August 8, 2007

The International Committee of the Red Cross reports that two Colombian soldiers, Jesus Alberto Sol Rivera and Alexander Cardona, die in FARC captivity. This escalates the anti-kidnapping sentiment lingering from the Valle del Cauca deputies' death.

August 3, 2007

President Uribe enters into an impromtu, two hour debate with protestors in the Plaza de Bolivar. Though originally intending only to meet with Gustavo Moncayo, a humanitarian exchange advocate who is the father of a kidnapped police officer, Uribe ultimately ends up defending arguments from the entire crowd. Afterwords, he offers to create a 90 day demilitarized zone in exchange for the release of hostages.

July 9, 2007

Ricardo Palmera is found guilty by a U.S. federal jury of kidnapping the three American hostages still held by the FARC. Though the conviction carries with it a mandatory life sentence, prosecutors agree to lessen the sentence if the hostages are released.

July 6, 2007

In response to the killings of the assembly members, Colombians flood the streets in every major city showing solidarity against violence and kidnapping.

• [English] Plan Colombia and Beyond posting, July 8, 2007

June 28, 2007

The FARC release a communiqué announcing the death of 11 Valle del Cauca assembly members two weeks prior, on June 18. The FARC claim the hostages died in the crossfire of a battle with an unidentified rescue operation and offers to turn over the bodies. The Colombian government holds the FARC responsible for the deaths.

• [Español] FARC communiqué, June 28, 2007
• [Español] Government communiqué, June 28, 2007
• [English] Government communiqué, June 28, 2007
• [Español] FARC communiqué, July 10, 2007
• [English] Plan Colombia and Beyond posting, June 28, 2006

June 7, 2007

President Uribe finally discloses the "reasons of state" for his unilateral release of 193 FARC prisoners. He argues that this humanitarian gesture will facilitate a dialogue and the eventual release of the FARC's 56 political hostages. Additionally, Uribe frees Rodrigo Granda, high-ranking officer who had been instrumental external relations of the FARC because French President Nicolas Sarkozy had hoped that the former guerrilla could be an interlocutor for the release of Ingrid Betancourt. Despite Uribe's explanations, many question whether Uribe's intentions were more political or if Uribe even had a clear plan.

• [English] Plan Colombia and Beyond posting, June 1, 2006
• [Español] Government communiqué establishing its authority to release guerrilla prisoners, May 15, 2007

May 24, 2007

Raul Reyes, in an ANNCOL interview, urges French President Nicolas Sarkozy to use his good offices to encourage a humanitarian exchange.

• [Español] ANNCOL interview transcription, May 24, 2007

May 20, 2007

Diana Patricia Pena escapes captivity during a police rescue attempt two days after her capture. Pena, Colombian national, was kidnapped with her Swedish husband Roland Erick Larson. Though the Colombian government asserts that the FARC were behind the kidnapping, the Swedish government questions this claim.

May 16, 2007

Anti-narcotic police discover Jhon Frank Pinchao in the jungle, who escaped from FARC captivity 17 days earlier. Pinchao's testimony serves as a proof of life for Ingrid Betancourt and the three American hostages (though he reported that one, Marc Gonsalves, had hepatitus). Pinchao warns that, though his FARC captors intended keep their prisoners alive, they would not allow government forces to take them back; any rescue attempt would be disastrous. He also confirms rumors that Betancourt's campaign manager, Clara Rojas, gave birth to a son in captivity.

March 8, 2007

Seven members of the U.S. House of Representatives sign a letter addressed to Luis Carlos Restrepo and the foreign ministers of France, Switzerland, and Spain. In the letter, the representatives affirm their support for the European proposal and offer to advise and observe a humanitarian exchange. Commissioner Restrepo responds, thanking the representatives for their support.

• [English] Letter from U.S. Congress members, March 8, 2007
• [Español] Letter from Luis Carlos Restrepo, March 21, 2007

February 23, 2007

President Uribe authorizes kidnapping victims' families to attempt direct contact with the FARC to negotiate a release.

January 5, 2007

Former Cabinet member Fernando Araujo escapes after six years of FARC captivity. He is soon appointed to be Foreign Minister.

December 21, 2006

The Uribe Administration discretely reauthorizes the European nations to speak with the FARC.

November 9, 2006

The FARC publish a letter to the people of the United States, specifically naming James Petras, Noam Chomsky, Jesse Jackson, Angela Davis, Michael Moore, Oliver Stone, and Denzel Washington. They request that Americans pressure Presidents Bush and Uribe to agree to a humanitarian exchange. They highlight the extradition of Sonia and Simon Trinidad as two unjust cases and whose release would merit the release of the three American hostages.

• [Español] Open letter from the FARC, November 9, 2006

October 27, 2006

The FARC reiterate their interest in negotiating a humanitarian exchange, but they make no mention of the War College bombing.

