rebuild Iraq, should force some badly needed questioning of U.S. foreign aid priorities.
Our current priorities have led us to project an image to the rest of the world of a country that spares no expense for military endeavors – from invading Iraq to years of mostly military aid to Colombia – but has far, far less to offer for disaster relief, health, education, generating goodwill, or strengthening the institutions of democratic allies. (Since Jesse Helms’ evisceration of the old U.S. Information Service in the 1990s, we don’t even spend enough on P.R. to counteract that perception.) It should by now be obvious that even the most powerful military in history by itself cannot achieve the Bush administration’s stated goals of spreading democracy and making us safer. We must pursue a host of non-military objectives with the same urgency, at the same time.
What does all of this have to do with Colombia? Everything. There are few better examples of a country where the United States has repeatedly tried the overwhelmingly military, punitive route – our aid since 2000 has been 80 percent military / police assistance – with only very poor results to show for it. (For those who think Plan Colombia is achieving miracles, here is what I mean by “poor results”: no change in drug prices or availability here at home; zones that were the key focus of our aid – such as Putumayo and Arauca – still extremely violent, ungoverned and insecure; no progress on impunity for powerful rights abusers; poverty rates not budging. There’s more but this is not the point of this posting.)
At least there’s reason to hope that the mix between military and nonmilitary aid might change after Plan Colombia expires at the end of 2005. As CIP has noted earlier, there are three possibilities for what might emerge after the debate over 2006 aid that will begin in Congress this spring: (1) a continuation of the mostly military strategy; (2) increased economic aid and reduced military aid; or (3) an across-the-board cut as money goes elsewhere.
President Bush’s lightning-fast visit to Cartagena in November made it look like the first possibility – a “Plan Colombia 2” with anti-terror military aid as its main thrust, which is most likely Álvaro Uribe’s ideal aid package – was his administration’s preference. “Next year I will ask our Congress to renew its support so that this courageous nation can win its war against narco-terrorists,” Bush promised.
But some recent statements from Plan Colombia stalwarts give hope that, in fact, the 2005 debate may lead to more economic aid and less military aid. Convinced that Plan Colombia has in fact been a success, they are now talking about increased development aid in order to “consolidate” their perceived gains.
- In a September letter to USAID (PDF format; discussed in this posting), a group of Republican House members, including several longtime proponents of increased military and police aid to Colombia, called for the transfer of funds to several programs for demobilized combatants, noting that “we are reaching a critical turning point. The challenge: to provide basic jobs and opportunities for many more working Colombians – such as displaced persons and the demobilized (ex-combatants who have renounced violence) – in a practical and sustainable manner.”
- Some Bush administration officials have expressed similar sentiments. In an article published Tuesday, the assistant secretary of state for antinarcotics, Bobby Charles, told the Miami Herald’s Pablo Bachelet that “if we are going to consolidate our gains, we will have to shift in the direction of greater attention to the social fabric in the country.”
- Clinton-era “New Democrats” who inaugurated Plan Colombia five years ago may also be headed in a less-military, more-economic direction. Robert Weiner, who as spokesman for Gen. Barry McCaffrey’s drug czar’s office was not a central figure in Plan Colombia’s birth but was certainly present at the creation, co-wrote an op-ed in yesterday’s Palm Beach Post calling for a doubling of economic assistance to Colombia.
Needless to say, these aren’t exactly signs that the U.S. has seen the light, and will henceforth offer Colombia packages made up mostly of the humanitarian, development, and institution-building assistance the country so desperately needs. But it is a sign that, for the first time in memory, the momentum may be moving away from military aid and toward economic and social aid. Our work next year must focus on maximizing this economic/social component and channeling it toward the institutions and programs that will make the best use of it.
Let’s hope that 2005 becomes the year of the resurgence of economic and social priorities in U.S. foreign policy. Not just in Colombia, the tsunami zone or Iraq, but worldwide. This component has been neglected for too long, and the “war on terror” is running aground without it.
Best wishes for a happier, more peaceful 2005.
Note as of January 1:Just as this entry was being completed, the Bush administration made public the very welcome news that the U.S. contribution for tsunami victims would increase tenfold, to $350 million. Japan immediately responded by raising its pledge from $30 million to $500 million. As U.S. personnel deliver humanitarian relief to victims - many of them in countries where the U.S. image has plummeted lately - let's hope that such generosity with non-military assistance will become the rule, not an exception, in 2005.
Posted by isacson at 06:01 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 21, 2004
Fumigation compensation? Forget it
A colleague in Colombia gave me a copy of this document [PDF format], obtained in June from the narcotics unit of the Colombian police (the DIRAN). It provides statistics about the number of people who have sought compensation for damages to their legal crops after being fumigated with herbicides by U.S.-funded spray planes. Of those, the document notes how many have been compensated, rejected, or are still being considered.
Colombians who seek compensation for damage to their legal crops must undergo an arduous and bureaucratic process, the Latin America Working Group explained in an excellent report published last February [PDF format].
The State Department reports that claims of damage are sent to municipal representatives who refer them to a local agricultural agency to be verified in a field visit. If the complaints are verified, the municipal representatives submit the complaint and a record of preliminary verification to the Antinarcotics Police (DIRAN) and the National Directorate of Dangerous Drugs (DNE). The DIRAN is then required to certify within five days whether spraying took place in the vicinity of the complaint. If the claim is certified, DIRAN makes a field visit within ten days to evaluate the veracity of the claim and the potential amount of compensation to be paid. It is important to note that the agency responsible for the spraying operation is the agency in charge of verifying claims, and it has no incentive to admit to spraying errors.
Despite having to undergo such a difficult process, the DIRAN document notes that, as of June, 4,535 people – most of them residents of remote and insecure parts of rural Colombia – had taken the step of registering a complaint.
Of those 4,535:
2,768 (61%) were rejected, or were thrown out because they filed too late (the most common reasons claimed for rejection: no spraying allegedly occurred on the day the campesino claimed it did, or the campesino had some coca near his legal crops);
1,757 (38.8%) were still under consideration, at some stage (field visits, due to cost and security concerns, are not easily arranged); and
10 (0.2%) had been compensated (I’ve heard anecdotally – and this may not be accurate, though I’ve heard it several times – that most of the ten are agribusiness enterprises, particularly oil-palm plantations.)
That’s right: 0.2 percent of those who had bothered to file a claim had received any compensation at all. Leaving aside the 1,757 still under consideration, that’s an incredibly low success rate: for every individual compensated, 276 are turned away.
Does this low rate owe to the incredible accuracy of the spray planes, combined with the malice of Colombian peasants looking to make a quick peso? Of course not. As the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, which closely monitors drug-crop eradication results, acknowledges in a remarkable recent “Mini-Atlas” of Colombian coca-growing [big Powerpoint document], “It is not technically possible to limit the aerial spraying only over coca fields and to avoid overlaps.”
In our judgment, this poor record should make it impossible for the Secretary of State to certify that “fair compensation is being paid for meritorious claims,” which since 2002 has been a requirement that the U.S. government must fulfill in order to free up money for new herbicides. (In 2005, for instance, 80 percent of funding for herbicides is frozen until the State Department can certify that this and several other requirements have been met.)
The compensation program must be dramatically sped up if the next fumigation certification is to be at all honest – and if we are to make any progress at all in the battle for hearts and minds in the “ungoverned spaces” of rural Colombia.
Posted by isacson at 10:46 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
December 17, 2004
A drug-policy advisor resigns
Two months after the fact, I finally found a copy of the resignation letter (PDF format) of Alberto Rueda, who was a drug-policy advisor to Colombian Interior and Justice Minister Sabas Pretelt until October, when he quit in frustration over U.S. and Colombian drug policy.
Rueda, who had previously worked in Colombia’s defense and foreign-relations ministries, as well as the human-rights ombudsman’s office, made headlines in Colombia with his public decision to resign. His letter, on Ministry of Interior and Justice stationery, makes several thought-provoking – if not downright troubling – points about an anti-drug strategy that is clearly not working.
The letter takes the form of a 27-page memo, which is too long to translate here (and often lapses into the staid style of the career bureaucrat). I offer the following excerpts below, though, because it’s a compelling read.
“Mr. President,” the missive begins, “I have decided to make the document I sent you on October 19 into an open letter asking for a true course change away from the current anti-drug policy. … Colombia may be devoting all of its efforts against this scourge [of drugs], but it is an effort in the wrong direction, incomplete and without hope of ending this agony anytime soon. … The emphasis on zero tolerance and fighting – mainly militarily – against supply has diverted us from a balanced vision, one requiring equal results in demand-reduction and a full understanding of the shared responsibility between drug-consuming and producing countries.”
Europe’s role
“The [Uribe government’s] ‘democratic security’ policy continues Plan Colombia (Pastrana/Clinton) as a central element of the fight against illegal drugs, under U.S. tutelage and financing. … The paradigmatic activity in this fight has been the fumigation of illicit crops, which aspires to spray a minimum of 130,000 hectares [about 325,000 acres] per year. … Plan Colombia was a policy developed bilaterally by the United States and Colombia, excluding very important international actors like the European Union and other developed countries which, had they participated, surely would have placed us in a more balanced situation. We shouldn’t be surprised, then, by these countries’ lack of enthusiasm for supporting the current drug policy. This helps us to understand our difficulty in obtaining resources from them.”
Lack of coordination and balance between strategies
“The Colombian government suffers from a vacuum of management and coordination of the fight against illegal drugs. … For example, we are ill-served by a plan to interdict precursor chemicals when the institutions of security, customs, and financial control lack a clear policy, sufficient budget, and an appropriate operational program to carry it out. In addition, the budget must balance priorities: while the outlay for crop substitution is almost insignificant, the aerial spraying program has millions at its disposal. Truly noteworthy results will not be obtained if we fail to take actions against every link of the chain, with equal effort and efficiency. To think that we will resolve the problem of illicit drugs just with fumigation is a mistake.”
Fumigation in Colombia’s national parks
(Something that, Colombian Interior-Justice Minister Sabas Pretelt warned last week, is not out of the question)
“The results of the 2003 illicit-crop census carried out under the SIMCI 2 agreement reveal some thought-provoking statistics. [SIMCI = Integrated Illicit Crop Monitoring System, a collaboration between the Colombian government and the UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention. It’s a useful resource.] National parks were not fumigated in 2003, yet the amount of illicit crops within their borders continued to decrease, as they have done since 2001: from 6,057 hectares in 2001 to 3,790 in 2003. This calls into question the thesis that the only way to reduce these crops is through fumigation: in national-park areas and buffer zones, the Environment Ministry instead carried out frequent consultations with communities and recent migrants (colonos). However, the threat that this success in national parks could be reversed, and that the expansion of crops in indigenous reserves could worsen, is more latent than ever. The reduction of supply through fumigation could raise the price of the product, while the President of the Republic has declared that lands where these crops are found will be expropriated. Combine these two factors and the pressure to cultivate in parkland will be hard to contain, given its legal status as public land that belongs to nobody and thus cannot be expropriated.”
Fumigation’s declining effectiveness
“Of all years since 2000, it was 2003 that showed the worst results in terms of reduced coca cultivation, and was the year in which that reduction cost the most.
a. Coca reduction was almost two-thirds less than in the previous year, and the least of the past three years. Comparing reduced hectares of coca with the intensity of fumigation, we see an inverse tendency: 132,817 hectares fumigated brought an effect of only 15,731 hectares less coca.
b. There is a presence of new crops, or an increase, in zones that aren’t characterized as empty or isolated from the country, such as the provinces of Caldas, Boyacá, and southern Antioquia.
c. The costs (borne by the United States) of reducing coca crops by fumigation have been the highest in 2003, if we compare them with the 16,000-hectare reduction. Conservative estimates establish that fumigating a hectare costs $626. If we multiply that by the number of hectares sprayed – 132,817 – we get a total of $82.5 million. If we divide this figure by the 15,731 hectares reduced, we get $5,243 per hectare. … This figure is what one would expect from such an unequal approach instead of an integral strategy: the obvious effect, a marginal success in the fight against drugs. … To give us an idea of what fumigation has cost in 2003, let’s conservatively compare it with the annual budget of several government entities. It equaled, for example, the annual budget of the Agriculture Ministry; the annual budget of the Ministry for the Environment, Housing and Territorial Development; or twice the annual budget of the National Housing Fund. And even though the purpose of this document is not to question U.S. aid, these figures contrast with the headlines of success promoted by the U.S. Department of State, which are repeated by the media both in that country and in Colombia. The U.S. contributors are wasting their money with this strategy.”
Fumigation’s impact on health
“With regard to health, the fumigation strategy lacks solid arguments to defend it against claims of negative effects on health and the environment. This is so much the case that the Colombian government has just signed an agreement with the OAS to carry out an investigation of fumigation’s effects on health and the environment. That is to say, we do not really know its effects, and as we act blindly, a certification from the U.S. Secretary of State argues that fumigation is not harmful to Colombians. … Only now, after so many years of aerial fumigation of illegal crops in the country, we have barely begun a program of public-health training and vigilance over pesticide intoxication. But there is no certain date for getting results anytime soon, as an active search is taking place for 100 samples that then have to be completed clinically and undergo laboratory and epidemiological analysis. The result is that the Colombian government has been applying – and even more seriously, intensifying – its fumigation program, even though we are not clear about its health effects. And there is an even more worrisome ingredient: the National Health Institute study is oriented toward determining acute effects, such as effects on mucous membranes and skin, but not toward chronic effects, such as evaluating possible genetic alteration or cancer. … Together, we have observed the industrial security measures taken by those [contract workers] who manipulate these chemicals at the airbases where fumigation takes place. They work covered in impermeable yellow safety suits, with gloves and masks. Herbicides are herbicides, Mr. Minister.”
Fumigating legal crops when planted with coca
“It is easy to conclude that the campesinos’ strategy of planting illegal crops alongside legal ones is intentional, but this does not make it legitimate for the government to apply a summary punitive measure like generalized fumigation. If the campesino or cultivator breaks the law with said crop, this must be punished like any violation of the law, and it should be, as is logical under the rule of law, the result of a judicial action, in which said campesino can defend himself and the judge can determine a fair punishment. But the state cannot apply a summary punishment of fumigating the crops they depend on for food.”
The aerial interdiction program
“The aerial interdiction program that re-started in August 2003 contemplates the shooting down of aircraft suspected of transporting drugs. In the opinion of this advisor, this is unacceptable. It is inadmissible and we must reject the notion that the air force can shoot down an aircraft on suspicion of transporting drugs. That is nothing other than a summary execution.”
A proposed alternative
“We must steady ourselves behind the idea that Colombia should promote, before the international community and within the framework of the United Nations, the thesis of regulation of the use of illicit drugs (a model similar to the recently approved Framework Convention on Tobacco Control), as the most effective mechanism for taking money away from the financing of war, not just in Colombia but in relation to international terrorism and transnational organized crime. This proposal is an alternative to both absolute prohibitionism and total liberalization. … The best policy, then, is that which takes resources away from narcotraffickers and terrorists. We would be presenting not just the only possible policy in terms of the realities we face, but also the only policy that is socially fair and politically balanced.”
We congratulate Mr. Rueda for his honesty and for following his conscience, at the cost of a comfortable career in the well-funded world of drug-war decisionmaking. We hope that he will continue to raise his voice.
Posted by isacson at 11:58 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
November 29, 2004
Did the FARC target President Bush?
Colombia's Defense Minister, Jorge Alberto Uribe, made an explosive allegation on Saturday. Colombia's security forces, he said, foiled a FARC attempt to assassinate President Bush during his November 22 visit to Cartagena.
This is a very serious charge. If it's true – if Bush narrowly missed murder at the hands of the FARC – it will set back for years any effort to limit U.S. involvement in Colombia's conflict and any effort to find a non-military solution to the fighting. If the FARC really tried to kill President Bush, it would put an entirely new set of options on the table for Washington, including direct military action. (Think about it - if the group truly put a hit out on the president, why would the United States respond indirectly, using the Colombian military as proxies?)
I'm skeptical. While the FARC has built a record of shocking brutality against Colombian citizens, and while it claims that U.S. troops and contractors are "military targets," its few attacks on U.S. personnel have been hastily arranged and too small to provoke a massive U.S. response. When a planeload of U.S. contractors went down (or was shot down, perhaps) in Caquetá nearly two years ago, the FARC column that found them killed one and took the other three hostage. A lone FARC fighter lobbed a grenade into a Bogotá bar frequented by U.S. personnel in 2003, and was caught shortly afterward.
Surely the FARC have had many other opportunities to target U.S. citizens working for their government. Why have they not done more? Probably because while the FARC often appear to be acting against their own interests, they're not suicidal.