• [Español] FARC communiqué, October 27, 2006

October 19, 2006

A mysterious car bomb goes off outside the Nevada Granda War College in Bogota, but kills no one. While the administration immediately blames the FARC, the uncertain details of the bombing leave many unconvinced. Nonetheless, Uribe refuses to participate in the pending negotiations.

• [English] Plan Colombia and Beyond posting, October 20, 2006
• [Español] Uribe speech at the bombing site, October 20, 2006

October 2, 2006

The FARC publish an open letter to the three branches of government stating the conditions under which they would agree to negotiate a bilateral ceasefire and prisoner exchange. In this letter, they reiterate their demand for a 45 day withdrawal from the Florida and Pradera municipalities. Similarly, Luis Carlos Restrepo announces that President Uribe has authorized the Alto Comisionado para la Paz arrange a meeting with the FARC. This exchange marks the beginning of a two week period of frequent statements from both sides in which a humanitarian accord seems imminent.

• [Español] Letter from the FARC, October 2, 2006
• [Español] Transcription of Restrepo's announcement, October 2, 2006

June 23, 2006

In an interview on Venezuelan television, FARC spokesman Raul Reyes suggests that the guerrillas would again be willing to negotiate a humanitarian exchange with the government.

May 28, 2006

Amid increased violence from guerrillas, Colombians reelect Uribe by a landslide. His victory is considered a mandate to continue a crackdown against the FARC.

March 24, 2006

The United States Department of Justice and Department of State indict the 50 highest ranking FARC officers on drug trafficking charges. They also demand the extradition of Jorge Enrique Rodriguez Mendieta, a.k.a "Ivan Vargas," Erminso Cuevas Cabrera, a.k.a "Mincho," and Juan Jose Martinez Vega, a.k.a "Gentil Alvis Patino" or "Chiguiro."

January 26, 2006

The Alto Comisionado para la Paz publishes a communiqué that supports the negotiation process and asks families to take leadership in moving it forward.

• [Español] Government communiqué, January 26, 2006

January 1, 2006

In a public statement, the FARC say that they will never negotiate a humanitarian exchange while Uribe is in office. There is speculation that this move is designed to hurt his reelection bid.

• [Español] FARC communiqué, January 1, 2006

December 19, 2005

A tape surfaces of former Development Minister Fernando Araujo urging a humanitarian exchange in front of a FARC-EP banner. This video serves as a proof of life.

December 13, 2005

President Uribe accepts a proposal submitted by the governments of Spain, Switzerland, and Fance to moderate a meeting between the two parties. In accepting the proposal, the Colombian government agrees to withdraw troops from a predetermined demilitarized zone in La Florida and La Pradera and leave security to the European governments.

• [Español] Proposal, December 12, 2005

November 25, 2005

The Colombian government announces that it is soliciting the help of an undisclosed international commission to negotiate the humanitarian accord.

September 23, 2005

After the latest government proposal collapses, the French begin meeting with the FARC without the approval of the Colombian government. When the Colombian government learns of this negotiation, it sends a rebuking letter to the French embassy.

• [Español] Letter from the Colombian government to the French embassy in Bogota, September 23, 2005

September 10, 2005

The FARC respond to the government's proposal, arguing that it had always been the will and initiative of the FARC to agree on a humanitarian exchange. Nonetheless, they insist that more time and a complete military withdrawal from the Florida and Pradera provinces are needed to guarantee security for the FARC's delegates.

• [Español] FARC communiqué, September 10, 2005

September 8, 2005

The government releases another proposal, this time asking for a meeting an a school in the Pradera municipality. The communiqué offers security for the FARC delegates and promises no military or police action will take place.

• [Español] Government communiqué, September 8, 2005

August 23, 2005

President Uribe allows the Episcopal Conference and the Apostolic Nuncio to engage in a "pre-dialogue" with all of the country's illegal armed groups, with hopes of moving towards a cessation of hostilities. The FARC respond in a communiqué commending the work of the Church and other negotiators but denouncing Uribe's actions as distractions from a humanitarian exchange. They also argue that though Uribe is making gestures of peace, he continues aggressive military action.

• [Español] FARC communiqué, September 5, 2005

August 9, 2005

The Uribe government accepts the Aures proposal put forward by the families of the kidnapped assembly members from Valle del Cauca. This proposal would demilitarize the village of Aures to allow a negotiation. The FARC responds that this proposal is militarily unfeasible, though it commends the effort to create a meeting.

• [Español] Transcription of Luis Carlos Restrepo's speech, August 9, 2005
• [Español] FARC communiqué, August 14, 2005

July 26, 2005

After meeting with family members of hostages, Uribe initiates another effort to negotiate a prisoner exchange. Luis Carlos Rastrepo announces an offer to meet in any location at any time proposed by the FARC.