To carry out a concerted campaign against U.S. citizens in Colombia – much less to target the president of the United States – would be to make the guerrilla group one of Washington's top military priorities in the entire world. The FARC knows it cannot afford to be one of Washington's top military priorities; at a time when it is facing a strengthened Colombian military, why would it choose to open up a huge new front in its fight by provoking the United States directly?
We need more details and proof from Colombia's defense minister. It may turn out that he is basing his allegations on something indirect or circumstantial, such as the discovery of an arms cache or a bomb-making facility in the general area of Cartagena during the days before Bush's arrival. While disturbing, such evidence would hardly indicate a sophisticated plot to kill the U.S. president.
So far, we haven't heard any details. I scanned the U.S. and Colombian press this morning and found no follow-up stories on Minister Uribe's allegations. The assassination-threat story has not even shown up on the news-update sites of either the Colombian presidency or the Defense Ministry.
The assassination story got a lot of media attention on Sunday. But let's take a deep breath here. We need to know more. Was the FARC really planning a sophisticated hit, or was an over-exuberant minister overselling his case for increased US military assistance?
Note as of November 30: The Associated Press reports that the Colombian government is backpedaling from Minister Uribe's allegation. "Interior and Justice Minister Sabas Pretelt played down the comments Monday, saying he had no information about any assassination plot against Bush." So there you have it.
Posted by isacson at 02:03 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
November 14, 2004
Bush and Uribe make their shopping list
I'll continue the postings about the paramilitary peace talks in a day or two. First, here's an English translation of the op-ed that ran today in El Espectador (the Spanish is here).
Bush and Uribe make their shopping list
By Adam Isacson
Colombia - and not Mexico, as was the case four years ago - will be the first Latin American country to get a bilateral visit from George Bush after his reelection. This shouldn't surprise us: there are very few governments in the hemisphere that have politically supported the Iraq adventure, fast free-trade talks, and the "war on terror" as currently envisioned.
For Bush and his foreign-policy team, Álvaro Uribe's Colombia is a "balance" against the growing axis of center-left regimes in places like Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina and now Uruguay. Among the main issues to be discussed with Uribe will be the question of what will come after Plan Colombia. At the end of 2005, after six years and $4 billion in U.S. aid - 80 percent for the armed forces and the police - this program will end.
The debate over post-2005 aid will begin in the spring of next year, when the Bush administration presents Congress with its 2006 aid request. Right now, months before formalizing its request, the administration is deciding what to ask Congress to grant Colombia: more military aid, a better balance between money for war and money for urgent socioeconomic needs, or an across-the-board cut to free up money for other countries.
For President Uribe, then, the November 22 visit is his best opportunity to lobby on behalf of his preferred "shopping list." If the past is any guide, this list will not include job-creation projects, hospitals, schools, or support for the judicial system. It will be made up of weapons, helicopters, fumigation and perhaps support to clone "Plan Patriota" and carry out similar military offensives elsewhere in the country. (Perhaps Uribe's list will also include a clear signal of U.S. support for his reelection.)
To sell his "shopping list," Uribe and his people will rain statistics and PowerPoint slides on their U.S. visitors. Men in uniform will tell of imminent victory over the terrorists. Officials will assure that, according to their data, fumigation is finally working and the little human-rights problem is quickly becoming a thing of the past.
How wonderful it would be if, in spite of the security bubble in which he travels, his first visit to Colombia opens Mr. Bush's eyes - at least enough to inspire him to ask some uncomfortable questions. Imagine if Bush sought to learn why, after so many years of fighting a drug war, the price and purity of cocaine and heroin has failed to change on U.S. streets.
Imagine if Bush asked his own officers if, given the current military realities in Colombia, we won't see ourselves condemned to keep on repeating the recent doubling of the legal limit on the U.S. military presence, until we find ourselves fully involved in the conflict. Imagine if Bush were to ask why so much U.S. aid goes to help conquer territory, and so little to help govern it.
Imagine if these questions led Bush to seek to consult with social and campesino leaders from the zones subject to fumigation; with brave organizers of innovative peace-building initiatives; with governors of indigenous groups under fire from all armed actors; with human-rights defenders and union activists living in conditions of permanent threat.
This is all very unlikely, of course. No matter what, it is at least reasonable to hope that, instead of another celebration of uncertain achievements, this visit results in a serious consideration of the challenges of the near future and the sharp changes in strategy that will be needed to meet them.
Adam Isacson is director of programs at the Center for International Policy in Washington.
Posted by isacson at 11:21 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
November 04, 2004
A post-Election Day look at Ricaurte, Nariño
A side effect of election results like last night's is a minor, momentary crisis of confidence for some on the losing side. When a majority of your fellow citizens ratifies a foreign policy you strongly oppose, it's only natural to ask - probably while lying awake at night - "Am I missing something? How do so many not see the obvious danger, the likelihood of failure, the need to change course now? Are they blinded by ignorance, ideology, or propaganda? Or could it be me?"
If that has happened to you, don't worry. It's easy to make that flash of doubt vanish in an instant. All you have to do is read a newspaper, visit some websites, stay informed.
For example: if you ever have even the faintest feeling that the Bush and Uribe governments could somehow, possibly, be on the right path, simply scan the day's news in Colombia.
One item in this morning's news did it for me. The IndyMedia Colombia site had posted an alert from the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) about the disappearance of Efrén Pascal, a leader of the Awá indigenous group in Nariño department, in Colombia's far southwest. Members of the FARC's 29th Front kidnapped Pascal, the governor of the Awá nation's Kuambí Yaslambí community, from his home in Ricaurte municipality (county) in the middle of the night on October 24. Even a 250-person delegation organized by the Awá People's Indigenous Unity (UNIPA), the ethnic group's advocacy organization, was unable to free or find him.
The alert struck a chord because I know some of these people - I paid a visit to the UNIPA's headquarters in Ricaurte back in April. While I've seen many examples of the human cost and unintended consequences of Plan Colombia and the Uribe security policies, the largely unknown situation of the Awá people is one of the most disturbing and urgent.
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Nariño and Ricaurte.
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Ricaurte straddles the main road between the city of Pasto and the busy port of Tumaco, about halfway between the high Andes and the sea. The municipality is big, stretching all the way to the Ecuadorian border. Indigenous groups, particularly the Awá, make up 85 percent of the 14,000 people scattered across Ricaurte's very rugged terrain. Colombia's 22,000 Awá people live in 11 communities, or resguardos, in three municipalities (Ricaurte, Barbacoas and Nariño). More live across the border in Ecuador. Their language, Awapit, is still widely spoken, and UNIPA has helped develop an alphabet to accommodate some of its softly spoken consonants - a project that Mr. Pascal, the kidnapped governor, helped to spearhead.
Together with colleagues from several Colombian and Ecuadorian human rights groups, I met and shared lunch with leaders of UNIPA. (I don't know whether Mr. Pascal was present; he may have been, as he is a member of the organization's board.) The group's leaders told us this was the first time any human rights groups had ever visited them.
We apologized for arriving at midday, nearly two hours late. They told us that it was for the best, since guerrillas and police had been fighting just that morning at a site about ten minutes away. Ricaurte is a violent place: its position on the Pasto-Tumaco road places it along a strategic corridor for the movement of drugs and weapons. All of Colombia's armed groups are present, and significant plantings of coca are in the countryside.
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The Awapit language.
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The spike in violence, the group's leaders said, is a very new phenomenon. Their part of Colombia had gone largely untouched by the conflict until very recently. "This was a tranquil zone," one UNIPA member said. "It was safe to travel through the countryside. ... We had a way of life that was functioning well, with our language, our traditional medicine, and a tight social fabric." Though a small ELN presence had established itself in the general area by about 1995, illegal armed groups were unknown.
Plan Colombia changed all that. In 2000-2001, the United States began pouring millions of dollars in military hardware, training and herbicide fumigation into Putumayo, the department about six hours' drive to the east. Putumayo was the main focus of Plan Colombia's first phase; at the time, it had more coca than any of Colombia's other 31 departments. Spray planes and a U.S.-funded army counter-narcotics battalion fanned throughout Putumayo's coca fields, destroying the crop. It did not take long for many Putumayo coca-growers, and the armed groups and narcotraffickers who buy from them, to pack up and move westward to Nariño, especially the coastal zone just west of Ricaurte. By 2003, the UN reported (PDF format), Nariño had replaced Putumayo as the country's number-one coca-growing department. As it has done many times since major spraying began in Colombia about ten years ago, the problem moved to a new zone.
The Awá leaders told us they had never seen coca until Plan Colombia began pushing it out of Putumayo. People began arriving from Putumayo in 2000-2001 and buying up land, even in the indigenous group's reserves, offering astronomical prices. Coca-growing expanded dramatically. In an area where people had traditionally lived on subsistence agriculture, earning perhaps $1-2 per day on sales of food, a strange world of brothels and discos sprouted up overnight, particularly in zones like Llorente in Tumaco municipality to the west.
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A view of Ricaurte.
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Our UNIPA hosts admitted that some Awá had planted coca too - particularly younger people tempted by the easy money - but that they only planted tiny amounts, enough to produce perhaps a few grams of coca paste per harvest. The paste sells for 2,500 pesos (about $1) per gram, a price that they said had not risen over the years despite U.S.-led eradication efforts (fumigation, they said, has occurred in waves arriving about every nine months since 2001).
As Plan Colombia pushed the coca westward into Awá lands, violence quickly followed. The FARC showed up for the first time in 2000, at about the same time as the coca. The paramilitaries' Pacific Bloc was not far behind. Guerrilla presence and violence grew sharply worse in 2002, as the end of the Pastrana-era peace process, and the Uribe government's military offensives elsewhere, pushed greater numbers of FARC into this more remote zone. The army, which had been utterly absent for years, established itself in 2003, as part of the Uribe government's efforts to secure strategic roads.
The armed groups, competing ruthlessly for drug money and access routes, have hit the Awá people exceedingly hard. Both the guerrillas and paramilitaries routinely blockade and displace populations. Dozens of indigenous people have been killed, both by selective assassination and by getting caught in the crossfire. Rape is common. Armed groups routinely steal money, livestock, crops, and even clothing. Blockades have had a devastating effect on a zone where malnutrition levels are already high; the guerrillas have made it impossible to maintain flows of food aid from the World Food Program and the Colombian government's Social Solidarity Network. In June 2003, the FARC killed an Awá governor who had tried to facilitate some of these shipments, accusing him of helping paramilitaries.
"You are the owners of this land, but we make the rules," a local FARC leader told UNIPA. The guerrillas prohibit travel after 6:00 PM. Both sides suspect anyone who travels - even from the rural to the urban part of Ricaurte - of spying for their opponents. Even a few minutes' detention and questioning by the military or paramilitaries may mark one as a sapo (snitch) in the eyes of the local FARC.
What of the Uribe government's vaunted Democratic Security policy, which has sought to protect citizens from this kind of violence through increased military presence? An Awá leader put it well: the increased presence is "only good if you happen to live near the highway," where most soldiers and police are deployed. In fact, the military and police presence in larger towns and roadsides has served only to push the guerrilla and paramilitary presence farther into remote, neglected zones like the Awá resguardos, making conditions markedly worse.
For their part, the indigenous leaders said, the army and police themselves have done little to win the local population's trust. Residents are treated as likely terrorists; even wearing rubber mud-boots, carrying more than a little cash, or lacking an identity card (a cédula, which many indigenous do not have) may mark one, at a military or police roadblock, as a guerrilla. Several recent combats between the military and guerrillas have taken place in small Awá towns, amid a terrified population; in February, as the ONIC has denounced, the Colombian air force apparently even bombed an Awá school in Ricaurte. Meanwhile, nobody we asked could cite an example of soldiers fighting paramilitaries.
After four years of Plan Colombia and two years of Democratic Security - two strategies that have pushed drugs and violence from other zones to their once-peaceful lands - the Awá people are reeling. Many are displacing, leaving for Pasto, for Ecuador. A fiercely independent and well-organized group, the Awá, usually through UNIPA, have repeatedly sought to denounce abuses and plead for help before various Colombian government institutions, with almost no response. The government's non-miltary presence in rural Ricaurte remains virtually nil.
Awá leaders did not hide their consternation when I told them that my country's aid to Colombia was 80 percent military and police assistance. "Plan Colombia should be all social aid," they said unanimously, as if that were the most obvious thing in the world.
We still await news on governor Pascal's whereabouts. Rumors that he had been killed were proved false earlier this week. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' Bogotá office has called on the FARC to release him immediately. ONIC and UNIPA are demanding the same. Though the guerrillas and paramilitaries have a poor record of responding to international pressure and outcry, CIP adds its voice to those urgently calling on the FARC to immediately release Mr. Pascal.
Faced with the overwhelming evidence of places like Ricaurte, and the evident suffering of the Awá and many others in similar circumstances, we repeat our calls for an immediate and fundamental reconsideration of U.S. policy toward Colombia. We fear that too many vulnerable Colombians - who, like the Awá, have the misfortune of living far from the roads and the towns, and far from the gatherers of optimistic statistics - are quietly becoming indirect victims of both Plan Colombia and the Democratic Security policy.
What we have seen in places like Ricaurte makes a crisis of confidence impossible, no matter what the election results tell us about public opinion in general. We will stay informed and active in the new political climate, and we hope that you will too.
Posted by isacson at 12:09 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
October 28, 2004
After next Tuesday: three scenarios
We're constantly being asked about how U.S. policy toward Colombia might change after next week's elections. The short answer: it's probably going to change a great deal, no matter who is elected. The longer answer is more interesting: as we see it, the policy could go one of three ways next year.
The United States' approach to Colombia has not changed much since about 2002-2003, when the Plan Colombia counter-drug framework was broadened to include aid for "counter-terrorism." Big-ticket initiatives begun then – protection of the Arauca pipeline, creation of a commando unit to go after illegal groups' leadership, helping create new mobile units, and others, including "Plan Patriota" – have been in place for some time now. The aid request for 2005, which Congress is in the last stages of approving, closely resembles 2004 aid (with the doubled troop cap the main difference).
We don't expect the policy to remain on autopilot for much longer, though. As the next Congress debates the 2006 aid proposal, 2005 will be sort of a "crossroads" year for the U.S. strategy in Colombia, perhaps the first such year since 2000.
The election result is only one reason why, and in fact not a major one. Whether the next president is a clean-slate Kerry or a strengthened Bush, we'll have an administration headed by a consistent proponent of Plan Colombia. Though the two candidates clearly disagree on some aspects of the policy – such as the weight that should be given to human rights – both appear to have supported the policy's general thrust, including the overwhelmingly military content of U.S. assistance.
There are more important reasons why 2005 is likely to be a year of reconsideration.
- U.S. officials insist that Plan Colombia, which they define as a six-year plan begun in 2000, is "ending" after 2005. What comes next? Will the United States continue to aid Colombia with more than $700 million per year (80 percent of it for the military and police)?
- The 2006 U.S. aid package for Colombia will have to compete with other priorities that didn't exist in 2000, like greatly increased aid for the Middle East, the Millennium Challenge account, and the Bush administration's global HIV-AIDS initiative. The pool of resources available for these priorities – the annual foreign aid bill – has grown since 2000, but not as much as one might expect given the urgent need to win more hearts and minds in the "war on terror." (Foreign aid totaled $16.5 billion worldwide in 2000; for 2005, the Senate would provide $19.6 billion and the House $19.4 billion. The new priorities listed above cost more than the $3 billion increase of the past few years; in fact, the administration plans to cut development and child-health aid to Latin America by 10 percent between 2004 and 2005.)
- Many policymakers, convinced of success after more than two years of Colombian government statistics claiming gains against drugs and violence, may believe that it is time to consolidate gains by shifting tactics.
Sometime in early 2005 (usually February, though a new administration often starts later), the next president will send his 2006 aid request to Congress, and the debate will begin. We foresee three possible scenarios for what U.S. policy toward Colombia will look like after that debate concludes.
Scenario 1: "Plan Colombia 2"
What would happen: It is possible that the U.S. military commitment will continue to expand after 2005. Military aid levels would increase, with counterterrorism / counterinsurgency becoming the chief focus. In this scenario, the U.S.-supported "Plan Patriota" offensive currently going on in southern Colombia would be seen as a pilot project for a profusion of similar offensives launched elsewhere in the country. U.S. trainers, logistics teams, intelligence specialists, and others would help the Uribe government expand its efforts to retake territory and go after guerrilla (probably not paramilitary) leadership. New weapons transfers – including more helicopters – would also be likely. This expansion would in turn create new pressures to raise the "cap" on the U.S. military presence once again. Under this scenario, a significant increase in economic aid would be unlikely. Even counternarcotics would become a secondary goal put on autopilot; fumigation, for instance, might even decrease to what State Department counter-narcotics chief Bobby Charles has called "maintenance levels" of spraying.