June 27, 2005

The FARC offer to open a dialogue with the United States about a prisoner exchange. They suggest they would release the three American contractors in exchange for Omaira Rojas and Ricardo Palmera. The State Department quickly rejects the offer in a press briefing.

March 27, 2005

In letters addressed to the Colombian Congress and the Supreme Court, the FARC demand an end extraditing captured guerrillas.

• [Español] Letter from the FARC to the Colombian Congress, March 27, 2005
• [Español] Letter from the FARC to the Colombian Supreme Court, March 27, 2005

March 9, 2005

Uribe signs an extradition order sending Omaira Rojas to the U.S. on drug trafficking charges. Rojas, A.K.A. Sonia, was captured in December 2004 and suspected to play a major role in the FARC's drug trafficking business.

April 30, 2005

James Lemoyne's Good Offices of the United Nations in Colombia close. This represents the final blow to a frustrated operation, unable to gain significant ground with either the Uribe administration or the FARC after the collapse of the 1998-2002 peace talks. An attempt to bring the parties together beginning in late 2003 in Brazilian territory faded out after the FARC failed to respond. Another effort, suggested by Kofi Annan after a FARC appeal, failed in early 2005 as the parties could not settle on their terms of negotiation.

February 1, 2005

200 FARC fighters attack a Colombian Army riverine post in Iscuandé, Nariño. Using mortars made out of propane tanks, the guerrillas inflict significant damage on the outpost. This attack marks a rumored end to the FARC's "tactical retreat." The FARC release a statement in December, claiming that their tactics will become increasingly offensive in the future. Though the Uribe administration claims to have the situation under control, critics grow concerned about a return to 1998 levels of violence. CIP's Adam Isacson speculates that the surge is more of a reaction to Uribe's tactic of refusing to label the violence as a "conflict" and thus avoiding Protocol II restrictions of the Geneva Conventions.

• [English] Plan Colombia and Beyond posting, February 13, 2005
• [Español] FARC communiqué, December 30, 2004

December 31, 2004

No compromise is met between Uribe and the FARC. Ricardo Palmera is extradited to the U.S. on kidnapping and drug trafficking charges.

December 20, 2004

Luis Carlos Restrepo announces an offer to meet in a church to negotiate the release of the FARC's political hostages.

• [Español] Government communiqué, December 20, 2004

December 17, 2004

President Uribe offers to suspend the impending extradition of Ricardo Palmera on the condition that the FARC release its top political hostages.

• [Español] Government communiqué, December 17, 2004

December 13, 2004

Rodrigo Granda, a FARC spokesman suspected of arranging large drug deals, is kidnapped in Caracas by bounty hunters and immediately brought back to Colombia for a reward. The FARC condemn the action, claiming that Granda was engaging in diplomacy other nations to find a political solution to the conflict. The capture sets off a diplomatic dispute between Colombian and Venezuela. The Colombian government claims the Venezuelan government hosted Granda and had not done enough to impede illegal guerrilla activity. The Venezuelan government denies this accusation and claims that Colombia impinged on its sovereignty by sponsoring the capture operation.

• [Español] FARC communiqué, January 2, 2005

December 2, 2004

Uribe unexpectedly releases 23 low-level FARC guerrillas from prison in an effort to encourage the FARC to release some of 59 key political hostages. This gesture is aimed at promoting the Swiss proposal, which is short of the FARC's request. They seek the exoneration of many of its mid and upper level commanders taken captive over the years.

• [Español] Press conference transcription December 2, 2004
• [English] Press conference transcription December 2, 2004

November 28, 2004

The government rejects the FARC's proposal because, according to the FARC, the demilitarization of Cartagena del Chairá and San Vicente del Caguán would make the government suspend Plan Patriota, Uribe's military offensive in the Southwest. In response, the FARC release a proposal to demilitarize La Florida and La Pradera municipalities in the Ville del Cauca department.

• [Español] FARC communiqué, November 28, 2004

October 28, 2004

The Alto Comisionado para la Paz releases a public letter to the Apostolic Nuncio seeking another facilitator for the Swiss proposal. This letter contains more specifics regarding where, when, and how a meeting would take place.

• [Español] Letter from Luis Carlos Restrepo to Monseñor Beniamino Stella, October 28, 2004

October 24, 2004

The FARC propose to demilitarize the Cartagena del Chairá and San Vicente del Caguán municipalities in the Caquetá department.

• [Español] FARC communiqué, October 24, 2004

August 18 , 2004

The Uribe administration leaks a communiqué containing some details from the Swiss proposal, anticipating a FARC response. According to the Colombian government, the FARC decline to use Switzerland as a mediator.