Who wants it: The Uribe government has already gone on record in favor of a "Plan Colombia 2," asking for an extension of aid through 2009 and more help fighting guerrillas. Segments of the Pentagon, Southern Command and State Department who want to support the Uribe program would also get on board; Southcom's commander, Gen. James Hill, has spoken often about the need to "stay the course," pressuring the FARC so hard that by 2006 they will be "combat ineffective" and have no choice but to negotiate. Some congressional Republicans would no doubt support this scenario as well.
What they will argue: Citing the statistics that come from Colombia's Defense Ministry and elsewhere in the Uribe government, this option's proponents will contend that progress is being made – we may even hear references to "the light at the end of the tunnel" – and insist that now is the time to begin to hit harder. This group may also argue that now is not the time to talk about economic aid or poverty alleviation, that security must come first.
Scenario 2: A more balanced approach
What would happen: While aid to Colombia would stay in the $700-750 million dollar range, military and police aid would decrease while economic and social aid increases. The military component would shrink to far less than the 80 percent that it has been since 2000. The United States would invest more on priorities like judicial reform, citizen security, alternative development and job creation, and aid to the displaced. The USAID mission would grow.
Who wants it: Some – mainly mid-level – officials at the State Department and other agencies may favor this shift. Congressional Democrats, including both opponents and some mild proponents of Plan Colombia, are likely to push for this scenario. Perhaps – and this is less certain – some congressional Republicans may begin calling for a better balance in assistance; an indicator of that could be last month's letter from nine key House Republicans recommending support for several job-creation initiatives (PDF format). If so, this scenario would enjoy the support of an unusual coalition of policymakers who come to the same conclusion from very different perspectives.
What they will argue: Liberals will argue, as they have for years, that an overly military strategy won't work, as it ignores and worsens the poverty and inequality that feed Colombia's cycle of violence. They will argue that economic aid is an inseparable element of a security strategy, and that it makes no sense to keep waiting for ideal "security conditions" to be established before making non-military investments. Conservatives, again citing official statistics, will argue that Plan Colombia and Uribe's "Democratic Security" policies have made rapid gains in drug-crop eradication and security, but they will express concern that these gains could be ephemeral without a stronger non-military strategy to sustain them.
Scenario 3: "Adiós, amigos"
What would happen: The proportion of military to economic aid may or may not shift, but it wouldn't matter much, as the overall amount of aid to Colombia would begin to shrink well below the current level of $700-750 million. Along with less aid, the U.S. military commitment and overall level of interest in Colombia would also decrease.
Who wants it: Some congressional Republicans, especially in the House, appear to be ready to start winding down after 2005. In the non-binding narrative report language accompanying its version of the 2005 foreign aid bill, which was released in July, the House Appropriations Committee's Republican majority seemed to be expressing "Colombia fatigue."
The Committee is concerned that the level of resources provided by the United States Government to Colombia is increasing in 2005, including increased funding for a costly air bridge denial program. Therefore, the Committee anticipates a decrease in the President's budget request for 2006 for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative for Colombia.
What they will argue: Proponents of this scenario will argue that while Colombia may have been a high priority in 2000, the world has changed dramatically since then, and the United States faces more immediate security threats. The foreign aid budget is already stretched very thin, they will contend, and our focus on the Middle East means that we'll need to redirect some of the hundreds of millions that go to Colombia. Another likely argument would hold that, since the statistics indicate that Plan Colombia and Uribe have brought Colombia's problems down to "manageable" levels, the United States can afford to "take its eye off the ball" and reduce its commitment.
Which of the three scenarios is most likely? We honestly haven't the slightest idea. CIP obviously favors the second, and we predict that it may be somewhat more likely to come to pass should Kerry be elected. However, it is also easy to imagine a Kerry government, including among its officialdom the original Clinton-era authors of Plan Colombia, going with Scenario 1. It's also possible that a Bush government, not wishing to make an ideological stand in a region it has largely ignored, might give in to a coalition pushing for Scenario 2. And the reality of Scenario 3 looms over both possible administrations.
The policy could change for the better in 2005, or it could spiral deeper into disaster. Much of the outcome will depend on whether U.S. policymakers are hearing from U.S. citizens. While Scenario 2 is attainable to an extent unseen in years, making it a reality will require that concerned Americans let their members of Congress and senators know that the choice they make next year matters to them. Without this input, our policymakers – whether under a Kerry or a Bush administration, a Republican or a Democratic Congress – will be debating and deciding the future of the U.S. Colombia policy in a vacuum. They will see no political cost if they choose either to launch "Plan Colombia 2" or to disengage from Colombia.
So be sure to vote next Tuesday – but also be sure to let whoever wins know what you think about where we should be headed in Colombia.
Posted by isacson at 02:16 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
October 26, 2004
Bipartisanship
"As President, I will work with President Uribe to keep the bipartisan spirit in Washington alive in support of Plan Colombia," reads Sen. John Kerry's October 15 statement on Colombia.
With that sentence, Sen. Kerry employed an adjective that Plan Colombia's proponents frequently invoke. A few examples just since June:
- "This policy reflects the continuing bipartisan support received from the Congress for our programs in Colombia." - Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega, testifying before the House Government Reform Committee, June 17, 2004 (PDF format).
- "Led by Speaker Dennis Hastert and enjoying bipartisan support, Congress continues to fund activities that are making a difference." - Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Thomas O'Connell, in a Washington Times op-ed, July 1, 2004.
- "Our policy enjoys strong, durable bipartisan support because it responds not only the needs of a friend and ally, but also to the fundamental values and vital security needs of the United States." – Ambassador William Wood at Georgetown University, September 20, 2004.
It makes good political sense to sell Plan Colombia – which was proposed by the Democratic Clinton administration and supported by the Republican congressional leadership four-and-a-half years ago – as a bipartisan strategy. If majorities on both sides of the aisle see the current course in Colombia as the best possible one, then the policy must not be controversial; all those peace and human-rights people opposing it must be fringe characters way out of touch with the mainstream.
The vision of bipartisanship may be comforting for Plan Colombia's proponents. Unfortunately, it's wrong, and it has been wrong for some time. Plan Colombia hasn't enjoyed anything resembling bipartisan support since Bill Clinton left the White House. Today, most of the Democratic Party is not on board.
A look at votes in Congress makes clear a trend of steadily increasing skepticism about U.S. policy toward Colombia. While skeptics have yet to win a vote – the Republican majority remains tightly disciplined, in part due to Speaker Dennis Hastert's longstanding interest in Colombia, a country he has visited many times – the Democrats' growing opposition is measurable.
Votes in the House of Representatives are quite illustrative:
- March 29, 2000: During the debate on the initial Plan Colombia appropriation, Rep. David Obey (D-Wisconsin) introduced an amendment to strip out military assistance for Colombia and postpone it for a later, separate vote. The amendment lost by a 186-239 vote; a majority of Democrats (127-81, or 61%) voted for the Obey measure. (Plan Colombia was attached to the 2001 military construction appropriations bill; the vote on that much larger bill is not a useful measure of representatives' positions on Plan Colombia.)
- July 24, 2001: During debate on the 2002 foreign aid bill, Reps. Barbara Lee (D-California) and Jim Leach (R-Iowa) introduced an amendment to shift some funding from the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative to the Global AIDS Trust Fund. The amendment lost by a 188-240 vote; a majority of Democrats (172-35, or 83%) voted for it.
- July 24, 2001: During debate on the 2002 foreign aid bill, Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts) and several other members introduced an amendment that would have cut $100 million from the Andean aid to pay for increased assistance for anti-tuberculosis programs. The amendment lost by a 179-240 vote; a majority of Democrats (156-50, or 76%) voted for it.
- May 23, 2002: During debate over a special appropriation for counter-terrorism, Reps. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts) and Ike Skelton (D-Missouri) introduced an amendment that would have cut language broadening the mission of U.S. military assistance in Colombia, restricted at the time to counter-drug purposes, to include combat against illegal armed groups. The amendment lost by a 192-225 vote; a majority of Democrats (170-30, or 85%) voted for it.
- April 3, 2003: During debate on the Iraq war appropriation, Reps. McGovern, Skelton and Rosa DeLauro (D-Connecticut) introduced an amendment that would have cut U.S. military assistance in Colombia included in the bill. The amendment lost by a 209-216 vote; a strong majority of Democrats (190-10, or 95%) voted for it.
- July 23, 2003: During debate on the 2004 foreign aid bill, Reps. McGovern and Skelton that would have some cut military aid for Colombia and transferred it to HIV-AIDS programs. The amendment lost by a 195-226 vote; a strong majority of Democrats (182-17, or 91%) voted for it.
The Senate has not considered Colombia as often, and is more difficult to measure. During the 2000 debate on the first Plan Colombia appropriation, this body did indeed act in a bipartisan fashion, rejecting amendments by Democrat Paul Wellstone (11 to 89) and Republican Slade Gorton (19 to 79) seeking to cut military assistance.
Though the Senate hardly considered Colombia over the next few years, 2004 brought signs that bipartisan support for Plan Colombia has eroded. In July, Sen. Russell Feingold circulated a letter to President Uribe expressing several human rights concerns; while the letter gained the signatures of 23 Democratic senators (including Kerry and Edwards), not a single Republican would sign onto it, despite activists' strenuous efforts to make the letter a bipartisan document.
On June 23 of this year, the Senate had its first significant debate and vote on Colombia policy in some time. Sen. Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia) introduced an amendment to the 2005 Defense Authorization bill seeking to roll back an increase in the number of U.S. military and contractor personnel allowed in Colombia. (A similar "troop cap" measure had been approved by the House of Representatives' Armed Services Committee – the first example of bipartisan support for a provision in opposition to the executive branch's efforts to carry out Plan Colombia.) The Byrd amendment lost by a 40-58 vote, a much better Senate showing than in 2000; a majority of Democratic senators (38-9, or 79%) voted for it.
The record of the last few years shows a string of sharply divided party-line votes, not a bipartisan consensus behind the current U.S. policy toward Colombia. "Bipartisanship" is not the appropriate term for a coalition between nearly all Republicans and a thin sliver from the Democratic minority. If one accepts that definition, then the "b-word" can be slapped onto just about any Republican initiative of the past few years that counted with a few maverick Democratic votes – the Medicare bill, the Bush tax cuts, even the war in Iraq.
Despite the wording of Sen. Kerry's statement and Bush administration officials' assurances, Plan Colombia does not enjoy bipartisan support. And saying so simply won't make it true.
Posted by isacson at 12:48 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
October 15, 2004
John Kerry's statement
John Kerry scored points in the presidential debates by using the focus group-tested term "more of the same" to deride George Bush's plans (or lack thereof) for Iraq. Yet for the most part, "more of the same" appears to be what Kerry is promising for Colombia in a statement released this morning. The three-paragraph release praises Álvaro Uribe's security policies and promises "to keep the bipartisan spirit in Washington alive in support of Plan Colombia."
However, the Democratic candidate's language does draw some distinctions with the Bush administration's approach. Three are worth highlighting.
- Kerry takes care to cite the twenty-seven recommendations for human-rights protection that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' Bogotá office has been promoting for the past two years. The Bush administration has been loath to pressure the Uribe government to comply with all of these recommendations, or even to offer clear support for them.
Kerry's statement says he is "encouraged that the Colombian government has agreed to use the recommendations of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as a framework for achieving the just peace that all Colombians deserve." Unfortunately, that's inaccurate: while Uribe's adminstration has made an effort to comply with some recommendations, it has flatly refused to follow others. Bogotá has dismissed recommendations for a strict distinction between civilians and combatants (which would torpedo efforts like the government's network of paid informants) and a prohibition on police powers for the military (the cornerstone of a constitutional amendment Uribe tried, and nearly succeeded, in passing earlier this year).
The Colombian government freely acknowledges that it does not accept all recommendations. An oft-repeated phrase, which appeared in Vice-President Francisco Santos' response to the High Commissioner's annual report in March, reads: "Your recommendations are respectfully received. When the government judges that it cannot attend to them, this will be discussed frankly."
Give Kerry a point for invoking the recommendations, though. It's the thought that counts. - The statement's second paragraph includes very good language on impunity, breaking links with paramilitaries, and protecting human rights defenders. If a Kerry administration were actually to make these issues priorities in the U.S.-Colombian relationship, that would represent a significant change. Instead of more sunny declarations about how everything is getting better in Colombia, this would require a very tough stance the next time the State Department has to certify Colombia's human rights performance.
- Kerry may or may not be promoting a better balance between military and economic aid. Oddly, this depends on which version of the campaign's statement you're reading. They may have removed it by now, but for much of the day the Colombian Embassy had posted an earlier version of the statement on its website. In that version, the first sentence of the third paragraph reads
In Colombia, we must not focus narrowly on the fight against narco-trafficking and counterinsurgency, diminishing the critical importance of the rule of law, alternative development, and the expansion of legitimate state authority in achieving a durable peace.
This looks like a clear and welcome call to give more emphasis to non-military priorities. However, in the "final" version posted to the campaign's website, this sentence has been softened considerably.
In Colombia, we must focus on the fight against narco-trafficking and counterinsurgency at the same time as we support the rule of law, alternative development, and the expansion of legitimate state authority to achieve a durable peace.
To this sentence, the Bush administration can simply respond, "we're already doing that." Why erase a key distinction with your opponent's position?
Despite these differences in emphasis, support for Plan Colombia has been a consistent Kerry position since the Clinton administration developed the U.S. aid package in 2000. No flip-flop here. Kerry even spoke on the Senate floor in favor of Plan Colombia during the June 2000 Senate debate on the special appropriation.
His speech merits a second look. The Massachusetts senator was clearly wrestling with some aspects of Plan Colombia that worry him – the likelihood of sliding into counterinsurgency, the possibility that drug crops will move elsewhere, the human rights implications, the need to focus on drug treatment at home – but he ended up supporting the bill mainly because Colombia needed help, and Plan Colombia was the only train leaving the station. "Despite my reservations, the potential benefits of this plan are too large to ignore."
When listing the "potential benefits," Kerry offers an unremarkable recitation of the Clinton administration's talking points at the time. Hindsight reveals that, by doing so, Kerry was gazing into a pretty cloudy crystal ball.
- On the line between counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency: "The line between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency is not at all clear in Colombia, but we cannot let this stop our extension of aid. … If human rights abuses continue, or if we begin to get embroiled in the counterinsurgency efforts, the Senate must remain vigilant, ending the program if necessary." He adds later, "the United States is not in the business of fighting insurgents, we are in the business of fighting drugs."
Yet two years later, in August 2002, the Senate first approved language expanding the mission of U.S. assistance from counter-narcotics only to a "unified campaign" against both drugs and insurgents. Nobody in the Senate, Kerry included, even bothered to introduce an amendment to strip that language out. (In the House, Reps. Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts) and Ike Skelton (D-Missouri) introduced just such an amendment and got 192 votes.)
Today, despite his previous misgivings, Kerry's statement argues that "we must focus on the fight against narco-trafficking and counterinsurgency." Perhaps that does count as a flip-flop. - On the U.S. military commitment: "Our military involvement in Colombia should go no further than this. Efforts to limit number of personnel are designed to address this." Our military involvement has in fact gone much further, with U.S. military personnel now on a number of missions – from pipeline protection to Plan Patriota – not contemplated in 2000. Meanwhile, "efforts to limit the number of personnel" changed dramatically last Saturday, when Congress approved a doubling of the number of U.S. military personnel allowed on Colombian soil.
- On other countries' balancing out the U.S. overemphasis on military aid: "I appreciate the concerns expressed by my colleagues that the United States contribution to Plan Colombia is skewed in favor of the military, but we must keep in mind that our contribution is only a percentage of the total Plan. … As part of our contribution, and to balance military aid, the United States must continue to support Colombian requests for additional funding from international financial institutions and other EU donors."
For a variety of reasons, high among them a disagreement with our chosen strategy, European donors did not contribute significantly to Plan Colombia. The Colombian government's Comptroller-General's office (Contraloría) keeps the best record of this with a series of periodic reports. The last one (PDF format) tells us that, as of March 2003, non-US countries had announced donations of $320 million, programmed $272 million, and delivered $165.5 million in aid, nearly all of it non-military. That adds up to less than 10 percent of the mostly military U.S. contribution. - On the effect Plan Colombia would have on the drug trade: "Plan Colombia's counterdrug focus will also benefit the United States by reducing the flow of drugs to the United States."
Unfortunately, as CIP has pointed out elsewhere (PDF format), there has been no change in the price, availability or purity of drugs on U.S. streets. Despite Plan Colombia, supply is meeting demand as well as it ever has.