• [English] Government communiqué, August 18, 2004
• [Español] Government communiqué, August 18, 2004
• [English] Government report on dialogues with the FARC, September 30, 2005

July 22-23, 2004

The Colombian and Swiss governments meet to work on a proposal, following up on a meeting between Raul Reyes and a Swiss facilitator.

January 2, 2004

Ricardo Palerma, AKA Simon Trinidad, is arrested in a Quito hospital while seeking treatment. He is quickly returned to Colombia and transferred to a prison to await trial. It is alleged that his trip to Ecuador has an alternative motive to make contacts to negotiate a prisoner exchange.

September 23, 2003

The Colombian government sends a note to the French Embassy in Bogota, stating that negotiations with the FARC, inside or out of Colombian territory, would impinge on Colombia's sovereignty. This is intended as a rebuke for the rescue attempt in July.

August 30, 2003

Another proof of life of Ingrid Betancourt is aired on Colombian television. This time Betancourt pleads for a rescue or humanitarian exchange.

August 24, 2003

The FARC and the ELN release a joint, six-point communiqué from a secret meeting held sometime in July between both groups' leadership at an undisclosed location in the Colombian mountains. The note calls Uribe an "enemy of peace" and declares the two armies to be allied against his government. Both parties pledge to never engage in talks with Uribe's government.

• [Español] FARC/ELN communiqué, August 24, 2003

July 25, 2003

The documentary film "Held Hostage in Colombia" is released. The film features footage shot by journalist Jorge Enrique Botero in a remote FARC camp that serves as the first proof of life for the three American contractors.

July 19, 2003

The United Nations Office of the Secretariat agrees to a meeting with the FARC, accepting a proposal submitted by the guerrillas two days earlier. The groups plan to meet in Brazil to discuss a potential political solution to the conflict.

July 9, 2003

The French government sends Special Forces and a medical team in a Hercules C-130 Helicopter to Manaus, Amazonas in Brazil. Allegedly, it does so in response to a plea from Astrid Betancourt, Ingrid Betancourt's sister, who hears word that her sister is ill and about to be released. The French government denies its involvement, though rebuked by the Brazilian government, and the FARC deny they ever had any intention of releasing Betancourt. The Colombian government criticizes France's involvement.

May 5, 2003

Colombian soldiers approach a FARC camp near Urrao, Antioquia in a rescue attempt authorized by President Uribe. As soon as the guerrillas hear helicopters approaching, they begin executing hostages and evacuate the camp. In total, 10 hostages die, including Governor Guillermo Gaviria and former Defense Minister Gilberto Echeverri. Uribe responds to the failed rescue attempt on television.

• [Español] Uribe speech, May 5, 2003

February 13, 2003

A U.S. Cessna plane carrying 2 Department of Defense contractors, 2 American pilots, and a Colombian guide crashes 250 miles south of Bogota. Though all crew members survive the crash, they are abducted by FARC forces. The Colombian guide, Luis Alcides Cruz, and one American pilot, Thomas Janis, are killed and left by the plane; the remaining three Americans, Keith Stansell, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes are taken hostage.

February 8, 2003

The FARC reject the commission on the grounds that it placates those concerned with a hostage/prisoner exchange while not addressing the demands of the guerrillas. Subsequently, the commission dissolves. Monsignor Castro and Father Echeverri are later invited back to meet with the FARC as representatives of the Church and not of the government. Uribe approves the switch and they meet the FARC in the end of 2003. Eventually, however, talks fall apart once again after little headway.

• [Español] FARC communiqué, February 8, 2003

January 31, 2003

The Uribe government releases a communiqué which authorizes Monsignor Luis Augusto Castro, former Minister Angelino Garzón, and Father Dario Echeverri to negotiate as a commission on behalf of the government through the U.N.

November 4, 2002

The FARC release a statement describing their requirements for a prisoner exchange, which oppose those of Uribe. They offer all their hostages in exchange for all FARC guerrilla prisoners, provided that the government holds negotiations in a agreed upon demilitarized zone inside Colombia.

September 24, 2002

Uribe refines his FARC policy, backing off from the cease-fire precondition. He maintains that he will not agree to a demilitarized zone and that ex-combatants cannot rearm.

September 1, 2002

The Uribe government releases a communiqué which describes the United Nations roll in the conflict. The government welcomes the UN's effort to bring a humanitarian accord which would end the violence, but does not allow the UN to take any part in hostage negotiation.

• [Español] Communiqué from the Alto Comisionado de la Paz, September 1, 2002
• [English] Communiqué from the Alto Comisionado de la Paz, September 1, 2002

August 12, 2002

President Uribe declares a state of emergency in response to heightened guerrilla violence.

August 7, 2002

President Alvaro Uribe is inaugurated. He reiterates his campaign stance that he will not engage in dialogue with any group without a ceasefire. He also opposes a demilitarized zone. During the ceremony, a group shells the presidential palace, causing a disturbance and killing several in a nearby slum. Police blame the attack on the FARC.