In the end, promising "more of the same" probably makes tactical sense if the goal is to get elected in 2004, when a candidate must inoculate himself against charges of being "soft on drugs" and "soft on 'narcoterrorists.'" There is also a need to appeal to the largely pro-Uribe, pro-Plan Colombia Colombian-American community in Florida, a state where peeling off even a few dozen votes can make all the difference. If he wins, however, let's hope that Kerry distinguishes his strategy from the Bush approach with some changes that are more fundamental than what his statement presents.
Posted by isacson at 03:45 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
October 13, 2004
Critics need not apply
Readers of the Colombian newsweekly Semana may have seen an article last week about a June 2004 letter from USAID to one of its contractors in Colombia. In the letter, a USAID official questions support for Colombian non-governmental organizations that criticize U.S. and Colombian government policies.
The contractor, Management Services for Development (MSD), was forced to accept the resignation of two project directors due to this and other complaints from USAID. The controversy caused Sen. Patrick Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the subcommittee that funds foreign aid, to freeze the flow of some human rights aid for over two months.
MSD has managed a significant chunk of U.S. aid to Colombia that fits under the "human rights" category, including assistance to Colombian government entities with human-rights responsibilities (such as the office of Vice President Francisco Santos), support for an early-warning system to prevent abuses, and technical support, protection, and other aid for some non-governmental human-rights groups. This aid, within a $24 million-per-year category called "Support for Democracy" under the "Andean Counterdrug Initiative" appropriation, is part of the 20 percent of U.S. aid to Colombia that goes to something other than the military, the police or the aerial fumigation program.
"Training and support for human rights non-governmental organizations" has been an non-military aid objective since Plan Colombia's inception. Though several prominent Colombian human rights organizations have refused aid that bears the taint of Plan Colombia, CIP has nonetheless supported this aid. An effective, independent NGO sector is absolutely necessary to keep democratic space open for those who happen to disagree with the government but wish to work within the system. It is also necessary to keep the Bogotá government accountable for its human rights performance.
The USAID letter to MSD is disturbing because it indicates that U.S. support to Colombian NGOs may be becoming "politicized" – that is, conditioned on what the recipient organizations say or believe.
"The purpose of this letter is to formally convey our grave concerns regarding a number of contract performance issues," the missive begins. High among those concerns is that some organizations MSD has chosen to support have dared to criticize Plan Colombia in writing.
For example, while USAID welcomes constructive criticism of Plan Colombia, USG policies and/or the Government of Colombia during debates and open policy forums supported by the human rights program implemented through MSD, it is nonetheless not appropriate for stringent criticism to be included in formal publications funded by the program. MSD has, however, permitted documents and/or publications funded under the contract to include language strongly critical of Plan Colombia and/or other USG programs and policy.
This appears to mean that, with USAID funding, it is permissible to criticize Plan Colombia orally, but not in writing. Must AID contractors now ensure that their NGO grantees' publications avoid criticisms of U.S. policy?
The letter chides MSD employees themselves for having "taken meetings considered by the CTO [the USAID contract officer] to be contrary to US Government policy (for example, the recent Humanitarian Accord meeting with the French Embassy)." What a chilling criticism that is. Does it really mean that MSD employees cannot "take meetings" with anyone whose positions run counter to U.S. policy? Perhaps it makes sense to avoid the French embassy – they're an enemy country now, after all – but can't this guideline be interpreted to mean that MSD employees should avoid CIP employees because we've criticized Plan Colombia?
In another passage, the letter instructs MSD to "include a strategy and approach for ensuring that events supported under the contract are supportive of USAID objectives."
For example, ... as USAID'S strategy for strengthening human rights in Colombia is focused upon strengthening the GOC's capacity in this area, work with the NGO community should be targeted to that support which advances this objective.
It should be evident that "strengthening the GOC's capacity" to guarantee the basic rights of all of its citizens is a central goal of human-rights NGOs' aggressive research, documentation, case advocacy – and even their criticisms. By pointing out the gaps between policy and practice, and by recommending steps that need to be taken, these groups are encouraging a whole range of improvements in the Uribe government's human rights performance. This is the role that independent NGOs have come to play, on a whole range of issues, in every functioning democracy.
But Colombia's most independent and effective NGOs are not out to win a popularity contest. Nor are they in business to encourage government policies or excesses that they fear will close space for non-violent dissent and worsen the human rights situation overall. Remaining independent – and, thus, credible – means speaking truth to power, saying things that neither the U.S. nor the Colombian government particularly wants to hear. If the organization in question gets U.S. government funding via MSD, it may even require them to "bite the hand" on occasion.
A defense of the USAID stance might argue that it only restricts what recipient organizations do and produce with U.S. funds. If that's the case, are Colombian human rights groups who receive U.S. assistance really required to compartmentalize their arguments, to gag themselves depending on the source of their projects' funding? That's awfully unlikely to happen, and to our knowledge, the support that European countries provide comes with no such strings. (We at CIP would make no such pledge to our own funders, nor would they expect it.)
Semana reports that the MSD affair caused Sen. Leahy to put a "hold" on aid to the program in July. The hold was lifted a few weeks ago, though it's not clear whether the issue has been resolved adequately.
Posted by isacson at 05:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
October 11, 2004
Hogs not bombs
It's not a major breakthrough, but a call for a new economic aid program in Colombia has come from an unlikely quarter: nine Republican members of Congress, including the present and former chairmen of several committees and subcommittees that oversee aid to Colombia.
In letters three weeks ago to USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios (here, in PDF format) and Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman, the nine Republicans ask to reprogram $3.5 million in USAID funds. The money would pay for a few specific initiatives to create jobs for demobilized guerrillas and paramilitaries and displaced people, as "a way to provide many Colombians with a ready and practical alternative to the cultivation, processing and transport of illicit drugs, or membership in illegal armed groups." Their list of projects includes improving abilities to trade in agricultural goods, and specifics like "Pest Risk Analysis," swine fever eradication, hog slaughtering, and growing fruit for export, like uchuvas and blueberries.
I do not know how, or from where, they came up with such a specific list of activities. In this case, though, the "who" is perhaps more important than the "what." The letter's nine signers are some of the House members most responsible for the design of U.S. aid to Colombia today, 80 percent of which has gone to Colombia's military and police since 2000.
These reps are not known for aggressively advocating non-military aid. These are the hard-liners, some of the members who as long as eight or nine years ago were pushing the Clinton administration hard to increase aid to Colombia's police and expand aerial fumigation. They include
- Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Illinois), chairman of the International Relations Committee;
- Cass Ballenger (R-North Carolina), who heads the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee;
- Tom Davis (R-Virginia), chairman of the Government Reform Committee and
- his predecessor, Dan Burton (R-Indiana);
- Mark Souder (R-Indiana), chairman of the Drug Policy Subcommittee and
- his predecessor, John Mica (R-Florida);
- Jerry Weller (R-Illinois);
- Katherine Harris (R-Florida, yes, the one from the 2000 recount); and
- Mark Steven Kirk (R-Illinois, who, incidentally, is the brother of Robin Kirk, the former Human Rights Watch researcher and author of More Terrible Than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America's War in Colombia.
All nine have been to Colombia, where they've flown over the coca fields in police helicopters. Several have issued statements, hosted hearings, and spoken on the House floor in favor of more helicopters, more guns, more spraying, and more training. By comparison, their advocacy of alternative development, judicial reform, protection of human rights workers, and similar economic and social assistance has been lukewarm at best.
That is why their advocacy of even these few initiatives is encouraging and deserves applause. Equally important is language in the letter that reveals a growing recognition that security, in Colombia, is more than just a military issue. "We are reaching a critical turning point," the letter reads. "The challenge: to provide basic jobs and opportunities for many more working Colombians – such as displaced persons and the demobilized (ex-combatants who have renounced violence) – in a practical and sustainable manner." That's absolutely right.
What happens after this "turning point" will be at the center of next year's debate over aid to Colombia in 2006 (Congress has nearly finished with the 2005 bill; opportunity for debate has passed). "Plan Colombia" – however you define it – is slated to end after 2005, and it is still not clear what will replace it. Will post-2005 U.S. aid still be a mostly military effort, a "Plan Colombia 2," with the counter-terror mission eclipsing counter-narcotics? Or will we finally see a better balance between military and economic aid, a recognition that reducing drugs and violence depends on more resources to fight poverty and strengthen the civilian part of Colombia's government?