• [Español] Uribe speech, August 7, 2002

July 30, 2002

The FARC release three foreign prisoners in a "humanitarian gesture." This same day, the Colombian Armed Forces kill Agudelo Alvares, who they believe to be the architect of the February 2002 hijacking.

July 23 , 2002

The FARC release a proof of life video, dated May 15, showing Ingrid Betancourt and her campaign manager, Clara Rojas, still alive.

April 21, 2002

The Governor of Antioquia, Guillermo Gaviria, and his peace advisor, former Defense Minister Gilberto Echeverri, are kidnapped after leading a peace rally critical of the FARC.

February 23, 2002

Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt is kidnapped by the FARC while traveling by land to the former demilitarized zone on a mission to advocate respect for the rights of the zone's residents. The FARC gives the Colombian government one year to negotiate the exchange of Betancourt and five other kidnapped legislators for FARC prisoners in Colombian jails.

February 20, 2002

The FARC hijacks a domestic airliner, forcing it to land on a stretch of highway in Huila department. All passengers are freed but one, Colombian Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay, the fifth member of Colombia's Congress to be kidnapped by the guerrillas since June 2001.

President Pastrana responds by announcing the end of the three-year-old talks with the FARC. Aerial bombardment, the first phase of military operations to re-take the demilitarized zone, begins at midnight.

• [Español] Pastrana speech, February 20, 2002
• [Español] Resolution ending FARC peace process, February 20, 2002
• [Español] FARC communiqué, February 21, 2002
• [Español] Statement from Colombian non-governmental peace organizations, February 21, 2002

February 19, 2002

FARC and government representatives exchange cease-fire proposals. The government proposal calls for maintaining guerilla fronts in small zones to keep them separate from the armed forces.

• [Español] FARC proposal

February 14, 2002

Several presidential candidates, including Horacio Serpa (pictured), Luis Eduardo Garzón and Ingrid Betancourt travel to the demilitarized zone for a meeting scheduled as part of the peace talks' timetable. All candidates sharply criticize the guerrillas' ongoing offensive against civilian targets.

• [Español] Serpa's speech

February 5 , 2002

A FARC offensive, much of it sabotage of infrastructure and bombings of urban areas, further increases skepticism about the peace process. The Colombian government issues a proposal for a six-month cease fire.

• [Español] FARC-government communiqué, February 6, 2002
• [Español] FARC communiqué, February 6, 2002
• [Español] Draft government cease-fire proposal, February 4, 2002
• [Español] Press conference by High Commissioner for Peace Camilo Gómez, February 4, 2002
• [Español] FARC proposal to diminish the intensity of the conflict, February 2, 2002
• [Español] Communiqué from Permanent Assembly of Civil Society for Peace, January 24, 2002

January 20, 2002

Shortly before the deadline for expiration of the guerrilla demilitarized zone, the FARC and Colombian government agree to a timetable for cease-fire discussions. The main issues to be discussed are cease-fire terms, kidnapping, and paramilitarism. The document, drawn up with the presence of UN, foreign embassy and church representatives, lays out a brisk schedule that would bring a cease-fire by April 7. President Pastrana extends the demilitarized zone until April 10.

• Text of "Accord for a timetable for the future of the peace process," January 20, 2002 [English | Español]
• Speech by President Andrés Pastrana, January 20, 2002 [Español]
• [Español] Communiqué from Paz Colombia, January 20, 2002

January 14, 2002

In a late afternoon announcement, after a day of efforts from UN, international, and church representatives, the FARC announce that guarantees exist for the peace process to continue, complying with President Pastrana's demand. The January 20 deadline for the demilitarized zone's renewal remains in place, Pastrana says, unless both sides can agree on a strict timetable for cease-fire discussions. Future talks will include international representatives in a more formal fashion.

• Communiqué from international group of facilitating countries, January 14, 2002 [Español]
• Statement of President Pastrana, January 14, 2002 [Español]
• Statement from the civil-society peace group Paz Colombia, January 14, 2002 [Español]
• CIP statement, January 14, 2002

January 13, 2002

The FARC announce that they will hand over the demilitarized zone's town centers, officially ending the three-year-old peace process.

• FARC statement, January 13, 2002 [Español]
• Statement of Colombian non-governmental organizations, January 13, 2002 [Español]
• CIP statement, January 13, 2002

January 12, 2002

After two days of talks with UN representative James LeMoyne, the FARC releases a proposal for re-starting the peace talks just before the Colombian government's 9:30 PM deadline. The guerrillas' draft re-affirms the commitments of the October 2001 "San Francisco de la Sombra" accord, but leaves out the question of government controls in the area surrounding the demilitarized zone. The FARC had demanded that these measures be lifted in order for talks to continue. To most observers, the statement tacitly acknowledges that the FARC has yielded on the issue of the control measures -- though the guerrilla proposal would create a commission to investigate complaints about the measures.

At midnight, President Pastrana rejects the guerrillas' proposal and orders the army to re-take the zone at 9:30 PM on Monday, January 14. Pastrana offers one last hope: that the guerrillas clearly state that the dialogues may continue even with the control measures in place. The UN's Lemoyne and FARC negotiators continued their meetings on January 13.

• FARC proposal to re-start talks, January 12, 2002 [Español]
• Statement of President Pastrana rejecting FARC offer, January 12, 2002 [Español]
• Statement of UN representative James LeMoyne, January 12, 2002 [Español]

January 11, 2002

UN representative James LeMoyne arrives in the demilitarized zone in early afternoon for last-ditch talks with the FARC. The two sides have until 9:30 PM on the 12th to find a solution that might save the peace process.

• Declaration of UN representative James LeMoyne upon arrival in San Vicente del Caguán, January 11, 2002 [Español]
• Letter from Colombian non-governmental peace and human rights organizations, January 11, 2002 [Español]
• Letter from activists and scholars, January 11, 2002 [English | Español]
• Letter from writers and other noted Colombians, January 11, 2002 [Español]
• Letter from U.S. non-governmental organizations, January 11, 2002

January 10, 2002

As troops mass on the fringes of the demilitarized zone, President Pastrana grants the United Nations time to find a solution to the stalled dialogues with the FARC. If no agreement is reached, the 48-hour countdown for the guerrillas' exit from the zone will begin the evening of Saturday, January 12.

• Statement of President Pastrana, January 10, 2002 [Español]
• FARC communiqué, January 10, 2002 [Español]
• Statement of UN representative James LeMoyne, January 10, 2002 [Español]
• Statement of Colombian non-governmental peace organizations, January 10, 2002 [Español]

January 9, 2002

The Colombian government announces the suspension of peace talks with the FARC. The military is to enter the demilitarized zone 48 hours after President Pastrana issues an order (which, as of the afternoon of January 10, he has not done). The U.S. State Department blames the FARC for the talks' collapse.

• Statement of Colombian Government High Commissioner for Peace Camilo Gómez, January 9, 2002 [English | Español]
• President Andrés Pastrana's televised speech, January 9, 2002 [Español]
• FARC communiqué, January 9, 2002 [Español]
• Remarks of Secretary of State Colin Powell, January 10, 2002

January 8, 2002

A new meeting between the FARC and Colombian government fails to make progress. The FARC continues to cite government controls on the demilitarized zone as the chief obstacle to progress in the talks and to the guerrillas' compliance with the October 2001 "San Francisco de la Sombra" accord. In a letter, FARC leader Manuel Marulanda leaves the talks' future up to President Pastrana. He also proposes a timetable, should the present difficulties be overcome: discussion of a subsidy for the unemployed in February and March, and discussion of a ceasefire in April and May. The FARC releases a series of open letters to officials and sectors of society.

• FARC communiqué, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• Letter from Marulanda to Pastrana, January 6, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to peasant organizations, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to Colombian Congress, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to Monsignor Alberto Giraldo, president of the Colombian Episcopal Conference, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to business groups, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to United Nations representative James LeMoyne, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to the armed forces, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to the international "group of friends" of the peace process, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to Colombian teachers and students, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to Victor Ricardo, Colombian ambassador to Great Britain and former high commissioner for peace, January 8, 2002 [Español]
• FARC letter to Colombian workers, January 8, 2002 [Español]

January 4, 2002

No progress is made after two days of talks between Colombian government and FARC representatives. The FARC continues to insist that the government lift the control measures it has implemented in the area surrounding the group's demilitarized zone -- activities such as border controls and air patrols that the guerrillas view as tantamount to a blockade. Arguing that the control measures have brought a reduction in kidnappings, the government -- particularly armed forces chief Gen. Fernando Tapias -- has made clear its intention to keep them in place.

• FARC communiqué, January 4, 2002 [Español]
• Government communiqué, January 6, 2001 [Español]

December 24, 2001

The FARC and Colombian government agree to hold talks, for the first time since mid-October, on January 3 and 4, 2002. According to a January 3 FARC communiqué, the talks' purpose is "to find formulas to get the process moving and to allow for discussion" of the talks' common agenda [English | Spanish], a cease-fire, subsidies for the unemployed, the September recommendations of the "notables commission," and the October "San Francisco de la Sombra" accord.