Or will aid just decline overall? In the non-binding narrative report language accompanying its version of the 2005 foreign aid bill, the House Appropriations Committee calls for just that in 2006.
The Committee is concerned that the level of resources provided by the United States Government to Colombia is increasing in 2005, including increased funding for a costly air bridge denial program. Therefore, the Committee anticipates a decrease in the President's budget request for 2006 for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative for Colombia.
CIP disagrees with that recommendation. Whether Colombia is recovering from its crisis or whether the worst is still to come, it makes no sense to cut back on the U.S. aid commitment after 2005. However, the ratio of military aid to economic aid absolutely must change. If the Uribe government is making gains militarily, these must be cemented by helping the rest of the government provide badly needed services, and by assisting those brave Colombians who are fighting to keep their government democratic and law-abiding. The priority should be on programs like the ones the nine members of Congress propose.
The Republicans' letter is a welcome step. The next step is to appropriate an increase in USAID funds in 2006 – not a reprogramming, but a real increase – to create jobs, fight poverty, protect human rights and strengthen civilian democratic institutions. If those funds have to come from reduced military and police aid programs, so be it.
Posted by isacson at 10:08 PM | Comments (1)
October 08, 2004
Doubling the "Troop Cap"
Congress has granted the Bush administration’s full request to double the number of U.S. troops in Colombia. (See CIP’s memo from earlier this afternoon.) Soon, it will be legal to have as many as 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. citizen contractors in Colombia at any given time.
With lots of public statements and in publications with titles like Getting in Deeper, we have been warning for years that a key risk of U.S. policy toward Colombia, which heavily favors a military approach, is to "greatly deepen Washington's involvement in Colombia's intractable war." While people told us back in 2000 that our talk of "slippery slopes" was hysterical, we now have objective proof that we're right: by triggering the troop cap tripwire, the congressional committee's decision makes our deepening military involvement quantitatively measurable.
It's anyone's guess how long it will be until the Bush or Kerry administration comes back to Congress asking for another increase. The argument will either be "the policy is failing, we need more troops" or "the policy is going great, let's stay the course, we need more troops." Either way, this is not the end of the troop cap debate.
This legislative defeat does hurt, though, because it was a close one. This was not a bipartisan steamroller like the Plan Colombia aid package in 2000; Congress was notably unenthusiastic about broadening one of our overstretched military's overseas missions. The House, thanks to the efforts of Mississippi Democrat Gene Taylor, ended up giving the administration very little of what it had asked for in May, only 100 more troops and no contractor increase at all in its version of the Defense Authorization bill (HR 4200).
The Senate granted the full request, however, even though in June Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia) managed to get 40 votes (the most votes the Senate has cast for a measure expressing any skepticism about Colombia policy) for a failed amendment that sought to do what Taylor had done in the House.
With a low revised troop cap in the House and a high one in the Senate, a conference committee – basically, the chairmen, ranking Democrats and a few other members of the Armed Services Committees – had to resolve the discrepancy. On the House side, committee chairman Duncan Hunter (R-California) was clearly in favor of the higher amount; however, his Democratic counterpart, Ike Skelton (D-Missouri), backed by Rep. Taylor, was solidly behind the lower cap. On the Senate side, neither chairman John Warner (R-Virginia) nor ranking Democrat Carl Levin (D-Michigan) had a strong opinion, though Levin had spoken on behalf of Sen. Byrd's failed amendment in June.
The conference committee had to deal with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of differences on the Defense bill, which governs the entire $400 billion-plus Pentagon budget for 2005. Nonetheless, we understand that the Colombia troop cap, a relatively minor provision compared to things like base closures and multibillion-dollar weapons systems, was one of the last issues to be resolved because of a lack of agreement.
In the end, however, the Senate version won out. The likely reason: Senator Levin was not convinced that the issue was important enough to be stubborn about, and didn't include it on his list of issues for which he would fight the Republican majority.
It's possible as well that some of Levin's staff actually favored the troop cap increase; Richard DeBobes, Levin's staff director on the Armed Services Committee, is generally a strong proponent of U.S. military missions in Latin America. Look at the 2002 report of the "Board of Visitors" - which meets each year to review the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), the successor to the controversial U.S. Army School of the Americas - which notes this sharp exchange between DeBobes and an activist from School of the Americas Watch.
Reverend Porter [of SOA Watch] … expressed the view that U.S. Government needed to apologize to the countries whose militaries were trained by the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) and WHINSEC, and the wish that the Board could help find a way 'not to give license to students to abuse their power to kill.' He told the Board that he and others honestly believe that students leave WHINSEC feeling empowered to commit crimes. … Mr. DeBobes took strong exception to Rev. Porter’s statement about students 'feeling licensed to commit crimes,' suggesting among other things that there was no evidence for this charge.
But enough with the post-mortems. Over the next few days, the goal is to ensure that the troop cap increase is viewed not as yet another victory for the Bush and Uribe policies, but instead a moment for sober reflection about where the United States is headed in Colombia. Mission creep is not cause for celebration – and in fact the Taylor amendment, the Byrd vote, and the conference committee's deliberations represent a high-water mark for congressional skepticism about U.S. policy toward Colombia.
Posted by isacson at 05:45 PM | Comments (1)
October 07, 2004
State's Marc Grossman on Colombian human rights groups
The PBS program Wide Angle broadcast a show on Colombia last month, and accompanied it with a very useful website. Among the pictures and articles you can find there is a transcript of an interview with Marc Grossman, who as the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs is the highest-ranking foreign service officer in the State Department.
In the transcript, Grossman makes a rather remarkable assertion to interviewer Carol Marin.
Carol Marin: When you go, what do you see? What kind of Colombia do we see through your lens?Marc Grossman: Well, let me tell you one of the things that surprises me whenever I go to Colombia. And that is that each time when I visit Colombia, I always make time to meet with the human rights groups and the democracy groups and the church because I think it's very important that we hear their voices as well.
And one of the most interesting things that I have found is that in every one of those meetings, what do you hear? You hear people say, 'Stay engaged. It's right for America to be here.' And specifically they ask for more and more training of Colombian military forces. Because they know that the forces that we train understand human rights and understand democracy and understand their role in a democratic society. And I've been very interested over these six or seven times, and usually I see the same people, so I can judge what they are thinking and where they have come to. And not ever does anyone say, take your money, it's wrong.
Carol Marin: Get out of town?
Marc Grossman: No, they want more. They want you to train more Colombian military units, to be involved more in their society. I think that's a very interesting thing and something that always gives me a real cause for optimism.
“Get out of town” indeed. For seven years now, CIP has been in regular contact with most of Colombia’s best-known, most-cited human rights groups, and never – ever – has any of them even come close to asking for “more and more training of Colombian security forces.”
It’s perfectly impossible to imagine any of Colombia’s prominent human rights figures ever saying something like “You know our military? The one that keeps intelligence files on us and whose officers call us guerrilla collaborators? The one with a history of working with the paramilitaries who’ve killed our colleagues? Well, we think it’s great that the United States is training them. It’s just wonderful that all that light infantry training from U.S. Special Forces (the subject of about a third of U.S. training in 2003) is giving them more lethal skills. How terrific that contact with the United States is conferring such prestige and legitimacy on them. Do keep it up.”
They wouldn’t say that, ever. Not even in jest. Many – among them CODHES, CINEP, the Colombian Commission of Jurists, Planeta Paz, MINGA, and others – have been steadfast and consistent in their opposition to Plan Colombia.
Marc Grossman is not an ideologue. He’s a very capable career diplomat, not a Bush political appointee from the neocon fringe. While we’ve disagreed with many of his past statements about Colombia, he’s always been careful and measured in his assertions. But this one isn’t careful.
If Grossman had used the more vague term “non-governmental organizations” instead of human rights and democracy groups, his statement could technically be correct – the cattlemen’s federation, for instance, is non-governmental, but I’m sure they’d want more US military aid. If Grossman hadn’t specified that he’d heard calls for more military training at “every one” of his meetings, there might still be a way to make this statement resemble truth.
But he didn’t say that. The State Department’s number-three official actually wants us to believe that Colombia’s human rights community wants the United States to train more Colombian soldiers, and that they tell him so every time he visits.
This leaves two depressing possibilities. It could be that Marc Grossman is being misled by a very slanted, very limited selection of pro-military human-rights groups (and there must be some) when he goes to Colombia. If not, we can only conclude that he's gone on record telling a first-class whopper.
Posted by isacson at 06:54 PM | Comments (1)