• FARC communiqué, January 3, 2002 [Español]
• FARC communiqué, December 25, 2001 [Español]

November 20, 2001

FARC leader Manuel Marulanda invites President Pastrana and leaders of business groups, Colombia's congress, judiciary and Catholic church to a January 15 meeting in the demilitarized zone. The meeting, Marulanda indicates, would seek to determine "what is negotiable" among a list of concerns, among them Plan Colombia, drug crop eradication, prisoner exchanges, and paramilitarism. The meeting would occur five days before the January 20, 2002 deadline for expiration of the demilitarized zone where talks are taking place. The Colombian government declared it would "study" Marulanda's proposal and respond in writing.

• [Español] Text of Marulanda's letter, November 20, 2001

November 13, 2001

The UN Secretary-General's special representative for Colombia's peace talks, Jan Egeland, resigns to head the Norwegian Red Cross. He is replaced by Egeland's deputy, UNDP official and former New York Times reporter James LeMoyne.

November 12, 2001

Residents of the indigenous community of Caldono, Cauca, resist an attempted FARC takeover of their town by assembling non-violently in the town center. Similiar examples of non-violent resistance to incursions follow in several indigenous towns in southwest Colombia. FARC fighters kill some non-violent resisters in Puracé, Cauca, on December 31, 2001.

• FARC message to the indigenous communities of southwestern Colombia, August 12, 2001 [Spanish]

November 7, 2001

In a letter to his group's peace negotiators, FARC leader Manuel Marulanda issues a set of demands for the restarting of stalled peace talks. These include, among others, a suspension of government overflights of the demilitarized zone, a government affirmation that the FARC are not terrorists or narco-traffickers, an end to military incursions in the zone (the Colombian military denies any such episodes have occurred), and suspension of the government's ban on unauthorized foreigners in the zone. If these demands are not met, Marulanda says, "it will be necessary to agree upon a day ... to officially hand over" the demilitarized zone to the government. President Pastrana and other government officials reject Marulanda's "ultimatum."

• [Español] Letter from Marulanda to FARC negotiators, November 7, 2001

October 24-25, 2001

In two speeches, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson warns that Washington will seek to extradite guerrilla and paramilitary leaders alleged to be involved in narcotrafficking, and compares Colombia's armed groups to Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. "My government is concerned by the use of the [FARC] demilitarized zone as a base for terrorist acts," Patterson adds. While she states that "the United States must do more to combat terrorism in Colombia," Patterson affirms that "Plan Colombia remains the most effective anti-terrorist strategy we could design."

• [Español] Speech by U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson, Bogotá, Colombia, October 25, 2001
• [Español] Speech by U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson, Cartagena, Colombia, October 24, 2001

October 17, 2001

FARC leader Manuel Marulanda orders his negotiators to stay away from talks with the Colombian government until the military ceases overflights and alleged inflitration of the FARC demilitarized zone.

• Letter from Marulanda to Pastrana, October 25, 2001 [Spanish]
• Memorandum from FARC negotiators, October 20, 2001 [Spanish]
• Response from Colombian government to FARC communiqués, October 17, 2001 [Spanish]
• Letter from Marulanda to FARC negotiators, October 16, 2001 [Spanish]
• Letter from Marulanda to President Pastrana, October 16, 2001 [Spanish]
• Memorandum from FARC negotiators to Colombian government, October 15, 2001 [Spanish]

October 15, 2001

Addressing a press conference at the Organization of American States, State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Francis X. Taylor tells reporters that the United States will fight hemispheric terrorism using "all the elements of our national power as well as the elements of the national power of all the countries in our region." At a House subcommittee hearing on October 10, Taylor identified the FARC as "the most dangerous international terrorist group based in this hemisphere."

October 5, 2001

Days before the FARC demilitarized zone's next expiration deadline, FARC and Colombian government negotiators sign the "San Francisco de la Sombra Accord," allowing the zone to be renewed until January 20. (FARC negotiators expressed disappointment that it was not renewed until August, when President Pastrana's term ends.) The accord commits both sides to focusing talks on conditions for a cease-fire, and the FARC pledges to cease its practice of "miracle fishing" -- staging roadblocks and kidnapping travelers for ransom. The government pledged to increase anti-paramilitary efforts.

• San Francisco de la Sombra Accord, October 5, 2001 [English | Spanish]

September 30, 2001

Soldiers find the body of Consuelo Araújonoguera, a popular former minister of Culture and the wife of Attorney-General Edgardo Maya. Araujonoguera had been kidnapped September 24 by the FARC at a roadblock near Valledupar, Cesar. The FARC admit the kidnapping but deny the murder, though witnesses say her guerrilla captors shot her at pointblank range while they were being pursued by the Army.

On September 29, Liberal Party presidential candidate Horacio Serpa was forced to give up an attempt to lead a protest march into the FARC demilitarized zone. FARC fighters at the zone's entrance fired warning shots with rifles and mortars, calling into question the status of the zone just over a week before its renewal deadline.

• FARC communiqué, October 2, 2001 [Spanish]
• FARC Caribbean Bloc communiqué, October 1, 2001 [Spanish]
• FARC Southern Bloc communiqué, September 12, 2001 [Spanish]

September 19, 2001

The "notables commission" created on May 11 to find solutions to the paramilitary problem issues a report recommending that the government-FARC talks proceed under a six-month cease-fire. Under the proposed agreement, the FARC would abstain from kidnappings and extortion, while the government would pay for the FARC members' basic needs and refrain from fumigating small-holding coca-growers.

• "Propuestas concretas de las FARC-EP al gobierno de Pastrana para agilizar el Proceso de Paz," letter from Marulanda to Pastrana, September 12, 2001 [Spanish]
• Communiqué #30 from negotiators, September 7, 2001 [Spanish]
• Letter from FARC negotiators to government negotiator Camilo Gómez, August 22, 2001 [Spanish]

August 13, 2001

The Colombian government arrests three suspected members of the Irish Republican Army in the Bogotá airport. James Monaghan, Martin McCauley and David Bracken are accused of spending five weeks in the FARC demilitarized zone, offering training in urban terror tactics.

September 19, 2001

The "notables commission" created on May 11 to find solutions to the paramilitary problem issues a report recommending that the government-FARC talks proceed under a six-month cease-fire. Under the proposed agreement, the FARC would abstain from kidnappings and extortion, while the government would pay for the FARC members' basic needs and refrain from fumigating small-holding coca-growers.

July 31, 2001

The Pastrana government names a new team of negotiators (Now called "consultants") for its talks with the FARC. The four so-called "consultants" are Manuel Salazar, the president's advisor for social policy; Ricardo Correa, secretary-general of the National Association of Industries (ANDI, one of Colombia's main business associations); Reinaldo Botero, coordinator of the government's human rights program; and Luis Fernando Criales, the assistant high commissioner for peace for the FARC peace talks.

July 15-16, 2001

Two FARC kidnappings anger the international community and slow the pace of the peace talks. On July 15, FARC guerrillas in Meta department kidnap the department's former governor, Alan Jara, while he was traveling in a clearly marked United Nations vehicle. A FARC statement issued later accuses Jara of paramilitary ties, criticizes the UN for transporting him, and promises to submit the former governor to a "popular tribunal." On July 16, the FARC kidnaps three German development workers in Cauca department, demanding an end to fumigations in the zone (which had started the day before). The United Nations and European Union issue strong protests, amid speculation that the guerrillas' actions will affect international support for the peace process.

• FARC statement on Jara kidnapping, July 19, 2001 [Spanish]
• FARC statement on German citizens' kidnapping, October 11, 2001 [Spanish]
• FARC statement on German citizens' kidnapping, August 24, 2001 [Spanish]

July 11, 2001

• FARC negotiators' second report to Manuel Marulanda [Spanish]

The FARC unilaterally releases 242 soldiers and police agents it has held prisoner for months, in most cases for years. The group threatens to increase its kidnappings, however. FARC leader Jorge Briceño ("El Mono Jojoy") told the prisoners, "We have to grab people from the Senate, from Congress, judges and ministers, from all the three powers (of the Colombian state), and we'll see how they squeal."

• FARC speech [Spanish]
• FARC communiqué [Spanish]

The public-relations impact of the release is further dulled by the group's kidnapping of Hernán Mejía Campuzano, vice-president of the Colombian Soccer Federation. Though Mejía was not kidnapped because of his position -- the guerrillas released him on June 29 -- the crime proved likely to force the Copa América soccer tournament, scheduled to begin in mid-July in Colombia, to relocate to another country.

June 23, 2001

FARC militias attack the La Picota prison in southern Bogotá, freeing 98 prisoners, including several FARC and ELN members.

• FARC communiqué [Spanish]

June 5, 2001

The FARC releases police Col. Alvaro León Acosta and three other officers, the beginning of compliance with a prisoner exchange agreement. Under the June 2 accord, the FARC will free 42 sick military and police personnel in exchange for 15 ailing guerrillas in government prisons.

• Humanitarian exchange accord, June 2, 2001 [English | Spanish]

May 22, 2001

May 11, 2001

The negotiators establish a commission to recommend ways to do away with paramilitarism. Its members are Ana Mercedes Gómez Martíne, Carlos Lozano Guillén, Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, and Alberto Pinzón Sánchez.

A two-person commission (Luis Fernando Criales and Simón Trinidad) is formed to evaluate the status of the demilitarized zone, in accordance with point 8 of the Los Pozos accord.

• Communiqué no. 29, May 11, 2001 [English | Spanish]

April 5, 2001

The negotiators meet with members of the "Commission of Friendly Countries" of the peace process (Canada, Cuba, France,